SUBM.005.0136
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Barbara Poniewierski
There have been several basic principles underlying my research. First and foremost was the
conviction that one must not rely blindly on anything that anybody says, no matter how
elevated his position. (Royal Society of London: ‘Nullius in verba.’) Neither can one rely on
any document, no matter what the source. One cannot rely on encyclopaedias or – Heaven
forbid! – Internet sites, certainly not blogs, but not even wiki.
However, there is a better chance of finding facts if one goes to people who were in a
position to know what happened, not to somebody who has heard a rumour and decided that
something might have happened, therefore it did. Having established the credentials of a
source, one then has to decide whether the person’s memory is accurate and reasonable,
whether the person has a motive for lying, and whether the verifiable circumstances are
compatible with the assertions made. In this case, these circumstances include the capability
of armaments, the speed of vessels, geographical limitations, political, strategic and tactical
considerations, and – trickiest of all and the source of most conflicting claims – chronology
and the sequence of events. Evaluating the testimony of persons who claim to be eyewitnesses, but who tell diametrically opposed stories, is a tricky business, as is demonstrated
daily in law courts.
If an assertion requires that Cape Otway was located at coordinates that would place her
near Alice Springs, it is wrong. If it would require Kulmerland to have travelled from the mid
Indian Ocean to the Central Pacific in three days, it is wrong. If it alleges that something
happened on 31 November, it is wrong. A claim made to me – unconnected with this topic –
would have been impossible unless in that year 20 July preceded 4 August; the person
making this claim admitted that he must have been wrong, but that was still the way he
remembered it.
This still leaves a fair amount of wriggle-room, which can be reduced by diligent research,
until there is very little space left for genuine, reasonable doubts. This small space is the
business of the current inquiry.
1
SUBM.005.0137
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Barbara Poniewierski
The Legal Position
War is a brutal, dirty, treacherous business. (So, on a different level, are rugby and boxing.)
However, a war crime is committed only when one side or individual blatantly and
deliberately breaks the accepted ‘rules’ with serious consequences, and not every petty or
accidental infringement of International Law is a ‘crime’.
Legal cases are arguable; that is why there are split judgments in the High Court, and it is
how lawyers and barristers make their money. However, while individual cases are arguable,
there are some general principles. In the case of the legality of wartime actions, there are
agreed conventions that have been varied from time to time and place to place. For example:
during World War II, Australia held large quantities of forbidden poison gases – mustard gas,
phosgene and chlorine – although Australia had ratified the convention against the use of
poison gas. It was decided that this applied only in respect of countries that had also ratified
the convention. Germany had ratified it; Japan had not. Therefore it would be legal to use
poison gas against Japanese forces, but not against Germans, except in retaliation.
A surrendering enemy was protected, although in the heat of battle emergencies this was
sometimes disregarded by all combatant armies. A fleeing enemy could be fired upon
legitimately. One controversial situation was that of aircrew parachuting from a crippled
aircraft. It was accepted that aircrew who would land on their home territory could be
returned to service and were therefore a ‘fleeing enemy’; thus they could legally be shot in
the air, though most pilots refused to do this. On the other hand, aircrew who would land on
enemy territory were classified as ‘surrendering enemy’, and they should have been immune.
On such legal quibbles do men’s lives depend.
Captain Hans Langsdorff complied with the section of International Law that decreed that,
if a belligerent ship entered neutral waters, any prisoners held aboard were deemed to have
reached neutral territory and had to be released. When he was forced to take his damaged
ship, Admiral Graf Spee, into Montevideo in neutral Uruguay in December 1939, he released
immediately all the prisoners he held. In February 1940, the tanker Altmark (Captain
Heinrich Dau) took refuge in neutral Norwegian waters. Dau did not release the 299 British
seamen held captive aboard his ship, and he resisted the rather feeble Norwegian attempts to
search his ship. On 16 February, the British destroyer Cossack (Captain Phillip Vian) attacked
Altmark, ran her aground in Jøssing Fjord, boarded her and released the prisoners. Germany
made great propaganda over the fact that the Royal Navy had violated the territory of neutral
Norway in a clear breach of International Law. It was done in response to an equally blatant
breach by Dau. Germany, of course, violated Norwegian sovereignty in a much more serious
way when she invaded less than two months later.
German propaganda went further than this, with claims that the British sailors had opened
fire on German sailors fleeing across the ice. As there were only four Germans killed and five
injured in the whole Cossack-Altmark action, it is unlikely that this happened. Even if the
2
SUBM.005.0138
2 STARTING POINT
Barbara Poniewierski
German claims had been correct, the British actions would have been legal: see above re
‘fleeing enemies’.
In the war at sea, the theoretical immunity of a merchant ship to attack without warning
depended on its not offering resistance. It was accepted that the definition of ‘offering
resistance’ was not limited to firing on the intercepting warship. It included:
Not complying with an order to stop.
Sending a wireless message.
Travelling in convoy.
Travelling blacked out at night.
Adopting an evasive (zigzag) course.
Being armed, whether the weapons were used or not.
Thus all Defensively Armed Merchant Ships (DEMS) had automatically forfeited their
immunity to attack without warning, as had all ships in convoy and all darkened ships.
The relevance of this background of International Law to the Sydney-Kormoran case is the
matter of whether Kormoran opened fire under a false flag. It is pointless to complain that it
was a mean trick for Detmers to be travelling disguised as a merchant ship, and under a flag
other than German. It was accepted that it was no crime to travel under a false flag, or for a
soldier to wear a false uniform. The crime was to fight under a false flag, or in a false
uniform. In the Mediterranean, under Captain Collins, Sydney had travelled disguised and had
entered an Italian port at night with her funnel modified to give the appearance of the
silhouette of a Condottieri-class Italian cruiser. To be sure she was flying a British flag – after
it had been dipped in oil so that it was dirty, hung limp and was nearly invisible. (Scarpanto,
3-4 September 1940)
Part of the irony of the situation is that it would have been perfectly legal for Detmers to
have stopped, feigned surrender and sent away boat as though the ship was being abandoned,
provided that he raised the German war flag even seconds before opening fire. The Royal
Navy had used ‘Q’ ships in World War I as submarine traps. They were meant to stop, pretend
to surrender, then decamouflage and open fire when the surfaced submarine stopped to
inspect them. They were also employed in the early part of World War II, but were withdrawn
from service fairly quickly, not because it was bad sportsmanship to trick the enemy, but
because they were not effective. Warship captains should have been aware that this could
happen, and they should have taken steps to make sure they were not caught in a dangerous
situation if did. Burnett was far from being the only captain to have placed his ship in danger
of being tricked and trapped; he was one of the few who paid the price.
Long gone were the days when armies lined up on a battlefield at dawn with flags flying
and drums beating and belted each other until one side fled or night fell. So were the days
when ships of the line set sail towards each other, tossed over grappling irons, drew cutlasses
and tried to board the enemy. Submarines fly no flag; the dagger-wielding commando who
sneaks up behind an enemy sentry at night is not displaying his uniform, even if he is wearing
3
SUBM.005.0139
2 STARTING POINT
Barbara Poniewierski
it. By 1940, if not earlier, stealth, deceit and speed had become essential elements of warfare,
and no officer unable to cope with this should have been given command.
Now that the search for Sydney has determined that the battle between Sydney and
Kormoran did not take place near the Abrolhos Islands or Port Gregory, or at any of the even
more outlandish locations suggested, and that there was no trace of a Japanese torpedo hit, let
alone a mine strike, the persistent proponents of various conspiracy stories are really left with
only one regarding the battle itself: that Kormoran opened fire before declaring her identity,
whether the attack was by gunfire or by the underwater torpedo tube. These claims will be
discussed elsewhere.
The other problem to be considered by the Inquiry is the reason why Burnett placed his
ship in such a dangerous position. What information had he been given? How much of what
he had been told was true, and how much was false? Was information that was known
withheld from him? Did he assess correctly the information that he had? Did he believe that,
in approaching a ship not yet identified, perhaps in the hope of capturing an enemy supply
ship, he was acting in accordance with implied Admiralty advice or even explicit orders? If
so, the consequences show that he did it in the wrong way. No amount of investigation can
resolve this question certainty. There can be only an evaluation of possibilities.
It must, however, be stated clearly and unequivocally, that it is hypocritical and undignified
to complain when ruses that have been praised as clever when used by one’s own forces are
condemned as mean or criminal when used by the enemy. The law should not take sides.
4
SUBM.005.0140
2 STARTING POINT
Barbara Poniewierski
The ‘Rules of War’
Below is the Section of the Hague Convention as it related to merchant ships being used as
warships. It was revised several times, but the principles remained the same, and I have not
been able to find the terms in force in 1939.
Hague Convention of 1907: (Abridged from site of Avalon Project)
Article 1: A merchant ship converted into a war-ship cannot have the rights and duties
accruing to such vessels unless it is placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and
responsibility of the Power whose flag it flies.
Art. 2: Merchant ships converted into war-ships must bear the external marks which
distinguish the war-ships of their nationality.
Art. 3: The commander must be in the service of the State and duly commissioned by the
competent authorities. His name must figure on the list of the officers of the fighting fleet.
Art. 4: The crew must be subject to military discipline.
Art. 5: Every merchant ship converted into a war-ship must observe in its operations the laws
and customs of war.
Art. 6: A belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a war-ship must, as soon as possible,
announce such conversion in the list of war-ships.
Art. 7: The provisions of the present Convention do not apply except between Contracting
Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are Parties to the Convention.
5
SUBM.005.0141
3 THE ARADO AND AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS
Barbara Poniewierski
Alleged Sightings of Aircraft between Pearce and Carnarvon, October 1941:
Some people become quite emotional when the validity of these alleged sightings, to which they
have become greatly attached, is discounted. They are convinced that it indicated that aircraft
from either a Japanese submarine or from Kormoran came close to Geraldton or Carnarvon.
Before analysing the situation or going into any further argument, I shall refer to documentary
evidence provided by the South West Area Combined Headquarters (SWACH) War Diary [On
microfiche in National Archives Australia] and the Daily Summaries of the Combined
Operational Intelligence Centre (COIC) held in Navy Office (not verbatim).
September Sightings:
SWACH:
The War Diary, page 57, ends at 1916H (= WA time) on 9 September, and page 58 resumes at
0954H on 20 September. There is a strong impression that, unless there were air patrols clearing
the way for an escorted convoy, entries in the SWACH War Diary at this time were not being kept
conscientiously. Perhaps that was about all they were intended to record. Fortunately, this gap is
covered in brief by the COIC Daily Summaries.
COIC:
An entry for 14 September 1941 mentions the sighting of a yellow light near Geraldton, at 0430H
on 11 September; reliability grading C3.
On 16 September, this was downgraded by Air Intelligence to C4.
(The grading system for the reliability of the informant ran from A to E; the likelihood that the
report was true ran from 1 to 5. A1 was used mainly for the product of cryptanalysis and
confirmed official observations; E5 indicated something like a vexatious person or suspected
enemy agent submitting an item known to be false.)
November sightings:
SWACH: 4 November 1941: 0234H/4: W/C McLean rang to ask for F/O Wesche re a report of an
unidentified A/C at Geraldton.
0430: Contacted op. Officer and gave him warning of operation for 4/10.
Signal sent to Pearce (R) CWR. P1/4 – SLZ – 186 – 330 -2848S – 11442E -300 -0030S/4. Object
locate suspected raider = 2045Z/3. This operation was decided on the report from Geraldton, that
night flying pilots saw the light of an A/C. (At least 17 patrols carried out. Convoy US 13
approaching.
COIC: There is a defect in the records from 2 to 4 November, but on 5 November there is a
reference to a sighting made at Geraldton on 1 November; this has been downgraded to D.4,
which is a reflection on the competence or sobriety of the observer, as well as the unlikelihood
that the observation was correct.
An entry for 5 November 1941 mentions also a sighting by two pilots three miles seaward of
Geraldton at 1430Z (= GMT) on 3 November, which was ‘considered to be’ the cabin of an
unidentified aircraft. This was graded B.3; that is, a fairly reliable trained observer with a report
of unknown validity.
Another sighting is recorded from Pearce at 0300H on 7 November.
1
SUBM.005.0142
3 THE ARADO AND AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS
Barbara Poniewierski
SWACH: 7 November: 0430: P/O Harrop Intelligence Officer Pearce rang & reported sighting 1)
unidentified A/C over Pearce by two airmen guards at Pearce. Tried to ring F/O Wesche but could
get no answer. – sent signal to H.M.A.S. Canberra to see if her seagull was up.
0545: Received message from Canberra that her seagull was not up at the time stated.
0625: Still cannot raise F/O Wesche so rang Sub/Lieut Ryan & reported re unidentified A/C.
0630: Reported unidentified A/C to F/O Wesche.
COIC: On 11 November, it is recorded that, after a full examination, it was considered not to have
been an aircraft.
Thus these sightings were dismissed by Air Intelligence at the time. Claims are still being
made that these sightings were of an aircraft from either Kormoran or a Japanese submarine. This
Inquiry is not concerned with what Japanese submarines might have been doing in September or
at the beginning of November, but anybody who continues to claim that one of the twelve
Japanese submarines capable of carrying an aircraft was involved should come up with a good
reason why it was worth expending the effort to inspect Geraldton at that time, what use it would
have been to fly there at night, and which submarine it was, not which submarine it might have
been if it could have travelled x miles in y days at z speed. Aircraft from Japanese submarines did
overfly Sydney, Melbourne and Hobart, but not as early as November 1941. Somebody else can
argue whether it was possible, or likely.
This section is concerned with the operational plans for Kormoran and the technical
capabilities of the Arado 196.
KORMORAN’S WAR DIARY:
Number of aircraft:
16 October 1940:
0630 Kiel, Buoy A 12.
One aircraft taken aboard.
17 October 1940:
0630 Kiel, Buoy A 12.
Second aircraft taken aboard.
8 November 1940:
1234 Off Gotenhafen
Anchor raised. N.V.K. trials. [Signals Trials Department.]
[*N.V.K. = Nachrichtenmittel-Versuchskommando]
1651 to
One aircraft set out. Sent to Pillau for repair of a wing bolt.
1655
(There are no spare bolts on board.)
2 December 1940:
Gotenhafen, Basin V
Remaining work completed. Considering the scarcity of
available materials, Deutsche Werft Gotenhafen has done good work. The ship is ready for
sea, apart from the missing aircraft and the box of gauges for the electrical department.
3 December 1940:
Gotenhafen, Basin V
The aircraft arrive in Putzig in the morning.
1405 Gotenhafen, Basin V
For the last time: ‘Cast off’.
1545 to Danzig Bay
Both aircraft taken aboard.
2
SUBM.005.0143
3 THE ARADO AND AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS
Barbara Poniewierski
Flights made or abandoned:
29 December 1940:
SE 2-3, long NW swell, clear, light haze, good visibility.
1200 20°28'N; 30°20'W.
1404 to 14.50
Stopped. I intend to use the good weather for the first aerial
reconnaissance. With the rolling of the ship, however, the aircraft cannot be
controlled; the elevator is damaged on the backstay. Attempt abandoned.
30 December 1940:
1200 16°51'N; 30°44'W.
I intend to start the aircraft in good weather. On the advice of
the meteorologist, it is ordered to fly reconnaissance only within sight of the ship, on
account of the Trade Wind haze. .
1435 Stopped to set out aircraft. New procedure on setting out. Procedure stands the test,
aircraft cannot swing so much.
1505 Aircraft set out on water.
1512 Aircraft started. Wind across swell. On account of the length of the swell, no misgivings.
Bombs not carried in order to make procedure easier. Start and landing go smoothly, good
flying performance.
1631 Stopped to take aircraft aboard.
1643 Aircraft alongside. Ship against the swell, aircraft in lee. Ship is making about 3 knots
ahead, in order to facilitate the control of the aircraft, which is difficult to control in a cross wind.
The second approach succeeds. Aircraft is picked up quickly, but the winch does not pull (old
complaint, our electric winches are very unreliable). It might have been possible to hold the aircraft
parallel to the ship by increasing power. However it turned crosswise, went under by the starboard
float, then the starboard wing and turned over in the lifting gear so that it was hanging on its
longitudinal axis with the floats uppermost. The observer, Lieutenant Ahl, fell into the water and
was brought on board immediately with a fender pole. The pilot remained in his seat and switched
off the motor. By energetic heaving the plane was lifted out of the water and returned to its normal
position. The rest of the manoeuvre of bringing it aboard went smoothly.
1648 Aircraft brought aboard. Motor boat set out immediately aircraft overturned.
1719 Both buoys picked up. Both brought board. Damage to the aircraft: outer section of
starboard wing and aileron, starboard float, elevator and side rudder, vertical tail fin and casing of
the bonnet. The damage can be repaired on board. Crew not injured. Lesson learnt: If the wind is
coming from a different direction from the swell when the plane is set out, damage must always be
taken into consideration. The primitive gear permits the use of the plane only in rare cases.
Ship must be absolutely stopped, since the controllability of the aircraft is improved only to a
slight degree by slow speed, on the other hand the personnel are endangered.
[*Three times in this report Detmers here refers to the aircraft as ‘Maschine’, which caused
confusion in the translation of his secret report on the encounter with Sydney; when he wrote
‘Maschine stoppt’, he was referring to the aircraft, not to Sydney's engines, which he would have
referred to in the plural ‘Maschinen’.]
9 January 1941:
1200 13°02'N; 32°21'W.
1745 The plane damaged on 30.12 is operational again.
[The aircraft was not used again in the Atlantic.]
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SUBM.005.0144
3 THE ARADO AND AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS
Barbara Poniewierski
3 June 1941: [Indian Ocean]
SW 2-3; slight sea; slight sea; light SSW swell; light clouds; very good visibility.
0849 - 0957
Anti-aircraft practice against balloons.
1200 0º47'S; 86º20'E.
1454
Stopped for trial flight of aircraft.
1514
Aircraft to water. Course 240º. Ship is kept capable of steering.
1621
Aircraft landed.
1623
Course 220º.
1632
Stopped.
1635
Aircraft taken aboard.
Trial flight passed without a hitch. In the short sea a float was bent and must be replaced.
Reconnaissance to the limit of visibility remained without success.
10 June 1941:
SE 1-2; calm sea; S swell; cloudy; very good visibility.
1200 0º25'S; 79º43'E.
1443
Stopped for aerial reconnaissance.
1452
Aircraft to water.
1548
Aircraft started.
1616
Aircraft returned from first fan search.
1717
Aircraft returned from second fan search.
1730
Aircraft landed.
1746
Aircraft out of the water.
1749
Aircraft aboard. Reconnaissance was without result.
Instead of the extremely heavy and clumsy hatch cover, we now have a double canvas
cover of special construction over the aircraft hold. This arrangement has acquitted itself
well, because it saves a lot of time.
5 August 1941:
SE 1-2; calm sea; short SSW swell; cloudy; fine; very good visibility.
0755 Stopped to see whether it was possible to use the aircraft. Given up on account of
unfavourable swell.
7 August 1941:
SE by E 2' calm sea; SSW swell; fine; extraordinarily good visibility .
0800
On account of unfavourable swell, not possible to use aircraft.
1200 18º49'S; 114º10'E.
2 September 1941:
Variable wind from SSW to ESE slight sea; S swell; cloudy; very good visibility.
0600 3-4;
Course 90º in order to search for vessel. Unfortunately, the aircraft cannot
start. Without a catapult, it is a seldom-usable occasional weapon. A helicopter or a
very slow machine would be better for us than the Arado, excellent though it is in itself.
1200 1º54'N; 96º39'E. [A vessel had been sighted and lost the previous day.]
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SUBM.005.0145
3 THE ARADO AND AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS
Barbara Poniewierski
16 September 1941:
S 3; slight sea; S and SE swell; cloudy; good visibility.
In this area I should like to have aircraft reconnaissance. Unfortunately the short
cross swell makes the start impossible. As good as the Arado is in itself, without a
catapult it remains a shell. Landing and taking aboard would certainly be possible today.
1200 2º09'S; 62º06'E.
19 September 1941:
SW-SE 0-1; SE swell; cloudy; good visibility.
0824
Stopped on course 160º.
0829
Aircraft to water. Start for reconnaissance flight to the limit of visibility.
0840
Course 140º, 11 knots.
1100
Aircraft landed, ship stopped.
1102
Aircraft aboard. Aircraft flew at a distance of 35 n.m. from the ship
and has seen nothing. Thus an area with a diameter of 80-90 n.m. was surveyed.
1200 0º55'N; 63º04'E.
20 September 1941:
SE-NNW 0-2; calm sea; SE swell; cloudy; good visibility.
20 September 1941:
0900
Aircraft set out for reconnaissance as on previous day. W/T in aircraft is
out of order, UK taken out. For this form of reconnaissance I can do without both.
1125
Stopped to retrieve aircraft.
1133
Course 35º, 11 knots. Aircraft reconnaissance again without result.
1200 0º59'N; 65º12'E.
21 September 1941:
NNW 3; slight sea; S swell; heavy clouds; isolated rain, otherwise good visibility.
1200 2º14'N; 66º58'E.
Not possible to start aircraft.
24 September 1941:
1200 0º20'S; 65º30'E.
1211
Aircraft to water. Task: reconnaissance to limit of visibility.
Secondary task: If cutter is sighted, fire white signal light.
[This referred to the Stamatios G. Embiricos lifeboat that was trying to escape.]
1252
Aircraft has found cutter at 255º true. (Its first success)
1258
Turned towards.
1305
Cutter in sight from crosstrees.
1408
Stopped. Cutter taken alongside. 24 men taken aboard.
1428
Course 280º, 11 knots.
1456
Stopped to take aboard aircraft, which has sighted nothing.
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SUBM.005.0146
3 THE ARADO AND AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS
Barbara Poniewierski
25 September 1941:
W 0-1; calm sea; SSE swell; overcast, cloudy; good
0944 visibility.
Aircraft set out for reconnaissance to limit of visibility.
0952
Course 90º; 11 knots.
1200 1º03'S; 65º31'E.
1230
Stopped to take aircraft aboard.
Reconnaissance without result. That was the 4th use of the plane in this area, and the 7th
during the whole trip. With a catapult it could have been at least 40, for the difficulty remains the
start. Here all 4 starts could take place with the swell; the movement of the sea was slight. Sea state
3 and the swell which is always present in the ocean, and which seldom runs exactly with or against
the wind, cause such heavy demands before the Arado reaches its take-off speed that the start is
practically impossible, although the machine in itself is sturdily built. In the same or even worse
weather, the landing help given by the ship is sufficient for the short landing distance, as long as the
swell is not too short, when as it is known it runs under the ship and cannot be hindered by it. The
help at the start on the other hand is as good as useless, for the so-called ‘duckpond’ is too small.
Setting out and taking on the aircraft is not very pleasant, as the place for transferring it is too far
aft, but we have learnt now how to do it. We take it on board at 2-3 knots by the ship and with
aircraft motor running until the machine is clear of the water. The stronger the wind, the lower the
desirable speed by the ship. Doubtless the small, convenient Arado is suitable for auxiliary cruisers,
but it needs a catapult. If this cannot be supplied to the auxiliary cruiser, then a sturdy, slow aircraft
with the lowest possible start and landing speeds would be more practicable.
26 September 1941:
SW-NW 2-3; calm sea; SE and S swell; cloudy; rain squalls, otherwise good visibility.
1200 0º36'N; 67º26'E.
Not possible to start aircraft.
This is the last reference in the War Diary to the aircraft.
Between Sea and Sky:
An Arado dangling from a derrick.
[Original source unknown.]
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3 THE ARADO AND AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS
Barbara Poniewierski
References during Interrogation to Aircraft flights: (In NAA B6121: 164M)
p. 29: KUGLER, Karl Albert Gustav; interviewed 6 December.
Saw plane fly twice in Indian Ocean. Last flight more than a month before fight, before meeting
last supply ship.
[RV on 16 October]
p. 58: AHLBACH, Erich; interviewed 3 December [?].
We had one aeroplane and spares; it flew very seldom. In No. 4 hold was an aeroplane.
p. 62: JÜRGENSEN, Otto Rudolph Adolf, Petty Officer; interviewed 4 December.
We had an aeroplane on board which was seldom used and actually only once or twice.
p. 63: JÜRGENSEN, Otto: [No date given.]
We could only use our planes when the sea was smooth and altogether only used them on two or
three occasions. On one occasion, we tried to use a plane, but the plane hit the ship’s side.
There was an elevator in the ship near hatch No. 5 to bring plane up from below.
p. 66: JÜRGENSEN, Otto; interviewed 5 December. [Note: third time]
Plane last used three months ago. Plane had never been of much use in search of ships.
In last weeks, sea was too rough for plane to be used.
p. 70: SCHOTT, Heinz; interviewed 4 December.
Their solitary aeroplane was used only three or four times – not used at all during the last few weeks.
p. 70: KUMMER, Johann; interviewed 4 December.
Our seaplane which was flown two or three times for short intervals.
p. 73: KURZ, Wilhelm; interviewed 4 December.
The one sea plane was not used much – not used in the “Sydney” engagement.
p. 112: TÜMMERS, Willy: [No date given.]
Aircraft had made reconnaissance flights on Australian coast many weeks ago. Observer
Duismann. Float aircraft had to be put overboard. [Duismann was the pilot.]
p. 121: ZAHN, Hans Alfred; interviewed 5 December.
Saw plane fly only once but it was often got ready.
p. 125: BRUNE, Robert; interviewed 4 December. Last saw plane fly in Atlantic.
p. 128: SCHWEIER, Anton; interviewed 5 December.
Saw plane several times – in Indian Ocean was used every day, weather conditions permitting. Last
time in action at time of sinking Greek boat. Later the sea too rough. Not used before fight. Lieut.
Ahl was Observer. Pilot was Duismann – no second pilot.
[Flight Sergeant Johann Duismann was killed or drowned.]
Plane did not help locate ships, though it was supposed to do so. Never more than two hours away
from ship – never out of sight of ship.
[Ahl was qualified to fly the plane, but did not.]
p. 129: SCHÖPF, Bernhard; interviewed 5 December.
Plane last went up to search for lifeboats from a captured ship.
p. 131: ELMECKER, Wilhelm; interviewed 5 December. Often saw plane in air.
p. 131: WIERMANN, Otto; interviewed 5 December. [Joined from Alstertor, late April.]
Saw plane fly several times – last flight 1½-2 months before fight.
p. 328: AHL, Heinrich Friedrich (Oberleutnant); interviewed 4 December, Fremantle Detention
Quarters. Never flew over land in the Indian Ocean. Altogether the plane was only up a few times,
because they depended on the weather. Last flight was about a month before November 19.
Sometimes flew out of sight of the ship, never so far away that an action with another ship could
take place without his knowing it. Ahl had flown a Heinkel and other machines.
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3 THE ARADO AND AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS
Barbara Poniewierski
p. 340: RUF, Albert; interviewed 8 December, Fremantle Detention Quarters.
Belonged to ground staff of plane (1 N.C.O. & 3 men) On plane were pilot and observer. Type
Arado 196. [Hoheitszeichen] (Swastika and War Cross) marked on it and name ‘Kolibri’. Plane had
no other markings. Flown 6 or 7 times altogether. Last flight three months before November 19.
Never flew over land. Remained aloft 1½-2 hours. Never returned from same direction as departed.
Supposed to be in sight of “Kormoran”. It had no radio communication. It had Morse lights.
Wireless apparatus installed, but not used. Plane was not much use. It found two lifeboats from the
“Embiricos”. It took three hours to get plane clear. It was often damaged in taking off or alighting.
Engine gave no trouble. Never used at night. Two machine guns 20 mm posted in the wings, one on
each side. They had in each wing a bomb rack and had 50 kg bombs on board, but forbade the use of
them. The machine could not take off with bombs in rough seas. The Observer had a machine gun, but
they took it off as being too heavy. Speed 300 k/m/hour. Could fly over four hours when tank was full.
p. 346: LENSCH, Rudolph; interviewed 4 December. They had two planes, but folded up. Last used
two or three months ago – never used over the coast of Australia. Never flew out of sight of ship.
p. 349: MARWINSKI, Oskar Aloysius; interviewed 8 December.
Plane used four or five times on voyage, last used some time before sinking of last ship. Does not
know brand or number. Had four or five men to look after it – 2 pilots, one observer and 4 men for
ground staff. Under wings was painted a war cross. Plane carried 2 20 mm. machine guns; was not
designed for bombs. Remained in air for 1/1½ hours. Plane was kept below amidships aft. It was
brought out with a crane. In good weather it took ½ to ¾ hour to bring it out.
Plane communicated with “Kormoran” by large lamp underneath (Morse signals) Never flew over
land. Plane never started at night. It was never much use in locating ships.
p. 452: WAGNER, Dr Hermann (meteorologist); interviewed 1 December.
No flying had taken place in October or November, for though the sea was not often too rough,
there was a swell in a different direction which made taking off and alighting too dangerous.
p. 454: VON GÖSSELN, Hans Joachim; interviewed 1 December.
There had been no aeroplane reconnaissance near Western Australia.
Points to be noted regarding use of Kormoran’s Arado 196:
1. It was difficult to launch, and in all but the most favourable of weather conditions there was a
danger, not only to the aircraft and the lives of its crew, but even to the equipment of the ship.
2. Sometimes the people on the ship could not see the aircraft, but the aircraft crew could always see
the ship through binoculars. This meant that they did not fly more than about 35 miles from the ship.
3. It was never used at night. Not only would it have been virtually impossible to launch, but it
could not have found its way back to the blacked-out ship. The ship would not have risked showing
a light to guide the plane back, and there was no wireless communication. The plane’s wireless had
been removed to reduce take-off weight, and to ensure that it was not used.
4. Because of the need to reduce the take-off distance, the weight of the plane was reduced as much
as possible, by removing the wireless and the machine gun, not allowing it to carry the bombs that it
was equipped to carry, and not taking on a full fuel load. Thus its effective endurance was much
below the theoretical specifications.
These limitations relegate the idea of the Arado flying over Geraldton or Carnarvon or Pearce to the
realms of fantasy.
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3 THE ARADO AND AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS
Barbara Poniewierski
ARADO 196 Ship‐based reconnaissance aircraft. [Adapted from http://german‐navy.de/kriegsmarine/aviation/shipbased/ar196/index.html] The Arado Ar 196 was the main float plane on board German naval vessels. Development began in autumn 1935as a replacement for the Heinkel biplanes then in use. Full‐scale production began in 1939. The Arado 196 was relatively heavily armed for a sea-based reconnaissance plane and with its
agility it was able to defend itself against land-based fighters in the early stages of the war. In
addition to its use on larger naval vessels and auxiliary cruisers, it also operated as a coastal patrol
aircraft. More than 500 were built between 1939 and 1944.
Dimensions Length: Span: Height: Weight: Crew: Armament: Engines:
Performance:
[On web site, Click on Technical Data in bar above drawing.] 11.00 metres 12.40 metres 4.45 metres Empty: 2990 kg Maximum: 3730 kg Two MG FF (20 mm): Two (wings) MG 17 (7.92 mm): One (Forward fuselage) MG 15 (7.92 mm): One (Rear cockpit) Bombs: Two SC‐50 (50 kg) One BMW 132K: 960 hp (707 kw)
Maximum speed:
310 kph
Maximum range:
1070 km
Maximum altitude: 7000 m
9
SUBM.005.0150
3 THE LS-BOAT, MINES AND TORPEDOES
Barbara Poniewierski
There are two favourite theories about the use of Kormoran’s LS-3 (Leichtes Schnellboot).
One was that it was responsible for sinking Sydney, by either torpedoes or mines. The other is
that it towed the lifeboats to shore or to the positions in which they were found.
First: the claim that it sank Sydney by torpedoes. It cannot be said often enough or firmly
enough that the LS-boats carried by Komet and Kormoran were not equipped with any
mechanism for firing torpedoes. [See specifications below.] Only Michel’s LS-boat could
carry torpedoes, and it was used very effectively to approach a target ship under the cover of
darkness and torpedo it. Any theory that relies on the use of Kormoran’s LS-boat as a torpedo
boat is automatically false, and the proponents of such a theory refuse to face facts.
If it is claimed that it was used to sow mines in the path of Sydney or Aquitania, the
objection is different. She could carry four mines, but not the round, horned mines that
could float. It could carry only ‘Grundminen’ (bottom mines; i.e. magnetic mines). These
sank as soon as they were laid, and it was forbidden – and quite pointless – to lay them in
waters deeper than twenty metres. [Operational Order, translation in B6121: 164L, page 57
of the digitised version on the website of National Archives Australia. Original in Freiburg
i. B.]
Second: the claim that the LS-boat towed Kormoran’s lifeboats towards the coast from the
site of her sinking, and possibly two of them as far as the coast, and was then scuttled in deep
water off Carnarvon to falsify the location of the battle. The story, in various versions, is
intrinsically ridiculous, but that is not immediately obvious to everyone, so it must be
examined in some detail.
If Kormoran sank off Port Gregory, it would have been nonsensical for the boats to head
out to sea and around Dirk Hartog Island, and hardly possible for them to have reached the
sea-lane more than 100 miles offshore. We now have confirmation that the battle was not
off Port Gregory, so any such procedure would have been pointless.
If it is maintained that the battle itself took place much further north and west, then
there must have been some explanation why Kormoran’s life boats and rafts were found in
the locations given, for they could not have travelled so far south east from that position
with the gear at their disposal. This entails some other means of propulsion; it has been
suggested that the mythical Japanese submarine towed them there, or a non-existent
second German raider, laying a false trail of debris as it proceeded. However, a few people
have transformed the LS-boat into this intermediary; at least it was on the spot. Two
persons have been particularly insistent that this craft was used to tow the lifeboats.
James Eagles gave the battle location as 24°54'S 108°42'E, so he had to provide an
explanation for the location of the lifeboats, and this was the LS-boat. He has been very
reluctant to give up this pet theory. When the side-scan-sonar produced images of the
wrecks of Sydney and Kormoran, he claimed they were wrongly identified, and they were
in fact two sections of the Liberty ship Peter Sylvester, which, as one of his own websites
1
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3 THE LS-BOAT, MINES AND TORPEDOES
Barbara Poniewierski
shows, was sunk some thousand miles away. When the ROV photos of the two ships were
published, his last resort has been to claim that these had been faked as a continuation of
the official conspiracy to conceal the truth.
John Montagu takes this ridiculousness to extremes by claiming that the LS-boat, which
for some reason he calls a ‘J-boat’, was intended to tow the ‘three’ lifeboats north towards
Timor by night, and hiding along the Western Australian coast by day. What was she
going to use for fuel? Montagu has taken to heart the patch of alleged linseed oil found by
HMAS Heros on 28 November at 24°07'S, 110°58'E. In his book, The Lost Souls and
Ghosts of HMAS Sydney II 1941, he has published three forged documents to support his
claim that HMAS Sydney went down on 20 November at 27º30’S 112º20’E, and
Kormoran on 22 November at 24º07’S 110º 50’E. (Proof of forgery will be given in a
separate section.)
His claims rely on the maximum theoretical performance of the LS-Boot, 300 miles at
30 knots, without taking into consideration the speed at which the tow could be made (The
lifeboat towed by Centaur swamped at 5 knots.), the extra fuel consumption caused by
towing a substantial extra weight, the technical problems of trying to tow five or six boats
and rafts of different configuration, and the impossibility of refuelling. In addition, there
were problems of weather and sea to be handled, when the LS-boat was designed mainly
for inland waters or calm seas. It is surprising that there are people who cannot see how
silly this idea is.
2
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3 THE LS-BOAT, MINES AND TORPEDOES
Barbara Poniewierski
Use of the LS-boat:
Eagles, who needs to decry anything that might suggest that the LS-boat was difficult to use,
has written that Barbara Winter is wrong in claiming that the LS-boat was trialled in the
Atlantic and damaged, because David Woodward (The Secret Raiders, London, Kimber,
1955), wrote that it was not. Woodward based his work on newspaper stories, gossip and
speculation. Writing in 1955, he had no access to official records, British or German.
However, his statement supports what Eagles wants to believe, so it must be true. See
Kormoran’s log book below, especially the entry for 18 February 1941.
31October 1940
Gotenhafen, Basin V
Taking on light speed boat. [*LS.3 = light E-boat]
1 November 1940
0825 Gotenhafen, Basin V
Put to sea for torpedo trials. 1300
Off Zoppot
Anchored. Boat exercises, evening action training.
3 November 1940
Gotenhafen, Basin V
LS-boat adjusted and taken aboard.
10 November 1940
0222 Off Hela
Anchored.
0900
Anchor raised.
0940
LS-boat set out for practice run, was soon incapable
of moving because of water in the oil; fished out again by the ship.
10 February 1941
1200 24º12' S; 10º55' W. According to Annex b of the Operational Order and the cover
of the magnetic mine regulations, use of these mines is forbidden in water depths
greater than 20 metres. That means that they must be taken to within at least 1
nautical mile of the South African coast, to 700 metres at harbour entrances. In my
opinion, that can be done only with the LS-boat.
18 February 1941
1200 28º39'S; 06º38'W.
1405 LS-boat set out for trial run. Despite only moderate swell, propeller damaged in
setting out. Experience: For us, the boat, like the aircraft, is a very questionable
weapon which can be used only occasionally.
[For the rest of the cruise, the LS-boat just lay in the hold taking up space, needing occasional
maintenance, and doing nothing.]
3
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3 THE LS-BOAT, MINES AND TORPEDOES
Barbara Poniewierski
References to the LS-boat by Kormoran crew during interrogation:
(Page numbers given refer to digitised pages of B6121: 164M on the NAA website. Note that
‘I did not see it used’ is not the same as ‘It was not used’.)
p. 18: PATTNER, Andreas; interviewed 12 December.
Large speedboat was always covered; never saw it in use. About 10 metres long, not armed.
p. 26: SCHNEIDER, Johann (Senior Petty Officer); interviewed 5 December.
Does not know exact size of speed boat – Saw it used on sea (Atlantic) and in Gotenhafen. It
was not armed but could have carried a machine gun.
p. 25: KUHLEN, Emil (Senior Petty Officer); interviewed 6 December.
Saw big speed boat working once when rough sea prevented operations. 1 or 2 propellors.
p. 28: KOBELT, Paul (Petty Officer); interviewed 6 December.
No mines laid – Could have been laid from the speed boat through two openings in the
bottom (midships). [Translation error??] Speed boat had a Diesel motor – was as big as a boat
for transporting provisions. Could have carried five mines.
Saw speed boat only once in action during voyage and once in Gotenhafen.
p. 29: KUGLER, Karl Albert Gustav (engineer); interviewed 6 December.
Does not know what the speed boat could have been used for. Had its own personnel of 6-10
men. Does not know how fast it could travel nor what H.P. its motor had.
Motor was probably Mercedes. It drew 1-2m. water.
p. 33: MOLLER, Peter Richard (Chief Petty Officer); interviewed 6 December.
Our Express boat was down below in No. 5 Hatch, we had to use winch to get it up. She had
two engines and two propellers.
p. 43: SCHAUMBURG, Werner Heinrich; interviewed 8 December.
On our ship we had two motor boats and also an express boat; this latter boat was in No. 6
hold, it was 2½ metres wide and about 20 metres long. We never used express boat. We did
use the two motor boats, both were smashed in the action.
p. 46: LINKE, Hans Gerhard; interviewed 8 December.
No radio communication with speed boat. The boat was used once or twice.
p. 52: BOSBACH, Josef; interviewed 9 December.
I saw an express boat on board – this was not used during voyage.
p. 61: JÜRGENSEN, Otto Rudolph Adolf (Petty Officer); interviewed three times, one dated
4 December. Will not speak of large speed boat. Saw speedboat lowered once on Atlantic;
during time of supplying U boats denies seeing it lowered again. [Suspect punctuation.]
Practised lowering boat whilst stationary. Speed boat was half as large as motor life boats
which could accommodate 30 men.
p. 63: We had two motor boats on deck. I know nothing about another motor boat.
[This page is apparently out of sequence and should be prior to p. 61. It is believed that
Jürgensen was one of the LS-boat crew.]
p. 74: PONA, Wilhelm Heinrich; interviewed 4 December.
Motor boat was used; he had been in one and it had circled the ship.
[It is uncertain whether he meant the LS boat or one of the smaller motor boats.]
4
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3 THE LS-BOAT, MINES AND TORPEDOES
Barbara Poniewierski
p. 76: KÖBLITZ, Hans; interviewed 5 December.
I know we had a motor speed boat aboard. Something went wrong with the gear for handling
the big motor boat – No. 4 hatch, had four propellers and was a swift river boat. I did not see
it put overboard.
p. 84: WEISZFLOG, Erich; interviewed 10 December.
We never used motor boat because it was too difficult and awkward to bring this on board.
[If it was ‘never used’, how did he know it was difficult to bring it aboard?]
p. 99: SCHMIDT, Edmund, Senior Petty Officer, torpedoes; interviewed 9 December.
The speedboat could not carry torpedos.
p. 105: LIEBSCH, Werner Hans Ludwig; interviewed 9 December.
Plumber in civilian life; before the war, he was on torpedo boats and destroyers.
Took a special “motor” course, mainly for Diesel Motors. Never saw speed boat used for
mines, although it could have been so used. Saw it only once in use, to test it. Speed boat was
a bit quicker, faster than Kormoran – it had two Daimler-Benz motors and two propellors.
[Presumably he was the mechanic in charge of maintaining the motors of the LS-boat.]
p. 114: TÜMMERS, Peter Wilhelm (Willy); interviewed 4 December.
Speedboat lowered once. Knows nothing further of this boat.
p. 116: HAGGE, Rudolph Richard, engineer; interviewed 4 December.
Never saw a speedboat, on deck or in water.
p. 125: BRUNE, Robert; interviewed 4 December. Never saw speedboat.
p. 127: SCHWEIER, Anton; interviewed 5 December.
Only once saw speedboat in action in Atlantic. Had no apparatus for torpedoes, but possibly
for mine-laying. No openings in speed boat for mines; would have been lowered overboard.
p. 133: SCHULZ, Wilhelm Joachim Friedrich; interviewed 5 December.
Had previously been on Schnell Boot: Escort = ‘Begleitschiff’. [In Norway.] Thinks speed
boat designed to lay magnetic mines. Speedboat had one propeller. Did not see it in use.
p. 136: LIPINSKI, Edmund; interviewed 9 December.
Speed boat was disappointing; tested it once, but it was not successful.
p. 194 BUNJES, Wilhelm (Leutnant): did not use the big boat at all when leaving ship
because it was too difficult to lower it.
p. 194: KOHLS, Richard (Chief Petty Officer): Big boat was amidships and could not be
saved – used 3 times, always for taking prisoners on board.
p. 194: MITZLAFF, Gerhard Hermann Karl (Senior Petty Officer): Big boat was much bigger
than a large life-boat –not used for transfer of prisoners. Engine prob. Daimler-Benz; three
pointed star is the trade mark. .
p. 346: LENSCH : Interviewed 4 December.
After the fight three wooden and three rubber boats were lowered. Big speed boat could not
be lowered. Had a Diesel motor – a special Lieut. Looked after it (Schaefer). No arms on
board – could go faster that the “Kormoran” in still water – never used in fighting – never
came near coast – was about three times as big as an ordinary life boat, was stowed behind
funnels, covered with canvas – lowered by Derrick.
p. 463: DIEBITSCH, Johannes Otto Emil (Leutnant): Big motor boat could not be used; 4-5
tons. Diesel motor, 18-20 mph.
5
SUBM.005.0155
3 THE LS-BOAT, MINES AND TORPEDOES
LEICHTE SCHNELLBOOTE Barbara Poniewierski
[Adapted from http://german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/fastattack/ls/index.html,
Some linguistic changes have been made.]
There were twelve small ‘fast attack’ boats called ‘Leichte Schnellboote’. In contrast to other German fast attack boats, the ‘Leichte Schnellboote’ were not intended to operate independently. They were to be based on auxiliary cruisers or other vessels operating in overseas areas to support the operations of a mother ship. In order to do this, the small boats could be fitted with different kinds of weapons, from stern‐launched torpedoes to mines and light machine guns. They were meant to be capable of attacking other ships on their own, to lay mines in areas where the auxiliary cruiser could not operate, or to transport raiding crews to Allied merchant ships. They could also operate against submarines to a limited extent. Because of their small size, these boats could operate only in light seas. Of the twelve boats completed, only three were used on board an auxiliary cruiser. (Komet, Kormoran, Michel) Most of the others were sent to the Aegean or Black seas, where they were used for escort duty or as submarine hunters. Leichtes Schnellboot LS2 in 1940 Dimensions Weapons Size (Max): ‐ 11,5‐13 t 2 cm MG: ‐ 1‐2 Length (Total): ‐ 12,50 m Machine Guns: ‐ 1 Beam: ‐ 3,46 m 5 cm Torpedo tubes: ‐ 2 [or] Draft: ‐ 1,02 m Mines: ‐ up to 4 Crew: ‐ 7 Engines Shafts: ‐ 2 Engines: ‐ 2 Type: ‐ Daimler Benz MB 507 12 cyl diesel engines (LS 1,2,5,6: Junkers 6 cyl Jumo 205M diesel engines) Performance Total Performance: ‐ 2000‐2293 shp [Shaft horse power] Speed: ‐ 37.0 – 40.9 knots Range: ‐ 300 miles at 30 kn 6
SUBM.005.0156
3 THE LS-BOAT, MINES AND TORPEDOES
Barbara Poniewierski
LS‐BOATS IN ACTION AND IN DOCK: [See: http://www.wlb‐stuttgart.de/seekrieg/km/sboot/sdiv‐mm.htm] To give an idea of size: Esau being launched from Michel. Crew: six.
This version was equipped as a torpedo boat.
7
SUBM.005.0157
4 THE CONSPIRACY THEORY TRAIL
Barbara Poniewierski
Most people who fill the internet with blogs, or sometimes whole websites, proclaiming their
belief in some untenable theory that has already been comprehensively disproven do so
mostly without intentional deceit or malice. However, it is a mystery why they think that
having heard something about the events or having read a few sensational newspaper articles
or ‘Letters to the Editor’ gives them the ability to make a valid comment on them. On the
other hand, some people have unsavoury motives for their claims, sometimes political,
sometimes personal. It is not always easy to tell the difference.
Jonathan Alan Robotham (NOT Rowbotham)
At the root of some of the problems regarding claims of a war crime on the part of the
Germans and a ‘cover-up’ on the part of the Navy and the Government in Australia is that
people who should know better are vocal in pushing their claims, for various arcane reasons.
Behind many of the conspiracies, to a certain extent unwittingly, is the enigmatic figure of
Jonathan Alan Robotham, who in his later years became known as ‘the Hermit of Carnarvon’.
Because his research and documents are ultimately behind many of the conspiracies, it is
worth giving his history in some detail. Born on 27 March 1893 in Newborough, England
(Newborough, Staffordshire, not Newborough, Cambridgeshire), he went to the West Indies
as a youth. Not much is known about his activities there, except that he was inducted into a
Masonic Lodge connected with the Scottish rituals. While I am reluctant to introduce another
conspiracy into the affair, and I have no particular argument with the Freemasons, I am
mindful of the strong Freemason representation that existed in the navy, and the obligation of
members to support their brethren and keep their secrets. (I think that there is a qualification:
murder and treason excepted.) It is known that Robotham was a Mason; it is known that John
Ross was also. It is strongly believed that John Collins was. But was Burnett? I think so, but I
do not know. If he was, has this had any influence on the way his naval colleagues have
interpreted his actions for public consumption? Not just from naval solidarity, but for a
deeper reason.
Robotham returned to Britain probably shortly after the outbreak of war in 1914, enlisted
and served in as a lieutenant in a Machine Gun Corps. In April 1918, he was left for dead on a
battlefield in France for several days, lying amid parts of the decaying bodies of dead comrades
before being taken prisoner. His initial injuries were apparently a bullet or shell splinter through
the right knee and a head wound. German doctors restored his body to health, but they could
not heal his mind. Severely traumatised after his experience, he suffered flashbacks and
intermittent psychotic episodes for the rest of his life. He learnt some German while a prisoner,
but his knowledge of the language was not as good people thought it was. He apparently
spoke fair German and could read it after a fashion, but I have seen enough of his attempts to
write German to know that he would have had trouble passing the Junior Examination.
After the war, he graduated from the University of London in 1925 as a Bachelor of
Science in Agriculture, and he had a special interest in horse breeding. [NAA MP508/1:
128/707/128: Robotham: application for commission, 12 June 1941.] After spending some
time in Africa, he migrated to Australia, arriving in Melbourne in July 1932 aboard Maloja.
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4 THE CONSPIRACY THEORY TRAIL
Barbara Poniewierski
Within a few years, he moved to Western Australia; he was doing odd jobs and living at the
YMCA in Perth when he enlisted on 4 January 1941, a few weeks short of 48 years. As next
of kin he named his mother, Mary, who lived at Tatenhill near Burton-on-Trent. Because of
his age and previous injury, he was classified medically as IIB. In February, he was
transferred to full time duty with the 5th Garrison Battalion, and on 25 June 1941 he was
made a probationary lieutenant. (Although he is referred to in many documents as a
‘sergeant’, his recently-released service record shows that he went straight from corporal to
probationary lieutenant. This may be the case, or there could be an omission. See NAA B884:
W31801: Robotham Jonathan Alan.) It is recorded that, with the rank of Acting Corporal, he
was sent to Geraldton as a Security Guard, 23 to 26 May 1941, but his trip to Carnarvon in
November 1941 is not recorded, probably because it was a movement with his unit. In any
case, his function there was probably only as a guard, and he is not mentioned officially as an
interpreter. (From 22 to 25 November he was on leave.)
From 5 January to 13 February 1942, he was in hospital in Fremantle; then at the end of
May he was sent to do a course at the School of Military Engineering at Middle Head,
Sydney. He failed rather dismally. After he spent some time back with his unit, he was tried
out on another course, a refresher course at the Small Arms School at Bonegilla, Victoria,
from 6 November to 19 December. He passed this course, barely, and his report said that he
was a ‘gentlemanly type’ but his knowledge of weapons was poor, and he was rejected as a
future instructor ‘owing to personality’.
It was a problem deciding what to do with a middle-aged man who was unfit physically for
active service, and unsuited psychologically as an instructor. As a last resort, he was tried out
as a member of staff of a prisoner-of-war camp. He was transferred to the Australian
Intelligence Corps, Victoria Lines of Communication Area, for 13 PW Group on 2 January
1943, and took up his duties with 23rd Garrison Battalion on 5 February. This brought him
into contact with some of the Kormoran crew again.
Robotham married Dorothy Rosa Lindsay in New South Wales early in 1943, and in March
he changed the address of his next of kin from his mother to his wife, Mrs D. R. Robotham,
Finlayson Street, Lane Cove, Sydney. There is no indication that she ever lived in Victoria,
nor that he spent much time in Sydney, so it must have been a rather tenuous sort of marriage,
though that was not unusual in wartime. In mid October, he was sent to Camp Pell (Parkville,
Melbourne) for a ‘Special Course, Cipher Instruction’, and in December he was sent to Camp
Pell again for a ‘Course for Unit Security Officers’. It was perhaps unwise to burden a fragile
psyche with notions about codes and ciphers and the subtleties of Intelligence operations. By
the end of March 1944, his mind had given way under the pressure, and he was sent first to
113 Australian General Hospital, Heidelberg, then to 114 AGH, diagnosed with a depressive
state; from there he was sent to 115 AGH, with the label altered to ‘Neurosis. Depressive
psychosis’. It was decided he should be ‘boarded’, which meant effectively that he should be
discharged on medical grounds. Charges of having been Absent Without Leave were dropped
on the grounds of his mental condition.
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4 THE CONSPIRACY THEORY TRAIL
Barbara Poniewierski
A report of 28 June referred to his ‘psychopathic personality’ and he was returned to 113
AGH. He was a difficult patient, who refused to obey hospital rules and became abusive and
violent; this came to a head when orderlies tried to restrain him in a straitjacket. The report on
the incident said: ‘Contusions to both eyes. Bruising of lips, fracture of 7th, 8th & 9th Ribs, Rt
side… Injury sustained in a struggle with Hospital Staff while a patient at 113 AGH.’ That
was the end of his military career, although the formalities lasted a bit longer. At one time, he
said he wanted to be discharged in Western Australia; at another time, he wanted to go to
Sydney where his wife lived. His military service ended officially on 25 November 1944. (In
mid 1946, he was living in Victoria. It is not known what happened between him and his
wife, but his friends in Carnarvon seem not to have known that he was ever married.)
During his time in the army, and while he was in contact with Kormoran crew, Robotham
had access to various material confiscated from them. First there were the sketches drawn by
Dr Fritz List on sheets of toilet paper from the Carnarvon lock-up. It has been believed that
Robotham found these, although there is no evidence verifying who had found them, nor is
there any reason why this should have been recorded. (If they were not found until the officers
were at Murchison, they could have been found by any member of the Intelligence staff and
given to Captain John Leslie Hehir.) These List sketches were analysed officially to see
whether they contained a message in shorthand; that is a story in its own right. Then there is
the ‘Kitsche diary’; Robotham did find this, for he kept it, when it should have been handed
in officially or else returned to the owner. Robotham did a bit of looting; in other words, he
stole it. As well as an apparent account of the Sydney-Kormoran action, there were some
domestic sketches of the interior and exterior of a house or tavern, which Robotham, with his
brief course on codes and security and his psychosis, thought contained secret messages.
.
Robotham returned to Western Australia obsessed with the idea that the ‘Kitsche diary’
contained the ‘true story’ of the battle between Sydney and Kormoran, and that the sketches
gave the location where something was buried neat the 17 Mile Well or in the vicinity of the
cave at Red Bluff where Kormoran’s lifeboats had landed: a camera, a chest of gold coins,
the log book of Kormoran? People who knew him at that time said he was ‘a nice old stick’,
but subject to psychotic episodes. Robotham had left Murchison and the army long before
List reported the existence of a camera hidden in a cave, and he did not know that an
unsuccessful search had been mounted for it. His German was not good enough to recognise
that the Kitsche ‘account’ of the battle could not possibly have been written by a native
speaker of German, but was simply a translation of an imaginative and nasty article written
by Robert S. Close and published in the Digest of World Reading in January 1942.
Translations of this appear in other diaries, two of which are reproduced on the Sea Power
Centre website. They have nothing genuine to say.
Robotham intended to write some sort of story about Kormoran, or the Sydney-Kormoran
battle, to be entitled ‘Eagle in the Crow’s Nest’, and he worked at it rather futilely for some
25 years. He planned to publish it under the name ‘Hickory Prior’, a pseudonym he used
when writing for a sporting magazine on the subject of race horse breeding and the genetic
inheritability of coat colour. A manuscript copy is held by J. S. Battye Library in Perth, WA;
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it is about 120 pages long, there seem to have been several versions scattered around. The
copy that I saw, a mixture of facts, conjecture, emotional hyperbole and irrelevant references
to classical literature, was quite unpublishable.
After writing a friendly and persuasive letter to Captain Detmers, and without giving
Detmers time to reply, he followed it up with an abusive letter saying that he was going to
attack him in the book. His efforts to obtain information from fellow-officers of Intelligence
at Murchison and Dhurringile failed, for they refused to assist him. Apart from his literary
pretensions, he frittered away the next thirty years of his life doing intermittent seasonal work
to support himself, and at other times living in a dilapidated hut near the 17 Mile Well while
searching and digging for something that did not exist. On his occasional visits to Perth, he
lived at the YMCA, until the manager wrote saying that he could not remain there unless he
mended his ways, as it was unreasonable to expect the domestic staff to clean up the filthy
mess in which he left his room. He moved frequently, leaving with various people cartons of
documents that he intended to collect some time., but never did. I have seen the contents of
two of these boxes. Letters from his sister Muriel urged him to come home, marry, and have
children to carry on the family name. He replied that first he wanted to solve the mystery of
the cipher, but this may have been an excuse to dodge the fact that he was already married. (It
is not known whether he was divorced.)
Robotham died in the Valencia Nursing Home on 16 January 1978. His fantasies did not
die with him; his sad, psychotic legacy was passed on to others, who developed it until it
became progressively nastier and more ridiculous.
The Sydney Research Group
Around the time of Robotham’s death, certain men in Western Australia, convinced that the
‘official story’ was a ‘cover-up’, formed themselves into small groups to which they gave
imposing names. Perhaps the earliest was the pretentiously named Sydney Research Group
(SRG), which sounds impressive, but it had only an informal group with a very small
membership. It appears to me that much of the ‘research’ was done propped up at a bar
gossiping. Another, with an equally minute membership, is the End the Secrecy on Sydney
(ESoS): a different name, but somewhat similar crew. (Glenys McDonald gives a good
account of the antics of the SRG in her book, Seeking the Sydney [principally on pp. 35 ff,
99], but there are other references to members of the group scattered throughout the book.)
Their reasoning runs along these lines. There were holes in the Carley float picked up by
Heros; these must have been made by bullets, therefore this float and any floats or lifeboats
from Sydney and the men in them must have been machine-gunned in the water, by either the
Germans or the Japanese. When forensic evidence showed that the fragments in the float
were not bullets, they did not modify their opinions. Instead, they claim that the evidence was
faked and part of the alleged ‘cover-up’. This attitude is applied to most of their claims.
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(Trevor) John McArthur:
The dominant figure in the SRG, though for a long time he kept out of the public eye, was
John McArthur. To use a military analogy: If people like Michael Montgomery, Ean
McDonald, John Doohan, C. A. V. Bourne and Eric Cooper are the frontline troops, Trevor
John McArthur has been the armaments manufacturer. He has described me as a ‘self-styled
apologist for the Germans’. [See Volume 10, Submission 104, pp. 2232-33] While others
have called me an ‘apologist for the Germans’, it should be obvious that I do not style myself
so. In any case, I do not see how my defence of the ability and integrity of Admiral Sir John
Collins and Commander R. B. M. Long, and my rejection of most of the accusations of RAN
conspiracy and cover-up make me an ‘apologist for the Germans’. At the same time,
McArthur has labelled me ‘the darling of the Naval Establishment’. Does this mean that
officers of the RAN in toto, past and present, were all apologists for the Germans? He seems
unable to formulate and adhere to a consistent, logical attitude.
McArthur refers to my making ‘a pilgrimage to Western Australia in what was arguably a
successful attempt to silence any local voice which attempted to tell something different
about happenings on 19 November 1941’. (I went to Perth regularly to see how my elderly
parents were faring.) I had hoped that, while I was there, I would be able to prevent a small
clique of elderly men associated with him from being manoeuvred into making fools of
themselves while at the same time they caused great hurt to relatives of men lost aboard
Sydney. He labels it ‘remarkable’ that Barbara Winter ‘could travel so widely, both nationally
and internationally on a very limited income’, with its usual implication of secret funding
from some sinister source. My income was and is none of his business, but the claim exposes
his habit of drawing unwarranted conclusions from imagined premises.
McArthur had been a teacher in private schools, later in State schools [WA Education
Department Gazette, seniority records, J. S. Battye Library], then at the WA Police Academy
[WA Public Service records.]. He knew Robotham in Carnarvon and inherited some of his
material. It was he who gave the ‘Kitsche diary’ – or a copy of it – to Michael Montgomery.
(Indeed, some people in Western Australia called McArthur ‘Montgomery’s agent’, although
Montgomery and McArthur reject this description.) Anybody with a reasonable knowledge of
German would have recognised immediately that the account of the battle in this notebook
was not originally written in German, and that no German with military background would
have had a superior officer address a junior as ‘Herr So-and-so’. If Robotham’s German had
been as good as he thought it was, he should have recognised this, but neither McArthur nor
Montgomery had sufficient knowledge, and they believed it was a genuine account. This
diary was not a ‘forgery’, for it was not intended to give the impression that it was a firsthand account. Robotham misinterpreted it. McArthur and Montgomery fell for it.
I had several encounters with McArthur. When I was in Western Australia, ca 1977, the
local Daily News published an article indicating that I was researching two topics, one of
which was the sinking of Sydney. McArthur was one of some score of people who telephoned
me offering information or material; he mentioned a black-bound diary with an account in the
‘old-style’ German writing. (Sütterlinschrift) He said he would like to meet me, but I told him
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that I would be leaving Perth in about a week. About three weeks later, he rang my parents to
arrange a meeting, although he should have known that I had left WA. Several years later,
Scott Sledge at the Fremantle Maritime Museum asked me to go to the Museum to discuss
the matter with him and McArthur; when McArthur did not show up, Sledge telephoned him.
McArthur denied having made the arrangement. On another visit to Perth, several of the SRG
people arranged to meet me, but they postponed the meeting until McArthur returned to
Perth. When he did, Gordon Laffer apologised to me, saying that McArthur had told them not
to meet me. (Some cheek!) By then, his behaviour seemed to be developing a suspicious
pattern. When we met at last at the HMAS Sydney Forum in 1991, a suitable opportunity to
challenge him on his previous behaviour did not arise.
McArthur obtained a Ph. D. Degree from the University of Southern Queensland
(Toowoomba campus) with a thesis on Sydney. This thesis, entitled ‘A Rush to Judgement:
An Analysis of the Loss of HMAS Sydney, 19 November 1942’, was embargoed for some
years, but apparently very recently was lodged with the Australian War Memorial, on open
access, Accession Number MSS1757. [Presumably the error in the date is a fault in the
registering of the item at the AWM.] I have had no opportunity to read this version, but his
attitude is well known. I have not been able to ascertain whether his supervisor was Professor
Bruce Horsfield, who endorsed John Samuels’ reprehensible book and has been associated
with Kennedy and Wittwer. Since his thesis is not available to me, I must assume that it
contains the same sort of nonsense that he has espoused elsewhere, including possibly the
involvement of a Japanese submarine, and the Abrolhos area as the site of the battle.
According to Glenys McDonald [p. 31], McArthur claimed to have details of a special section
of commandos sent to Port Gregory on the night of 19 November, which intercepted Japanese
coming ashore, but I have not seen any indication of his source for this silly story. If this is
the sort of stuff in his thesis, it reflects little credit on the suitability of his supervisor to
monitor work on this topic, or on the external readers who recommended that it be accepted,
or on the University of Southern Queensland, which awarded the doctorate.
Michael Montgomery:
Montgomery’s history has been analysed thoroughly elsewhere over a quarter century, so
only a few points will be mentioned here. [See Tom Frame’s book passim.] When he visited
me in Brisbane, I recognised within half an hour or so that his main interest was not in
writing a genuine history, but in doing a hatchet job on Detmers. (I think this would have
been about February 1978, but it could have been a little earlier.) After our meeting, he went
to Western Australia, where he encountered the men who were later to form the SRG, and he
obtained the so-called ‘Kitsche diary’ from McArthur. It fitted in so well with his intentions
that he did not subject it to the necessary critical scrutiny. Having based much of his book on
this document, he could not retreat from the claims, and has made great efforts to substantiate
them from other sources, no matter how unreliable these sources are. Although associated
closely with the conspiracists in Western Australia, he is not Australian. At one time, he stood
for Parliament in Britain representing a party opposed to closer links with the European
Union. I was unable to discover how many votes he received.
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Ean Lawrence McDonald:
McDonald enlisted in the RAN on 4 September 1939 at 21; he served as a signalman until he
was discharged on 24 December 1945 as a lieutenant. [World War 2 Rolls] (His claim to the
rank of lieutenant-commander stems from post-war RANR service, from which he retired in
1963. NAA A6769: MCDONALD E L). Although an army telegraphist may be called a
signalman, a naval signalman works with flag hoists and signal lamps; he is not a telegraphist.
McDonald was not a telegraphist and has not claimed to be one. However, people who do not
know naval terminology have often assumed that he was. He also did not work with codes
and ciphers. In the 1970s and 1980, he owned a store selling sporting goods, including
medals and trophies. This may be relevant in connection with Wilson Evans. (See below.)
Gordon Laffer:
A surveyor in civilian life, Laffer was born in Kalgoorlie on 8 May 1916; he enlisted in the
RAAF on 25 March 1944, and was discharged on 26 September 1945 as a Leading
Aircraftman. [WW2R] His cousin, Peter Laffer, was lost aboard HMAS Sydney, and his aunt
blamed the RAAF for not searching hard enough for survivors of Sydney. Perhaps her
reproaches affected his judgment more than the death of his cousin. Shortly before his
discharge in 1945, he was shown an RAAF file that recorded a message allegedly received
from Sydney after the battle. This combination of circumstances made him an easy prey for
the rest of the SRG, who perverted his judgment.
He was convinced that at least one message was received from Sydney, and he supported
the Japanese submarine theory, claiming that Sydney would have reported the presence of a
submarine, but would not have known its nationality, as it was submerged. Sometimes he
claimed that there were two submarines. He believed implicitly that the ‘Sydney calling
Darwin’ message was from the cruiser, saying that ‘all the airmen at the Geraldton party were
interviewed’. In fact, three of the five people who heard the message were women, and the
two men were not from the RAAF.
Frame has linked some of Laffer’s statements to Jim Davies, a former reporter on the Perth
Sunday Times; it was obvious that Davies was initially responsible for forming this paper’s
pernicious attitude to the Sydney story. He claimed that the RAN asked the RAAF for help to
interrogate a suspicious merchant vessel on 11 November, and it was seen and identified as
be Kormoran, and it was known that she had provided supplies for two Japanese submarines.
Davies’ reprehensible conduct had a seriously detrimental effect on opinions in Western
Australia. [For further detail on Laffer and Davies, see Frame, pp. 166, 169, 188, 195, 201]
Laffer supported Montgomery’s claim that there were bullet holes in the Carley float
retrieved by Heros. He claimed that a motor boat could have been used to follow Sydney’s
wreckage for five days, shooting Australian survivors, and that it was then scuttled; at other
times, he claimed this was done by two boats. He wrote that ‘if some agency had got rid of
Sydney’s crew and most of the wreckage, was it von Gosseln [Kormoran’s battle watch
officer] and Jurgensen [the senior petty officer]? Why has this question not been asked?’
Somewhat illogically, he also supported the claim that the Japanese murdered survivors.
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According to Frame [p. 166], Laffer wrote in about 1986 to Ross Lightfoot, a member of
the WA State Parliament, that ‘we’ [the SRG] think that von Gosseln [sic] was ‘the executioner
who murdered the Sydney crew’. Is it any wonder that Kormoran crew have occasionally
retaliated, or that Gösseln has long been reluctant to have anything to do with Australians?
Laffer picked his target well, for Lightfoot’s poor judgment later became legendary and an
embarrassment to the Liberal Party. He was appointed to the Senate in 1997 to fill a casual
vacancy caused by the death of Senator Panizza; scandal, deserved or otherwise, followed
him like a faithful dog. Soon after his appointment, it was reported that he had said that
Aborigines were ‘the bottom colour of the civilisation spectrum’. He was photographed
holding an AK-47 while standing with Kurdish rebels, an unwise action for a parliamentarian,
however much one may sympathise with the Kurds. There were allegations of smuggling
money into Iraq, of misleading the Senate about funding for another trip to Iraq in 2004, nondisclosure of financial interests in 2005. His second term in the Senate ended in June 2008.
Laffer told the 1991 Sydney Forum that he felt a ‘sense of outrage and bitterness’, because:
‘Several bloody minded people, in high places, have perverted and suppressed the real story.’
Statutory Declarations and letters to politicians notwithstanding, this ‘sense of outrage and
bitterness’ was a self-inflicted wound. It is often not possible to save people from themselves.
He died early in 1998.
Other persons were associated to varying degrees with the SRG. Glenys McDonald
mentions one long-term associate, Malcolm Barker. He supported Laffer’s claim of seeing a
message that said: ‘On fire and abandoning ship 28º S.’ He was also an adherent of the claims
that lifejackets were seen along the Zuytdorp Cliffs, this time attributing the sighting to a
seaman from Wyrallah, although it is unlikely that Wyrallah would have gone close enough
for such a sighting to have been made (and the cliffs were not named until much later). He
apparently claimed that an attempted Japanese invasion was thwarted only by a cyclone.
[Seeking the Sydney, pp. 27-28, 32.] In 2001 he published a book called Truth is so Precious;
I have not read it; I simply could not stand another rehash of these stories.
Captain Reginald Hardstaff, naval hydrographer, was also associated with the SRG. His
role seems to have been to work out scenarios that would make the group’s claims seem
possible, whether they were reasonable or not. Another person on the fringes of the SRG was
George Duncan, who has not said much in public, but who at one time had an attractivelooking website containing various dodgy claims. Soon after my book was published, he was
saying that he had a hundred questions to ask Barbara Winter. I devoted a day to talking with
him and some of his friends; I answered every question they asked; they appeared to agree
with the evidence I presented. I few months later, I heard that Duncan was still saying he had
a hundred questions to ask Barbara Winter, and his website showed that he had ignored my
evidence. Why did I bother?
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Cyril Albert Victor (Ric) Bourne:
Bourne was born 13 September 1920, Gillingham, England. He enlisted on 15 August 1940
in Western Australia, and was discharged on 13 September 1967 as a Wing Commander.
Apparently he was allowed to call himself a Group Captain after discharge, but he did not
serve in this rank. (This practice is not uncommon.) [WW2R] He died early in 2008. As a
pilot, he probably took part in the searches for Sydney, but his relevant log book was lost
during the fighting in the East Indies. He therefore could not substantiate his claims regarding
the dates of searches in which he participated nor the areas covered. His memories differ
from the records in the South West Area Combined Headquarters War Diary. (Flights are
recorded by time and patrol area, seldom, unfortunately, with the names of the pilots.) His
particular claim was that he had made a search for Sydney on 23 November; therefore it must
have been known that Aquitania had reported picking up Kormoran survivors. The SRG and
the ESoS group supported him in this delusion, and John Doohan helped to present his claims
to the JPI. [See section on Aquitania.] Bourne may have made a flight on 23 November. Not
only should a search for Sydney have been proposed by then, but there was an important
convoy passing through, and reconnaissance flights were made to ensure its safety. It should
have been recorded, but there were complaints around this time that Pearce or the Central
War Room was failing to pass on notification of all flights, and that aircraft whose flights
were not notified might be fired upon. His claim that this flight would have been made only if
Aquitania had reported picking up survivors, and if the location of the battle was reported as
south-west of Fremantle, is totally unsustainable in the light of Aquitania’s later reports.
The following examples show how Bourne became carried away with his fantasies and
ignored facts. Tom Frame [p. 192] writes on Bourne’s claim that, about the time Sydney was
lost, he came out of heavy fog and ‘nearly struck’ a ship that resembled a Japanese Mogami
class cruiser; it had one three-gun turret aft, two three-gun turrets forward. He was told that it
was the Dutch Tromp. If he ‘nearly struck’ the vessel, he should have been able to count the
turrets; the Mogami class had three triple turrets forward, and two triple turrets aft. McArthur
continued to believe that it was Japanese, and possibly still does.
Bourne wrote to the JPI [Vol. 8, Submission 15B, p. 1792]: ‘Babara [sic] Winter a B.A. at
University studied at Heidelburg [sic] in Germany majoring in German Literature [No;
language and society] at which she is an expert. She used the Sydney/Kormoran battle for her
thesis [No; I wrote a treatise on the Moabit Sonnets of Professor Albrecht Haushofer, and
their relation to the involvement of the Kreisau group in the plot to assassinate Hitler in
1944.], interviewed the German crew [Not a single one during my studies in Germany, 195455; I was not interested. Note that the battle was seven years earlier, not forty.] and preferred
their 40 year old stories to what they said over 6 years of interrogation. [There was very little
difference except in detail.] Fairly obviously if she wanted her M.A. degree she couldn’t say
the Germans were a bunch of pirates who helped murder Sydney survivors. [German
universities did not award such degree as an M.A., and the battle was not my topic.] Finally,
she married a German [No; he was an NCO in one of the Polish partisan groups, and after
the war a lieutenant in the US army.] i.e.: she is a little biased, pro German and anti
researchers like me who do not accept her or the official story.’
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I admit to a certain bias against presenting imagination as factual. I see no reason to give
any credence to people who, like Bourne and many proponents of Sydney conspiracy
theories, live in a murky fantasy world of their own and expect other people to join them in
their emotional junkyards? Are we to assume that the Australian naval officers and
Government members who have supported the account over more than half a century are or
were also ‘pro-German’?
Eric William Cooper:
Cooper was born 29 March 1915, Summerhill, New South Wales; he enlisted on 4 December
1933 and was discharged 23 October 1945 as a Wing Commander, having been awarded the
Air Force Cross. [WW2R] His spin is that the notorious message, ‘Sydney to Darwin’ was
received on 19 November and came from the ship, whereas in fact it was sent on 4 December
and came from the PMG Sydney. Cooper claims that documents showing that the message
was received on 4 December are forged. He is wrong. The thing most likely to be wrong in
false memories is a date, and a message was indeed received in Geraldton on 19 November: a
fragment of the QQQQ signal sent by Kormoran before the battle. It seems obvious that
Cooper has confused the two messages, neither of which he heard personally. [See section on
Wireless messages.] Again, the SRG and the ESoS (Doohan) have been involved in urging
him on. I do not criticise anybody for not remembering dates correctly, but I do take it amiss
when they insist that they are correct when there is compelling evidence to the contrary,
especially if these claims are used to accuse others of dishonourable and criminal activity.
John William Daniel Doohan
Doohan has been one of the most persistent and vocal of the conspiracy theorists, and perhaps
the one who has caused the most grief to relatives of sailors lost on Sydney, particularly in his
harassment of Betty Schoch and Barbara Craill, who appear to have placed too much trust in
him. He has a long history of being anti-Government in a variety of causes. His current longrunning project is to attack the Government and the navy for alleged deceit in the matter of
the loss of Sydney. He demanded an Inquiry into the loss of Sydney; when this was held, and
he did not like its findings, he demanded another inquiry. A Royal Commission. An inquest.
If they do not support his theories about Japanese submarines and sailors machine-gunned in
lifeboats or in the water, what will his next demand be? He needs especially close, personal
attention because of the way he persuades gullible politicians to support his claims.
Doohan was born at Beverley, WA, in September 1926. He served in the Merchant Navy
during the war, and then spent some months in the RAAF. In the 1960s, he was involved in
protests against the Vietnam War and he applied for membership of Australia-USSR
Friendship Association. A lot of well-meaning people held similar ideas, but the actions he
planned or took and the methods he used were unique and bizarre. The following summary of
his antics is mostly not secret; he sold his story to the Murdoch press, and this just collates
the evidence, compresses the story, corrects a few press errors and elucidates some matters.
Other material comes from transcripts of Parliamentary proceedings (Hansard), both Federal
and State (Western Australia).
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ASIO opened a dossier on Doohan when he was elected to the Committee of the Vietnam
Objectors Campaign in July 1967, but he was only a small player. His name was on attendance
lists at meetings; a carbon copy of the minutes was added to the file every time he attended a
meeting or sent his apologies. (Of course there was at least one ASIO operative at all meetings,
and he – or she – was in a high enough position to supply attendance lists and minutes.) His
car was observed outside the Soviet Consulate or Embassy; his contacts with Vladimir
Yevgenyevich Tulayev were noted, but it was the Russians who were being monitored, not
Doohan, and Tulayev was believed to be the KGB ‘resident’ and head of Soviet espionage in
Australia. Quite a bit of the dossier consisted simply of newspaper clippings of varying
degrees of reliability. (Doohan was in Canberra for a time.)
He was in some trouble when he was the channel for importing 500 copies of the left wing
London Bulletin, dated October 1967, on behalf of one of the protest organisations; as well as
an article entitled ‘War Crimes Tribunal: Evidence of American Aggression in Vietnam’ it
contained one called ‘Tribute to Che Guevara’. In November 1967, a note added to the file
said that he was wearing a current badge from the Returned Services League. His activities
resulted in his expulsion a few years later.
Doohan said that he objected to having part of his taxes used to pay to kill Vietnamese, and
he tried to go to North Vietnam where his trade skills could help rebuild what Australia’s
American allies had destroyed, and his wife could nurse the sick and wounded. There cannot
be harsh condemnation of his noble sentiments, or his objections to Australia’s involvement
in Vietnam. What made Doohan stand out from the crowd was the nonsensical way in which
he expressed them. He seems to have harboured a wish to become an Australian version of
‘Hanoi Jane’ Fonda, but Doohan had no public profile and would have been of little value to
North Vietnam. It is not clear from records whether Australia prevented him from going, or
whether North Vietnam would not have him.
Late in 1968, it was recorded that he told a contact that he and his wife were of the opinion
that Australia had become a police state, and they would go to live in the Soviet Union when
they could sell up. He felt that there would be another war soon, and Russia would be the best
place to live. He was apparently not bothered when Soviet tanks blasted their way into
Budapest (November 1956) and Prague (August 1968), nor does he seem to have considered
that, if they all became Soviet citizens, his son would later have been subject to conscription
into the Red Army, and could have been behind the guns of the forces that were sent to crush
the next attempt by people of one of the Soviet satellite states to gain their freedom. Late in
December, they left Australia aboard the Italian vessel Galileo. Apparently they did reach the
Soviet Union, but they were not allowed to stay. There are gaps in the record of his movements,
for ASIO did not consider him sufficiently important to warrant particular attention.
After returning to Australia in 1969, Doohan wrote to the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin
asking for permission to enter the Soviet Union. It was Tulayev who arranged his passage,
and a KGB Resident does not do favours without expectation of advantage. Having been
granted Soviet citizenship in December 1971, he sold up his property in Australia and took
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his family to the Soviet Union to obtain a better life, and good job and greater ‘freedom’.
[Facsimile of the letter granting citizenship is in A6980:S203334, p. 6, and at other places in
his files.] Doohan was not a member of the Communist Party, but he allegedly told reporters
that he ‘did not disagree with their principles’. Apart from what appeared in the newspapers,
he said sometimes – allegedly – that he had not applied for citizenship; sometimes that he had
applied for himself but not his family; sometimes that he had applied for his family as well,
but it had not come through; and once, in 1975, that his citizenship included his family.
In view of his new notoriety and impending departure, ASIO took more notice of him. Not
only did his wife’s family and ASIO take a dim view of his activities: so did his associates in
the Vietnam organisations and the Australia-USSR Society and the staff of the left-wing
Pioneer Bookshop. One said that she ‘considered him unstable and did not trust him’; others
said he was ‘erratic’, and that he had ‘a persecution complex’. The ASIO agent reporting
summed him up as ‘a nut’; the Russians were welcome to him and would get nothing but
trouble out of him.
The family left Fremantle in August 1972 aboard Novotroitsk, John, his wife Betty, his two
daughters, his son and a grandson. Aboard ship, things went fairly well, but by the time they
arrived in Russia in October, he had begun to learn what it was like to be under really close
surveillance, and to know fear as well as irritation. Two weeks of Soviet living conditions and
Soviet food took a toll on their health and their spirits. While in transit, probably for John to
take up a job as a welder at the village of Lisakovsk in remote Kazakhstan, they managed to
evade their escort and find their way to the Australian Embassy. They caused a lot of trouble
for the Embassy officials, for although they all held Australian passports John at least was
also a Soviet citizen. Within a few days, however, diplomatic manoeuvres obtained exit
permits for the family, and they were flown out immediately. Then they had to make
arrangements for the Doohans’ luggage, which had been left behind, to be sent after them.
Later, John showed little appreciation of their efforts; he complained that not enough had
been done to help them, and they had not been advanced any money.
Arriving in Britain practically destitute, the family was given permission to stay for six
months, and John was given a work permit. In June 1973, Britain refused to renew this, but
they could not afford their fares back to Australia. John hit upon the idea of taking the family
by steamer to Sweden and applying there for political asylum. That did not go down well
with the Swedish Government, and they were sent straight back to Britain. Renewed
residence was denied, and they were taken to Harmsworth Detention Barracks until arrangements could be made to send them back to Australia. John complained about the living
conditions, the lack of privacy, the food that was provided, the sort of fellow-detainees with
whom they were forced to associate. He complained that two of his children were seriously
emotionally disturbed and were not being given adequate medical attention. (No wonder they
were disturbed, considering the ordeals that their father’s whims had put them through.)
Doohan sold his story to the Murdoch press for £300, and he received an advance on it.
Then he objected to the way in which it had been written, and the editor insisted that it be
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published as written, or else he had to repay the advance on the fee, which he could not do.
They were allowed to leave the detention centre, as long as they could pay for accommodation,
and Betty’s mother raised the money for their air fares, as long as Betty handled the money.
Doohan had said that he would not have gone to Russia if he had known that a Labor
Government would be elected in December 1972, and the Vietnam War would end, but his
relationships with the new Government also began to show signs of strain. After returning to
Australia in July 1973, he complained that Australia House in London had also not done
enough to help them, and that the Australian Government (the new Labor one) would not
advance money for their fares back to Australia.
In the mean time, Doohan had been up to some strange activities behind the scenes. As
Senator Lionel Murphy was visiting London early in 1973, Doohan asked for an interview
with him, so that he could give him some secret information. The interview did not take
place, so on 4 March Doohan wrote to Murphy, who was then back in Canberra, giving him
an outline of what some Yugoslav contacts had told him about the Croatian Ustasha. This had
nothing to do with Murphy’s notorious raid on ASIO headquarters on 15 March, because he
clearly had not received the letter by then. (It was already 11 April when he sent a telegram to
Doohan saying that he was ‘very grateful to receive information referred to in your letter’.)
Doohan wrote that he had raised the question of the Ustasha with these men, and had been
warned to be very careful, because of his acquired Soviet citizenship, but apart from the
identity of the two men, Doohan knew nothing about Ustasha.
He wrote to Murphy again on 10 August, telling him that on arriving at Perth Airport early
on 8 July he was accosted by two men who said they were Serbs, and one of them had spoken
to him in Russian. He reported this to the police, and was interviewed by them, but he now
considered that they might have been ASIO agents. (If they had been, the contact should have
been noted in his dossier, and it is not.) The affair fizzled out for the time being.
On 29 August 1974, Doohan wrote to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Senator Willessee)
asking for confirmation that the Australian Government recognised his dual citizenship, as he
had recently written to the Soviet Embassy saying that he did not wish to lose Soviet
citizenship, ‘if it [had] not already been revoked by the Supreme Soviet’. The available files
do not record whether Doohan ever lost his Soviet citizenship officially; presumably it would
have lapsed anyway when the Soviet Union disintegrated. ASIO monitored visitors to Soviet
ships, and on 27 February 1975, they recorded that the driver of an off-white Morris, UEW223,
had visited Novosibirsk. They identified the owner as John William Doohan of Willagee. If,
however, Doohan had been a target, they would have already had his car number on record.
Doohan came under notice in the press again in May 1975, when he testified before the Hope
Royal Commission into ASIO. The Ustasha material surfaced again (though not in the press),
and he introduced the Palestine Liberation Organisation. He told the Commission that he had
gone to Palestine in his younger days, and that in the detention barracks in Britain he had made
contact with some Egyptian Arabs, saying, ‘They were revolutionary too so we felt common
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ground.’ After they returned to Australia, one of them had sent from Cairo an affectionate
letter to his elder daughter. He thought that this letter might have been intercepted by ASIO,
and might have led them to think he had connections with the PLO. He complained that at
times his telephone had been tapped, that his correspondence had been intercepted and
withheld, that his car had been followed, and that Commonwealth cars with number plates
beginning with a red ‘Z’ often pulled up briefly outside his house in a dead end street.
He complained that ASIO was persecuting him. On 18 August 1974, he had sent a telegram
to the Attorney-General asking to have his ASIO file ‘publicly examined’. He raised the matter
again at the Hope Commission, which sent a question to ASIO regarding the existence of a
file on Doohan. ASIO replied, very carefully and correctly, that they were not conducting
surveillance operations on him. That was true, but it did not mean that there was no file on
him. Of course there was; it would have been a gross dereliction of duty if somebody with his
record of activities and attitudes had not been noted, not so much for anything he had done as
for what he had the potential to do. He was not, in a serious sense, what ASIO called ‘a
person of interest’; he was just ‘by-catch’ in the trawl. Several telephone conversations were
monitored, but not because his phone was tapped. The Soviet Embassy phones were tapped,
and he made a number of calls, particularly to Tulayev, the KGB resident. Movements of his
car were sometimes entered, not because his car was being tailed, but because he left it
parked outside the Soviet Embassy, and the number plates of all visiting cars were traced, as
were visitors to Soviet ships.
Beware what you wish for. Three files on his activities, two of them from ASIO, have been
released and are now available to be ‘scrutinised publicly’; they have been digitised and are
available on website of the National Archives of Australia. [ http://www.naa.gov.au Click on
‘Search the collection’ and follow instructions to files A6119: 3813 and A6119: 3814; and
A6980: S203334.] A fourth file that I saw – his brief RAAF service record, which had ended
when he objected to a routine transfer – seems to have been removed; at least, I cannot locate
it again. With the dismissal of the Whitlam Government in November 1975, Doohan lost his
contacts in the Federal Government, and he began cultivating State parliamentarians.
On 10 January 1989, the Assistant Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, Colin
Winchester, was shot dead in the driveway of his Canberra home. On 17 April, Doohan swore
an affidavit that a Mr Noel Sharp had given him some information about the murder. This was
tendered at the coronial hearing on 21 November, but the coroner rejected the information.
Doohan did not let the matter rest; he accused the AFP of making a suppression order against
his statement, tapping his telephone, and giving advice that he was mentally unstable. He wrote
to the Coroner again on 25 March 1996 asking whether his affidavit had been rejected as
‘unworthy of coronial examination’, or because of a suppression notice. Somewhat persona
non grata with both the Liberal and Labor parties, Doohan inveigled Senator Diane Elizabeth
(Dee) Margetts of the Greens Party to ask questions on his behalf. [Hansard, Senate, 22 May
1996] Senator Amanda Vanstone gave the Attorney General’s answer on 9 September 1996,
which included the Coroner’s statement that it was only the names that were to be suppressed,
as Sharp’s statements were not believed. [Hansard] The content of the statement is not
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available to me, but as Doohan wanted the statement made available to David Eastman, the
man who was charged and later convicted of the murder, it seems likely to have contained an
allegation that the AFP themselves, or perhaps Doohan’s bugbear, ASIO, had arranged the
murder and framed Eastman.
In the mean time, probably soon after the publication of Michael Montgomery’s book on
Sydney in 1981, Doohan turned his attention to the Sydney case. Apparently not having
sufficient influence on the Sydney Research Group, he founded the End the Secrecy on
Sydney Group about 1992. On 25 June 1997, he wrote to the Prime Minister (John Howard)
with his usual allegations: Wittwer’s claims regarding Heinz Grossmann, Lander and the
HFDF tracking of Kormoran, Bourne and the aerial searches, Japanese submarine, survivors
murdered in the water, etc., as are in the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry records. His stooge again
was Senator Margetts, who asked a Question on Notice on 26 June, so probably had the
information directly from Doohan. The questions were answered on 25 August by Senator
Amanda Vanstone, in a rather dismissive fashion, as the affidavits that Doohan had
mentioned enclosing were not available. [Hansard, respective dates.]
In August 1997, moves were made to set up a Joint Parliamentary Committee to investigate
the loss of Sydney and any associated misconduct. A call for submissions was made in
October, and the resulting report was submitted to the Senate on 22 March 1999 and to the
House of Representatives on 29 March. It rejected Doohan’s claims virtually in total, so of
course the members of the panel joined everybody else on Doohan’s list of collaborators in
the cover-up. He demanded another Inquiry. Well, now, ten years later, there is a new Inquiry,
and if it does not endorse his claims the members of this Inquiry will be similarly stigmatised.
Unfortunately, for a time Doohan had the ear of the (State) Member for South Perth, the
late Phillip George Pendal (Liberal), whose submission to the JPI was clearly inspired by
Doohan’s promotion of Wittwer’s letter. [JPI, Vol. 8, Submission 87, pp. 1717-21.] In an
interview for the TV documentary, ‘The Hunt for HMAS Sydney’ he again claimed that ASIO
was withholding documents concerning the sinking of Sydney. It is known that Doohan has
been responsible for manipulating or encouraging Bourne, Wittwer, Cooper, Laffer, Lander,
Samuels, and quite likely others, including other politicians whose contributions have been
less than intelligent. He has pestered relatives of men lost aboard Sydney, persuading them of
cover-up and increasing their distress, and gaining permission to act in their names. Most of
this happened because Jonathon Robotham stole a notebook, John McArthur got hold of it,
and the information he thought it contained was passed to Michael Montgomery. Many of the
other problems had their origins in Doohan’s self-centred belief that ASIO regarded his
activities in connection with the anti-Vietnam protests as significant.
To gain some insight as to the extent to which Doohan exploited the naïve goodwill of
Senator Margetts, it would be instructive to consult the Hansard records of the proceedings of
the Senate for 26 June and 27 August 1997 for her Question on Notice, and the reply of
Senator Hill. Incoming members of Federal and State Parliaments should be familiarised with
Doohan’s record, so that they can make an informed decision about associating with him.
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In 1998, Doohan wrote to the JPI: ‘Poniewierski/Winter apparently fails to understand that
some of us on this side, who saw at first hand much of what the Nazi enemy did, are not
capable of sharing her admiration for the pirate crew of HSK KORMORAN.’ [As the
representative of the ESoS Group, in his Submission 99, Vol. 9, p. 2138. Much waffle; much
emotion; few facts and little real evidence.] I admit to some bias, although it has little to do
with Sydney-Kormoran. The brother of an uncle by marriage (Lieutenant Czaplinski) was
among the thousands of Polish officers butchered at Katyn forest in 1940 by the murder
squads of Doohan’s beloved Soviet, but since they were not involved in the SydneyKormoran affair, that has no influence on my research and writing on this case. (The Katyn
Memorial Wall bears the legend: Never forgotten – Never forgiven.) However, it does affect my
opinion of John William Doohan. I have no particular attitude towards anyone involved in the
events on either side, however it may seem, and I seek the facts. What I do fail to understand
is how Doohan could have been so misguided as to leave Australia in 1972, complaining that
it was a ‘police state’, in order to find ‘freedom’ in the Soviet Union, his trip and his Soviet
citizenship being arranged by the head at the time of Soviet espionage in Australia.
Joanne Helen Green:
Dr Jo Green from the School of Media, Culture and Communication at the Murdoch
University (Perth metropolitan area, some 10 km ESE of Fremantle) is the latest blunderer to
rush headlong into the Sydney minefield. In 2007, and using the cachet of her association
with Murdoch University, she posted a silly and emotional website in which she regurgitates
practically every already comprehensively discredited theory and press beat-up: Japanese
submarine, underwater torpedo, survivors murdered, bullet in the skull of the Christmas
Island body, the story that the impostor Grossmann told to the naive Pastor Wittwer (whose
names she writes as Grossman and Wittner), and many others. (See the relevant sections.)
Then she adds a few of her own, accusing Curtin, Churchill and Roosevelt of deliberately
fabricating the official story. She is obviously under the influence of John Doohan, whom she
mentions on her site, and is probably unaware that she is pushing the same barrow as the neoNazi Adelaide Institute. And take a close look at her claim that she ‘became intensely
interested and involved with the truth about HMAS Sydney after a chance encounter with one
of its survivors, Betty, widow of Sydney Engineer Fred Schoch’. Excuse me. How did Betty
Schoch manage to wangle a trip on a warship? And how did she get off? Of course, what she
really meant to say is understandable; this is just sloppy thinking and writing.
Green’s doctoral thesis (November 2005) is on ‘ICTs: Empowering Western Australian
Women.’ There is no evidence that she has done any original research into naval history, or
knows anything about naval technology and practice. To see how badly things can go wrong
when academics venture into a field about which they have no real knowledge, see her
website, ‘Remembering Anzacs and not forgetting HMAS Sydney’. It is to be hoped that she
demands higher academic standards of research and analysis from her students.
Site: http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=5760
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Bret Christian:
Christian is editor of the ‘POST’, a local newspaper based on Perth suburbs. He has provided
wide publicity for many of the outrageous theories that flourish around Perth like noxious
weeds, especially the unsourced, unsubstantiated claims of John Montagu and John Samuels.
[See separate section for an analysis of the incredibly stupid and nasty book by Samuels,
Somewhere Below.] Some newspapers have at least the excuse that they need scoops and
sensations to boost circulation. Christian apparently does not have even that excuse if, as I
understand it, the POST is a free throw-away weekly with a captive circulation.
That just about covers the Western Australian groups linked in various ways through John
McArthur and John Doohan. There are several other persons in Western Australia pushing
different barrows, and a few people from other areas with their own pet theories. Most have
made only a brief appearance on the scene, but a few are fixtures.
Lieutenant-Colonel (Retd) T. Warren Whittaker, OBE:
(A British migrant, well after the war.) Whittaker was outside the orbit of the two groups
mentioned, because his main hobbyhorse was that the wrecks of Sydney, Kormoran and a
Japanese submarine were located in the Abrolhos Islands group. He did a lot of intricate
mathematical work, but the results were wrong because some of his basic assumptions were
wrong. He also vehemently supported the work of Lindsay Charles Knight, with his Knight
Direct Location System (KDLS). They made several flights over likely sites, and Whittaker
supported Knight’s claim that in 1989 they had definitely found the wrecks of Sydney and
Kormoran and another vessel, possibly a Japanese submarine, near the Abrolhos Islands. He
claimed that one of the vessels was blown to pieces, and the other was in two halves; that
would have been a logical deduction from reading most histories of the battle. He had
allegedly detected samurai swords and human bones, but he had determined that there were
no modern wrecks north of 28º30’S, and there was definitely nothing near the site indicated
by Detmers. These claims, vigorously pursued, caused a lot of vexation and expense to
others. Even Ean McDonald from the SRG apparently began to believe the Knight-Whittaker
claims, to his subsequent embarrassment.
Knight’s contraption was based on the theory of Electron Spin Resonance, which is an
established practice for determining the age of archaeological specimens in a laboratory.
Various claims have been made concerning attempts to extend this to oil exploration. One
could overlook his inconsistent stories, but his claim that he could detect minerals, including
identifying marine wrecks by the chemical composition of the materials of which they were
constructed, might have attracted more serious notice, despite his proven failures, if he had
not also claimed to be able to detect wrecks by ‘map dowsing’. That is, by holding a twopronged rod over a map of an area. [See book by Glenys McDonald, Seeking the Sydney,
Chapter on ‘The Wreck Detectives’, esp. pp. 162-65; also p. 236.] The mind boggles. Is this
supposed to work for every map scattered all over the world? A map is just paper and ink.
What is there to detect? He must seriously have lost touch with reality. Or else he was a
snake-oil salesman who knew exactly what he was doing, or a prankster who enjoyed making
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fools of his friends. It is strange that he had problems raising funds to make these exploratory
flights over his preferred sites if he could locate gold bullion by holding a gadget over a map.
On his website, Whittaker said that he had promised, before Knight died on 4 December
2002, that when the wrecks and the Japanese submarine were found near the Abrolhos,
Knight would get the credit. It is a pity he is not around to share the embarrassment. Unlike
some of the other persons involved, Whittaker has had the grace and courage to say those
difficult words: ‘I was wrong.’ However, six months later his website has still not been
altered, and the rubbish has been copied into other people’s sites.
John Alexander Montagu:
Montagu does not fit into any of the established conspiracy groups; he is out on his own.
Born in Britain on 15 February 1932, he arrived in Australia in late 1959 aboard Fairsky with
his wife and son under the Assisted Passage Scheme. Some of his correspondence bears the
title ‘McElhinney Associates’; that was the maiden name of his wife. For years, Montagu has
been fiddling around with two forged documents that allegedly showed that Sydney had been
sunk in the early hours of 20 November when she ran into a mine in a ‘practice minefield’
being laid by Kormoran, which slowed her down enough for Kormoran’s ‘J-boat’ to put two
torpedoes into her. He writes that Kormoran picked up 30 members of Sydney’s crew and
poured diesel fuel on the water to incinerate the rest, then she was herself sunk two days later
by one of her own mines, and the crew abandoned ship leaving the Sydney survivors to drown
in their cells. At one time, he was writing to Kormoran crew offering them a bribe of
$250,000 US if they would tell the ‘true story’ to his satisfaction. [The Lost Souls and Ghosts
of HMAS Sydney II: 1941, p. 103] He drew into his orbit Kerry Davey, JP, a real estate agent
with an interest in fostering the writing of local history, and the late Phillip Pendal, member
of the State Parliament. Bret Christian reviewed Montagu’s book in the Subiaco Post (16
December 2006), but kept calling him ‘Montague’. His work is not only unsubstantiated, but
also so disorganised, fanciful and downright nasty that it fails to convince even most of the
harden fantasists, so he is not really very important. Nevertheless, these documents are
analysed in the section on Forgeries to show how far some minds have become unhinged by
the Sydney affair. (See section on forgeries.)
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Individuals on the Fringes
David Kennedy:
Kennedy is a journalist, believed to be currently a sub-editor on the Australian. He is one of
the few Australians working on the topic who understand German, but perhaps not as well as
he thinks. Kennedy tends to overestimate his abilities. When he tried to claim a video made in
Europe as a business deduction, the Taxation Department rejected his claim on the grounds
that it was only a home movie with no commercial potential. He was also planning a TV
program on either Sydney-Kormoran alone, or on the raiders around Australia as a whole.
Neither his equipment not his knowledge of cinematography is up to the job. (Neither is
mine, but I know it.)
While he properly rejects the ‘Japanese submarine’ claim and some other outlandish
theories, he has been flogging two particular lame horses. 1: wireless messages. 2: the
underwater torpedo claim. His contributions to these matters will be examined in the relevant
sections. In the latter case, he relies for first-hand information on Hans Linke, a wireless
operator taken over from the merchant navy. Linke had been in no position to see any part of
the battle, but he pitched a yarn that Kennedy wanted to hear, so Kennedy believes him rather
than all other Kormoran crew, who must have conspired to tell lies if their stories conflict
with those of Linke.
It is difficult to hold a discussion with Kennedy, for he quickly loses his temper and resorts
to vulgarities with which a lady can hardly compete. He has submitted material to the
throwaway free weekly in Geraldton (Western Australia) Sydney material that the Australian
apparently declined to publish.
James Eagles:
Eagles was a naval telegraphist, and it is worth giving serious consideration to what he says
about wireless procedure and the technical history of wireless, but in other matters his quest
for arcane and esoteric explanations in place of reasonable and simple ones leads him to
make some strange and unsustainable claims. He rejects some of the sillier stories, but has
developed some of his own. One of these was that Sydney had met a Dutch submarine, taken
aboard the gold reserves from Singapore or Hong Kong, and stored the bullion in her
magazines. He relates this to ‘Operation Fish’, the removal of gold from Allied countries in
danger of enemy occupation. This is a genuine and very interesting story, but it had nothing
to do with Sydney.
He had a letter posted on Whittaker’s website in which he claimed that Kormoran’s LS3
boat towed lifeboats eastwards at 2 to 3.7 knots, maybe dropping boats off along the way,
from his favoured battle position of 24º54’S 108º42’E. Towing other boats greatly increases
fuel consumption, so what did the boat use for fuel over that distance? And what happened to
it after it dropped off the boats at Red Bluff and the 17 Mile Well? One suggestion that Eagles
has made is that it took some of the men back to other lifeboats, and distributed them between
the boats picked up by Yandra and Centaur. He does not explain how they managed to make
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a mid ocean rendezvous, considering at the very least their very limited visual range from
almost sea level and lack of navigational instruments.
When the wrecks of Sydney and Kormoran were first found, he was sceptical, claiming that
one was more likely to be two sections of the US Liberty ship, Peter Sylvester, even though
he has posted on part of the RANCBA website on Giang Ann and Darvel: ‘After her docking
and overhaul in Bombay, Darvel headed for Fremantle, and while crossing the Indian Ocean
was diverted on January 28, 1945 to look for survivors from the torpedoed U.S. Liberty ship
Peter Sylvester (7,176 tons). The Liberty ship was lost about 1000 miles off the W.A. coast
while enroute from Melbourne to Colombo.’ How did he think this sunken ship could have
travelled some 1,000 miles to the position where the wrecks were found? For that matter,
since it was sunk on 6 February 1945, and the loss was not known for several days, how
could Darvel have been diverted to pick up survivors on 28 January? [This story is repeated
on a members.dodo.net site. Peter Sylvester was sunk by U-862 at 34º11’S 99º37’E. That is a
long way from the position where the Geosounder found the wrecks.]
Eagles posts his websites on the site of the Royal Australian Navy Communications
Branch Association (RANCBA). He does a lot of reading and research, and his sites may be
interesting and informative, but sometimes you run into something like the above. (The
RANCBA should monitor its website for obviously ridiculous contributions.) However,
Eagles cannot accept that the battle could be anywhere else than where he had worked out
that it must have been. When the ROV pictures were posted, he claimed that they were
mistakes, or falsifications, for Sydney’s guns looked different, etc. etc. For a time he claimed
that the one allegedly Sydney was not a modified Leander class, but one of the original
Leanders; however, they had only one funnel. Then it might have been an Arethusa class
cruiser, but the Arethusas had only three turrets. Then there were too many holes in the wreck
allegedly of Kormoran, for Sydney hit her only a few times. (Maybe the 360 or so mines had
something to do with the holes.) Until that point, I would have said that he seemed honest
enough to abandon theories when they are clearly untenable, but this is really too much. It
must mean that David Mearns, Lieutenant Perryman, Dr McCarthy and Glenys McDonald, as
well as the whole crew of the search vessels must have conspired to lie about their find. What
next?
David Angwin:
Angwin is a very odd character somewhat in the style of Robotham. His fetish is digging up
beaches in the Shark Bay area looking for bodies allegedly from Sydney, and sending peculiar
letters, alternately smarmy and abusive, to eminent people, not only in Australia but also
abroad. One favourite target of his abuse is the RSL, for complicity in covering up the fate of
Sydney and her crew. He calls the former Japanese leader, Junichiro Koizumi, his ‘mate’,
while accusing Japan of a war crime it did not commit. He claims that he possesses signed
declarations from service personnel who were involved in burying scores of bodies in
unmarked mass graves on the beach, but has not yet produced these declarations or identified
the people who allegedly made them. When the wrecks were first found, he circulated the
claim that they were bogus, and must have been the wrecks of a Dido class RN cruiser and a
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merchant vessel used in the Monte Bello atomic tests. However, the Dido class had five
turrets. Any port in a storm! Any claim when you don’t like the facts! After the close-up
showed that the wrecks were indeed of Sydney and Kormoran, he claimed that he had found
the wreck of a Japanese submarine some 80 miles away. In view of the nature and costs of the
equipment needed to find wrecks, how did he manage that? [See section on Bodies.]
Tim Akers:
David Mearns used to employ Akers until they parted under acrimonious circumstances; it is
impossible and unnecessary to judge the rights and wrongs of their disagreement. What is
important is that Mearns found the wrecks of Sydney and Kormoran, while Akers’ claims
have been shown to be wrong. His ‘Merlindown’ system of finding objects deep under water
by analysing ordinary satellite photographs does not work, despite eminent academics who
have cautiously supported him. His alleged claim that he can locate objects as deep as 16,000
metres under water is weird, as the deepest known part of an ocean is the Mariana Trench, at
about 10,900 metres. He is a one-string fiddle, and he is included here only because his
claims are as bizarre as the KDLS map-dowsing stories.
The following are not connected with the conspiracy classification. However much I
might disagree with them on some points, they lack the essential element of neurosis.
Tom Frame:
Frame was born in Sydney in 1962; he joined the RAN as a cadet midshipman in 1979, and
resigned in 1992 to study theology. He was ordained in 1993 and served various parishes
before being consecrated Anglican Bishop to the Australian Defence Forces in 2001. In
January 2007, he was appointed Director of the Canberra-based St Mark’s National
Theological College of the Charles Sturt University, where he currently enjoys the title of
Right Reverend Associate Professor. [For further personal information on Frame, see his
entry on the website of the Charles Sturt University, or wiki, where he has an individual
entry.]
There are a number of problems with his book HMAS Sydney. Loss and Controversy
(1993). One is that he writes hastily and researches superficially; apart from sermons and
lectures, he has published 23 books in about 20 years, which inevitably means that he cannot
do sufficient research into original material and therefore relies on secondary and tertiary
sources, many of which are likely to be faulty. (Research for each of my books has taken a
minimum of two years, extending up to nine years.) Another is his complex personal attitude
to the RAN, resulting from his years of service. His book has antagonised many people in one
way or another, including me, which is not necessarily a bad thing in itself. His analyses of
errors in claims made by Montgomery and the members of the SRG and ESoS groups are
brutal, but mostly correct.
Because he was a naval officer, the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry gave him too much credit
for knowing what he was talking about, but it is a sad fact that his own ‘reconstruction’ of
how the battle between Sydney and Kormoran might have developed is based on a flawed
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document: an interim interpretation of Detmers’ action report. The errors in this document
were corrected fairly quickly, but Frame’s perfunctory research did not find the amended
translation. How Frame has gone astray will be analysed in the section on the battle. His
theory is not intrinsically ridiculous, but it is clearly impossible in the light of the correct
translation and other supporting accounts. [See section on the battle.]
Besides the untenable account of the battle he has a lot of minor errors; some of them are
trivial and irrelevant, but a few are of some significance. He gives the meaning of HSK –
‘Handelstorkreuzer’ – as a merchant navy protection cruiser, whereas it was a trade
disruption cruiser. [p. 38] The function of the raiders was not to protect German shipping, but
to upset Allied seaborne trade; this apparently trivial error could lead to a failure to
understand the role of the raiders. He gives the name of Mary Celeste as Marie Celeste
[p. 225], a common error, but one that does not inspire confidence in a naval historian. He
gives the name of the Vichy paper that carried Habben’s report on the battle as ‘De Jour’ [p.
108]; it may or may not have been ‘Sept Jours’, but it could not have been ‘De Jour’. He also
reproduces [p. 243] a fairly irrelevant map from Gill [p. 369] with the Maldives labelled as
the Andaman Islands.
In considering what might have happened during the battle, he assumes that Sydney would
have ordered Kormoran to stop; he writes that if the order to stop had not been obeyed,
Sydney would have opened fire at long range and Kormoran would have been sunk without
putting up a fight. He writes: ‘This is exactly what happened to Pinguin.’ [p. 209] Of course,
that was not what happened to Pinguin; she returned fire so effectively that there were
casualties aboard Cornwall; the steering control circuits and engine room ventilation were
knocked out temporarily, and the cruiser had to go to Durban for repairs. (Frame may have
Atlantis in mind, but that was after the Sydney-Kormoran battle.)
Frame refers to the ‘doubtful legality of his [Detmers’] assault on the first officer of
Eurylochus [p. 219], citing Montgomery as his authority. [Endnote, p. 288. Montgomery, p.
284, 1981 edition.] Despite knowing that Montgomery is unreliable as a source, he has taken
as fact the claim by the first officer of Eurylochus that Detmers had punched him in the face
when he inadvertently observed one of Kormoran’s torpedo crews practising a drill. The only
lifeboat picked up by Kormoran from this ship contained mainly Chinese seamen; there were
only four Europeans, of whom the Second Officer (Edgar Ashworth) was the only officer. (It
is possible that Ashworth was calling himself the ‘First Officer’, or that Montgomery
assumed this.) The other Europeans were able to evade Kormoran in the darkness and most
were picked up late by Monte Teide. The casualties were nowhere near as high as the first
reports suggested, but the original report is still being quoted.
Without going into details: Frame is wrong about the circumstances of the finding of
Bretschneider’s diary. [p. 108] He is wrong about the date of the death of Ruckteschell. [p.
219] He is wrong about the date when List reported that he had buried his camera. [p. 108]
He is wrong in claiming that the Iron Cross First Class was reserved for officers. [p. 63] He is
wrong in claiming that raider captains needed to sink 100,000 tons of shipping to qualify for
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the Knight’s Cross [p. 64]; that applied only to U-boats. (See section on Aquitania.) He was
being obtuse in not seeing that the body on Christmas Island had to be from Sydney. His book
is nowhere near as bad as those by Montgomery, Bathgate, Samuels or Montagu, but there are
enough demonstrably false factual errors to make it necessary to check everything he writes. I
gather that his book is to be released in a revised edition; it will be interesting to see if it
retains the same fundamental errors.
The real problem with his book is his determination to defend Captain Burnett at all costs,
not matter to whom he does injustice, whether Australian or German, naval personnel or
politicians or other historians. His glib claim that Detmers was a liar and perhaps just short of
a war criminal is based largely on a few words and figures in a single faulty document. Not
only is this a bad practice for an academic or historian: it is an unchristian act of bearing false
witness, even if not intentionally.
Glenys McDonald:
She has done sterling work in collecting oral statements, and has checked and disproven
some of them, but she has been too willing to believe that what a person sincerely believes
corresponds to the facts. She did not have a broad enough background in naval technology
and operational procedures, especially German ones, to feel instinctively when something
was wrong, or to recognise when she was being led astray. Some of her errors are trivial,
some are significant. She has provided valuable material, but it needs to be handled with
caution. One small detail, for example. She mentions, without comment, a letter referring to
German officers (NB: plural) who were ‘well dressed in new uniforms, complete with Air
Force wings and Iron Crosses at their throats’. [p. 120] These were, of course, not Luftwaffe
wings but simply the naval version of the Nazi military eagle, and the officers were Detmers
and Foerster. The error is unimportant, unless somebody tries to use it as a basis for claiming
that there were several Luftwaffe officers aboard Kormoran. Even Ahl, the air observer, was a
naval officer, not a Luftwaffe member. The pilot (Duismann, who was killed) was not an
officer. And the photo of Detmers, labelled a passport photo [p. 108], is not from a passport;
it was taken for his internment dossier, and as such was published in newspapers after his
escape from Dhurringile in January 1945. (It was even in the rural edition of the West
Australian, though it was removed from the metropolitan edition, which is the one retained in
Archives and on microfilm. I remember seeing it.) There are quite a number of such errors,
trivial in themselves, but with the potential to set some crackpot off on a wrong track. Her
background claims need to be checked, if they are to be used as a basis for some theory.
Kim Kirsner and Wes Olson do not really belong here at all. Kirsner has done very good
work in his limited fields, and wisely does not stray beyond them. Olson is very good on
weaponry, engines, technology and general history, but has occasionally strayed outside these
spheres of expertise with none-too-happy consequences, but this is not the result of malice or
carelessness.
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The Media:
In the Sydney-Kormoran affair, the media have at times played a pernicious role in purveying
falsehoods and fomenting ill will and hysteria, which began almost as soon as the news of the
loss of Sydney was announced. It continues until the present day, although the discovery of
the wrecks has recently brought some sobriety into the debate. Some years ago, I challenged
a well-known and respected newspaper man about an untruthful and nasty piece he had written.
His response was that he was a reporter; his job was to report what people said, not to bother
whether it was true. Unfortunately, that is not the way many people interpret media reports.
Some years ago, the Sunday Times in Western Australia produced some particularly evil
reports; Jim Davies was behind some of these. I do not know what it has been doing lately, as
nobody in my circle of friends ever reads it. In late 2007, the West Australian produced a
sensational report that Sydney had been found, without examining the claim carefully or
applying much common sense to it, let alone considering the hurt it would cause to relatives
when it was found to be untrue. It did not take more than a few days to expose the falsity of
the claim, but while I was working briefly on a newspaper I found that embarrassment is an
emotion that is in short supply among media personnel.
Newspapers habitually feature sensational stories on the front page with sensational
headlines in large print. They then often refuse to print a reasoned correction on the grounds
that people are not interested. If a retraction is printed at all, it is usually buried in a few
centimetres of a single column on an inside page, unless there is a well-backed threat of legal
action. When a new angle to a story arises, the job of writing it up may be given to some wetbehind-the-ears young pup who knows nothing about the topic; for background, (s)he goes to
the old files that contain the same old rubbish and rewrites it. This does not apply solely to
the Sydney-Kormoran story; it is the way newspapers habitually operate. One cannot take this
unduly amiss, but readers are naïve if they think they can trust newspaper reports.
The bias against my work seems to have been too constant to be coincidental, and it began
before I started writing unkind things about the media. At the Sydney forum in Fremantle in
November 1991, the West Australian sent a reporter to cover the morning session when
Michael Montgomery gave his address, but withdrew him from the afternoon session when I
presented my paper. Thus a biased report went into their files to be consulted by later
reporters, and they missed the material on Detmers’ diary, which I introduced then, until I
gave information about it to David Mearns. (They could have had a genuine little scoop
then.) At the Brisbane public hearing on 29 May 1998, the Brisbane Courier-Mail sent a
reporter to cover John McArthur’s evidence in the morning, and withdrew him from the
hearing of my testimony later. What both irked and amused me about this was that this very
reporter had been one of my tutors at a Journalism course at the University of Queensland,
where he had stressed the importance of balanced coverage, which he clearly did not practise.
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The proponents of the various conspiracy theories have made constant and determined
efforts to steer people away from my book, which exposes the silliness of so many of their
claims, and there are bibliographies where my book is the only one omitted from the list.
Especially since the wrecks have been found, there has been some rather good material
appearing in the media, and some sanity has become evident. There has been good material
from Rob McAuley, Tony Barrass, Nikki Barrowclough and Joe Poprzeczny, and quite likely
others whose work I have not noticed. They have included a few small errors, of course, but
they have shown a genuine respect for truth, balance and common sense. Maybe there is
some hope at last.
Years ago, I made the mistake that others are now making. I thought that people would
understand the truth if presented with solid evidence and a logical, reasoned argument. I
abandoned that delusion more than ten years ago. There are people who cannot let go of a
cherished theory, the core of their being, the reason for their existence, or at the very least a
security blanket. They created a myth for themselves and became its slaves. Their claims are
not reasoned expositions: they are a religion. They will not change their minds because they
cannot. One might have more success in persuading Pope Benedict XVI and Osama bin
Laden to exchange their religious beliefs.
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When I was first interviewed by a member of the Inquiry team, I was asked what I meant by a
remark on page 127 of my book: that my view of the battle was based on, among other
things, ‘the character and personality of officers, as reported’. This question was sprung on
me unexpectedly, and I assumed it to mean the officers of Kormoran. It is possible that the
question was meant to include Sydney officers as well; however, I had obviously never met
any of Sydney officers, and reports on them had not then been released, for reasons of
confidentiality, although there is now some material on them on the Archives website. While
I knew a fair bit about Captain Burnett, I knew little about the others, except their basic
records. It is still the case that, if an analysis of their character and personality is required,
others who do this better than I; and others who would do it worse, for reasons of bias.
However, I probably know more about the Kormoran officers than most people, so I shall
give an analysis, in case it might be of use to the Inquiry and others. Some background of
German law and society is also given, as lack of knowledge of this has led to many
statements that are simply ridiculous.
This section gives:
1: the background to the laws governing the Nazi Party and its relationship to the armed
forces and the mercantile marine. Ignorance of these has given rise to a lot of statements that
are quite contrary to fact.
2: brief biographies of all the officers and some of the petty officers, especially the ones on
the bridge during the battle. This will assist those who want to make a reasoned assessment of
the men concerned and the value or otherwise of their statements.
Neither part is meant to be show support for, or disapprobation of Party regulations,
military law, or the men concerned. Any such judgment results from the interaction of the
beholder’s mind with the facts of the matter.
Background:
It was forbidden for active members of the armed forces to belong to a political party of any
kind, including the Nazi Party. Party membership cards from about 1936 have pre-printed
sections for recording dates when the holder’s membership had been suspended while he was
in the armed forces, and when it resumed after his service ended. (Once a man joined the Party,
the only way to get out of it without unpleasant consequences was to join the armed forces.)
This regulation was not introduced by the Nazi Party; it was a long-standing tradition,
enforced by regulation, that military personnel were servants of the State, not its masters, and
they were not even allowed to vote in elections. (This, of course, no longer applies.)
Membership lists for the Nazi Party for German residents closed on 1 May 1933. They
remained closed for about four years. During that period, applications were accepted, in
principle, only from youths who had passed through the Hitler Youth with a ‘good’ record, or
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adults who had given outstanding service in one of the subsidiary Nazi organisations, such as
the Labour Front. [Arbeitsfront]
From about 1934, German citizens living outside Germany were permitted officially to
join the Party, although some joined earlier. (Some memberships in Australia dated from
1932.) As time passed, more pressure for them to join was exerted by restricting import
agencies and other privileges to members, even by threats to cancel their passports. There
were specific threats to persons returning to Germany to visit relatives that they would not be
allowed out of Germany unless they had already joined the Party.
The situation in the mercantile marine was this. Partly owing to the number of communists
on board ships, it became virtually mandatory for every ship to form a Party group aboard.
[Bordzelle] The leader of this group had considerable power and influence, for he could
report to the Gestapo through the Auslandsorganisation. Because it was undesirable for a
cook or a junior boiler room hand to have the power to threaten the captain, the crews of
many ships implored an officer to join the Party, whether he felt inclined to do so or not.
Basically, this was to keep real Party control off the ship. The sacrificial lamb was often the
captain or the first officer.
Communist influence was never eradicated. When the vessel Witram left Sydney in June
1935, it was observed that members of the crew had left behind a message painted in red:
‘Freedom for Thaelmann. In spite of Hitler the red front lives.’ This was duly reported to
Germany by the official Gestapo informant in Sydney at that time. A half-Jewish communist
seaman deserted from Halle in Brisbane in July 1939, because he had been warned that he
would be arrested if he reached Germany alive. There was also political trouble aboard
Leuna, as late as mid 1939, of a kind I have not been able to discover.
The point of this exposition is to warn against judging a man’s character too quickly and
based on too little knowledge. As not all Muslims are terrorists, so were not all Germans –
and not even all nominal Nazis – racist thugs. The street violence and murders did not begin
with the nationalistic and often – though not always – unsavoury Freikorps; it had been
preceded by communist violence, especially in Hamburg, where the Sailors’ Soviets had
dumped the mangled bodies of their officers in the streets. How this is judged depends on the
political orientation of the person making the judgment, but it should not depend on
ignorance of the facts.
Naturally, many sailors in both the merchant navy and the fighting navy were resident in
Hamburg or Bremen or along the North Sea coast, even if they were not born there. Hamburg
and Bremen were independent city-states (Freistädte), formerly of the Hanseatic League.
They were not ‘Prussian’; they had extensive international contacts through trade; many of
their inhabitants had very mixed international backgrounds. It was said that Hitler did not
dare make a public speech in Hamburg because of the reception he would have received; that
is not true, but his public appearances in Hamburg were few. Along the North Sea coast, there
was a strong Dutch and Danish component in their ancestry, and this was reflected among the
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officers of Kormoran and the crew who came from the merchant navy. Among the young
conscripts, this was not the case. There is considerable, often intangible, evidence of the
effect that four or five years of Hitler Youth training had on some of them, such as recording
a non-denominational ‘gottglaubig’ [believer] in their POW registration forms.
Interpretation of military service: Those born before 1900 would have been subject to
conscription during the Imperial period and World War I, and there would have been some
born 1901-1902 who volunteered for wartime service. Those born 1902-1911 would normally
not have been subject to conscription, although they might have volunteered for post-war
service. Those born in 1915 or later would have been conscripted for six to twelve months
Labour Service, followed by two years of military or naval service unless there was some
cogent reason for exemption. Those born 1912-1914 were theoretically liable for conscription
after 1936, perhaps for short-term training rather than the full two years, but some slipped
through the net completely, particularly merchant seamen. Those born in 1917-1918 would
normally have been conscripted about April 1938, and would not have completed their
service by the time war broke out. This is in general terms only; there were various reasons
for exemptions, or earlier or later commencement of service. [Regulations are in various parts
of the Reichsgesetzblatt, Vol. 69, especially Sections 56 and 64.]
Kormoran personnel:
Note: all officers were transferred from Dhurringile to Tatura in July 1945; Dhurringile
reverted to its owners, and any mention of prisoners of war there after mid 1945 is incorrect.
They were all repatriated by Orontes on 21 January 1947, so this is not recorded. Exception:
Dr Habben, who accompanied an exchange of prisoners and civil internees aboard Nieuwe
Amsterdam, which left Hobart in July 1943.
Glenys McDonald is incorrect in saying that ‘20 Germans from Kormoran left aboard
Clipfontein for America in 1944’. [p. 104] However many Germans there were aboard
Klipfontein when she left Brisbane on 30 August 1944, only Chief Petty Officer Richard
Kohls was from Kormoran. (He was killed towards the end of the war.) The only other early
repatriate identified was Willi Rönchen, 15 December 1944, General Buttner.
Tom Frame is likewise incorrect in labelling a photo of a group of repatriates boarding
Orontes in January 1947 [photo section] as coming from Kormoran, even if the Perth Daily
News said this was so; many of them are clearly army personnel, and some of them are
wearing Afrika-Korps caps.
In the list below, where it says ‘single’ or ‘no children’, this refers to their status in
December 1941 – January 1942, when the records were compiled.
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The Commander:
Detmers, Theodor Anton Gunther: born 22 August 1902, Witten in Ruhr (between Essen and
Dortmund) Religion: Evangelical. Father: Anton Detmers, a Hamburg businessman; mother:
Louisa Christensen. Noted as tall (6 ft), of slender build.
Joined navy 1 April 1921. Fregattenkapitän; promoted to Kapitän zur See, 1 April 1943.
(This was a regular promotion, not a reward for sinking Sydney.)
Iron Cross, First Class (Norway campaign). Knight’s Cross, 4 December 1941.
Escaped from custody: 11 January 1945; recaptured 18 January. Sentenced to 28 days
detention, 23 January; time served in Old Melbourne Gaol.
Transferred to 115 AGH, 23 March 1945; stroke. Returned to Dhurringile, 22 June 1945.
To hospital again, 8 to 31 October 1945, apparently after a second stroke.
Tom Frame [p. 108] is wrong in claiming, as have others, that Detmers was ‘elected’ Camp
Leader although he was not the senior officer until promoted to captain in 1943. Elections of
a sort were held in camps for civil internees, but leadership in the military camps was strictly
by seniority, unless the senior officer was in some way incapacitated or incompetent. The
next highest ranking officer was Luftwaffe Major Hellmut Bertram. Detmers always
outranked him by at least two years. Bertram was also promoted, on 6 July 1943, from Major
to Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant-Colonel).
Frame is also wrong when he writes: ‘He had been promoted and decorated because he
sank the Sydney.’ [p. 222] The promotion, dated 1 April 1943, was a regular one, and virtually
every raider captain was awarded the Knight’s Cross at the end of the cruise, although
Detmers received his perhaps a little more promptly than usual. (4 December 1941.)
There have been suggestions that Detmers’ stroke, at a relatively early age, was caused by
the stress of guilt and the fear that he would be court-martialled over the sinking of Sydney.
This speculation has no real foundation. The stress came from four and a half years in
command, without any relief, seriously compounded by the fact that he was a chain smoker,
as well as the tensions that increased in the camp after the assassination attempt on Hitler on
20 July 1944. This caused turmoil in all camps where German prisoners were held; in some it
may have caused murder. The following story came to me from a German merchant navy
officer who was a trusted friend.
When news of the attempt reached the camp, one of the officers, whose name I never
discovered, was heard to say: ‘Pity they didn’t get the bastard!’ This caused uproar. As senior
officer, Detmers had the responsibility not only of calming things down, but of ensuring that
the Australians did not learn too much about the tensions in the camp. He let it be known that
many officers involved in the attempt were from families that had given generations of
service to Germany, and they must have had their reasons, which could not be judged by men
who had been out of the country for four to five years. Then he issued an order forbidding
any discussion of the event. From that moment, Detmers’ life would have been on the line if
Germany had won the war. (Cf. the case of Rommel.)
After the war, relatively late in life, he married Ursula Reinhardt, daughter of a pastor of
the Evangelical Church. Detmers’ sister Käthe disapproved; she felt that Ursula as not quite
‘their class’.
There was another personal cause for the stress Detmers suffered. While in Melbourne
during the visit to Australia by the cruiser Köln in March-May 1933, Detmers made friends
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with a family in Camberwell. He became much attached to the daughter of the household;
Joan was then aged sixteen or seventeen; her paternal grandfather had been born in Germany,
though the rest of her ancestry was British. At some point, several years later, marriage was
discussed, but he would not take her to live in Nazi Germany, particularly not when a war
seemed likely. Nor would the Kriegsmarine have allowed one of its brightest young officers
to resign and emigrate, and it is unlikely that he would have wanted to give up his career.
Joan’s father was in a position that required him to visit the Murchison POW and civilian
internment camps periodically, including Dhurringile, so they were in intermittent contact
throughout the war. One of Joan’s younger brothers, a captain, was killed in July 1943 during
the fighting around El Alamein and Tel el Eisa. When Detmers was in Heidelberg Military
Hospital, Joan managed to visit him – with or without permission. After the war, she was still
willing to follow him to Germany to marry him, but he refused to let her; Germany was in a
mess, and he did not expect to live much longer. So the romance was broken off, and she
married somebody else. When Ursula Detmers visited Australia in 1991 or 1992, it was not
just to see the places connected with her husband’s association with Australia, but to make the
acquaintance of Joan’s children. (Joan herself had died a few years previously.)
Some people have said that my estimate of Detmers’ character was based on inadequate
information. In fact, I knew a lot about him; I have known the outline of this story for nearly
30 years, and many of the details for some 20 years. I kept quiet about it out of respect for
Joan’s family. Now I think that it is time to tell the story to complete the record, but I shall
still not give their name; it is up to them if they want to associate themselves with the story.
It is natural and proper for relatives of crew members who were lost aboard Sydney to
grieve, but it might be taken into account that Hans Gunther Jantzen, Detmers’ nephew, who
produced for David Mearns the dictionary that confirmed the ‘Action Report’, was once a
young lad who, hearing that an auxiliary cruiser had been sunk, ran to his mother in tears to
tell her that ‘Onkel Tetje’ had been killed.
Note re Köln: also aboard Köln on the 1933 cruise were Otto Schniewind, who was later in
charge of equipping the raiders, and Günther Gumprich, commander of Thor during her second
cruise in 1942, and of Michel during her second cruise in 1943. He drowned when Michel
was sunk. I am convinced that Detmers’ role of arranging sporting activities for the crew
would have entailed his meeting Burnett in the course of their duties, but although Burnett
was in Navy Office, Melbourne, during Köln’s visit, I can find no evidence of a meeting.
The Officers:
Foerster, Kurt Johannes Otto: born 9 November 1907, Frankfurt am Oder. Religion: Roman
Catholic. Married, one son, two daughters; wife Elisabeth lived in Wesermünde.
Father: Otto, resident in Berlin; mother: Dorette Wilkison.
Joined navy in 1924. First Officer. Kapitänleutnant; promoted to Korvettenkapitän, 1 March
1942. Iron Cross, First and Second Class. He had commanded the minelayer Königin Luise in
the Baltic earlier in the war.
Tom Frame [p. 63] is wrong in stating that the Iron Cross First Class [EKI] was for
officers, and the Iron Cross Second Class [EKII] was for non-commissioned personnel.
Prisoner of War record cards show officers with the EKII and other ranks with EKI, although
the reverse was more common.
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Meyer, Henry Carl Martin: born 25 March 1901, Blankenese/Hamburg. Religion:
Evangelical. Married, one son, two daughters; wife Else lived in Blankenese.
Father: Martin (deceased); mother Albertine Maehlmann.
Chief Officer, merchant navy; joined Hamburg-Amerika Linie, 1922. (HAPAG); he had
visited Australia aboard Reliance. Conscripted early 1940 and performed clerical duties in the
Naval Office in Hamburg before joining Kormoran. Prize Officer, Navigating Officer from
October 1941. Kapitänleutnant; Iron Cross Second Class.
He received shell splinter wound, base of spine, during action; this indicates that he was
probably on the bridge. So does logic; he was the navigator, without specialised weapons
training.
Member of Nazi Party from 1934; see note above re the Party groups aboard ship.
Bretschneider, Herbert: born 11 June 1909, Neustadt/Coburg. Religion: Evangelical. Single.
Father: Gunther; mother Laura Suffa.
Join navy 1929. Verwaltungsoffizier (Administrative Officer).
Kapitänleutnant; promoted to Korvettenkapitän, 1 April 1943. He had served aboard Graf
Spee during the Spanish Civil War. Iron Cross Second Class.
He joined the Bundesmarine after the war, served with the NATO forces and retired as a
Captain.
Gösseln, Joachim von: born 3 March 1912, Burhave, Lower Saxony. (On a peninsula
between Bremen and Wilhelmshaven.) Religion: Lutheran. Single.
Father: Carl. He had been in the merchant navy and had been around Cape Horn (believed to
have been under sail), but it is not known with what line or ship.
Joined navy 1936 [?]. Oberleutnant; promoted to Kapitänleutnant, 1 February 1942.
Rollenoffizier (Duty Officer; Rosters, Training and Battle Watch Officer).
(As in the case of Ahl, some basic information is lacking on his registration form.)
He was on the bridge during the battle, but not because, as some claim, he was especially
close to Detmers. It was the action station allotted to him before the ship left port.
He spent 1 to 9 December 1941 in detention in Fremantle, not for any misdemeanour but
because, having been on the bridge during the battle, he was wanted for special questioning.
It has been stated as a fact that Gösseln was a Party member and a fanatical Nazi. I have
seen nothing in records to justify this, but as he was in the merchant navy for a time, it is
possible. A check of the Party records in the Archives at Berlin-Lichterfelde would show
whether he was ever a member, but I am not going to be the one to pay for a search. See note
above re the Party groups aboard merchant ships.
Upon retirement, he settled on the island of Foehr, off the west coast of Jutland.
(Gordon Laffer’s claim that Gösseln was ‘the executioner who murdered the crew of Sydney’
was unfounded, malicious and a disgrace to him. That is: a disgrace to Laffer.)
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Messerschmidt, Heinz Christoph Max: born 21 January 1915, Kiel. Religion: Lutheran.
Wife: Ruth. No children. Father: Christoph; mother: Margueritha Rehder
Joined navy 1935. Oberleutnant; promoted to Kapitänleutnant, 1 June 1942.
Waffenoffizier (Mines and explosives). Iron Cross, First and Second Class. He had been
aboard Schlesien during the Spanish Civil War.
Although Detmers and Jürgensen spoke about intending to lay mines in the vicinity of
Shark Bay, Messerschmidt has always denied knowledge of any such plan. As Mines Officer,
he should have been in a position to know. It cannot be resolved how Detmers could have had
such a plan, while Messerschmidt not only denies it, but seems not to have known that
Detmers had written this in his book.
Greter, Joachim Hans: born 20 January 1917, Buenos Aires, Argentina. Religion:
Evangelical. Single. Father: Adolf; mother: Margarete Luhr. Resident Neustadt/Holstein.
Joined navy 1936. Oberleutnant; promoted to Kapitänleutnant, 1 October 1943. Torpedo
Officer. Iron Cross, First Class. He had been aboard Deutschland when it was hit by a
torpedo in April 1940. Aboard ship, he was detailed to supervise prisoners.
Three years three months in the Hitler Youth; three months Arbeitsdienst. (Compulsory
Labour Service)
Greter’s father was a captain in the merchant navy; about 1907, he was involved in a
rescue of a ship named Susannah in Australian waters. (Details forgotten.) The family spent
much of World War I in South America. They returned to Germany in 1920, then went back
to Argentina in 1923 for another three years. They returned to Germany permanently in 1926,
when Greter was nine years old.
His father was delighted when Greter was taken prisoner in Australia; he wrote that there
was hardly a better place to spend the war. After the war, he spent many years in Argentina
with his wife, son and daughter. His son settled in Sweden and became a Swedish citizen. He
had an international outlook and a sharp wit, and he was the Kormoran crew member whose
conversation I found most entertaining, though his critical observation and disdain for
narrow-mindedness could have been intimidating at close quarters over a long period.
Crace called him ‘a surly toad’, but they did not meet under favourable circumstances, and
Crace had something offensive to say about a lot of people. (He called Commodore Pope a
‘poor fish’, and the wife of one of his dinner companions an ‘old trout’.)
Ahl, Heinrich Friedrich (called ‘Heinfried’]: born 30 July 1916, Mainz. Religion: Lutheran.
Single. Father: not named (probably deceased); mother: Elisabeth (née Phul).
Joined the navy in April 1936. Oberleutnant. Fliegeroffizier (in this case, Air Observer,
although he was also trained as a pilot.) Ahl, Greter and Schäfer belonged to the so-called
‘Olympia Crew’; that is, the 1936 intake of officer cadets.
Basic information on Ahl in POW records is scarcer than that for most other men.
Like Gösseln, he spent a week or so in detention in Fremantle for special questioning, in his
case in connection with the reports of unidentified aircraft in the Geraldton region in October
and November.
I made contact with Ahl through a German merchant navy officer, ca 1978, and then
through him with Jürgensen and other crew members. I met him personally when he and his
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wife Brigitte visited Australia in 1979; they stayed with us when they visited Brisbane for
Expo 88. Ahl was raised in an all-female household. (I suspect that his father had been killed
during the war, but felt that it would have been tactless to ask.) As a result of having no male
role-model in the family, he acquired certain manners and mannerisms that earned him the
nickname of ‘Fräulein’ aboard ship. As an example of this: he had been trained to eat slowly.
This irritated the other officers, because he always finished his meal well after everybody
else, and Detmers did not give permission to smoke until everybody had finished. This came
to a head and was resolved when Detmers said something like: ‘Ahl, we will not mind if you
eat slowly, if you do not mind that we smoke while you are still eating.’
Ahl became a Professor of Economics after the war. He was pedantic, somewhat fussy and
a compulsive talker. He exasperated Greter in particular; they had joined the navy together,
gone through the naval college at Mürwik-Flensburg together; served aboard ship together for
over a year, and been in a prison camp for over five years. I remarked to Jürgensen that for
the life of me I could not imagine Ahl as a naval officer; Jürgensen snapped that he could not
imagine him as a teacher, for that was a much harder job.
Ahl and his wife were generous, kindly folk; they sponsored a girl in South America
through one of the international charities for children. (Rosina or Rosetta or some such
name.) Nor was their charity impersonal. I saw him stop while walking along a street in
Frankfurt, not merely to give money to an injured beggar, but to engage him in conversation
and treat him as a friend. In the long run his pedantry could be quite exhausting, but he was
such a kindly, gentle man that one felt guilty about being irritated by him.
Malapert, Reinhold Karl Max, Freiherr von: born 8 January 1914, Darmstadt. [Also given as
Reinhold Kurt Adolf Max Karl) Religion: Evangelical.
Wife: Gertrude Brunst (Darmstadt). One son, born a few weeks after Kormoran set out.
Father: Hans (army officer); mother: Irmgard Erdmann.
Kapitänleutnant; Funkoffizier (wireless). Eight and a half years navy (1933). Iron Cross
Second Class. He served aboard Graf Spee during the Spanish Civil War, and he made a prewar training cruise to South America aboard Schlesien, 1938. He met his first wife at that time.
The wireless officer from another German vessel told me that Malapert’s knowledge of wireless
construction and technology was not very good, as distinct from operation and procedure. I
have also been told that he could not manage his Division, and had to be replaced at sea.
(This is not logged. He would normally have been one of the Divisional Officers for Division
Four, but he said in December 1941 that he was not a Divisional Officer.)
After the war, he settled in Chile, divorced and remarried. He probably started there in
Lufthansa administration, but was later an import-export businessman. Obituaries for him
appeared in numerous papers after he died on 22 April 2007.
The family was descended from Reichsritter (Free Imperial Knights), an order of landed
gentry from about the 15th century; they had a long tradition of military service; at some time,
possibly during the Napoleonic Wars, it adopted the name ‘von Malapert-Neufville’. His
father had been a general in the Imperial Army in World War I. One brother was a lieutenantcolonel in the army in Italy in 1944. The other, Robert-Georg, was a Stuka pilot, who was
awarded the Knight’s Cross on 6 January 1942 and, posthumously, Oak Leaves to the
Knight’s Cross on 8 June 1942.
8
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5 COMMENTS ON KORMORAN CREW
Barbara Poniewierski
Owing to his annoyance at Montgomery’s book, I could get information from Malapert
only through Ahl or Jürgensen; my book settled him down somewhat, and after that he gave a
number of interviews, including to David Mearns and Peter Hore, and he corresponded with
David Kennedy. Personally, I would have been put off anyway by his attitude towards
women, but that did not bother ‘the blokes’, if they noticed it.
Skeries, Fritz Julius: born 5 April 1915, Elbing, East Prussia. Religion: no denomination.
Wife: Brigitte, Berlin. One daughter. Father: Julius. Mother: Helene Rotweiler; Trakehnen,
East Prussia. (Now: Yasnaya Polyana, Russia.)
Joined the navy 1935: Oberleutnant; promoted to Kapitänleutnant, 1 April 1942. ArtillerieOffizier. (Gunnery). Iron Cross First Class.
One of the few genuinely ‘Prussian’ officers aboard, he was possibly the nearest thing to a
Nazi among the officers. Nazi policy encouraged people to dissociate themselves from
organised religion, while maintaining a belief in a ‘god’ of some sort. Of the officers, only
Skeries and List followed this course, although many young ratings gave their religion as
‘gottglaubig’, which was usually translated as ‘theist’.
Schäfer, Edmund Bernard Josef: born 6 February 1915, Düsseldorf. Religion: Roman
Catholic. Single. Father: Wilhelm; mother Anne Wegerich. (Düsseldorf)
Oberleutnant; promoted to Kapitänleutnant, 1 August 1943. In the navy five and a half years.
(1936) Iron Cross, Second Class.
A keen and competent yachtsman, he was in charge of the LS-boat and the searchlights. He
had been a guest at the Royal Naval College in Britain in 1936.
Brinkmann, Wilhelm Gerhard: born 31 March 1912, Osterfeld in Westfalen. Religion:
Roman Catholic. Single. Father: Wilhelm; mother: Anna Stapel. (Hamm in Westfalen)
Oberleutnant; promoted to Kapitänleutnant, 1 August 1943. Flak-Offizier (anti-aircraft). Iron
Cross Second Class.
Four and a half years navy. (Possibly not continuous; otherwise, it meant that he joined in
1937, at age 25, which would have been unusual.)
Six months in merchant navy, Second Officer.
Lienhoop, Karl Hinrich [or Heinrich] Friedrich Wilhelm (Dr, med): born 2 July 1908,
Bremen. Religion: Lutheran.
Stabsarzt (Surgeon Lieutenant-Commander); promoted to Oberstabsarzt, 1 November 1942.
Iron Cross Second Class. Six years, ten months in the navy. (1935)
Wife: Ingrid; residence Brake/Oldenburg. No children.
Father: Friedrich; mother: Frieda Magerkurth. (Bremen)
He was concerned mainly with the general health of crew on a long voyage with periods
without fresh food and in unaccustomed tropical heat.
9
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5 COMMENTS ON KORMORAN CREW
Barbara Poniewierski
Habben, Siebelt (Dr, med.): born 16 August 1905, Insenhausen bei Esens, Ost-Friesland.
Religion: Evangelical. Father: Redelf [sic?]; mother: Tobken Marie Tjarks.
Lieutenant. Single. Iron Cross Second Class. Two years in navy; before that, surgeon in
Berlin hospital.
Habben, rather than Lienhoop, was the specialist surgeon; he also operated as a dentist.
Wagner, Hermann Heinrich Fritz Bernhard (Dr): born 26 May 1903, Bremen, Oberneuland.
Religion: Evangelical.
Wife: Friedel Grettsche; three daughters. (Delmenhorst)
Father: August (Berlin); mother Else Buecking (deceased).
Regierungsrat; promoted to Oberregierungsrat, 6 June 1943.
Meteorological adviser attached to army, navy and air force, ca 12 years.
The Auxiliary Officers:
Diebitsch, Johannes Otto Emil: born 12 June 1896, Magdeburg. Religion Evangelical.
Wife: Auguste Muller (Hamburg). No children.
Father Oscar; mother Elise Tauschner (dec.)
Leutnant (Sonderführer). Formerly Chief Officer, Norddeutsche Lloyd. Navy two years.
Interned in Spain, World War I. Self-proclaimed ‘Nazi since 1932’.
Lost while captain of training barque Pamir when she foundered in a storm, September 1957.
Bunjes, Wilhelm Christian: born 31 December 1902, Ipwege/Oldenburg. Religion: Lutheran.
Leutnant (Sonderführer). Formerly with German Afrika Linie, until June 1940.
Wife: Bertha Wittern (Heimburg, Sachsen-Anhalt; post-war Soviet Zone). 2 sons, 1 daughter.
Father: Diedrich (dec.); mother Marie Kreyer (dec). He was not well respected aboard ship,
and he felt isolated and resentful.
Jansen, Rudolf Wilhelm: born 20 July 1914, Oberhausen/Osterfeld. Religion Evangelical.
Single. Father: Rudolf (Oberhausen); mother Wilfriede Schmidt (dec.)
Leutnant (Sonderführer). Four years in navy’ formerly three years with Norddeutsche Lloyd,
Third Officer. Joined Kormoran from Alsterufer, April 1941.
He was the lookout who first sighted Sydney. Joined in the escape party in January 1945.
Kube, Bruno Hermann: born 20 January 1899, Hindenburg, Upper Silesia. Religion: Roman
Catholic. Merchant navy officer, Hamburg-Amerika Linie.
Wife: Alice Habuch, 1 son, 1 daughter (Hamburg).
Father Paul; mother Gertrud Pelke (Bad Landeck).
10
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5 COMMENTS ON KORMORAN CREW
Barbara Poniewierski
Supernumeraries:
List, Fritz (Dr, not med.): born 26 August 1907, Kiel. Religion: Christian, non-sectarian. (Se
comment on Skeries.) Widower. (Margot, née Schwarze). No children.
Father: Franz (dec.); mother Josephine Pietschmann.
Leutnant. Three years with Marine-Artillerie; called up with his unit at the beginning of the
war. Worked for Reichspropaganda-Amt. He would have had to be a member of the
Reichspressekammer and may have been a Party member previously. List’s doctorate was in
Economics (Wirtschaftswissenschaft) not Science (Naturwissenschaft) as has been claimed.
List drew the cave picture that was believed to contain shorthand, but not the domestic
triptych that allegedly contained a coded message. It was he who buried a camera in a cave at
Red Bluff. (Not a hole; German ‘Höhle’ = English ‘cave’. List’s English was not very good.)
Frame writes, incorrectly [p. 108], that Detmers ‘revealed’ on 2 February 1945 that List had
hidden in a cave a camera containing photos of the battle. In early February, Detmers was in
Old Melbourne Gaol, and he would in any case have said nothing until the war was over.
[Probably Frame, or some intermediary, has mistaken ‘11’ (November) for ‘II’ (February).]
Hrich, Walter: born 18 April 1907, Vienna. Religion: Evangelical.
Wife: Gertrud Siebeneichner (Berlin).
Father: Eugen (Berlin; mother: Valerie Valenci.
Leutnant. Navy, two and a half years.
A newsreel cameraman with UFA. (Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft)
Killed:
Chief Engineer: Hermann Stehr
Electrical Engineer: Egbert von Gaza (real name, von Gazen; it is not known why he was
called ‘Gaza’ aboard ship.
Significant Petty Officers:
Ahlbach, Erich Friedrich: born 21 February 1915, Neuwied.Rhein. Religion: Evangelical.
Single. Father: Friedrich; mother Anna Ehlscheid. Iron Cross Second Class.
Signalmaat (Second class signal mate); promoted to Obersignalmaat, 6 June 1943. Navy 8
years; previously a clerk.
Wounded in action: shell splinter in left calf. Entered in a list of personal possessions when
captured were a photographic lens, and a stopwatch.
Jürgensen, Otto Robert Adolf: born 28 January 1911, Hamburg. Religion: Evangelical.
Wife: Gretchen Rundspaden. No children. (She was killed during the bombing of Hamburg in
July [?] 1943. Second wife: Marina) Father: Richard; mother Alwine Schlichting (Hamburg).
Bootsmaat (Bosun’s Mate); navy one year; transferred from army. Iron Cross Second Class.
As assistant to the Navigation Officer, he knew more than most about what happened during
the raider’s cruise.
11
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5 COMMENTS ON KORMORAN CREW
Barbara Poniewierski
Jürgensen had been a secondary school teacher of English and sport before the war. It
would have been obligatory for him to join the Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund (NSLB; as
with the Builders’ Labourers Union: no ticket, no start.), but he was probably not a Party
member. The family name was originally Jorgensen (Danish), but at the time of a plebiscite
held in the Schleswig-Holstein borderlands, an ancestor opted for German citizenship and
moved to Hamburg. Jürgensen was quick-tempered and argumentative. He and CPO Köhn
had a falling out with Dr Habben over disciplinary jurisdiction in the POW camp and the
ROA classes (Reserve-Offiziers-Anwärter = Reserve Officer Candidates), and he was sacked
as camp interpreter when he had a row with one of the Australian officers.
After the war, he organised the crew reunions, giving hospitality to some guests, keeping
discreet clandestine contact with crew members in the Soviet Zone and arranging finance for
them to visit reunions when they were too old to be of such value to the communist economy
that they were not allowed out. He and Ursula Detmers heartily but politely disliked each other.
Weinig, Sigmar: born 19 June 1912, Karsau/Rhein. Religion: Roman Catholic.
Single. Father: Sigmar; mother Lena Zimmermann (Konstanz/Bodensee).
Obersteuermaat (Warrant Officer I); promoted to Stabsobersteuermaat, 1 April 1943. Iron
Cross First Class. Helmsman during the battle.
Highly decorated pre-war: Sudeten Medal; Memel Medal; Spanish War Cross (from Franco);
Moroccan War Medal.
Köhn, Paul Otto Gustav: born 30 October 1904, Hamburg. Religion: Evangelical. Single.
Father: Gustav (dec); mother: Thekla Witt (Hamburg).
Navy fifteen years three months (1926); Oberfunkmaat (Warrant officer First Class, wireless).
Iron Cross Second Class. He was Petty Officer in charge of ciphering and coding, and
whatever attempts were made at cryptanalysis on board.
Linke, Hans: See section on wireless.
12
SUBM.005.0194
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
A great deal of nonsense has been written about Detmers’ ‘diary’ and the ‘dictionary’,
because people mix them up. The suggestion that Detmers took the dictionary with him when
he escaped is nonsense. The claim that he would not have been allowed to return to Germany
with the dictionary ‘tucked under his arm’ is also nonsense. (See below.) So is the suggestion
that the dictionary was found in Australia and forwarded to the Admiralty; it remained in the
possession of Detmers’ family. Therefore I shall go into some detail about them to try to sort
out the mess.
The Diary:
During the night of 10-11 January 1945, Captain Detmers joined a party of escapees, mainly
officers, from the prisoner of war camp at Dhurringile near Tatura in Victoria. Only three
were from Kormoran: Kapitän Theodor Detmers, Leutnant (S) Rudolf Jansen, and an orderly,
Walter Rodzies. [For details see Barbara Winter, Stalag Australia, 1986, pp. 272-94.] On
18 January, Detmers and a Luftwaffe officer, Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant-Colonel) Hellmut
Bertram, were recaptured outside Tallygaroopna, some 25 km north of Shepparton. When
they were searched, a notebook was taken from Detmers. It contained a cipher report of the
action, either in the notebook or on loose pages placed inside the notebook.
The cipher account was sent to a cryptanalytic unit in Melbourne; this was still called
FRUMel (Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne), although it is likely that, by this time, most of the
Americans had moved out. They determined that the cipher was based on a modified
polyalphabetic Vigenère grid, and enciphered using the key word ‘Gefechtsbericht’ (Battle
Report). Detmers had made a few errors in enciphering, but these would not have held up the
cryptanalysts for long. A more significant problem was that, although the cryptographers
recognised that he had used letters to indicate numbers, some translators could not always
decide where numbers were intended. Thus they did not pick up the meaning of the QQQQ
signal that Kormoran had sent, nor did they recognise the latitude and longitude, nor the
references to types of rangefinders or the number of shells fired. Apparently, two translations
were made in Melbourne, and one in London. None is totally correct, but comparison of the
three obtains the full report. [See NAA B5823: 1: Dietmar’s (Detmer’s) diary. Account of
action between [HSK] Kormoran and [HMAS] Sydney – decode and translation. Digitised on
Archives website. Pp. 2-4: methodology; pp. 5-16: working sheets. From there, translation
attempts.]
There has been disagreement as to the type of cipher used. Captain Peter Hore obtained a
copy of Detmers’ original German version and worked through it again, finding encryption
errors made by Detmers, and decryption errors made by the cryptanalysts, and making a
couple of his own, but his big error was in mentioning to Australian Archives that the cipher
used was Playfair. Archives put this comment on one of their websites, with the result that
James Eagles added to one of his RANCB sites that I was wrong, and this was picked up by
others. I am wrong sometimes, but not about this. (RANCBA = Royal Australian Navy
Communications Branch Association)
1
SUBM.005.0195
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
Upon my complaint early in 2007, and after consulting Hore and the Defence Signals
Directorate, Archives admitted that it was indeed Vigenère cipher, not Playfair, and amended
their site. Whether others who relied on this error have noticed the retraction is unclear. Two
polyalphabetic ciphers, Beaufort and Vigenère, rely on an enciphering grid about 26 by 26
squares, and the difference between them is not obvious from a casual glance. Playfair,
however, is a type of bigram cipher, and its square is radically different: only five by five
squares. [See wiki for the history and appearance of Vigenère and Playfair grids and how to
use them. The difference is obvious.] Eagles wrote to me that he would revise his claim about
the cipher when the Archives altered theirs. They did; he has not yet done so; in September
2008, it still appears under his name on both the RANCBA site and Ahoy – Mac’s Web Log.
Another piece of nonsense from Eagles regarding the cipher is the claim that Detmers wrote
or would have written his report in a German naval code that relied on the initial letters of the
words in a message. It was cumbersome to use, even for short messages, and it would have
been impossible to use it to encode a report of any length and complexity. In addition, it was
intended for use by the U-boat arm, and it is not certain that Detmers even knew this code.
It puzzled me that Eagles claimed that I had written that Detmers had used a German naval
cipher, because I knew I had never said or thought that. I worked it out eventually. He quotes
me has having written, regarding the ‘diary’: ‘Some of it was “in German naval cipher”.’ In a
way, this is quite funny. One would expect a literate adult to recognise that the quotation
marks indicate that the writer was not taking responsibility for what was written, and did not
necessarily agree with it; it was taken from the initial report by the FRUMel cryptanalysts,
and I knew that it had turned out to be wrong. All that fuss because Eagles does not appear to
recognise the significance of quotation marks! The rather flimsy security of the Vigenère
cipher offered only a limited degree of security; it depends on the use of a key word, which
the cryptanalysts try to discover; once that is done, the cipher can be read easily. On internet
there are programs that can crack Vigenère practically automatically; it no longer offers any
but the briefest security.
The Dictionary:
There have been accusations that the diary report was a pack of lies, and that Detmers
intended it to be found. However, it is almost word for word identical to the dictionary report,
which was not found and was definitely not meant to be. It is possible, however, that Detmers
was content for the diary to be found, for if Naval Intelligence thought they had found his
secret report, they might not look too hard for another copy. Some people have cast scorn on
the idea that Detmers would have been able to get back to Germany with the dictionary
‘tucked under his arm’. However, prisoners of war and internees being repatriated were
allowed to take with them a certain weight of luggage. They could use this however they
liked, except that commercial quantities of coffee and cigarettes were forbidden. If Detmers
chose to use up some of his weight allowance with a reference book, that was his business. It
would not have been queried.
2
SUBM.005.0196
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
The message in the dictionary is not in cipher. It was concealed as steganography. [Dare I
say again: see wiki? The article begins: ‘Steganography is the art and science of writing
hidden messages in such a way that no one apart from the sender and intended recipient even
realizes there is a hidden message. By contrast, cryptography obscures the meaning of a
message, but it does not conceal the fact that there is a message. Today, the term
steganography includes the concealment of digital information within computer files.’]
The method used by Detmers was to compose his report in plain language, then place a
tiny pencil dot under the required letters in certain sections of his dictionary. Although in
plain language, the message is not easy to read, even when you know that it is there, and
where it is, and approximately what it is going to say. First, the dots are difficult to see, or to
distinguish from minor blemishes in the paper. Two dots under a letter mean that the letter is
doubled. Unusual abbreviations are used as well as common words. (For example: bb and sb
for Backbord (port) and Steuerbord (starboard); bz and kz for Bodenzünder [base fuse] and
Kopfzünder [nose fuse]. A ‘b’ with two dots under it thus meant the port side.) If the letter he
wanted to use did not occur within a reasonable distance of the previous letter, he would use a
similar substitute. Thus a C could stand also for K or S, and an S for C or Z, but not K for S.
It is not an easy read.
I had heard about the dictionary, but did not have access to it when I wrote my book. When
I visited Hamburg in November 1990, in the course of a research trip for another book,
Ursula Detmers invited her nephew, Hans-Günther Jantzen, to show me the dictionary. He
later provided me with photocopies of the relevant parts. In a photocopy, the report is even
more difficult to read, as the faint lead sheen of the original dots is missing. Nevertheless, I
transcribed most of it, and presented an account of it at the HMAS Sydney Forum at the
Fremantle Maritime Museum in November 1991. The West Australian newspaper missed this
information, because it sent along a reporter to cover the address by Michael Montgomery in
the morning session, but withdrew her from the afternoon session when I gave my address.
When inquiries were made asking for information that might help determine the area for
the search for Sydney, I told David Mearns about the existence of the dictionary and who had
possession of it. This was a key factor in deciding the area to search, as it seemed unlikely
that Detmers had been lying to himself.
The ‘diary’ cipher account, in the original German decrypted version below is adapted
from the Archival file, Series B5823: 1, currently digitised on the website of National
Archives Australia, so that anyone with the ability and perseverance to try an independent
translation can have a go. An attempt has been made to make it more readable while still
showing the difficulty that the translators faced. One page of the original enciphered version
written by Detmers is given at the end. It will be of little use to most people, but it gives an
idea of the complexity of the task with which the cryptanalysts and translators were faced.
There is one erratic error in rendering numbers; the exposition in the introductory page is
wrong. GHI should clearly be 789, but sometimes I is rendered as 8.
3
SUBM.005.0197
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
I have inserted a comma to divide words; there is no such division in the original. Letters that
have been, or should have been rendered as figures in the translation are given in BOLD, the
actual figures are given on the right hand side. An underlined D stands for zero. An ‘X’ is
sometimes used in the original for a decimal point. Full stops: if they are followed by a space,
they are given in the text as X, which indicates a new ‘sentence’ or section. If the full stop is
not followed by a space, it indicates that the previous word is an abbreviation. The lines are
arranged with letters in multiples of 15, as the key word, GEFECHTSBERICHT, contains 15
letters. Errors and omissions excepted. The material is very difficult to read. Page 1 is not
available on this site.
Page 2:
AEEE,MELDUNG,AUSGUCK,JANSEN. SEGLE
R,IN,SICHT,BB,VORAUS,PEILUNG,ETWA,BD,R
W. VERBESSERT,MELDUNG,LAUFEND,IN,X,B,
SEGLER. MEHRERE,FAHRZEUGE. B,RAUCH
WOLKEN,ANSCHEINEND,BEWACHER. ALA
RM. NACH,BB,AUF,BFD,ABGEDREHT. AK,VOR
AUS.
AFDD, KREUZER,ERKANNT,ALS,PERTH,KLAS
SE,ANGESPROCHEN,LIEGT,AUF,SUEDKURS
K,KURS,BED,IN,DIE,SONNE,HINEIN. DUNKE
LWERDEN,ERST,AB,AI,ZU,RECHNEN. STARK
E,EIGENER,RAUCHENTWICKLUNG. K,MASCHI
NE,MELDET. MOTOR,D,AUSGEFALLEN. DAD
URCH,FAHRT,ETWA,AD,SM.
AFDE,KREUZER,DREHT,ZU,MESSUNG,UEBER,
AFD,HM.,KOMMT LANGSAM,AUF,GEBT,DAUERN
Page 3:
D,NNJ,MIT,SCHEINWERFER. SETZEN,SIGN
AL,FUER,STRAAT. LAGEBEURTEILUNG,UN
D,ENTSCHLUSS.
AFCE,MOTOR, D,WIEDER,KLAR,MIT,H,ZYLIND
ERN,K,FAHRT,AD,BEIBEHALTEN. MESSUNG
MIT,C,M,GERAET,BEI,HD,HM,AUS,TARNUNGSG
RUENDEN,EINGESTELLT,MIT,AXCE,M,GERA
ET,WEITERGEMESSEN. FORTWAEHREND,S
IGNALVERKEHR. KREUZER,KOMMT,MIT,SC
HMALER,SILHUETTE,LANGSAM,STB.ACHTE
RAUS,AUF.
Page 4:
AGDD,MELDUNG,AUF,FDD,M. QQQ,STRAAT,AA
AEBFS. PERTH,RADIO,WIEDERHOLT,FORD
4
1555
20; [RW=rechtweisend]
2
2
260;[AK=äusserste Kraft]
1600
250;[K= Kormoran]
19 [hours]
4 (IV)
14 [SM=Seemeilen=knots]
1605
164
1635, 4, 8
14;[K= Kormoran]
3, 80 [HM= Hektometer]
1·35
1700, 600, 11
1E 26S
SUBM.005.0198
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
ERT,WEITERE,MELDUNG,FALLS,NOTWENDIG.
AGAE,KREUZER,LAEUFT,STB,QUERAB,MIT,A
BSTAND,I,HM.
UM,AGBE,MORSESPRUCH,NOCHMALS. HOIS
T,YOUR,SECRET,CALL. WEITERE,VERZOEG
ERUNG,KANN,NUR,LAGE,VERSCHLECHTERN,
STELLT,MOTOR,AB,ALSO,VOELLIG,AHNUNG
SLOS.
DAHER,AGCD,ENTTARNEN. HOLL.FLAGGE
NIEDER,KRIEGSFLAGGE,GROSSMAST,WEH
T,KLAR,AUS. ENTTARNZEIT,F,SEK.ARTL.
FEUERLAUBNIS. TORPEDOWAFFE,SCH
IESSERL. GEGNER,SACKT,LANGSAM,ACHT
1715
9 [Note: 9hm, not 90hm]
1725
[Motor: of aircraft]
1730
6
Page 5:
ERAUS. B,TORP.LAGE,ID,FAHRT,AD,ABKOM
MPUNKT,BUG,HECK,DAZU,LANGSAM,AUF,BFD,
UM,ARTL,NICHT,ZU,STOEREN. A,SALVE,EINZEL
SCHUSS,KURZ. EINGESTELLTE,E,AC.
B.SALVE. C,D,E,MIT D,VOR, ETWA,D,SEKUN,SPATE
R, GIBT,TREFFER,BRUECKE,UND,LEITSTAN
D. UNMITTELBAR,DARAUF,VOLLSALVE,VO
M,GEGNER,LIEGT,WEIT. KEIN,TREFFER.
DANACH,ETWA,B,SALVEN,E,SEK,TAKT. TREF
FER,MITTSCHIFFS,FLUGZEUG, BRUECKE.
SCHIEBERVERBESSERUNG,LINKS,ZWISC
HEN,VORDERE,TUERME. FLA,MW,UND,STB,CG
WIRKSAM,AUF,BRUECKE,ROHRSAETZE,FLA
KART.L BIS,E,SALVE,KEINE ANTWORT,DAN
N,TURM,C,GUT,UND,SCHNELL. TREFFER,SCH
ORNSTEIN,MASCHINE. TURM,D,NUR BIS,C
Page 6:
SALVEN,ALLES,WEIT. TURM.B,NICHT,MEHR.
ETWA,BEI,H,BIS,J,SALVE,TORP.TREFFER,V
ORKANTE,TURM,A,B,TORP.KURZ.VORM,BUG,V
ORBEI. VORSTEVEN,TAUCHT,FAST,VOELL
IG,EIN,KURS,BFD,BEIBEHALTEN,WEIL.TOR
P.ROHRSAETZE,WEGEN,FLA.M.W.FEUER,NIC
HT,BESETZT. GEGNER,DREHT,HART,ZU. KU
RS,UND,FAHRT,BEIBEHALTEN,UM,KLAR,ZU,K
OMMEN. TURMDECKE,B,FLIEGT,AUSSENBO
RDS,WEITERE,TREFFER,VORSCHIFF.
UM,AGCE,ETWA,SCHLAEGT,GEGNER,HINTER
5
2, 90, 14
260
1
13 [E=Entfernung]
2, 3,4,5, 4,4
2, 5
3·7
5
3
8, 10
2 [2. = second]
260
[MW=Maschinenwaffen]
1735
SUBM.005.0199
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
M,HECK,DURCH, IN,FUER, IHN,TORP.TAKTIS
CH,UNGUENSTIGE,POSITION.STARKER,Q
UALM,INFOLGE,MASCHINENBRAND,VERDE
CKT,GEGNER,FUER,BRUECKE. FLAKO,WEIT
Page 7:
ER,MIT,HECKGESCHUETZE. E,ETWA,DD,HM
GEGNER,GESCHUETZE,ZEIGEN,BB. SEINE,
FLAK,IST,NICHT,BESETZT.
ETWA,AGDE,NACH,BB,ANGEDREHT, UM,GEGNE
R,VOELLIG,ZU,VERNICHTEN. KURZ,DARAU
F,FALLEN,UMDREHUNGEN,SCHNELL,KEINE,
VERBINDUNG,MIT,MASCHINE,GLEICHZEI
TIG,D,BLASENBAHNEN. GESTUETZT,WEIL,
FRAGLICH,OB,MASCHINEN,NOCH,DREHUNG,
SCHAFFEN,UND,BAHNEN,GUT,ACHTERAUS,W
ANDERN. KURS,BDD. DURCHGAENGE,KURZ,
HINTERM,HECK.GLEICHZEITG,GEHEN,M
OTOREN,DURCH. LENSCH,MELDET,MASCHI
NE,UND,ALLE,FEUERLOESCHMITTEL,VOEL
LIG,AUSGEFALLEN. BEFEHL, VERSUCHEN,
WENIGSTENS,A,MOTOR,KLARZUMACHEN.
Page 8:
ART. LTG.AB,ETWA,AGED,WIEDER,VOM,VO
RDEREN,STAND,MIT,GANZER,BATTERIE,AU
F,FD,HM. SIDNEY,SUEDKURS,GERINGE,FAH
RT. BRUECKE,BIS,ACHT. SCHORNSTEIN,
BRENNT. LAUFEND,WEITERE,TREFFER. ET
WA,AHDD,EINZEL,TORP.AUF,GD HM,LAGE,HD
FAHRT,E,FEHLSCHUSS,HINTEN.
AHBE,BATTERIE,HALT,LETZTE,MESSUNG,I
J HM,SCHUSSE.ADD HM,SCHIFFSPEILUNG,
BBE,VERBRAUCHT,ETWA,EDD BZ,ED KZ. VO
BEREITEN,SCHIFF,ZU,VERSENKEN. ALLE,B
OOTE,RETTUNGSMITTEL,AUSSETZEN. DU
RCHKOMMEN,ZUR,MASCHINE,UNMOEGLICH,SE
LBST,UEBERZEUGT,EWERK,B,KLAR,ABER,N
UTZLOS. GEGNER,KOMMT,AUF,ETWA,AFD HM
KURS,ETWA,AED,AUSSER,SICHT,FEUERSCH
[Flak-Offizier]
40; [E=Entfernung]
1745
4
240
1
1750
60
1800, 70, 80
5
1825; [IJ: 90?]
100
BB5: See below. 500, 50.
160
150
(BBE has been rendered as 225; this seems strange. Might it have been
BB5=Backbord 5º - Red 5?)
Page 9:
EIN,BIS,ETWA,BBDD,DANACH,NOCH,VEREIN
6
2200
SUBM.005.0200
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
ZELTES,AUFFLACKERN.
ETWA,BADD,ALLE,RETTUNGSMITTEL,ZU,WA
SSER,BESETZT,UND,ABGELEGT. NOCH,ABD
MANN,AN,BORD,DARUNTER,FAST,ALLE,OFFZ.
KLARE,KANONEN,DAMIT,BESETZBAR. MI
NENRAUM,NUR,WENIG,VERQUALMT,BEIDE,B
OOTE,AUS,LUKE,A. ETWA,BCCD,BEIDE,ZU,WA
SSER,A,MIT,EH,ABGESTELLT,SPRENGLADUNG,
OELBUNKER,BB,VORN,BCEE,QUALM,MINEND
ECK,NIMMT,STARK,ZU,BDDD,AUSSERDIENS
T,GESTELLT,SPRENGLDG,ANGESCHLAGEN.
LETZTES,BOOT,ABGELEGT,DDAD,DETONAT
ION,SPRENGLDG,DDCE,MINEN,GEHEN,HOCH.
SCHIFF,SINKT,SCHNELL,UEBER,ACHTERS
TEVEN.
2100
120 [Not ABD=124]
1, 2330
1, 58
2355
2400
0010
0035
Page 10:
This page is missing, or non-existent. Continuation on page 11 is the Engine Room log. This
has obviously been composed by a different person. The numbers are written in full instead
of being represented by letters, and Umlauts have been omitted. There are also more
enciphering errors. Note also the use of the even then obsolete ‘ward’ for ‘wurde’.
Page 11:
Engine Room Log:
EINS,SECHS,NULL,FUNF,MELDUNG,AN,BRUC
KE,MOTOR,VIER,AUSGEFALLEN,WEGEN,HEI
SSLAUFENS,EINES,KOLBENS,DADURCH,HO
CHSTFAHRT,EINS,VIER,KN. BEI,DEM.V
ERSUCH,DIE,BELASTUNG,DER MOTOREN,ZU,
STEIGERN,FIEL,DER,HAUPTMOTOR,VIER,I
NFOLGE,HEISSLAUFENS,DES,KOLBENS,SI
EBEN,AUS.DER,MOTOR
WURDE,SOFORT,GESTOPPT,DER,BESCHADI
TE,KOLBEN,ABGEFANGEN,DIE,TREIBSTA
NGE,AUSGEBAUT,UND
DIE STEUERORGANE,ABGESCHALTET.ETW
D,EINS,SECHS,DREI,FUNF,KONTE,DER,MOTO
R,MIT,ACHT,ZYLINDER,WIEDER,AUF,FAHR
NETZ,GESCHALTET WERDEN.DAMIT,SCHIF
F,WIEDER,KLAR,FUR,HOCHST,FAHRT,EINS,S
Page 12:
IEBEN,EINS,FUNF,LECKZENTRALE,VON,ST
B,BETRIEBSGANG,NACH,BB,BETRIEBSGAN
7
SUBM.005.0201
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
G,VERLEGT,VORAUSSICHTL,FEUERLEE.EIN
NS,SIEBEN,DREI,NULL,BEFEHL,VON,BRUCK
E,ENTTARNEN. ETWA,EINS,SIEBEN,DREI,FU
NF,MEHRQRE,TEFFEU
IN,DEN,HAUPTMOTORENRAUM, EINE GRANA
TE,RISS,DIE VORDERE,BUNKERWAND, DES,M
ASCHINENRAUMES,ERHEBLICH,AUF.EIN,B
REITER, BRENNENDER,TREIBOLSTRAHL,E
RGOSS,SICH,IN DEN,RAUM, DER SCHNELL,MI
T,UNDURCHSICHTIGEM,RAUCH,GEFULLT,W
ARD.DIE,HAUPTFEUERLOSCHLEITUNG,WURD
DE,IM,MASCH.RAUM, AUF BEIDEN,SEITEN,DU
RCHSCHLAGEN.GLEICHZEITIG,FIEL,DIE,
Page 13:
GESAMMTE,AN,STB,VERLEGT,SCHAUMFEU
ERLOSCHANLAGE,AUS.EINE,EXPLOSION,A
N,STB,SEITE,BRACHTE,DEI,TRANSFORMAT
OREN,ZUM,AUSFALL.HIERDUCL,FIEL,DIE,E
LEKTRISCHE,ERREGUNG,FUR,DIE,HAUPTG
ENERATOREN,UND,FAHRTMOTOREN,AUS.DA
MIT,WARD,DIE,GEWAMTE,HAUPTMASCHINEN
ANLAGE,AUSGEFALLEN.MELDUNG,AN,BRUC
KE,MASCHINENANLAGE,DURCH,FEINDEIN
WIRKUNG,AUSGEFALLEN.MOTORRAUM,BRE
NNT,UNTER,SEHR,STARKE,RAUCHENTWIC
KLUNG.FRAGE,KANN,MOTORENRAUM,VERLA
SSEN,WERDEN.BEFEHL,VON,BRUCKE,MOTOR
ENRAUM,VERLASSEN.
ES,WAR,JETZT,NUR,NOCH,EWERK,ZWEI,KLAR.
DER,VERSUCH,DES,PUMPENMEISTERS,DIE
Page 14:
FEUERLOCHLEITUNG,VON,DEM,AGGREGAT,
IM,SCHRAUBENMOTORENRAUM,UNTER,DRU
CK,ZU,NEHMEN,MISSLANG,WEIL,IN,DER,BES
CHADIGTEN,FEUERLOSCHLEITUNG,DER,D
RUCK,SOFORT,WEGFIEL.EINS,SIEBEN,VIE
R,FUNF,EINS,WACHMASCHINIST,MELDET,M
UNDLICH,DEM,KOMMANDANTEN,AUF,DER,BR
UCKE.ZU,DIESER,ZEIT,GINGEN,DIE,MOTOR
EN,DURCH.KMDT,BEFIEHLT,ZU,VERSUCHEN,
WENIGSTENS,EINEN,MOTOR,WIEDER,KLAR,
ZU,BEKOMMEN. ALLE,VERSUCHE,IN,DEN,MAS
8
[mehrere Treffer]
[brachte die]
[hierdurch]
[gesammte]
SUBM.005.0202
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
CHINENRAUM,EINZUDRINGEN,WAREN,ERF
OLGLOS.EINS,WM,UBERMITTELTE,BEFEHL,
KMDT,TELEFONISCH,VON,LECKZENTRALE,
AN,LT,IM.MASCH.LEITSTAND.LI.MELDETE,Z
URUCK,DAS,BEFEHL,
Page 15:
NICHT,DURCHFUHRBAR,UND,LEITSTANDB
ESATZUNG,LJ,EJ,ZWEI,AM,EM,ZWEI,FAHRMA
TE,UND,ZWEI,ORDONNANZEN,AM,ERSTICK
EN,SEI.KURZ,DARAUF,
MELDETE,SICH,DER,LEITSTAND,NICHT,ME
HR.EINS,WM,MELDET,KMDT,DASS,MASCHINE,
ENDGULTIG,AUSGEFALLEN,UND,MIT,LEIT
STAND,KEINE,VERBINDUNG,MEHR,VERSUC
HE,DIE,LEITSTANDSBESATZUNG,ZU,RETTE
N,MISSLANGEN. NUR,EINEM,FAHRMAAT,OBM
ASCHMT,HAHNERT,GELANG,ES,AUS,DEM,LEI
TSTAND,ZU,ENTKOMMEN.ER,GIBT,ANGESEH
EN,ZU,HABEN,WIE,DIE,
LEITSTANDWACHE,BEI,DEM,VERGEBLICH
EN,VERSUCH,DIE,FALLTUR,DER,SPLITTER
Page 16:
GRATING,ZU,OFFNEN,DURCH,EINE,PLOTZL
ICHE,FEUERGARBE,GETOTET,WURDE. EINS,
ACHT,ZWEI,FUNF,BEFEHL,VON,KMDT,ALLE,M
ANN,AUF,BERGUNGSSTATION.
9
SUBM.005.0203
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
The following is adapted from material labelled: ‘Account by Detmers’.
Although it is very similar to both the ‘diary’ account and the dictionary, it is not identical in
wording to either, and must be a separate source. It has been suggested that this account was
confiscated when returnees disembarked at Cuxhaven. There are a few instances where a
letter or two at the right-hand edge have been cut off when the material was photocopied.
These have been inserted when obvious.
Gefechtsbericht. 26.10.41
KULMERLAND entlassen. Nach Westen abgesetzt. Motor 1 statt 2
wechselseitig schaltbar.
7.11.41
Mittags Amerikaner gesichtet, abgedreht. Anschliessend Umbau. 1-stündige
Bereitschaft.
8.11.41
Umbau beendet. Probefahrt ohne Störung. Auf V-Mann-Weg gegangen da
noch Zeit bis Neumond. Will dann vor PERTH stehen. Meldung über CORNWALL mit
Convoy bei CAP LEEWIN auf Westkurs. Daraufhin auf Kurs NO gegangen. Absicht:
Kontrolle der Küste vor SHARKS BAY.
Mittwoch, 19.11.41. Kurs 25º, 11 Sm. 111º Ost, 26º34‘ Süd. SSO 3 bis 4, See 3, mittl.
Dünung aus SW, sehr klar.
15.55 Meldung Ausguck (Lt.z.S. JANSEN) Segler in Sicht BB voraus. Peilung etwa 20º rw.
Verbessert Meldung laufend in 2 Segler, mehrere Fahrzeuge, 2 Rauchwolken, anscheinend
Bewacher. Alarm. Nach BB auf 250º abgedreht. A.K. voraus.
16.00 Kreuzer erkannt als PERTH-Klasse angesprochen liegt auf Suedkurs. Kurs 250º in die
Sonne hinein. Dunkelwerden ab 19.00 Uhr zu rechnen. Starke eigene Rauchentwicklung.
Maschine meldet, Motor 4 ausgefallen. Dadurch Fahrt etwa 14 Sm.
16.05 Kreuzer dreht zu. Messung über 150 Hm. Gibt dauernd NNJ mit Scheinwerfer. Wir
setzen Signal fuer STRAAT.
Lagebeurteilung und Entschluss:
16.35 Motor 4 wieder klar mit 8 Zylindern. Fahrt 14 beibehalten. Messung mit 3m-Gerät bei
80 hm aus Tarnungsgründen eingestellt. Mit 1,25 m Gerät weitergemessen. Während der
ganzen Zeit Signalverkehr. Kreuzer kommt mit schmaler Silhouette langsam StB achteraus
auf.
17.00 Meldung auf 600 m abgesetzt: QQQ STRAAT MALAKKA, 111 E 26 S. PERTH
Radio wiederholt, fordert auf Weiteres zu melden falls notwendig.
17.15 Kreuzer läuft StB querab, Abstand 9 hm. [In one version, somebody amended this to
9[0]hm.]
17.25 Gegner stellt Flzg.Motor ab, ist also völlig ahnungslos.
17.30 Befehl entarnen. Kriegsflagge am Grossmast weht klar aus. Enttarnzeit
6 sec. Gegner sackt achteraus. 2 Torp. Mit Lage 90, Gegnerfahrt 14. Dazu auf
260º gedreht. 1. Salve Einzelschuss I. Kurz; eingestellte E 13 Hm. 2. Salve
(III, IV, V) mit 4. Hm vor, etwa 4 sec. Spater geschossen, ergibt Treffer in
Brücke und Artl.Leitstand Gegner. Unmittelbar darauf Vollsalve des Gegners,
liegt weit, kein Treffer.
10
SUBM.005.0204
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
Danach (5-sec Salventakt) etwa 8 Salven geschossen. Treffer mittschiffs,
vorderen Türmen, Fla.M.W. und St. 3.7 halten Rohrsätze, Flakartl. und Brücke.
Bis zu unserer 5. Salve keine Antwort. Danach Turm C gut und schnell. Turm D
schiesst nur 2-3 Salven, alles zu weit. Turm A und B kommen nicht mehr zum
Schuss.
Bei unserer 8. bis 10. Salve Torp.Treffer Vorkante Turn A. 2. Torp. geht eben
vorm Bug vorbei. Gegner dreht zu. Turmdecke Turm B fliegt aussenbords.
Etwa 17.35. Gegner schlägt hinter dem Heck durch. Starker Qualm aus unserem
Schornstein in Folge Maschinenbrand. Artl.Leitung Fl.A.O., schiesst mit
Flakgeschützen. Entfernung etwa 40 Hm. Gegnergeschütze zeigen nach BB. Seine
Flak ist nicht besetzt.
Etwa 17.45. Um Gegner völlig zu vernichten nach BB angedreht. Kurz darauf
Meldung Umdrehungen fallen schnell, keine Verbindung mit Maschine. Gleichzeitig sehe ich 4 Blasenbahnen. Kurs 240º beibehalten. Torpedos gehen kurz
hinter dem Schiff durch. Gleichzeitig schwere Erschütterung infolge Durchgehens der Motoren. Lensch meldet Maschine völlig, alle Feuerlöschmittel ausgefallen. Befehl versuchen, wenigstens eienen Motor klarzumachen.
Etwa 17.50. Artl. Leitung wieder vord. Stand. Mit ganzer Battr. Gefecht auf
60 Hm. Gegner läuft mit geringer Fahrt ungefähr S-Kurs. Back liegt tief im
Wasser. Vorkante Brücke bis achteren Schornstein brennt. Erhält laufend weitere
Treffer.
Etwa 18.00. Eigener Torp.Schuss auf 70.00 m mit Lage 100 [110?] Gegnerfahrt 5 Sm.
Fehlschuss hinten.
18.25. Halt, Batterie Halt. Letzte Messung 90 Hm. Letzte Schuss-E 104 Hm.
Letzte Schiffspeilung 225º [?]. Munitionsverbrauch etwa 500 Bdz., 50 Kz. EntSchluss: Vorbereitungen Schiff zu versenken, alle Offiziere auf die Brücke.
Befehl an I.O.: Alle Boote und Rettungsmittel auszusetzen. Lensch und Noll
melden Durchkommen zur Maschine unmöglich. Selbst überzeugt. E-Werk II ist
noch klar aber nutzlos. Minendeck laufend beobachten. Umrisse des Gegners
kommen in Dämmerung auf etwa 160 Hm ausser Sicht. Gegnerkurs etwa rw 150º.
Feuerschein von starken Bränden bis eetwa 2200 Uhr sichtbar.
Etwa 21.00 Uhr. Alle Rettungsmittel zu Wasser, besetzt und abgelegt. Es sind
noch 120 Mann an Bord, darunter fast alle Offiziere. Bedienung noch klaren
Geschütze ist damit sichergestellt. Minenraum bisher nur wenig verqualmt.
Befehl die beiden Boote aus Luke I auszusetzen.
(There must have been another page, but it is missing from my documents.)
11
SUBM.005.0205
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
‘Translation of parts of diary of Captain Detmers regarding the “Sydney-Kormoran”
Action.’ (Translation errors marked in bold; they are explained on the next page.)
(The title is followed by unrecognised initials and 15/7. So, 15 July, but which year?)
26.10.41
(four figures
omitted)
Wednesday 19.11.
1555
1600
1605
1635
1700
1715
1725
Detached KULMERLAND. Drew away to westward to
effect alterations to engines. Exchange of nos. 1
and 2 engines.
Midday: sighted an American, turned away. Then
effected alterations completed by
(four figures omitted). Trial run without trouble.
Proceeded on agent’s way, as still time before
new moon. Intend to be off PERTH by then. Report
of CORNWALL with convoy off Cape LEEUWIN course
west. Altered course to NE in consequence.
Intention: Investigation of coast off SHARKS BAY.
Course 25, Speed 11; 26.34 South, 111 East. SSE 3
to 4, Sea 3 medium swell from SW. Very clear.
Look out JANSEN reports sailing ship in sight on
port bow, bearing approx. 20º true. Report corrected currently to 2 sailing ships, several vessels,
2 smoke clouds, apparently escort.
Alarm. Turned away to port on to 260. Full speed
ahead.
Cruiser made out, identified as PERTH class, on
course South. Course 250 into the sun. Approach
of darkness not due before 1900. Producing large
quantities of smoke ourselves. Engine room reports:
No. 4 engine out of order. Speed therefore approx.
14 knots.
Cruiser turns towards; range over 150 hm.
Approaches slowly making “NNJ” repeatedly on
searchlight. Hoist signal for STRAAT. Appreciate
situation and make decision.
No. 4 engine running again on 8 cylinders. Speed
14 maintained; at 80 hm ceased measurement with 3
metre rangefinder, for reasons of disguise,
continued ranging with 1.35 metre rangefinder.
Continual signalling. Cruiser approaches slowly.
Report on 600 metres QQQ STRAAT EBFS. PERTH radio
Repeats and requests further report if necessary.
Cruiser draws away on starboard beam 90 hm distant.
Morse signal in (MAKS): HOIST YOUR SECRET CALL.
Further delay can only make the situation worse.
12
SUBM.005.0206
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
1730
1735
approx.
1745
approx.
Barbara Poniewierski
(Cruiser) stops engines, thus has not the least
suspicion. Therefore
Removal of disguise. Dutch flag struck, War flag
flies clear from main mast. Time taken 6 seconds.
Guns and torpedo given permission to fire. Enemy
drops slowly astern.
Two torpedoes inclination 80. Speed 14, point of aim
bow and stern. Also slow alteration to 260 so as not
to interfere with guns. First salvo single shot short,
Gun Range 13. Second salvo. Third fourth fifth, up
400. About 4 seconds later scores hit on bridge
and control position, followed immediately by full
salvo from enemy, but no hits. Then approx 2 salvoes
at 5 second interval. Hit amidships, aircraft, bridge.
Correction for deflection left between forward turrets.
A/A MG’s and starboard 3.7 effective against bridge,
torpedo tubes and A/A armament. Up to fifth salvo
no reply, then “C” turret well and fast. Hits in
funnel and engine room. “D” turret only two or three
salvoes, all of them over. “A” and “B” turrets no
longer (firing). At about eighth or ninth salvo
torpedo hit forward of “A” and “B” turrets. Torpedo
passed short distance ahead. Stern almost completely
submerged. Course 260 maintained since torpedo tubes not
manned because of A/A MG fire.
Enemy turns sharply towards. Course and speed
maintained to get clear. Top of “B” turret flies
overboard, further hits forward.
Enemy passes astern in unfavourable position for
firing his torpedoes. Thick smoke caused by fire
in engine room conceals enemy from bridge.
A/A Control Officer continues with stern armament
range approx. 40 hm. Enemy’s guns pointing to starboard. His A/A is not manned.
Turned away to port in order to destroy enemy
completely. Shortly afterwards revolutions drop
rapidly. No communication with engine room.
Simultaneously four torpedo tracks. Hold course
because questionable whether engines would make the
turn and tracks deviate well astern. Course 240.
(Torpedoes ) pass short distance astern. Simultaneously engines break down. LENSCH reports engine
room and all fire-extinguishing apparatus completely
out of order. Order to try to get at least one
13
SUBM.005.0207
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
1750
approx.
1800
approx.
1825
2100
approx.
2330
approx.
2355
2400
0035
Barbara Poniewierski
engine working. From
Gunnery control working again from forward position
With whole battery at 60 hm. SIDNEY course south
slow speed. On fired from bridge to after funnel.
Constant further hits.
Single torpedo at 70 hm inclination 80, speed 5.
Miss astern.
Guns check. Last range 90 hm. Shots 104 hm,
relative bearing 225. Rounds fired approx. 500
base fuze, 50 nose fuze. Prepare to scuttle. Lower
all boats and life-saving equipment. Impossible to
reach engine room; satisfied myself personally of
this. No. 2 electric installation working but
useless. Enemy disappears from sight at approx.
160 hm then occasional flickerings.
All life-saving apparatus lowered and cast off.
Still 124 men on board including almost all officers.
Such guns as are still working can thus be manned.
Only small quantity of smoke in mine hold. Both
boats from no. 2 hatch.
Both lowered, one with 59 (men). Explosive charge
in forward oil tank.
Smoke increasing heavily on mining deck.
Paid off. Touched off charge, last boat cast off.
Mines explode. Ship sinks rapidly stern first.
14
SUBM.005.0208
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
Erroneous and questionable translations:
‘Proceeded on agent’s way,’: This is not an error, but it needs explanation. The original reads
‘Vmannweg’. In this context, a V-Mann, or Vertrauensmann, was an agent of German naval
intelligence, and the ‘Weg’ was a course reported by him, being allegedly a diversionary
course prescribed for Allied shipping by the RN or RAN. This agent could have been
anywhere: Australia, India, Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Marmagoa or aboard some ship.
1700: Report on 600 metres QQQ STRAAT EBFS. PERTH radio
This should clearly be AAAEBFS = 111E 26S, as shown in decipherment. That is
within about 12 miles of the position in which the wrecks were located.
This erroneous interpretation, first brought to public attention by Montgomery, has
been repeated mindlessly again and again by others.
1715: Cruiser draws away on starboard beam 90 hm distant.
The original shows 9 hm. It is not known who made this irresponsible alteration.
Other translations are correct at 9 hm.
1725: (Cruiser) stops engines, thus has not the least suspicion.
One version reads: ‘Stoppt Maschine’, another ‘Stellt Motor ab’.
Turns off motor, therefore completely unsuspecting. This refers to the motor of the aircraft,
not the ship. ‘Cruiser’ has been inserted by a translator who did not understand the difference,
and it has given rise to quite false interpretations of the battle.
The other German report is quite specific and unambiguous:
17.25 Gegner stellt Flzg.Motor ab, ist also ahnungslos.
Opponent turns off aircraft motor …
1730: Two torpedoes inclination 80. This should be 90 (degrees). A decryption error for ‘I’,
which has been rendered sometimes as 8, sometimes as 9. It should always have been 9.
Stern almost completely submerged.
Deciphered report: Vorsteven taucht fast voellig ein.
Translation should read: STEM (bow) almost completely submerged.
1825 Guns check. Last range 90 hm. Shots 104 hm, relative bearing 225.
The greatest possible bearing relative to the ship is 180º. A true bearing would
indicate the Sydney was heading south-west. The probable correct interpretation is BB5.
That is, Backbord 5, or 5º Red (or port). I am not certain on this point.
2100: Still 124 men on board including almost all officers.
As it would have been impossible to do such an accurate head count under the
circumstances, one must presume this should be 120 men, as is stated in another account.
That would mean simply that D (0) had been read as D (4).
15
SUBM.005.0209
DETMERS’ DIARY AND DICTIONARY
Barbara Poniewierski
Engine Room Log: Translation:
This contains material that is not in the cipher report above, so it must come from a different
source.
19.11.41
1555
1600
1602
1604
1635
approx.
1715
1730
1735
approx.
Speed 11 knots. Nos. 1 and 4 engines on propulsion,
No. 3 engine on ship’s supply. On watch Warrant
Engineer LENSCH and two Stoker P.O’s.
Alarm. Order from bridge: All engines ready for
maximum speed. No. 2 engine turned on to propulsion.
All watches at action stations:
1st Watch working stations, Warrant Engineer
NAGEL.
2nd Watch at damage control stations, Warrant
Officer LENSCH.
3rd Watch engine room action parties, Warrant
Officer MITZLAFF.
Report to bridge: Engines ready for maximum speed.
Report to bridge: No. 4 Engine out of order by
reason of piston running hot, maximum speed therefore
approx. 14 knots.
On the attempt to increase the load of the engines,
No. 4 main engine became unserviceable owing to
piston 7 running hot. The engine was stopped forthwith, the damaged piston slung, the connecting rod
Removed and the valve gear disconnected.
Engine could be put into propulsion again on 8
cylinders. Ship thus again ready for maximum speed.
Damage control centre shifted from starboard gangway
to port gangway, as being probably away from the firing.
Order from bridge: Remove disguise.
Several hits in main engine room. One shell tore
the forward tank bulkhead of the engine room badly
open. A thick jet of burning fuel oil poured into
the room, which was rapidly filled with opaque
smoke. The main fire extinguisher pipe was punctured
On either side of the engine room, at the same time
the whole foam extinguisher plant which had been
transferred to the starboard side went out of action.
An explosion on the starboard side rendered the
transformers unserviceable, thereby putting the
electrical excitation for the main generators and
propulsion motors out of action. The whole of the
main engine installation was thus out of action.
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1745
1825
Barbara Poniewierski
Report to bridge: Engine installation unserviceable
by enemy action, very heavy smoke. Query may personnel
leave engine room? Order from bridge: leave engine
room. By this time only No. E electrical installation
was in order. The attempt by the Chief Plumber to
get pressure in the fire extinguisher pipe from the
power unit in the propulsion motor room failed, as
pressure dropped immediately in the damaged pipe.
Senior Stoker on watch reports verbally to C.O. on the
bridge. At this time the engines failed. C.O. orders
to try to get one engine working at least. All
attempts to penetrate into the engine room failed. First
Watchkeeping Officer passed order from C.O. by
telephone from Damage Control Centre to Engineer
Officer in Control position. Engineer Officer replied
that the order could not be carried out and crew of
control position, Engineer Officer (corrupt passage)
two P.O.’s and two stewards were suffocating. Shortly
afterwards control position ceased to report. First
Watchkeeping Officer reported to C.O.: engine room
finally out of action and no further communication
with control position.
Attempts to save crew of control position failed. Only
one P.O. Stoker P. O. Hahnert, succeeded in escaping
from the control position. He states he saw the
control position watch killed by a sudden burst of fire
while trying unsuccessfully to open the hatch of the
splinter grating.
Order from C.O.: All hands to abandon ship.
Note: The so-called‘Chief Plumber’ was the ‘Pumpmeister’ or ‘Pumpenmeister’, a Chief
Petty Officer in charge of fire-fighting.
Some comments on the content of this report, rather than its provenance, will be made in the
section on the battle itself.
On the next page is a copy of one of the original pages from the ‘diary’.
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Barbara Poniewierski
18
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7 AQUITANIA AND LARGS BAY
Barbara Poniewierski
THE LARGS BAY CLAIMS
The claim that Sydney escorted Largs Bay on a portion of her southward trip can be
disposed of fairly simply. This claim was publicised in the first volume of the submissions
made to the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry. [Vol. 1, Submission 12, p. 95] Lindsay Harold
Drake wrote that he had been returning to Australia aboard Largs Bay, which left Singapore
on 15 November. He asserted that:
1: she was to have been escorted in the Indian Ocean by Sydney.
2: three Dutch warships escorted her until the morning of 19 November.
3: at about 4.00 pm, the Dutch ships left as Sydney arrived.
4: Sydney then cruised on starboard side, ca 150-200 metres away, until around 6.00 pm,
when she cruised off ahead.
5: later, Aquitania passed them just before Cape Leeuwin.
Drake was genuine in that he had been in Malaya with the 8th Division, 4th anti-tank
regiment; he was being repatriated medically unfit aboard Largs Bay. He was discharged for
medical reasons on 2 February 1942. [WW2 records] However, he was a landlubber. He had
very little idea of where he was when at sea, and he could not have read the signals between
the ships, whether by flag or lamp. Even if he could have read Morse, he would not have
known the call signs of the ships, nor the identification procedures. He also probably had
only a scant idea of the profile of various classes of cruisers.
This story has been repeated by John Samuels (pp. 20, 112) and no doubt by others. To
my shame, I too fell for this story at first, as it would have filled in some of the gap in
Sydney’s cruise, but the scenario is simply impossible. Samuels claims (p. 20): ‘Orders to
break off escort with Largs Bay and proceed with all haste for an interception could only
have originated from the Commander-in-Chief China Station.’ This must also be false, as
Sydney could not possibly have been escorting Largs Bay.
Largs Bay could not have been in the vicinity of 26ºS 111ºE by 19 November. What
happened, approximately, was this. She left Singapore at 0500 hours [Time Zone not
indicated; probably local time, Singapore] on 15 November. It is possible that she was
escorted for a time by Dutch vessels while north of Sunda Strait, but they had left her by the
time she was challenged by Durban at the northern edge of Sunda Strait, on 17 November,
not 19 November. Clark would not have recognised that the cruiser that challenged them
was only about two-thirds the size of Sydney, with her funnels raked and much closer
together, and with fewer guns. Durban had parted company with Sydney about noon, Zone
Time G/H; that is, 7½ hours ahead of GMT; she then headed roughly northwards through
Sunda Strait. At half past four in the afternoon (Durban time), she sighted Largs Bay; she
had identified her and sent her on her way about fifty minutes later.
Thus, at about 1730 hours (± 30 minutes, according to the time she was keeping) Largs
Bay was at the northern end of Sunda Strait: say, roughly 5º50’S 106ºE. It would have taken
her about four hours to reach the southern edge of the strait, depending on the strength and
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direction of the currents through the strait at that time. So, again roughly, she would have
been at 6º30’S 105º30’E at about nine to ten o’clock at night. A direct course towards the
site of the battle would have entailed covering over 1200 miles. Her service speed was 15½
knots; her maximum was 16 knots. By 5.00 pm on Wednesday, 19 November, she could not
have covered more than about 750 miles. These figures are very approximate, but the
discrepancy is so great that a bit of leeway either way is unimportant.
It has been suggested that Sydney hung around the rendezvous point with Durban,
waiting to take up the escort of Largs Bay. That would have been a waste of good cruiser
time, but it is unnecessary to pursue this argument. It was Zealandia that could not have
made the speed for Drake’s scenario to be feasible. Drake himself provides the clinching
evidence against it. He wrote that Aquitania passed them near Cape Leeuwin on 24
November. If Largs Bay had been near 26ºS 111ºE on the afternoon of 19 November, why
would it have taken her another five days to cover the 540 or so miles to Leeuwin? (She did
not call at Fremantle or any other port.) It should have taken less than a day and a half.
The story just does not hold water; but no doubt, having believed it for over fifty years,
Drake would have been as unwilling to let it go as Bourne and Cooper and others have been
of their own pet fairy tales.
THE QUESTIONS REGARDING AQUITANIA
What of the claim that Kormoran must have sunk later than 19-20 November, as the
survivors picked up early on 23 November appeared to be ‘clean-shaven?
Did Kormoran plan to waylay Aquitania alone?
Was there a pre-arranged plot for Kormoran to ambush Aquitania in company with a
Japanese submarine?
Did Aquitania report, either by wireless or by approaching Rottnest or Fremantle, that
she had picked up survivors from a raider?
Queue up. One at a time. The easy one first.
What of the claim that Kormoran must have sunk later than 19-20 November, as the
survivors picked up early on 23 November appeared to be ‘clean-shaven?
Some people claim that the battle must have taken place later than 19 November, because
official reports show that survivors picked up by Aquitania on the morning of 23 November
were clean-shaven. They have felt encouraged to invent bizarre scenarios to account for why
a battle should have taken place on 22 November when Sydney was due in Fremantle on 20
November.
John Montagu has relied heavily on this claim. The scenario that he concocted is
particularly obnoxious and ridiculous, and it will be considered elsewhere along with other
forgeries. Montagu writes; ‘plus being logged that all her survivors were clean shaven and
had not been in the boat for more than half a day or less’. [p. 24] Later he adds the
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Aquitania’s log states that they were all clean-shaven and dressed in shore leave clothes. [p.
106] Nobody has found Aquitania’s log, as far as has been acknowledged; in fact there have
been many complaints that it cannot be found. Even if it existed, it should not have contained
any such material, for merchant ships were forbidden to make any reference to such
occurrences in their logs during the war.
Captain Farncomb, who interrogated the men in Sydney, commented that they were a
‘dirty and unkempt lot’. [B6121: 165P, p. 33] What did he expect them to look like after
more than three days in a lifeboat, at least another three aboard Aquitania with no change of
clothes and possibly inadequate washing facilities?
There was only one source for this claim. ONE newspaper reporter (unidentified) wrote
that ONE passenger (unidentified) commented that the men looked clean-shaven. Maybe the
reporter invented the whole story. Maybe the alleged passenger did not see them until well
after they were picked up, which was very early in the morning. Maybe Aquitania had done
the decent thing and provided them with shaving and washing facilities. This newspaper
article is a flimsy lever with which to try to overturn history.
Did Kormoran plan to waylay Aquitania alone?
Detmers’ Operational Orders (Marschbefehl), like those of the other auxiliary cruisers,
stated explicitly:
A long term restriction and harassing of the enemy is more important to the success of
the operation than a high record of sinkings accompanied by a rapid deterioration of
the auxiliary cruiser…Armed convoys should not be operated against, passenger
ships should be avoided. [B6121: 164N: p. 53of digitisation, p.47 of translation, p.
41of original German]
For him to have decided to disobey such a clear and definite instruction, he would have
needed a cogent motive for doing so, precise knowledge of the ship’s movements and
projected position, and a belief in his ability to succeed in this task.
First: a motive. Tom Frame suggests that he was ambitious to be awarded the Knight’s
Cross, and for this he needed to sink or capture 100,000 tons of Allied shipping. [Frame, p.
64, citing Detmers’ comment that Schulz of U-124 needed to sink 100,000 tons.] This is
applied only to U-boats, its application by Frame to the auxiliary cruisers had unintended
consequences in its further development by Samuels and Montagu.
Below are the tonnages sunk by raider captains prior to their being awarded the Knight’s
Cross or the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross. The tonnages may be inaccurate to a small
degree; on Internet, they are all over the place, and even respectable official sources vary.
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Knight’s Cross:
7 December 1940:
Rogge [Atlantis]: 89,229.
22 December 1940: Kähler [Thor]: 96,547.
22 December 1940: Krüder [Pinguin]: 80,433.
21 August 1941:
Weyher [Orion]: 73,478.
31 October 1941:
Ruckteschell [Widder]: 58,644.
29 November 1941: Eyssen [Komet]: 41,568.
4 December 1941:
Detmers [Kormoran]: 69,572 (+ Sydney).
31 December 1942: Gumprich [Thor]: 52,037. [Wiki has this as 58,644; see Ruckteschell]
Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves:
16 November 1941: Krüder [Pinguin]: 136,642 total directly, 18,068 by mines.
31 December 1941: Rogge [Atlantis]: 145,968 total.
23 December 1942: Ruckteschell [Michel]: 99,386 (additional).
15 September 1944: Kähler [Not for raider activities.]
Wiki states: ‘To qualify for the Knight's Cross, a soldier had to already hold the 1939 Iron Cross
First Class, though the Iron Cross I Class was awarded concurrently with the Knight's Cross in rare
cases. Unit commanders could also be awarded the medal for exemplary conduct by the unit as a
whole. Also, U-boat commanders could qualify for sinking 100,000 tons of shipping, and Luftwaffe
pilots could qualify for accumulating 20 "points" [with one point being awarded for shooting down a
single-engine plane, two points for a twin-engine plane, and three for a four-engine plane, with all
points being doubled at night]. It was issued from 1939-45, with the requirements being gradually
raised as the war went on.’
Samuels enlarges upon this 100,000 tons myth on page 81, where he says that the total
tonnage claimed by Detmers was 56,965 tons, which wrongfully included HMAS Sydney,
and that sinking Aquitania, at 45,647 tons, would have raised his tonnage to over 100,000
tons, which would have justified the award of the Knight’s Cross. He writes that Kormoran
sank only 50,135 tons, [p.11] but does not indicate his source for this idiosyncratic number.
The approximate merchant tonnage accounted for by Kormoran were:
(Tonnages vary slightly in various sources.)
06.01.41
Antonis
3,927
Sunk
18.01.41
British Union
6,850
Sunk
29.01.41
Afric Star
11,900
Sunk
29.01.41
Eurylochus
5,764
Sunk
22.03.41
Agnita
3,420
Sunk
25.03.41
Canadolite
11,309
Prize
09.04.41
Craftsman
8,022
Sunk
12.04.41
Nicolaos d. L.
5,911
Sunk
26.06.41
Velebit
3,644
Sunk
26.06.41
Mareeba
4,884
Sunk
23.11.41
Stamatios G. Embiricos
3,941
Sunk
Total:
69,572
Sydney: 6,830 t displacement.
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[Muggenthaler, German Raiders in World War II, p. 138, gives a total of 68,274 t., not
including Sydney. He does not give individual tonnages.]
The myth that a raider captain needed to sink 100,000 tons to win the Knight’s Cross should
be abandoned, as should any theory dependent on it.
Second: a knowledge of Aquitania’s movements: when she left Singapore, what route she
would take and what speed she would travel.
It is a myth that Japan was supplying a lot of information to Germany about shipping
movements. Although Singapore and the Malay Peninsula were crawling with Japanese
spies, they had their own agenda, and it did not include taking risks to secure information
for Germany. Frame writes that Commander Menzel, ‘head of the Navy Group in the
Abwehr’, reported in May 1941 that the Japanese provided little information from Cape
Town and Suez, and ‘information from Singapore was not coming at all’. [Frame, p. 176;
Winter, Intrigue Master p. 187.] It might be thought that the Japanese would be more
cooperative as their plans for war against America progressed, but in fact the opposite was
the case, and they made it more difficult for Admiral Wenneker, the Naval Attaché in Japan,
to organise supplies or communicate with the raiders and supply ships. The bitterness of the
German officers dealing with this matter is palpable in their reports.
Aquitania did not leave Singapore until 19 November. Allowing for enciphering and
deciphering at several stages, it would have been impossible for this information to have
reached Kormoran. It is pointless to speculate that ‘it stands to reason’ that Aquitania would
have taken the shortest route, or the most economical route, a route offset by so-and-so miles
from the direct route. In fact, during the war even the captain of a merchant ship did not
usually know what route he would travel until he opened his sealed orders after leaving port.
Examples of routes in November 1941:
The routes allotted to ships are not always noted on the record cards. Some just say
‘Routed’, and some entries are illegible. It appears to be impossible to determine now what
courses these diversionary routes entailed. [Some figures on the cards are very difficult to
read; sometimes it is ‘best guess’; but this gives a general idea of procedure.]
Aquitania: Left Singapore on 19 November for Sydney via Leeuwin and Bass Strait: Route
15/20. (Passed Wilson’s Promontory, early afternoon, 27 November.)
Centaur: Left Banjoewangi 22 November: ‘Routed’. Arrived Carnarvon 27 November.
Evagoras: Left Colombo 10 November: ‘Routed’. Christmas Island 19-23 November.
Arrived Fremantle 1 December.
Gorgon: Left Banjoewangi 9 November: Route 156/11. Arrived Carnarvon 12 November.
Herstein: Left Calcutta 16 November: Route 999. Arrived Fremantle 28 November.
Largs Bay: Left Singapore on 15 November for Sydney: Route 138.
Trocas: Left Palembang 16 November: Route 142/17. Arrived Fremantle 26 November.
Saidja: Left Palembang 19 November: Route 138/21. Arrived Fremantle 27 November.
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It is not known who started this story that Kormoran was trying to ambush Aquitania, but it
has deceived a lot of people. Montagu uses the story of setting a trap for Aquitania as a
support for his inane theory. He makes the even more ridiculous comment re Kormoran:
‘Her target was the converted liner Aquitania, which spies had signalled was on its way
from Singapore to Fremantle with the entire Australian Army eighth division on board.’
Aquitania was big, but not that big. At a time when Australia was sending reinforcements
TO Singapore and Malaya, what would she have been doing taking them in the other
direction? [See section on forgeries.] Without apparently doubting it at all, Glenys
McDonald claims that Detmers had hoped to meet with Aquitania on 17 November [p. 179],
and that McCarthy suggested ‘that Kormoran could have been lying in wait for Aquitania’.
[pp. 25-26] The first is wrong, the second doubtful, but I am not buying into this argument.
Was there a pre-arranged plot for Kormoran to ambush Aquitania in company with a
Japanese submarine?
Samuels possibly did not invent the claim that Kormoran was collaborating with a Japanese
submarine in a plot to ambush and sink Aquitania, instead of the old claim that she was
supplying Japanese submarines, but he has gone into elaborate detail about the mythical
plot. There is so much wrong with his claims that it is difficult to know where to start.
The first problem is that, in order to ambush Aquitania, it would have been necessary to
know months in advance where she was going to be. Samuels writes: ‘Japanese spies were
reporting home from Australia and established intelligence cells reported Aquitania’s
whereabouts with reasonable accuracy.’ [p. 65]
I have spent a number of years researching Japanese espionage in Australia; in fact, off
and on, some twenty years. While Japanese agents vacuumed up whatever political,
commercial and military information they could obtain, it was mostly of mediocre quality;
their wartime shipping information was pretty poor, and what there was arrived too late to
be useful operationally. It is not appropriate to set out here my reasons for this claim, except
to say that they would report on warships in harbour by observing the sailors’ cap bands,
which still bore the ships’ names until about the end of 1941. This led to reports that
Rushcutter or Cerberus was in port. This gave them very low credibility with German Naval
Intelligence personnel, who knew that these were shore stations, so they could hardly be
anywhere else. The meagre flow of information relating specifically to shipping dried up
virtually completely when Kenichiro Yoneda, the Sydney manager of the Yamashita
Steamship line, left Australia by Suwa Maru on 6 June 1941. Neither the Consulate-General
nor the Legation had a transmitter, and when Japanese vessels stopped calling after mid
August, it was difficult to get any information out at all. Does Samuels have any evidence to
back up his claim that Japanese agents in Australia reported on Aquitania at all, let alone in
October-November 1941. The situation in Singapore has been mentioned above.
The claim that Admiral Paul Wenneker had arranged with his friend, Vice Admiral
Nobutake Kondo, for German raiders to use isolated Japanese islands to reprovision from
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supply ships is not noxious, just wrong. The arrangement was negotiated between Vice
Admiral Joachim Lietzmann, the Attaché in January 1940, and Japanese officers Ichiyama
and Nakamura. Wenneker, who had been Attaché in Japan from December 1933 to 1937, did
not return to Japan until March 1940. [Wiki currently gives the date of his first appointment
as 1935, despite citing reference works that say 1933. My references: Public Record Office,
ADM223/51: 51/45. Conference of 9 January 1940; Bundesarchiv, Freiburg: RM12.II/257:
Kriegstagebuch des Marineattaches. What references can Samuels give?]
Samuels writes that, prior to 1938, the Imperial Japanese Navy had used Jurien Point,
south of Geraldton, as a submarine training area, with the approval of the Australian
Government. [p. 66] Very prior indeed; about 1916-17, some Japanese units sheltered in
Jurien Bay for a time. Why would the Japanese Navy compromise its tactics by practising
them in an area where they could be observed? They had thousands of square miles of their
own waters in which to practise. There had been allegations of suspicious activity in that
region, but if they were correct they were more likely to be connected with smuggling.
To cap it all, he uses Montgomery’s technique of presenting an unsubstantiated or already
discredited allegation as though it were fact, for example: ‘We now know that Germany and
Japan were cooperating closely by this stage: that interaction between German raiders and
Japanese vessels, including submarines, was common if not ordinary.’ [p. 47] We know
absolutely nothing of the kind. No German vessel of any sort met a Japanese submarine at
sea prior to December 1941. If Samuels has any evidence, would he please name the ship,
identify the submarine, and give the date and location of the meeting; otherwise he should
withdraw the allegation. The only known meeting of any kind between a German and a
genuine Japanese vessel on the high seas prior to 1942 (as distinct from a German vessel
disguised as Japanese) was when Komet sought out a Japanese whaling ship in order to top
up acetylene supplies. Komet located the whaling mother ship by its wireless signals, and
played the part of an innocent merchant vessel.
With regard to the genesis of the plan from Kormoran and a Japanese submarine to
waylay Aquitania, Samuels writes: ‘At a time not exactly known possibly in the last two
weeks of September and at least ten days prior to the early departure of I-58 from Samah,
Hainan Island, on 12 Octobr [sic] 1941, Yoshitomi Setsuzo put forward a plan to Nobutake
[Kondo]’. (p. 65) … ‘Yoshitomi’s suggestion for an attack on Aquitania was very attractive,
and was acted on immediately.’ (p. 66) Of course, Samuels has no evidential basis for this
claim; it is pure fantasy. In the first place, this would have been a high-level political
decision that Wenneker did not have the authority to make. In addition, Aquitania was in
New Zealand (Wellington) from 8 to 15 September, and not even the Admiralty knew yet
where she would be in November.
He adds: ‘The record of I-58’s movements – as revealed in Japanese and American
archives of naval movements – locates the submarine and its crew from early September at
the Japanese naval base at Samah, Hainan Island, along with some “accounted for” subs
which departed Samah for operations off the Malayan coast on December 1st 1941.’ (p. 129)
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The records in fact show that there were no submarines at Samah before mid to late
November 1941. The date of arrival of I-53 to I-58 is not recorded precisely, but it was
already late November when they left Kure. I-62 and I-63 left Sasebo on 26 November
1941. Samuels writes that I-58 ‘was in the Indian Ocean on November 19th 1941, when
HMAS Sydney was destroyed and all her survivors were slaughtered.’ [p. 12] No, she was
not; she was probably still in Kure, or had left only a day or two earlier. He can claim as
much as he likes that all evidence about Japanese submarines is faked, but he has no
evidence of their whereabouts apart from his imagination. The dockside workers Samuels
claims he interviewed could hardly have been expected to remember the dates of individual
submarines; they had no special reason to commit them to memory. There were no Japanese
submarines at Samah before mid November 1941, and none returned after 7 December. It
was not a regular naval base.
Samuels claims that Wenneker decided to use Kulmerland to deliver the secret orders to
Kormoran to rendezvous with I-58. ‘Wenneker asked her commander, Captain Pschunder, to
come to Tokyo and join him for afternoon tea at the mission. There Wenneker entrusted a
hand-to-hand diplomatic [?] pouch to Captain Pschunder, to be given only to Captain
Detmers or destroyed without opening should there be any likelihood of it failing to reach
him. Amongst other things, the pouch contained orders from the German Naval Attaché to
collaborate with I-58 to sink the troopship Aquitania.’ He dates this ‘afternoon tea’ as ‘two
days before Kulmerland’s departure; that is, by 4 September, since the vessel left on
6 September. [pp. 66-67] As mentioned above, and as is shown in Australian and New
Zealand records, Aquitania was then on her way to Wellington.
On the Japanese side, according to Samuels, I-58 was given orders to rendezvous with
Kormoran, and after a leisurely 22 days’ trip from Hainan she may well have sheltered in
the inshore waters of Shark Bay. [pp. 48, 69] Note that ‘may well have’ is a way of
indicating that there is no evidence for something.
Having made their rendezvous – goodness knows how – Detmers and the commander of
I-58, Soshichi Kitamura, formulated a plan. Samuels notes that they would have had to
converse in English. [p. 69] He does not mention that, in order for Kitamura and Detmers to
be able to converse at all, the submarine would have had to surface, and every single
member of the Kormoran crew, including the Chinese laundrymen, would have known
about it and most would have seen it. This is a totally untenable supposition.
Samuels theorises that Kormoran was ‘keeping close company’ with I-58 when Sydney
was sighted. [p. 114] If that had been the case, everybody would have known. The
submarine would have had to submerge, and with her slower underwater speed she could
not have kept up with Kormoran. Indeed, in order to know where the raider was heading she
would have had to stay at periscope depth and risk being seen. The difficulty of this was
evident when the U-boats that Atlantis had been supplying tried to get near enough to
Devonshire to attack her. They failed.
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Did Aquitania report, either by wireless or by approaching Rottnest or Fremantle, that
she had picked up survivors from a raider?
There are two main primary sources for the claim that during 23-24 November Aquitania
notified that she had picked up survivors from a raider. ‘Ric’ Bourne claimed that he had
made a reconnaissance flight searching for Sydney or a raider or survivors on 23 November.
At her cruising speed of 23 knots, it would have taken Aquitania about 22 hours to travel to
Fremantle from the place where she picked up the survivors. That is, taking into account the
time she spent retrieving survivors, she could have not have arrived off Fremantle until
about 5.00 am on 24 November. Thus Bourne claimed that Aquitania must have broken
radio silence, and on the basis of her report he had been sent out on reconnaissance. This
would have been unlikely; Gibbons denied that he had sent a signal, even when he was
reprimanded for not having done so, and there is no record of such a signal. Doohan urged
Bourne on until he was sure that the impossible was fact. [For the way in which Bourne’s
imagination manufactures myths in which he firmly believes, see the section on conspiracies.]
It is not impossible that Bourne made a flight of some sort on 23 November; occasionally
Pearce failed to report flights to SWACH and was warned that any aircraft approaching
Rottnest or Fremantle without prior notification risked being shot down. After that, Pearce
behaved a little more carefully, but still sometimes failed to give notice of flights over the
open ocean. However, if Bourne did fly that day, it had nothing to do with any notification
from Aquitania. One reason for such a flight could have been that Sydney was well overdue;
another was that a couple of important convoys were passing through.
McDonald writes that Lindsay Peet found an extract from the Central War Room diary
that seemed to indicate that the first search was ordered on 22 November, to commence
0801H/23, and that this backed up Bourne’s statements. [p. 149] It possibly backed up his
claim that he made such a flight, but it does not support any claim regarding the reason for
this flight. McDonald also mentions that a SWACH log entry has been altered from 1250/23
to 0050/24, and she wonders: ‘Could this suggest that people were trying to protect
themselves after things went “belly-up”, or simply reflect confusion between Zulu time and
H?’ [p. 150]
In fact, neither is the case. The previous entry is 1800 hours (23 November implied from
the previous page), and the following entry is 0105 (24 November). The alteration is merely
a correction of the manner of expressing 50 minutes past midnight during the night of 23-24
November. The original was a misleading, civilian way of expressing the time; the alteration
was the correct naval form, but the actual time was identical. As the entry refers to the
despatch of a search plane, it must be Zone Z (GMT), as it was out of the question that a
search plane would have been sent out at night. This can be quite confusing, but one should
not build a conspiracy theory based on one’s own lack of understanding.
The claim that Aquitania called briefly at Gage Roads (the shipping channel between
Rottnest and Fremantle) to pass a message to the Port War Signal Station there was raised in
a submission by George Bell to the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry. [Vol. 1, Submission 178, pp.
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3899-90] He claimed that he was on board Aquitania on the voyage when the Kormoran
survivors were picked up. There is a ring of truth regarding his presence on board, but some
of his details are suspect.
Bell claims that Aquitania anchored in Gage Roads for one and a half or two hours, while
a visual message was passed ashore. Nobody from the ship went ashore, and nobody from
the shore went out to the ship. He writes: ‘The captain was under the impression that the
navy would know all about the action, and the Navy people in Fremantle, on being told that
we had German prisoners on board presumed that these prisoners were an intake from the
Middle East as we usually did bring prisoners from there.’
As Bell did not join the merchant navy until October 1940, there cannot – in view of
Aquitania’s movements as recorded – have been more than about two occasions when this
happened, and they would have had to be Italians, for there is no recorded transport of
Germans from the Middle East aboard her. As it was known that Aquitania had made a
roundabout trip from the Middle East, and had been in dock in Singapore, it would have
been a rather odd conclusion for the shore authorities to have reached. Anyway, how would
Bell have had any idea what the ‘Navy people’ in Fremantle presumed? What sort of signal
did he think Gibbons would have sent that did not include the fact that there had been some
sort of battle?
Bernard Eneberg drew up a schedule of Aquitania’s movements, in which he claimed that
she could have been in Gage Roads for 1½ hours from 2232/23Z to 0002/24 Z. [Vol. 19,
Submission 96G, pp. 4571-73. Bernard Sigfrid Eneberg, born 25 March 1922 in South
Australia, enlisted on 11 September 1941; he was discharged in July 1946 as a Flying
Officer with the Air Sea Rescue service.] However, ‘she could have been’ is not the same as
‘she was’, even if the mathematics may be correct. He has tried to be too precise with times
to the exact minute, even if it meant fiddling with her speed from 18 knots to 24.5 knots,
and he does not appear to have taken enough account of the time it took for a large vessel to
ease herself out of Gage Roads through the dogleg Deep Water Channel, heading north
around Rottnest until she found the open ocean and could head for Leeuwin. He also allows
only 1½ hours at anchor. According to his schedule, this would have been from 0632H to
0802H, by which time it was broad daylight and thousands of people could have seen her. It
was already more than four full days since Sydney had sunk, and already too late to save any
survivors from Sydney, unless they were in a reasonably stocked lifeboat.
Bell writes: ‘The staff captain asked what nationality they were and the officer clicked his
heels and said, ‘Me German, all German.’
Comment: It is a matter of record that there was no officer in the group, but this is an
understandable error on the part of Bell.
Bell: ‘The prisoners told us that they had been sailing up the coast of West [sic] Australia in
their armed merchant ship MV Kormoron [sic] when the Navy cruiser HMAS Sydney sailed
towards them signaling for identification.’
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Comment: Records of the interrogation aboard Aquitania show that the Germans picked up
did not know the name of the ship that they had probably sunk; they simply called it ‘the
English ship’. [B6121: 165P: digitised pp. 41-43]
Bell: ‘I can guarantee that we did anchor off Fremantle, and in later years I have often
wondered why this was covered up.’
Comment: He could find no mention of this because it did not happen.
Bell: ‘I know that the Aquitania definitely did go into Gauge [sic] Roads and anchored off
Fremantle for two hours, as Fremantle was my home town and when I arrived I quickly
wrote a letter to my mother and “posted” it as I had done before, in a bottle thrown
overboard while going past Cottesloe beach on the way out. My letter in a bottle was picked
up by a soldier and delivered to my mother the following day. I received a reply to this letter
from my mother when we arrived in Sydney. It seems ironic that my mother knew that the
HMAS Sydney had been sunk before any other person in Australia.’
Comment: On several points, Bell is definitely wrong. If he threw the bottle overboard on
the morning of 24 November, then it was 25 November by the time it was ‘the next day’,
and by then Trocas had reported her find and quite a few people knew that Sydney was at
least in dire trouble and probably lost. Moreover, since the Germans did not know the name
of the ship they had fought, neither did anybody else aboard Aquitania, so Bell could not
have written it to his mother on 24 November. At least this part of his story must be untrue.
In addition, this story bears an unsettling resemblance to the fake ‘Mareeba bottle’ incident.
Bell: ‘Eventually we arrived in Sydney and about three weeks later the story of the HMAS
Sydney came out.’
Comment: Aquitania arrived in Sydney at 0430K on 28 November. The loss was announced
in morning papers of 1 December, just three days later. Bell is, of course, not intentionally
telling an untruth about something that can so readily be disproven, but it is a glaring
example of the unreliability of his memories.
Soon after the wrecks were discovered, the Merimbula News Weekly (26 March 2008)
published an article by Andrew Clarke concerning an interview with Neil Grano, who
likewise said that he was aboard Aquitania when she picked up survivors. (Records confirm
that both Bell and Grano were born in 1923, and both were engaged as cleaners, ca 1940,
but details of their careers are not available.) Grano did not go into much detail, but he did
not claim that Aquitania had called at Fremantle. Neither did he deny it, but surely he would
have mentioned the incident if she had. In addition, he said: ‘The interrogators never let on
what was going on… We had no idea the Kormoran was responsible for sinking HMAS
Sydney until a fair while after the event.’ This does not tally with what George Bell’s claims.
Over the years, it seems that four men have turned up with stories of having been aboard
Aquitania at the time. Unfortunately, two claimed she had gone into Gage Roads at night;
the other two said she had not. Therefore evidence must be sought elsewhere.
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When naval officers reproached Captain Gibbons of Aquitania for not having reported his
find earlier, either by wireless or by calling at Rottnest and passing a visual signal, he did
not write that he had called there and his report should have been noted; he gave several
reasons for not having done so. The criticism of him, though muted, was clear, and if there
had been a chance of clearing himself of the implication that his actions might have been
responsible for depriving any survivors of a chance of rescue, he would have taken it. In
fact, it was unlikely that any men could have survived three days in shark-infested waters,
and it seems equally unlikely that Sydney could have launched any boats. Still, one thinks of
the body that drifted near Christmas Island on a Carley float, and the body found on a float
by Wyrallah. Both Australian and German died a similarly lonely death, bereft of hope.
Note the following messages.
20 November 1941: R.A.M.Y. to Director of Sea Transport (R) ACNB, NZNB. 0945Z/20
(1745H) W.T. Naval Cypher A. Aquitania left Singapore 19 November. Embarked for
Australia. RAN 1st class: one; 2nd class: five; troop deck, four. AIF: First class: four; 2nd
class: six; troop deck 31. [ACNB Signals (Seapower Material; not on internet). Aquitania
had enough trained men to stand guard.]
27 November 1941: From Wilson’s Promontory to NB: 1320K/27. By phone. Merchant
Navy Code. Secret. ‘HAVE INTERCEPTED YOUR MESSAGE. 22ND NOVEMBER 2230
G.M.T. LAT. 024º 35’STH LONGITUDE 110º 57’EAST RESCUED (?) 26 GERMANS
FROM RAFT Ø STH EAST. THEY REPORT CRUISER ON FIRE.’ ‘(ORIGINATOR DID
NOT GIVE NAME BUT EVIDENTLY AQUITANIA.)’ [B6121:165P: p. 310].
Comment: This appears to be a report of a wireless message, not a visual signal; although it
was later alleged that none of the messages that Aquitania claimed she sent was heard.
27 November 1941: From Secretary of the Naval Board to Secretary, Department of the
Navy: Minute paper, 2105 hours. [K? Extract.]
[Par.] 15: His Majesty’s Transport “AQUITANIA” has passed Wilson’s Promontory this
afternoon en route from Singapore to Sydney, and reported to Wilson’s Promontory Signal
Station that had picked up 26 Germans from a raft on the early morning of 23rd in the same
area in which it is considered the action took place. Those prisoners will be interrogated on
the arrival of “AQUITANIA” in Sydney. [B6121:165P: p. 174.]
29 November 1941: To NOCS from ACNB: 0724Z/29. (1724K) Teleprinter. N Cypher (A)
REQUEST YOU INVESTIGATE REASONS WHICH GUIDED AQUITANIA IN NOT
REPORTING BY W/T RECOVERY OF ENEMY SURVIVORS OR CLOSING
ROTTNEST P.W.S.S. AND REPORTING BY V/S. [B6121:165P p. 91]
[PWSS = Port War Signal Station; V/S = Visual Signal.]
Some crucial correspondence relating to this topic is given below. It is digitised on the
National Archives website at B6121: 164L, but it is in places difficult to read, so it is
retyped here. (Some unclear figures may have been misread; if one seems wrong, and it is
important to some theory, check it.)
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[ B6121: 164L: pp. 19-21]
From: The Commodore-in-Charge, H.M.A. Naval Establishment, Sydney. [Muirhead-Gould]
To: The Secretary, Naval Board, Melbourne.
Subject: 2026/2/453
Date: 2nd December 1941.
No. R.S. 2518/310/4
Subject: RECOVERY OF ENEMY SURVIVORS BY M.T. “AQUITANIA”.
Be pleased to inform the Naval Board that, in accordance with Naval Board Message
of 0724/29th November, 1941, I have held an investigation into the reasons which guided
the Master of H.T. “AQUITANIA” in not reporting the recovery of enemy survivors or
closing Rottnest Port War Signal Station and reporting by V/S. In my enquiry I had the
advantage of the services of Lieutenant-Commander C. F. Mills, R.A.N, my Staff Officer
(Intelligence) and Lieutenant-Commander (S) J. L. Bath, R.A.N., kindly lent to me by RearAdmiral Commanding, H.M.A. Squadron.
2. Captain Gibbons stated at the time he picked up the survivors (2030 G.M.T. on 22nd
November, 1941) he had received no W/T messages of any sort indicating to him that an
action had taken place, or that any ship was overdue or that there was any anxiety from a
Naval point of view. There were no signals about the action received in “AQUITANIA”
until long afterwards. G.B.M.S. are received and dealt with correctly in “AQUITANIA”.
3. The survivors were picked up at 2230 G.M.T. on 22nd November, 1941 (0600 local
time on Sunday morning 23rd November, 1941). They were turned over to the Staff Captain
for interrogation – the “AQUITANIA” proceeded on her voyage. No search was made for
other rafts or wreckage as Captain Gibbons “did not know what also there might be about”
(meaning that another raider might be in the vicinity).
4. It was not until nearly noon (local time) that Captain Gibbons read the results of the
interrogation of the prisoners and realised that there had been an action and he says in his
own words: “It never dawned on me that there was anything wrong with the Cruiser – I thought
“Well she has sunk this German ship, and the Navy knows about it, and they have it in
their scheme of things, and they know what they are going to do”.”
5. Captain Gibbons referred to C.A.M.S.I. and said that he felt bound by C.A.M.S.I. 63
because: “There had been no distress signals, no enemy action signals, no Raider, no
Submarine, no Aircraft signals, or anything hostile that I could clear myself with for
breaking Wireless silence. I felt that I was bound by C.A.M.S.I. No. 63 – Restriction
on the use of W/T. Furthermore, I had no reason to suppose that anything out of the
ordinary had happened, beyond the vital fact that a Cruiser had sunk an enemy raider.”
6. The reading of the interrogation did not convey to Captain Gibbons that the Cruiser
had been badly hit. He knew she had been hit and two Germans had seen fire on the Cruiser;
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they did not say the Cruiser was on fire. He had no reason to suppose the Cruiser had been
burnt out.
7. Captain Gibbons proceeded on his voyage and then gave some consideration to
taking his prisoners into Fremantle, or at least, closing Rottnest and making a report.
R. S. 2518/310/4
2nd December, 1941.
--2--
He knew, however, that the raider had carried mines and did not believe the Germans’ story
that none had been laid. He thought that Rottnest was a very likely mineable area. He still
had it fixed in his mind that the Cruiser would have made a report if she had wanted to, and
that the Naval Authorities must know all about the action. And that therefore, he would not
be justified in diverging from his route and taking his ship into a dangerous area.
8. The LEEUWIN was rounded at 0500 G.M.T. on 24th November, 1941. At 1700
G.M.T. on 24th November, 1941, the ship was in position 33º 30’ S 119º E (approximately).
By this time he had received a number of W/T received as follow: T.O.O. 1157 G.M.T. /24th November
1052
“
1214
“
1700
“
From A.C.N.B.
“
(to “Trocas”)
A.C.N.B.
(to “Hermion”)
from “Trocas”
T.O.R. 1434.
1531.
1625.
1706.
None of these was addressed to “AQUITANIA” and “AQUITANIA” was not included in
any messages which were received.
9. Message 1052/24 from A.C.N.B. to “TROCAS” and “TROCAS” reply1700/24
(received 1706) at once gave Captain Gibbons cause for anxiety. Up to this moment he had
been convinced that the Naval authorities knew all about everything. – Now he suddenly
realised that something was wrong and that he could have provided valuable information
some 36 hours earlier. But “TROCAS”, in Message 1706/24 had given Navy as much
information as Captain Gibbons himself possessed, and he decided therefore, still to
maintain wireless silence.
“These two signals gave me some cause for anxiety whether the Naval Board knew as
much as I had supposed. By this time, I knew that anything I could say would be too
late, because I then knew that the Navy knew as much as I could tell them from
information from the survivors.”
“I couldn’t tell the Navy anything that “TROCAS” hadn’t told them except that I had
some survivors too, and the position I had picked them up”.
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10. However on receipt of messages 0848/25 from District Naval Officer, Western
Australia, to “TROCAS” and 1144/25 and 1226/25 from Naval Board to “TROCAS” at
1732Z on 25th November, 1941, he realised that lack of information was more than he had
supposed and after discussion with the Staff Captain of “AQUITANIA”, decided to break
W/T silence to pass in what information he had. Adelaide Radio was then called at intervals
of about two minutes on 500 k/cs. From 1938Z/25 to 2115/25 but no answer was received.
Melbourne Radio was called instead a few times during this period and one call was made
on 24 metres for Sydney Radio (VIS). No reply was received from either of these two
stations. Adelaide Radio had been heard working some time before calls were made but not
for at least half an hour before calls were commenced. Melbourne Radio was heard working
during the period calls were made but Sydney Radio had not been heard at all during the
day. The ship was in approximate position 37º 00’ S 133º 00’E at 2100Z/25.
11: In view of the difficulty of establishing communication, Captain Gibbons gave
orders to cease calling and after one call had been made for any British Man-O’-War at
2202Z/25, calling was discontinued. The message it was intended
R.S. 2518/310/4
2nd December, 1941.
--3--
to pass was eventually passed through Wilson’s Promontory War Signal Station.
12, Mr. Parsons, senior wireless operator, said that he was quite certain that the correct
adjustments to the transmitter had been made. He has not attempted to tune by wavemeter
during these transmissions and it had been impossible to get a cut on his receiver to check
the frequency of the transmitter since it was swamped by his own transmissions. The main
aerial had been damaged while in Sydney before this particular voyage and had been cut
down as a result. However, a wireless inspector had visited the ship at Wellington before the
ship left on this voyage and had re-checked the adjustments for the cut down aerial.
13. Captain Gibbons made his Visual Signal to Wilson’s Promontory in order to let the
authorities at Sydney know that he had prisoner survivors. He knew there was always a
Visual (Lloyds) Station there.
14. I should like to record that during the investigation Captain Gibbons gave every
possible assistance and that he was, throughout, perfectly frank and sincere in all his
statements.
Signed by Muirhead-Gould, Commodore
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[B6121: 164L: pp. 17-18]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
MINUTE PAPER
SUBJECT
S E C R E T.
2026/2/453
It is proposed that the sense of the following be sent by letter to the Admiralty (copy
to Cunard agents, Sydney; C.C.S.; and R.A.C.A.S.)
“With reference to the attached report B.S. 2518/316/4 of 2nd December, 1941, from
Commodore-in-Chief, H.M.A. Naval Establishments, Sydney, it is desired to make the
following comments.
2. Hired Transport ‘AQUITANIA’ was the first authority to be aware that an action had
taken place between Raider No. 41 and H.M.A.S. ‘SYDNEY’ off the west coast of Australia
on 19th November, 1941. Captain Gibbons, the Master of the ‘AQUITANIA’, should have
been aware, by the interrogation of prisoners vide paragraph 4 of B.S. 2158/310/4, that a
British cruiser had been in action, and, had the interrogation been complete, the plight of the
cruiser would have been apparent. All prisoners rescued by means other than ‘AQUITANIA’
have been quite frank and have even boasted of the fire on the cruiser. It is therefore
reasonable to suppose that ‘AQUITANIA’s’ prisoners would disclose this fact.
3. Had Captain Gibbons informed the Naval Board of the result of the interrogation and
the fact that he had prisoners on board in reasonable time after the rescue, 36 precious hours
might have been saved and some of the crew of H.M.A.S. ‘SYDNEY’ rescued. As it is, not
one man from ‘SYDNEY’ has been saved.
4. With reference to paragraph 5, the fact that no enemy action signals were heard is no
significant, as H.T. ‘AQUITANIA’ would not be on the same frequency as that on which
action signals are made. Much of Captain Gibbons’ apprehension might have been removed
had he waited until the late afternoon or the dark hours in which to make his report. With his
speed – 20 knots – he could then have been far removed from the area in which he had made
his report by first light the following morning and thus would have been reasonably secure
from a surface raider.
5. With reference to paragraph 9, it is not understood why Captain Gibbons assumed
that the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board was in possession of adequate facts. On
24th November, a G.B.M.S. message addressed to six ships was transmitted, instructing
them to pass through the area of the action and to keep a lookout for survivors. It is
reasonable to supposed that, had the
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2.
cruiser been afloat then such action would not have been necessary. Captain Gibbons should
have had some misgivings about the fate of the cruiser at the latest on the 24th November.
6. With respect to paragraph 10, the radio stations at Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney
keep constant watch, It is therefore not understood why ‘AQUITANIA’s’ calls failed to
obtain a reply from these stations. The implication is that the call was incorrectly
transmitted, the frequency of transmission in error, or the transmitter inefficient.
7. The Naval Board have regrettably come to the conclusion that Captain Gibbons
made an error in judgment in not passing this vital information to the authorities concerned
as soon as he was aware that an incident of considerable importance had occurred.”
9/12/41
Signed: Dechaineux, D.O.D.
At the top of the first page, the Chief of Naval Staff (Royle) wrote: ‘Personally I consider
the N.B. was gravely at fault in (1) not knowing that Aquitania was due to pass through that
area. (2) not informing her of the action or making any inquiries of her. 19/12
[Comments: CAMSI = Confidential Admiralty Merchant Ship (or Shipping) Instructions.
GBMS = A message to all British merchant ships, or to all within a given area.]
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[B6121: 164L: p. 16]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
MINUTE PAPER
SUBJECT
2026/3/453
“AQUITANIA” passed through the area at 2230/22 G.M.T. (0830K/23).
The first news of German survivors, and in fact there may have been an action, was
received at 0816Z from C. in C. China, and received by Naval Board late p.m. local time on
24th November. Thus the “AQUITANIA” was 36 hours – 720 miles to the southward of the
area of the action by the time any relevant information had reached the Naval Board.
The Operations Division was aware of the position of the “AQUITANIA” at all
times. As she was so far to the southward of the action it was not considered that it was
necessary to inform her, and it was not desired to tell her to break wireless silence to make
any report.
22/12/41.
Signed: Dechaineux
Handwritten comments:
(Ink)
Submitted re C.N.S. Minute:
(A) ACQUITANIA was plotted from Trincomalee during her passage. We had her time of
departure, route, speed & E.T.A. at Sydney.
(B) ACQUITANIA had passed through the area by the time we suspected an action. We
directed ships approaching the area to keep a lookout for survivors.
22/12.
Further pencil comments:
[Barely legible, but seems to be] I think my reactions would have been the same as Captain
of Aquitania.
25/12. [Initials appear to be those of CNS, Royle]
[Comment: Aquitania could hardly have been plotted from Trincomalee, because she had
sailed from Singapore.]
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B6121: 165P: p. 70.
19
SUBM.005.0231
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
This Inquiry is free of the clutter caused by arguments about the location of the battle and
whether to attempt to exhume the body buried on Christmas Island. The wrecks have been
found; the site of the battle is known fairly closely, to the satisfaction of all but a few diehards who will not be satisfied with anything that does not support their contrary claims, no
matter how outlandish these may be. Claims that the photographs of the wrecks have been
faked are defamatory to every individual who took part in the search operations and the
subsequent photography. The body has been exhumed and examined, and the fragment of
metal found within the skull has been identified by metallurgical analysis as a fragment of
shell casing. (It has been called ‘shrapnel’, but ‘shell splinter’ is a more accurate description.)
To the disappointment and disbelief of some, it was not a Japanese projectile of any kind. Nor
was it a bullet of any manufacture, despite an irresponsible premature comment that it was.
It has been claimed that Detmers said this, or Detmers said that, but it is wrong, because he
must have been lying, so first let us examine what he apparently said during interrogation and
what he really did write in the cipher report, and take it that the dictionary report is very
similar, except for abbreviations and a slightly different wording.
More people are coming around to the unthinkable proposition that, by and large,
Commander Detmers was telling the truth, and that G. Hermon Gill and Barbara Winter (to
wit, myself, i.e. Dr Barbara Poniewierski), and more recently Dr McCarthy and John
Perryman and a good few others, might have been justified in believing him because of the
evidence, and not because of a predisposition to believe Detmers. This may be with some
reservations, but notwithstanding mistranslations, misinterpretations and typing errors in
many documents, his story hangs together technically and psychologically if it is viewed with
the documents in their correct form. This section is written from the point of view that
Detmers could have been correct in most of his statements, and that, in the absence of firm
evidence to the contrary, he is entitled to be believed. It will provide a comparative analysis
of what the ‘Action Report’ said, and what Tom Frame has claimed. This is not because
Frame’s scenario is the worst produced. On the contrary: many of the others are so ludicrous
that they are believed only by a small circle of devotees.
It is because Frame’s claims sound feasible, given the documents he was using, that they
are seductively deceptive, and they did deceive the first Inquiry into half-believing him.
Because Frame was a naval lieutenant and he had been awarded a doctorate on the Voyager
incident, he has sometimes been given too much credit for knowledge and interpretation,
even in cases where he has clearly been wrong. He has, for example, minimal knowledge of
the German language, the German navy, or the underlying ethos of German society. He
cannot see beyond his own training in the Australian navy in the 1990s or interpret how
things were in the 1930s and 1940s, not even in the RAN, let alone in the Kriegsmarine. In
addition, his clear aim is to exonerate Captain Burnett from the slightest suggestion that his
handling of the situation was faulty. His scenario was based on a flawed document: an interim
translation of Detmers’ cipher report. He did not find – or look for – the amended translation.
The resultant errors will be explained in the course of this section.
1
SUBM.005.0232
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
One problem in reconstructing the course of events is that the ‘Action Report’ gives times
rounded to the nearest five minutes, while other accounts from interrogation reports and from
Detmers’ book give few fixed times points, and the sequence of events is sometimes unclear.
Another is that the ‘Action Report’ is the work of a naval officer accustomed to submitting
factual reports, but Detmers’ book in German acknowledges the collaboration of Jochen
Brennecke, who liked to spice things up emotionally, and some things hit a false note if it is
taken that it was Detmers himself who wrote them. The third is that the English translation or
version, while not bad overall, has errors and ambiguities that can mislead critical researchers
who rely on the book almost exclusively as the definitive German account.
Before contact was made
On 11 October, Detmers took Kormoran to an isolated part of the Indian Ocean, away from
the shipping lanes. This was around 19º40’S 88º40’E, ± about 30’, and there she drifted. As
the heavy growth of weed on the hull was slowing her down and increasing fuel consumption,
he wanted to have as much as possible of the hull, particularly the waterline, scraped and
painted while the ship was fairly high out of the water, before she took on a heavy load of
fuel and supplies from Kulmerland. At 0200 hours the ship stopped and was careened to
starboard so that the port side could be treated. Then the ship was careened to port so that the
starboard side could be scraped, but there was so much swell and splashing water that he
considered it pointless to try to paint the starboard side. Shortly before midnight on 12
October, they got underway again towards the rendezvous with Kulmerland. [This material,
up to 24 October, is extracted from Kormoran’s War Diary.]
Just after 1000 hours (Kormoran time), they sighted Kulmerland within the rendezvous
point known as Marius. (The noon reading was 32º20’S 97º05’E.) Captain Pschunder went
aboard Kormoran to hand over documents and discuss the arrangements for transferring oil,
provisions and equipment. He reported that he had seen and no doubt been seen by a vessel
the previous day, apparently an Allied merchant ship with a stern gun, but the ship, after
approaching to five nautical miles, just made off. Deciding not to take the risk that the ship
would report a suspicious vessel, Detmers transferred the rendezvous 300 miles northwards.
The next morning, they stopped in order to paint the starboard waterline, which they had been
unable to do a few days earlier. They left themselves drift slowly north-east, and their noon
positions were given as:
17 October: 27º41’S
96º54’E
18 October: 27º27’S
97º23’E
19 October: 27º02’S
97º44’E
20 October: 26º59’S
97º51’E
2
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THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
By about midnight on 20 October, the transfer of diesel oil was completed. Detmers entered
in the War Diary the state of his fuel supplies.
Taken on: 2765 tons gas oil
565 tons diesel oil
= 3328 tons fuel oil
Plus remaining supply: 1130 tons
4450 tons
He commented: ‘The fuel will be sufficient for 223 days, i.e. until 1 June 1942, at 20 tons
daily usage. The necessary reserve can be achieved through economies.’
Bad weather forced Detmers to move further north to complete the transfer of supplies.
The last day for which there are entries on the War Diary is 24 October. They had drifted 21
miles in the previous 24 hours, and were at 26º00’S 95º20’E at noon. Since being
commissioned, the ship had covered 71,363 nautical miles. The provisioning was due to be
completed the next day. Detmers handed over his prisoners and the War Diary, in which the
last entries read:
The cooperation with Kulmerland was very good. Captain Pschunder devoted himself
entirely to his task, so that there was no friction at all. I respectfully suggest that a
suitable recognition be awarded to him and his crew.
My sea endurance until 1 June 1942 seems to be ensured by this provisioning.
I intend to proceed immediately with carrying out alterations to adapt Engine I as
reserve ship's network engine. Thanks to the speedy completion of the provisioning, I
hope to be back in my operational area by the next new moon period.
John McArthur called the time between 26 October and 19 November ‘The Dark Period’.
[JPI, Vol. 10, Submission 104, p. 2244] It is indeed not as well illuminated as the time
covered by the War Diary, but neither is it a ‘black hole’. From 25 October, information on
their activities comes from various sources, principally Detmers’ book and statements by
various crew members under interrogation. At last he had a stock of White Metal 80
sufficient to keep the temperamental bearings of his engines under repair. He mentioned some
of the documentation he had received from Admiral Wenneker in Tokyo:
The list supplied about enemy merchant shipping contains moreover our Straat
Malakka as well. She had recently made several trips to Mombasa, and had last been
seen in Singapore. [German edition, p. 195]
In consultation with the Navigation Officer, Henry Meyer, he decided to go further west for
‘two days’ to carry out some necessary alterations to the engines. (This location should have
been, very approximately, 26ºS 85ºE.) There is a slippage of time here, when he does not
specify what they were doing. ‘Two days’ from leaving Kulmerland would have taken them
until 28 October, but in at least one version of the Action Report he mentions that it was on
7 November, at about the time they reached the area planned, that they sighted an American
vessel, which turned away and disappeared peacefully. The alterations were completed by
8 November (two days) and the test run was satisfactory.
3
SUBM.005.0234
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
His stated intentions were to use the time until the new moon to patrol along a route
reported by an agent, and then (at new moon) to stand off Perth. Then he received a report
from Germany that there was a convoy escorted by Cornwall travelling west near Cape
Leeuwin. This is from the Action Report; in his book he expands on this:
I intended to cruise up the west coast from Cape Leeuwin, the south-west corner of
Australia, perhaps lay mines off Shark Bay, then go past Java and Sumatra and make a
sortie into the Gulf of Bengal and lay mines off Calcutta or the alternative harbours.
[Ausweichshäfen: if you know of a better interpretation in this context, please tell me.]
Therefore I set off first on an easterly course. I intended to be off Cape Leeuwin at the
time of the new moon. In the evening Skl informed me that Cornwall was off Cape
Leeuwin with a convoy…
After several days of evasive action, I headed for the coast again. I left Cape Leeuwin
and Perth behind to the south. I intended to investigate the area around Shark Bay, and
if this was fruitless, to lay mines in the bay itself. [German edition, p. 197-8]
Several objections have been made to this account. One is that Cornwall was not off Cape
Leeuwin; the cruiser there was Canberra, but she was due to hand over her convoy to
Cornwall somewhere in the vicinity of the Cocos Islands, and it was Cornwall that would be
delivering the convoy to its destination. (This would need checking in Canberra’s log, which
I do not have at my disposal.) McArthur writes: ‘Given that Detmers wrote his book almost a
decade after the war, his failure to check the accuracy of the message is interesting. The
cruiser was nowhere in the area and it must be doubted whether such a message was ever sent
or received.’
In fact, a copy of this message outward does exist in Skl records, so why did McArthur not
check before calling Detmers a liar? It would have been easier for him to check this than for
Detmers, at the time he was writing, to check on the whereabouts of Cornwall in 1941.
Besides, he did not write that Cornwall was around Cape Leeuwin, only that he had received
a signal that she was. The report was indeed wrong, but it was a failure of the Intelligence
system ‘at home’, and that was the way Detmers received the message. It did not matter
greatly; cruiser was cruiser, and Detmers kept out of the way.
Another objection to his stated plan is that Shark Bay and Carnarvon were too insignificant
to warrant the use of mines. Messerschmidt claims that Detmers would not have done this,
and that he had not been given notice to prepare the mines. However, there was a valid reason
for laying mines there: to stir up the area and cause confusion, which would cause him no
trouble, as he would be well away before the mines were discovered. On 15 August, when he
was only a few hundred miles off the north-west coast of Western Australia (23º23’S
111º25’E), he had written in his War Diary: ‘I have considered the question of mining
Carnarvon and Geraldton. It would be quite possible at both places. On account of the sparse
traffic in them even in peace time, however, my mines are still too valuable for that.’
Three months later, the situation had changed. There were three possibilities regarding the
manner of laying mines. One was to take Kormoran within the 200 metre line to lay moored
4
SUBM.005.0235
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
mines. She had about 360 EMC mines; that is, Einheitsminen Typ C: horned, moored contact
mines. (The number ranges in various accounts from 200 to 400, but 360 seems to be the
most authoritative.) Another was to send in the LS-boat to within the 20 metre line to lay a
few magnetic mines. She had only 30 TMB mines; that is, Torpedominen Typ B, also called
Grundminen: torpedo-shaped magnetic mines. The ones Kormoran had were adjusted for the
southern hemisphere and could not have been used, for example, around India. The third
option was to use a small captured ship to lay mines, as Pinguin and Komet had done, but
recently Kormoran had not had much luck in finding ships, let alone capturing them in usable
condition. It is not known which options Detmers was possibly considering, and none of them
came to pass anyway.
During October and November, there were several alerts about suspicious or unidentified
ships. There was the case at the beginning of October when Yandra made a misidentification
of a ship that was probably Armadale outbound rather than Salland inbound. An investigation
decided that the vessel had been Armadale, which was just leaving port, and it found that the
officer on watch at the time could not read Morse at an adequate speed, had just guessed at
what the light signals said, and had chosen a name from the list of vessels in the area.
Ironically, this investigation was conducted by Captain Burnett personally. [Winter, pp. 11417; NAA MP1049/5: 2021/5/596: Report on suspicious sighting my HMAS Yandra] The
result of the Inquiry was, of course, not communicated to everyone who had heard rumours
about this ‘mystery ship.’
On 2 November 1941, there was also the case of Cyclops, which was forced into Fremantle
by engine trouble, although it was not due to call. This was probably not as well known as the
Yandra-Armadale case. [Winter, p. 120]
The rumour that an officer who disappeared from Rottnest Island late in 1941 was a spy
who had been picked up by the raider Kormoran is spurious and it defames a decent man.
Lieutenant-Colonel Herman August Kuring disappeared from Rottnest Island on 3 September, a
day when the noon position of Kormoran was 1º54'N 86º39'E, south-west of Ceylon (Sri
Lanka). It would have been no disgrace to Kormoran if she had retrieved a German spy, but it
would have been a stupid misuse of an auxiliary cruiser for such a task, especially as this date
was only two days short of the full moon. Taking a raider close to the coast at that time would
have been suicidal.
What makes this claim particularly offensive is that Kuring had served Australia so well in
both wars. Having enlisted in August 1914, he was an original Anzac who went in with the
first Gallipoli landings; he was wounded twice at the Dardanelles, and again in France at
Camiers. He was commended for his actions at Villers-Bretonneux on 24-25 April 1917. He
was mobilised again in October 1939, aged forty-five, and was commander of the 10th
Garrison Battalion at Rottnest when he apparently fell to his death from one of the cliffs on
Rottnest. This is the veteran whom some lowlifes seek to stigmatise as a spy.
5
SUBM.005.0236
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Vic Jeffery’s claim that Kormoran called at Geraldton on 13-15 October 1941 disguised as
the Norwegian tanker Seirstad [Naval Historical Review, March 1990, p. 7.] has already been
disposed of adequately. The slur on the laxity of port authorities in not inspecting documents
is as offensive as the claim that Kormoran could disguise herself as a tanker is ridiculous. The
idea that Detmers would be stupid enough to expect he could enter an Australian port undetected
is ridiculous, and it is mentioned here only for the sake of completeness. (Kormoran also had
seamen from three Allied ships, including Mareeba, on board at the time.)
Probably the last claim that Kormoran approached the coast of Western Australia was that
she was sighted off Fremantle by air reconnaissance on 11 November and positively
identified. This apparently stems from an entry in the SWACH War Diary for 15 November:
2016: By secraphone from W.A. (Airsitrep serial 91) from CWR. Unable to get table of
letter coordinates, as key for safe not left with duty officer. = C241 15/11 = Enemy
forces. Unidentified M/V sighted 11/11 BCNA 9990 believed to be raider.
Reconnaissance 12/11 failed to locate. Unidentified A/C sighted at 8,000 ft 16 miles
south of Rabaul 2230Z/ 13/11. Maybe related to raider or to Japanese reconnaissance
from Carolines.
The fact that a report of a sighting on 11 November was not entered until 15 November
indicated that it was not a local sighting, and it was entered probably only because, with the
key to the safe temporarily unavailable, they did not know immediately where BCNA 9990
was. I checked this out with the Naval Historical Branch, Department of Defence, London. At
that time, BC was 3ºS and NA was 157ºE. [See Winter, The Intrigue Master, p. 201.] Those
who claim that they had heard that Kormoran had approached the coast of Western Australia
during September-November (before she really approached on 19 November) are misguided.
On the other hand, those who claim they saw her or know that she was definitely identified
are not telling the truth.
Contact and pursuit
It will be remembered that the Operational for auxiliary cruisers enjoined them to avoid
warships and passenger ships. (See section on Aquitania.) If Detmers had planned to ambush
either Sydney or Aquitania, in defiance of an explicit order, he would have incurred serious
disapprobation. There was no credit to be gained from losing his ship and killing his crew in
an act of stupidity and disobedience. He was not suicidal, and he knew the fate of Pinguin.
(Note that the times below, as given by Detmers, are approximate in that they have been
rounded to the nearest five minutes; he did not bring a written record from the ship. He must
have reconstructed the account while in Dhurringile, in consultation with his officers.)
Wednesday, 19 November, was Buss- und Bettag, the Day of Penance and Prayer. (It was
not, as has been translated, ‘Rogation Day’; it has no precise equivalent in English.) It was a
Lutheran religious holiday and an official public holiday in parts of Germany. Therefore the
ship was operating on a comparatively relaxed schedule. The Action Report gives the noon
situation entry:
6
SUBM.005.0237
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Mittwoch, 19.11.41. Kurs 25º, 11 Sm. 111º Ost, 26º34‘ Süd. SSO 3 bis 4, See 3, mittl.
Dünung aus SW, sehr klar.
(Wednesday, 19.11.41. Course 25º, 11 knots. 111º East, 26º34’South. Wind SSE, force 3 to 4,
moderate swell from the south-west, very clear.)
Here we come to the first snag in the report: Course 25º. In his book, Detmers writes: Kurs
20º. (German edition, p. 198. The rest of the details on weather, etc. correspond.) I tend to
believe the Action Report, for four main reasons.
1. The Action Report was written much closer to the time of the events.
2. The Action Report was written before Detmers had two strokes, the book afterwards.
3. The book was worked over by Jochen Brennecke, and in this and other books he has
taken a somewhat cavalier approach to factual details.
4. The course of 20º does not sit well with the details of the initial sighting of Sydney; a
course of 25º fits very well.
The 5º difference in course is important only if you want to use it to estimate where to
look for the wrecks or if you want to prove something with regard to Sydney’s course, but
it is an unfortunate distraction.
Sighting:
15.55: Meldung Ausguck (Lt.z.S. JANSEN) Segler in Sicht BB voraus. Peilung etwa 20º rw.
Verbessert Meldung laufend in 2 Segler, mehrere Fahrzeuge, 2 Rauchwolken, anscheinend
Bewacher. Alarm.
15.55: (Zone time G): Report from lookout (Sub-Lieutenant Jansen): Sailing ship in sight,
port bow. Bearing about 20º true. Report amended continuously into two sailing ships,
several vessels, two smoke columns, apparently escort. Alarm.
The ‘rw’ has often been considered to be an error for ‘sw’ = south-west, and the objection
is raised that Sydney could not have been south-west of Kormoran. However, ‘rw’ means
‘rechtweisend’, a true bearing, not one relative to the ship’s heading. If Kormoran’s course
was 25º, then Sydney would have been fine on the port bow. If the course had been 20º,
this would have meant that Sydney was right ahead.
Linke mentioned the sailing ships and an escorted convoy during his first preliminary
interrogation in Carnarvon. Admiral Royle sent a note to Dechaineux on 30 November that
Linke was obviously lying. Detmers mentions the same sequence of sighting in his book.
[German edition, p. 199. The claim that he thought it might have been the German Pamir
sounds very much like one of Brennecke’s superfluous interpolations.] He also said at an
interrogation on 2 December: ‘Visibility good, but some haze close to the water.’ [B6121:
164M: p. 289] Some people have said that Detmers was lying about this too, because the
log records that visibility was very clear. That was at noon. On summer afternoons off the
coast of Western Australia, a surface heat haze often forms, resulting in a mirage effect.
Personal experience: I lived close to that coast for 25 years. At times, when viewed from
Fremantle, Rottnest Island appears to be hovering above the sea.
7
SUBM.005.0238
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Evasion:
[15.55] Nach BB auf 260º abgedreht. A.K. voraus.
16.00: Kreuzer erkannt als PERTH-Klasse angesprochen liegt auf Suedkurs. Kurs 250º in
die Sonne hinein. Dunkelwerden ab 19.00 Uhr zu rechnen. Starke eigene
Rauchentwicklung. Maschine meldet, Motor 4 ausgefallen. Dadurch Fahrt etwa 14 Sm.
[15.55] Turned away to port. Full speed ahead.
16.00: Cruiser recognised as PERTH-class.
(‘Angesprochen‘ normally means ‘accosted’ or ‘addressed’ or ‘spoken to’, but it seems too
early for signals to have been sent; the distance was still very great.)
[Cruiser] lies on a south course. [Kormoran] Course 250º into the sun.
We count on darkness from 19.00 hours. We are making smoke heavily.
Engine room reports, Engine 4 dropped out. Therefore speed about 14 knots.
According to an interrogation report, Bunjes said that the raider had been 120 miles from the
coast steering north, 26ºS 11ºE [sic], when the Cruiser was sighted, 20-25 miles away, at 45º
on starboard bow. [B6121: 164M: p. 228] Obviously, he had not seen it until Kormoran was
changing course to 250º. It would have given an odd relationship if Sydney had been at 45
Green from Kormoran while the raider was on a heading of 20-25 degrees.
Meyer said that a vessel was sighted from the crow’s nest, but Kormoran waited until they
were certain that it was a cruiser before turning away. [B6121: 164M: p. 226. A. It has been
overlooked that at first Detmers might have thought that he had found a merchant vessel that
he could attack. Although it was a little dangerous to attack so close to the coast – and 120
miles was close in this situation – the moonless night could have given him a chance of
evading subsequent pursuit.]
16.05: Kreuzer dreht zu. Messung über 150 Hm. Gibt dauernd NNJ mit Scheinwerfer. Wir
setzen Signal fuer STRAAT.
16.05: Cruiser turns towards us. Measured distance more than 150 hm. Continually sends
NNJ with searchlight. We set the signal for STRAAT (MALAKKA).
150hm = 16,404 yards = 9.32 land miles = 8.1 nautical miles.
Bunjes said that the cruiser began flashing a (helio) light at seven miles, but he was not on
the range-finder, nor was he on the bridge. [B6121: 164M: p. 228] He was relying on his
experience to guess the distances, and it is unclear whether he meant nautical miles or
statute miles. He may have been wrong anyway, as the sighting was made at 15.55, and at
about 16.05 the distance was ‘more than 150 hm’ – possibly not much ‘over’ 150 hm, but
not at 150 hm.
At interrogation, Detmers and Ahlbach said they were not sure at first whether the signal
was NNJ or NNP. It has been said that experienced officers and signalmen should have
been able to tell the difference, but the difference between NNJ -. -. .--- and NNP -. -. .--.
was simply the duration of the final flash. With the summer afternoon sea haze there could
well have been a problem reading the signal at seven to eight nautical miles. However,
Ahlbach also said that the light signals began at a distance of seven miles, and I think this
is a case where Ahlbach’s detailed statement should be believed rather than Detmers’
8
SUBM.005.0239
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
summary. Like Bunjes, Ahlbach said that Sydney began to send light signals at seven
miles, which corresponds roughly to the 14,000 yards taken by Tom Frame as a crucial
distance. [B6121: 164M: p. 54. This statement was made when Ahlbach was recalled for
further interrogation on 8 December. He was in Hut 31 at Harvey, with other survivors
picked up by Yandra.)
(Detmers called it a ‘searchlight’; Bunjes said ‘helio’ light. Ahlbach allegedly said ‘flash
light’, but it was of course not a hand-held battery-operated torch. [B6121: 164M: p. 54] This
was probably a translation of ‘Blinklicht’, as Ahlbach would have been interrogated in
German. In fact, it would have been a signal lamp, however it was translated.)
Frame gives a succinct exposition of the relative advantages of the Sydney’s superior fire
power and gunnery control, the pivotal points of which are these:
The crucial moment in the encounter occurred when Burnett took his ship within 14,000
yards of Kormoran. At that point, the character of the engagement changed dramatically. At
or beyond 14,000 yards, Sydney was definitely safe and Kormoran was certainly doomed…
[Nearly 7 nautical miles; see table below.]
When Sydney came within 14,000 yards of Kormoran, she was inside the maximum
effective range of the raider’s guns. After coming within 14,000 yards, there was little
effective alteration in the tactical situation until the range was only 5,000 yards. Between
5,000 and 14,000 yards, Sydney was always in danger of being hit by Kormoran’s guns… At
5,000 yards, Sydney had become an easy target for Kormoran… Once Sydney was within 5,000
yards, she advanced from a moderate level of risk of being hit by Kormoran’s poorly
directed and controlled guns to a substantial risk. Within 5,000 yards, there was a high
probability that Kormoran would be able to inflict serious damage on the Australian ship…
[Nearly 2½ nautical miles.]
When the range was further reduced to between 1,200-1,500 yards, Sydney had become a
simple target and could not avoid being hit and badly damaged by Kormoran’s guns. [Frame,
pp. 207-08]
Let us keep these estimates in mind and accept his analysis of the effects of changing range as
roughly correct, except that the comment about Kormoran’s ‘poorly directed and controlled
guns’ is debatable. Their ranging was not as sophisticated as Sydney’s, but as the range
decreased dramatically, this may have worked to Kormoran’s advantage. This will be
discussed later. Noteworthy is Detmers’ estimate that the critical range was 30 hectometres.
[Detmers, p. 205] At that distance, his 20 mm anti-aircraft and 3.7 cm anti-tank guns would
become effective, and if Sydney did not have all the secondary weapons ready, it might be
Kormoran who had the fire-power advantage. (‘30 hm war die höchste Schussentfernung für
meine Fla-Maschinenwaffen. Jeder Meter weniger brachte sie zu bessere Geltung.’) He also
wrote, on the same page: ‘Der Gegner lief jetzt in die 30 hm Entfernung ein. Wird er die
Fahrt verringern? Kommt der Stoppbefehl für uns?’ (30 hm was the greatest range for my
anti-aircraft guns. Every metre made them more effective… Now the opponent crossed over
the 30 hectometre distance. Will he reduce speed? Shall we receive the order to stop?) Thus
the order that Frame feels should have been sent at 14,000 yards had, according to Detmers,
9
SUBM.005.0240
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
still not been sent when Sydney was already at 3,000 metres. The best that Frame could do in
the face of all the evidence was to claim repeatedly that Detmers was lying.
Because distances and ranges are given in a variety of measurements, a rough conversion
table of those distances most often mentioned in the battle accounts is given here for purposes
of comparison. There is one small point that might be noted. One sailor specified under
interrogation; ‘German nautical miles’. An Australian officer scribbled the comment: ‘Is there
any difference?’ Yes, there was, and I presume that Kormoran was using the German system,
but the difference was not great enough to make a significant difference to the flow and
course of events. The land mile was also not necessarily the fixed length that it became; there
were times when each little German principality was likely to have a ‘mile’ of a different
length. [Check wiki if this difference worries you.] This has been calculated and can be
checked using website: http://www.arrowscientific.com.au/usefulbitsmetricconv.html.
Nautical
Miles
21·72
17·38
8·10
6·91
4·86
2·47
0·74
0·59
0·49
0·43
Statute
Miles
25
20
9·32
7·96
5·60
2·84
0·85
0·68
0·56
0·50
Yards
Metres
Hectometres
44,000
35,200
16,404
14,000
9,843
5,000
1,500
1,200
984
875
40,234
32,187
15,000
12,802
9,000
4,572
1,371
1,097
900
800
402
322
150
128
90
46
14
11
9
8
Frame writes that at 14,000 yards Kormoran must have done something to allay or confirm
Burnett’s fears about the identity of the suspect ship.
The evidence suggests that Sydney ordered Kormoran to stop when the range was more than
14,000 yards… It is also likely that Sydney stood off the raider at about 14,000 yards for
some time. The evidence of the survivors is quite clear on this point. At least one hour
elapsed from the time that Sydney was sighted by Kormoran until the engagement. With
Kormoran cruising at 14 knots and Sydney closing at nearer to 30 knots, Sydney could cover
the distance of 7-9 miles between the two ships in 30 minutes. However, at 17.15 Detmers
claimed that Sydney was still 9,000 yards distant. Five minutes later, he claimed the range
was 1,200 yards. [Frame, pp. 209-10]
Here the first objection is that the evidence does not suggest that Kormoran was ordered to
stop at a range of over 14,000 yards. If she was ever ordered to stop, it was not until the ships
were 1,000-2,000 yards apart. Nothing in the ‘evidence of survivors’ makes it at all clear that
Sydney stood off the raider at that distance for some time, or at all. About one and a half hours
elapsed between the sighting and the engagement, but the sighting was at a significantly
greater distance than 14,000 yards, and without the intrusion of the spurious 9,000 yards, the
10
SUBM.005.0241
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
rate of approach is quite reasonable and fairly constant. If Sydney was travelling at 30 knots
and Kormoran at 14 knots, then the closing rate would have been 16 nautical miles an hour.
If, as Detmers really said, Sydney was 900 metres off at 17.15, then the initial sighting would
have been at about 20 miles, the lower figure of the range given by Bunjes.
Of course, these two claims – that Sydney was 9,000 yards distant at 17.15 and 1,200 yards
distant ‘five minutes later’ - are quite inconsistent, but this is where Frame’s claims and
reality part company, for Detmers did not claim that the distance at 17.15 was 9,000 yards.
He claimed it was 9 hectometres: that is [see above] about 985 yards. The Action Report in
Detmers’ diary, when decrypted, said: ‘AGAE KREUZER LAEUFT STB QUERAB MIT
ABSTAND I HM.’ That is: ‘1715 cruiser is running on the starboard beam at a distance of 9
hectometres.’ That is, 900 metres. The cryptanalyst had it right; the translator possibly had it
right initially as well, but somebody, unable to imagine that a cruiser would approach so
close, added a zero to make it 9,000 metres. When this was noticed, it must have been
ordered that the report stand as it had been written, not as somebody thought it ought to have
been. This distance is not an enciphering or deciphering error. The distance appears as 9
hectometres in the ‘dictionary report’ and in several other independent reports. Frame’s
solution to a non-existent problem rests entirely on the presumptuousness of one person who
decided unilaterally to alter a document.
This error has also misled Greg Bathgate, who has Sydney approaching closely, then racing
off like a startled gazelle before returning. Bathgate converts the account to Zone H time, so
when he writes 1807 he means what others would generally call 1707. He writes that at 1807
Sydney travelling at 28 knots, was at a distant of 6,500 metres, then at 1809 was at 7,800
metres, heading away, because Burnett was satisfied that the ship was not Straat Malakka.
Then at 7,800 metres she slowed to 12 knots, because, at 1812 hours, with the ships nearly
9,000 metres apart, the surrender is formalised. It would be an unrewarding waste of effort to
analyse everything that Bathgate has written; his allegations are unsubstantiated, speculative
and shameless; but even so, it is not the worst book written on the topic; there are at least two
that are worse in terms of malice and stupidity. [Bathgate, HMAS Sydney: 1941: The
Analysis, pp. 66-68. The map on page 68 is a crazy concoction.] Before we return to Frame’s
account, it should just be noted that Bathgate’s claim that there had been Japanese submarines
standing off the Koolan Island – Yampi Sound area to protect Japanese mining interests is not
only unique, but totally wrong. [Bathgate, pp. 152-53] The whole Japanese mining project
collapsed before it began, when licences for the export of the iron ore were forbidden in 1938.
Let us return to Frame’s claim that at 14,000 yards Kormoran must have done something to
allay or confirm Burnett’s fears about her identity. His suggestion was that Sydney’s first
action would have been to order Kormoran to stop, but I have found no record that shows that
he ordered any other merchant vessel to stop while at this distance, or indeed at all. Frame
writes that, having been ordered to stop, Kormoran then hoisted the Dutch flag. In fact the
Dutch flag would have been set fairly soon after Sydney was sighted. He writes that nobody
but Detmers, Jurgensen [sic] and von Gosseln [sic] would have known of this signal. [Frame,
pp. 209, 210.] Of course there were others. Ahlbach would have known: he would have made
11
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Barbara Poniewierski
the report to Detmers. Helmsman Sigmar Weinig was on the bridge all the time, and he would
have heard this report. Henry Meyer was there most of the time, Foerster and Malapert some
of the time, and the other signalman on the bridge (Lins) should have known. Still, that is not
very many. Frame then claims that Kormoran must have obeyed, otherwise Sydney would
have fired a warning shot, but nobody reported that one was fired. Likewise, nobody noticed
that the ship had stopped, or slowed to two or three knots, although they had lived with the
ship for nearly a year and knew her moods and movements. Even the Chinese laundrymen,
who seem not to have been the brightest baubles on the Christmas tree, would have known
whether their ship was moving or not.
My suggestion is that Sydney did nothing of the kind. At 14,000 yards, Kormoran could
read the Morse light signals that Sydney was sending, but Sydney could not read Kormoran’s
signal flag hoists. It would have been difficult enough in any case at that distance, with the
sun in the eyes of the men on Sydney’s bridge, but at Detmers’ behest, the chief signalman,
Erich Ahlbach, made it as hard as possible by fumbling the flags, dropping them, then
hoisting them in the place most difficult for them to be seen, and arranging that they came out
twisted and had to be hauled in to be cleared and hoisted again. Detmers knew what Frame
set out, as above: with every hectometre he could lure Sydney to come closer, the cruiser lost
part of the advantage of its superior gun control, and they were on a more even footing. The
process has been described in detail in several sources, so we shall leave it at that.
The Action Reports give very little on the period between 1605 and 1700. They say only:
16.35: Motor 4 wieder klar mit 8 Zylindern. Fahrt 14 beibehalten. Messung mit 3m-Gerät bei
80 hm aus Tarnungsgründen eingestellt. Mit 1,25 m Gerät weitergemessen. Während der
ganzen Zeit Signalverkehr. Kreuzer kommt mit schmaler Silhouette langsam StB achteraus
auf.
16.35: Engine 4 serviceable again with 8 cylinders. Speed 14 knots maintained. Distance
measurement with 3 metre apparatus ceased at 80 hm for reasons of camouflage.
Measurement continued with 1·25 metre apparatus. Signal traffic the whole time. Cruiser
approaches slowly from starboard quarter with a narrow silhouette.
(The 1·25 m range finder was the one designed for the anti-aircraft guns.)
What else happened during the approach has to be taken mainly from the interrogation
reports and Detmers’ book. Note that Detmers writes that measurement with the 3m
rangefinder ceased at about 16.35 at a distance of 80 hectometres; therefore Sydney was well
within Frame’s critical 14,000 yards; in fact, she was within the 90 hectometres that the faulty
document claimed she did not reach until 17.15. At first, Sydney was approaching showing an
appropriately narrow silhouette, as would be the natural and proper thing to do.
17.00: Meldung auf 600 m abgesetzt: QQQ STRAAT MALAKKA, 111 E 26 S. PERTH Radio
wiederholt, fordert auf Weiteres zu melden falls notwendig.
17.00: Report (message) sent at 600 metres. QQQ STRAAT MALAKKA. 111E 26S. PERTH
Radio repeats, requests further report if necessary.
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Barbara Poniewierski
(This message has been handled in the section on wireless messages, but it must be stressed
again that it was not a case of ‘faking a distress signal’; these QQQQ signals were
operational signals. For more detail, see section on wireless messages.)
As he had done on other occasions, Detmers relied on the effectiveness of his camouflage and
the psychology of the captain of the other ship. However, this effectiveness did not depend
entirely on her appearance, but how she behaved. In his War Diary for 31 January, he wrote:
Evaluation of Afric Star: Statements by prisoners confirm that the captain fell for our trick and
considered us harmless. Thus our disguise must be good. The outstanding point about this is
probably the fact that we have no superstructure behind which one could suspect a gun.
On 15 March, while he was in company with U-124, he offered to let its commander see a
demonstration of the speed with which Kormoran could decamouflage and be ready for
action. Although he had been warned of what was about to happen, the commander was
shocked by the speed of the transformation.
So much for the speed aspect of the process. Then there was the matter of exercising
patience himself, while wearing down the patience of the other captain. On 17 April, he had
stalked Nicolaos D. L. from sighting her smoke at 0600 to decamouflaging at 0953, then
captured her within ten minutes. (She had to be sunk after all.) He wrote in the War Diary:
I must get to within 100 hm in order to have a reasonable chance to hold him effectively
with my guns. I count on human weakness; the captain will want to return to his former
course. So keep calm; it is only a trial of patience. He must come to me.
When confronted with Sydney, Detmers was prepared to let himself be chased for hours in
order to get her within a range where his guns would do the most damage, and Sydney would
be most handicapped.
Lagebeurteilung und Entschluss:
17.15 Kreuzer läuft StB querab, Abstand 9 hm.
Situation Appraisal and Decision:
17.15: Cruiser is running on the starboard beam, distance 9 hm.
(The error in altering this 9 hm to 90 hm has been handled above.)
This is startling. The battle did not begin until 17.30; so here apparently were Sydney and
Kormoran running parallel, almost directly abeam, at a distance of 900-1,000 yards, for
fifteen minutes. Allowing for the fact that Detmers rounded off his times, it might still have
been ten minutes. Still, I think that this is inaccurate as regards time or distance, and that at
17.15 Sydney, although very close, was not yet directly abeam.
Detmers said that Sydney approached with all guns and torpedo tubes trained on his ship, but
no doubt he meant only the turret guns. It is doubtful how much he could have seen much of
the smaller guns. [B6121: 164M: p. 224. A] A boat had also been swung out, but not lowered,
and apparently not manned, while the aircraft was warming up on the catapult.
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Barbara Poniewierski
Let us analyse here the other various reasons Frame gives for claiming that Sydney ordered
Kormoran to stop while still at a safe distance, and that she obeyed.
It is very likely that both Sydney and Kormoran either stopped or slowed considerably before
Sydney closed to less than 14,000 yards, possibly to board Kormoran… Burnett was justified in
approaching the Dutch ship because she had obeyed his orders, and because he would need
to board the ship if she were unable to prove her identity.’ [p. 210]
Sydney had given no orders, except to ask a few questions that Kormoran answered as
clumsily as feasible. This could be rewritten as: ‘Burnett would have been justified … if she
had obeyed his orders…’ And the converse to this is that he was not justified, since these
events did not happen.
The QQQ signal was one such ploy and was consistent with Kormoran having stopped. [p. 210]
It was even more consistent with her still being under way.
Since Detmers claimed that at 17.15 Sydney was at 9,000 yards, and five minutes later was at
1,200 yards, Kormoran must have stopped or substantially reduced speed. [p. 210]
But since we have seen that the allegation that he claimed she was at 9,000 yards was an
error, Frame’s claim that she stopped is also false.
Indeed, sketches prepared by Fritz Treber for Captain Farncomb of the engagement seemed
to show that Kormoran was not underway as Sydney approached.’ [p. 211]
This is purely Frame’s imagination; they were not moving pictures. In fact, the most readily
available version of these sketches had been redrawn by somebody else.
In his book, Detmers says that he watched the compass bearing until Sydney ‘had come
practically to a standstill’. Although the reference to a compass bearing would normally mean
that Sydney’s bearing from Kormoran was steady, his choice of words suggests that the
Australian cruiser was not under way or making way.’ [p. 211]
Obviously, any ‘choice of words’ in the English version was made by the translator, not by
Detmers. What Detmers wrote did in fact have the meaning Frame calls ‘normal’. This is
clear in the German version.]
Detmers wrote [p. 207]: ‘Am Peilkompass stellte ich fest, dass die Peilung zum Gegner fast
zum Stehen gekommen war.’
(From the bearings compass I ascertained that the bearing to the opponent had almost come
to a standstill.)
This is what happens when two vessels are running on parallel courses at the same speed.
It is unclear from the original German version of the decrypted action report whether
Detmers was recording that Sydney stopped main engines, or that the aircraft’s engine was shut
down. Both interpretations of this entry are possible. [Frame. p. 211]
The original German is quite clear, and it is given in different wordings in several independent
versions. .
‘Stellt motor ab.’ = Turns off engine, but it cannot be the engine or engines of the ship.
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Barbara Poniewierski
‘Stoppt Maschine.’ Several times in the War Diary, Detmers referred to the Arado as ‘die
Maschine’. In German as in English, pilots sometimes refer to their aircraft as ‘meine
Maschine’ or ‘my machine’.
Another version is even more specific. It reads:
Um 17.25 Morsespruch nochmals. ‘Hoist your secret call.’ Weitere Verzoegerung kann nur
Lage verschlechtern.
Gegner stellt Flzg.Motor ab, ist also völlig ahnungslos.
At 17.25 another Morse signal. ‘Hoist you secret call.’ (This signal was also by lamp.)
Further delay can only make the situation worse. (If Burnett had suspicions, and they were
confirmed, he could have given the impression of being satisfied, and then drawn away until
he could destroy Kormoran from a safe distance. Detmers could not risk that.) Opponent
turns off aircraft (Flugzeug) motor. So he is completely unsuspecting. [‘Ahnungslos’ is also
regularly translated colloquially as ‘clueless’.]
Detmers’ book [p. 206] reads: ‘Er stellte den Flugzeugmotor ab und ging sogar mit der Fahrt
herunter.’ (He turned off the aircraft engine and even reduced speed.)
There is no ambiguity or unclarity at all about these reports.
The only ambiguity is where, in one of the English translations, somebody rendered ‘Stoppt
Maschine’ as ‘(Cruiser) stops engines’. (Cruiser) is an unwarranted interpolation in the same
version as the change from 9 hm to 90 hm; it was presumably done by the same person.
One could continue deconstructing the details of Frame’s claims almost indefinitely, but
enough is enough. The background to his interpretations, whether they are based on doctored
documents or are faulty interpretations of genuine reports, is that he wants at all costs to
exonerate Captain Burnett from any claims of negligence, and he cannot do that unless he can
show that Kormoran must have stopped, and possibly feigned surrender, for nothing else
would justify his actions.
Contrary to the general impression given by Detmers’ book, it seems as though Kormoran
may not have answered Sydney’s questions, except to signal her feigned identity, until the
cruiser was already dangerously close. The range of visibility of the signal flags used to
respond to the questions was not great, and with the sea haze and the sun in their eyes
Sydney’s officers would have had trouble reading them, even without Ahlbach’s deliberate
obstructionism. Then came the demand to hoist the secret call sign.
Detmers wrote in his book: ‘Auf diesen Morsespruch warteten wir schon besorgt über eine
Stunde, besorgt, weil uns das Geheimsignal der Straat Malakka nicht bekannt war.’ [p. 206]
(For over an hour, we had been waiting anxiously for this Morse signal, anxious, because we
did not know the secret call sign of the Straat Malakka.) The ships were still not quite on
parallel courses, but while Ahlbach fiddled with flags, Sydney closed further, then began to
signal again. (It is not 100% clear whether this last signal was a repetition of the demand that
she show the secret call sign, or an order to stop.) ‘Die Zeit genügte, um den offenbar noch
immer ahnungslosen Gegner auflaufen zu lassen. Genau dahin, wo ich ihn haben wollte.’(The
time was sufficient to allow the opponent, still obviously unsuspecting, to close up. Exactly
15
SUBM.005.0246
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Barbara Poniewierski
there, where I wanted to have him.) An interrogation report notes that Foerster said: ‘He was
very astonished that the cruiser came near to the raider.’ [B6121: 164M: p. 288; on p.224,
reliability grading B.1. When an officer was going through the interrogation notes and
collating them under topics preparatory to writing a report, he gave many of the statements a
reliability grading. These notes are at pp. 224-232. Some gradings will be cited when
reference is made to statements during interrogations, but page numbers will not be given.
Most statements by Detmers, Bunjes, Ahlbach and Jürgensen were graded A, B1 or B2. The
standard grading system ran from A1 to E5.)
Frame writes that Sydney asked for the secret call sign probably at 5,000-7,000 metres.
[p. 212] However, this was the last signal made, immediately before Detmers ordered
decamouflage and open fire. Frame is clearly wrong. It is doubtful that, under the conditions,
signals flags aboard Kormoran could have been read at that distance. Ahlbach gave the
sequence and timing of signals as:
Hoisted signal Straat Malakka above bridge. Cruiser 10º from aft.
When cruiser came parallel, he asked where they were going. Answered Batavia.
Flash light [from Sydney]: ‘Show your secret call sign.’
Cruiser did not signal “Proceed” nor “Stop”.
[B6121: 164M: p. 54. Typed notes of second interrogation, 9 December. p. 231: A.]
Bunjes wrote later:
At 1700 hours, the distance between her and us is half-a-mile, at sea an incredibly short
distance. She is now travelling parallel to us on our starboard side at the same speed as
ours… We observe that the engine of her plane which has been running is stopped, and
the aircraft is replaced under cover…[Sydney then ordered Kormoran: ‘Hoist your
secret call.’] That is too much because we do not know the secret callsign of the
“STRAAT MALAKKA”.
[B6121: 164M, p. 483. The time of 1700 is clearly wrong. The error could have been made
by Bunjes, a translator, or a typist.] At his original interrogation, Bunjes said that the ships
were about 1200 metres apart, on parallel course abeam, when the cruiser asked for the secret
call. [B6121: 164M: p. 228. A]
Meyer said that Sydney sent the signal: ‘Hoist signal letters’, whereupon they gave the name
of ‘the Dutch ship’. Then she asked for the secret signal, but they did not reply. [B6121:
164M: p. 224. B3]
Detmers said on 1 December: ‘Cruiser signalled “stop” and ordered Raider by search light
in plain language to given secret call. Didn’t know so had to fight, although his orders were
to take prizes and his ship was not equipped to fight warships.’ [B6121: 164M: p. 287] These
are notes typed up from an interrogation. It is likely that he did say this, although there are
enough transparent errors in the typescripts to be suspicious when one solitary statement
contradicts other statements. He did not repeat this in his book, and the implication from what
is written on page 205 is only that had was expecting such an order to be given.
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Barbara Poniewierski
The handwritten draft of a preliminary report states: ‘According to Ahlbach, “Sydney” did
not order the raider to stop, and this statement is made by other prisoners, but Captain
Detmers mentions an order to stop immediately before the signal by search light in plain
language to give the secret call sign.’ [B6121: 164M: p. 176. A] It is a little strange, though
not impossible, that he would have seen a signal that Ahlbach, the specialist, missed. As far as
the battle is concerned, it would have made no difference at all whether the order to stop was
given or not. Its only significance is in trying to read Burnett’s mind. If Sydney did signal
‘Stop’, then it is probable that he thought he had an unarmed German supply ship in front of
him and intended to capture it.
What have various authors written about this segment of the encounter?
Glenys McDonald writes that Detmers had stated that Sydney had stopped. ‘I do not
believe Detmers’ comment that Sydney had stopped. [p. 177] She is correct in believing that
Sydney had not stopped, but wrong in thinking that Detmers said that she had, so it is not a
question of believing Detmers or not.
Frame writes [p. 178] that Detmers did indicate that this order was given. On page 97 he
writes that Montgomery rightly points out that if Sydney was not suspicious, there was no
reason to ask for the secret call sign. (There does not seem to be anything on record to
indicate that the captain of Cornwall asked for the secret call sign of ‘Tamerlane’ [Pinguin],
or that the captain of Devonshire asked for the secret call sign of ‘Polyphemus’ [Atlantis], but
the latter did check to see whether the vessel concerned could have been in the area.) It is true
that, if the ship being challenged was on the list of ships expected to be in the area, and if she
looked like that ship, then she probably was not asked for her secret call sign, which was
intended primarily for use in wireless signals rather than in ship-to-ship encounters. The mere
fact that Straat Malakka was not on Sydney’s list of vessels in the area should have made her
suspect, but this was not a unique situation. Then, however, Frame goes on to write:
As Kormoran was unable to reply and the range had closed to 5,000 yards, Sydney prepared to
board the Dutch merchantman from a distance of 1,200 yards… [German] accounts included
a description of a boat being swung outboard from its davits and made ready for launching…
At the same time, a signal would have been sent to ‘Straat Malakka’ advising that she would be
boarded. This is probably the signal that Detmers tried to suggest was the order from Sydney
demanding the hoist of her secret call sign. [p. 214]
Let us crack open this curate’s egg of a hypothesis. Like so much of Frame’s book, the
distance of 5,000 yards is totally wrong, being based on the doctored document.
The order to hoist the secret call sign was not given until about 1,200 metres.
The claim that a boat was swung out on its davits is correct; it could have indicated that
Burnett was considering that the stranger was a vessel that needed to be boarded. However, it
has been brought to my attention that a crash boat was routinely swung out in case of an
emergency when the aircraft was to be launched, and this might not be manned unless there
was an accident. Thus it is not proof that Burnett intended to try to board the other vessel.
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Barbara Poniewierski
The allegation that a signal ‘would have been sent’ to the stranger advising that she would be
boarded is at the best speculation, and is implicitly contradicted by all statements made.
The allegation that this mythical signal was one that ‘Detmers tried to suggest’ was the order
to hoist her secret call sign is totally unjustified; in fact, it is unworthy.
Now we come to the question of whether Detmers really did know Straat Malakka’s secret
call sign, and used it to lure Sydney closer. If he had had it, and if he did use it in this way, the
use was quite legitimate. The captain of the cruiser should not have let himself be fooled into
lowering his guard. The most persistent advocate of the argument that Detmers had this call
sign is James Eagles. He insists that not only could Japanese spies have obtained the secret
call signs in Singapore, but that they did obtain them. They then notified Tokyo, which
informed the German Naval Attaché, Admiral Paul Wenneker. Wenneker would then have
sent the information to Berlin for passing on to Kormoran, or have notified Kormoran
through the material carried by Kulmerland. [JPI: Vol. 16, Submission 42D, p. 3860-68.] He
wrote that the Germans had plenty of opportunity to obtain secret call signs: when they
invaded the Netherlands in May 1940, or when the Japanese occupied French Indo-China in
July 1941. This is bizarre; he waffles on interminably and irrelevantly about the capture of
codes and ciphers, although the secret call signs had nothing whatsoever to do with these.
First: the list was a booklet containing the secret call signs of the vast number of British
merchant ships, and from June 1941 of Dutch ships (and still later of Norwegian ships). It
would not have been possible to steal a booklet without its loss being noticed. It might have
been possible to have photographed it, but photographing documents does not seem to have
been a technique used widely by Japanese agents.
Second: in order to obtain the call signs just of the disguises that the raiders might use, it
would have been necessary for the Germans to tell the Japanese what these disguises were.
That would definitely not have been done until 1942.
Third: Eagles would have it that the Japanese obtained this information in Singapore.
[Personal emails.] However, the Germans complained that the Japanese were not supplying
information from Singapore.
Fourth: Kulmerland left Japan on 6 September. The three months between when the Dutch
call signs were first issued in June 1941 may seem a long time, but the snatch would have had
to be organised on political level then arranged at ground (operational) level, and the material
would have had to be sent to Japan by ship, as it would have been dangerous and difficult to
send it by wireless. It just does not hang together.
Unfortunately, the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry thought it possible that Kormoran might
have had the secret call sign of Straat Malakka. This was one of the few places where they
thought wrong. Detmers did receive from Admiral Wenneker a scrap of information about
Straat Malakka; there was information that she had been in Mombasa and Singapore. That
was information that could have been obtained easily, particularly as Mombasa was in neutral
territory, a Portuguese colony, where there were still German representatives.
Commander Detmers said they did not know the secret call sign.
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Barbara Poniewierski
First Officer Foerster said they did not know the secret call sign.
Wireless Officer von Malapert said, even as late as 2007, they did not know the secret call sign.
Prize Officer Bunjes said they did not know the secret call sign.
Chief Yeoman of Signals Ahlbach said they did not know the secret call sign, and he was the
man who would have had to run up the flags if they had been able to respond to the demand.
But Eagles and some others have decided differently, so everybody else must have been
lying. The basis for this claim is their opinion that Burnett would have been stupid to have
approached Kormoran so closely unless he had satisfied himself of her identity, therefore she
must have had the secret call sign. This reasoning is pseudo-logical.
The two ships were now perilously close. The story of the ‘pantrymen at the railings’ is
well known. Detmers wrote in his book of the pantrymen ‘leaning on the railings. [German
edition, p. 206] Some men said that they could not distinguish individuals on board Sydney.
Bunjes said: ‘We can distinguish every single man aboard; the bridge is full of officers.’
[B6121: 164M: p. 483. He was using the German grammatical device of using the Present
Tense to describe small, exciting sections of a narrative of past events.] The difference can be
accounted for at least in part by the time when the man was able to see Sydney, and whether
or not he had binoculars. It has been suggested that the men in white might have been
ammunition handlers for the secondary armament, or members of a planned boarding party.
This begs the question: either way, they had no reason to be ‘leaning on the railings’. One
thing is virtually certain: immediately before the action commenced, an officer with
binoculars on either ship could have discerned individuals on the other. It has also been
claimed that Detmers had ensured that the bridge personnel were not wearing Kriegsmarine
jackets, for the naval eagle was distinctive and could have been seen from the cruiser.
Decamouflage:
Now that Detmers had Sydney ‘exactly where I want him’, he gave the order to decamouflage.
17.30: Befehl entarnen. Kriegsflagge am Grossmast weht klar aus. Enttarnzeit
6 sec. Gegner sackt achteraus.
17.30: Order: ‘Decamouflage.’ War flag flies clear from mainmast. Decamouflage time 6 seconds.
Opponent drops astern.
(Another version says: Daher,1730, enttarnen. Holl. Flagge nieder. Kriegsflagge Grossmast
weht klar aus. Enttarnzeit 6 Sek.
Therefore, at 1730, decamouflage. Dutch flag down, war ensign streams clear on the
mainmast. Decamouflage time 6 seconds. There is a possibility of a second or three error in
the timing, but it was being noted carefully, probably by stopwatch, and by Gösseln or Meyer
rather than by Detmers or Ahlbach.)
The general impression seems to be that the Dutch flag had to be lowered and the German
ensign raised on the same mast. Frame puts this into words: ‘The Dutch flag was struck and
a German battle ensign was hoisted in its place.’ [p. 86] This is weird; it is another case where
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Barbara Poniewierski
Frame has made an incorrect assumption and then, on the basis of his error, has claimed that
Detmers was lying. He adds:
Conceding that every preparation had been made before the order to decamouflage was
given, it is difficult to believe that the Dutch flag was lowered and the German battle ensign
hoisted by one man, and that this was reported by the same individual to Detmers; and that
the ship was decamouflaged and the guns trained and fired, all within six seconds. [p. 101]
This, of course, was not the way it happened; the events were not sequential; they were
simultaneous. The lowering of one flag, the hoisting of the ensign, the raising of the flaps
camouflaging the guns: everything happened at once. The only thing that had to wait for the
ensign was the order to open fire. (Feuer frei!)
Detmers writes in his book: ‘Die holländische Flagge ging am Flaggenstock nieder. Die
deutsche Kriegsflagge kletterte im Grossmast hoch…Der Signalmaat meldete, wie üblich:
‘Kriegsflagge weht.’ [p. 207]
(The Dutch flag was lowered on the flagpole. The German war ensign climbed the mainmast.
The Yeoman of Signals reported, as usual: ‘War flag flies.’)
All right; don’t believe him. Go back to the refrain: whatever Detmers says, he is lying.
However, look at a sequence of actions, compiled from numerous interrogation reports.
Kormoran had four signalmen: Signalobermaat Erich Ahlbach, whose name is mentioned in
many books on the topic; next in rank and experience was Signalobergefreiter Erhardt Otte.
Karl Heinz Krug and Heinz Paul Lins both held the rank of Signalgefreiter. Ahlbach, as the
senior man, handled the exchange of signals with Sydney; Lins was on the bridge with him.
From the time of sighting, or very soon afterwards, one signalman (Krug) and an ordinary
sailor had been stationed at the stern ensign staff where the Dutch flag was flying (for that is
where merchant ships show their colours when they show them at all), waiting to haul in the
Dutch flag. The fourth (Otte) and another sailor were stationed at the foot of the mainmast,
where the ensign and pennant were already attached to the halyards waiting to be hoisted.
[Interrogations: B6121: 164M: Ahlbach, pp. 54, 57; Otte, pp. 100, 191, 407.] Their
statements are consistent within themselves and with one another, except that Ahlbach
guessed the time taken to decamouflage as 10-15 seconds, [p. 231: B1] while Otte said 8-10
seconds. They had obviously not been drilled to say that it was six seconds. The most
complete record is the second interrogation of Ahlbach, 9 December, p. 54. B1. CPO Kohls
also said that the flag was raised before the first shot. P. 227, A] It was quite a decent-sized
flag; Otte said, 2·5 metres by 3·6 metres. [p. 231: B1]
Nobody had to run to the bridge to report that the ensign was flying; somebody on the
bridge was detailed to watch the mast and report when it could be seen. At the command
‘Enttarnen’, everyone went into action immediately and independently, and everything
happened at once. As the flag was still being hoisted, the camouflage of the various guns was
being raised or lowered. (How long does it take to swing open a garage tilt-a-door?) Then the
guns had to be checked for line and range. Detmers wrote that the ‘Signalmaat’ (Ahlbach)
reported to him when the ensign was flying. The idea that one man did all of these things, one
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Barbara Poniewierski
after the other, is simply bizarre. It could possibly have been done in six seconds, certainly in
ten. Detmers might have been physically able to see the flag on the mainmast, but he would
have been unlikely to have taken his eyes off the cruiser. He relied on the training of his men:
on Otte to raise the flag quickly, on Ahlbach to report it promptly but accurately.
Looking at a silhouette or photo of Kormoran, it might be assumed that the ‘Grossmast’
(‘big mast’, or mainmast) was the larger of her two masts. The larger mast was in front of the
bridge, and whatever its height, it was the ‘foremast’. The mainmast (‘Grossmast’ or
‘Achtermast’) was the one well aft of the bridge and funnel; the name was a relic of the days
of sailing ships, when the mast that took the most strain needed to be placed close to the
centre of the lengthwise axis of the ship.
There is little point in arguing about how quickly the flag could be hoisted. Inquiry needs
to do some tests with a mast the height of Kormoran’s mast, a flag the size of Kormoran’s
ensign, a signalman as good as Otte, and the flag already attached to the halyards and ready
to hoist. A flag is usually raised with slow, ceremonial solemnity; that not the case here. Otte
had trained for a year for one specific purpose: to get the ensign up quickly. It would have
been impressed on him that the lives of his shipmates depended on this. (And, of course, his
own life.)
In describing the practice decamouflage demonstration for the benefit of U-124, Detmers
gives a more precise description of the process than he does in connection with the battle:
Im Nu wehte die Kriegsflagge am achteren Mast aus, die Klappen für die Geschütze unter
Back und Poop flogen hoch, dieLuken Zwo und Vier senkten sich. Die in ihnen montierten
Geschütze wurden sichtbar. Die Reling klappte überall nieder, um das Schussfeld frei zu
machen. Die Torpedoklappen gingen auf, die Rohre wurden querab geschwenkt und
Scheinwerfer, Entfernungsmessgerät und sämtliche Flakkanonen wurden hydraulisch hoch
gefahren. [p. 120]
[In no time, the war flag was flying from the mainmast, the flaps for the guns under the
forecastle and poop flew up, the hatches two and four sank. The guns mounted in them
became visible. The railing dropped down everywhere, in order to clear the field of fire. The
torpedo flaps opened, the tubes were trained abeam and searchlight, rangefinder and all the
anti-aircraft guns were raised hydraulically.]
It must be remembered that all these things happened simultaneously, and could have
occurred in a lesser time span than it takes to describe them. This is a sticking point with a lot
of people: was the German ensign flying before the first shot was fired? That is a legitimate
query, and one that seems impossible to determine definitively.
Detmers said that the torpedo aiming points were the bow and stern of Sydney. Whether or
not one is inclined to believe Detmers or not, that was in any case the logical thing to do.
Burnett faced a different problem. He did not know whether his opponent was armed, and if
he did take into account that she might be, he could not be sure where the guns were. The
21
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Barbara Poniewierski
logical aiming point for one of his guns would have been the bridge of the stranger, in order
to destroy central control for both ship and guns.
What happened was this. The torpedo that Kormoran aimed at the bow missed Sydney
altogether. It was the torpedo that was aimed at the stern that hit the bow. Therefore, at such a
close distance, either the torpedo officer was not very good, or the relative positions of the
ships had changed quickly in a way that could not have been predicted.
Sydney did not hit the raider’s bridge, but one shell tore through the funnel behind the
bridge and sent a shower of splinters the main wireless room, killing one man and wounding
others, then wounding several men on the bridge, including Ahlbach in the left calf and
Navigation Officer Meyer in the lower back. This also meant that the relative positions of the
ships had changed, and Sydney’s guns were affected in the same way as Kormoran’s
torpedoes, but in the opposite direction. It is confirmation of Detmers’ statement: ‘Gegner
sackt achteraus.’ (Opponent drops astern.)
Kormoran had turned slightly and slowly, from a heading of 250º to 260º, because it was
easier to move the ship than to move the tubes, but it was turning on its axis, and that should
not have affected the aim of Sydney’s guns much. It was as though it had been noticed on
Sydney’s bridge that the German war ensign was being raised, and the men had just enough
time to think: ‘Christ, it’s a bloody raider!’ while somebody shouted: ‘Open fire!’ Some order
must have been passed to the engine room, for Sydney began to drop back, and she must have
been slowing down, for Kormoran maintained speed. However, Sydney could not fall astern
quickly enough to evade both torpedoes. (A demonstration with models will show how this
worked.) This possibility is worth considering: namely that not only was the ensign raised,
but that it was seen from Sydney. The dislocation of Kormoran’s torpedoes and Sydney’s
broadside are highly indicative of this.
Now let us turn to Kormoran’s weaponry, and consider their capabilities.
Guns:
As is well known, Kormoran’s main armament consisted of six 15 cm guns, type C/13, of
which no more than four could be brought to bear at any one time. I shall not go into detail on
their location and camouflage, as I presume others will do this.
There were two 3.7 cm anti-tank guns (Pak = Panzerabwehrkanonen), one on each side of the
bridge, and obviously only one would be able to fire at a time.
There were five 20 mm anti-aircraft guns (Flak = Flugzeugabwehrkanonen) but it is not quite
certain how many had a clear field of fire at once. Kormoran was issued with C/30.
There may also have been several machine guns that could be mounted in different places.
(In the evaluation of Kormoran’s cruise, there is a mention of two additional 3.7cm antiaircraft guns, double mounted, but there is a footnote amending this; it says that all auxiliary
cruisers except Kormoran had these guns.)
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Barbara Poniewierski
The situation with the use of the secondary armament is confusing, because some men
referred to ‘3.7 anti-aircraft guns’, and others referred to ‘20 mm machine guns’. Thus some
men, including officers, said, and continued to say long after the war, that ‘machine guns’
were used, and some said that they were not. I think this is a question of terminology rather
than a disagreement about what happened. It is also questionable how much the interpreters
knew about weaponry. The term ‘Maschinenwaffen’ (automatic weapons) included both
‘Maschinengewehre’ (machine guns, usually of the heavy variety mounted on a stand) and
‘Maschinenpistolen’ (automatic hand guns, including the Tommy-gun type). If precise
information on the type mounted on Kormoran is desired, somebody else will have to find it;
this is not my field. Suffice it to say, the weapons were powerful, and at short range, deadly.
There would probably have been ‘Maschinenpistolen’ available; they would have been
desirable for boarding parties, but they were probably not used in the action against Sydney,
although they could have been. In fact, at 1,000 metres even an army ·303 rifle, in the hands
of a sniper, would have been effective, though not very accurate.
According to Alaistair Templeton: Ortmann, Greter, Jürgensen and Jentsch were adamant
that machine guns had not been used, as it was not necessary. According to Graham
Anderson: Malapert, Ernst, Messerschmidt, Marmann, Koenig, Engelmann, Meder,
Rosenkranz and Greter were just a few of those who told of the ‘devastating effect’ of the 3.7
and 2cm guns. But what of the smaller machine guns? The comment on the interrogation of
Hans Ziegler said: ‘In combat he was a machine gunner standing amidships; fired at first, but
Cruiser was soon too far away for machine guns.’ [B6121: 164M: p. 72] Did he mean the 20
mm AA guns? Since almost all of these men are now dead, it is impossible to investigate
what each of them meant by ‘machine guns’. Perhaps it is as futile as arguing whether a cat is
a quadruped or a mammal.
Another point that must be cleared up is the meaning of the German word ‘Salve’. It does
not mean a broadside, nor does it necessarily imply the use of more than one gun. Frame
writes that the rounds (plural) from Kormoran’s first salvo fell short or were too high. [p. 89]
However, Detmers wrote: ‘Erste Salve Einzelschuss.’ That is, the first ‘salvo’ consisted of a
single shot, not several. This throws out all Frame’s logic about the sequence and effect of the
first shots. Frame also writes: ‘As for the issue of gunnery raised by Winter, the pertinent
comparison was not the fire power but the fire control.’[p. 142] I understand that quite well,
even if I did not analyse the topic in my book. What Frame does not seem to understand, at
least in this section of his work, is that Sydney’s advantage in fire control had been forfeited
by her close approach. Sydney’s guns were gyroscopically controlled, and they could not fire
until the gun platform was level; this was an important advantage in long-distance aiming. At
close range, it would have been a weakness. How long the gyroscopic control might have
delayed their ability to discharge would depend on her rolling period and the state of the sea
and how she was lying at the moment the order to fire was given. At close range, Kormoran’s
more primitive but flexible gunnery control worked to her advantage. Although their aiming
points were coordinated, each gun fired independently as fast as it could lay, train and reload.
23
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THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Manning of guns (senior gunners):
15cm: (C/13)
1: Ahsbaas, Friedrich
2: Probably killed, (Treutler or Dobileit?)
3: Kobelt, Paul
4: Reidt, Karl
5: Saalfrank, Erhardt
6: Bergmann, Paul
3.7cm Pak:
Starboard: Fend, Jakob
Port: Lemke, Ernst
20mm Flak: (C/30)
1: Hennig, Ernst Otto
2: Auer, Josef
3: Unknown (probably killed)
4: Haas, Hans
5: No definite reference has been found.
These are the men who knew what the guns were doing. Whether or not they told the truth is
a different matter, but a general impression can be gained by comparing their statements. Some
lied, especially Jakob Anton Fend, who was responsible for the speedy destruction of Sydney’s
command and control structure. He possibly wanted to conceal information concerning the
destructive power of the anti-tank gun against armour plating, as well as to protect himself.
(An engine driver in a coal mine, he was killed in a disaster in the Saar mines in 1962.)
The Torpedoes:
Kormoran was equipped with G7 torpedoes. Perhaps wisely, Wes Olson, who is so good on
weaponry, dodges the question of whether they were G7v or G7a. From the material on
internet, the difference is not clear. It seems that the original designation was G7v, and that
the category was split about 1939, when experiments began with torpedoes propelled by
electric batteries. Then the designations were G7a, later G7a/T1 (Typ 1) and G7e/T2, G7e/T3,
etc. It is unclear from information available to me whether G7a was a further development of
G7v, or the same thing renamed. For purposes of analysing the Sydney-Kormoran battle, the
only really important thing is that her torpedoes were driven by compressed air, whether they
were called G7v or G7a. They were not one of the types of G7e, so they left a bubble trail.
The evidence for this is that the trail of the torpedo sent after Sydney at long distance could be
seen from the bubbles. (See below.) The range of the torpedoes varied according to the speed:
the slower the speed, the longer the range. The maximum calculated speed had been 44 knots,
but it was notified that it was inadvisable to set them to a speed higher than 40 knots.
On each side, there was an above-deck double mounting, and an underwater single tube.
The double tubes above deck could be man-handled into several positions, but the job was so
slow and difficult that it was easier to aim them by turning the whole ship. The underwater
tubes apparently could not be moved, but were fixed at an angle of 45º aft of abeam, or 135º
measured from the midline of the ship. (It was not at 145º, as has been suggested.) Photographs
taken by the ROV show that the gap in the hull in front of the tubes were slightly elliptical; it
is not known why that was so, but the odd shape would not have allowed much movement in
any case. The ship had to be stopped or proceeding at no more than three knots in order for an
underwater tube to be fired without considerable danger to one’s own ship.
24
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THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
It has been suggested that Detmers, as a torpedo specialist, would have favoured the use of
the torpedoes. In fact, as a torpedo specialist, Detmers would have been only too well aware
of the unreliability of the German torpedoes of that era. Olson gives a very good analysis of
torpedo capabilities and problems. The air-propelled ones all left a bubble trail; some of them
would break the surface or else dive; they did not keep line very well; they detonated
prematurely, or sometimes did not detonate even if they hit. [Olson, pp. 251-58] (It is alleged
that Dunera, on her way to Australia with prisoners from Britain, was struck by a torpedo that
did not detonate.) Orion had to fire TEN torpedoes to sink one stationary vessel, while one
torpedo fired by Atlantis went in a circle and virtually chased her.
Many people have claimed that Detmers opened the engagement by firing the starboard
underwater tube while still flying the Dutch flag, but let us stick with Frame, because it was
his account that deceived the previous Inquiry. He concentrated on whether Detmers would
have used the torpedoes in an illegal way, instead of considering the technical capacity of the
torpedoes themselves. He also could not see that, given the unreliability of German torpedoes
at that time, it would have been operationally unsound for Detmers to have opened the battle
by firing the underwater torpedo. (Or else he did not know much about these torpedoes.)
Frame knows that, in order for the underwater torpedo to be fired, Kormoran would have
had to be almost stationary, so he has to find a reason for this. His reason is that Sydney must
have ordered Kormoran to stop, and she must have obeyed, or have been proceeding at not
more than three knots. Frame writes:
If Sydney were in position abeam of Kormoran, it was likely to have been achieved by
manoeuvres undertaken by the raider.
Alternatively, if Kormoran were unable to manoeuvre to decamouflage her guns undetected
before swinging around to starboard to be parallel with Sydney, she could have waited until she
had swung to starboard, possibly with the aid of the port main engines, and then fired one of
her underwater torpedoes while the Dutch flag was still flying. This possibility was considered
earlier. Detmers stated that he altered course shortly before opening fire to improve the angle
for the torpedo shot. Whereas he claimed that the alteration was of some ten degrees, it could
have been in the nature of eighty to ninety degrees…
As Kormoran’s four 3.7-centimetre guns and five anti-aircraft guns were easier to decamouflage
and were less obvious that her 5.9-inch guns, it is likely that these weapons were fired just
prior to the underwater torpedo exploding under Sydney’s two forward turrets. [p. 215]
It is hard to know where to start on this piece of nonsense.
How was Kormoran carrying out these manoeuvres if she was almost stationary?
What was Sydney’s course and position that Kormoran could bring herself parallel to Sydney
by swinging eighty or ninety degrees to starboard?
Detmers said that, to improve the angle for the torpedo shot, he altered course to starboard
slowly, in order not to upset the aim of the guns. They were already firing.
What justification does Frame have for claiming that the turn might have been up to eighty or
ninety degrees? Some model work would indicate that, on the basis of previous assessments
of the relative positions of the two ships, this would probably have brought Kormoran across
25
SUBM.005.0256
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Sydney’s bows and any torpedoes would have been fired parallel to the cruiser’s length, with
little chance of hitting, and none at all of detonating.
How could Kormoran have fired four 3.7 cm guns, when she had only two, and one was in
the fire lee?
So what moral or technical justification does Frame have for claiming that the underwater
torpedo was fired ‘while the Dutch flag was still flying’?
Greg Bathgate writes that the battle flag might not have been raised at all. He claims that
Kormoran had already surrendered and was travelling at two knots, while Sydney, almost
stopped, was preparing to lower a boat at 1834 precisely. [HMAS Sydney. An Analysis, p. 70.]
(This would have been 1734, Kormoran time.) The analysis is wrong, like so much else in
Bathgate’s book, and the precision of the time given, when the process of lowering a boat was
not instantaneous, is weird. This is not very important, because hardly anybody takes any
notice of the obviously ignorant Bathgate, but Frame is accorded more respect and should
have shown a greater sense of responsibility.
Olson also gets into a tangle, having been led astray by the same document that caused
Frame to blunder on. He claims that the torpedoes (the deck ones, not the underwater one)
were fired at an inclination of 80º,
The target speed was estimated as 14 knots, and the inclination was calculated to be 80º. This
calculation is interesting, for inclination is the term used to describe the angle on the target’s
bow. In this instance, it means that Sydney was not running parallel with Kormoran (because this
would have provided an inclination of 90º) but was slightly bows on, by an angle of 10º. In
other words, Sydney was still closing when the calculation for the shot was made. [p. 254]
This is another unfortunate example of the use of the faulty preliminary draft of the
interpretation of Detmers’ Action Report in the so-called ‘diary’, when FRUMel made an
error in converting letters to numerals, and turned an ‘I’, which should have been 9, into an 8.
[See section on diary and dictionary.] All other versions give the correct 90º as the inclination
– directly abeam – so Olson’s conclusion is necessarily flawed. However, even if the figure
were correct, I think his deductions are faulty. The inclination is not ‘the angle on the target’s
bow’, but the angle from the bow of the attacking ship. Thus an inclination of 80º would have
placed Sydney already ahead of Kormoran, not still closing. My reasoning here needs to be
checked, as I am reluctant to assert that Olson is wrong in a matter of this nature.
Having worked through the nature of the armaments, let us proceed to the battle itself,
taking what Detmers wrote, mainly in the Action Report, and analysing it from the point of
view of whether events and sequences described were possible or likely. There are three
obviously independent sources of the ‘Action Report’, apart from variant translations of each.
The quotations have been taken from whichever one seems to give the most information, and
the clearest exposition. In a few cases, two versions have been given.
26
SUBM.005.0257
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
The Battle Itself:
Detmers gives his description of the main part of the action under the time-line 1730, which
was the approximate starting time, all his times being rounded to the nearest five minutes. His
entries will be explained rather than translated. Note the slight but important difference
between cardinal and ordinal numbers in German. 1 and 2 really do mean ‘one’ and ‘two’, but
1. and 2. mean ‘first’ and second’. Let us pick up the story at the moment of the ensign being
raised.
We start with the order to fire: ‘Feuer frei!’
Artl. Feuerlaubnis. Torpedowaffe Schiesserl. Gegner sackt langsam achteraus.
Guns, permission to fire; torpedoes, permission to shoot. Opponent slowly falls astern.
2 Torp. Lage 90 Fahrt 14 Abkommpunkt Bug, Heck. Dazu langsam auf 260 um Artl. nicht zu
stoeren.
Two torpedoes at inclination 90 degrees, speed 14 knots. (This is of course the speed of the
ship, not of the torpedoes.) Aiming points bow and stern. At the same time, turn slowly to 260
degrees in order not to disturb the guns.
Owing to the short range, Greter probably set the torpedo speed at the maximum allowable
speed (not the maximum possible), which was 40 knots. Somewhere I read that the running
time was 76 seconds, but I cannot verify this, as I cannot locate my source again. As the
speed is not certain, and the rate of acceleration is unknown, this information does not allow
the distance between the two ships to be calculated accurately, but a reasonable estimate
would be 1,400-1,500 yards; in any case, it should have been less than a nautical mile.
1. Salve Einzelschuss I. Kurz; eingestellte E 13 Hm.
First salvo: a single shot. Aimed at a distance (Entfernung) of 13 hectometres; falls short.
This was from No. 1 gun (Ahsbaas), forward, starboard; it had a reputation for being the
fastest crew.
Although Detmers does mention it here, the 3.7 cm Pak and the 20 mm Flak, readily
trainable and very fast, would already have opened fire. The aiming point for the Pak was the
bridge, and its armour-piercing shells, while perhaps not powerful enough for Sydney’s
waterline, could readily have burst through the bridge protection. This would have taken out
most of the command personnel for control of both ship and guns.
During interrogation, Gunnery Officer Skeries said that the cruiser was 1,500 metres away
when the battle began at 17.30; the first shot was short, and the second was too high at 1,600
metres. Brinkmann, Anti-Aircraft Officer, said that the range was 1,500-1,600 metres.
[B6121: 164M: p. 227. B1] Brinkmann added that they were ready to fire on the aircraft if it
flew over them, but since it did not start, they could use all the AA guns against the torpedo
tubes and the smaller guns so that these could not be used. [B6121: 164M: p. 462. B1]
Mines Officer Messerschmidt allegedly said that the first salvo was at 1500 metres.
[B6121: 164M: p224. B1] That, however, may have been the first shot to hit, not the first one
fired.
Frame writes:
27
SUBM.005.0258
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Firing first from the 3.7-centimetre mounting would have given the crews of the 5.9-inch
guns time to decamouflage, train and fire their weapons. Whereas the first two salvoes from
the main armament may not have been on target, the 3.7-centimetre guns and the torpedoes
would have created havoc on board Sydney. [p. 216]
However, only one of the 3.7 cm guns could be brought to bear at that stage, and only one
torpedo hit.
2. Salve (III, IV, V) mit 4. Hm vor, etwa 4 Sekun spater geschossen, ergibt Treffer in Brücke
und Artl.Leitstand Gegner.
Second salvo, guns 3, 4 and 5. Up 4 hectometres, fired about four seconds later. attains hits
on bridge and artillery control of the opponent.
One must allow a bit of leeway for the times. This seems to imply that three of the heavy
guns were apparently firing at the bridge, which is a bit strange, as their targets were
supposed to be the cruiser’s turrets. Possibly Detmers was willing to risk taking a few hits
initially, as long as the cruiser’s control was destroyed.
Amid all this split-second efficiency, there was one hitch: Paul Kobelt, leader of the No. 3
gun amidships, said that they had received an order incorrectly and his gun had at first been
trained to port. When they decamouflaged, there was no target in front of them. This was
obviously rectified very quickly. [B6121: 164M: p. 27. Kobelt was the only member of the
crew to be allowed to remain in Australia. (Others returned later.) He escaped, and he
remained at large long enough to build himself a new life, get a good job and a fiancée. He
was given special permission to stay. See Winter: Stalag Australia, pp. 368-375. If ASIO had
been serious about checking on Heinz Grossmann, they could have consulted Kobelt.]
Unmittelbar darauf, Vollsalve vom Gegner. Liegt weit. Kein Treffer.
Immediately afterwards, broadside from opponent. Lies wide. No hit.
To me, this abbreviated form does not make it totally clear whether the shots were over or
wide; other accounts say that they went over the raider, very close to the deck. Kormoran had
recently taken on a full load of fuel and she was low in the water, probably her main deck,
though not her bridge, would have been below the level of Sydney’s guns, and – at that close
range – it would have been necessary for them to be depressed about to the maximum.
(Sydney, returning from a patrol and expecting to be in port the next day, could have been
comparatively low on fuel and riding fairly high.) Usually it is claimed that Kormoran
managed to get the first shots away. (This would have been true for the Pak and Flak, but
perhaps not for the 15 cm guns. The crew would have been more concerned with getting the
job done rather than fiddling with stopwatches.) Once during interrogations, Detmers said he
thought that the cruiser might have fired about half a second earlier; others have suggested
that the shells crossed in mid-air. Able Seaman Robert Brune, on No. 3 gun amidships, said
that both ships opened fire together. {B6121: 164M: p, 125. B1] As Kormoran’s guns were
firing independently, it is quite possible that at least one of her shells was on the way when
Sydney’s guns fired. It was a very, very near thing.
Michael Montgomery discovered that there had been storm damage to ‘A’ turret, which
would have affected her ability to train, and he claimed that Sydney went into action under a
28
SUBM.005.0259
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
handicap. This has been repeated constantly by others, but this damage was repaired during
October, as Glenys McDonald found and reported in her book. [p. 126. ‘Letter of Proceedings
for October 1941, dated 5 November. Others may also have found this earlier, but I read it
first in McDonald’s book. I had suspected from accounts that there was nothing wrong with
‘A’ turret, but had not found the evidence.]
Danach etwa 2 Salven 5 Sek. Takt. Treffer Mittschiffs Flugzeug, Bruecke.
Schieberverbesserung links, zwischen vordere Tuerme.
Fla, Mw, und Stb 3.7 wirksam auf Bruecke, Rohrsaetze, Flakart.
After that, about two salvos at five second intervals.
(This does not mean broadsides or coordinated firing, but individual use of guns.)
There are hits amidships, and on the aircraft and bridge. Alteration of line to left, between
forward turrets. Flak, machine guns (Maschinenwaffen) and starboard 3.7 effective against
bridge, torpedo mountings and anti-aircraft guns.
Detmers mentions the anti-aircraft guns AND the machine guns AND the 3.7 gun, so it seems
as though other ‘machine guns’ might have been used, despite denials, but this may not mean
‘machine pistols’. Apart from this, Detmers has little to say about the secondary weapons.
[Schieberverbesserung: there may well be a better technical translation for this word. ‘Schieber’,
literally from ‘schieben’ (to shove or push), can mean anything from swindler, drug pusher, black
marketeer or gun runner to slide rule, door bolt, sluice valve or hospital bed pan, according to context.]
Bis 5. Salve keine Antwort, Dann Turm C gut und schnell. Treffer Schornstein, Maschine.
Turm D nur bis 3 Salven Alles weit. Turm B nicht mehr.
Until the fifth salvo, no response. Then turret C (X) fires well and quickly. Hits on funnel,
engine room. Turret D (Y) fires only up to three salvos; all of them miss. Turret B does not
fire any more.
One of Sydney’s guns would certainly have been aimed at Kormoran’s bridge, for that was
standard practice, but it was apparently this shell that hit the funnel just behind the bridge,
indicating that the relative positions of the ships had changed, and that Sydney had dropped
behind slightly. Again, the situation becomes clear if you work through this with models.
During interrogation, Gösseln said that Kormoran’s funnel directly behind bridge was hit, but
not the bridge itself. [B6121: 164M: p. 228.]
Etwa bei 8. bis 10. Salve Torp.Treffer, Vorkante Turm A; 2. Torp. kurz vorm Bug vorbei.
Vorsteven taucht fast voellig ein. Kurs 260 beibehalten, weil Torp. Rohrsaetze wegen Fla.
M.W. Feuer nicht besetzt.
At about the eighth to tenth salvo, a torpedo hits the leading edge of Turret A; the second
torpedo misses just in front of the bow. The stem is almost completely under water. Course of
260º is maintained, because the torpedo tubes are not manned, owing to the AA and automatic
weapons fire.
Note that the torpedo aimed at the stern hit the bow, and the one aimed at the bow missed.
One might be tempted to think that Greter’s aim was poor, but this is confirmatory evidence
of the change in relative positions.
At this point, the accounts in two different reports vary slightly in sequence.
29
SUBM.005.0260
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Gegner dreht hart zu. Kurs und Fahrt beibehalten um klar zu kommen. Turmdecke B fliegt
aussenbords. Weitere Treffer Vorschiff.
Um 1735 etwa schlaegt Gegner hinterm Heck durch in fuer ihn Torp. taktisch unguenstige
Position. Starker Qualm infolge Maschinenbrand verdeckt Gegner fuer Bruecke. Flako weiter
mit Heckgeschuetze. E etwa,40 Hm. Gegner Geschuetze zeigen Bb. Seine Flak ist nicht
besetzt. [E=Entfernung]
Gegner dreht zu. Turmdecke Turm B fliegt aussenbords.
Etwa 17.35. Gegner schlägt hinter dem Heck durch. Starker Qualm aus
unserem Schornstein in Folge Maschinenbrand. Artl.Leitung Fl.A.O.,
schiesst mit Flakgeschützen. Entfernung etwa 40 Hm. Gegnergeschütze
zeigen nach BB. Seine Flak ist nicht besetzt.
The opponent turns sharply towards us. We maintain course and speed in order to get clear.
The roof of Turret B flies overboard. Kormoran makes further hits on the forecastle.
At about 17.35, the opponent crosses behind our poop in a tactically unfavourable position
for his torpedoes. Heavy smoke from our funnel on account of the engine room fire screens
the opponent from the bridge. (That is, the bridge personnel could no longer see Sydney or
direct gunnery.) The anti-aircraft officer continues firing with the guns on the poop. (Brinkmann,
aided by Ahl.) Note that only five minutes have elapsed since fire was opened.
One version specifies that firing continued with the anti-aircraft guns; the other appears to
include the heavy guns: starboard No. 5, then a brief interval when none of them could train,
then port No. 6 alone, until port 2 and midships 4 could take up the battle again. It is unsure
whether midships 3 rejoined the battle; this was the gun at which one man had been killed
and some damage done. At this point, the distance is given as 40 hectometres, but when she
actually crossed Kormoran’s stern, Sydney was a great deal closer. Even nearly fifty years
later, the look on Ahl’s face when he spoke of the blazing ship bearing right down on him was
one of utter dismay. ( He and Brinkmann and several AA gunners were closest to the cruiser.)
‘The opponent’s guns are trained to port. His anti-aircraft guns are not manned.’
Nowhere in Detmers’ reports, and nowhere during interrogation of anybody, is there the
slightest hint that Sydney’s anti-aircraft guns or other secondary weapons were manned;
certainly none of them fired, and they should have been able to fire marginally earlier than
the big guns.
Etwa 1745 nach Bb angedreht um Gegner voellig zu vernichten. Kurz darauf fallen
Umdrehungen schnell. Keine Verbindung mit Maschine. Gleichzeitig 4 Blasenbahnen.
Gestuetzt, weil fraglich ob Maschinen noch Drehung schaffen und Bahnen gut achteraus
wandern. Kurs 240. Durchgaenge, kurz hinterm Heck. Gleichzeitig gehen Motoren durch.
[Another version says: Gleichzeitig schwere Erschütterung infolge Durchgehens der
Motoren.] Lensch meldet,Maschine und alle Feuerloeschmittel voellig ausgefallen. Befehl,
versuchen wenigstens 1 Motor klarzumachen.
At about 17.45, turned to port in order to destroy the opponent completely. Shortly
afterwards, revolutions drop quickly. No communication with the engine room. At the same
time, four bubble tracks. Continued on steadily, because it was questionable whether the
engine could still produce revolutions, and the tracks were deviating well astern. Course 240º.
30
SUBM.005.0261
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Misses, close behind the poop. At the same time, there are heavy vibrations as the engines
fail. Lensch reports that the engines and all fire-fighting equipment were totally unserviceable.
Order: try to get at least one engine working.
Etwa 17.50. Artl. Leitung wieder vord. Stand mit ganzer Battr. Gefecht auf 60 Hm. Gegner
läuft mit geringer Fahrt ungefähr S-Kurs. Back liegt tief im Wasser. Vorkante Brücke bis
achteren Schornstein brennt. Erhält laufend weitere Treffer.
Etwa 18.00. Einzel Torp.Schuss auf 70 hm mit Lage 80 Gegnerfahrt 5 Sm. Fehlschuss
hinten.
At about 17.50, gunnery control returned to the forward stand with the whole battery. Battle
is at 60 hm. Opponent is making an approximately southerly course at slow speed. The
forecastle lies deep in the water. It is on fire from the leading edge of the bridge to the after
funnel. It is still taking hits constantly.
At about 18.00, single torpedo shot at 7,000 metres with an inclination of 70º. Opponent’s
speed five knots. It misses astern.
This is confirmation that Kormoran’s torpedoes left a bubble trail; otherwise they would
have known only that it missed, not whether it missed astern or ahead. It is unclear whether
this was fired from the underwater tube or one of the deck tubes. One would think that all
tubes would have been loaded, and that, if the intention was to get rid of one powerful
explosive device for the sake of safety, they would all have been fired. (Foerster said under
interrogation that ‘he personally flooded the magazines’ so that the 15 cm shells would not
explode. [B6121: 164M: p. 455] The mines were not yet such a great danger. They were
stored aft, while the torpedoes were amidships where the raider was burning.)
Only three of the 15 cm guns could still keep firing at Sydney: No. 2, port forward; No. 4,
amidships; No. 6, port aft. The No. 3 gun amidships should have been able to swing and
rejoin the action, but apparently she had jammed; possibly the shell that had passed close
enough to kill one of the crew had damaged the gun as well, although it had been able to keep
firing to starboard. [Robert Brune: B6121: 164M: p. 125: B1]
18.25. Halt, Batterie Halt. Letzte Messung 90 Hm. Letzter Schuss-E 104 Hm.
Letzte Schiffspeilung 225º [?]. Munitionsverbrauch etwa 500 Bdz., 50 Kz.
18.25: Cease fire. Last range finder measurement 90 hm. Last shot at a distance of 104 hm.
Last bearing of ship 225º. Ammunition usage about 500 base fuse shells, 50 nose fuse shells.
This bearing is a puzzle. If 225º was a relative bearing, it could not have exceeded 180º. If
it was a true bearing, then Sydney was heading west-south-west. It might have been enciphered
or deciphered or copied wrongly. [Paul Kobelt, No. 3 gun, said that the last shot was on the
port quarter at 225º-235º, at eight to nine km. I do not understand this; it is included for the
benefit of anybody who might understand. B1]
[104 hm = 11,374 yards = 6.45 Statute miles = 5.62 nautical miles.]
It is not known exactly when Detmers thought about notifying Germany about the battle.
He said on 2 December: ‘There was a chance to radio to Germany in the beginning of the
action, but his attention was taken up by the fight and when he ordered his signal officer to do
so the radio was too badly smashed.’ [B6121: 164M: pp. 289. 224. B1] Funkmaat Peter
31
SUBM.005.0262
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Wilhelm (Willy) Tümmers said: ‘The first hit of the Cruiser hit the bridge of “Kormoran” and
finished all radio. They had no time to tell Germany that the ship had been sunk.’ [B6121:
164M: pp. 414, 230. B1. The report on the interrogation of Wireless Officer von Malapert is
not available in files in the National Archival. The Archives preamble to the digitised version
of these files comments that material has been shifted between files by persons reading the
files, and I know that, since I saw the files ca 1980, some has gone missing as a result of
carelessness or theft. It is also possible that some was mislaid while still in naval custody.
However, a duplicate set held by Seapower includes the interrogation of Malapert. The
interrogator did not appear even to know that Malapert was the Wireless Officer.
I discussed with Gerhard Krüger, Wireless Officer on the blockade runner Ramses (sunk by
HMAS Adelaide in November 1942), the procedure for notifying Germany of the impending
loss of his ship. He said that he had the required message always at hand near the wireless. In his
case the message was GGG YYY 239S 239S 9925 9925 EQUL. The coordinates, of course,
would vary. The last group was apparently the call sign of the Norwegian vessel Tai Ying.
Entschluss: Vorbereitungen Schiff zu versenken, alle Offiziere auf die Brücke.
Befehl an I.O.: Alle Boote und Rettungsmittel auszusetzen.
Decision: Prepare to sink the ship; all officers to the bridge.
This was a decision that the captain was not permitted to make alone; he had to have the
agreement of a majority of junior officers.
Order to First Officer: launch all boats and rescue equipment.
Likewise the captain was not permitted to give the order to abandon ship without
agreement, unless it was actually on the point of foundering.
Lensch und Noll melden Durchkommen zur Maschine unmöglich. Selbst überzeugt. E-Werk
II ist noch klar aber nutzlos. Minendeck laufend beobachten. Umrisse des Gegners kommen
in Dämmerung auf etwa 160 Hm ausser Sicht. Gegnerkurs etwa rw 150º.
Feuerschein von starken Bränden bis etwa 2200 Uhr sichtbar.
Lensch and Noll report that it is impossible to get through to the engine room. I investigated
this myself. Electrical motor 2 is working, but useless. The mine deck is under constant
observation. The opponent’s silhouette disappears into the twilight at about 160 hectometres.
Opponent’s course about 150º true. The glow of the fierce fires can be seen until about 22.00
hours.
Here we have the estimated true course on which Sydney was heading when last seen:
approximately south-south-east.
Etwa 21.00 Uhr. Alle Rettungsmittel zu Wasser, besetzt und abgelegt. Es sind noch 120
Mann an Bord, darunter fast alle Offiziere. Bedienung noch klaren Geschütze ist damit
sichergestellt. Minenraum bisher nur wenig verqualmt.
Befehl, die beiden Boote aus Luke I auszusetzen.
About 21.00 hours. All rescue apparatus lowered to water, occupied and pulled away. There
are still 120 men aboard, including almost all officers. The manning of the guns still operable
is thus ensured. So far, only a little smoke in the mine compartment.
Order: set out the two boats in No. 1 hatch.
32
SUBM.005.0263
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
One of the errors in the preliminary translation is that it gives the number of men aboard as
124. This is silly, but it has been repeated in several books. The men were scattered
throughout the ship, and a roll call or head count would have been impossible. What
happened was that the translator missed the difference between ABD (124) and ABD (120) in
the cipher Detmers had used.
One report has ‘Kanonen damit besetzbar’ instead of ‘Bedienung noch klaren Geschütze ist
damit sichergestellt’.
This is as far as we need to go with Detmers’ report of the battle. We can skip the engine
room report here, and the accounts of the raising and launching of the boats, and their time at
sea until they were picked up. That is not really the field of this Inquiry.
Kormoran’s Third Torpedo:
The question of whether Kormoran fired two torpedoes or three seems to have confused
several writers in different ways. Let us consider the different perspectives taken by Frame.
Kennedy, Olson and McDonald, who represent just about the full range of claims except for
the ‘Japanese submarine’ cranks, who are not worth considering. Perhaps the first person to
report that the raider fired thee torpedoes was Captain Robson of Trocas. [B6121: 164M: p.
229] Of course she did. What is the problem with that? The question is this: when did she
fire them and from which tubes?
Based on a rather superficial reading of interrogation reports, Frame comments that Shu Ah
Fah said that Kormoran fired three torpedoes, and the torpedoes and rounds from the main
armament appeared to hit at the same time. [p. 94] Hans Böhm and Fritz Noll also allegedly
said that Kormoran fired three torpedoes. Frame assumes, therefore, that they must have fired
the starboard underwater tube, because there would not have been time to reload the decktubes. He takes the assumption further: if the underwater tube was fired, it must have been
fired before the battle flag was raised. This is another incorrect assumption by Frame. It must
be pointed out that none of these saw any of the action. Shu Ah Fah was in the laundry with
the other Chinese – or he should have been. He saw nothing and he knew nothing. Böhm and
Noll were engine room personnel, Noll being a Senior Petty Officer. (‘Maschinist’, not
‘Mechaniker’, which would have indicated a torpedo mechanic.) They were both in the
lifeboat picked up by Trocas, and they had plenty of time to discuss the action and invent a
scenario. They saw nothing and they knew little.
David Kennedy lends support to the claim that an underwater torpedo was fired before the
flag was raised, basing his claim on a statement by Linke (a very long time after the war, not
during interrogation), who allegedly said that an underwater torpedo hit Sydney ‘at the same
time’ as the gunfire, and they had talked about this in captivity. As the torpedo was slower
than the guns, it must have been fired earlier. [JPI Vol. 5, Submission 6, p. 966.] Let us throw
some light on this claim as well. Linke is merely repeating his selection of camp gossip. He
was in the reserve wireless room, below deck, on the port side. He saw little of the action at
all, and none of the early part. That is something Kennedy should have checked. Kennedy
33
SUBM.005.0264
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
makes a further attempt to prop up this claim by reference to a book by Zvonimir Freivogel,
Deutsche Hilfskreuzer des Zweiten Weltkriegs. According to Kennedy, Freivogel wrote that
the gunfire and torpedo hit Sydney ‘at the same time’. What Freivogel actually wrote [p. 111]
was this: ‘HMAS SYDNEY wurde gleich zu Beginn des Gefechtes von Granaten und einen
Torpedo im Vorschiff schwer getroffen.’ (HMAS Sydney was severely hit by shells and a
torpedo right at the beginning of the action.) Kennedy constructs a war crime on the basis of
his failure to understand the difference between ‘gleich zu Beginn’ (right at the beginning)
and ‘gleichzeitig’ (simultaneously). From what I hear, Freivogel is livid, not just because of
the misinterpretation of his words, but because there does not seem to be any jurisdiction
under which he could sue Kennedy.
Olson puts a different spin on this:
There is, however, a statement made by Friedrich Schmitt, who served the starboard
underwater torpedo tube… He said he sent one torpedo and that there was ‘not much firing
after torpedo’, implying that there was little firing after Sydney was torpedoed. He also said that
he ‘could see the cruiser burning all over when he fired the tube torpedo’ indicating that
Sydney was well ablaze before the torpedoes were fired. [p. 240]
Olson’s confusion at this apparently quite different sequence of events is understandable;
what is difficult to understand is why he placed Schmitt at the starboard tube, when he said,
in the interrogation report from which the rest of the material is taken, that he was at the port
torpedo tube. [B6121: 164M: p. 118] The port torpedo was fired after Sydney had crossed
Kormoran’s stern and was heading away blazing fiercely. This being the case, everything
dovetails perfectly.
Glenys McDonald writes [p. 179] that Detmers sent an underwater torpedo after Sydney
‘when she was mortally wounded and well out of range’, and that this was ‘a sign that
Detmers was in a rage at the loss of his ship’. There were two good reasons for firing the port
torpedo. One is was that a warship is a target until she sinks or strikes her flag. Sydney was
still afloat, although in a desperate state, and if she had struck her flag – which was unlikely –
this could not be seen. (Compare this with the Sydney-Emden action in 1914. Captain Glossop
kept firing, when Emden was a defenceless charnel house, because she had not sunk and
could not sink, as she was stuck on a reef, and her flag was still flying, because men could not
reach the mast to lower the flag.) The second reason for this port torpedo to be fired was to
dispose of a piece of ammunition that was highly likely to detonate; it was probably from a
deck tube, as the angle of inclination in this case is apparently genuinely 80º, which was not
possible for the underwater tube. The starboard underwater tube was probably unreachable,
because of the manner in which the fires on Kormoran were spreading, but it is not known
why the other two port torpedoes were not also jettisoned. As for McDonald’s comment on
Detmers’ temper: an officer who gets into ‘a rage’ under such circumstances should have
taken up a more genteel occupation, such as embroidery or painting flowers on china.
34
SUBM.005.0265
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Sydney’s Torpedoes:
It is stated in all versions of Detmers’ Action Report, in his book, in Gill’s book, and even in
mine, that Sydney fired four torpedoes from her starboard tubes after she crossed over
Kormoran’s stern. The discovery of the Sydney wreck, with two torpedoes still in the
starboard tubes, necessitates a re-examination of the evidence.
Obviously, Sydney would have fired everything she possibly could at the enemy raider, so
what happened? It would have been unlikely that Detmers could have seen the torpedoes for
himself. Smoke from the fire amidships would have made the tracks difficult to see from the
bridge, and he had a lot of other things to watch and do. The torpedoes were heading for
Kormoran’s stern, and they would have been reported by one of the two officers on the poop
deck: Wilhelm Brinkmann and Heinfried Ahl, who were the controllers for the AA guns. At
first, he would have relied on their reports. Thus, on 28 November, Rycroft reported that the
raider captain had said that Sydney’s two torpedoes had missed Kormoran. [B6121: 164M: p.
229] Otto Jürgensen said that Sydney fired two torpedoes, both of which missed. [B6121:
164M: pp. 62, 363. Grading, p. 225: B1.] Interviewed apparently in Harvey Camp by
Commander Ramage on 4 December, Brinkmann still said: two torpedoes. [p. 462] (It is not
known why Brinkmann might have been in the camp for the ratings. The only officers
supposed to be there were the two doctors.) Ahl had been taken to Fremantle Detention Centre
for special interrogation concerning the aircraft, and there is no record showing that he was
asked about the torpedoes.
In the absence of Ahl and Brinkmann, the officers apparently discussed the torpedoes and
talked Detmers around to the view that, if Sydney had fired any torpedoes, she would have
fired all four in the quadruple mountings, and he amended his statement accordingly. Thus,
on 1 December, Detmers said that Sydney had fired four torpedoes [B6121: 164M: p. 287],
and there the matter rested until the wrecks were found, and the initial reports by Ahl and
Brinkmann and Jürgensen were confirmed. It was not a case of what the torpedo men aboard
Sydney wanted to do, or tried to do, but of what was still possible aboard the shattered ship.
Concerning Detmers’ reports of the battle, Tom Frame writes:
After his return to Germany, Detmers’ sense of history and his own vanity gave him
sufficient reason to produce a version of the action from which he emerged in the best possible
light. [p. 220]
[One] must conclude that Detmers had the capability and probably the willingness to violate
international law and, later, to deceive his captors. [p. 221]
His efforts to manufacture an account from which he emerges in the most favourable light
draws attention to his actions and creates a feeling that he has something to hide. [p. 224]
Even when his book was published in 1993, Frame had no justification for his claims, and
certainly not for the motives that he attributes to Detmers. In the light of more reliable
evidence, and the ROV photographs of the wrecks, it has been shown that Detmers’ accounts
are largely consistent within themselves and within themselves, and that Frame’s accusations
are untrue.
35
SUBM.005.0266
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Concerning other members of the crew, Frame writes:
They have naturally been unwilling to accept even the faintest possibility that their former
commanding officer could have done anything other than act in a perfectly lawful and
honourable manner. But they lost any ability to analyse the events of 19 November 1941 with
open mindedness and critical spirits. [p. 222]
I am not convinced that Joachim von Gosseln [sic] has revealed all that he knows… He was
curiously close to Detmers and seems to have been especially trusted by his captain. In being
a party to any post-action deception, von Gosseln [sic] would have acted from his personal
devotion to National Socialism. However he might regard the Nazi Party in old age, von
Gosseln [sic] as a young man displayed an overt enthusiasm for Nazism and revealed a
capacity for deception. [p. 222]
If Detmers did signal to Sydney that he intended to surrender or was, at least, not intending to
fight, he was prima facie guilty of a breach of international law which made such a ruse illegal.
[p. 222]
The crew know fairly well what happened; they are not obliged to accept he concoctions of
others, whether these are simply ill-informed or deliberately malicious.
Gösseln was not ‘particularly trusted by his captain’; he was on the bridge because Battle
Watch Officer was his action station. He may have been a Party member, but to assess the
significance of this, one would need to know when and under what circumstances he joined.
The report that he was ‘frantically [sic] Nazi-minded’ came from Lieutenant Taplin, the
officer who had caused so much bother when he reported Armadale as Salland in October.
[B6121: 164M: p. 238. This has been rewritten, and it is unknown who made the ‘fanatically’
error. In an interrogation report of 1 December, there is a comment that he was ‘formerly in
the Merchant Navy, then a Party member’. If he was a member, he would probably have
joined while in the merchant navy, not afterwards. Frame can have no idea of whether
Gösseln had any ‘personal devotion’ to Nazism, still less whether he had displayed ‘overt
enthusiasm’. This is all in Frame’s imagination. He has to vilify Detmers and Gösseln in
order to exculpate Burnett, whose mistake Frame is ‘unwilling to accept’.
If Detmers had surrendered, it would still not have been ‘a breach of international law’, as
long as the ensign was raised before he opened fire. Pretending to surrender was not necessarily
illegal; that was what the British Q ships had been designed to do, in both wars. Does the
RAN not give its officers some instruction in international maritime law? When he writes that
‘Burnett was imprudent in assuming that international law would be observed by Kormoran’
[p. 224], Frame highlights a problem: even if Kormoran had surrendered, that would not have
meant that she was not dangerous, even within the bounds of the law. Burnett was obviously
wary of the stranger, but not wary enough.
Concerning the work of other writers and historians, Frame writes patronisingly:
What Winter and others do not seem to realise is that Detmers is an advocate in his own
cause and that his word cannot be accepted at face value. This is not an insult to Detmers’
character and integrity. It is simply to observe the historian’s obligation to test and scrutinise
historical evidence thoroughly before deciding that it is, or is not, acceptable. [p. 219-20]
He goes much further into this at some length, but this will do as a basis.
36
SUBM.005.0267
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
I did not accept an account simply because Detmers said so. This was not a game of ‘Simon
says’. Where one statement was contradicted by a number of contrary statements, or by
technical possibilities, or by common sense, I rejected it and looked for other possibilities. My
book showed the result of this research, not the workings or reasoning behind it; that would
have made it far too long. A few others have been as conscientious; a lot have not been.
I did decide that the report that Detmers sent back to Germany by Dr Habben would have
been close to the truth, as it would have been unlikely that he set out to lie to the Naval High
Command. When the dictionary with the steganographic account was located, after my book
was published, I was confident that Detmers would not have lied to himself. Having based his
whole reconstruction of events to turn Detmers into a liar and a criminal on a faulty
document, why did Frame not test this document carefully and scrutinise its provenance?
Concerning his own work, Frame writes:
However, my purpose is to show that the accepted account is less likely than the alternative
reconstruction.’ [p. 216]
[It] should be emphasised that they are possible accounts of the action which are not
inconsistent with the evidence’ [p. 217]
Often shaky on logical and technological grounds, Frame’s accounts are now exposed as
quite inconsistent with the evidence, once the correct translation of the Action Report has
been consulted. He also writes: ‘It is not being mean-spirited to assume nothing good about
Detmers. He was just as disposed to committing a crime as any other professional German naval
officer…’ [p. 218] Detmers joined the navy in 1921, when its size was strictly limited by postwar treaties; it could afford to select the very best from the large number of applicants for the
small number of officer-training positions. Although the Kaiser had abdicated, these were still
trained in the old Imperial traditions, the traditions that produced officers of the quality of
Captain Langsdorff of Graf Spee as well, of course, as some with lower standards of ethics.
The honour of the flag was still sacred, and ‘death before dishonour’ had real meaning. When
the Nazis gained power, Detmers had been in the navy for nearly twelve years; his character
had been moulded in the old traditions. Frame’s glib comment is despicable.
Burnett was a decent and likeable man and a conscientious officer, but he made a mistake.
To call his action ‘criminal’, as one member of Kormoran crew has done, is to go too far, but
considering that, for more than 65 years, a few mean-spirited and ignorant Australians have
been abusing Captain Detmers as a war criminal, and the rest of the crew as liars, it is
surprising that it took them so long to retaliate.
Dr Siebelt Habben wrote later in an account that was called a ‘diary’, that he and Medical
Petty Officer van der Twer and Petty Officer Rudolf Lensch exchanged home addresses before
the battle, for they expected that some of them were going to die that afternoon. Habben and
Lensch survived; van der Twer drowned while trying to save wounded men from the capsized
life raft. Those who survived felt some gratitude to Burnett, for they felt that they owed their
lives as much to his naiveté as to Detmers’ skill, and they thanked God that, on the fateful day
when the two ships met, John Collins was not still in command of Sydney.
37
SUBM.005.0268
THE BATTLE
Barbara Poniewierski
Some reasons for the proliferation of alternative accounts
1. The role of Media. In 1941, some newspapers and magazines made precipitate and illconsidered claims. Stories about a Japanese submarine, the use of the Norwegian flag, and
the murder of Australian sailors in the water or in lifeboats stem from wartime propaganda in
the press.
2. The delay by navy in releasing such facts as were known. One reason for the delay was to
find out what had happened before a statement was made that anything had happened. There
were operational reasons for delaying release: to disrupt the German supply system, to sink or
capture a supply ship, to force the German navy to send wireless messages that might reveal
the location of another vessel. There appears to have been, however, a somewhat faulty
appreciation of what secrecy was necessary, and what was not.
3. Faulty documents. There were mistranslations, enciphering errors, typing errors and failure
to notice certain items in interrogation reports, or a tendency to draw hasty deductions that
were reasonable at the time, but which were not corrected on the record when they were
found to be wrong. Once Gill had published certain errors on the basis of a faulty report, and
Captain Stephen Roskill had repeated them in the Royal Navy history, it became almost
impossible to correct them. Furthermore, when it was recognised that there were errors, they
were sometimes attributed to a conspiracy rather than an oversight.
4. The enduring effect of wartime propaganda, and transference to the surface naval units of
the criminal attitudes of the SS and the Gestapo.
5. Faulty memory for dates and transference of something that really happened at some other
place or some other time to the Sydney-Kormoran action. This became coupled with not just
unwillingness but also an absolute inability to see that memories might be false.
6. Claiming that all evidence that contradicts a cherished theory is forged, and if there is no
evidence to support this theory, then it must have been destroyed, or is still being withheld.
7. The eye of the beholder. Some quibbles about the account of the action were reasonable in
the light of what was known. Many of the conspiracies are not entirely unreasonable, but they
are founded on insufficient factual information and distorted reminiscences. However, some
are symptomatic of various neuroses and mental disorders, among them paranoia and an
obsession complex. A few of these people could just have well associated themselves with
Elvis-is-alive, or We-have-already-been-taken-over-by-aliens, or We-are-reincarnated-froman-ancient-civilisation. Sydney just happens to be their fetish.
38
SUBM.005.0269
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Barbara Poniewierski
The most serious charges of dereliction of duty and criminal negligence levelled at the Royal
Australian Navy the Royal Navy and the British and Australian governments are that
personnel at the time ignored wireless messages from Sydney or from Aquitania, that this
negligence took away any chance that survivors from Sydney might be found, and that
subsequently the navies and the governments conspired to cover up this crime. Therefore,
unfortunately, it is necessary to go into some tedious detail about these alleged signals. Some
of it has already been covered fairly thoroughly; some is new, as more fantasies are dug up.
A great deal emotion has been devoted to writing nonsense about wireless signals. The
Joint Parliamentary Inquiry Report gave a good analysis of the question of signals [Chapter
5], but some people could not understand the reasoning, or did not want to believe it, or
overlooked it altogether. In addition, new claims have arisen from time to time, so a slightly
different approach must be taken, combining the pieces of evidence in a different way. Some
of the JPI report is summarised here, and other material, not available in 1997 or not
presented to the Inquiry, is also added, as well as a few new claims. It needs to be stated
again, this time with regard to Statutory Declarations made in connection with wireless
signals, that the fact that such a deposition has been made does not mean that the content is
true; the sworn statement says only that the person making it has a sincere belief that it is
true. Daily, all over the planet, people give sworn testimony to conflicting evidence. Since
probably everyone has to some degree a sincere belief in something that is untrue, many to the
extent of being martyred for this belief, a Statutory Declaration has very limited value.
To try to bring some order into the signals chaos, this section is divided into sections:
Kormoran: Her orders, her wireless practices, her wireless installations and personnel.
The signal she really sent.
Signals that it was claimed she sent.
Sydney: Signals that she allegedly sent.
Kormoran’s Operational Orders (Marschbefehl)
[B6121: 164N: “Kormoran” (Raider No 41) “G” – German AMC Translation of Log,
Voyage. Page 56 of digitisation, p. 50 of translation, p. 43 of original. Admiralty Record No.
PG14257. NB: This is not the ship’s log book or War Diary; it is only a summary.]
L. Communications Instructions:
1. The Communications instructions apply particularly to the auxiliary cruisers.
2: Wireless silence is to be observed from the moment when the Home Port is left.
Wireless silence may be broken
a) on contact with the enemy, or in the case of the ship‘s position otherwise becoming known.
In this case, short messages about: Successes, position, preparations, fuel position, endurance
and experiences, in as far as they have meaning.
b) for sending short signals should wireless traffic be necessary or useful, when the position
of their ship is not known to the enemy.
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List of wireless signals sent by Kormoran:
(and comments made by Detmers on the dangers involved in using his wireless)
1. 19 December 1940: 2337 hours (0137 GMT)
My position is #CD63.
(Short signal to Norddeich.)
My position is #DF23.
2. 20 December 1940: 2259 hours ()059 GMT)
(Short Signal sent to Kiel; this was sent because Skl requested position, and there was
no acknowledgment that the previous signal had been received.)
3. 15 January 1941: 2257 hours (0057Z) (To Kiel) Have sunk so far one vessel.
Predominantly neutral shipping in sea area, consider further implementation of task futile,
since enemy merchant shipping almost exclusively in convoy.
(Short Signal on long distance traffic wave.)
Short Signal repeated on shortwave
4. 16 January 1941: 0258 hours (0458 GMT)
service as receipt not confirmed.
(As Kiel had not confirmed receipt, the repeat was sent to Norddeich.)
5. 18 January 1941: 0257 (0457 GMT)
W/T re position and area searched so far
(40°N, 5°N, 27°W, 46°W) sent and understood.
Shifting operational area to #EJ, ES.
6. 21 January 1941: 0317 hours (0517 GMT)
Intend to pass Bahia-Freetown. Expect to be at rendezvous about 29 January.
(Sent as a ‘Short Signal’, therefore shorter than this appears.)
Position #FL 96; up till now accounted
7. 3 February 1941: 2327 (0057 GMT)
for 28,000 tons gross. (Short signal to Operations)
0137
Signal repeated three times, as not
acknowledged as understood, and in this isolated area of the ocean I have no misgivings
about a repetition.
8. 11 February 1941: 0357 hours (0357 GMT)
Provisioning completed. Handed over equipment for one U-boat. Do not want whale
chaser. Changing operational area to South West Africa.
(Short signal code)
9. 18 February 1941: 0437 hours (0437 GMT)
Signal not cited verbatim. Entry: ‘By short signal requested a supply of 700 kg of
whitemetal. Unfortunately WM 80 and WM 10 are not separated in the list. Therefore a
supplementary wireless message will be necessary, which I shall send tomorrow night.’
Whitemetal 80.
10. 19 February 1941: 0258 hours GMT:
(To Operations; not acknowledged.)
WM80 urgent.
11. 19 February 1941: 1918 hours GMT:
(To Operations; Norddeich acknowledged.)
I suggest #GG45 as rendezvous.
12. 22 February 1941: 0358 hours.
(Short Signal code; regarding RV with Pinguin)
13. 28 February 1941: 0457 hours: Changing my operational area to Central Atlantic.
Mine-laying not yet carried out.
(Short Signal code to Operations.)
Still have 13 torpedoes on board.
14. 2 March 1941: 2356 hours GMT (To Operations)
(Short Signal code; meant to indicate torpedoes for U-boats.)
Shifting my operational area to #FD, FL.
15. 5 March 1941: 2317 hours GMT
(Short Signal code)
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16. 15 March 1941: 1337 hours
Weather unfavourable at rendezvous. Rendezvous
unsuitable. New rendezvous #ER89.
(Short Signal to Operations; not confirmed.)
17. 15 March 1941: 1637 hours (1737 GMT) Short signal repeated and again not confirmed.
18. 15 March 1941: 1836 hours (1936 GMT) Short signal sent for third time.
[This time Norddeich understood and acknowledged. This signal had to be repeated; Detmers
wrote: ‘It is possible that Scheer is on the same wave length and has heard the signal.
Therefore I cannot go back, but must get the signal through.’]
THE PREVIOUS MESSAGES WERE ALL SENT FROM THE ATLANTIC.
Here, rendezvous for transferring fuel and provisions had to be arranged, and auxiliary
cruisers and U-boats had to be kept out of one another’s way. Kormoran passed longitude 20º
east on 1 May, and was then considered to be in the Indian Ocean.
Message one: 3 May 1941:
2317 GMT (Short signal code)
Position 3.5 in 38ºS 35ºE. Going to #KS.
10 May 1941:
0740 (Inward W/T): Reuter report over sinking of an auxiliary cruiser. Ship 33 to report
position by 12.5 at the latest. Ship 41 to go to Alstertor at ‘Veilchen’. Operations counts on
arrival there about 12.5.
0743 (Inward W/T): Alstertor is to wait at ‘Veilchen’; arrival of a prize and of 33's whale
chaser [Adjutant] expected.
1140 Course 39º, 14 knots. Course towards ‘Veilchen’. I cannot make it by 12.5; I am too
far south for that.
1200 29º19'S; 60º17'E.
2113 (Inward W/T about suspicious whale chaser.)
Message two: (Time of outward signal not given.)
My signal, that I cannot arrive until 14th, does not get through.
(14 May 1941: I shall remain at ‘Veilchen’ until the evening of 17.5. Alstertor will be
dismissed after the equipping and a day later will report to Operations that Adjutant and
Alstertor are on their way. As far as possible, I do not want to wireless in my new
operational area yet.
1200 13º49'S; 73º03'E.)
(19 May 1941: Operations has received W/T: Whale catcher detached 14.5 to # KU 63,
Alstertor 17.5 for home. Signed Ship 41. I also cannot understand why Alstertor sent this as
W/T and not as short signal.
[In order to avoid revealing his position by sending a wireless message, Detmers ordered
the captain of Alstertor to send the signal reporting the completion of the fuelling task.]
1200 9º42'S; 76º36'E.)
W/T over development of enemy radar.)
(11 July 1941: 0301
1200 7º34'S; 81º04'E.
(12 July 1941:
2347
W/T over enemy wireless intelligence. The good direction finding on
the shortwave wireless compels extreme limitation of wireless transmissions.)
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(15 July 1941:
0715
W/T: Supply ship should be ready to leave Japan on 20.8. Notify urgent
requirements by 2.8 at the latest. Supply of special goods requested is envisaged for late
summer from home. I assume that the latter refers to our bearings and condenser coils. We
are trying, by utmost economy with water, to extend the life of our condenser coils. [*This
has a bearing on claims that Kormoran would have been willing to supply water to a Japanese
submarine.] Apart from that, there are no other urgent requirements yet; from December, a
whole lot will suddenly be urgently necessary, especially in the electrical department, things
which cannot be replaced by means available on board. Since I cannot wireless such a long
list, and the Operations will of its own accord consider that for the time which will have
exceeded a year I shall need a proportionate part of a year's equipment, I shall wait to
see what the supply ship brings and not wireless yet.
1200 6º21'S; 85º55'E.
(23 July 1941:
1808
W/T: Old short signal book (three-figure) withdrawn.)
1200 0º09'S; 96º36'E.
(25 July 1941:
2320
W/T: Supply service code WFS 1936 withdrawn.
Next goal: routes Western Australia to Sunda and Lombok straits.)
(28 July 1941:
rendezvous.)
0126
W/T: New cypher ‘Himalaya’ for supply ships. Take a copy at
(16 September 1941: 1135 W/T: Supply service wireless transmission no longer possible.
[*Messages sent by raiders in Pacific and Indian oceans had been repeated to Germany
through Japan, which now withdrew this facility.])
(20 September 1941: 0213 W/T: Opponent can take bearing on ultra-shortwave [*UKW]
from land, therefore on UKW as a matter of principle wireless silence.)
Message three: 2 October 1941:
2317
Sent short signal. Norddeich acknowledges.
The KTB ends at 24 October; the two ships parted on 26 October.
Message four (?): ca 28 October 1941:
Reported completion of provisioning. Normally, the lesser unit should have reported the
completion of provisioning, thus Kulmerland, but it is possible that Kormoran may have sent
the wireless message confirming that re-fuelling and provisioning had been carried out. If so,
there could have been two reasons for this.
1. Alstertor had handled such a message incorrectly, ca 19 May.
2. Kulmerland was returning to Japan, and it was possibly considered that it would be
undesirable to take a risk that a DF bearing might show this.
However, Kulmerland could have sent a message ‘signed’ by Ship 41, as Alstertor had done.
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Kormoran’s Equipment:
There were two wireless rooms in use. No. 1 was used for operational purposes. Messages
were sent only from this station, and orders and background information from the Naval
Command were handled here. The task of No. 2 room was to listen to general incoming
wireless traffic from whatever land stations they could pick up clearly, and to record weather
reports and news items of relevance. Hans Gerhard Linke [B6121: 164M, p. 201] spoke of
‘four receivers and two transmitters’, but it appears that he was referring only to No. 2
wireless room, for Peter Wilhelm (Willy) Tümmers said that there were eight sets picking up
the news. [B6121: 164M: p. 202] Linke also said Telefunken and Lorenz apparatus were in
use, and one interrogation mentions ‘small Siemens parts’, which does not seem quite logical.
It is possible that there might have been a reserve set aft for emergency use, but evidence
on this point is inconclusive. Senior Petty Officer Paul Köhn said that at the time of the action
he was ‘below deck on the reserve set aft’, but that during the fight the wireless was ‘out of
action’. [B6121: 164M: p. 405] Wilhelm Grun, a ‘reserve telegraphist’, also said that he was
below deck during the fight with the two reserve sets, but they ‘could not transmit from them
as they were’. [B6121: 164M: p. 402] The interrogators did not pursue this point.
Linke said that they transmitted on wave lengths varying from 10 to 60 metres, according
to weather and time, the wave length being increased as evening came on. Tümmers gave the
wave lengths as 15 to 50 metres, adding that they did not use UKW (ultra-short wave).
Personnel:
Linke stated that there were 18 operators, four NCOs, one Senior Petty Officer (Köhn) and
one officer (Malapert). Somebody commented that 18 was a rather large number of operators,
and the Navy did not detect that some of these men were not working on transmitting and
receiving, at least not exclusively, but that they formed a small cryptanalysis unit headed by
Köhn; it was also said that he did most of the coding, but ratings did the actual transmitting,
although they did not know the meaning of what they were sending. (A list of wireless
personnel will be given at the end of this section.)
Linke is worth special mention, as he figured largely in the interrogations, and he had a lot
to say afterwards. At the time of the battle, he was in charge of the watch in No. 2 wireless
room. Although he had been in the Kriegsmarine for over two years, he had been trained as a
telegraphist by Debeg, which provided wireless operators for merchant vessels, which hired
their wireless officers through Debeg (Deutsche Betriebsgesellschaft für drahtlose Telegrafie).
After initial training, young telegraphists were posted to a large passenger ship in a junior
position, then sent to DAN Norddeich to familiarise themselves with the shore station before
being hired out to a freighter. Every telegraphist could be called a ‘Wireless Officer’, but that
did not entitle them to officer status when mobilised into the navy. Linke had spent his trainee
period aboard the Atlantic liner Bremen, and was at Norddeich about the time war broke out.
Telegraphists trained in merchant navy procedure had their uses aboard a warship, especially
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an auxiliary cruiser, for they had been trained differently, and their transmission style was
recognisable. Linke was at Norddeich almost until Kormoran put to sea.
Interrogators tried to establish the battle stations of members of the crew, and with the
telegraphists this was done by asking them whether they were with Linke. This placed in the
second wireless room, the one that did not transmit at all: Adolf Peter Marmann [p. 45], Karl
Jarolin [p. 384], Reinhold Bäumer [p. 384], Helmut Funke [p. 391], Josef Bareth [p. 446],
and Paul Muller [p. 398], who said he was usually in No. 2 room, but was in the transformer
room during the action. Eduard Eberhardt had drowned. With Linke, that made eight.
The QQQQ message had been sent from No. 1 wireless room; that was the room that had
been hit by the fragments of the shell that had struck the funnel. One man had been killed
aboard ship; others had been wounded, some of them seriously; six of these were lost when
the rubber dinghy sank. The interrogation of survivors picked up by Aquitania was somewhat
perfunctory; the one on board ship was very superficial, and after they arrived in Sydney six
were allegedly not interviewed at all. While the information necessary for operational reasons
was obtained, the details that historians want are largely lacking. At Harvey (in Western
Australia), interrogation was more thorough, and information on wireless procedures and
messages was one of the topics that was pursued. The interrogators leaned hard on Köhn, and
the field of possible senders of the QQQQ message was narrowed down. Paul Muller, from
the second wireless room (which some also called ‘the receiving office’), said that he knew
that a message had been sent, because the switch was ‘in’ but he did not know what it was. [p.
108] Others from this room also denied knowledge of the signal.
Eventually, the interrogators settled on Ernst Pachmann, who had been in No. 1 wireless
room. At his first interrogation [B6121: 164M, p. 45], he said merely that he had seen nothing
of the fight, because he was ‘on the opposite side of the wireless room’. After a night in the
cells and – he claimed – having a gun pointed at his chest, he gave information about the
QQQQ signal. While the notes of the second interrogation [p. 48] do not specifically state
that he sent the signal, it was clear that he had. His statement on the messages will be given in
the next section.
The QQQQ Message that Kormoran really did send:
First, the legal position of QQQQ signals: They were not repeat not ‘distress signals’ made
with the intention of saving the ship being attacked or even of calling up rescuers for
survivors in lifeboats; they were operational signals meant to draw the attention of the
Admiralty to the presence of an enemy vessel. By sending such a signal, a merchant ship
forfeited its non-combatant status. Thus it was not a case of ‘faking a distress signal’ when
Kormoran sent a QQQQ message. The full series of messages was: QQQQ (unknown ship),
RRRR (regular warship), SSSS (submarine), AAAA (aircraft attack) and LLLL (enemy
landing). These messages did not follow standard merchant navy procedure with regard to
establishing contact with a specific receiving station.
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At about 1700G, as Sydney was drawing close to Kormoran, Detmers ordered that a Morse
message be sent twice on the 600m band: QQQQ Straat Malakka 111E 26S 1000GMT. This
was a standard frequency, not one of the odd frequencies monitored by the naval attaché post
in Tokyo. Detmers wrote later that Perth asked for a repeat. He was perhaps not told, and he
might not have known if he had been, that VIN was Geraldton; ‘Perth’ was VIP.]
On 9 December, at his second interrogation, Pachmann said that the message was sent
twice, about ten minutes before the opening of fire. He gave it as QQQQ 111E 26S 1100GMT
STRAAT MALAKKA, but there was no acknowledgment. [B6121: 164M, p. 48. At p. 225,
an officer collating reports gave this a reliability grading of A.] For once he knew what he was
sending, for this message was not encoded. Linke said that, three or four minutes before the
battle, a message was sent out twice on 600 metre band, 500 kilocycles, with 200 watt power.
He said that it was meant to be picked up in the Dutch East Indies, and to distract attention
from them. [B6121: 164M, p. 45, 8 December] While reading the interrogation reports, it
should be kept in mind that the men concerned had more important things on their mind than
fiddling around with stopwatches, and many times given are very approximate, as regards both
a point in time and a duration of time. (For the relationship between metre band width and
kilocycles, see earlyradiohistory.us/khz.htm.)
While Linke knew what had been sent, he was speculating when he said it was meant to be
picked up in the Dutch East Indies. Detmers did not want any station apart from Sydney to
pick up the messages, as they could have brought more warships out to look for him, and he
did not confide his intentions to Linke. In the POW record cards, Linke’s rank is given as
‘Funkobergefreiter’ and in English as AB; on 8 December 1944, he received a promotion at
‘Funkhauptgefreiter’, which would be about Leading Telegraphist. To call him ‘the Kormoran
wireless operator’ or ‘a senior Kormoran wireless operator’, as Kennedy does, is to overstate
his importance. Apart from the only Wireless Officer, Malapert, the wireless department
consisted of seven telegraphists of higher rank than Linke, sixteen of equal rank though not
necessarily equal seniority, and only one of a lower rank. It is obvious in the partial audio
transcripts Kennedy provided in Vol. 9, Submission 66, for interviews with Linke and others,
that he was often asking leading questions that required Linke only to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’, or to
repeat back to him the words suggested. This is an unsound practice in taking evidence. It is
also obvious that, being in the enclosed No. 2 wireless room on the port side, Linke saw none
of the battle; at best, he was simply repeating crew gossip.
Nor was the QQQQ signal, as Glenys McDonald submitted to the Inquiry [JPI, Vol. 1,
Submission 26, p. 169], a way of informing Germany that she was in trouble and where, for it
did not have the strength to reach Europe. Still, how did Linke know what had been sent? A
careful check of records shows that two telegraphists were picked up by Aquitania (Meder
and Schäfer), one each by Centaur (Funke), Koolinda (Tümmers), Trocas (Ropers) and
Yandra (Bareth). Another eleven landed north of Carnarvon, most if not all of them in the
boat over which Chief Petty Officer Köhn presided. They had ample time to compare notes, if
not in the lifeboat, then ashore and aboard Centaur. There were two secrets that they did
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manage to keep: the operation of the cipher machine (the so-called Enigma machine), and the
existence of a small cryptanalysis unit aboard ship, both of these being overseen by Köhn.
Reception of the QQQQ signal:
Faint fragments of Kormoran’s QQQQ signal were picked up. The tug Uco, which had left
Darwin on 12 November bound for Fremantle after having towed a hulk from Albany to
Darwin, recorded that at 1803H the wireless operator heard a message that began with
QQQQ, but the rest was unintelligible. The operator recorded the strength as 5-6, and the
distance as ‘within 300 miles’. Two minutes later, when the message was repeated, he
understood only a little more: QQQQ QQQQ – then a string of unintelligible figures, perhaps
containing 110 – then the ending: 1000GMT. [B6121: 165P, p. 175. Here the time of receipt
is given as 1000GMT (1800H). Too much can be read into differences of a minute or three in
these contexts.] Uco was possibly not under strict Admiralty orders, for it was not normally
an ocean-going vessel, and her operator apparently did not think it useful to repeat this
fragment. She arrived in Fremantle at five minutes past midnight on 21 November, and it is
not known when she reported this signal
The other station to receive and record a differing but dovetailing fragment of the signal
was the Geraldton coastal wireless station VIN. It reported this later as including 7 C 11115E
GMT but it heard no QQQQ. As it gave the time as 1005Z (1805H), it had obviously heard
only the second transmission, and had missed the first altogether. After ten minutes (recorded
as 1015Z), it sent a message asking whether any ships had anything to report, but there was
no reply. No other source is mentioned, and it is reasonably safe to assume that the message
really was sent at about the times given, with the content noted, and at a low power, and that
it was heard only by these two receivers, both of which were within 150 miles of the source.
The finding of the wreck of Kormoran at 26º 05’ 49.4” S 111º 04’ 27.5” E points to the
conclusion that the message was sent as claimed, that the position was roughly correct, and
that allegations that Kormoran had sent a false location for the purpose of deception are
merely attempts to adapt facts to some outlandish theory.
It has been suggested that the signal was sent on a Marconi set with a range of only 350
miles. If so, Geraldton VIN was the only maritime land station within range. Perth-Fremantle
was too distant, Singapore even more so. Kormoran had possibly taken a set from one of the
merchant vessels sunk, or had even acquired one in Germany. If she had such a set, Detmers
would have used it, as it could be recognised by its tone as not being naval equipment.
The earliest conclusive evidence that I have found that the signals were known to the navy
is a message from SWACH, dated 0630Z (1430H) on 27 November, hand-delivered to the
Central War Room. This is recorded in the RAAF Central War Room Operations Diary at
0748Z. [Richard Summerrell, The Sinking of HMAS Sydney, Australian Archives Research
Guide No. 3, p. 38, referring to AWM64: 0/2.] The most important business at that time was
the search for lifeboats and survivors; the messages now had little but historical value. Two
days later, the Naval Board sent a message to the District Naval Officer Western Australia:
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‘Request W/T logs for 19th November of tug Uco and Geraldton Radio and ship-shore log of
Perth Radio be forwarded by air.’ [ACNB records: 0718Z/29, N Cypher A] No record has
been found that Perth had heard anything.
There have been accusations that there was something sinister in the way that the wireless
material from Uco was ‘confiscated’ by the navy; so it should have been, and there was no need
to return it, for Uco had no use for it. There have also been accusations that its log was faked.
It seems to have been Montgomery who started this story. No doubt the log was written up as
a fair copy from the rough copy made previously, but that is not proof that it has been faked.
One detail might be added to this. By an international agreement made in 1906, there were
two prescribed 'Radio Silence periods’ every hour; during these times, no ship was supposed
to transmit except one in distress. This was to give distress messages the best chance of being
heard among all the messages on air. These periods ran from the exact hour until three minutes
past, and for three minutes after the exact half hour. The Distress Call frequency was 500
kilocycles. The raider captains were aware of the danger of attacking within the silence
periods, for it was at that time that a QQQQ or RRRR signal had the best chance of being
heard. Captain Rogge of Atlantis was very wary of attacking at the start of these times. An
examination of Kormoran’s War Diary suggests that Detmers was not so fussy when it came
to attacking ships, but he chose a ‘silence period’ to send his QQQQ signal.
Signals allegedly sent by Kormoran:
The Lander claim:
Reginald Ernest Lander (not Landers) was born 8 March 1914; he was a civilian radio
operator technician with the Department of Civil Aviation, and was at some time given the
rank of Pilot Officer, RAAF. [WW2R] His competence with wireless technology is not being
questioned, but he had no idea of raider operations or German naval procedure. Raiders sent
few wireless messages; under no circumstances would a raider have sent messages nightly for
over a week; not only was it against orders, but it would have been virtual suicide.
Lander writes about the installation of Direction Finding equipment at Liverpool and Rose
Bay (Sydney), then claims that ‘at this point’ John Christie, the Officer in Charge, told them
that there was ‘a German raider on the West Australian coast operating outside Fremantle and
moving up and down the coast, or so they thought, transmitting on a certain frequency each
night making a rendezvous with Danzig radio’. Lander and several others were rostered to listen
for a coded signal to Danzig at midnight for eight to ten days. Liverpool took a bearing ‘about
270 degrees’, and Pearce (WA) took a bearing ‘somewhere between 180 and 360 degrees’.
(That would be a big ‘between’. In fact, it is a reciprocal.) The bearings were given to the
PMG, which passed them to one of the services, probably the navy. [JPI: Vol. 9, pp. 2160-62,
Statutory Declaration, 30 April 1997. It was part of Submission 99, from John Doohan.]
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Let’s take it bit by bit. The base communicating with raiders was the powerful DAN station
near Norddeich on the Friesian coast, not Danzig. Somebody without adequate knowledge
assumed thoughtlessly that DAN implied Danzig; it did not. A naval telegraphist should have
known that was Norddeich, one of the world’s most important stations, but Lander was a D/F
operator, and he was RAAF not RAN. Signals from a mobile German unit that appeared to be
off the coast of Western Australia may have been tracked by D/F daily for a week or so ‘about’
November 1941, but Lander’s interpretation was wrong. He knew only the bearings; he did
not coordinate them. It was found that this signal came from a U-Boat in the Atlantic, for
which the Northern Hemisphere stations could not obtain a good intersection.
At the HMAS Sydney Forum at the Fremantle Maritime Museum in November 1991
Lander aired this claim that he had been with a unit tracking daily signals from Kormoran. I
tried to give the forum session some brief information on raider practice with regard to
wireless transmissions, but I was not allowed to complete this explanation. After the session,
when I challenged Lander with the facts, he said in front of witnesses that he had never
claimed that the signals came from Kormoran, only that they were German, but he had in fact
done so, in public, only a few hours earlier. Although he admitted to me that it was pure
speculation that they came from Kormoran, he reneged on his admission and allowed himself
to be persuaded by a small clique of conspiracy protagonists in Perth that he had indeed
tracked signals from Kormoran. This was all a fraud, though probably not a deliberate one on
his part. If in 1991 he did not know the nature of these signals, he did not know in 1997 when
a submission to the Inquiry was presented. His evidence had been contaminated and was
worthless. The story that wireless signals were tracked off Western Australia is a myth; for
some people, it is a psychologically convenient myth.
The following pieces of documentary evidence should be noted, as some may relate to the
incident that stuck in Lander's memory, and the indicate some of the problems with HF/DF.
They are in the Daily Summaries of the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre (COIC),
held in Navy Office. The summaries were not issued every day, but Serial Numbers suggest
that none is missing, although a few are in a bit of a mess. Quoted below is every reference
found to D/F bearings from 2 September to 20 November. There is nothing that matches the
claims by Reg Lander that signals from Kormoran were being monitored; in fact, there is
nothing from the Indian Ocean. Intercepts, whether or not they were genuinely from German
vessels, placed the raiders in the Pacific. In fact, the report of 12 September states explicitly
that there had been no report of raider activity in the Indian Ocean since 1 August, and there is
nothing in the COIC reports to indicate that there was a confirmed intercept after that.
[Material under the headings ‘Comment’ is from the reports; they are not my comments.]
12 September: (DS 98): Par 5:
RAIDER ACTIVITY – The Norwegian vessel “TROPIC SEA” was 6 days overdue at
Lorenzo Marques from Basra on 9/9 and no confirmation as to her arrival has been
received since.
Comment – The last report of raider activity from the Indian Ocean was the D/F indication
of an enemy unit in the Crozet – Kerguelen area on 1/8.
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[My comment: This was later amended; the vessel was Kongsdal. Tropic Sea had been
sunk by Orion in 1940.]
23 September: (DS 106): Par 1:
WEST of Australia Station
Singapore has received a report from Direction Is. (Keeling-Cocos Is.) that a German
mobile transmission was picked up on a bearing of 318º on the 20th Sept. The sense was
determined.
Comment – This single bearing passes approx through Colombo, Arabian Sea, Germany, to
the North Atlantic. The reciprocal passes through the south west of the Australia Station
and up towards Panama. In the absence of any cross bearing on this unit, it is impossible to
gauge its location which in any case, from the sense would appear to be well away from
this Station and either in the vicinity of Colombo or in the Atlantic.
26 September: (DS 109): Par. 4:
NORTH of Australia Station
W/T Intercept of German Naval Mobile Transmission – Singapore reported having intercepted
a transmission on 23/9 by a German naval mobile unit on a 3rd class bearing of 295º.
Comment – The bearing given passes through the Northern Indian Ocean and the Atlantic
Ocean. The reciprocal bearing passes through the Coral Sea and South of New Caledonia,
reaches a southernmost latitude of approx 25º at 166ºW and thence curves up to the Coast
of Ecuador. Without a cross bearing it is not possible to determine the location on the
reciprocal for the transmission but a position on the reciprocal bearing is consistent with
recent intelligence as to raider activity in the Pacific.
[My comment: There is no Daily Summary for 5 or 6 October; this information would be
in the Weekly Summary, which is not available to me.]
9 October: (DS 118): Par 4:
Pacific Raider Intelligence
a) Tasman Sea – D/F Enemy Unit on 5/10 – With regard to D/F fixed report by N..Z.N.B.
and N.B. on 5/10 suggesting the presence opf an enemy unit in the Tasman Sea, it is possible
that both reports were based on the same facts. Although it was thought likely that they
originated from the antipodal area in the Atlantic, it is now considered by Admiralty that
the transmission was probably from a surface ship in the Pacific. This still further confirms
the view already expressed that at least one enemy unit is at present in the S.W. Pacific and
that such a unit was off the South Is. of New Zealand, possibly in the Tasman on 5/10.
b) H.M.S. “ACHILLES” – R.D.F. Interceptions – With regard to the intercept by H.M.S.
“ACHILLES” on 20/9 it is suggested from Singapore that this transmission may have
originated from one of H.M. Ships and that its reception as reported may have been due to
freak propagation conditions. No reply to Singapore has yet been received from New
Zealand. As far as the Australia Station is concerned H.M.A. Ships are not yet fitted with
R.D.F., although the frequency of 200 megacycles is used in army coast defence sets. The
possibility of a defect in “ACHILLES” equipment being responsible has been suggested by
A.C.N.B. to C.O.I.S. for consideration.
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[My comment: Note the confirmation that Sydney was not fitted with RDF.]
10 October: (DS 119): Par. 4:
H.M.S. “ACHILLES” Interception of 20/9 – It is now reported that H.M.S. “ACHILLES:
is the only ship on the New Zealand Station fitted with R.D.F. N.Z.N.B. suggests two
possible explanations –
(1) Probably from R.D.F. Station at Moko-Hinou (Is. in approaches to Auckland);
(2) Possibly interference from electrical equipment on board H.M.S. “ACHILLES”.
11 October: (DS 120): Par. 5:
PACIFIC OCEAN – D/F/Intelligence –
a) With regard to the D/F bearings given 20/10, which indicated the possibility of a
German naval unit approx 500 miles north of Auckland, it is now advised that one of the
bearings was incorrectly reported. The fix arrived at on the basis of the report is
accordingly cancelled and no other position can be determined from the data available.
d) It is reported from Wellington that by D/F fix at 1547Z/20 a German surface unit was
probably within 300 miles of 32ºS 139ºW.
Comment – This position is approx 630 miles S.W. of Pitcairn Island and some 760 miles
from the fix on 13/10 which placed an enemy unit about 400 miles N.W. of Pitcairn Island.
It would appear likely that this is the same unit which for some reason is remaining in an
area comparatively unfrequented by Pacific shipping. This may indicate that the unit in
question is a supply or prison ship which is keeping out of the way for the time being while
a raider operates further westwards.
12 October: (DS/121): Par. 3:
PACIFIC OCEAN – Raider Activity: (a) A series of dashes and V’s was heard by an
Auckland naval W/T station on 431 kc/s strength nine at 2003M/11. This frequency was
thought to be used by raiders for communication with and D/F homing of supply ships.
Comment – While this is a possible explanation, it may well be that one of the several
American shore stations or a local New Zealand station using this frequency was testing in
the manner indicated and was responsible.
(b) [This section is not relevant.]
14 October: (DS/122): Par 2:
PACIFIC OCEAN RAIDER ACTIVITY – D/F Intelligence.
(a) Further to the bearings at 0140K/13 indicating the probability of an enemy unit approx
400 miles N.W. of Pitcairn Is., N.Z. have advised a further fix within 300 miles of position
24ºS 125ºW on the same day – 13th.
Comment – This position is approx 600 miles S.E of the other position and approx 300
miles east of Pitcairn Is. It is highly probable that both fixes relate to the same unit.
(b)
(i) Admiralty advised that an enemy unit transmitting on 5595 k/cs at 0242Z/13 was
in approx position 45ºS, 164ºW but later stated that on further investigation it was thought
to have originated from a U-boat in the European area, possibly Mediterranean.
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(ii) N.Z.N.B. reported the fixing by D/F of a German surface unit at the same time
in approx position 42º south 162º West.
Comment – As both times coincide exactly it would appear that the fixes relate to the same
unit which Admiralty considers to be a U-boat in the European area.
GENERAL COMMENT – The position remains the same as set out in yesterday’s Weekly
Summary, namely that there would appear to be two enemy units operating one of which is
in the mid-Pacific, and one in the S.W. Pacific, the latter being probably off the South Is. of
N.Z. on 5/10.
[My comment: The assessment implies that there are only two ‘units’ operating, and that
both are in the Pacific, therefore none in the Indian Ocean.]
17 October: (DS/124): Par. 2:
a) With reference to the supposed R.D.F. transmission reported by H.M.S. “ACHILLES” on
20/9, investigation now shows that the transmission was due to local interference on board.
b) In reply to N.Z.N.B.’s query whether the transmission whether the transmission “Stop
your ship immediately – heave to or I will open fire” heard by H.M.S. “ACHILLES” on
7/10 could have come from the N.E.I., A.N.L.O. Batavia has reported that the transmission
was probably part of a notice to mariners being broadcast from Sourabaya.
21 October: (DS 127): Par. 4:
PACIFIC OCEAN – D/F of German Naval Unit – Third class bearings of 121º from
Coonawarra (Darwin) and 009º from Waipap [Waipapakauri] (N.Z.) indicate that a German
naval unit was possibly within 200 miles of 29ºS, 175ºE at 1440Z/20.
Comment – This position is approx 500 miles north of Auckland and being on the crossing
of trade routes is a likely position for a surface raider. However, the antipodal position,
after investigation is considered more probable. This would place the unit in the vicinity of
Northern Africa but in view of the possible margin of error in the bearings given this could
be in the Eastern Atlantic or Mediterranean areas.
24 October: (DS 130): Par. 2:
PACIFIC OCEAN – Raider Activity – A D/F fix has been received from Admiralty of
either a raider or supply ship within 300 miles of 30ºS, 122ºW at 1443Z/20/10.
Comment – This is within 900 miles of the fix of a German surface unit by N.Z. on the
same day. It would appear likely that both D/F fixes cover different interpretations of
bearings on the same unit.
31 October: (DS 134): Par. 3:
D/F Intelligence – D/F bearings indicate that an enemy unit was within 200 miles of either
50ºS 147ºE or the antipodal point 50ºN 33ºW at 0330K/31. It is considered that the
antipodal area is more probable.
Comment – The former position is approx 425 miles south of Hobart and the latter in the
North Atlantic.
6 November: (DS 137): Par. 12:
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(a) Ellice Is. Area – D/F bearings indicated a German unit within 100 miles or 9ºS, 177ºE at
2030Z/3/11. It was considered that this position was more probable than the antipodal position.
Comment – This position is approx 100 miles S.E of Funafuti in Ellice Group.
(b) East of New Zealand – Latest F.E.C.B. Summary reports there were D/F bearings
which fixed a raider or a supply ship in position 40ºS, 167ºS on 25th October.
Comment – This position is 850 miles east of Wellington.
GENERAL COMMENT – From the area of the D/D fix of 20/10 (further eastward) a unit
could have reached the position of October 25th at from 12 – 15 knots, and could have
reached the area of the 4/11 at less than 10 knots. Although this unit would be either a
raider or a supply unit it appears possible that the latest D/F is from a supply ship which
after meeting a raider further east is now returning northward to the Japanese Mandates.
The following entries from the SWACH War Diary for 11 October may also be relevant:
1210H/11: From 1210. Received following signal from Central War Room.
Third class bearings from AWARUA WAIPAPAKAURI and AUCKLAND NEW ZEALAND
obtained of German Naval Mobile Unit at 0736Z/10 on 12700 kcs indicate unit possibly
within 300 miles of 20º S 160º E = 1245Z/10. [This was in the vicinity of New Caledonia, not
off Western Australia.]
1215: CWR consider antipodal point of Sierra Leone more probable.
It is regrettable that it was necessary to go into so much tedious detail, but Lander
developed a fantasy that he had been involved in tracking Kormoran; people whose aim it
was to seize any chance to discredit the Navy and the Government encouraged him to believe
this; and a section of the public was naïve enough to accept it.
Points to note:
1. There was no way that Detmers would have sent a signal if he intended going close to the
Australian coast. (See extracts from War Diary above.)
2. A single D/F station could not fix a position by either distance or direction, owing to the
possibility of a reciprocal reading. Two were essential, and often a third was necessary.
To forestall possible objections: the position of a mobile unit, particularly if it is
proceeding in a straight line, may be deduced roughly from bearings taken by only one
station, for they will produce a ‘fan’ spread, intersecting at the receiving station.
John Samuels has taken up this claim that Kormoran’s signals were being monitored. He
writes [Somewhere Below, p. 21]: [Regarding a German raider]: ‘Singapore had been
monitoring it as wireless opportunities arose… When transmissions were intercepted by
Singapore in the later part of the afternoon November 17th, between the raider and a
respondent, they were able to fix a position…’ (Naturally, Samuels gives no citation; the
claim is pure rubbish.) And at page 112: ‘But Aquitania was deliberately held over in
Singapore on the direct orders of Commander-in-Chief China Station. This was because
China Station was aware of a raider operating off the coast and had been tracking her
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spasmodically hoping for over a week to fix her position.’ [Ditto: rubbish. Cite your source. A
lot of people would be interested in finding records of wireless monitoring in Singapore.]
If China Station had any idea of Kormoran’s location, it was not from monitoring wireless
transmission from her. Her wireless records show how few she sent. Even when Kormoran
lost contact with one of her Atlantic supply ships overnight, and the weather did not allow a
sextant sighting, they spent hours looking for each other rather than send a wireless signal. The
story that Kormoran was being tracked in October-November 1941 by Direction Finding of
wireless signals that she sent is false, and it stems from only one original source: Reg Lander.
The Larsen-Kennedy claim.
In 1996, David Kennedy interviewed a Norwegian wireless operator, Roald Larsen, and his
Australian wife Fae, who lost her uncle, Charles Collins, in Sydney. Larsen said that a German
wireless operator, Heinz Gerhard Otto Herrmann, formerly from the supply ship Kulmerland,
had told them after the war he had been in radio contact with Kormoran during the battle and
had been ‘horrified’ at the account. (The ships in which Larsen and Herrmann were serving
were in harbour at Tunisia together in 1946; that is, fifty years before Kennedy interviewed
him. NBB: Was Fae present at this meeting, or are her statements hearsay?). It is accepted that
Larsen met Hermann and was told something about Kormoran, but Kennedy’s interpretation of
Larsen’s account of what he thought he had been told is not accepted. (See JPI, Vol. 5,
Submission 66, D. Kennedy, pp. 959-61.)
According to Larsen, Hermann said he was radio operator in the German Embassy in Tokyo
during war. He had been in communication with all the German warships in the Pacific. There
was none in November 1941; Japan had forbidden direct communication between the German
Naval Attaché and the raiders and their support ships since 25 September 1941, but the Attaché’s
wireless personnel could not have been prevented from trying to hear them. The only records
of a raider sending messages to Tokyo show that they were sent in 1940 to Choshi Radio for
the firm of Illies & Co., under the cable address ‘Hillcarn’, and that they came from Orion,
using a Swedish call sign. Hermann allegedly said that he was in communication with Kormoran
‘at that time’. Kennedy asked whether it would have been possible for Kormoran to talk to
Tokyo without the Allies knowing, and was told that it would have been, as they all had secret
frequencies. He made other inquiries, and was told that a signal sent from a site off the coast
of Western Australia could have been picked up in Tokyo; then in a newspaper article, he
wrote that a signal from Kormoran had been picked up. I pointed out that this was a
different thing. What was theoretically possible technically might not have been feasible
because of reception conditions, shortage of personnel, or the political situation.
Checking with Swedish and German authorities, Kennedy found that Herrmann, born on
18 October 1913, had been detailed to the Abwehr in December 1940 and sent via the TransSiberian Railway to Japan. (A good few wireless officers served in Naval Intelligence.) There
he ‘headed the Kriegsmarine wireless unit’ until 1942. He was indeed aboard Kulmerland
when she left Kobe on 6 September 1941. He was aboard her during the rendezvous with
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Kormoran in October. [Some of this information is from Kennedy’s JPI Submission 66, some
from other sources.] He spent quite a bit of time in Tokyo and claimed he had operated in the
Pacific and ‘off the coast of Australia’. (A very long way off, and he could not have been
aboard Kulmerland when she was a supply ship and consort to Orion and Komet in late 1940.
She had left Japan before Herrmann arrived.)
When Kennedy first repeated this story, he said that Larsen claimed that Herrmann had
picked up the signal while he was in Tokyo. However, Herrmann was at sea aboard Kulmerland
on 19 November, and did not reach Japan until the third week in December. Naval Attaché
Admiral Paul Wenneker recorded in his War Diary (KTB) for 16 December that Kulmerland
was due in Kobe that day, and he recorded on 18 December that Captain Pschunder and radio
operator Herrmann arrived at 1720 on 18 December. It is not entirely clear whether this
‘arrival’ referred to Kobe or Tokyo. Apart from the captain, Herrmann was the only crew
member named. There is not a word about a message from Kormoran. [The Price of Admiralty,
War Diaries of German Naval Attaché in Tokyo. Edited by John Chapman. Vol. IV: 10
September 1941 – 31 January 1942.]
Confronted with this evidence, which he read for himself in a translation of Wenneker’s
KTB, Kennedy amended his story, claiming that the signal must have been picked up while
Herrmann was aboard Kulmerland, and then reported in Tokyo (where the loss must already
have been known, as it was in Reuter international communiqués, and news would also have
been sent from Germany). The signal itself is also not mentioned in the KTB of either the
Seekriegsleitung or the Naval Attaché, and it would have been if one had been received. It is
nonsensical to claim that it was too secret to be recorded; the KTB records reports from spies,
and their code names and real identities, and these would have been really secret.
Then Kennedy suggested that such a message from embattled Kormoran was picked up in
Tokyo, and told to Herrmann there. This is also false. First, the signal had to be sent; while
Detmers would no doubt have liked to let Germany know of his fate, he left it too late to send
a message, for his wireless room had taken the full force of the hit on the funnel, and in
addition the electricity supply had failed. Then it would have had to be sent at a high enough
power to reach Tokyo, in which case dozens of stations might have picked it up. But there
was another point. It was not just a question of whether the receiver had the capacity to pick
up such a signal, but whether there was somebody sitting before a set to receive the message.
Wenneker’s War Diary for 31 October 1941 records the listening schedules for periods lasting
not much over ten minutes:
0300 GMT on 13275 kHz
[1000G, 1100H]
1100 GMT on 8875 kHz
[1800G, 1900H]
1720 GMT on 11340 kHz
[0020G, 0120H]
2300 GMT on 13275 kHz
[0600G, 0700H]
The HSK was to repeat ABCD several times, then send the message blind. (That is, without
waiting for an acknowledgment that the initial message had been received.) Kormoran
probably received these instructions. Now, the battle began at 1730G. By 1740 probably, and
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by 1800 certainly, Kormoran’s wireless rooms were out of action. No identifiably German
message would have been sent before the action began, and there would have been only one
period of possibly five minutes when she could have sent a message between the opening of
the battle and the destruction of the wireless rooms, and that would have been at a time when
the station in Tokyo was not scheduled to be on watch. An entry for 8 January 1942
[Wenneker’s KTB] says that a continuous radio watch was not possible owing to shortage of
personnel. That is Wenneker’s statement of fact, not an expression of my opinion.
It should also be noted that, on the videotape that Kennedy made of an interview with
Larsen (a copy of which he was kind enough to send me) the Norwegian avoided saying that
the Herrmann had told him that he had picked up the message. He said, three times, such
things as ‘gained the impression’, or ‘was given to understand’, but not that he ‘was told’.
Kennedy says that Larsen did say this off camera; but the fact remains that, when he knew he
was being recorded, he dodged this issue. Larsen was not asked under oath exactly what was
said. Kennedy believed this story of the involvement of Herrmann and/or Tokyo in the
reception of a message from Kormoran, and possibly still does, although it becomes
increasingly untenable. Whatever his current opinion, other people are still promoting this
story. This story is not very important, just another example of a misunderstanding that
somebody will not let go, and that other people may take up.
Did Kormoran send a message reporting to Germany after the battle?
Detmers said that he had a chance to radio Germany at the beginning of the action, but his
attention was taken by the fight, and when he ordered the signal officer to do so, the radio was
too badly smashed. [B6121: 164M: p. 244. The statement was given a reliability grading of
B1.] If such a message had been sent, it would have been dangerous for Detmers to make this
statement for some British station, particularly Singapore, might have picked up any message
sent.
Statements by telegraphists:
Hans Linke: No other signals were sent out (apart from the QQQQ messages). ‘Later on
the radio apparatus was out of action and no message could be sent to Germany.’ [164M, p.
46, 8 December]
Helmut Funke: No. 2 room sent no messages because the current was stopped by a direct
hit. [164M, p. 391, 9 December]
Paul Koehn: During the fight, the wireless was out of action. No communication with
Japanese bases. [164M, p. 405, 9 December]
Willy Tümmers: First hit of cruiser was on bridge of Kormoran; finished all radio. They
had no time to tell Germany that the ship had been sunk. [164M, p. 415, 4 December]
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German sources:
Heinz Bonatz had been Staff Officer for Intelligence, Naval Command West, since 23 August
1939. He was promoted to Kapitän zur See on transfer to the position of Chef IV Abteilung
Seekriegsleitung Marinenachrichtendienst. [Captain, Head of 4th Department of Naval
Operations, Naval Intelligence Service.] He was appointed as Skl Chef MND III (Head of the
Abteilung Funkaufklärung; wireless intercept and cryptanalysis intelligence) at a date given
on various websites as 16 June 1941 to 11 November 1941. In his book, Seekrieg im Äther:
Die Leistungen der Marine-Funkaufklärung 1939-1945 [Verlag E. S. Mittler, Herford, 1981],
he gives a brief account of Kormoran’s cruise and final battle, writing: ‘Both ships had
obviously not wirelessed or been able to wireless.’ [Beide Schiffe hatten offenbar nicht mehr
gefunkt oder funken können. – pp. 200-01] If either ship had sent a wireless message, German
Naval Intelligence did not know about it, either directly from Norddeich or through Tokyo.
Naval War Command War Diary:
[RM7 /30: 1SKL Teil A KTB ( Band 27), 1.11.1941 – 30.11.1941.]
Jochen Franke provided translations of selections of this document for the Joint Parliamentary
Inquiry. [JPI, Vol. 18, Submission 189, p. 4443] Note the significance of two entries.
23/11/1941: Informing Ship 41 about enemy ship movements in the Indian Ocean by
FT. 1037. Information about enemy position by FS. 0056, 0705 and 1224.
24/11/1941: Informing Ship 41 by FT 0110 about request of unknown land command
from 24/11 to steamer by radio saying “B I W D – report by W T details engagement
and name of ship from which survivors were rescued”, Naval Command adding
“Context not known.” This message allows us to assume that some action has happened
in the operational area of Ship 41. Details are not known yet.
Exceptional message to Ship 41 about enemy ship movements in the Indian Ocean
by FT 0451. General information about enemy position by FT 2037.
(‘Exceptional message’ could be misleading; it was probably ‘Sonderbericht’, which
meant simply that it was addressed to Ship 41 only, not to other ships.)
The inevitable deductions from the above entries are these:
1. As signals were still being sent to Kormoran as late as 24 November, the German Navy did
not know that she had been sunk, and had therefore received no message from her.
2. BIWD was the secret call sign of Trocas, for she was the vessel to which this message was
sent; as it was her secret call sign, the German Naval Intelligence Service could not identify her.
3. Since the survivors were not identified in this signal as German, it would have been a
logical to presume that they could have come from a ship that had been sunk by Kormoran.
There will always be people who claim that one man’s memory is more reliable than any
number of Australian, British and German records combined, for they have all been forged.
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ALLEGEDLY SENT BY SYDNEY:
First: did Sydney send a signal on or after 17 November to amend her Estimated Time
of Arrival in Fremantle?
Taking into consideration only what Gill writes [G. Hermon Gill, Royal Australian Navy
1949-1942, Vol 2: p. 451], it is a tenable theory that Sydney did send a signal amending her
estimated arrival in Fremantle after she had handed Zealandia over to Durban, for his exact
words are: ‘On 11th November, Sydney and Zealandia left Fremantle for Sunda Strait, where
onward escort was to be taken over by H.M.S. Durban. Sydney signalled her expected time of
arrival back at Fremantle as p.m. on the 19th or a.m. on the 20th November. This she later
amended to Thursday, 20th November. This was the last heard from her.’
This sounds as though she did signal after the transfer, but I believe that Gill, with no
intention of misleading, has written these events out of sequence, and that the change of ETA
was notified before she left Fremantle on 11 November, and for the following reasons:
1. Sydney was under general instructions to maintain strict wireless silence.
2. No such signal, between 11 and 19 November, has been found in her signal packs.
3. The Naval Board had to signal Singapore to enquire about the handover to Durban, as it was
considered that something might have happened that made it necessary for her to accompany
Zealandia all the way to Singapore. This is reflected in a signal sent on 24 November, shortly
after midnight.
24 November 1941: Naval Board to Commander-in-Chief China. By cable. Naval
Cypher A. 1533Z/23. [That is 0133K, 24 November.]
Request time and position in which H.M.A.S. “Sydney” parted company with H.M.S.
“Durban” after handing over “Zealandia”. [B6121: 165P, p. 465]
It was discovered later that, while it was true that Zealandia and Durban were late arriving in
Singapore, the delay happened between Sunda Strait and Singapore. Sydney was not behind
the schedule that she had notified before she left Fremantle, so there was no need for her to
signal. For me, this is sufficient indication that Sydney did not made a signal, and I shall
continue to maintain that unless somebody produces an authentic record of the actual signal,
with Time of Origin, Time of Receipt, and the type of cipher used. The point is trivial and not
worth arguing, unless it is implied that the Naval Board was negligent (in some way) in
failing to act (in some way) upon a signal that Sydney probably did not send.
Second: did Sydney send a message to check whether the unidentified vessel she had
encountered could have been the genuine Straat Malakka or before the battle began?
Robert Mason:
Mason, born on 13 May 1915 at Randwick, NSW, enlisted in the navy on 12 August 1934 as
a ‘twelve-year man’. His record, on a badly deteriorated card, is difficult to read, but at some
time, apparently early in 1940, it was proposed that he be discharged as he was subject to
severe seasickness. (P.U.N.S. = Permanently Unfit for Naval Service) On appeal, he was
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allowed to remain in the navy, but was limited to a shore posting. He was discharged on
6 September 1945 as a Leading Writer, with a note concerning his medical condition:
‘Nervous disorder’ and bursitis. He was not a telegraphist, but a Writer to Commander
Archibald McLachlan at HMAS Harman, the naval wireless receiving station in Canberra.
He claimed that two messages were received directly from Sydney just before the battle, and
that these were covered up in collusion between officers in Canberra and Melbourne. (The
transmitting station was Belconnen.) He lodged his version of these alleged events with the
Manuscript Section of the National Library in Canberra (Mason’s statements: MS7460).
Regarding the first signal, he wrote that he overheard a shouted alert that Sydney had bailed
up a ‘quere customer’ and was going to investigate. (This is not necessarily an incorrect
spelling of ‘queer’; it could have been intended to be – likewise an incorrect spelling –
‘quaere’, meaning doubtful or questionable; this term is still in legal use.) The only signal
that Sydney could have been justified in sending before the action was a cipher message asking
whether the genuine Straat Malakka could have been off the coast of Western Australia. If
Sydney had sent such a cipher message before the action, the telegraphist could not have
known what was in it until it had been deciphered – by somebody else. That would have
taken time, and then somebody, probably in Navy Office, had to check the plot or cards to
make sure that the vessel in question could definitely not have been in the area.
Mason claimed that the second message said that she was ‘about to open fire’. As has been
pointed out: in a battle situation, a captain does not wait to have a message announcing his
intention to open fire encoded and sent; he just does it. Thereupon, according to Mason, the
receiving telegraphist left his set unattended, and a later message was lost. He wrote that all
the staff who were present that night were sworn to secrecy, but he had already left the station.
The next morning, he was told that ‘it looks like Sydney has gone’. Mason did not hear any of
the signals personally; he did not see any decipherments. The kindest interpretation to put on
his claims is that he too made errors in both the content of any such signals and their date, for
when it was discovered that Sydney was probably lost, all those who knew this would have
been bound to secrecy until an announcement was made.
Marion Stevens, who really was a telegraphist at Harman, and later a Chief Petty Officer
in charge at Molonglo station, and still later a Third Officer, WRANS, rejected these claims
in a submission to the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry. [JPI, Submission 49A, Vol. 16, p. 392531] Other telegraphists who were on duty there have also discounted them, as did the JPI
Report in Chapter 5. Mason’s story is repeated here briefly only to remind people of the
nature of his claims.
There are several anomalies about Mason’s naval service. One strange thing is that his
record card shows that he was at Penguin from 1 July 1941 to 30 December 1942, at Kuttabul
from 1 January to 30 June 1943, and not at Harman until 1 July 1943. Still, the WRANS who
were at Harman did not object that he was not there in November 1941, so there may be
something peculiar about the way entries were made on the card.
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The people who continue to maintain that Mason was correct in his claims seem to be
those who want to attack the navy at all costs. John McArthur submitted to the JPI: ‘Even in
the face of Mason’s evidence the Navy has gone to great lengths to destroy Mason’s story.’ It
is entitled to take steps to defend the navy’s reputation against Mason’s unsubstantiated and
unjustified calumny. David Kennedy has said that Hans Linke, in an interview, tended ‘to
support the statements made by Robert Mason’. During interrogations, no Kormoran
telegraphist (including Linke) mentioned that Sydney had sent signals; on the contrary:
several stated that she did not. [B6121: 164M: Including Willy Tümmers, p. 114; Josef
Bareth, p. 143] John Samuels mentions Mason’s claims only briefly.
It may seem unreasonable to reject all claims of messages from Sydney as faulty recollections,
particularly of dates, but it is more logical to maintain that a dozen or so people have made an
error, than to accuse hundreds of people, perhaps thousands, in Australia, Britain, Germany and
the United States, representing their respective governments or navies, of a ‘cover-up’ lasting
more than 65 years. There is also supporting evidence for rejecting individual claims.
Third: did Sydney send a message during the battle?
Many claims are made that Sydney sent a message during or after the battle, and some people
say that this is confirmation that a signal must have been sent. Unfortunately for those making
the claims, they do not confirm one another, but contradict one another, in content and timing.
It has been said that there are claims of some twenty different messages from Sydney. I shall
consider only the most persistent of the myths.
Hetty Hall:
Hetty Hall has claimed that on 19 November 1941, while working in Singapore as a cipher
clerk, she been given a message from Sydney to decipher. Many years later, she wrote down
what she thought she remembered of the text:
Being attacked by a raider that have [sic] been disguised until they opened upon them,
said they’d been hit had made smoke screens & were sailing at 3 knots and were…’
Message recd later to say loss was to be kept secret until they caught the raider.
[Written between the lines: “German Cormorant”.] which they did.
All that were [was?] found of the Sydney were two Farley [sic] rafts and they
presumed they got a direct hit on their ammo.’ (She said that it was a cipher in groups
of four figures.)
It was David Kennedy who first put her claim on public record, and he quoted her as saying:
‘I deciphered it in the normal way and my co-worker wrote it down and I checked the message
and then it was then passed on, with urgency, to another office.’ Kennedy commented: ‘The
messages are the only first-hand detailed account by somebody on the allied side of having
actually handled deciphered last signals from the Australian light cruiser sunk on November
19, 1941, off the West Australian coast by the disguised German auxiliary cruiser Kormoran.’
(The claim, no matter how detailed, has not been substantiated.)
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Although she was young for such a position, I accept that Hetty Hall could in fact have
been a cipher clerk in Singapore. Even in Britain, the WRNS regularly recruited cipher clerks
as young as eighteen or nineteen; in the colonies, where reliable assistants were scarce, it
could have been at a younger age. The situation in Singapore was critical. Air Chief Marshal
Sit Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief, Far East, wrote in a report of 28 May
1942: ‘Apart from 50 W.R.N.S. at the Naval Wireless Station and a number of nurses, many
women were employed in the different services for clerical, cipher and other duties,
including intelligence work in F.E.C.B. Had all these been sent away, it would have meant a
large increase in the number of men absorbed. As it was, we were short of women to fill
suitable posts and thus relieve men for the fighting units.’ [Supplement to the London
Gazette, 22 January 1948, paragraph 67, p. 549. Emphasis added.]
Children matured quickly during the war, and even pre-teen children were entrusted with
vital tasks, where an indiscretion could have cost many lives. Deciphering a known cipher
with a known key was routine clerical work that a twelve-year-old could learn in a few days.
The basic mathematical skills should have been learnt by Grade 4, except for the concept of
non-carrying addition. Pre-teens can cope with codes; C U L8R is a sample of a ‘code’ that
they use frequently. Neither high intelligence nor mature judgment was needed for the task;
conscientiousness, clerical accuracy and absolute discretion were the qualities needed. I also
accept that she deciphered some such material. What I do not accept, from Hetty Hall or from
David Kennedy, is that the material came directly from Sydney during or after the battle, nor
that it was received on 19 November.
The content of these messages bears a strong similarity to messages sent to London and
Singapore by the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board. However, it is a sad commentary
on the efficiency of the Navy Office clerks that messages are not only in the wrong date order
within files, but are sometimes even in the wrong files, and searching them is confusing and
frustrating. In matters concerning naval affairs in South-East Asia, there was close contact
between the ACNB in Melbourne, the Admiralty in London and the Commander in Chief
China (actually in Singapore), most messages being sent in ‘Naval Cypher A’, sometimes in
the Flag cipher. When the message was repeated to CZM (Commandant Zeemacht, Batavia),
the ‘Anglo-French Cypher’ was used, as CZM was not given access to the most secret British
ciphers. During the period 25-28 November, there are several messages that mentioned a ‘smoke
screen’ and more that mentioned a ‘disguised raider’, but I have not been able to find one in
which ‘disguised raider’ and ‘smoke screen’ are mentioned together. I have also seen a signal
from ACNB to Admiralty saying that release of the news was to be delayed in the hope of
catching a second raider or a supply ship, but I have not been able to locate it again.
Nevertheless, I feel quite sure that the first signal that Hetty Hall deciphered was about
Sydney, not directly from Sydney. As the loss had not been announced by 28 November, the
message would have had as much impact on her then as it would have had on 19 November.
No matter how many times this has been written up by David Kennedy, or repeated by John
Samuels and Glenys McDonald and Warren Whittaker, or any number of other people, there is
only one original source, and it is entirely dependent on one woman’s memory for an exact date.
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Sybil Tweedie:
Sybil Tweedie, remarried widow of Sydney’s British Gunnery Officer Michael Morgan Singer,
said that Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser told the family that Kilindini naval radio in Kenya took
signals from Sydney and the position of the battle was known. Admiral Fraser arrived in
Australia late in 1944 in command of the British Pacific Fleet, and it must have been fairly
soon after this date that the conversation between them took place.
Admiral Fraser was one of the outstanding naval leaders of his time. Nevertheless, the only
time he spent in Kenya consisted of about three days in June 1942. From March 1939 to May
1942, he was at the Admiralty in London, as Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty and Third
Sea Lord. Whatever had been picked up at Kilindini station (in Mombasa, Kenya), Fraser was
not present at the time, and his source for this claim is unknown. Kilindini became a very
important wireless centre after about February 1942, but it was not a major player in 1941.
There are therefore several stages at which an error could have been inserted into this claim:
from Kilindini through more than one stage in transmission to the Admiralty, thence to Fraser
(whose field of responsibility was ‘Home Waters’, not China or Africa or Australia Station or
raiders), and finally to Tweedie. Without documentary confirmation, or at least a source
closer to the original interception of an alleged message, it cannot be considered reliable.
Fourth: Did Sydney send a message after the battle?
There are perhaps a dozen or more different instances of messages allegedly from Sydney
after the battle. It is claimed that these confirm that Sydney really did send a message or
messages. Unfortunately, hardly any message bears much resemblance to any other in regard
to time sent, content, and method of transmission. As it is on the basis of these supposed
signals that scurrilous accusations of criminal negligence and subsequent collusion have been
made against the navy and the government, they need a fairly lengthy examination. I am not
so naïve as to think that armed forces and governments never go to great lengths to cover up
blunders; the issue in question is simply whether they did so in matters relating to Sydney.
Eric Cooper And Gordon Laffer:
The most notorious of the signals that Sydney allegedly sent after the battle is the ‘Sydney
calling Darwin’ one. There are several Very Big Questions about this. This signal was picked
up on an ordinary private set; how could it possibly have been missed by the coastal wireless
station Geraldton VIN, the closest to the action, and the only one that had heard both the
QQQQ signal in part and the signal from Trocas in full. The only other station to hear part of
the QQQQ was the tug Uco; the only other station to hear the Trocas message was Singapore.
VIN was an efficient station, but neither VIN nor Singapore heard this alleged message.
Squadron Leader Cooper claims that this message, which is shown in archival sources to
have been made on 4 December, was really heard on 19 November 1941, and that any
evidence to the contrary is a falsification. Gordon Laffer made a statutory declaration that he
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had been shown this or a similar message in 1945, and that it originally contained latitude and
longitude coordinates that had since been removed. [For Cooper, see JPI Vol. 1, pp. 69, 166;
Vol. 2, p. 298, Vol. 3, p. 641. This statement has been repeated frequently in books and
newspapers. For Laffer’s Statutory Declaration, see JPI, Vol. 3, Submission 45, p. 536, by
Ean McDonald, and Vol. 9, Submission 99, p. 2184, by ‘End the Secrecy on Sydney’ Group,
to wit, John Doohan; or for a brief description see Glenys McDonald’s book, pp. 86, 193-98]
Let us consider first the circumstances under which the messages were picked up and how
they were handled; then, the messages themselves; next, the disagreements about the source
and date; and finally, the offshoots from this basic series of messages.
How the Messages were Picked up and Handled:
Persistent claims have been made that a signal from HMAS Sydney was heard by listeners in
the Esplanade Hostel, Geraldton. (This was a boarding house, not a hotel.) Records show that
these messages were heard on 4 December 1941. Squadron Leader Cooper, who was involved
in the incident, claims that he remembers that the message was received on 19 November,
and that the documents have been altered to conceal this. Relevant entries in the SWACH
War Diary are given in Richard Summerrell’s research guide, The Sinking of HMAS Sydney
[pp. 42-43], but since the booklet is currently out of print, and some people find it difficult to
navigate the archival website, the essentials are repeated here.
South West Area Combined Headquarters War Diary:
This will be referred to as the SWACH War Diary. Area Combined Headquarters were set up
to coordinate naval and air force operations, especially sea searches to ensure the security of
convoys in the vicinity of ports. The offices were manned primarily by air force personnel,
and they were in close contact with the Central War Room. The SWACH War Diary is written
in a foolscap size book, like a ledger, with pre-numbered pages. If a single page had been
removed, this would have been obvious; to forge an entry would have involved forging an
entire book of some 400 pages. The handwriting is in some cases abominable to the point of
illegibility, especially in the case of names, and the times given are sometimes dubious, some
being in Greenwich Mean Time, as GMT is entered at the top of some columns, while some
are recorded as /H: that is, Western Australian local time. The timing of some items can only
be deduced, but it is certain that there was little point in making aerial reconnaissance flights
over the ocean on moonless nights. Below are selected entries from the SWACH War Diary
over the period 4-6 December 1941. They have been edited to remove irrelevant material.
Emphasis is added. Material in square brackets [ ] is added explanatory material
Thursday, December 4th 1941: (Duty Officer: Flying Officer Palmer)
1520 [GMT]. W/A phoned message received from Geraldton = Geraldton heard a call on
24.50 metres possibly from HMAS Sydney & requested Pearce to call Darwin for bearing.
[NB: This was 2320H; that is, 25 minutes after the date given for receipt of the last message.]
1543. Rd. [received] following by telephone from W/A = S/L [Squadron Leader] Cooper at
Geraldton reports one of his operators listening at 24.5 metres heard R/T telephone signal
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calling Darwin or technical telegraph operator. Signals weak and operator thought it may be
from HMAS “Sydney”. Later Geraldton report strength of signal increasing.
1545. On instructions from Lt/C [Lieutenant Commander] Moir, Naval Duty Staff Officer
signalled Darwin. Immediate = Establish watch on 24.5 metres immediately. Geraldton heard
R/T signal calling Darwin or technical telegraph operator & thinks call possibly from Sydney
= 1500Z/4. [2300H – WA time]
1555. W/A phoned following message received from S/L Cooper at Geraldton = Geraldton
Aeradio opinion call coming from Sydney Aeradio on 25 metres. Following heard,
“Calling Darwin or technical telegraph operator from sea. Sydney calling send carrier men on
board calling Frazer D/F Darwin cannot detect your Singapore call. Darwin. This is M.S.S.
Sydney calling message received frequency satisfactory will put through one more. Heard at
1510Z. [2310H]
Friday, Dec.5th 1941: (Duty Officer: Flying Officer John Pigdon)
0930. Rcd. Signal fm Darwin = our Z126 4/12 Station identified as P.M.G. Darwin &
P.M.G. Sydney – telegram channel = 0230Z/5.
Saturday, Dec. 6th 1941: (Duty Officer: Flying Officer [Laurence Edmond?] Prentis)
0054. Signalled CWR [Central War Room] = Information received from Darwin that short
wave broadcast overheard on 4th of December was from P.M.G. Sydney to P.M.G.
Darwin. In view of confusion caused request information whether this a regular &
authorised channel = 0054 Z/6.
Thus the SWACH War Diary entries they show that the message was received on 4 December.
They also show that Squadron Leader Cooper reported at 2320H that a call had been heard
that might have come from Sydney, and at 2355, thirty-five minutes later, Cooper himself
reported that Aeradio Darwin thought it was not. By the following morning, Aeradio Darwin
had positively identified it as coming from the Postmaster General’s telegraph station in
Sydney. That is, unless the whole War Diary is forged.
Glenys McDonald, in her first submission to the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry, wrote:
‘Winter maintains that this was a 4 December signal between Sydney PMG and Darwin
PMG. This seems an unusual assumption given the content of the message here,’ [JPI, Vol. 1,
Submission 26, p. 167] It was not my ‘assumption’; it was what was determined by Air
Intelligence after due investigation. I did the work necessary to find out what the official
inquiries discovered.
This exchange of telephone messages became unimportant when a signal was received at
2230Z on Sunday, December 7th [0630H, Monday]: Rcd from CWR. C.278. 8/12 =
Following from C in C China begins. Japanese are attempting landing Kota Bahru, 06ºN
1020’ E. Two minutes later came a message from the Admiralty: Commence hostilities
against Japan at once.
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The Messages Themselves:
These messages are reproduced in Summerrell’s guide, the version on an official RAAF
Message Form (not a sheet from a signals pad) is on page 40; the version on plain paper is on
page 41. The reproductions on the Archives website are too small to be read easily, and
enlarging them blurs them. Versions of the messages are given below, together with an
analysis of the circumstances. It can be seen at a glance that this is not the sort of message
that would be transmitted from a blazing, sinking ship. In such a case, the message would
have given the location of the ship and called for help, not waffled on as this message does.
The document in Summerrell on page 41 is given below in Times Roman; the document on
page 40 is in Courier. Written out like this, it is easier to see the 'slippage' between the
reports. The document on page 40 gives only a span of times received, not times for
individual messages; the document on page 41 gives in Zone H the times of four separate
messages over a 75-minute period; times in the SWACH War Diary relating to these
messages are in Zone Z (GMT).
Heading (in the p. 40 record only):
Taken over phone by Signals clerk Western Area from S/L Cooper
Geraldton.
24.50/metres.
Aeradio Geraldton under impression came from Aeradio Sydney.
[Comment: Altered to read ‘Aeradio Geraldton is under the impression
coming from Aeradio Sydney’.]
R/T & morse.
[Addition: Mr Palmer (Bailash)
[Comment: Flying Officer Palmer was one of the Duty Officers at
SWACH. ‘Bailash’ was Lieutenant-Commander Philip Bailhache, District
Naval Office, WA]
R/T & morse. Calling during 0940 till 1125.
[Comment: These times, using the army or air force method, have been
crossed out and changed to the naval method: 2140H and 2325H.]
2140
Calling Darwin Telegraph Operator. (Repeated several times.)
Calling Darwin or Technical Telegraph Operator.
Call from C. Sydney calling. Send carrier. men on board, all men on board.
Call from Sea Sydney calling, send Carrier men on board.
Calling Frazer DM Darwin Cannot detect you repeated couple times)
Calling Frazer D/F Darwin. Cannot detect you.
2150
R.T. Sydney calling Darwin Distress signall starts [?] Leichardt.
Sydney calling Darwin. Distress Sig – Starts [?] Lykard.
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[Comment: Out of sequence. In document on p. 40, ‘Leichardt’ has
been added in a different handwriting. Note that R.T. signifies
Radio Telephony: that is, voice signals.]
Send morse after 2450. DSZD
[No equivalent in the document on p. 40. 2450 is a civilian
designation; naval method would be 0050. ]
2240
Singapore call Darwin. AS Sydney calling 2450.
Singapore call Darwin. This M S Sydney calling.
[Comment: In the document on p. 41, HM has been added above the
line, in a different handwriting and with a different writing
implement. The implication that the message was from HMAS Sydney
relies on transparent document falsification.]
2255 Message received Frequency satisfactory will put through in morse.
Message received frequency satisfactory will put thru in morse
[Comment: There is no record that any following Morse signals were
received.]
On document, page 41 only:
(At 1110H) Cpl Dawson & Aeradio Ger - Four stations transmitting in morse on same
wavelength.
[Comment: The time has been altered to 2310. Interpolated between
‘on’ and ‘same’ is an illegible word that might be ‘about’.]
Bottom left: S/L Cooper.
[Comment: This significance is not clear, but it probably meant that
it was to be reported to Cooper, or had been reported.]
On document, page 40 only:
Heard by 3 women, 2 men, Cpl Dawson at Esplanade Hostel on ordinary
short wave Broadcast receiver. Dawson phoned S/L Cooper at
Geraldton. S/L Cooper phoned area.
Passed COIC [Wesche?] per secraphone. per phone from F/O Bogue.
Geraldton, 1630H [5/12?]
[Comment: This 1630H cannot refer to the same day. There is another
reproduction of this page on which ‘Wesche’ and ‘5/12’ are shown
more clearly, though still barely legible.]
[It should be noted: Two Radio Silence Periods fell within the time
span of the signals noted: 2200-2203, and 2300-2303. (Zone is
irrelevant.) Those would have been the logical times for Sydney to
concentrate on transmitting, instead of sending at random outside
these times.]
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Brief notes on the officers involved:
Eric William Cooper: born 29 March 1915; enlisted 4 December 1933; discharged 23 October
1945 as Wing Commander. He was awarded the Air Force Cross.
Venn Gordon Wesche: born 27 February 1903; enlisted (Unknown); discharged 6 August
1945 as Squadron Leader. In 1941, he represented the Combined Operations Intelligence
Centre, first in Melbourne, then in Western Australia. In 1942, he was with the COIC at
General MacArthur’s Headquarters in Brisbane as Staff Officer Air Intelligence. He was
awarded the US Legion of Merit.
Gerard Frederick Joseph Bogue: born 12 June 1902; enlisted 10 March 1941; posted to
4 S.F.T.S. Geraldton on 21 April 1941. He was an accountant with the Administration Branch
at Pearce. On 24 November 1941, he was appointed Intelligence Officer. Prior to that date,
he should not have been involved in receiving or forwarding information of this nature. That
means that, if the message had been received and handled on 19 November, Bogue would not
have been involved; if it was on 4/5 December, he would have been.
Without taking into consideration the evidence in the SWACH War Diary: if you were on
the charnel house of a blazing ship that might blow up or sink at any moment: would you
engage in that sort of chit-chat for more than an hour? Or would you send an SOS or some
sort of call for help, giving your location? (In none of the records is there any mention of an
SOS in the alleged messages. Various writers have invented this.) Would you call Darwin
specifically, when VIN Geraldton and VIP Perth were closer and Harman was the central
naval receiving station, or would you call any available station? (The naval station at Darwin
was called Coonawarra, not Darwin.) The whole thing is just too ridiculous. To expect people
to believe that this signal came from Sydney is to insult their intelligence.
Disagreements on Source and Date:
Any claim to have heard a voice message from Sydney is patently false. She did not have the
capacity to send voice messages. This was confirmed at the JPI by Lieutenant Alaistair
Templeton, who served aboard Sydney. [JPI, Official Hansard Report of hearing of witnesses
in Sydney, 22 May 1998, p. 473] Marion Stevens, who was a telegraphist at Harman in
November 1941 submitted: ‘I want to stress the fact that the Transceiver in the SYDNEY
WAS THE LATEST AND MOST MODERN “NAVY No.36 BUT IT WOULD ONLY
HANDLE MORSE CODE… Any R/T signals received anywhere DID NOT ORIGINATE
FROM THE SYDNEY. The Transceiver was only capable of transmitting Morse Code.’
If any such messages existed at all, they were not from Sydney.’ [JPI, Vol. 16, Submission
49A, p. 3925]
Some people who like to believe any story that would discredit the navy have turned this
around and said: ‘Voice messages were received; therefore she must have been able to send
them.’ That sort of logic can prove anything. The main source for claiming that the signals
were received on 19 November has been Squadron Leader Cooper. Glenys McDonald points
out that at the forum in 1991 he could not remember the date, but that later he claimed that he
could. [McDonald, p. 195] It must be difficult for someone in Western Australia to resist the
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pressure applied by the Sydney Research Group and the End the Secrecy on Sydney group to
make them change their minds and give the testimony that these groups want to promulgate.
The Offshoots:
In her book, Seeking the Sydney, Glenys McDonald outlines many of the claims regarding
alleged messages from Sydney after the battle; some of these seem to be linked to the above
message. Several of them are linked to Michael Montgomery and Gordon Laffer. [His service
record shows: Gordon Ashley Laffer, born 8 May 1916, enlisted 25 March 1944, discharged
26 September 1945 as Leading Aircraftman.] For personal reasons, Laffer seemed had a bee
in his bonnet about Sydney. His goal was to shift the blame for the delay in searching for
Sydney survivors from the air force to the navy, and this meshed with the aims of the Sydney
Research Group. He claimed that, in 1945, while in Western Australia awaiting discharge, he
was shown copy of a message that had been picked up from Sydney, and had been told that
the RAAF had notified the navy, but the reply was that no action needed to be taken, as
Sydney was not missing. Laffer made a Statutory Declaration that the signal had contained
‘Sydney calling Darwin’, given twice (as in the document at Summerrell, p. 41). [JPI, Vol. 3,
p. 536; Vol. 9, p. 2184] But he added that it contained the words ‘On fire fore and aft.
Preparing to abandon ship’, and that it gave a latitude and longitude. [McDonald, p. 86.] It is
also given as ‘On fire and abandoning ship’ with the latitude quoted as 28º S, which is now
known to be false. Under this were listed several names, and the Esplanade Hostel was
mentioned. [McDonald, p. 27] Part of this clearly relates to the message mentioned above, and
part, equally obviously, does not. It is likely that Laffer saw several signals, and confused in
his mind which words were in which signal.
According to McDonald [p. 86], Michael Montgomery made available to Laffer a signal
that the RAAF released in 1989, which was ‘undoubtedly the signal pad that Gordon Laffer
had seen’. It was allegedly heard by five RAAF personnel at the Esplanade Hostel, the first
being at 9.40 pm (2140/H), which makes it sound authentic, but in fact it says that it was
overheard by three women and two men, and there is no indication whether or not the men
were service personnel. It was then phoned to the air force base by ‘Corporal Dawson’, who
may or may not have been one of the ‘two men’ mentioned. He must have been an army man,
for the rank of ‘corporal’ exists in neither the navy nor the air force. (He might well have
been in the Volunteer Defence Corps.)
Michael Montgomery also found a Malcolm H. Young, who claimed that while on watch at
Fremantle he had seen a signal ‘am engaging raider’ come off the teleprinter, followed by
‘further signals from Geraldton reporting fires out to sea’. [McDonald, p. 104] Young’s
service history was difficult to trace, as he is registered as Hal William Malcolm Young, born
7 October 1917 at Albany; he ‘reported for duty on 7 September 1938, and was drafted to
Leeuwin, the Fremantle shore station, from 25 September 1940 to 30 June 1943. However, he
was rated a ‘Signalman’, and in the navy ‘signalmen’ are not telegraphists. (I checked out
Sydney’s telegraphists to make sure they were not in records as signalmen.) If Young saw
such a signal, it was not from Sydney.
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David Kennedy, in a newspaper article, quoted Hetty Hall’s daughter, Deborah, as saying,
in connection with the Esplanade Hostel message, that ‘considering the circumstances “in
which these guys had to get a message out it would have been plausible that they would have
been sending out a voice message in distress and anything in plain (language morse) to get a
message across”.’ According to Kennedy, Deborah had worked on ciphers in the Defence
Signals Directorate for four years. Obviously, they did not teach her much about wartime
wireless technology; from the way this is written it does not seem that she knows the difference
between ‘plain language Morse’ and ‘voice’ messages. You could not just decide to use
Morse equipment to send a voice message. This is not merely implausible; it was impossible;
it required different equipment.
Quite a few people cannot give up their belief in these radio messages. Carmelo Amalfi
wrote that an affidavit by Cooper, claiming that he had relayed a Sydney distress signal from
Geraldton to military headquarters in Perth on 19 November, was tabled in the Western
Australian Parliament in 2002. Nothing would be likely to make Cooper change his belief,
but others do not have to regard his memory as a source superior to contemporary documents.
David Kennedy has staked a lot in believing in the accuracy of Hetty Hall’s memory for
dates. Glenys McDonald writes [p. 198]: ‘I believe the signals picked up in Geraldton did come
from Sydney. I believe they prove conclusively that Sydney was in contact with Singapore and other
bases including Kilindini naval radio base in Mombasa.’ The evidence, however, simply does not
stack up, and all evidence that there were messages from Sydney depends ultimately on the
accuracy of memory for dates.
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The Ingvarson Statutory Declaration
On 9 May 2007, Julius Ingvarson made a Statutory Declaration, the substance of which was
published in the Post, Subiaco on 12 May 2007. Ingvarson was a ‘Signalman’, but with the
army, and the army designation of signalmen included telegraphists. The copy that I saw had
obviously passed through an Optical Character Recognition program thar distorted it badly. It
has been retyped below, as close as possible to the original.
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
OATHS, AFFIDAVITS AND STATUTORY DECLARATIONS ACT 2OO5
I, Julius Francis Ingvarson a Retiree of 3 Smith Court, Tarcoola Beach, Geraldton, WA sincerely
declare as follows:
l. I am aged 86 years, born on April 9, 1921, in Subiaco Western Australia.
2. In l94l at the age of 20 I was conscripted in to the Australian Amy and trained as a radio operator.
My service number was W37069. In November! 1941 I held the rank of Signalman and was working
for Fortress Signals, a military radio network. I was based in an office in the Artillery Barracks in Burt
Street, Fremantle. The radio office was just to the west of the main Burt Street entrance.
3. At about 5 pm on November 19, l94l, I was tuning the condenser of the voice radio and listening for
incoming signals through headphones.
4. I heard a voice with a distinct Australian accent say ”Hit by torpedoes and sinking".
5. I am positive that the accent was Australian and that the word “torpedoes,' was plural, meaning
more than one torpedo.
6. I tuned the transmitter to the frequency of the incoming signal and transmitted these words: 'Name
your ship". I received no reply.
7. I wrote the incoming message and the date received, November 19, 1941, on a piece of paper and
handed it to my immediate superior, Corporal Arnold Grogan. He read it and made no comment. I did
not discuss the message with the other operators.
8. Next morning, November 20, 1941, I was walking across the Barracks parade ground at about 8am
when I was approached by Corporal Grogan and Sergeant-Major Tommy Thompson.
9. They told me that on orders from our commanding officer Captain Jimmy Marshall, the message I
had received the night before was classified information and that I was under strict orders to tell
nobody about it.
10. They told me the ship mentioned in the message was HMAS Sydney. Il. Because of the orders, I
kept all this quiet for 60 years until the subject of the HMAS Sydney came up among workmates. They
were dismissive of me
12. I later visited the HMAS Sydney memorial museum in Geraldton and learned that the authorities
had not made public the sinking of the Sydney until 12 days after the event. That is when I told more
people what I had heard.
This declaration is true and I know that it is an offence to make a declaration knowing that it is false in
a material particular.
This declaration is made under the Oaths, Affidavits and Statutory Declarations Act 2005.
At Subiaco in the State of Western Australia
In the presence of.
Signatures
Brian G. Tennant
Dated 9 May 2007
Justice of the Peace W A No. 3914
109 Coghlan Rd, Subiaco, 6008
31
SUBM.005.0300
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Barbara Poniewierski
Comments on Ingvarson’s Statutory Declaration:
Point 1: pars. 1-2: Records tally; enlistment is given as 4 March 1941.
Point 2: pars. 3-5: Sydney could not send voice messages, so this was impossible. As
Ingvarson admits that the message did not name the ship, his claim is a deduction, not an
observation. It is probable that the deduction that the message came from Sydney led to the
deduction that the message was heard on 19 November. However, since Sydney had no capacity
to transmit voice messages, it is likely that other similar Australian ships of that time could
not do so either.
Point 3: pars. 4-5: Sydney was not hit by ‘torpedoes, plural’, so this is incorrect.
Point 4: pars. 7-9: According to official records as published, Arnold Grogan did not enlist
until 9 June 1943; he was discharged on 13 February 1946 as a lieutenant with the 32
Australian Wireless Section (Heavy). Likewise, although there were a lot of men with the
name ‘James Marshall’, this name, he appears to have been the one who enlisted on 31 July
1942, and was discharged on 1 October 1946 as a major with the 22 Australian Lines of
Communication, Signals. ‘Tommy Thompson’ could not be traced, and it is probable that
Tommy was not his given name, but was derived from his surname. In addition, the article in
the Post names him as ‘Tommy Tomlinson’, so he remains a mystery. These military records
[World War Two Nominal Roll] are not perfect, but there are too many things wrong with the
details that Ingvarson claims to remember.
Point 4: par. 12: It is inconceivable that anybody who in November 1941 was old enough to
read a newspaper did not know that the release of the news of the loss of Sydney was delayed,
and it was not known to the general public until the morning newspapers of 1 December
appeared. I remember it, and I was only ten years old then.
Ingvarson does not like having his memory challenged, and people who support the theory
that there were messages that should have alerted authorities to begin a search earlier have
leapt to his defence. However, to allow this claim to go unchallenged in deference to his age
would be indefensible in view of its potential for harm.
As the wording is quite different from that of the signal allegedly seen by Laffer, the two
claims do not support each other.
One woman, in a letter to the Post, tried to back up Ingvarson's claim of hearing a message
from Sydney saying that she had been hit by torpedoes and was sinking by claiming that she
too heard a message from Sydney, but it was 'SOS Straat Malacca'. This was a version of the
Kormoran’s Morse message, not a voice message from Sydney. Although incorrect, this was
reasonable if she meant to claim that she had heard about this QQQQ message. (Not SOS.) If
she was claiming that she heard it personally, she is seriously deluded.
32
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Barbara Poniewierski
Miscellaneous signals:
There are various isolated examples of individual claims that do not form part of the general
patterns – claims that may not have been widely publicised or accepted. In many cases, they
have been made by persons who say simply that they ‘heard a message’, with no indication of
whether it was voice or Morse. In others, people are merely alleging that somebody said they
had heard about a message, or that they heard a message that they decided , often many years
later, ‘must have’ come from Sydney.
David Kennedy reported that David Ronald Griffiths, a telegraphist who, at the time, was
twenty years old, told him that, just before 8 pm on 19 November he picked up a signal ‘in
the three-letter emergency fleet code on ship-shore frequency’; he wrote it in the log, but he
did not decipher it. (It was only in small establishments that telegraphists did their own
coding and decoding, so he would not have known what the message said, and nor even
which ship had sent it. Griffiths’ naval record shows that nominally he was posted to
Cerberus 4 May to 16 September, and 13 November to 22 December 1941.) Eight in the
evening in Melbourne (2000K) is 1800H and 1700G; that was half an hour before the
beginning of the battle. If Sydney officers had sensed a real ‘emergency’ at that time, they
should not have kept closing with Kormoran for another half hour. Griffiths had no idea what
the message contained; later he jumped to a conclusion, or perhaps was pushed into it. He
also mentioned in his tale the presence of a WRAN in the office. The WRAN Service was not
formed until 1942, and, as Marion Stevens points out, there were no WRANS at Cerberus
until May 1943. No doubt there were women in the office, possibly including telegraphists,
but they were not WRANS. This does not invalidate his claim that he took a message, but it
does cast further doubt on the accuracy of his deductions.
John McArthur submitted a claim to the JPI that an RAN ‘signalman’ on duty at Fremantle
on the night of 19 November received a signal from Sydney: RRRR v Sydney, which meant
that Sydney had encountered a warship; the last signal was allegedly: ‘on fire, abandoning
ship’, ‘in clear English no need for code’. [JPI, Vol. 10, Submission 104, pp. 2252, mentioned
in Report, Chapter 5.] This is just plain silly. In the first place, this type of signal was sent
only be merchant ships. Second: as Kormoran was a converted merchantman, not a regular
warship, the signal sent on meeting her should have been QQQQ. Third: an RRRR would
have been in Morse; how was the ‘on fire, abandoning ship’ transmitted? Fourth: it must be
repeated that it was not proper for RAN telegraphists to call themselves ‘signalmen’. Fifth:
this has no value at all if the man concerned was not willing to be identified and asked to
explain this silly situation. McArthur’s ignorance of naval procedure is profound.
Many minor claims come from the Geraldton area, so naturally Glenys McDonald has
collected and investigated them. She mentions a claim by Chris Rob, who lived on a farm
inland from Port Gregory; she said she had a ‘distinct memory’ of a voice message regarding
Sydney interrupting a radio programme between 6.00 and 7.00 pm ‘one night’, and it was
believed that the programme was either ‘Martin’s Corner’ or ‘Dad and Dave’, but Glenys
found that the Geraldton station 6GE did not run those programmes at that time. [McDonald,
33
SUBM.005.0302
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Barbara Poniewierski
pp. 40, 103] In a report of this story to the JPI, she allegedly recalled it as ‘a plain voice
distress call’ from HMAS Sydney. This is quite unconvincing. [Vol. 1, Submission 26, p. 169]
Ean McDonald wrote to the JPI that an official of the Postmaster General’s Department,
stationed at the PMG repeater station at Hamelin Pool, claimed that ‘heavy telephonic traffic
(between Fremantle and RAAF Pearce) took place on the line between Perth and Carnarvon’
on the night of 19/20 November 1941 and continued ‘for the next five or six days’. [JPI, Vol.
3, Submission 45, p. 538.] Why in the world would calls between Fremantle and Pearce, only
about 55 km apart, pass through Hamelin Pool, which is about 180 km south of Carnarvon
and 800 km north of Fremantle? Some such traffic might have been connected with the need
to provide cover for an important convoy that was passing through at that time., and there
would have been fairly heavy traffic to Carnarvon a few days later when the search for
survivors from Sydney was being conducted. However, if he heard a signal that Sydney had
‘opened fire first’, it would not have come directly from Sydney, and that is not exactly what
he seems to have said. It seems more likely that, a week later, he overheard a telephone call
from Lieutenant-Commander Rycroft in Carnarvon concerning the results of the first
interrogations. I cannot understand what point Ean McDonald thinks he is trying to make.
In June 2007, Michael Montgomery circulated an email in which he wrote: ‘I had it from
Mrs. Mack’s own mouth that she had been fast asleep at 5am on November 20th in Marble
Bar PO when woken by Joe Ryan with the message from Sydney “We're sinking, abandoning
ship.” Joe Ryan was unfortunately already dead by 1978, but Joe Armstrong was also there
and confirmed that it had been relayed from RAAF Corunna Down, as Wally Phillips also
heard on his return from leave - so definitely not “just unverified gossip”.’ D. R. E. King
submitted to the JPI that Montgomery had written in his book Who sank the Sydney? that Joe
Ryan had picked up a short-wave message on an ordinary radio at 3.00 am, which would
corroborate what Marjorie Porter had claimed in one of his own interviews: that the battle
had taken place off Port Gregory, and it had ceased at 3.00 am. [JPI, Vol. 5, Submission 68,
p. 1018. I cannot find the reference in Montgomery’s book; it is not in the index. The
Geosounder search has shown that both the place and the time of the sinking are false.]
Note: ‘Mrs Mack’ did not hear the message. Wally Phillips did not hear it; he was only told
about it later. In the 2007 version, Joe Armstrong said it had been relayed from the RAAF,
Corunna Down[s]. Sorry, but there was no RAAF base at Corunna Downs in November
1941. The first RAAF survey of the area commenced in November 1942; the contract to build
the base was not let until January 1943. [K273: 1942/28: Corunna Downs – Aerodrome. See
also: Heritage Council of Western Australia. Register of Heritage Places. No. 03695.
Assessment Documentation – pp.7-8.] Furthermore, ‘Wally Phillips’ is presumably Walter
Phillips, W74694, born 19 November 1910 at Sandstone, Western Australia, who enlisted at
Marble Bar on 21 June 1942 as a Private in the 11 North West Battalion Volunteer Defence
Crops. As he did not enlist until mid 1942 – while at Marble Bar – he should have heard
about it before enlisting, and he would not have ‘return[ed] from leave’ before he had
enlisted. Somebody is hallucinating, and it most definitely is unverified gossip.
34
SUBM.005.0303
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Wireless personnel
Barbara Poniewierski
Rank, d.o.b., length of service
Picked up
KÖHN, Paul Gustav Otto
Stabsoberfunkmeister
Carnarvon
PWGA42161
B. 30.10.07
Navy 15¼ years
(Chief Petty Officer)
TROTTMANN, Erich Hermann
Funkobermaat
Carnarvon
PWGA42367
B. 8.10.13
Navy 8 years
TÜMMERS, Peter Wilhelm
Funkobermaat
Koolinda
PWGA42267
B. 25.02.15
Navy 6 years
ROPERS, Karl
Funkmaat
Trocas
PWGA42393
B. 16.04.16
Navy 5 years (later Funkmeister)
GRUN, Wilhelm
Funkmaat
Carnarvon
PWGA42302
B. 1.04.13
Navy 3½ years (Initial enlistment 1935)
FUNKE, Helmut Gunter Ewald
Funkmeister
Centaur
PWGA42215
B. 4.10.14
Navy 3½ years
MEDER, Kurt
Funkobergefreiter
Aquitania
PWGA42113
B. 24.02.20
Navy 3½ years
PACHMANN, Ernst Wilhelm
Funkobergefreiter
Carnarvon
PWGA42376
B. 3.03.18
Navy 2¾ years
MULLER, Paul Friedrich
Funkobergefreiter
Carnarvon
PWGA42371
B. 23.03.19
Navy 2¾ years
SCHÄFER, Ernst
Funkobergefreiter
Aquitania
PWGA42116
B. 19.01.21
Navy 2½ years
LINKE, Hans Gerhard
Funkobergefreiter
Carnarvon
PWGA42369
B. 22.02.18
Navy 2½ years
BÄUMER, Reinhold Friedrich
Funkobergefreiter
Carnarvon
PWGA42380
B. 18.10.21
Navy 2¼ years
BARETH, Josef
Funkobergefreiter
Yandra
PWGA42373
B. 13.01.21
Navy 2¼ years
JAKUBECK, Heinz
Funkobergefreiter
Carnarvon
PWGA42372
B. 17.02.21
Navy 2 years
JAROLIN, Karl Heinrich
Funkobergefreiter
Carnarvon
PWGA42374
B. 21.08.20
Navy 2 years
MARMANN, Adolf Peter Bernhard
Funkobergefreiter
Carnarvon
PWGA42370
B. 1.01.22
Navy 2 years
Funkgefreiter
Carnarvon
NOLDEN, Karl-Heinz Rolf
PWGA42375
B. 21.09.21
Navy 1½ years
Kormoran’s Wireless Personnel killed:
Funkhauptgefreiter: LANGE, Hermann (killed on board)
Funkobergefreiter: (presumed drowned)
EBERHARD, Eduard
HAARNAGEL, Gerhard
FELDMANN, Heinz
HEUMANN, Eugen
GEORG, Ernst
HILLE, Albert
This list may be of use to anyone trying to assess the relevance and reliability of material in
interrogation reports. It is arranged by approximate seniority.
35
SUBM.005.0304
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Barbara Poniewierski
Arthur Lane
John Samuels and David Kennedy have relied heavily on alleged statements by Arthur Lane
in their claims that a voice message directly from Sydney was picked up in Singapore after the
battle with Kormoran. Lane founded the National Ex Services Association in Britain, and he is
highly regarded by its members for his services. The following statements – which he now
denies having made – are attributed to him.
Submissions to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
1997-1998. (Commonly called the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry [JPI].)
Volume 16, Submission 108B: pp. 4019-4022: Adolf Marmann.
pp. 4019-20: Covering letter.
p. 4021: A photocopy or fax of a letter to the Daily Mail, (UK; date not evident), from
Michael Montgomery. He summarises some of the well-known allegations concerning the
sinking of Sydney: ‘The Germans said they were lying in wait for the troopship Aquitania…’,
Japanese submarine involved, etc.
p. 4022: A letter in the same Daily Mail, 5 June 1998, attributed to Arthur Lane, Stockport,
Cheshire. From a fairly long letter, two statements are relevant.
1. ‘Messages from the engagement were picked up in Tanglin barracks, Singapore
(where I was on duty with the signals section of the Manchester Regiment), and
transmitted to London. The answer came back: ‘Do nothing.’
2. ‘As the Sydney was sinking, she was boarded by German officers who took away
documents including Churchill’s communiqué, which was later transferred to Japanese
intelligence.’
In terms of the current Inquiry, Point 2 is unimportant, as nobody believes it. With regard to
the rest of the letter: in an email on 7 August 2008, Lane told me: ‘I have been a Daily Mail
reader for as long as I can remember, but have no knowledge of such a letter, and I would like
to think that if someone used my name the editor would at least advise me.’
To continue the story of signals possibly picked up at Tanglin Barracks:
Michael Montgomery sent a letter, dated 21 July 1998, to the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry; it
includes the paragraphs: [JPI, Vol. 18, Submission 53B, p. 4463.]
I subsequently had a letter published in a national newspaper here drawing British
attention to the Committee’s existence, which drew the following response from a reader:
On November 19, 19 days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, the Sydney
was attacked by the German raider Kormoran in an action which may have included a
Japanese submarine. Messages from the engagement were picked up in Tanglin
Barracks, Singapore (where I was on duty with the signals section of the Manchester
Regiment), and transmitted to London. The reply came back: ‘Do nothing’.
When I contacted the reader, he confirmed that the signals had been in Morse with the
exception of one in plain language – and an Australian accent, for good measure – which
said, ‘SHE’S GOING DOWN! SHE’S GOING DOWN!’
The mention of ‘Tanglin Barracks’ links this to the Daily Mail letter mentioned above.
According to Montgomery, this ‘clearly refers to the Kormoran rather than the Sydney in
36
SUBM.005.0305
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Barbara Poniewierski
which case it would have read ‘We’re going down’ and as such completely overturns the
accepted German account of her being scuttled hours after the Sydney had disappeared.’ The
finding of the wrecks, their condition and their positions, shows that this is not what happened;
therefore the signal is obviously bogus.
In order to bolster his claims that messages from Sydney were picked up, David Kennedy
cites this example among others:
Also, author Michael Montgomery, whose father Clive was the Royal Navy navigator
on Sydney, was contacted four years ago by a former Singapore army veteran who said
messages he later took to be from Sydney that ‘She's going, she's going’ had been picked
up at the island's Tanglin Barracks and transmitted to London, who replied: ‘Do nothing.’
This was apparently first published in the Geraldton Guardian, and the date suggests that it
was about 2002, but the original paper is not at my disposal, and the website appears to have
been taken down. In any case, it contained nothing new relevant to this particular claim; it
was simply a repetition. Glenys McDonald also mentioned this story briefly in her book, but
did not enlarge on it. However, they no doubt influenced her when she wrote: ‘I believe the
signals picked up in Geraldton did come from Sydney. I believe they prove conclusively that Sydney
was in contact with Singapore and other bases including Kilindini naval radio base in Mombasa.’
[Seeking the Sydney: A Quest for Truth, pp. 198-99.]
It is John Samuels’ book (2006) that has given the most prominence to this story that
signals directly from Sydney were picked up at Singapore. [Somewhere Below, pp. 50-52.]
The gist of the story follows. Lane had allegedly written or said:
I can remember vividly the 19 November 1941… The signals section had that morning
picked up a Japanese coded message which today has become well known as the winds
messages. “Higashi no Kaze Ame”… This message was intercepted and translated by
one of the signallers and then relayed to India…
Later that same day among other messages on the [vocal radio] was one which sounded
like an Australian voice… The voice sounded excited as it repeated “She is going
down”. At the same time that this was happening, he [the radio operator] informed me
that a British warship had sunk a German raider… [Note A]
Samuels claims that Lane wrote that, just a few weeks before Sydney was sunk, he was in the
Botanical Gardens, Singapore, and ‘A group of sailors from the Sydney had formed a singing
group and were singing with the music.’[Note B]
On page 51 of his book, Samuels refers to ‘part of Arthur Lane’s letter’:
Sydney wasn’t under radio silence in Singapore waters. In fact there was an incident.
The same singing lads I’d met at the café on an earlier visit to Singapore (it had to be
them) put out a song over HMAS Sydney’s radio, and they were reprimanded for it by
the shore station and that would have been not much short of 48 hours before she was
sunk. [Note C]
37
SUBM.005.0306
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Barbara Poniewierski
Note A: Again: Sydney did not have the equipment to transmit voice messages. As the loss of
Sydney did not become known until days later, the radio operator was in no position to make
such a comment ‘at the same time’. (The ‘winds message’ was in the diplomatic cipher J19.)
Note B: Sydney was last in Singapore on April 1941, seven months before she was sunk.
Note C: See Note B. From 11 to 19 November, Sydney was plying between Fremantle and her
Sunda Strait rendezvous with HMS Durban and back. She did not have the equipment to
broadcast music over the wireless.
In a second email to me of the same date (7 August), Arthur Lane referred to his book
Lesser Gods Greater Devils (1989), ‘in which there is reference to the Sydney in my
introduction, apart from a copy of this being sent to the enquiry in 1992/3 [sic], this was the
only occasion where the Sydney has ever been put into writing by me.’ On 8 August he wrote
further: ‘I did receive a letter from a John Samuals [sic] and in response I sent him a copy of
my book “Lesser Gods Greater Devils” apart from that I did not furnish him with any written
work or comments.’
However, the website of the National Ex-Services Association contains an article on Sydney
attributed to Arthur Lane; it mentions Samuels’ book ‘Somewhere Below’. There was also a
letter in the POST (Perth, WA), February 25, 2006, to which somebody (presumably but not
necessarily Bret Christian) added the headline: ‘Singapore did get voice messages’. As far as
I know, there was never any question as to whether Singapore could pick up voice signals;
the point is that Sydney could not send them, and that is not addressed. At the time of writing,
this letter was still available on POST’s website, but a copy will be included for preservation
purposes. The letter is attributed to ‘Arthur Lane, Stockport, England’. It contains mention of
similar material to the above: Tanglin barracks, voice message, ‘she’s going down’, etc.
It also says: ‘We conversed with the crew of the MS Rawalpindi before she docked in
Singapore early in 1940 and we contacted the crew when they were under fire and being sunk
by a German raider in 1941.’ Rawalpindi was sunk by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau north of
the Faroe Islands on 23 November 1939. She had not been in Singapore since before the war.
Also on the NESA website is an autobiography of Arthur Lane. It is rather unspecific on
dates, but it states that in mid 1941 he joined 112 STS independent company for training in
jungle warfare at Mersing. He mentions still being there in October-November 1941, but does
not give a date in November when he left this posting. (The POST letter says that he was
based at Tanglin barracks from 1937 to February 1942.) Lane joined the Manchester
Regiment as a ‘boy soldier’ at about fifteen, and was a drummer boy and bugler before
becoming, apparently, a rifleman. It has been stated that he was a signalman, but I can find no
mention in this autobiography that he was trained in signals or telegraphy.
The contradictory statements cannot all be true. Claims by Montgomery, Kennedy,
Samuels and Christian that Lane has said or written this or that must be sorted out,
especially the Statutory Declaration mentioned below. The task should not be left to me.
38
SUBM.005.0307
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Barbara Poniewierski
Perth,
Singapore did get voice messages
Western Australia
February 25, 2006 Some of your correspondents on the Sydney mystery
claim that the Singapore listening posts could not
receive voice messages.
I was based at Tanglin barracks from 1937 until
capitulation in February 1942.
On many occasions when I was off-duty I would sit in
the Tanglin listening post listening to messages being
passed over the airwaves in a number of languages.
On November 19, 1941, I was in the listening post
about the same time that HMAS Sydney was under
attack and distinctly heard a male voice stating, "she is
going down", then repeating the message.
It was only later in a Thai prisoner of war camp that I
learned that Sydney had gone down.
On my return home after the war I was asked to give
this information to the HMAS Sydney investigators.
I can assure you that the listening posts were equipped
for all communication receiving and transmissions.
We conversed with the crew of the MS Rawalpindi
before she docked in Singapore early in 1940 and we
contacted the crew when they were under fire and
being sunk by a German raider in 1941.
We listened to messages in Japanese in November
1941 when the Japanese fleet set sail on her voyage of
destruction and then listened to the wind messages.
There are far too many people spreading untruths
about Singapore, especially those who state that
30,000 Japanese, riding bicycles, took Malaya and
Singapore unopposed.
I know different, I was there.
Arthur Lane
Stockport, England
39
SUBM.005.0308
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Barbara Poniewierski
Perth,
Signal reports deepen mystery
Western Australia
May 12, 2007
News
Time Out
Letters
Write a Letter Classifieds
Search Real Estate Trades & Services Submit About
People in these locations all reported distress calls
from HMAS Sydney - calls that officially were never
made
"From Sydney herself, no word was ever received"these dismissive words were quoted by a 1997 federal
parliamentary inquiry into the sinking of HMAS Sydney.
But like every new twist and turn in this baffling
mystery, things are never as they seem.
The inquiry heard evidence of a number of plain-voice
communications said to have come from the Sydney on
the evening she was sunk.
And with apparent reluctance, the inquiry concluded
that it was possible that unorthodox signals could have
been sent from the ship in her death throes.
But the inquiry exonerated the Australian Navy from
any blame, saying there was no evidence that such
messages were received by the Navy.
40
SUBM.005.0309
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Barbara Poniewierski
The inquiry
seemed most
concerned by
claims that
Australia's
main Navy
listening post
near Canberra,
HMAS
Harman, heard
the ship's
voice distress
calls.
One allegedly
said, "On fire,
abandoning
ship".
But, according
to one
witness, no
further action
was taken.
Four other
witnesses on
duty that night
did not back
up this
evidence.
Fremantle's memorial to HMAS Sydney
depicts women waiting anxiously but
vainly for their menfolk's ship to arrive
home.
HMAS Cerberus, another naval shore base south of
Melbourne, also reported picking up an emergency fleet
code the same night.
Conveniently, "both Harman and Cerberus logs are
missing and there is no documentary evidence to
suggest that signals, either to or from Sydney, were
received", the committee concluded.
Doubt was cast by the committee about reports that
distress calls were heard by HMAS Perth, anchored in
Melbourne's Port Phillip Bay, and from an RAAF base in
Darwin.
The Darwin message reportedly said: "On fire fore and
41
SUBM.005.0310
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Barbara Poniewierski
aft. Preparing to abandon ship".
Alleged HMAS Sydney messages were also heard on a
short-wave radio in the Esplanade Hotel, Geraldton,
and on a household radio by a Port Gregory resident.
The Geraldton message was heard by an RAAF officer
and reported to Fremantle.
The committee liked the evidence of one of HMAS
Harman's WRENS that the Sydney's radio equipment
could only transmit morse code, and that the ship had
no voice radio capability.
Another tantalising character is Arthur Lane, a British
soldier in Singapore who later became a signalman.
He did not give evidence to the inquiry
but has since sworn a statutory declaration that he was
stationed at Singapore's Tanglin Barracks, a British
listening post.
He said HMAS Sydney had a voice radio - he knew
Sydney crewmen and had heard voice transmissions
from their ship while she was in Singapore waters.
Late on December 19, 1941, he heard this message in
an Australian or American accent: "She is going down".
HMAS Sydney had 24 "tele-graphists" on board when
she sank, and radio transmitters in up to three different
locations.
The parliamentary committee agreed that it was
possible that some, possibly untrained, individual
attempted to get off a signal on improvised equipment
after the ship's main radio equipment was put out of
action by the Kormoran's gunfire.
"It is likely that signals...were sent on inappropriate
frequencies or by suspect methods in the hope of
raising some alarm," the committee said.
A clue to the committee's focus is given in its
conclusion on one of the inquiry's most contentious
42
SUBM.005.0311
WIRELESS AND RADIO MESSAGES
Barbara Poniewierski
points, that of signals from HMAS Sydney:
"There is no evidence that the signals were received by
naval or other authorities.
"The committee can find no evidence that signals were
received and were ignored deliberately by the RAN or
by the Admiralty".
The absence of expected written records is a constant
theme that dogs HMAS Sydney researchers.
Soon after the war an inquiry into the ship's sinking
was closed without any significant detail being released.
The POST has had access to hearsay evidence of a
deathbed confession by an ASIO officer who said his
sole job was to collect all documents from around the
time of the sinking that refer to the ship and the
aftermath.
Vital pages are missing from the logs of ships and a
lighthouse, entire log books are missing, shorthand and
tape recordings of an explosive ASIO interview with a
Kormoran crewman have vanished and many other
records have gone missing or are locked in vaults.
Do you have something to say? Write to us and we may
publish your letter next week.
Copyright © 1999 - 2008 Post Newspapers Pty Ltd. All rights
reserved.
43
SUBM.005.0312
10 SEARCH AND INTERROGATION
Barbara Poniewierski
The intention in this section is not to go into detail on the Kormoran lifeboats, the way they were
set out, their struggles to reach the shore; that can be read elsewhere. It will not present the
details of the search, except to note some critical points that have sometimes been overlooked,
and could continue to be overlooked, among the mass of information. Some observations will
be made about the interrogation process and methods, its intentions at the time, and how
confusions arose. Some analysis will be given of how different views on the location of the
battle arose and how some fallacious ones became entrenched. Lastly, there will be some
comments on how the loss of Sydney was handled, and whether lessons were learned from it.
ABANDON SHIP
When the lifeboats and floats left Kormoran, the senior officers or ratings were given the
following information. They were about 120 miles off the coast of Western Australia, which
lay to the east, and the sun rose at 110º and set at 250º. [Bearings: Ahl’s account. 120 miles:
B6121: 164M: Wagner, pp. 207, 228; Bunjes: p. 228] They did not need to know the latitude;
all they needed was to know how to head east; in most of the boats, there were men who
could navigate fairly well by the sun and stars. Some men thought they were near Fremantle.
The geography of South-East Asia, Australia and the Pacific regions was not given a high
priority in German school curricula, and few of the ratings would have heard of Carnarvon or
Geraldton or even of Perth.
The wind blowing strongly from the port side enveloped the starboard amidships in smoke
and flames, making it impossible to launch any boats from starboard. [B6121: 164M: p. 228]
It was difficult to get clear of the hull, and when they did the wind and current tended to carry
them northwards. The floats could do little to help themselves, but it was estimated that the
boats could make shore in about five days, so they rationed whatever water and food they had
on the basis of needing to make them stretch for about seven days. Some people object that
they should have been able to do better than this; others argue that they could not have done
as well as they did. They have little idea of the varied nature of the boats and floats; of their
equipment or lack of it; or of the extent of overcrowding; and they do not appreciate the skill
of some of the senior seamen, particularly but not exclusively the officers. On the other hand,
the floats could do little except try to stay afloat and hope that help would arrive.
One of the boats started to row towards the light of the flames from Sydney, hoping to be
picked up: ‘Survivors pulled towards cruiser which was on fire but before they closed
“Sydney” she disappeared believed sunk.’ [B6121: 165P. P. 386: DNOWA to NB by phone,
2300H/25; p. 383: ACNB to Admiralty, CinC China, 1909Z/25. Flag Cypher.] This sounds
ridiculous in the light of what is known to have happened to Sydney, but the men in the boat
did not know that yet. It was this incident that gave rise to the claim that Kormoran must
have stopped and surrendered, as she lowered a boat that was heading towards Sydney, but it
happened after the battle, not beforehand.
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The first men to be rescued were picked up by Aquitania early on 23 November, the last by
Yandra on 27 November. Two boats had landed on the coast north of Carnarvon, but the men
on individual floats perished, one body being found by Wyrallah.
THE SEARCH
A Combined Operational Intelligence Centre Daily Summary of Operational Intelligence,
dated 12 November 1941, commented at Paragraph 4: ‘Admiralty state that there is now no
evidence of a raider being in the Indian Ocean.’ No later comment on raiders was promulgated.
Whatever Burnett told his crew, and whatever the Admiralty might have known but did not
communicate, that was the most up-to-date information on raiders available to officers in
Fremantle. Therefore it took them several days to become really worried when Sydney did not
arrive at the expected time on the afternoon of 20 November. On that day, the District Naval
Officer, Western Australia, sent Sydney a wireless message concerning the movements of
Duntroon, and the planned escort eastwards. [ACNB signals, MP1074]
On 22-23 November, there was a puzzling exchange of signals. At 0759H/22, COIS (Chief
of Intelligence Staff Sydney?) apparently sent to the Admiralty a report of the sighting of a
suspicious ship. This signal has not been found, but it is mentioned in a reply sent by the
Admiralty (in the Flag Cypher) at 1436Z/23 [2236H/23] to COIS, repeat to Naval Board
(Melbourne) and New Zealand Naval Board. ‘Vessel was not repetition not Raider “C”.
Description appears to fit Raider “G” Number 41, last located in South Atlantic May 1941
with Raider C.’ Apart from the differences in appearance, the Admiralty probably knew by
then that Raider C (Atlantis) had been sunk a few days earlier, but it is odd that they could not
give a later date for the location of Raider G (Kormoran), or did not want to do so. This
report could not have been based on a D/F bearing or a wireless intercept. For there to have
been a description, the vessel to which reference was made must have been seen. Since the
report came from Sydney, but the answer was referred also to New Zealand, the sighting
could have been made by a ship travelling from America to Australia, but passing through
waters of interest to New Zealand. Had some ship seen Kulmerland? She could have been
roughly in that area, and she resembled Raider “G”. Unfortunately, Kulmerland’s log has
disappeared, so it cannot be checked whether she reported contact with another vessel.
The course of deliberations in Fremantle and Melbourne are readily available elsewhere,
but the exact time and wording of this signal may not have been appreciated: ‚Report your
E.T.A. at Fremantle by W/T via a commercial W/T station on 500 M/S and pm 6610 M/S.’ It
was made at 1436Z/23, in Naval Cypher A. That is: at 22.36 Western Australian time.
[B6121: 165P: p. 466] That was about 10.30 in the evening in Perth/Fremantle. It was a
moonless night, and it would have been obviously futile to send out reconnaissance aircraft
until the next morning. Equally obviously the fate of Sydney was not known, which further
undermines Bourne’s claim that he made a search flight on 23 November in response to a
wireless message from Aquitania.
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A statement prepared for ‘the Minister’ (Minister for the Navy, Norman Makin) on
24 November, attributed to Admiral Sir Guy Royle, Chief of Naval Staff, reported that the
RAAF was conducting a search to a depth of 300 miles along Sydney’s probable track. It said
that she should have arrived on the afternoon of 21November. This was incorrect; she should
have arrived on 20 November, but she had been declared overdue since 21 November. He
added: ‘It is most unlikely that she has received instructions from other naval authorities to
proceed outside Australia Station.’ [B6121: 165P: p. 452] This makes the stories that she had
been diverted to check on an alleged submarine highly unlikely; if she had been diverted, the
ACNB should have been notified, but Royle knew nothing about any such order.
At about this time, Wing Commander McLean and Squadron Leader Daniel began to
attend the SWACH office personally to supplement and supervise the Flying Officers who
were usually in charge. On that same afternoon, news began to arrive on which action could
be taken. The following notes have been selected from B6121: 165P, where they are out of
sequence; they have been re-arranged, punctuated and sometimes abridged. The originals
messages are in all capital letters.
Abbreviations: 1st N. M.: First Naval Member, Admiral Sir Guy Royle; he was on the point of
leaving for Singapore.
2nd N.M.: Second Naval Member, Commodore W. J. Durnford.
D.C.N.S.: Deputy Chief of Naval Staff: Captain F. E. Getting.
D.N.I.: Director of Naval Intelligence. Commander Long; he was absent in Singapore.
M. of N.: Minister for the Navy: Norman Makin.
DNOWA : District Naval Officer Western Australia: Captain C. Farquhar-Smith.
C.Z.M.: Commandant der Zeemacht (Admiral Helfrich in Batavia).
C. Recs.: Controller of Records.
ACH: Area Combined Headquarters.
CWR: Central War Room.
A.F. Cypher: Anglo-French Cypher; used when a message was to be sent or copied to C.Z.M.
who did not hold the secret British naval cyphers.
(R): Repeat.
TOO: Time of Origin.
Tpr: Teleprinter.
P/L: Plain language. W/T: Wireless Telegraphy
L/T: Line Telegraphy.
1500H/24 [p. 436]: Trocas reported at 0700Z/24 (1500H/24) that seamen had been picked up.
(From the available records, it seems that Singapore did not notify the ACNB until 2232H on
24 November. The first notification from VIN Geraldton has not been found.)
1616H/24 [p. 451]: 24 November From C.inC. China to A.C.N.B. TOO: 0816Z/24 Code X.
(This is recorded on a form marked ‘IMMEDIATE’, with ‘MOST’ added by hand.) [p. 451]
‘Following received from SS Myroca [overwritten: Trocas] at 0700Z for Zebra today Monday
begins. Picked up 25 German naval men floating raft require naval guard immediately.
Position 24º06’ South 111º40’ East. [Position repeated.]’
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1441H/24 [p. 450]: 24 November: From N.B. to Coonawarra, Harman, D,N.O.W.A.
0841Z/24 W/T. Naval Code K.
‘W/T stations to cease calling H.M.A.S. “Sydney”. D.N.O.W.A. inform Perth Radio.’ [The
typed initials at the top, WD. Indicate that this was authorised by Durnford.]
1740H/24 [p. 447]: 24 November: From CWR to ACH Fremantle: 0940Z/24. By hand. P.L.
‘Cancel your Z7 24th November.’
[Abridged: This messages cancels previous search arrangements and orders new searches to
commence at daylight on 25 November. Object: locate HMAS Sydney or ship’s boats.
Aircraft to start from Geraldton and land at Carnarvon. The new search areas run from 22º00’
to 29º56’South, and from 108º53’ to 114º48’ East.]
1852H/24 [p. 446]: 24 November: From ACNB to Trocas: 1052Z/24. Beam. MN (R)
‘Report by W/T details of engagement and name of ship from which survivors were rescued.’
2014H/24 [p. 444]: 24 November From ACNB to Hermion: 1214GMT/24. Beam. MN (R)
Table “B”.
‘Proceed with all despatch to position 24 degrees 06 minutes S 111 degrees 40 minutes E
[position repeated] and pick up survivors. Break W/T silence to report situation.”
2057H/24 [p. 445]: 24 November: From ACNB to Pan Europe, Saidja, Herstein, Sunetta,
Centaur. 1257Z/24. W/T/ M.N. (R/c)
[Instruction to other ships by a different method to pass through the above position and keep
lookout for survivors.]
2112H [p. 442]: 24 November: From ACNB to CZM (R) C.inC East Indies, RACAS, C.inC
China. 1312Z/24. W/T. Anglo-French cypher.
‘British tanker Trocas picked up 25 German naval men floating on a raft [same position].
Consider connected H.M.A.S. Sydney. Please cancel air search. Necessary action will be
taken from Australia.’ [This was to cancel a proposed Dutch air search.]
2232H/24 [p. 437]: 24 November: From C.inC China to Admiralty, C.inC E.I., ACNB.
1432Z/24 W/T. Code (X)
‘ACNB’s 0617: 24th following received from S.S. Trocas at 0700Z today Monday begins.
[Message as above. ‘Confirmed Trocas should have been in this position.’]
2245H/24 [p. 436]: 24 November: From C.inC China to C.Z.M. (R) A.C.N.B. in AngloFrench Cypher: TOO 1445Z/24:
‘A.C.N.B. 0645 24th. S.S. “Trocas” reported at 0700Z 24th November begins “Picked up 24th
November naval men floating raft. Require guard immediately. Position 024º6’ South 111º40’
East. Ends.’ Distribution: 1st N.M., 2nd N.M., D.C.N.S., D.N.I., M. of N., C. Recs.
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2333H/24 [p. 465]: 24 November: NB to C in C China: Cable, Naval Cypher A: 23/11:
1533Z/23. (0133K/25)
‘Request time and position in which H.M.A.S. “Sydney” parted company with H.M.S.
“Durban” after handing over “Zealandia”.’
0100H/25 [p. 431]: 24 November: From DNOWA to NB: 1700Z/24
‘Received from “Trocas” via VIN. [Geraldton wireless] Found raft with 25 German seamen
in 024º6’ 111º4’. Said from Comoron sunk by cruiser.
[Notice must have been received earlier.]
2300H/25 [p. 386]: 25 November: From DNOWA to Naval Board. 1500Z/25. P.L Phone.
[Preliminary message from Carnarvon: Survivors number about 110. – Inserted by hand later:
‘German’ – mostly 70 miles north of Carnarvon. Germans are from a raider. Commenced
engagement with a British ship “Perth” class which began 19th November 120 miles S.W. of
Fremantle. At midnight raider blew up. Germans rowed towards light of vessel which was in
flames. Before they arrived British ship disappeared believed sunk. They turned and ran with
the wind to land. Police in charge of prisoners. One prisoner arriving midnight. Will report
immediately. May they be transferred by vessel arriving Carnarvon 26th November. ]
[Since the boat that rowed towards the cruiser was one that later reached land, it must have
been the one of which CPO Köhn was in charge.]
0325H/26 [p. 382]: 26 November: From DNOWA to Naval Board: 1925Z/25: L.T. Naval
Cypher A.
[This reports the results of the interrogation of Wireless Operator Linke, whom the RAAF
delivered by road, arriving in Carnarvon at 0250 on 26 November. It states correctly that the
battle took place at about 26ºS 111ºE, but incorrectly that the raider had 8-inch guns and a
crew of 300, and that the battle commences at 1730H. [It should have been 1730G. The
difference did not really matter any more. It was only of historical interest.]
0309H/26 [p. 383]: 25 November: From ACNB to Admiralty, C.inC China. 1909Z/25
(0509K/26) W.T. Naval Cypher (Flag)
[This was the first notification from Melbourne to London with details that resembled the
facts to some extent, but the only person yet interviewed was Linke.].
1140H/26 [p. 374]: 26 November: From ACNB to Tromp (R) ACH Fremantle, CWR, CZM.
0340Z/26. (1340K) Anglo French Code.
Sydney was in action with German raider in position 26 degrees south 111 degrees east at
1730 H/19. Raider sank. Survivors of raider report Sydney last seen burning amidship and
aft. Australian aircraft and 4 naval vessels will be in the area of the action. C.Z.M. has been
asked to cover by air search the possibility of Sydney proceeding at slow speed to Singapore
or Sourabaya. Two lifeboats from raider landed 50 miles north of Carnarvon
With the signals arranged by time to sort out the sequence in which information was
obtained and forwarded, it becomes easier to understand what was going on in the minds of
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the officers ashore who were organising the search. By the end of November, the time for
physical action was over and the mind games began. The Skl had cause to wonder what had
happened to its auxiliary cruiser, but until about 24 or 25 November it was still sending
messages to Kormoran. It was a few more days before it decrypted a message from ACNB to
the Admiralty. The activities in Melbourne were more purposeful, but equally futile. It was
suspected that there was a supply ship not too far away, and it was hoped that it might be
possible to waylay it, although there was now no really battle-worthy vessel on the western
coast. To maintain for a while longer the fiction that there still was, the ACNB arranged for
dummy messages to be sent as though to Sydney. On 28 November, ACNB sent at message to
New Zealand: ‘Messages with delivery groups for HMAS “Sydney” will be dummies but will
not bear delivery group for dummy messages.’ [From a compilation of messages regarding
Sydney, taken from MP1074]
This sort of attempted wireless deception could not last long, for the loss of Sydney had to
be announced, but it was delayed as long as possible. On 1 December George L. Macandie,
Secretary to the Naval Board since 1919, wrote that the raider might have been meeting
another raider or a supply ship, which might be compelled to break wireless silence to report
that the rendezvous had been missed, therefore it was considered that the date and place of
the action should not be revealed until it was certain the this information had already got out
of Australia. [B6121: 165P: p. 46]
Just one small detail needs to be added regarding a lifebelt allegedly picked up by
Evagoras: I was wrong about this, and so has everybody else been.
2016H/27 [B6121: 165P: p. 286]: 27 November: From SWACH to CWR. (1216Z/27) By
hand. P/L.
‘Ship Evagoras reports to aircraft at 1135/27 having picked up RAN lifebelt in position
2306S 1104E.’
1409H/4 [B6121: 165P: p. 14]: 4 December: SWACH to CWR. (0609Z4) N Cypher A.
‘Investigations now reveal that Evagoras(Brit) did not (R) not pick up a life belt. Wyrallah
(Brit) picked up one life belt which was apparently the only one recovered.’
An entry in the SWACH War Diary, p. 149, for Friday, 5 December, confirms transmission
of this signal. However, when the initial reports on the loss of Sydney were being written, this
correction was overlooked, so it went into history that Evagoras had picked up a life belt.
This is not important in itself, but some deductions are significant. For example: there was no
reason to falsify such a trivial detail, which indicates that where there are discrepancies in
records it may be the result of somebody’s error, rather than of a plot. It also highlights the
unreliability of attempts made at hindcasting to discover the position of the battle, as it is not
established beyond doubt how accurate the initial reports were.
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INTERROGATIONS
The next step was to interrogate the Kormoran survivors in order to establish what had
happened, and to gain information to avoid a repetition. There have been complaints that the
interrogations were superficial, inadequate and incompetent. (There is a section of the
conspiracy cliques that will allow anybody – naval officer, politician or historian – to be
called incompetent, as long as it is not Burnett.) Soon after the war, a letter was published in a
paper in Western Australia asking why the navy did not interrogate the Germans about what
had happened to Sydney. The armchair admirals are still making the same complaint, but the
story was revealed long ago, and asking the same people the same questions is not going to
be very fruitful.
Admiral Crace (Rear Admiral Commanding Australia Squadron = RACAS) wrote in his
diary for 28 November that ‘from all accounts the interrogation has been very good’. [Diary
is in the Churchill College Archives, University of Cambridge.] In theory, they could have been
better. The naval officers conducting the interviews were not specially trained interrogators;
they could not understand German and had to work through interpreters, which gave their
subjects too much time to stall while they thought of an answer; they had little knowledge of
German naval procedure and customs. This would not have happened in Britain, where the
interrogators were properly trained specialists, linguists who lived and breathed the
atmosphere of the German navy; moreover, there were often dossiers available.
Moreover, there were few facilities available in Western Australia. There was no way of
making audio recordings of interrogations, so the taking of notes was slow and disruptive.
There were no stenographers, so there were no verbatim transcripts, only brief notes, and not
even the original notes, only those typed up by typists who found it difficult to read the
handwriting of the officers or interpreters and could not spell the German names and terms.
There are obvious errors; just because a report says that some prisoner is alleged to have said
something does not mean that this is what he meant to say. Second-guessing is fraught with
hazard, but some things stand out as peculiar. Some people have taken these eccentricities as
being the truth, while everybody else was lying. It is more likely that they are errors, but it is
sometimes a hard call. Still, one way and another, they obtained all the information that was
operationally necessary about what had happened to Sydney and where to conduct the aerial
and sea searches, even if it does not always satisfy the curiosity of historians
The first report came from an amateurish attempt aboard Trocas, as the information was
wanted quickly. The men had been picked up from a rubber raft on 24 November, and were in
fairly bad shape already. There were no officers among them. The attempts on board produced
some information and some misinformation, the latter including the allegation that Chief
Petty Officer Engineer Rudolph Lensch had said that Sydney had lowered a boat. [Lensch was
promoted to Sub-Lieutenant to date from 1 September 1942, but was not notified until 27 May
1943.] It was said later that he ‘refused to repeat’ this statement, but it is doubtful whether he
had said that at all, or whether the interrogator just thought that this was what he had said.
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The next interrogation was that of Linke, in the early hours of Wednesday, 26 November,
by a person not readily identifiable. It was then arranged for ‘a Naval Intelligence Officer &
Interpreter’ to be flown to Carnarvon by Gannet, leaving Pearce at 0300H that morning; it
would be light enough to land by the time it reached Carnarvon. [SWACH War Diary, p. 113]
It was Lieutenant-Commander J. L. Rycroft who flew to Carnarvon, but if it is true, as Glenys
McDonald writes [p. 80], that he was a fluent German speaker, an interpreter might not have
been necessary, although uses could still have been found for him. (I have not been able to
find anything in currently available records to show whether Rycroft could or could not speak
German, but as he needed an interpreter at Harvey Camp, I do not think he did.) By 1300
hours, he had conducted preliminary interrogations and submitted a brief report.
Linke had been in the boat that landed at the 17 Mile Well; the Germans did not know this
name: they just called it ‘Köhn’s boat’, in which CPO Köhn was the senior Petty Officer.
Likewise, they did not know the name Red Bluff, but referred to ‘Bretschneider’s boat’ or
‘Meyer’s boat’. It is impossible to work out in full who was in which boat, as they referred to
the distances from Carnarvon of their landing places fairly randomly as 50 or 80 miles. None
had had the opportunity to see the odometers of the trucks, at either the beginning or the end
of the trip to Carnarvon, and they could estimate the distance only by the time it took.
Because of the nature of the track, the matching of time to distance did not work very well.
However, even Australian authorities mentioned the distances at anything from 40 to 90
miles. It did not matter much to them, except when civilians (including police) wanted to
claim a petrol allowance from the navy.
The location where survivors had landed caused intrinsic difficulties. Roads were poor,
being little better than bush tracks. Carnarvon, at that time, was little more than a village, a
supply port for an agricultural hinterland. Shortly before dawn on 28 November, after
inspecting Centaur, which had recently arrived, Rycroft reported his problems to the Naval
Board. [B6121: 165P: p. 160, 0419H/28; Shore Code.] There were 103 prisoners from the two
boats ashore; and Centaur had brought 60 more and another 72 were expected by Yandra.
The captain of Centaur was refusing to take them unless a stronger guard could be provided.
It would have been impracticable to separate each boatload, unless the ship discharged in
Carnarvon cargo that was destined for Fremantle, and then fifty guards would be insufficient.
Besides, two groups had already been mixed in Carnarvon. He asked for permission to put
the ratings in No. 2 cargo hold, and the officers in No. 3 between decks, both those spaces
being empty. Under those circumstances, the guards would be sufficient. Some people
complain that no attempt was made to separate different groups, and they were able to
collude to concoct a story. That which could be done under the circumstances was done.
There were still three groups that had not been in contact: those in Aquitania, Koolinda and
Trocas; there were no officers in any of these groups. Aboard Yandra, Gösseln and Bunjes
had been separated from the ratings and from each other. In addition, Rycroft removed
Detmers and Foerster from the group and sent them to Perth by road. That would have to be
enough.
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General instructions were given for the interrogation procedure, and a list of question to
which answers were needed was supplied. Those who had to that point been segregated were
kept segregated, and not all were in Harvey, so that the men did not know until considerably
later how many of the crew had been saved. Those who had already been questioned were not
allowed to return to the same hut until questioning of all men in that hut was finished. Some
who were thought to have knowledge of particular value were kept isolated in detention for a
while, overnight or up to a week. It is noticeable, when reading through the interrogation
reports, that men with the same type of duties tended to be in the same hut, for they had been
friends aboard ship, so they had left in the same lifeboat and they remained together. That
was particularly noticeable in the case of the telegraphists, many of whom had been in
Köhn’s boat. It was little use asking men questions about anything outside their own work,
for they knew little; in fact, it could be detrimental, because they would then invent an
answer, and it went into records that way. After about a fortnight, it was decided that ordinary
questioning was of no further use. Interrogators reported that the ratings knew little and the
officers would not talk. That was not entirely true, for they had obtained, one way and
another, about all the information that was necessary.
Later, microphones were put into what had been intended as a camp hospital, and the officers
were quartered there for a few weeks before going to Dhurringile; as far as can be ascertained,
no microphones were installed in Dhurringile. The work of monitoring conversations was
supervised by Captain J. L. Hehir. Apparently they were neither recorded nor transcribed; any
information relevant to the battle or the raider operations was noted and inserted into reports
with the notations ‘S.M.’ (Special Means). Equipment existed at that time to make such
recordings, but it was cumbersome, and it was scarce in Australia. Apparently it was not
considered worthwhile to continue for very long. In the camp for the ratings, there were no
microphones, but there were a few ‘stool pigeons’; at least, there was definitely one, who
made a report that I saw but could not find again. Various other devious means of obtaining
information were tried, but the solidarity of the crew was breached when the merchant
seamen were declared combatants, and men from German merchant ships sunk or captured
around the world were transferred into the same camp. (These included a lot of the prisoners
aboard Dunera; not all those aboard this ship were Jewish refugees.) There were several
regular informants among the merchant seamen, and a good few gossips.
In Sydney, Captain Farncomb took over the interrogation of the men from Aquitania. He
did a fairly superficial, perfunctory job, and six of them were not questioned at all, but the
information he gained was confirmatory of that obtained in Western Australia. He referred to
them as mostly ‘an unpleasant lot, dirty and unkempt’. [B6121: 165P: p. 33.] What did he expect
under the circumstances? His comment does not support claims that they were clean-shaven,
and contradicts Montagu’s assertion: ‘Another important issue is the German survivors when
rescued by Australian were all dressed in shore leave clothing…’ [Montagu, p. 15]
The results obtained by the interrogations have been mentioned in other appropriate
sections (wireless, aircraft, LS-boat, etc.), but First Officer Foerster said one tantalising thing
on 1 December, for it might have related to the possibility of a future action. His statement
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was recorded as: ‘Captain told him eight or ten days before the action that a Supply Ship was
due.’ [B5121: 165P: p. 288] This was one time when a full transcript would have been useful.
The two words ‘the action’ were struck through. Had he meant that the captain would always
tell him eight to ten days prior to a rendezvous with a supply ship? Or did he really mean that
he had been told, about a week before the action, that another supply ship was due?
This was a possible interpretation. In fact, Portland was outward bound from Germany to
Japan. Messages were being sent to U-boats along the way to avoid attacks in certain areas,
and D/F showed that these avoidance zones were moving southwards along the west coast of
Africa, so presumably the ship was too. As Kormoran needed a few items of equipment that
could not be supplied from Japan, it is possible that these were aboard Portland; in fact, one
website specifically states that Portland was to supply Kormoran. No official confirmation of
this has been found. The fact that ‘the action’ was struck through indicates that it was
interpreted in Melbourne as meaning that he had been notified of the supply rendezvous with
Kulmerland about eight to ten days before that one took place. In any case, it was too late to
prevent release of the news; it had been in the daily papers that morning.
The reports submitted on the basis of the interrogations were a mixed bunch. Those of any
length were all wrong in part, and some were particularly inaccurate, but though they are the
stuff of nightmares for historians they would have made no difference to operations. Nobody
got the whole story entirely correct; the best that can be done is to whittle away at the margin
for error.
One source made public in late 1945 has been taken as fairly authentic, because it was a
translation of the diary of an officer, the Administrative Officer Bretschneider, but it is wrong
in several places. It was translated by Allan Leslie and published in The Mail, 27 October
1945. Kormoran certainly did not have the four 37mm Pak that he claims. There never was a
raider called ‘Frigga’; by his description of her cruise, he probably meant Komet, but it is
unknown where this name originated. It was unlikely to have been for reasons of secrecy, as
he named other raiders correctly. The location of the battle was given as 650 miles west by
south of Carnarvon; this is unique, and is possibly a misreading of a figure by the translator.
The statement that Sydney was 1700 to 1200 metres is probably a translator’s error, a German
figure 1 being read as a 7. No document can be trusted totally, and oral statements are even
more unreliable, especially at a distance of time, but in the end, when enough material has
been examine and tested, some sort of reasonable judgment can usually be made.
The Battle Site:
Sextant readings were entered in the War Diary for noon each day, and in the Engine Room
log morning and evening. Few men aboard Kormoran really knew the location of their ship
except very approximately. The noon reading would not necessarily always have been known
to all the officers. Detmers, Meyer, Dr Wagner, the watch officer on duty, the Chief Engineer,
some of the telegraphists and a few others would always have known. Officers who wanted to
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know could have found out, but at midday on Wednesday, 19 November, it was just another
day at the office. Not even that, for it was a holiday.
We know now where the wrecks were found, and the battle must have been near those
locations. The locations can be kept in mind as we trace what was known or thought possible
at various times.
Kormoran was found at 1730 (WA time; 0930 GMT) on 12 March 2008
At position
26º05’49.4”S 111º04’27.5”E
At a depth of 2,500 metres.
12.2 nautical miles to the south-east was
Sydney, found
at 1103 (WA time; 0303 GMT) on 16 March 2008
At position
26º14’37”S 111º13’03”E
At a depth of 2,468 metres.
Both are given as approximately ‘207 kilometres (128 miles)’ west of Steep Point on the
coast of Western Australia, the most westerly point of the Australian mainland. (Cape
Inscription, being on Dirk Hartog Island, does not count.) The above details are taken from
the site ‘HMAS SYDNEY II Search – Press Room. The full story of the search is at:
http://presspass.findingsydney.com/
The closest published estimate seems to be the ‘revised Kirsner’ position of 26º 01’ ± 5’ S
111º 16’ ± 3’E, for the battle, not for where the ships might had steamed or drifted afterwards.
An earlier estimate, known as the ‘Kirsner-Dunn’ position, was 26º15’º 111ºE. On his
website, Whittaker commented: ‘Appears to be based on the assumption that the German
survivors told the truth about the location of the battle. The evidence is that Detmers gave a
False position.’ He adds that the JPI report estimated 26º32-34’S 111ºE, saying: ‘The
Committee appeared to have overlooked the fact that a battle in the vicinity of 26S, 111E
could NOT have been observed from the shore.’ And Whittaker overlooked the fact that the
claims that the battle was seen from the shore had no firm basis. In fact, the evidence is that
Whittaker simply has no idea of how evaluate information.
Some people have complained that, for the wrecks to be found so soon after the search
began, the navy must have known all along where they were, and have kept the knowledge
hidden. Of course they knew, approximately: that is, within about thirty miles. The problem
has been that these are often very same people who complained that the true site was a
hundred or more miles away. The extreme range of claims for the alleged battle site varies by
this much:
Latitude:
24ºS (John Montagu)
to 28º38.39’S (Knight/Whittaker)
Longitude:
108º42’E (James Eagles)
to 113º32’E (Glenys McDonald)
[See JPIR: Chapter 8, Table 8.1. McDonald rejected an earlier estimate of 28º8’S 114º5’E. p. 61.]
For an account of previous abortive amateur searches and some rather dodgy dealings, see the
website of the Western Australian Maritime Museum – Maritime Archaeology Publications:
http://www.museum.wa.gov.au/collections/maritime/march/publications.asp
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Then go to Publication 230: HMAS Sydney search chronology. This can be read online and
printed out.
At ca 1705G, Kormoran sent the QQQQ signals gave the location of the ship as 26ºS
111ºE. This must have been rounded-off, for in the time between then and the first shot,
Kormoran would have travelled about another seven miles. At 1705, she would still have
been a little east of the exact position. Michael Montgomery introduced the claim that this
signal must have been false, giving a different position so that Sydney would race off to the
ship that was sending the message. [Who Sank the Sydney?, 1981 edition, pp. 116-17.] The
discovery of the wrecks has proven that he was wrong about this, as about so many other
things. However, these signals remained unknown ashore until about 29 November. Thus the
first information about the location of the battle had to come from interrogation of Kormoran
survivors. This is the sequence of statements made in November and December 1941
concerning the location.
SWACH War Diary: p. 103: Monday, 24 November: [Out of sequence, squeezed in at bottom
of page] 1900: D.N.O. received telephone message from DCNS advising Tanker “Trocas”
had picked up 25 German Naval ratings on a raft in position 24º06’S 111º40.’ E 24/11.
B6121: 165P: p. 440: 24 November: From CWR to ACH Fremantle. 1320Z/24 (2120H) By
Hand. P.L. Action approx. 25ºS 110º20’E.
SWACH: p. 105: Tuesday, 25 November: Appreciate action took place approximately 19/11
in approximate position 25ºS 110º20’E.
B6121: 164M: p. 241: Signal, Tuesday, 25 November: from DNOWA: 1935Z/25. Battle at
1730H, Wednesday 19 November, position 26ºS 111ºE. [In fact, 1730G, 1830H]
B6121: 165P: p. 378: Wednesday, 26 November 1941: From ACNB to CZM, C.inC China,
C.inC East Indies. 0016Z/26 (0816H) W/T. Anglo-French cypher. Sydney was in action with
German raider Komoran reputed 8 inch guns in position 026 degrees south 111 degrees east
at 1730H/19.
B6121: 165P: p. 374: 26 November 1941: From ACNB to Tromp (R) ACH Fremantle, CWR,
CZM. 0340Z/26. (1140H, 1340K) Anglo French Code. Sydney was in action with German
raider in position 26 degrees south 111 degrees east at 1730H/19. Raider sank. Survivors of
raider report Sydney last seen burning amidships and aft. 2 lifeboats landed 50 miles north of
Carnarvon.
SWACH: p. 114: 26 November: 0250Z: Signal received from Pearce by phone: From W/Cdr
Lightfoot. Interviewed one member of crew W/T operator name LINCKE [sic]. Wed 19th
Nov about 1730 hours pos 26ºS 111ºE …
B6121: 165P: p. 344: 26 November: From DNOWA to NB: 1530Z/26 (2330H) L.T.
N Cypher (C). Navigating officer [Meyer]: 27ºSouth 111ºEast.
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SWACH: p. 132: Thursday, 27 November: 0058Z: Raider Captain can confirm previous
report with addition action took place 26 deg. 32 Mins south long., 111 degrees. “Sydney”s
two torpedoes missed. Raider torpedo hit forward & salvo amidships. Sydney badly on fire.
Action began 19th at 1600 broke off at 1830. Raider struck in engine room & on fire.
“Sydney” last seen turning behind smoke screen bearing 153 degrees 5 miles from Raider and
steering south 5 knots. 1315Z/27. (2115H)
MP1074: Friday, 28 November: From S.O.(I) Wellington to Achilles, Leander, Resident Naval
Officer Suva. 0532Z/28 (1332H =1732M) Sydney sank raider, not heard of since. 26º S 111E.
B6121: 165P: p. 135: 28 November: From Secretary, Department of Navy, to Secretary,
Naval Board, for Governor-General, Prime Minister, Minister for the Navy, Mr Shedden.
[TOO 1115; Zone time not stated]
‘The raider captain confirms the previous reports with the addition that the action took place
in latitude 26º, longitude 111º. He states that “SYDNEY’s” two torpedoes missed.’
[See Teleprinter Message reproduced at the end of this section.]
B6121: 164M: p. 286: Monday, 1 December: Wilhelm Bunjes: When cruiser was sighted,
about 120 miles from coast, 26º S 111º E.
B6121: 164M: p. 353: 1 December: Interrogation, Karl Ropers (from Trocas; always
separated from main group and from officers): Position 26ºS 111ºE.
B6121: 164M: p. 46: (Interrogation, Hut 30, Harvey, 8 December) Linke, Hans Gerard [sic]:
Sent out two QQ messages (600m, 500 kc) before battle. No acknowledgement. 3-4 minutes
before battle. 26ºS 111ºE given as position.
B6121: 164M: p. 48: Pachmann (after night in cell): (Hut 30, Harvey, 9 December) On
meeting Cruiser, sent two messages. QQ Position 111E 26S – about ten minutes before
opening fire. QQQQ 111E 26S 1100 GMT Straat Malakka. Sent twice.
With regard to the reports that the latitude was 25º or 27º, one must take into account the
possibility of a typist’s error, or an enciphering error, but these locations may well have been
given when the persons being questioned had just come out of the lifeboats. It must also be
realised that Detmers was concentrating on the battle between the two ships; the persons who
should have been noting where the ship was going were Meyer, Gösseln and Jürgensen. Some
of the telegraphists knew the position given in the QQQQ signal, but few others, rating or
officer, would have had much of an idea.
Detmers wrote in the German edition of his book [p. 222]: ‘Ich entschloss mich, bei der
ersten Gelegenheit die Position des Gefechtes zu nennen, damit die Suche in die richtige
Richtung verlegt würde.’ (I decided to give the position of the battle at the first opportunity,
so that the search could be carried out in the right direction.) On 28 November 1941, he gave
the location as 26ºS 111ºE; he gave the same location in the enciphered ‘diary’, and in the
steganographic report in the dictionary.
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In November 1941, the exact position was irrelevant to either Germans or Australians,
except for determining the search area. The precise location had only historical interest. Some
people have alleged that Detmers did not want the wrecks investigated, as that would reveal a
different story about the action, so he gave the wrong position for the battle, without regard
for the consequences to his men. However, the Australians had no thought of looking for the
wrecks. The idea of locating or photographing the wreck would have seemed as fantastic as
the idea of landing a man on the moon. That was then.
Glenys McDonald writes [p. 181]: ‘[It] is not unreasonable to consider the Germans did
not want their ship found and gave a coded position’. In fact, this is quite unreasonable, for it
would not have entered their heads that the ship might be ‘found’, as there was no technology
to find a ship at that depth at that time.
Greg Bathgate writes that Detmers’ ‘official’ position was fictitious, and there was a
compelling argument concerning ‘the deliberate misrepresentation of the position in order to
negate the possibility of Kormoran ever being found’. [p. 129] ‘On learning there were no
survivors, [Detmers] was at liberty to declare the false position in much deeper water in order
to detract from any future search attempt in case Sydney had sunk at shallow depths. The false
position also attests to Detmers’ bona fides regarding the description of the engagement.’ [p.
147] The above objection also applies here: why should it have crossed anyone’s mind that
the Sydney would be ‘found’ in the sense that Bathgate means?
My book, published in 1984 (p. 227), gave the Detmers’ Diary site at 111ºE 26ºS (AAAEBFS).
One translator had assumed that AAA was a meaningless filler, and Michael Montgomery
interpreted the remaining EBFS as the call sign of a Norwegian vessel. In a map my book, the
site that I indicated was a bit too far north-west, largely due to overestimating the rate of the
current to which Kormoran would have been subjected; precision did not seem terribly
important. When there was a prospect of a search, I worked through the material again and
gave my estimate to McCarthy. I lost my copy, and forget what it was, but it was probably
still too far north by about a third of a degree. I did not wish to submit a position to the JPI,
nor to David Mearns, as I was reluctant to take responsibility for influencing the expenditure
of so much money.
We know now both where the wrecks are, and what the Kormoran crew said about the
position. Note that few of them said anything, because they had not known where they were.
Let us now move on to what others have claimed. Some of the attempts to estimate the
position were intelligent and based on valid information, and it is unfortunate that some of the
intelligent attempts produced results about as bad as the seriously crazy ones. I shall not
comment on the serious attempts that were fairly close to the mark; I shall analyse only some
that were way out, and one, by Bathgate, that was not very far off the mark, even though in
most other respects his book was seriously flawed.
In G. Hermon Gill’s ‘official’ history, which was not so much ‘official’ as ‘authorised’,
there is a map at p. 455 showing the approximate location of the battle. The relative positions
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seem to be fairly accurate, but lining up the location with the latitude and longitude markings
around the edges indicates a position of about 26º35’S 110º40’E. This is a little too far south
and east, but within the general area. Critics and conspiracy theory proponents carp that the
short time required for Geosounder to find the wrecks indicates that the navy already knew
where they were. As mentioned above, they did know fairly closely; the irony is that the
people who made this complaint were the very same people who alleged that the position
given by the navy was wrong and indicated some sort of cover-up.
The ‘KDLS’ site put forward by Lindsay Charles Knight and T. Warren Whittaker has been
discussed in the section on conspiracies, along with electron spin resonance and ‘map dowsing’.
They claimed to have found Kormoran and Sydney, 95 nautical miles apart, about 160 nm
south of the ‘popular’ position. Knight even claimed he had identified human bones inside the
wreck. [See McDonald, p. 165 re article by Carmelo Amalfi in the West Australian, July 2001
and the dodgy nature of Knight’s claims.] The site submitted to the JPI for the location of the
Kormoran wreck was 28º38.39’S 113º 21.86’E. On his website, Whittaker commented on this
location: ‘KDLS location is supported by Oral records, Archival records and Navigational
analysis.’ In fact it was supported only by Knight’s imagination and Whittaker’s naiveté.
David Kennedy reported that Hans Linke had said that Sydney was heading west after the
battle, but later said it was heading north-west. [JPI, Vol. 9, Submission 66B, p. 2036.] In
fact, Linke was not much of a navigator, and on a moonless light, with the smoke of his
burning ship obscuring the stars, it would not have been easy to maintain a sense of direction.
Kormoran had turned from a westerly course to a southerly course during the battle. When
the engines failed, she was at the mercy of the wind and current, but was probably facing bow
more or less to the west. Linke could not have judged in what direction Sydney was heading
unless he knew which way his own vessel was pointing. Kennedy adds that a former RAN
deputy hydrographer (to wit, Commander Reginald John Hardstaff) put Sydney 13 nautical
miles north-west of Kormoran. We now have evidence that Linke was wrong, and so was
Hardstaff, despite his rank and position. He gave the following positions:
26º42.30’S
26º28.28’S
26º38.7’S
111º46.8’E
111º32.6’E
111º 41.9’E
The action position.
Sydney wreck.
Kormoran wreck.
These locations are not very far wrong, although there are several objections. One is that he
accepts somebody’s claim – maybe the Kennedy-Linke claim – that Sydney was heading
north-west after the battle. Another is that, considering the many variables of wind and
current, trying to attain such a degree precision was simply pointless. Whittaker dismisses
Hardstaff’s calculations loftily with the comment; ‘Location is on the drift vector. Currents
and leeway appear to have been underestimated.’
For several reasons, Glenys McDonald tenaciously advocated a location that was quite
wrong. While I do some interviews for atmosphere and attitudes, I do not do many for factual
information, as I find it rather embarrassing to be having afternoon tea with some quite
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charming person while knowing for certain that what I am being told is false, and wondering
whether (s)he is deluded or lying. McDonald diligently interviewed people who had been
living along the coast south of Carnarvon in 1941 and traced people who had been involved
in various incidents, or who had talked to other people who claimed to have been involved.
Many of their claims were second or third hand, and some she found to be false, but she still
reached some false and untenable conclusions, such as the ‘third lifeboat’ in the Port Gregory
area, or the origin of flotsam washed up along the beaches, and in particular, the position of
the battle. In her submission to the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry she estimated this as being
28ºS 113º32’E. [JPI, Vol. 1, Submission 26, pp. 174-75.] Whittaker comments: ‘Oral records
are consistent with a battle west of the Abrolhos Islands when low level ducts are taken into
account.’ He did not support the position she estimated, although he supported the claims by
people from the Northampton-Port Gregory region that they saw the glow of fires or
explosions from the battle, for extending the line of sight could have placed the battle in the
Abrolhos area, (Whittaker comments on his web site: ‘The Committee appeared to have
overlooked the fact that a battle in the vicinity of 26S, 111E could NOT have been observed
from the shore.’ Sorry, but almost all of that which was allegedly observed from the shore
was almost certainly not the battle.)
McDonald partly reconsidered this position as a result of a well-intentioned drift card
experiment that she conducted with John Bye and Roslyn Page. From the results of this quite
respectable experiment, the conclusion was drawn that Sydney sank at 29º30’S 113º30’E,
west of the Abrolhos, and Kormoran sank at 28º30’S 113º30’E; this is over 190 miles from
the site where the wrecks were found. [McDonald, p. 144.] So what went wrong with this
honest academic investigation? It may eventually contribute something to the understanding
of the erratic currents off the coast of Western Australia, but as far as helping to locate the
wrecks of the two ships it was not only a waste of time, money and effort, but also very
misleading. The currents and wind forces operating on drift cards floating on the surface
would have been very different from those affecting the movement either of things that lay
deep in the water, or of things that projected well above the water. (Bathgate, even though his
book is crazy in other respects, worked this out more systematically.) Other naval officers and
academics came up with similarly erroneous positions.
McDonald mentions the submission by Lieutenant-Commander Alex Hawes from the mine
hunter Huon and claims that his assessment was that the battle position was within three
nautical miles of Bye’s because of the ‘sound and light’ seen from Port Gregory. [McDonald,
p. 157. (Port Gregory is at approximately 28º11’S 114º14’E.)] I cannot find this precise
statement in his submission, but it contains several suggestions in that general area, and he
states his choice: ‘If I am correct, the wrecks lay [sic] in less than sixty metres of water, with
the SYDNEY eight miles SSW of the Kormoran, still making for the safety of Geraldton
Harbour.’ [JPI Vol. 19, Submission 196, p. 4624. How would going SSW have taken Sydney
to Geraldton?] Hawes states that he was dux of the practical phase of the ‘Long Navigation’
course in 1993 [p. 4622], so one must assume that his mathematics and seamanship are very
good; the fault in his reasoning must lie elsewhere, perhaps in his knowledge of history and
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wartime procedures, and certainly in part in the readiness with which he trusted in gossip and
reminiscences, and perhaps because he was a shipmate of McDonald’s son, David. [p. 4623]
This brings us to Lieutenant-Commander David McDonald, also a specialist navigator,
who was consulted by his mother. [p. 169] She asked him to work out Sydney’s position at
1600 hours at 17 knots and 21 knots. From that very moment, things started to go wrong. He
calculated that Sydney would have made a visual sighting in the vicinity of Christmas Island,
and would then have maintained a nearly coastal transit for the remainder of the voyage.
Therefore the meeting at 4.55H would have put Sydney in the vicinity of Shoal Point, Port
Gregory. [McDonald, p. 182.] His calculations founder on the fact that he apparently knows
nothing about wartime tactics and diversionary routes. Vessels did not take the shortest
routes, because that was where raiders would most likely be looking for them. They did not
take routes close to the coast, because of the danger from mines. One such diversionary route
was approximately longitude 111º East, straight up and down for quite a long way, and
Sydney might well have been checking this area.
David McDonald’s paper on the topic supported his mother’s claims as to the general area,
but not the precise location. He homes in on two locations. He calls 26ºS 111º E ‘Position 1’,
and decides on 27º51’S 112º01’E as ‘Position 2’. He writes that Von Gosseln and Detmers
could not have sighted Aquitania if the point of origin of their lifeboats was Position 1: ‘The
transit of Detmers and Von Gosseln (lifeboats) correlates with the calculated set and rate if
the point of origin is considered to be in the vicinity of position 2 but not if the point of origin
is position 1.’ [McDonald, p. 184] That might well have been true if she had been on her normal
peacetime route, but she should have been on the diversionary course allocated to her in
Singapore (Route 15/20), so this reasoning has no foundation. He contends that conditions
precluded a point of origin from the German position, and supported a point of origin in the
vicinity of 27º51’S 112º01’E. This view was allegedly supported by Captain Bruce Kafer, the
Navy Hydrographer. [p. 169]
This result delighted Glenys McDonald, for it appeared to validate the coastal position and
her suspicion that Detmers, in his Action Report, gave some sort of coded position. She
writes: ‘I believed then as now, that oral history shows that the Port Gregory location played
a role in the battle. I believe this role was initially covered up by either ineptitude or design
and was lost to archives… Because it was lost, the evidence I presented was inconclusive and
impossible to prove…’ [p. 171] This evidence was not ‘lost’; it never existed, because the
event to which it would have referred did not happen. Having been aboard the Geosounder,
she no doubt ‘now’ no longer believes this, for she is not one of the crazy conspiracy cranks,
but unfortunately books continue to influence people long after their authors have changed
their minds, so this book had to be analysed.
Since the side-scan sonar search by Geosounder and the subsequent ROV filming of the
wrecks of Sydney and Kormoran, almost everybody has given up on alternative positions for
the battle and the locations of the two wrecks. The most notable hold-out is James Eagles,
who has been putting a lot of effort into proving that the findings are not genuine. [For details
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of his claims before the findings, see the section on Conspiracies.] From his submission to the
JPI, dated 28 December 1997, some of his justification for his bizarre claims can be found.
He refers to a statement by Prime Minister John Curtin on the ‘3rd or 4th of December’ in
which he said that the battle had taken place 300 miles west of Carnarvon, ‘but on the 4th of
December he also signed a Cabinet Minute on the 4th of December 1941 stating the position
of the battle was in position 25 Deg South 111 Deg East, which is the position (pretty much)
as given by the German captain (about 160 - 180 miles SW of Carnarvon.’ [JPI, Vol. 6,
Submission 42A, pp. 1301-05.] He goes on to speculate:
That leaves us with the situation of the Prime Minister having signed a document
giving one position and a public statement on the same day giving a completely
different one. It seems to me there are three options, he deceived the public and the
world, he deceived the Cabinet, or the Latitude and Longitude in the cabinet minute
supplied by the Navy (?) was considered by him to be the position 300 miles west of
Carnarvon… That leaves us with the Navy supplying misleading information to the
Prime Minister… it appears that the Navy has indeed, been party to an ongoing plan of
misleading everyone about this matter. [p. 1302]
The answer to the ‘three options’ query is simply ‘None of the above’. Curtin had no idea of
navigation, and he obviously did not have time to read interrogation reports. The officers who
compiled the reports – probably different ones in each case – probably did their best, using
different sets of source material, but they were all still only interim reports giving their best
estimates, and neither of Curtin’s statements was correct. ‘The Navy’ is not a many-headed
hydra of a creature; it consists of individuals going about their work independently, and not
necessarily sharing the same information base. Eagles did a lot of ‘Chartwork’, with lines
hither and yon from Carnarvon, but he would have done them on a flat chart. He writes:
The correct battle site is then obtained by drawing a direct line from Fremantle which
was SYDNEY’s last port, and Cocos Island, which was EMDEN’S last port of call, and
this line cuts the East-West line at exactly 300 n.m. west from the town of Carnarvon.
This gives us a position for the battle site planned by Detmers at 24.54 South 108.42
East – not just 300 miles West of Carnarvon, but exactly 300 n.m. due West of Carnarvon,
exactly where everyone said it had taken place. [JPI, Vol. 15, Submission 42C, p. 3611]
Taking into account that the earth is an oblate spheroid, it would be found that the position is
not exactly 300 nautical miles from Carnarvon. It is approximately 270 nautical miles, or 310
Statute miles. And it is not exactly due west (270º) of Carnarvon; it is at 268º75’. So the
mystique of his deduction collapses. Why did Eagles not do his measurements correctly?
[These measurements can be checked automatically on a very useful website: ‘Aviation
Formulary V1.43’. Site: http://williams.best.vwh.net/avform.htm#flat. This site is designed
for aviation and is of no use for plotting distances and courses at sea if there is a hunk of land
between points being checked. For open ocean plotting it is splendid.]
The position Eagles has worked out is so far out to sea that he had to invent some device
that would account for the lifeboats that landed on the coast and the scatter of debris. The
only one that came to mind was the LS-boat, which he duly had towing the boats towards the
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coast before being scuttled. However, he cannot account for what it used for fuel over that
distance, apart from other technical and human problems. He reiterates his claim in a later
submission, July 1998: ‘The position given by Detmers is a fabrication, which the navy
accepted and adopted in 1941 and refuse to admit that they have known it to be wrong ever
since. The correct position was known in 1941, that the battle took place 300 miles west of
Carnarvon.’ [JPI Vol. 16, Submission 42D, p. 3989]
After investing some twelve years of his life and so much emotional energy into this claim,
Eagles has been trying desperately to prove that the wrecks discovered are not those of
Sydney and Kormoran, and that those who make this claim are lying or duped. Probably he
will continue to ‘refuse to admit’ that he is the one who has been wrong all along, because he
simply cannot face the truth.
Let us now get out a chart, rulers, protractors and dividers and see what happens if we work
from the assumption that Detmers might have been telling the truth about the position of the
action to the best of his knowledge. The noon sextant reading for Kormoran was 26ºS 111º
34’E. From here they travelled in a straight line on a course that was given by Detmers as
25º, by Meyer as 24º and by Bunjes as 20º. My money would be on the Navigator, Meyer. So
let’s say 24º. They were travelling at 11 knots, with the wind from the south-south-east at
strength 3 to 4, and a moderate swell from the south-west. They maintained this speed and
heading until at least 15.55, probably for another few minutes, as the ship on the horizon
might have been a merchant vessel that he could attack. Factor in the estimated effect of the
wind and a current probably about 1 to 2 knots.
Then we have the turn to port to a course of 250º; that is, somewhat south of due west
(270º), proceeding at ‘Full speed’, which would have been between 15 and 17 knots. Then, at
an unknown time not long after 16.00, one of the engines failed and the speed dropped to 14
knots. The time taken to repair the damage is not recorded exactly, but it does not matter, as
Kormoran remained at 14 knots, for that would allow Sydney to close the gap more quickly. It
stayed on this course at this speed for one hour until the QQQQ message was sent at 17.00 as
26ºS 111ºE, then for another half hour, until battle was joined at 17.30. This will, not coincide
exactly with the position where the wrecks were found, but it will be in the general area.
(Take into consideration that the effect of current and wind from the south-east on a ship
travelling on heading 24º will be different from the effect on one travelling on 250º.)
Do some complementary calculations for the movements of Sydney. At ca 16.00, she was
20-25 miles from Kormoran, at a true bearing of 20º. When she turned to chase the stranger,
she would have increased speed fairly quickly, but not instantaneously, and her final speed
could have been from 28 knots to 30+ knots. Say, a rough closing rate of 15 miles per hour.
Never mind whether Burnett would have or should have come within about 1,000 yards of
Kormoran; could he have done so? That will depend on how one fiddles with the possible
variables of current and speed.
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During a battle, exact movements cannot be plotted exactly enough quickly enough;
diagrams of ships in action give a general idea, but the log books are likely to say: ‘Course
and speed as required’. After about ten minutes from the opening of fire, we have Kormoran,
her engines out of action, drifting for some six hours propelled only by the wind and currents.
The battle must have been further south-east than her wreck was found; possibly five miles
further south, and three or four miles east. Sydney was heading south-east for perhaps two or
three hours, initially at about five knots, later possibly almost dead in the water.
These calculations are fascinating and frustrating and they cannot be conclusive, but it does
not take much logic or good will to see that, within the limits of what he could have known,
Detmers might have been approximately correct.
Conclusion:
The critical question remains unsolved, and probably always will remain so. What made
Burnett’s act as he did?
Kormoran had not surrendered, and even if she had, greater precautions should still
have been taken.
Kormoran did not entice Sydney to approach by giving the secret call sign of Straat
Malakka, because she did not know it, the claims by James Eagles notwithstanding.
Sydney was not necessarily preparing to board, because a boat would have been
swung out if the aircraft was to be launched.
All Sydney’s 6-inch guns were manned, but she was not fully at Action Stations, or
there would not have been men leaning on the railings, whether they were pantrymen or
something else. Her secondary armament was almost certainly not manned, or these guns
could have fired before Kormoran’s first shells hit: perhaps not before the 3.7 Pak and
the 20mm anti-aircraft guns, but these could not have hit all Sydney’s secondary weapons
quickly enough to put them all out of action if they had been ready. There would also
not have been men running to try to reach these guns after the beginning of the action.
Whatever Burnett might have said to his crew to pep them up, did he really believe that there
might be a raider in the area? Did he believe that there was not, or did he simply have no
idea? (No reflection on Burnett; he could only form opinions based on the information with
which he was supplied.)
There is nothing in the COIC Daily Summaries for October-November that could be
construed as giving warning of a raider in the Indian Ocean, although they give a lot of
information about raiders in the Pacific.
There is nothing in the SWACH War Diary to give the impression that there really
was a raider in the vicinity, although there were some false alarms that were resolved
satisfactorily.
Nothing has been found to date in the packs of wireless signals sent to Sydney.
If Burnett did receive some sort of indication that there could have been a raider around, it is
difficult to see from what source it emanated, and through what channel it could have been
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forwarded. There seem to be only two other possible sources: the COIC Weekly Reports and
the signal packs of general messages sent to all warships on Australia Station. The Weekly
Reports are not available to me, and the other signal packs would take a lot of time to search.
It was unfortunate that the Director of Naval Intelligence, Commander Long was away at this
critical time. The last time he signed a COIC Daily Summary before leaving for Sydney, the
East Indies and Singapore was on 1 November; the first one he signed on his return was 2
December, although he had returned to Melbourne several days earlier.
While it is obvious that the COIC was receiving information from the Far East Combined
Bureau in Singapore working on Japanese messages, there is nothing to indicate that copies
of any Ultra messages (from the Admiralty) were being sent to Australia during Long’s
absence, as there was probably nobody else in Australia authorised to handle them.
Tom Frame writes: ‘That no other ship was lost in the same circumstances as Sydney
during the war suggests that the Navy learned all there was to learn from her loss.” [Frame,
p. xv] In fact, what it ‘suggests’ is that there was hardly a German raider at sea, and none of
them happened to meet a surface warship. It could easily have happened again.
(Thor made a second successful trip under Günther Gumprich, and blew up in Yokohama as
the result of an accident. Michel made a cruise under Hellmuth von Ruckteschell and reached
Japan, where he fell ill, so that Michel’s Pacific cruise was commanded by Gumprich; the
ship was torpedoed by an American submarine a few days before returning to Japan. Stier
was sunk in the Atlantic by an American Liberty ship with a single gun; this was as unlikely
an occurrence as the sinking of a cruiser by a raider.)
My wireless officer friend from Ramses had gone out to Japan aboard Doggerbank on the
trip during which she laid mines successfully off the coast of Africa. (How Doggerbank –
formerly Speybank, which had been captured by Atlantis – was for legal reasons transformed
into a warship with a naval crew for a few weeks, then back to a merchant ship, is interesting,
but out of place here.) On 13 March 1942, while they were about to proceed with minelaying, they were challenged by the RN cruiser Durban; Doggerbank identified herself as
Levernbank; the pretence being helped by the fact that she was a genuine Bank Line vessel.
Krüger had the ‘last message’ ready to send, and the confidential books stowed in a weighted
bag ready to be dumped overboard. Durban closed to six miles, then made off without asking
for her secret call sign and apparently without checking on whether Levernbank should have
been in the area. The next day they identified themselves as Inverbank when challenged by
the Armed Merchant Cruiser Cheshire, which closed to three miles under almost identical
circumstances before heading off. The Doggerbank crew simply could not believe it; if the
RN had learned anything, they had not passed it on to all their captains. If they had been as
heavily armed as Kormoran, they could well have blown Cheshire out of the water. (Krüger
had a row with Captain Paul Schneidewind and had himself transferred before Doggerbank
set out on her doomed voyage homewards.)
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There is a website that gives the name of the German ship in these two encounters as Thor.
I cannot think why. Thor would have been a pathetic match for a Bank ship. [This is on Ahoy
– Mac’s Web Log, ‘Marauders of the Sea’.]
One point that has caused controversy is the decision not to release details of the loss of
Sydney fairly soon after the war, when there was apparently no imminent danger of another
war. (Except with the Soviet Union.) Lieutenant-Commander Arthur George Monteith
considered whether the information should be released, and on 17 October 1945 presented a
note setting out five reasons why it would not be advisable. Long initialled it on 18 October.
On the same day, Lieutenant-Commander G. Hermon Gill commented: ‘Even if the proposed
account were published, it would not be accepted as final. Indeed, in many minds there will
never be any finality in the matter, and I imagine that “Sydney” will take her place with
“Marie Celeste” and “Waratah”, whatever is written.’ [B6121: 165P, pp. 209-10] When the
letter was typed up for Long to sign, Point 4 of Monteith’s reasons for not publishing had
been removed: ‘[It] would be derogatory to the Service in that it infers that the “Sydney” was
far from being alert.’
The matter rested there. All three men were on the point of leaving the navy. Monteith was
discharged on 13 November, Gill on 14 November, and Long on 13 December. The new DNI,
Arthur Stanley Storey, did not show any evident interest in re-opening the topic.
One final point should be borne in mind regarding Detmers’ accounts of events: a stroke
that crippled him so badly was likely to have affected his memory as well. Years after my
book was written, I questioned some of the crew on this point. They said that, if this was so,
it was not noticeable, and he still remembered every member of the crew by name. The action
reports in his ‘cipher diary’ and in the dictionary were composed before his stroke. The book
was written more than ten years afterwards. The German edition acknowledges the
collaboration of Jochen Brennecke, a noted author; but I found, when I checked with officers,
including Admiral Rogge, that even in his fairly sober histories Brennecke had invented not
only conversations but also events. Some of Detmers’ book clearly stems from Brennecke’s
imagination; some corresponds with Detmers’ pre-stroke accounts. In many cases, however, it
is impossible to be sure. Was the fictitious boarding of Eurylochus a Brennecke invention, or
a failure of Detmers’ memory?
Some of those who disagree with the ‘official’ story of the battle are less ready to accept that
Burnett made a mistake than to claim that all the Germans were liars and war criminals, and all
Australian naval and Government persons who came into contact in any way with the story
were incompetent, lying dupes. This mind-set is not only unreasonable and unjust; it is quite
sad. In a submission to the previous Inquiry, I wrote: ‘Are there any more brainstorms out
there? Please, please produce them now and not wait until 2008 to start it all up again.’ [Vol.
10, Submission 36B; p. 2290.] I was joking; I did not realise how true this would be.
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The fanciful stories that bodies from Sydney were found and reports suppressed are mainly of
three types.
1: That Laurence Snook performed an autopsy on a decomposing body that was
wearing a lifebelt marked ‘Sydney’.
2: That the lighthouse tender Cape Otway discovered a field of floating bodies.
3: That there are or were bodies buried along the coast near Shark Bay.
First, however, a mention of a body that genuinely was that of a crew member of HMAS
Sydney, as I wrote in my book in 1984. [Barbara Winter, HMAS SYDNEY: Fact, Fantasy and
Fraud, 1984, Boolarong, Spring Hill (Brisbane), pp. 240-41.] This contradicted the claim in
Gill’s official history. [G. Hermon Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942, 1957, Australian
War Memorial, Canberra, pp 459-60] Gill based his assertion on information supplied by the
then Director of Naval Intelligence. It is a pity that Commander G. C. Oldham, later aide de
camp to the Governor-General and honorary aide de camp to Her Majesty the Queen, did not
feel that one humble body was worth really serious investigation.
There was no other possible explanation for a body that had arrived in that position, at that
time, on an Australian Carley float that had been under fire, and which had been in the water
for several months, as was indicated by the marine growth on it. I have been accused of
assuming that, because the Christmas Island float ‘could’ have come from Sydney, then it did.
The logic worked the other way around: it was demonstrated that it could not have come
from anywhere else, therefore it must have come from Sydney. It puzzled me that some
people could not understand that, if no other explanation was possible, then the float and the
body had to come from HMAS Sydney. They seem not to understand the principle of logic,
reductio ad absurdum, for any specific claim that it came from elsewhere could be shown to
be false for at least one reason. I would be apprehensive about having them on a jury
evaluating evidence at a trial. The argument as to whether the Christmas Island body should
be exhumed has been resolved. It has been done. Some diehards may still doubt that the body
was that of a member of Sydney crew, and the investigation has not yet been completed.
When the remains had been given a cursory examination, a premature, unofficial and
irresponsible announcement was made that a bullet had been found inside the skull. The
supporters of the claims that Sydney crew were murdered in the water by either the Germans
or Japanese were delighted. To their chagrin, a proper forensic metallurgical examination
showed that it was not a bullet but a small fragment of a shell casing of German manufacture.
Predictably, the conspiracy theorists immediately claimed that this was proof that the ‘coverup’ was still continuing, as it had to be Japanese. Others maintained that, if the man had a
piece of metal in his brain, he would not have lived long enough to get into a float. There are
verified examples of people living for many years with a bullet or a nail or some other
foreign object in the brain. (Russian doctors have made some of the most comprehensive
studies of brain damage, as they had many wounded soldiers as subjects.) It would be helpful
if people who exercise their minds by jumping to conclusions did not offer an opinion until
they had done some research.
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John Samuels goes to market on the Christmas Island body also [Somewhere Below,
especially pages 108-09], his comments there having been largely invalidated by subsequent
discoveries. He writes in addition: ‘Spent bullets are also highly likely to have survived, the
same type and calibre as those in the Christmas Island Carley float. Metallurgy will be able to
prove their Japanese origin.’ [p.144] However, there is no credible analysis of what was
found in the Christmas Island float, while the Carley float in the Australian War Museum
contained only German shell splinters.
On page 105, Samuels draws sinister conclusions (as have others) from the failure to find a
record of a coronial inquiry or inquest concerning the body at Christmas Island. However, the
preservation of inquest records varies from state to state, and period to period. Some in
Victoria and Queensland are well preserved. Most in New South Wales and Western Australia
are not retained, those in WA being destroyed after ten years, unless the situation has changed
recently. Try to find any 1942 inquest in Western Australia. While most autopsies and coronial
inquiries are of little significance, this cavalier treatment of all such records can sometimes be
a great handicap to historians and legal authorities, but it does not have sinister implications.
John Montagu has an original spin on this body. His claim is that Sydney sank first, after
running into a mine in a field laid by Kormoran. Kormoran picked up survivors, who were
locked in cells aboard ship. Two days later, Kormoran was crippled by an explosion of one of
her own mines. He writes: ‘The raiders Kapitan Detmers was sowing the seeds of collusion
and cover-up, in so much as releasing Carley floats recovered from other sinkings including
one of HMAS Sydney’s floats into the ocean with one Australian crewmen’s dead body on
board to fulfil the expectations of survivors off the Australian light cruiser. This Carley float
was released from Kormoran’s deck and was the one washed up on Christmas Island in
February 1942…’ [The Lost Souls and Ghosts of HMAS Sydney II. 1941, p. 188]
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‘Captain’ Snook’s autopsy:
John Samuels (110-11) claims that Laurence Snook told his sisters that he performed an
autopsy on a badly decomposed body that had been wearing a life belt marked HMAS
Sydney, and it is true that they have made some such claim.
There are two holes in this story. The first obvious one is that ‘life belt’ can be used to
mean two different things.
(1) A life buoy, the round thing with a hole in the middle. Yes, they do bear the name of the ship
to which they belong, but they are unlikely to support an unconscious or dead man for long.
(2) A life belt or life jacket, which is worn around the chest; but these do not carry the ship's
name. (The genuine Sydney life belt found by Wyrallah bore only the inscription OTRC 11/39.)
The other takes a bit of work to find. According to the military dossier of Laurence Cecil
Snook, he was born in Meckering, WA, on 13 August 1909, and enlisted in Sydney on 1 June
1940 (NX24732). Now comes the part that will be a little difficult for Samuels or anyone else
to explain away satisfactorily. Snook embarked for the Middle East in Sydney on 19 October
1940. On 27 March 1941, he was transferred to AAMC Tng Wing. (Australian Army Medical
Corps, Training.) On 6 January 1942, while still in the Middle East, he was promoted to
lieutenant, as an Assistant Pathologist. He left the Middle East on 13 March and transhipped
in Bombay to Duntroon. He did not return to Australia until he landed in Adelaide on 23 May
1942. The autopsy could not have been performed until 26 July 1942, when Snook was
transferred to 110 AGH in Western Australia. What reasonable circumstances could have
delayed it so long? Snook left for Bougainville on 13 August 1943. Claims have been made
that Snook’s file was closed to reveal that he had been involved in such an autopsy, but I
found his dossier easily; it is digitised on the National Archives website.
As for Colonel John Adey, Snook’s senior officer, whose file, according to Samuels, is
missing: I found four files on him. His World War I file is digitised and available on Internet;
his World War II file has not yet been examined, as apparently nobody has asked for it. Born
in 1897 at Taunton, England, he served at Gallipoli and was invalided home. He joined the
army again in 1930 (probably the reserve), and was discharged on 1 September 1943.
People have referred to Laurence Snook as ‘Dr Snook’, but he was not a doctor; and he
was not in Australia at a time that would have made this story at all feasible. Scratch another
fable.
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The Cape Otway allegations:
Claims have been made that the lighthouse tender Cape Otway was diverted to search for
lifeboats or rafts from Sydney, but that all she found was a group of bodies, and that this
information has been hidden from the public and expunged from records. There were several
sources for this claim.
This story was first publicised by Michael Montgomery in the second edition of his book,
Who Sank the Sydney? [1983, Cooper, London. In the Penguin edition, 1985, this is on p. 191.]
It came from former Petty Officer Stoker John Hetherington Heazlewood (whom Montgomery
calls ‘Hazlewood’); he was a ‘12-year man’ who had served aboard Sydney until about
September 1941. (Heazlewood: born 8 March 1919, Warrnambool, Victoria; enlisted 4 April
1939; discharged 3 April 1951; died August 1997.) He contacted Montgomery and told him
that, while he had been serving aboard the boom defence vessel Lanikai at Albany, he met
two men who claimed that they were officers from Cape Otway, and that they had found
‘several bodies’ from Sydney, ‘but when they had signalled to naval headquarters they had
been instructed to leave them where they were’. Glenys McDonald fixes the location by
adding that ‘they had sailed amongst bodies against the Zuytdorp Cliffs’. [JPI, Vol. 1,
Submission 26, p. 163] Obviously they could not possibly have said exactly this, as the cliffs
were not given this name until the Zuytdorp wreck was found and identified in the late 1950s.
Heazlewood devoted much time and effort to having the Christmas Island body exhumed
and submitted to forensic examination; his submission to the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry
(1997-99) occupies the whole of Vol. 7, some 300 pages of analysis and correspondence with
authorities. In this submission, he did not mention the Cape Otway story. It was his grandson
Adrian who submitted an account written previously by Jack. In this claimed that, while he
was serving in the boom defence vessel Lanikai in 1942, he was told this story in the
Freemasons’ Hotel in Albany by three unidentified men, who alleged they were the captain
and two officers from Cape Otway. Unfortunately, in his covering letter, Adrian Heazlewood,
with his grandfather’s letter before him, claims they met in a Fremantle Hotel. [JPI, Vol. 8,
Submission 89, pp. 1737-60.]
In a letter to Dr McCarthy at the WA Maritime Museum [Dated 9 May 1994, JPI Vol. 8, p.
1755], Heazlewood wrote that he was in Albany 1943-1945, when he met the officers from
‘Cape Ottway’ [sic], and that a later signal from the navy had said: ‘Leave the area
immediately, resume your normal duties.’ These minor discrepancies do not per se invalidate
the claim, but they illustrate the unreliability of second-hand anecdotes. Was it verified that
these men had really been aboard Cape Otway? Were they perpetrating a tasteless nasty
hoax? Why did they confide their story to a stranger in a hotel and to nobody else? Did
Heazlewood misunderstand them? This cannot be known.
Did Heazlewood ever really know their names? In his letter to McCarthy [9 May 1994] he
wrote that he had been told later that the name of the captain was Aubrey Baddham.
McCarthy wrote back that Aubrey Badman had been Master of Cape Otway from 31 March
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1941, but there is no indication that the men in the hotel gave any names, nor that one of
them was Badman; Heazlewood assumed this from later knowledge. Thus in January 1997,
he wrote to Harold Chesterman (who might at some time have been First Mate of Cape Otway),
saying that he had met Captain Aubrey Badman in Albany in 1943, and asking whether Cape
Otway could have made entries up to 18 November, then no further ones. [JPI, p. 1760]
There is also a claim that the widow of the first mate told how her husband had nightmares
about bodies. [This was obviously not Chesterman.] Adrian Heazlewood writes: ‘I am aware
of the identity of the widow who told my grandfather on a confidential basis the conversation
reported in the penultimate paragraph of my grandfather’s paper.’ [JPI, Vol. 8, Submission 89,
p. 1737: Letter, 13 January 1998] Unfortunately, I have not been able to work out which
paper or letter contains the relevant ‘penultimate paragraph’, as there are several letters, and
none seems appropriate. By context, it would seem to be linked to a paper, ‘HMAS Sydney.
Another View’, presented by Gordon Laffer and Reginald Hardstaff at the 1991 HMAS
Sydney Forum held by the WAMM. In this they claimed that the wife [widow] of the first
mate of Cape Otway, Mrs W. E. Hardman, reported that prior to his death, in his eighties, he
had been hallucinating about bodies in the water before he died. [JPI, Glenys McDonald, Vol.
1, Submission 26, p. 163] This is repeated in McDonald’s book [2005, Footnote, p. 187] with
the name changed to Mrs W. F. Hardmann. Thus the story went from Heazlewood to
Montgomery, thence to Laffer, then to Hardstaff, then to McDonald and Samuels, but it is still
only one story from the same source, no matter how many people repeat it.
A letter that Heazlewood wrote to Ean McDonald on 28 June 1994 raises interesting
questions about his emotional attitude to the Cape Otway case, and makes one wonder about
his general knowledge of maritime matters, despite his twelve years in the navy. [JPI. Vol. 8,
Submission 89, p. 1763-65] He wrote correctly that Cape Otway left Darwin on 17 November
and arrived at Point Cloates on 29 November, working out that she must have spent these
twelve days travelling at an average speed of 4.8 knots, unless – he implies – she was doing
something else. He asked: ‘Do you believe a ship probably the only ship off the north west
coast of Australia, and so near the turmoil and tragedy from the 23rd November, would
dawdle along at four knots? … No signals from the Cape Otway, which could possibly have
been the nearest ship. No signals from the Cape Otway so where was the Cape Otway on
23rd November. Six days out of Darwin, but where?’ [Heazlewood’s emphasis. In fact, Cape
Otway called at Broome and Cossack on 23 November.]
This comment is patent nonsense. Did he not realise that Cape Otway did not travel nonstop from Darwin to Point Cloates (or Carnarvon)? She was doing what a lighthouse tender is
intended to do: providing supplies to lighthouses and servicing navigational lights. One of the
lighthouses at which she had called was obviously Cape Leveque, where she took the
Davidson family aboard; she also called at Broome and Cossack. There are gaps in her log;
there are also gaps in her record card, but not only for November-December 1941. She made
many short stops that are not recorded. On other trips between Darwin and Fremantle, she
was reported as calling at Gantheaume Bay, Port Hedland, Exmouth Gulf, Cape Inscription
and Jurien Bay.
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In the same letter, Heazlewood also asked: ‘One other small thing, on the trip from
Geraldton to Fremantle the Cape Otway called in to a place called North Head. What for? It
doesn’t show in the log but does on the Naval prepared search plans. Maybe that was to drop
the ships [sic] logs off to be taken by hand to Fremantle, who knows?’ In fact, she called at
North Head at the northern edge of Jurien Bay because there was a light there that needed to
be serviced. Heazlewood worked himself up into a frantic lather largely because he did not
take into account what lighthouse tenders do.
He also wrote that, when Trocas picked up 25 sailors about 200 miles north west of
Carnarvon, she sent a signal. – ‘Reports by radio! Shouts it to the world! Is our ship still
crawling along at 4 knots with the air ways screaming for help and activity.’ (The only
stations to pick up the call from the fairly weak wireless aboard Trocas were Singapore and
VIN Geraldton. See section on wireless messages.) He was entitled to his opinions, but it was
a bit thick to say, on the basis of his lack of understanding: ‘The Navy is still getting away
with murder.’
On the other hand, the story that Cape Otway found a lot of bodies (or at least several) has
also been denied credibly. In reply to Heazlewood’s letter, McCarthy wrote on 17 May 1994:
‘There are however, members of the crew who state that the Aubrey Badman story has no
foundation.’ [JPI, Vol. 8, Submission 89, p. 1758] Again, unfortunately, these are not named.
Glenys McDonald interviewed ‘Shirley and Sue’, two of the children of Kempston Davidson
(the Cape Leveque lighthouse keeper) and his wife, Alma. They had been picked up at the
lighthouse and were being taken to the mainland on relief. Aged at the time fifteen and eight,
they both said they had heard (and presumably seen) nothing of the bodies. Nevertheless,
McDonald writes that she believed the Cape Otway story, as there were many independent
sources. [McDonald, p. 190] However, at best only two sources were truly independent; most
were just variations of a few unverified reports. (Cape Leveque lighthouse was north of
Broome; Cape Otway must have called there on 22 November, but the visit is not in records.)
The story that Cape Otway had seen ‘several’ bodies grew until she had allegedly been
churning through a sea full of bodies, as shown in ‘No Survivors’, a Prospero Productions
piece produced for Channel 9 TV, with its unsubstantiated and tasteless segment on a field of
bodies. Some people spoke of fifty bodies, some of more than a hundred.
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Cape Otway’s Recorded Itinerary:
The Cape Otway card in Ship Movements collection shows she was highly mobile, but not all her
contacts with lighthouses are recorded.
Brisbane:
arrived 2318 September 19;
departed 0545 October 8. Remark: Via Lights.
Cleveland:
arrived 2248 October 18;
departed 0001 October 19.
[This is Cleveland Light near Townsville, not Cleveland in Redland near Brisbane.]
Townsville:
arrived 0130 October 19;
departed 0110 October 20.
Cairns:
arrived 2040 October 20;
departed 2000 October 21.
Archer Rd
arrived 0615 October 22;
departed 0654 October 22.
Thursday Island: arrived 0832 October 30;
departed 2100 November 1.
Cape Don
November 15.
Darwin:
arrived 0318 [or 0518] November 12; departed 1025 November 17.
Remark: 8 k. Via [name pencilled in faintly; it says ‘?LIENUM’; should possibly be ‘Lights’.]
Broome:
arrived 0023 November 23;
departed 0610 November 23.
Cossack:
arrived November 23
[No time; departure not entered.]
Geraldton:
arrived 0530 December 3;
departed 1000 December 3.
Remark: 9 k. Via Jurien Bay.
Fremantle:
arrived 2337 December 4;
departed 0933 March 30, 1942.
Remark: 8 1/2 k. Via S'thern lights.
Albany:
arrived 1057 April 4;
departed 0257 April 14. Remark: 8 k. C. Leeuwin.
Fremantle:
arrived 2148 April 15;
departed 1033 May 8.
[Seven mostly illegible words, containing words 'coastal lights']
Cape Otway spent a lot of time calling at lighthouses that did not report her movements to the
navy. The gap in the Movements Card relating to her, 23 November to 3 December, is filled
in partly from other sources:
SWACH War Diary, pp. 140-41: aircraft sighting reports:
30 November, report 0939H:
0306: By phone from Pearce. = Late report from Anson. Saw at Anchor Island at 0239Z/29
ship at anchor was C. Otway. FIG – HG – BK –STN no superstructure aft of funnel giving
island effect to bridge. Flag VJPK. Approx. 2000 tons.
30 November:
0320: From Wirraway at Onslow: sighted trawler, 225º North West Cape 1 mile. Name Cape
Otway, 1000 tons, grey, F? M? British flag steering 235º.
WA Maritime Museum:
1 December, at 1440 hours: Arrived Carnarvon, [JPI, Vol. 8, Submission 89, pp. 1758-59;
McCarthy letter to Heazlewood, 17 May 1994.]
What was Cape Otway doing between 4 December and 30 March? One logical explanation is
that she was slipped and being serviced while the crew took leave, although the time is rather
long unless repairs were extensive. Could she have been sent on some sort of search? Possibly,
but why? That was the business of naval vessels, and her own proper task was too important
to take up months of her time in such an enterprise. Claims that Cape Otway was asked or
ordered to join in the search in November may have some slight foundation, but they have
been misinterpreted.
Glenys McDonald writes that Shirley and Sue Davidson said that, ‘two days out from
Carnarvon, the captain asked their father to decipher a Morse message ordering him to pick
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up a lifeboat with about forty people aboard, and he was not happy with his orders. If the
timing was correct, this would have been on 29 November, by which time the search was
being called off; the last of Kormoran’s lifeboats had been picked up by Yandra on the
morning of 27 November, and no further boats had been sighted by air patrols. (It is a
mystery how it might have been thought that Cape Otway, with its meagre crew and scant
weaponry, could have coped with some forty prisoners, and by that time there were several
small naval units in the area.) She also writes: ‘The Cape Otway was instructed to search
within 5 miles of the coast and appeared to do so.’ [JPI, Vol. 1 Submission 26, p. 162:
(Footnote: HMS Plotting Sheet.)] This may be so, but no date is given, and the search would
not have been for Sydney boats.
The key to this mystery is probably in Naval Board signals records. [B6121: 165P;
digitised on the Archives website.]
p. 159: 28 November 1941: From NB to Evagoras. 0021Z28 (0821H) Beam. MN B
Proceed immediately to 21ºS 130ºE and search for aeroplane.
[Note: This was sent at 0821 in the morning of 29 November, WA time.]
p. 155: 27 November 1941: From NB to DNOWA. L. T. N Cypher A. 0156Z/28 (0956H/29)
My 0021Z/28 to “Evagoras”. “Cape Otway” should also search if in vicinity.
[Note: the date, 27 November, is an obvious error.]
The drama behind this story was that late on 27 November a searching Anson (W2114, Pilot
Flight Lieutenant Harben, Second Pilot Sergeant Burrows) had failed to return from its patrol.
A search was ordered to begin at daylight on 28 November, with at first three Wirraways and
then the remaining serviceable Ansons patrolling the coast from Cape Cuvier to Robe River.
The proposed search by Evagoras and Cape Otway would have been ordered to cover the
possibility that the Anson had gone down in the sea, but the signal to Evagoras (and probably
to Cape Otway) was utter nonsense, if this is the way it was really sent, for 21ºS 130ºE is in
the Northern Territory in the vicinity of the Tanami Desert. A later message was even more
puzzling, for it gave the coordinates as 21ºS 30ºE, which was in the middle of Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe). Even 21ºS 113ºE would not have been much better; it was well outside the
search area, but it least it was in the ocean. Shortly after eight o’clock on the morning of
29 November, it was reported that the Anson had been found on a clay pan on the southern
edge of Exmouth Gulf, having run out of petrol. [SWACH War Diary, pp. 128-132] Thus the
plane had been found before the messages were sent to Evagoras and Cape Otway, and the
content became irrelevant.
Let us see where these claims about Cape Otway and the bodies that it could not have
found have led. One of the more recent accounts comes from John Samuels in his book
Somewhere Below. He has embroidered the story with passionate purple prose befitting a
1930s B-grade weepie.
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‘The lighthouse tender Cape Otway was on station at its usual position off the Zuytdorp
Cliffs…’ [p. 138]
From the section of her itinerary given above, does it look as though she had a ‘usual
position’? Cape Otway was not a ‘lightship’. Her task was to take supplies and relief
personnel to lighthouses and service unmanned lights.
‘On December 12th 1941, the watch aboard Cape Otway sighted bodies floating at the foot of
the cliffs.’ (p. 138)
‘We know that on December 12th 1941 the crew of the lighthouse tender Cape Otway saw
bodies floating in the sea.’ (p. 143)
We know nothing of the kind. If Heazlewood’s informants were really from Cape
Otway, and if they sighted bodies, it was certainly not on 12 December, and highly
unlikely that they were from Sydney. Memory plays strange tricks. Cape Otway arrived
in Fremantle on 4/5 December 1941. She would have had no cause to return north to the
Zuytdorp Cliffs area, which, of course, did not bear that name in 1941. 12 December
seems to be an invention unique to Samuels; at least, the source is not evident.
‘The need to doctor the log stemmed from what the ship's officers recorded, after the search
was over, on December 12th 1941. Cape Otway reported by radio to the Navy that she was on
station and that the bodies were floating at the steps of the Zuytdorp Cliffs. The Navy ordered
the master of the ship to leave the area immediately…So a lighthouse ship charged with
being a life-saving beacon for vulnerable vessels along a stretch of treacherous coastline was
ordered out of the area by the Navy.’ (p. 139)
Bring out another box of tissues. Repeat: Cape Otway was a supply ship. If she was ‘a
life-saving beacon for vulnerable ships’ on that ‘treacherous coastline’, why was she in
Brisbane in September, in Darwin in November 1941 and in Fremantle on 5 December?
‘Cape Otway’s presence and the bodies in the sea sighted by her officers are well established
facts that have been addressed time and time again by other researchers.’ (p. 139)
These are not ‘well-established facts’ at all; they are wide-spread rumours.
John Montagu takes this story to a breath-taking level of inanity when he claims that bodies
from Sydney would have drifted with the current to the Zuytdorp cliffs ‘where the life house
ship Cape Otway was on station’. [The Lost Souls and Ghosts of HMAS Sydney II, p. 87]
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Missing or falsified log books:
It has been claimed that the absence of various log books, and the fact that Cape Otway’s log
(in National Archives at East Victoria Park) ends on 18 November, are evidence that there
was a ‘cover-up’ of her finding of bodies. Michael Montgomery writes that pages of her log
have been cut out [Penguin edition, 1985, pp. 191-92]; others just say that there are no entries
after this. Has an attempt been made to find the log books of other vessels, particularly of the
other lighthouse tenders working at this time? (Cape Leeuwin, Cape York) Records, even
ones that might become important later, are frequently destroyed for reasons of storage space,
or simply lost because somebody was careless.
The Ship Movement card for Cape Otway is available. The Centaur log covering November
1941 is extant, but it makes no mention of picking up survivors, as it was forbidden for
merchant ships to records such items in their log books. Glenys McDonald [p. 126] remarks
that the log of Yandra mentions picking up German survivors, adding: ‘Previously I had been
told that such details would never be recorded in a log.’ Clearly she did not understand that
this order applied to merchant ships, but Yandra was a naval vessel, to which this order did
not apply. However, there would have been no mention of such incidents in the logs of
Centaur, Koolinda, Trocas or Uco, unless they disobeyed orders. Aquitania was a transport
under Government charter, but she appears to have been operating under the regulations for
merchant ships. Cape Otway was a Government-owned vessel, so what there is of her log is
retained in National Archives, which holds Government records, but not necessarily those of
commercial companies, including shipping lines, but she was not a warship, and she should
have been following merchant shipping orders to record nothing operational in her log.
It has also been claimed that the log of Uco, covering the period when she picked up
Kormoran’s QQQQ signal, has been falsified. It had possibly been re-written, or was a fair
copy made of a rough deck log. However, rewriting a text does not necessarily mean that it
has been altered for a deceitful purpose.
The Bodies on the Beach:
The claim that there are scores, maybe hundreds of bodies of sailors from Sydney buried along
coast south of Carnarvon is largely the province of David Angwin. He claims he has signed
statements from soldiers who helped bury the bodies, but he has never produced them. He
digs industriously along the beaches, to the annoyance of local inhabitants and the detriment of
the environment, but it keeps him out of worse mischief. (Angwin has not yet tried to publish
a book, and most material relating to his claims and his style has come from ephemeral blogs
and widely circulated emails.)
The theory was never reasonable, and it has become totally untenable since the discovery
of the wrecks, which proves that the battle did not take place close to shore. That is why,
when the side-scan sonar images were produced, he put forward the claim that the wrecks
were not of Sydney and Kormoran, but of a Dido class RN cruiser and a merchant ship used
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in the Monte Bello atomic tests. When the ROV pictures showed that they were indeed
Sydney and Kormoran, he began to claim that he had found the wreck of a Japanese
submarine about 80 miles away. He does not appear to have explained how he managed that
without any sort of expensive equipment.
One position he puts forward for the hasty mass burial of seamen, some of whom he claims
were wearing lifejackets marked ‘Sydney’, is 26.0395S 113.2107E. Presumably he is using
the decimal system of coordinates, and this converts to approximately 26º 02’ 22” S 113º 12’
39” E. This is weird. By my reckoning and measurements on the best chart available to me,
this is not on the seaward side of Dirk Hartog Island. (This needs to be checked by an expert.)
To reach this point, the bodies would have had to drift through the narrow channel between
Dirk Hartog Island and Steep Point, while his once favoured position near the Zuytdorp Cliffs
is much farther south. Besides that, lifejackets were not marked with the name of the ship; if
they were marked at all, it was more likely to be with the name of the owner.
Angwin uses the term Royal German Marine (abbreviated as RGM) to indicate the German
navy in World War II. The German navy was never ‘royal’; before the Kaiser abdicated, it
was the ‘Imperial’ (Kaiserliche) navy; later it was the ‘Reichsmarine’ or ‘Kriegsmarine’; but
never was it ‘royal’. (Now it is the Bundesmarine.) He sends messages, alternately chummy
and abusive, to all sorts of people, from Tony Blair to Junichiro Koizumi, whom he calls his
‘mate’. He emails copies of these messages to a wide variety of contacts, most of whom want
nothing to do with him. [Several of these emails will be appended at the end of this section.]
While Angwin is the chap working over the beaches with a shovel and sending out weird
emails, there have been other proponents of these claims.
Samuels claims at page 102 of his book: ‘A later chapter will show how both the government
and the citizens of Australia were deceived by means of the most unspeakable crime ever
perpetrated in Australia, one that once proven will send shock waves around the world.’
The world is not so easily shocked, and he fails to prove his case; he presents only
gossip, emotion and hyperbole.
‘Ships do not go down gradually without people abandoning them, and even if those people
do not survive, their corpses rarely vanish.’ [p. 110]
False. It often happens that no bodies are found, even when a ship sinks fairly close to
shore. How many were found from Centaur, which went down almost in sight of
shore? And what of the body of Harold Holt, lost off a beach?
‘A written record of life jackets and flooring timbers from ship’s boats, coming ashore on the
Zuytdorp Cliffs, near the mouth of the Murchison River, exists in the form of a letter written
to the commanding officer of HMAS Moresby, by Reg Harrison of the Naval Association of
Australia, on August 6th 1993…’ [p. 137]
Did he also mention bodies? Is there a positive dating for these findings? Did he
witness something himself or was he just repeating gossip from unidentified sources?
Anybody living along the coast of Western Australia during the war will probably
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remember lots of stuff washing ashore along the beaches. It is in the nature of an
obsession to connect everything in some way to HMAS Sydney.
‘While attached to an army engineers militia unit in Fremantle, the digger had been part of a
small unit raised to go north by road transport on a job which required every man in the unit
to sign an official secrecy document… The exact date is unknown but it was mid December
of 1941.’ [pp. 140-41]
If this is as dodgy as some of Samuels’ other dates, this could extend well into 1942. It
is also open to question whether any such men would have known where they were.
There was no road to the area in 1941, and it is not easily accessible even now. The way
Samuels tells it, there are several men who swear to this event, but the only way to test
whether it could possibly be true, or if it could be connected with Sydney, is to identify
the men concerned and check their service records to see if they were in Western
Australia at the right time.
‘No serviceman should have been asked or ordered to participate in covering up a crime,
which by then the Navy could not afford to explain to the government and the people at
large… Bloated and in advanced states of decomposition were more than fifty grotesque and
distorted cadavers of men who had been Sydney’s crew… They were sent from Fremantle to
the coast near Dirk Hartog Island, where they dug a trench 150 feet long to bury the bodies.’
[p. 141-42] (Elsewhere he identifies the spot as being ‘north of the Zuytdorp Cliffs’.)
Samuels writes that the man’s name cannot be recorded, but his daughter, who dictated
the story to Samuels in October 2003, was prepared to reveal it to a Royal Commission.
The Coles Inquiry has a status similar to that of a Royal Commission, and it is the
perfect opportunity to air this claim, if there is anything in it. Unless they were roped
together, the bodies would have drifted apart at sea; they would not have been all
clumped together on one beach. He writes also that Lieutenant-Commander Vic Jeffery
believes that the army burial party is factual.
(Jeffery claimed in the Naval Historical Review, March 1990, p. 7, that Kormoran had called
at Geraldton while disguised as Seirstad, a Norwegian tanker, and while she had about a
hundred merchant seamen prisoners aboard. He gave no consideration to the amount of
documentation that a ship had to present to port authorities, nor to the wartime controls on
shipping movements. Jeffery’s belief in a theory is no recommendation for it.)
Samuels had another ace up his sleeve. He later claimed that some 150 bodies buried in
unnamed graves in Karrakatta Cemetery near Perth were from Sydney, buried in secret to
cover up something scandalous. Justifiably annoyed, the Cemetery Board said they had
records for all these unmarked graves, which are those of still-born babies or unidentified
vagrants. This claim, aired by Bret Christian in the Post, does not seem to be on permanent
record, and it is totally untenable in consideration of the now known location of the wrecks.
Montagu, after asking a rhetorical question about what happened to the bodies, writes that
they would have drifted with the current to the Zuytdorp cliffs: ‘Bodies 50 decomposed and
bloated were floating around the cliffs [sic] location.’ He writes that a ‘shore patrol’ from Perth
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was sent overland from Perth to bury the bodies on high land above the cliffs…’ [pp. 87-88]
So this is no confirmation of bodies on the beach where Angwin is digging.
Glenys McDonald reports a deathbed confession of a man who told his family that north of
Geraldton he had buried bodies that were later removed by the army. [p. 25] She does not
give the name the informant. [p. 25] She refers to a Bob Cornell, who had a contemporary
who told him about guarding some bodies in a dinghy on the coast [p. 105], but this was not
first-hand evidence, and it is doubtful whether he could have testified to a date. She also
mentions that there were ‘rumours’ of a lifeboat, additional to the two German boats at Red
Bluff and 17 Mile Well, which were guarded by two soldiers at the water’s edge, but there
seems to be no verifiable date, and no names for the soldiers. She also records a mention by
Vic Jeffery at the 1991 Sydney Forum, of a ‘bullet-riddled HMAS Sydney lifeboat … located
in the shallows … about 600 yards south of the Germans’. [p. 55] What is his source and
where is his evidence?
The hidden agenda
People who are unwilling to believe there could be no survivors, nor even a trace of bodies
from Sydney, have perpetuated this Cape Otway myth, but for some there could be a hidden
agenda. Cape Otway was a coast-hugger, and if she found bodies, then the battle must have
taken place closer to the coast than the established position. Samuels [p. 113] claims that this
was so, and he uses the Cape Otway story as a prop. Montagu uses it throughout to support
his claim that Sydney hit a mine laid by Kormoran and sank at 27º04’ S 112º15-30’E.
Glenys McDonald writes that, if bodies from Sydney were located by Cape Otway, it
indicates that Sydney sank closer to the coast than Kormoran. [p. 191] The corollary to this is
that, since it is known now that Sydney did not sink close to the coast, the bodies-on-the-beach
story has lost all credibility. In her book she says: ‘I believe the authorities did eventually locate
the debris field and some bodies from Sydney.’ [p. 201] Having been aboard Geosounder when the
Sydney wreck was found, she may no longer believe this, but people who have read her book may still
do so, for it fits in so nicely with the hypothesis that the battle took place off Port Gregory.
Since the wrecks of both Sydney and Kormoran have been found about 120 miles from the
coast, and in view of their condition, it would need evidence much more persuasive than any
so far presented before the ‘bodies on the beach’ story could credibly be connected with
either ship. The rumours of bodies are persistent, and there may be something in them. Was
there perhaps an unknown Dutch refugee ship lost there in early 1942? A commando
operation or exercise gone wrong? Whether there were bodies from some other vessel present
at some other time might be a matter of interest, but is not relevant to this Inquiry.
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Angwin Emails:
Sent on Friday, January 05, 2007 to Major General William Crews, National President of
the Returned Soldiers League.
-Without Predujice.Hello Bill,
This is David Angwin.
I'm concerned that you are avoiding all contact with me at the moment. Perhaps Legal, rather
than Moral Reasons ? For the Record Bill, - I am personally concerned that you might lack
Moral Fibre.- If you are keen, whats needed here is an envelope, a sixty cent stamp and a
white feather.
I'll do the right thing and put my name on the back ? You'll know its from me. When are you
going to throw your Hat in the Ring Bill ?? Only, if You are Able ?
Without fear or predujice etc et al ?
'645 Men on Board, All Men on Board '
Any time soon is good.
Kind Regards.
David Angwin.
Sent on Wednesday, January 03, 2007, to The Prime Minister Of Britian,
Mr Tony Blair.
Dear Sir,
I hope this e-mail finds you well.
My apologies for hoisting this matter on you.
I wish to notify you on progress made with the Search for the lost HMAS Sydney sunk
without trace on the 19th November 1941 with all hands on board.
To cut a very long story short, the contents of Churchill's Private Papers to the US President
Roosevelt would reveal the Structure to the HMAS Sydney Puzzle. Those papers are
catalouged as " PREM 3 252 / 5 , and PREM 3 252 / 6B; and are to be released in 2011. In
those papers, the Loss of the HMAS Sydney and the upcoming Pearl Harbour attack are
discussed. My understanding is that Churchill had to choose between the Total Destruction of
the British Empire, or the loss of 645 Australians.
--------------------------------------Here are the seven components to the Puzzle.
The UK are reading the IJF codes and parts of the German codes, and re-direct the HMAS
Sydney to engage a RGM Cruiser off the Western Australian Coast. The Original target for
the RGM and IJF is the Troop Ship 'Aquitania". The RGM 'Cruiser' is a disguised Merchant
ship, the Raider HSK Kormoran, and may have opened fire while flying a white flag.
There is an 'attendant axis submarine ' present, and it appears that it was ordered by Tokyo
late in the evening of the 19th November 1941 to sink the distressed Sydney and eliminate
the surviving Crew. That decision may have been made outside of IJF Naval Command
Recommendations
It appears that Captain Detmers of the HSK Kormoran took offence to the un-authorised
sinking and elimination of the HMAS Sydney and sunk the I-67 the next afternoon on the
20th November 1941. It was His Operation.
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It appears that Allied Command -only-, had full awareness of all these events. The AUS FED
GOV and the RAN were told to wait for a Declaration of War , or Notice of Intent from the
IJF. That day by day wait has blown out to 65 years.
As part of the day by day wait, the RAN, RAAF and Australian Army had to bury the bodies
that floated onto the Zuydtorp Cliffs, Steep Point and Dirk Hartog Island. The burials were
meant to be a short term gap response only. 300 plus RAN, RN, RAAF, RGM, IJF and some
Civilians. ' some still in their HMAS Sydney lifebelts ' etc 26-0395 S and 113-2107 E if you
are keen.
Thats what stops the AUS FED GOV from Full Disclosure.
What a mess.
---------------------So Prime Minister Blair, it looks like the UK may have lost the HMAS Sydney. Any chance
of releasing Churchills Private Papers on the Matter to end the grief this is causing.
Have cc'd the others involved etc. No point making it too hard.
Kind Regards from Australia.
David Angwin.
Previous communication, early May, 2006, to Tony Blair.
Hello Prime Minister.
Just a short note to inform you of the latest in the HMAS Sydney saga. It will be 65 years
soon that the Light Cruiser, under the Direct Control of The UK was lost with all hands orf
the Western Australian Coast. The Royal Australian Navy never lost that Ship. The RGM and
the Modern Nation of Germany are in a sticky situation regarding the loss. The Modern
Nation of Japan is in an aweful mess regarding the 'total elimination' of the Ship and are in no
position to even contemplate any more 'loss of face' regarding WW 2. As you may know,
there were seven Royal Navy Personnel on board. The Australian Federal Government, The
Royal Australian Navy, The Returned Soldiers League and The Modern Nation of Germany
are all very-very keen to have the saga carefully unwravelled. Carefully.
I would like to notify you that the finding of the HSK Kormoran is now a viable task. She
theoretically lies in 840metres of water off Dirk Hartog Island. It would be the lessor of the
two evils to find her first. The harsh reality of the 'removal' of the 'Sydney' is lessened by
finding the HSK Kormoran first. 'Plan B', as it is known, allows for time to heal some of the
deep Australian wounds, before finding the 'Sydney' leads to full disclosure. Finding the
'Sydney' will bring about involving 540 million or so Citizens of the Modern World regarding
something that happened in 1941. I have notified the Modern Nation of Germany. I
personally am geared to hold orf till arter the Soccor World Cup.
I am currently 'positioning' the Modern Nation of Germany to 'assist' with the finding of the
'Kormoran'. Thats the best for them in the short and long term. Thats only fair. Its an
Orstralian thing. I need to disclose that I have generated a low level alert regarding the
finding of the HMAS Sydney. The Royal Australian Navy is slightly unhappy with me at the
moment. They have been stuck in a terrible situation for 64 years now regarding this.
Its all a bit sticky. Commodore Bob Trotter RAN [Ret] from the 'Finding Sydney' Group is
the Man with the special key to this all. Please ask Bob about 'Plan B'.
His direct number is +61 8 9261 7749.
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Please call.
Major General William Crews AO [Ret] from the Returned Soldiers Leauge has been
notified. His direct number is +61 02 6248 7199. He is very keen for progress on behalf of
our 240,000 Veterans.
The Governor General Major General Michael Jeffries AO [Ret] is aware and has been
notified. He can be directly contacted through Dianne Callahan regarding this matter on +61
02 6283 3512.
The German Ambassador to Australia, Mr Martin Lutz is aware of proceedings. He can be
contacted regarding this on +61 02 6270 1911.
My Mate Junichiro Koizumi is aware. He is in an aweful position. The Modern Nation of
Japan is still quite insular. There is nothing he can do about it. The Modern Nation of Japan
will need to endure more grief when the 'Sydney' is found. It Her Lot.
In the End, the loss of a 'Perth Type Modified Leander Light Cruiser with its total crew of
645 men isn't much really on the World stage. However, on the 19th November 1941, that
was all we had. Not much really.
Thankyou.
Kind Regards.
David Angwin.
Lest We Forget.
Sent Friday, October 05, 2007 to mailing list:
Subject: HMAS Sydney unmarked Wargrave -prelim survey on Dirk Hartog Island.Update #253
Hello All.
Loading into Shark Bay area tomorrow.
Possibility of three unmarked wargraves on Australian soil containing the long lost mariners.
Prelim survey on Cape Ransonett.
26 " 09 .022' South and 113 " 12.795 ' East
55 Widows left.
629 Royal Australian Navy Families still awaiting the 'killed in action notification '
Keep up the pressure.
David Angwin.
The foregoing emails are just a small sample of Angwin’s peculiar state of mind.
(The telephone numbers beginning ‘+61.02’ are wrong, of course.)
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The story told by one ‘Heinz’ Grossmann was made public about Anzac Day, 1997, when
Pastor Ivan Wittwer, former pastor at Cleve in South Australia, revealed it, claiming he
wanted to clear the Sydney crew, and in particular her captain, of blame for the loss of the
cruiser. His story was carried by the Eyre Peninsula Tribune on 1 May. Wittwer was
descended from a family of German migrants who arrived in South Australia in the early days
of settlement in that state (ca 1840). Graduating from the (Lutheran) Immanuel Seminary
(Adelaide) in 1950, the young pastor was sent at the beginning of 1951 to minister to
German-speaking immigrants working on the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Authority.
[Various issues of the Lutheran Herald, State Library of South Australia; Immigration
records. Wittwer’s Statutory Declaration, dated 14 August 1997, was submitted to the JPI by
John Doohan; it appears in Vol. 9, Submission 99, pp. 2154-56.] According to his story, he
met there a Heinz Grossmann, who had become a representative for German workers because
he spoke good English. Despite knowing that Grossmann was a drunk and a ‘con artist’,
Wittwer let himself be thoroughly ‘conned’. The story is recorded in a number of places: in
the Parliamentary Inquiry in several volumes; by Glenys McDonald (Seeking the Sydney: a
quest for truth, Crawley, WA, University of Western Australia, c 2005, pp. 122-24); by John
Samuels (Somewhere below: the Sydney scandal exposed, Broadway NSW, Halstead, 2005,
pp. 95-98) and by Greg Bathgate (HMAS Sydney 1941 – The Analysis, Boolarong Press,
Salisbury, Qld, 2007, p. 163) Their reports concerning what Grossmann allegedly told
Wittwer are similar, and they will not be attributed individually.
Grossmann’s story, which he told to Wittwer allegedly on 13 May 1951, was that he was
really Gerhardt Grossmann, who had been gunnery officer on Kormoran, but in order to be
allowed into Australia he had assumed the identity of his brother Waldemar Heinz, who had
been killed on the Russian front. [A Waldemar Grossmann was posted missing near Radom in
January 1945. www.volksbund.de This German-language site is fairly complicated, but the
automatic translation into English is so woeful that it is unusable.] He dished up to Wittwer
the story that Sydney had been sunk by a Japanese submarine that was keeping company with
the raider, or lying in wait for Sydney, and had put two torpedoes into her at a distance of 2½
miles. (The finding of the wrecks has conclusively demonstrated the falsity of any claim of
two or three torpedo hits.) The Germans had heard machine gun fire as the submarine set
about destroying lifeboats and survivors.
Wittwer reported the story to a friend in the Canberra police, who passed it to Colonel Spry
of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Representatives were sent to
interview Grossmann in Wittwer’s presence, and a tape recording was made of the interview.
Wittwer was sworn to keep the matter secret for thirty years. Owing to ill health, he left the
Snowy area in 1952, but he heard later that Grossmann had been deported, and he jumped to
the conclusion that this was to prevent him from telling the story of the Japanese submarine
to anyone else.
The affair raised several important questions. First, let us be clear that there was only one
artillery (gunnery) officer aboard Kormoran; that was Oberleutnant Fritz Julius Skeries. Next:
was ‘Heinz Grossmann’ really, as he claimed, Gerhardt Grossmann, crew member of
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Barbara Poniewierski
Kormoran? I doubted it, and quickly established that the genuine Gerhardt Grossmann, born
18 March 1917, had been repatriated by Orontes, leaving Melbourne on 21 January 1947. His
home had been at Oelsnitz im Vogtland, so he had been sent to the Soviet Zone of Germany,
and he was never allowed to leave. He was never an officer, his highest rank being Leading
Seaman. [NAA MP1103/1: PWGA 42014] That satisfied me, but Glenys McDonald (p. 123)
took the matter further. She made contact with his widow, Jenny. They had married in 1948
and they had no children. Gerhardt died in 1986, having never left East Germany. Heinz
Grossmann had told Wittwer that he had been selected as an interpreter for the 1936 Berlin
Olympics because he spoke good English. (To have been chosen to have close contact with
foreigners, he would probably have had solid Nazi credentials, though not necessarily Party
membership.) Neither Gerhardt nor his two brothers, who had also not left Germany, could
speak English, and aboard Kormoran Gerhardt had been associated with the mines, not the
guns. The Heinz working on the SMHA project was not the Gerhardt who had been aboard
Kormoran. Who was he? That does not really matter. What was he? A bare-faced liar.
The Grossmann fraud would hardly have made it into the public arena if the interrogation
by ASIO and a naval officer had been conducted a little more astutely. The interviewers
apparently asked questions about the battle and shipboard life, but made little apparent
attempt to establish whether Grossmann’s claim to have been a member of Kormoran’s crew
was authentic. To establish this, only three questions were necessary:
1. Who were your Divisional Officers? (A seaman who had been aboard the same ship for
a year would not have forgotten this in a lifetime.)
2. What was Kormoran’s Feldpostnummer? (That is: the mailing address number of the
unit to which the serviceman was attached; Kormoran’s FPN was 26823; that was on record.)
3. What was your enlistment number? (Gerhardt Grossmann’s number, recorded on his
POW registration card, which was with Army records and could have been checked, was
N.2879.S38. ‘N’ stood for ‘Nordsee’; it meant that he was intended for service on the high
seas. ‘S’ meant that he was a general seaman, not a technical specialist. ‘38’ indicated
enlistment in 1938. The ‘2879’ was his personal number within these categories. It would
have been difficult, even for somebody who knew the system, to come up with a fake that
would have withstood investigation.)
Resurrecting the story of Grossmann in 2005, Samuels [p. 97] claims straight out: ‘Did
ASIO arrange for his swift deportation? You bet they did.’ No, they did not. In December
1951, Grossmann broke his two-year contract and left his job with the SMHA to take a betterpaid position with the New South Wales Forestry Commission at Batlow, and he encouraged
others to do likewise. On 29 January 1952, the SMHA wrote to the Secretary of the Department
of Labour and National Service regarding Grossmann, describing him as ‘a serious menace to
the Authority’s interests’ and asking that Grossmann and three others (Bartkowski, Lunau and
Neumann) be deported. The Immigration Department arranged that this be done. [NAA
MP1722/1: 1952/47F/1949: German Special Project Workers: absconders, Snowy.]
It might have seemed that Wittwer was simply naïve and a bit gullible in repeating
Grossmann’s claims as factual, and possibly attributing false motives to Government
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Barbara Poniewierski
authorities regarding his deportation, for it was all hearsay, but his Statutory Declaration to
the JPI states that Grossmann gave him this information on 13 May 1951. Records indicate
that the SMHA did not begin recruiting Germans for the project until April 1951, and a
Heinrich Grossmann, aged 44, is on the passenger list for Skaubryn, which left Bremerhaven
on 23 May 1951, and did not arrive in Melbourne until 25 June 1941. [NAA SP908/1:
GERMAN/GROSSMANN HEINRICH. Heinz is to Heinrich as Bob is to Robert or Bill is to
William.) Having been born in 1906 or 1907, he was too young to have served in the army in
World War I, and too old to have been conscripted when military service became compulsory
again, though it would have been surprising if he had not served in some capacity in World
War II. Unless another Heinz or Heinrich Grossmann employed by the SMHA can be located
in records, the most charitable explanation for the discrepancy is that Wittwer’s memory was
not as good as he thought, and that he made a mistake in the date.
This file has not yet been examined and cleared for public access. I discovered it too late to
have it cleared by the time submissions close for the Inquiry. It should give conclusive evidence
as to whether a Heinz (or Heinrich) Grossmann entered Australia for the SMHA before the
Heinrich who arrived on 25 June.
Title: List of Germans who entered Australia as part of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric
Authority "Introduction of German workers" scheme, April to June 1951 [Box 1]
Series number
C1491
Control symbol
N1950/5/10932
Contents date range
1951 - 1951
In a submission to the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry [Vol. 2, Submission 36, p. 322], I wrote
that Wittwer’s ill-will towards the Japanese might have affected his judgment of the situation.
He contradicted this, but earlier in 1997 he had circulated to numerous persons copies of a
letter, in some of which he admitted that it was unchristian to hate people, but he could not
help hating the Japanese because they had tortured a relative of his. This comment was not
included in his official submission to the Inquiry. Whether the feelings influenced his
readiness to believe Grossmann is debatable, but he did harbour such feelings. It also appears
in evidence given by David Kennedy in Sydney on 22 May 1998 before a panel of Joint
Committee of the Parliamentary Inquiry. Kennedy said that he telephoned Wittwer, who in
the course of the interview said ‘how - and as a Christian he feels he should not have had
these feelings – he could have killed the Japanese who killed his cousin or uncle, and how he
was having to struggle against these feelings’. [Hansard Report of Joint Parliamentary
Inquiry, page FADT 460, Transcript of Evidence, 22 May 1998]
The official report states [p. 96]: ‘The sub-committee decided, in view of suggestions made
at the Inquiry, that Pastor Wittwer harboured ill feelings against the Japanese which may have
influenced his reactions.’ Pastor Wittwer described these suggestions as ‘utter rubbish’. There
is another dimension to this. The Wittwer family migrated to South Australia with some of
the earliest German Lutheran migrants; they retained their language and their affinity with
Germany, and this had possibly caused them some hardship during both wars. In view of the
rumours circulating that Sydney crew had been machine-gunned in the water, it was natural
that Pastor Wittwer should seize upon the opportunity to put the blame on anybody else but
the Germans. In any case, this seems clearly to have been the motive behind an article
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produced by the neo-Nazi Adelaide Institute and posted on a website, one which seems to
have been taken down now. They too promoted heavily the ‘Japanese submarine’ myth. [The
Jewish Anti-Defamation League has the Adelaide Institute called before the Supreme Court
and has it ordered to take down websites almost as fast as they appear. The Sydney story
would not have been the reason for taking down a site.]
Bathgate [p. 163] writes that the Grossmann-Wittwer evidence presents an ‘intriguing and
compelling’ argument suggestive of the involvement of a Japanese submarine. It is irrelevant
that this information was submitted to the Inquiry in the form of a Statutory Declaration. A
Statutory Declaration implies only that the person making the statement sincerely believes it;
it does not mean that the statement corresponds with the facts.
Around the time of the earlier Inquiry, ASIO was asked to produce a record of the
interview with Grossmann. When it did not do so, sinister motives were attributed to this.
There is a claim that they said they could not find it, and Bathgate [p. 163] says that ASIO
would neither confirm nor deny that the interview had taken place, which should be taken as
‘affirmative parlance’. However, ASIO routinely destroys obviously useless files, and this
was useless, because Heinz Grossmann was Heinrich Grossmann, not Gerhardt, and knew
nothing about Sydney or Kormoran except gossip that he picked up in Australia. On the other
hand, it might be useful to ask ASIO and the Department of Immigration to check to see if
they have records for a Heinrich Grossmann.
Bathgate continues, writing that Grossmann’s declaration was probably sincere if he was a
crew member, and if he was not, there must have been a motive for making such a statement,
and authorities would take steps to silence the source of such sensitive information if it
conflicted with the official version. He says that the truth of Grossmann’s attempt to expose
Japanese involvement should become evident on inspection of the wreck when Sydney is
found. Well, Sydney has been found and photographed, and it is the falsity of Grossmann’s
statements and the gullibility of those who have been promoting them as truth that have
become evident. There was just one torpedo strike on Sydney, exactly where the Germans
said she had been hit, and there was no indication of Japanese involvement.
John Samuels has written [p. 98]: ‘Whether or not he was the real Kormoran survivor, he
had a damaging story to tell.’ Why does Samuels not see that, if Grossmann was a fake, his
whole story is irrelevant? I would not have taken up so much space expounding the background
to this silly story, except that some people have apparently found it difficult to understand a
factual exposition. The care taken by Samuels in producing this story is indicated by the fact
that within four pages he writes Grossmann eight times, and Grossman about fourteen times.
However, there is one small mystery: how did Heinz Grossmann know that there had been
a Gerhardt Grossmann aboard Kormoran? It does not stretch credibility too far to think that
he had met a former camp guard, who asked whether he was related to the Grossmann who
had been aboard Kormoran. He could then have gathered information that was available in
Australia, with a view to exploiting it later.
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Wittwer was awarded the Order of Australia (degree not known) in 1978 for services to the
community. He is supposed to have a ‘double doctorate’, but how can a person with academic
pretensions promote such a deviant story without making some effort to establish the
credentials of the person telling it, and the chances that it was true? Wittwer even wrote that
he had purposely read nothing at all about Sydney, because he did not want to confuse his
memories of what Grossmann said. He could have preserved his memories by writing them
down, and then checked the facts with a little research. Glenys McDonald writes [p. 158] that
a ‘fellow researcher in another state’ (i.e. Wittwer) claimed that naval intelligence had broken
into his home, professionally wiped files from his computer and removed his hard copies,
whereupon he phoned to warn her and the Western Australian Maritime Museum to keep
duplicate copies in a separate location. Making duplicates of important documents and
keeping them secure is always advisable, but why would ASIO or naval intelligence be
bothered specifically with Wittwer, in view of all the other even worse rubbish that is being
produced regarding Sydney?
Wittwer wrote in his Statutory Declaration:
‘I have not studied the works relating to the loss of HMAS SYDNEY, for reason that I
want my recollections to be uncoloured by other sources… I want to keep my memory
clear on details, so will not get deeply into the work of others. Mine will remain a firsthand account from an eye witness. But I accept Doohan’s work as reliable…’
In other words, he is abysmally ignorant of anything related to Sydney and is content to leave
things that way. If he had preserved his story by writing it down, and then done a bit of reading
and research, he might not have fallen for the claims by Grossmann and Doohan. The road to
Hell is paved with good intentions; Pastor Wittwer may have meant well, but however good
his intentions might have been, he has done a great deal of harm, and the pain that he has
caused to relatives of men lost with Sydney cannot be simply brushed aside.
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Conspiracy theory proponents claim that the ‘true’ story of the loss of Sydney has been
covered up by falsification of official documents and forgeries. There are indeed forgeries,
but they have other origins, and the people who produced them have varied motives.
The ‘Mareeba Bottle’
A claim was made that a small bottle allegedly found north of Perth near Yanchep in late
1945 was one of those allegedly thrown overboard by captive crew members of Mareeba
while they aboard the supply ship Kulmerland. The story was carried by the Daily News, and
for a time the War Museum in Canberra included the bottle in their Sydney display. It was a
clumsy forgery, easily exposed as such, and it may have been simply a juvenile hoax. It
caused no lasting damage. For an analysis of the content and a photo of the bottle see HMAS
Sydney: Fact, Fantasy and Fraud, by Barbara Winter (Boolarong, 1984), pages 239-40.
The Letter of Proceedings
This obviously bogus document, several pages long, was introduced to the public by Wilson
Percy Evans about 1982. It was allegedly dictated to a typist by Sub-Lieutenant (Provisional)
Bruce Elder aboard the burning, sinking Sydney and cast overboard from the burning ship
after 3.00 am in the morning after the battle. [WW2R; NAA A6769: ELDER B A] For the
contents of the document and an analysis of the mathematical errors, inconsistencies and
impossibilities see HMAS Sydney: Fact, Fantasy and Fraud, pages 256-66. It is not suggested
that Evans perpetrated the forgery, but his claim of finding it at Kalbarri or nearby Bluff Point
is not convincing. If he found it there, then somebody had put it there for him to find; it could
not have been lying there for 40 years. He neither presented a submission to the Joint
Parliamentary Inquiry, nor appeared at any hearing.
Sometimes Evans claimed that he had some German ancestry and wrote of the Kormoran
crew in a friendly manner; at other times, he abused them as war criminals. One could never
guess which face he would be wearing next. To boost his credentials, he circulated
photocopies of some documents from many sources: Poland, Sweden, America, the Latvian
Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Order of St John the Baptist, the Royal Knights of Justice,
various awards for participation in ‘la lutte dans la clandestinité’ against the Axis. He acquired
for himself a Polish ‘Polonia Restituta’ citation from a spurious branch of the Polish
Government in Exile; but the text was semi-literate. He alleged that he had found an Iron
Cross with his name inscribed on it in his letterbox while he was in Perth; it was not exactly a
forgery, but it too was a fake, resembling only superficially any form of a genuine Iron Cross
of any era, and the ribbon colours were in the wrong order. This is a purely military
decoration, not a civil one, and Evans can hardly claim that he served in the German army.
He was also designated himself at times as ‘His Excellency General Dr’ Evans.; he had not
been an ambassador, nor held any position that entitled him to the term ‘Excellency’; he was
not a general (not even of the Legion of Frontiersmen, of which he might have been a
member); he was not a bona fide doctor from a recognised academic establishment; he had
not engaged in secret operations. Born at Williamstown on 20 October 1923, Evans served in
both the army (16.12.41-27.1.43, 6 Btn, as a private) and the navy (28.1.43-29.8.44, when he
was discharged from HMAS Leeuwin as a Probationary Supply Assistant, owing to an
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‘Anxiety Disorder’. WW2R; NAA A6770: EVANS W P). The sordid background to these
fake certificates can be found on web site ‘The Once and Perhaps Still Lucrative Trade in
Polish Military Decorations, the Revival from the Ashes of an Order of St. Stanislas and
Profit-Making Veterans Associations’ by ‘Dr Pangloss’. These citations are not cheap; A fake
‘Polonia Restituta’ certificate could cost as much as $500. Sending me bogus Polish
documents was not a good move.
[http://www.mainenewsservice.com/caltrap/once_and_perhaps_still_lucrative.htm]
At one time, Evans was associated with Ean McDonald and the Sydney Research Group,
but his pretensions and the transparent falsity of his claims apparently became too much even
for them. The Australian War Memorial confiscated the letter and the accompanying material
(including a Combined Operational Intelligence Centre canvas bag that had once held
documents for Sydney) for forensic analysis, and their conclusions were that its authenticity
left a lot to be desired. Unfortunately, his death has made it unlikely that the true origin of this
forgery will ever be discovered.
The forged German document sponsored by John Montagu
[The Lost Souls and Ghosts of HMAS Sydney II 1941, p. 84]
This alleges that Kormoran had picked up some thirty sailors from Sydney, which sank as a
result of hitting a mine in a ‘practice’ field that Kormoran was laying, and that these were lost
when Kormoran was sunk as a result of an accident with one of her own mines. It was
published by Montagu in his book, The Lost Souls and Ghosts of HMAS Sydney II 1941,
Perth, WA, John A. Montagu, 2006, page 84. The document shows clearly that liberal use has
been made of a dictionary by somebody who did not know what the words selected really
meant. It is so weird that an attempt to untangle the vocabulary, grammar and meaning cannot
succeed fully. It is re-typed here, with the original in Times Roman 12; a partial correction of
the spelling and grammar is in Arial 11, as are explanations; a translation, as far as one is
possible, is in Courier 12. The attempt to remain as close as possible to the original has
resulted in some peculiar sentence construction.
Deutschen [eagle crest] Marine
This heading, which may not have appeared on the document as it was circulated several
years prior to the publication of the book, is in itself sufficient evidence that the document is
bogus. No German Government department would use an adjective with a masculine
accusative ending in front of a feminine nominative noun.
Aufklarungsstreitkratkrafte
Aufklärungsstreitkräfte
Reconnaissance forces.
Densch had been Befehlshaber der Aufklärungsstreitkräfte since 2 October 1937. In
November 1941, he was no longer head of this group, as he had been appointed to
Kommandierender Admiral der Marinestation Nordsee on 29 November 1939.
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Vizeaadmiral Herman Densch
Admiral
Hermann Densch
Densch, a Vizeadmiral since 1 April 1938, was promoted to full Admiral on 1 October 1940.
Schiffriermacfchine Enigma
Chiffriermaschine. (more usually called ‘Schlüsselmaschine’.)
Forger has apparently confused ‘Chiffre’ (cipher) with ‚Schiff’ (ship).
‘Enigma’ was a British designation; the Germans did not use it.
The forger has confused the form of ‘s’ used in the middle of a word with an ‘f’.
A blurred reproduction of what appears to be a sticker. What can, however, be made out is
that it contains a distribution list of seven, surmounted by ‘Geheim’. The security
classification on wartime German naval documents was rubber-stamped in large print,
usually purple, in the centre of the document just above the text. (Sometimes not positioned
very accurately.) The gradings were Vertraulich = Confidential; Geheim = Secret; Streng
Geheim = Most Secret, Top Secret. A fourth grading, Ganz Geheim, was rarely used; it
concerned mainly the personnel and ciphers of the espionage service. The equivalent of the
British ‘Ultra’ was ‘X–B’.
Three lines at left of sticker:
Das decca-great zur.
27.19: s 112.13: e.
20.00 g November 1941. 21
Line 1: This appeared at first to be sheer nonsense, but research revealed that it stood for
‘Decca-Geraet’. Geraet (Gerät) is ‘apparatus’ or ‘appliance’. ‘Decca’ was a British long wave
hyperbolic low frequency radio system for coastal navigation (produced by the company that
had produced Decca gramophone records). Experimentation began in September 1942, and
it was first used on 5 June 1944 to guide small craft involved in the D-Day landings. It was
not German; and it was not used in the open seas. Yet here is an alleged German document,
November 1941, apparently showing it being used to determine open ocean coordinates.
Post-war, it was used internationally by fishing fleets until the stations were closed in 2000
when GPS made it superfluous.
Line 2: This indicates the latitude and longitude that somebody wants to promote as the
place where Sydney sank. Note that a German report would use O (Ost) not E (East).
Line 3: The time, 2000 Zone G = 1300 GMT, 1400 German time. The date is obvious, but the
positioning of ‘21’ is wrong.
Dreissig von der besatzung wurden errettet von dem englischen leighten kreuzer
Dreissig von der Besatzung des englischen leichten Kreuzers
More likely: Dreissig Besatzungsmitglieder.
wurden gerettet,
Thirty of the crew of the English cruiser were saved.
nachdem es sank.
nachdem er gesunken ist.
(‘Das Schiff’ is an ‘it’, hence ‘es’; ‘der Kreuzer’ is a ‘he’, hence ‘er’.)
after it had sunk.
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Acht offiziere und zwanzig matrosen wurden aufgelesen (Note: 8 + 20 = 30.)
Acht Offiziere und (zweiundzwanzig) Matrosen wurden (aufgenommen?) (aus dem Wasser
genommen)
‘Auflesen‘ has the sense of selecting something to pick up from the ground (e.g. windfall
fruit).
Eight officers and twenty sailors were picked up
durch die schwarze nacht.
wegen der dunklen Nacht(?). (More usual: ‘wegen der Dunkelheit‘.)
(durch die schwarze Nacht. Literally, ‘through the black night’; this expression is
impossible in German. The English ‘translation’ shows it was possibly intended to mean ‘on
account of the darkness’.)
through the black night?
Nur zehn matrosen hatten die rettungsgurth an,
Nur zehn Matrosen hatten die Schwimmwesten an, (trugen eine Schwimmweste)
Only ten sailors had lifebelts on.
der die leighte kreuzer kentterte nach backboard
da der leichte Kreuzer nach Backbord kenterte
since the light cruiser capsized to port
und sank 15 minuten nachdem es angeschlagen war by torpedos.
und in 15 Minuten versank, nachdem er von Torpedos getroffen wurde.
(See above; incorrect use of ‘es’.)
and sank in 15 minutes after it was hit by torpedoes.
Durch die mono phase kam eyne vollige dunkelheit
Wegen der Mondphase wurde es völlig dunkel,
(Eine, not eyne; Dunkelheit, not dunkelheit. Incorrect use of ‘durch’ for ‘through’ or ‘on
account of’ is repeated.)
On account of the phase of the moon it was completely dark.
und das flotziche [?] ozean rollen war das ergebnis der grosse verlust (Ergebnis, Verlust)
und das [???] Rollen des Ozeans hatte zur Folge, dass viele
The [Goodness knows what this should be!] of the ocean was the
result of [meant is ‘resulted in’]the great loss
von einer ergänzung von manschaft von 550. (Ergänzung; Mannschaft)
von der gesamten Besatzung von 550 ums Leben kamen.
(In reference to a ship, ‘Mannschaft’ necessarily excludes the officers; hence ‘Besatzung’)
(‘Ergänzung’ means ‘supplement’ or ‘completion of something by an addition’.)
of the complete crew of 550.
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Gefecht kurze einzelheit. (Einzelheiten)
Kurzer Gefechtsbericht.
Brief details of the battle.
Engusche leander klasse dreuzer, warscheinlich Sydney.
Englischer Kreuzer Leander Klasse, wahrscheinlich Sydney.
(The German navy used the international classification Perth-Klasse.)
(If survivors had been picked up, the name of their ship would have become known.)
English Leander class cruiser, probably Sydney.
Plotzliche uberraschungs angriff war mit einem torpedoboot gemacht.
Plötzlicher Überraschungsangriff wurde von einem Torpedoboot ausgeführt.
[Das Torpedoboot machte einen überraschenden Angriff?]
(Kormoran did not have a boat capable of firing torpedoes.)
Sudden surprise attack was made by a torpedo boat.
Durch die störungen an der Western Australian kuste
[Meaning unclear]
an der Küste von Westaustralien
Through the disturbances on the coast of Western Australia
am morgan des 20 November 1941 in totale dunkelheit.
am Morgen des 20. November 1941 bei (totaler Dunkelheit?)
on the morning of 22 November in total darkness.
Hatte man grosse probleme weil man die auslegungen von mienen machte.
hatte man grosse Probleme, weil Minen gelegt wurden. (or ‘wegen Minenlegung’)
(‘Mienen’ means ‘expressions, appearances’.)
There were great problems because of mine-laying.
Da war keine besch ä di gung zu 41
(Es gab) ( keine Beschädigungen) (Errors in individual words, but the whole structure is
wrong.)
41 war unbeschädigt,
There was no damage to 41
weil die war dahin treiben unter dem einfluss
[Meaning unclear]
unter dem Einfluss
‘treiben’ = drift, but past tense is ‘trieben’ and past participle is ‘getrieben’.
The causative ‘weil’ gives the impression that the ship was undamaged because it was
drifting. Alternatives would be ‘während’, ‘indem’, or ‘als’, depending on what the writer
means.
Word order is wrong, but according to intention it could be arranged in several ways.
‘denn wir trieben unter dem Einfluss’ is one possibility.
Because it was drifting away under the influence [?]
von einem starken südöstlichen Wind von ungefähr 2.2 grids von der küste.
eines starken südöstlichen Windes von ungefähr 2.2 [grids??] von der Küste. [??]
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(Linguistically, this sentence, like the one before it, is incomprehensible garbage.)
(It is possible that ‘grids’ was meant to be the plural form of ‘Grad’ (degree), but the singular
form is used when giving latitude and longitude. The sentence would still not make sense.)
Of a strong southeastly wing of about 2.2 [goodness knows]
from the coast.
Leighte kreuzer uberlebende personele auskunft
Auskunft über überlendes Personal vom leichten Kreuzer
Information about surviving personnel from the light cruiser
wird noch nachfolgen nachdem die besatzung befragt war.
folgt, nachdem man die Besatzung vernommen hat.
will follow after the crew have been interrogated.
Hulsenkopf. [?] 21 November 1941.
Hülsenkopf. [?] 21. November 1941.
Oberkommando der Marine (OKM)
Oberkommando der Marine (OKM)
Supreme Command of the Navy
Konteradmiral. Otto Schniewind.
Admiral
Otto Schniewind.
Schniewind was promoted to Vizeadmiral on 1 April 1940 and to full Admiral on 1 September
1940.
Seekriegsleitung Kiel.
Schniewind was transferred from the Seekriegsleitung in June 1941 and became
Flottenchef. (Commander of the Fleet).
Head of the Skl in November 1941 was Admiral Kurt Fricke.
Sticker, lower left: This is also almost illegible, but a few words are clear, and others can be
guessed.
Heading: [Ritt?]meister und Ordonnanz-Offizier.
[Cavalry ? captain] and aide-de camp or Orderly Officer.
Verteiler: A.
[Distribution List]
Chef Gen. St.d. H. 1. Ausf [Chief of the General Staff of the Army: Copy 1.]
Chef Führ.Gr.
[Copy 2]
Chef [de?] Abt.
[Copy 3]
Adjutant
Adjutant
des Chefs des Generalstabes
of the Chief of the General Staff
des Heeres
of the Army.
What was the Adjutant of the Chief of General Staff of the ARMY doing authorising a NAVAL
document?
Nr. 1030 /45.g.Kdos. Geheime Kommandosache. Military secret. [1945]
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And to the right of this sticker:
OKW de 27.3.45
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht = Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
27 March 1945 [Need one say more?]
3 Ausfertigungen
3. Ausfertigung
Three copies [made]
Third copy [this one]
No raider ever sent a message anywhere near this length under any circumstances. This
document is a fiasco from start to finish. What sort of warped mind could have composed it?
How did he hope to get away with the fraud? Trying to palm off bogus German documents on
me is also not a good move. It is incomprehensible that John Montagu did not have the sense
to check its contents. A document reproduced on p. 82 of his book reveals the origin of the
incorrect ranks and postings: ‘The Organisation of the Kriegsmarine, November 1938’. It was
naïve to imagine that things were still the same three years later. The apparent purposes
behind the forgery will be examined later.
The attention of the German Government should be drawn to this forged document,
if it has not already been made aware of it.
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The forged English document.
[The Lost Souls and Ghosts of HMAS Sydney II 1941, p. 83]
This is dated 28 June 1962; by regulation, it should not have been released until the end of
1992 at the earliest. The language is unexceptional. The impression is that the piece was
constructed first in English, and then a critical part was translated into German, with
additions.
For example: German version of rescued crew: 8 officers + 20 ratings = thirty. (Wrong)
The English version: 8 officers + 22 ratings = thirty. (Right)
Heading: (This document is the property of His Majesty’s Britannic Government.)
More than ten years after Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II came to the throne?
[Dated: 29th June, 1962.]
S.A.C. S.R. (93)2: This apparently means: Supreme Allied Command, Southern Region. But
‘southern region’ of what? This is supposed to be a Headquarters document.
Government Information Committee. Far Eastern Zone: What has the Far Eastern Zone to do
with German investigations?
Sub-Heading: Source: British Intelligence:
This generalisation would not be used, only a cryptic abbreviation of the department.
The authorising officers:
Major General C. Gibbons, MC. OBE.
Major.
Keswick
Director.
Prosecutions.
The compiler probably meant Colin McVean Gubbins and John Keswick, both of Special
Operations Executive during the war. However, Gubbins had retired by 1962. Nobody named
Gibbons headed any Intelligence department in Britain.
If SOE Asia consultant Sir John Keswick is meant, he had returned to China in 1945 to
rebuild the family firm of Jardine Matheson. Expelled from Shanghai about 1951, he then
resided in Hong Kong fighting a commercial war with Chairman Mao. He had no Intelligence
role outside Asia, nor anything to do with prosecuting German War Crimes. It seems as
though the forger just used some names he happened to have heard in connection with
Intelligence operations, and not only got the dates of service wrong, but could not even copy
spelling correctly.
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Second paragraph of letter:
Information Matter. [?]
Translated from German Naval Report as per Kriegsmarine Rolle
106662. Time and co-ordinate of loss of Light Cruiser. Date 20th
November 1941. Torpedoed and sank Gmt 1930. 19th November 1941.
Western Standard Time. 0315. 20th November 1941. 27º.29’ S.
112º19’E. Depth 1800 metres.
1930 hours GMT 19 November is not 0315 Western Australian time. Why the mathematical
discrepancy? (It is evident from p. 22 of his book that Montagu has no idea how to handle the
mathematics of zone time conversion.) The forged Skl letter allegedly of 21 November gives
neither the time of the sinking (unless 20.00 g is supposed to mean 2000 Zone G) nor the depth
of the water, so whence came this additional material?
Casualties.
Thirty Crewmen were recovered from the Light Cruiser sinking.
Eight Officers and twenty two other ranks were recovered from
the Indian Ocean, only ten seamen had life jackets on. The ships
capsize to port was the cause of very few of the light cruisers
plus the hours of darkness were responsible for the high loss of
life.
konteradmiral Otto Schniewind.
st
Seekriegsleitung, Kiel.
21 November, 1941.
Great George Street.
SW1
28th June 1962.
S. Rimington. Director. British Intelligence.
This must mean Dame Stella Rimington. [Above, ‘Gibbons’ is given as Director.] Born in
1935, she was only 27 at the time of the date on this document. She did not join MI5 until
1967, and became its Director in 1992. Montagu probably does not realise that she is still
alive. Steps should be taken to ensure that both MI5 and Dame Stella Rimington
become aware of this forgery, and of Montagu’s involvement.
By the time he published his book, Montagu claimed that he had forgotten the source of this
sensational, crucial document. Despite this, he has written has written in his book, at page 81: ‘A
British intelligence woman officer by the name of Irene Moore located an incident concerning
the German raider Schiff 41 (Kormoran) was examined due to the loss of 645 Sydney crew
complement of officers and crewmen without trace.’ (The fractured grammar and non sequiturs
are typical of Montagu’s whole book.) Who was this Irene Moore? It is difficult to trace what
could be a fairly common name, but one person who strikes a chord is the daughter of ‘Leon
Moore’, adviser on Soviet affairs to Allen Dulles of Central Intelligence. He was Lev Borisovich
Guelfand or Helfland or Gelfland or Helphand, a Russian who defected to the United States
when the KGB recalled him to Moscow from Italy in July 1940. The Lev-Leon alternative
indicates that ‘Moore’ was probably of German Jewish descent. (Cf. ‘Leon Trotsky = Lev
Davidovich Bornstein.)
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The Sketch Allegedly Supplied by Otto Jürgensen
[The Lost Souls and Ghosts of HMAS Sydney II 1941, p. 96.]
While it is feasible that Montagu had nothing to do with compiling the two previous
documents, he takes responsibility for this one, as he has written on page 100: ‘Otto
Jürgensen who was a CPO on Kormoran and died in 1998 sent a hand drawing of HMAS
Sydney’s demise to my consortium which is displayed on the previous pages.’ [This drawing
is on page 96.] Since it is clear that it is a forgery, including the signature, it is difficult to see
how Montagu could not have been aware that it was bogus. This was not made public until
after Jürgensen had died and could no longer expose the forgery.
The picture of a ship, allegedly Sydney:
This is not a picture of Sydney; it is nothing like a warship. If it is meant to be Kormoran
standing by while Sydney sank, it is also clearly wrong. It is derived from a photograph of
Steiermark-Kormoran, taken before she underwent conversion. She never put to sea looking
like that. At the very least, two pairs of Samson posts had been removed. The original
photograph shows the accommodation ladder lowered, as in this picture, but the boat at the
bottom of the ladder has been added, rather in imitation of another photograph of Kormoran,
taken while she was being provisioned. It is rather puzzling what the messy sketches added to
the foreground are meant to signify: perhaps wreckage, or fire, or water columns from shell
impacts.
The writing at the top:
Left:
STRAAT MALAKKA
24ºS 7’S
110º 56’E
2850 m
Das Scholotanzeigegerat
Right:
SYDNEY
20.11.1941
0400
27º30’S
112º20’E
3500 m
Das Scholotanzeigegerat
HSK KORMORAN
Das Scholotanzeigegerat: should probably be Echolotgerät: echo sounding device (monitor).
There are figures included that no German would write in that way, particularly the ‘4’ and
‘7’. Also suspect are ‘1’, ‘3’, ‘8’ and ‘9’. Although Jürgensen sometimes used that form of
‘1’, more often he used the standard German form.
The coordinates and time have been introduced to bolster Montagu’s imagined scenario. They
would never have occurred to Jürgensen, and the finding of the wrecks of both ships has proven
them to be false.
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Why would it have occurred to Detmers or Jürgensen to include the depth of the ocean at the
location of the sinkings? Were they planning a dive and salvage operation? Indeed, did
Kormoran have on board a machine for measuring such depths? Why would she have needed
to know? While she had a device, similar to ASDIC, for checking for submarines, it would
not have been able to measure such depths.
Should be:
Writing below picture:
Die Volderpiek
Der Vorderpiek
Der Achter
[Das Achterdeck?]
The meaning of ‘Achter’ as an independent word is an eight-oared rowing shell.
Die Schornstein
Der Schornstein
Das Torpedoboot
[Jürgensen knew that Kormoran did not have one.]
Das Schlnuchboot
Das Schlauchboot
Der Vorschiffquerschniff
Der Vorschiffquerschnitt
The signature:
This is not Jürgensen’s signature. An attempt has been made to forge the signature using the
signature on a genuine letter [p.99 ] as a model, but there are at least five distinct points of
difference.
Comments:
In his book, Montagu rambles on repetitively about aspects of his theories, claiming constantly
that the documents he has reproduced prove it to be true. Basically, his story is this:
On the night of 19-20 November 1941, Kormoran was laying a practice mine field, at
approximately 27º30’S 112º20’ E, in order to estimate the drift of mines so that she could lay
mines in the path of Aquitania, at about 24º07’S 110º 56’E, in order to slow her down enough
for Kormoran or her ‘seventy tonne J-boat’ [p. 26], as Montagu calls the LS-boat of 10 to 11
tons, to torpedo the liner. (The stupidity of such an enterprise will be clear to anyone who
knows anything about World War II mines.) Sydney’s port bow struck one of these mines, and
the ‘J-boat’ was then able to put two torpedoes into her stern. [Kormoran’s LS-boat could not
fire torpedoes; and if it was simply observing mine-laying, why would it have been carrying
torpedoes?] Sydney sank quickly, with most of her crew trapped in the living quarters below
deck. Kormoran picked up about thirty of the crew, then Detmers had diesel fuel poured on
the water and set it on fire to incinerate any others who might still be alive. The forged German
document on page 84 would have supported part of the mine-laying story, but even this
mentions nothing of setting fire to oil. That comes exclusively from Montagu’s imagination.
Kormoran then proceeded to the place where she intended to set a trap for Aquitania, but
‘a mine handling accident on the raider exploded against the stern plates breeching the
machine room and killing 79 of the raiders crew’. [pp. 14-15. He claims (p. 159) that these
were all engine room crew. In fact, about thirty of Kormoran’s dead had been engine room
personnel.] Montagu alleges that, although there was plenty of time to abandon ship, Detmers
left the survivors of Sydney locked up aboard Kormoran to drown when she sank. Even the
bogus documents to which Montagu keeps referring do not mention any such thing. This is
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his imagination again, and what a nasty imagination it is. Whoever hatched this crazy
scenario and forged the documents was not intelligent enough to implement it in a credible
fashion. That is not surprising.
The slight factual basis for his intricate story consists of two items. During the search in
November 1941, HMAS Heros noted a slick believed to be linseed oil at 24°07'S, 110°58'E,
and in roughly the same place picked up a damaged Carley float from Sydney. From this,
Montagu has assumed that this is where one of the ships sank. Others reached the same
fallacious conclusion, but the details are unique to Montagu.
A second item is that there was a claim that Kormoran must have sunk later than the night
of 19-20 November, as the survivors picked up were ‘clean-shaven’. Montagu writes that this
was in Aquitania’s log. As far as can be determined, Aquitania’s log for this period does not
even exist; the only basis is that one (unnamed) passenger aboard Aquitania made that
comment to one (unnamed) newspaper reporter, and then the story was up and running for
anybody who wished to discredit the official account. Did this alleged passenger see the
Kormoran crew only after they had been provided with shaving gear? (If Aquitania did
furnish this; she should have, considering the length of time they were aboard.)
In placing the sinking of Sydney in a ridiculous place for Kormoran to have been laying
mines, Montagu may also be trying to account for the stories of flashes and explosions
allegedly seen or heard at points along the coast near Point Gregory, and the ‘bodies buried
on the beach’ claims.
There are a variety of subsidiary fairy stories and really sloppy errors. Montagu claims that
Heros ‘recovered one of Kormoran’s manned lifeboats’ [p. 106].No, she did not; she picked
up an empty Carley float from Sydney. He writes that ‘the body washed up in the Timor Sea
on Christmas Island was a plant’ [p. 189], for Detmers set one of Sydney’s Carley floats adrift
from a false position in order to mislead anybody searching for the site of the sinking. [p.
175. Christmas Island is not in the Timor Sea.] He mentions that he wrote to Detmers’ widow
Marina asking for access to her late husband’s papers. [p. 177] Marina was Otto Jürgensen’s
widow; Detmers’ widow was Ursula.
The finale to his story is the claim that seven [pp. 14, 23] or eight [p. 182] well-equipped
steel lifeboats were launched, and that three of them, towed by the ‘J-boat’, were to make
their way northwards along the coast of Western Australia, travelling by night and hiding by
day, until they reached German counter intelligence on ‘the islands in the Timor Sea’, or
made a rendezvous with a German vessel or a Japanese submarine. [Mainly p. 333] He does
not explain how this meeting was going to be arranged, or what the boat was going to use for
fuel on such a long trip. However, ‘before they could implement the escape plan to fruition’,
they were seen from a searching aircraft and had to sink the J-boat ‘on a reef in 20-30 metres
of water’. [p. 177] He fails to explain how the plane’s pilot, who saw the men on the beach,
did not notice the hulking great ‘70 tonne J-boat’.
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Montagu sent a circular letter to those relatives of Sydney crew whom he could reach,
inflicting this evil story on them. In his book, he has entitled it ‘BRIEF OF TRUE FACTS’. It
begins on page 264, but with the way he rambles it is not clear where the letter ends and a
new section begins. It is hard to see how he thought he was doing them any sort of favour, but
people were harassing relatives within days of the sinking being announced, to the extent that
the navy had to contact them and tell them to ignore rumour mongers. He sent a slightly
different version to those Kormoran survivors whom he could reach, threatening them with
prosecution for a war crime and he offering a reward (bribe?) of $250,000 US to any
crewman who would confirm his story. [p. 104] Then he has the breath-taking audacity to
write that he is trying to generate goodwill. [p. 334]
Now that the Geosounder search has proven that Sydney did not sink where he insisted it
did (he alone being correct in this), and that Kormoran did not sink at the location he gave –
180 miles north of Sydney – and that Sydney did not have two torpedoes from the ‘J-boat’ or
Kormoran at her stern, does Montagu feel any shame at having invented this hurtful story?
There are a few other points to be made. One is plagiarism. He has taken nearly six pages
from my book, HMAS Sydney: Fact, Fantasy and Fraud, [pp. 140-5] verbatim, except for the
deliberate change from ‘scene of the battle’ to ‘scene of the mine explosion’, and accidental
retyping errors introducing spelling mistakes; they form pages 26 to 33 of his book. He has
also lifted a map and two pages of legend. [My book: pp. 160-62; his book: 201-03,
photocopied.] Action will be taken. I am not the only victim of this form of theft; whether
others take action is up to them.
The second point is defamation. There is a line between analysis or criticism, even abusive
criticism, and defamation. Montagu is constantly bitterly critical of other writers and
researchers, and in most cases he can get away with it. He writes repetitively of an ‘atrocity’
or a ‘war crime’ perpetrated by Kormoran crew, as in the story outlined above. He writes, on
page 332: ‘The lack of disclosure by Kormoran’s surviving crewmen and her senior officers
is in itself a crime against humanity.’ On the same page he writes that the Geneva Convention
holds participators and witnesses accountable.
On page 110, Montagu refers to authors Herman [sic] Gill and Wes Olsen [sic], ‘and of
course Barbara Winters [sic] who actually lived within the German Republic where all or
most of the Kormoran survivors are alive today. She missed or was willing to collaborate
[sic; corroborate?] the support that fuelled the conspiracy for such a period.’
On page 166, he writes of the ‘Kormoran survivors colluded account’, adding: ‘[It] has
always amazed me on the reluctance of fellow investigators and researchers of their short
sighted approach to factual evidence… despite being aware that their descriptions and
timings of events by one and all of the survivors [sic] was a fabrication… This situation
applied by [sic] one and all.’
‘Plus of course another author, who actually lived in Germany for ten or more post war
years and most certainly must have had some inclination [sic; indication?] as to the truth
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about the whole Sydney-Kormoran charade as passed off by the Kormoran Survivors
Association through their mentor Kapitan Theodor Detmers, master of the HSK Kormoran.’
And on page 155: ‘In particular the two prominent women publishers, who in one
instance actually lived amongst the Kormoran survivors post war to obtain a true insight into
the complete circumstances of the loss of both vessels but failed entirely of factual evidence.’
Only two women have written extensively on the Sydney-Kormoran engagement: Glenys
McDonald and Barbara Winter, not Winters (to wit, myself). We are authors and historians,
not publishers. Glenys has visited Germany briefly, but I was the only one who lived there,
not for ten years but from 14 February 1954 to 1 March 1955, during which time I made short
trips to France, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxemburg. (And later to England and Scotland. A tip for anyone who wants to raise the
question of finance again: a reliable bicycle and a Youth Hostel card.) I was studying at the
Interpreters’ Institute of the University of Heidelberg on a scholarship. I did not meet a single
Kormoran crew member during that period, nor did I try to find any, because I was not
interested in the matter.
These statements combined could be considered to come under the definition of
‘contiguous libel’, for the implication is that I knowingly concealed knowledge to a war
crime, which he writes is an offence according to the Geneva Convention. He does not even
have the defence of truth, for his story of a war crime of this nature is manifestly untrue. In
the light of the fact that the documents on which he bases his story are manifestly forged, it
would be difficult to put forward even a defence of a sincere belief in the truth.
I would have a good case, but nobody whose opinion is worth much would be deceived by
his book. It is somewhat doubtful whether other writers could sustain a case on the basis of
his sweeping assertion: ‘Fellow researchers have all had doubts about the ship and her crew
total loss but one and all fall into line with the Kormoran survivors final colluded
account.’ [p. 322] It might well be thought that his state of mind was such that he could not
be held responsible for his words or actions.
It is bizarre that he writes of his ‘true researcher’s point of view’ [p. 166], or that he boasts:
‘The realistic scenario that we have presented due to our detailed research is far superior and
factual through documentary evidence and solid investigative technique through all sorts of
Archives…’ [p. 115] His ‘scenario’ is about as realistic as a Sylvester the cat comic.
Another aspect of Montagu’s involvement needs to be considered. He made two
submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry. The first one, Submission 16, appears Volume 1, at
pages 107-119. (In his later Submission 16A, Montagu refers to this earlier submission as
Submission 107; that is the number of the first page, not a submission number.) This
submission to the HMAS Sydney Sub Committee is dated (on the bottom line)
19th November 1991, but since the date on the stamped receipt is 21 November 1997, that
letter was obviously written in 1997, not 1991. A covering letter gives names of those
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associated with McElhinney Nominees: J. A. Montagu CD and T. Montagu (Theresa, his
wife), but the name of the ‘Acc. Secretary’ has been deleted, although it is left on the
reproduction of an envelope addressed to McElhinney Nominees. [Vol. 11, p. 2674] This is
Kerry Davey, JP, a real estate agent with an interest in history; it was she who was
responsible for involving Phillip Pendal, MLA, in the Sydney conspiracies in a manner that
did not show him in a favourable light.
Montagu writes in his first submission: ‘The factual evidence that is missing has been
filled in by probability and conduct of naval personnel of that period and of course the
conditions and equipment that existed to offset the human eliment [sic] during such an action
as these two ships experienced… [p. 107] There is no doubt whatsoever that HSK Kormoran
rests on the ocean bed at 24 deg south lat, 110 deg east longitude in depth of water betwee4n
3000-4000 metres.’ [p. 110] This location for the sinking of Kormoran is based on the
discovery by Heros of a patch of linseed oil on the surface, which Montagu converts into oil
‘welling up’ from the depths. He also claims that ‘from our reasoning’ most of the losses from
Kormoran were of engine room personnel, because that was near the place where her own
mine detonated. Jürgensen’s letter of 18 September 1997[?] – the genuine one, not the forgery
– is reproduced in Volume 11, Submission 16A, pp. 2675-76.
Montagu’s submissions contain the same sort of linguistic errors, both grammatical and
stylistic, as does his book: ‘ships compliment’, ‘Curley float’, ‘true actual facts’, lack of
apostrophes or insertion of them where they are wrong, not just a few times, but over and
over. This, combined with his convoluted sentences and lack of logic, is irritating over a few
pages, but really painful over the course of his book. This could be excused if he had
something sensible to say, but there is one thing that should ring alarm bells quite clearly.
In his submissions, Montagu refers to his research and ‘our reasoning’. Despite putting
forward a theory of the course of events that varies from every other account by officials,
academics, journalists and the general public, he has relied on ‘reasoning’. Not only did he
not produce for the Inquiry the documents on which he bases his theories and his book, but
even in Submission 16A, dated 18 March 1998, he did not mention them at all. He might
have been keeping them secret to protect his commercial interests in publishing his book, but
I doubt this.
It seems likely that his claims are not based on the documents, but that the documents were
concocted later to support his theories. Greater effort needs to be made to establish the
origin of these documents, especially to determine whether Kriegsmarine Rolle 106662
actually exists, and if so, what it contains.
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GENUINE DOCUMENTS MISINTERPRETED:
The Kitsche ‘Diary’:
A large number of false stories have been attributed to a document that has been called
‘Kitsche’s Diary’: that Kormoran was flying a Norwegian flag; that she surrendered and
opened fire under a white flag, etc. This diary was in places more of a notebook. Jonathon
Robotham confiscated it from Petty Officer Heinz Kitsche, and instead of handing it to
authorities or returning it to the owner, he stole it. It contained an account of the engagement
between Sydney and Kormoran, but if Robotham understood German as well as people
thought he did, he would have recognised that it had not been composed in German, but had
been translated from English, and written originally by somebody who knew little of the
navy. It was written by Robert S. Close, and published in January 1942. At some time, the
notebook fell into the hands of John McArthur, who passed it on to Michael Montgomery.
Neither McArthur nor Montgomery makes any claim to being a linguist, but the
provenance of this source should have been checked thoroughly by somebody really
competent before the content was publicised as a genuine original eye-witness account of the
battle. It should even have been obvious that, if the statements had been true, no German
would have written them while in Australia; it would have been too dangerous. The relevant
section of Kitsche’s diary occurs in the records of other members of Kormoran crew, and
some are on the Seapower website. Why Robotham chose to retain Kitsche’s account, but not
the others, must remain a mystery. Perhaps other persons found the other documents.
Although Montgomery now knows the origin of the story, he seems to continue to believe
that part of it was a true account, although it does not mention his pet theory: the involvement
of a Japanese submarine. Even if he has changed his mind, the conspiracy proponents still
inflict it on gullible and ill-informed people, who have not the motivation or resources to do
their own basic research.
Dr List’s sketches:
These sketches by Lieutenant Dr Fritz List became one of the mainstays of claims that the
Japanese were involved in some way in the sinking of Sydney. (His doctorate was in
Economics.) He was not, as Montagu has written, a ‘coder’, but a journalist reporting for
Goebbels Propaganda Ministry. (Detmers would never have trusted him near Kormoran’s
codes and ciphers.) On some sheets of toilet paper scrounged in Geraldton or aboard Centaur,
he began to write some notes in longhand and made some sketches that allegedly contained
shorthand symbols. This may be so, but they have been seriously misinterpreted. The crucial
one depicted some caves at Red Bluff, surrounded by scribble that apparently indicated scrub.
This scribble may represent shorthand, but at best they were an aide memoire for himself.
The paper is not ruled, and the symbols, if such they be, are out of alignment and would be
near impossible to read. [The cave sketch is reproduced in Michael Montgomery’s Who Sank
the Sydney? p. 162 (Cassell), p. 150 (Penguin); Barbara Winter, HMAS Sydney. Fact, Fantasy
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and Fraud, p. 234. They are also available at NAA, B6121: 165K (previously MP1587). The
sketches are at p. 113 of the digitised version on internet, an analysis at pp. 110-12, 114.]
Tom Frame is incorrect in claiming that they were confiscated from Dr Habben,
Kormoran’s surgeon, early in 1942, and that the intention might have been for him to take
them back to Germany when he was repatriated in an exchange of prisoners of war. This
exchange was not even under consideration until 1943. It seems that somebody writing a
report had been told they came from the ‘doctor’, and had assumed that this meant a medical
doctor. His comments on the interpretation of the sketches, however, are sound.
The sketches were handed to Hermine Kevin, the Austrian wife of John Charles George
Kevin (called Charles), a barrister who had been on the staff of the Australian High
Commission in London. On returning to Australia, he worked with the Department of the
Army, and also helped to establish the Commonwealth Security Service in 1941. He saw
service at sea briefly in the Naval Reserve, then returned to the CSS. Enlisting in the navy on
2 May 1942, he was connected with Naval Intelligence and the Commonwealth Security
Service; he saw service in some exotic places, being posted for some time to New Delhi.
Discharged on 22 June 1945 as a lieutenant, he was involved later in the foundation of ASIO.
He held various diplomatic postings; by the time he died in February 1968 in Transvaal, he
and Hermine were divorced. [See Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 15, p. 15, article
by Joan Beaumont, or consult at www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A150017b.htm ]
Hermine decided that the sketches contained some shorthand symbols in Einheitskurzschrift.
She worked with Sergeant Edward Caminer, and they gave a tentative version that is much
less specific than various people who have worked over it would like to claim. Caminer, an
indent agent importing mostly German goods, was born in New Zealand of German parents.
In 1938, he nominated Walter and Hedwig Kalischer for entry to Australia. They were
apparently Jewish, for having survived the war they arrived in Australia post-war, sponsored
by somebody else, and they declared themselves as ‘Stateless, formerly German’. It is not
known whether Caminer was Jewish, and certainly not whether this might have influenced
his judgment. He enlisted in the air force in August 1940, transferred to the army in May
1941, and was discharged in July 1945 as a Warrant Officer, Class 2, in the Security Service
of the Australian Intelligence Corps.
The Western Australian Maritime Museum holds material showing how Hermine Kevin
came to her conclusions. The alleged reading mentions a ‘sudden attack’ (No quibbles;
Kormoran did open fire ‘suddenly’.), and two Japanese aircraft carriers, direct from Japan.
The translation does not reflect how uncertain Kevin was concerning the true meaning. What
has been interpreted as ‘zwei japanische flugzeugträger’ is shown as ‘zwei aeroplan [sic]
träger’, and ‘japanische’ simply as ‘ja-an’ once, and just ‘j’ on another occasion. In the course
of handling by various people, ‘aeroplan’ became ‘flugzeug’, and was translated back to
‘aeroplane’. Why would List have written ‘aeroplan’? The rest of the material is similarly
uncertain. Even List’s ordinary handwriting was abominably difficult to read; one can only
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imagine what his shorthand was like, if such the symbols were shorthand. Nobody else who
reads this form of German shorthand has yet been able to confirm Hermine Kevin’s work.
Montagu has reproduced this cave drawing on page 142 and has imagined a totally
different interpretation. He has chosen two spots on it as showing Sydney and Kormoran,
although there is nothing there that is different from the rest of the hatching of the interior of
the of the caves. He has a very active imagination.
Other sketches.
One of the Robotham collections included another page of sketches. These are reproduced in
Montagu’s book at:
Page 138: Interior sketch, full size.
Page 143: Full sheet of the drawings.
Page 148: Enlarged version of the exterior
Page 149: Full sheet, reduced size + Robotham’s interpretation. I know this was done by
Robotham, because I saw it and his working notes in a box of his documents.
Montagu’s Interpretation:
p. 139: TRANSLATED FROM GERMAN DRAFT 1958
THE KORMORANS DOCTOR LISTS CRYPTOGRAPHS RELATING TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE DRAWINGS.
T: (TRINKEN) TO DRINK:
BKGFMST = BOTTLES, KOMPASS, GAME, FURNATURE [sic], MORNING, SEATS,
TABLE.
B: (BADEN) BATHE:
BWPA = BOATS LIFE, WATER, POSITION, ACCIDENT.
p. 140: S: (SCHLAFEN) TO SLEEP:
SZBNL = SHELLS, ZONE, BOAT, NOVEMBER, LIGHT.
E: (ESSEN) TO EAT:
KTMSWERO = KORMORAN, TORPEDO STRIKES, MINES, SYDNEY, WRECKS,
EARLY MORNING, ROPE LADDER, OCEAN.
These two pages are typed in Montagu’s idiosyncratic style of using capital letters throughout
and ignoring possessive apostrophes, and on these pages he builds an intricate story around
his fantasies. There are several objections to Montagu’s claims.
1. In 1958, Montagu was still in England, and he did not have access to these sketches.
2. A German writer would not have used English words in the key.
3. The sketches were definitely not drawn by Dr List.
Among Robotham’s papers there were different interpretations. Here, for example, SZBNL
stood for ‘Schlafzimmer’ (bedroom), ‘Bett’ (bed) and ‘Nachtlampe’ (night light). BKGFMST
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was interpreted as ‘Brett’ (shelf), ‘Krug’ (jug), ‘Glass’ [sic] (should be Glas = glass), F (?),
‘Masskrug?’ (measuring jug), ‘Stühle’ (chairs) and ‘Tisch’ (table). Although these are purely
speculative, they are at least in German, and the objects are in fact depicted in the sketches.
They are not intrinsically ridiculous, while Montagu’s suggestions are totally false.
Montgomery describes these drawings as: ‘Cryptographs found at the time of the Germans’
imprisonment at Carnarvon.’ [Cassell, p. 215, Penguin p. 214.] They were not found in
Carnarvon; they were apparently found in Murchison camp. Glenys McDonald attributes
them to Heinz Kitsche, writing that they were folded inside a diary, and Robotham
confiscated them when Kitsche was a prisoner in Dhurringile. [p. 237, Note 2. Note that
Robotham was not posted to Murchison until February 1943.] She may be correct about the
identity of the person who drew them, although I have not seen evidence of the identity of the
‘artist’. However, Kitsche was at Murchison camp, never at Dhurringile. In any case, they
were not done by List, nor is there any real evidence that they are ‘cryptographs’, but they
have been considered as such because Montgomery, possibly on the basis of Robotham’s
fixation, described them as such.
McDonald [pp. 169-70] finds in the sketch of an exterior ‘a distinct resemblance to a
sketch of “Sanford House” at Port Gregory’. She writes that she thought it was related to the
location of one of the wrecks and the landing of a third lifeboat, adding: ‘I firmly believe that
the topography with the cryptogram was of the Port Gregory area.’ Belief notwithstanding,
however, it is on record that Kitsche was never in the vicinity of Port Gregory; he was in a
boat that landed ‘50 Miles north of Carnarvon’. The drawing, with its annex and the boats
tied up at a lakeside, bears a distinct resemblance to thousands of East German farmhouses,
including those in Upper Silesia, which was Kitsche’s home territory.
Montagu [pp. 145-47] turns the picture upside down, making it into a drawing of Kormoran
about to sink, with the path leading from the house becoming smoke pouring from her funnel,
and he turns what may well have been dirt spots from being lugged around by Robotham for
more than a decade into men floundering in the water.
Whatever may be the significance of List’s cave drawings, the Kitsche domestic sketches
(assuming that they were his) look to me like the wistful daydreams of a homesick sailor too
long from home and family, with as little real significance as a fancied image of the Madonna
in grilled cheese on toast.
[The documents mentioned above are not included, as they will be available to the Inquiry
from other sources. Rather unclear copies of a letter intended for Kormoran crew members
are reproduced below. (I hope.) Jürgensen had died several years before this letter was
written.]
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GREG BATHGATE:
(HMAS Sydney; 1941: The Analysis. 2007, Boolarong, Salisbury Queensland)
Some of the claims and errors by Bathgate have already been mentioned, but others did not
fit in anywhere else. His main object was to determine the location of the wrecks of Sydney
and Kormoran. In this endeavour, he was not very far wrong, but he tried to be so accurate
and restrictive that, if Mearns had heeded him, the wrecks would not have been found.
Information about ocean currents shows only general trends and averages; they are not
constant. Air Sea Rescue searches demonstrate constantly how difficult it is to estimate where
lost yachtsmen and fishermen might be drifting, even though the weather at the time is
known. Trying to hindcast is even more unreliable, particularly after more than fifty years,
when the local weather conditions at the time are not known. At best these estimates can
show only, fairly reliably, what could not have happened. For example: the lack of wreckage
or life boats between the Abrolhos and 26ºS should have alerted the advocates of the KnightWhittaker site to the unlikelihood of the Abrolhos as the site of the action.
Much of Bathgate’s book, however, is not related directly to the sites. He resurrects many
old furphies that have been comprehensively discredited long ago, sometimes giving them a
new twist. He tries to accommodate the claim that Sydney visited Geraldton in November
1941, although this bit of oral history has been discredited; the visit was in October. He works
out that Sydney could have broken off the escort of Zealandia and made a high-speed dash to
Geraldton, where she could have stayed for up to four hours before racing back to Zealandia.
[p. 33] He writes: ‘[It] is inconceivable that Burnett would have left Zealandia unless he was
satisfied that the latest intelligence reports on enemy vessels presented no danger.’ [sic] It has
been widely claimed that Burnett knew that there was a raider in the area, or said that he did,
but whatever he knew it would have been hard to justify such a dereliction of duty. Still, it did
not happen, so working out that it could have happened is pointless.
Bathgate resurrects the discredited Grossmann story, writing that the truth of Grossmann’s
attempt to expose Japanese involvement should become evident on inspection of the wreck
when Sydney is found [p. 163]; what has become evident is its falsity. He supports the Largs
Bay story. [p. 49] He writes that the actions outlined by Detmers in the Action Report are
‘demonstrably inaccurate’, and his story is ‘incredulous’ [sic] [pp. 66-68] He writes that the
battle flag may not have been raised at all, and that at 1834 hours (precisely, presumably
Zone H time), Sydney was almost stopped and was preparing to lower a boat, while Kormoran,
having surrendered, was travelling at two knots. (How much of this did he pinch from Tom
Frame? He certainly accepted the distance of 90 hm rather than 9 hm.) He described Detmers
as ‘one who suddenly decided to seek fame with complete disregard for the welfare of the
crew’. [p. 17] In fact, Detmers had no choice; it was Sydney who was chasing Kormoran, not
vice versa. His exposition of the course of the pursuit and the battle is unsubstantiated,
outrageously speculative, and quite shameless in its disrespect for evidence, while the
accompanying map is weird.
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He is a devoted supporter of the claims that wireless signals were sent by both Kormoran
and Sydney. Of Detmers he writes that his priority would have been to signal his approximate
position to Germany. [p. 66] Detmers said that he had wanted to do so, but left it too late, for
his priority would have been to conduct the battle in the manner most likely to save his ship
and crew. Bathgate states bluntly that signals from Sydney were picked up by Geraldton Radio
and in Singapore, Mombasa and possibly at HMAS Harman, without any consideration of the
reliability of the reports that make these claims. (In any case, it was ‘a radio in Geraldton’,
not ‘Geraldton Radio’.) Then he states: ‘The failure to locate any of these signals, which
should be recorded in the Australian, British or overseas archives, has largely exacerbated the
controversy of [sic] the whereabouts of Sydney.’ [p. 85] What has exacerbated the controversy
is the refusal of people such as Bathgate to believe the evidence that there were no signals.
Later he writes that it is presumptuous to conclude that no signals were sent by Sydney
because none have been found in Australian or British Archives. [p. 164]
He writes that by November 1941 Orion, Komet, the supply ship Kulmerland and the
blockade runner Spreewald had been recalled to Germany when the Pacific war became
inevitable, and that Admiral Wenneker and his wireless operators in Tokyo ‘maintained
wireless contact with the German vessels in the Indian Ocean and were purportedly in contact
with Kormoran and Kulmerland after the action began’. [p. 151] The facts: Orion had
returned to Germany by August 1941, as her engines were on the point of failing; obviously,
this was arranged at least a month previously. Komet had been out for more than a year and a
half, and it was not intended that raiding cruises should last more than 12-18 months.
Kulmerland was not going to Germany; she returned to Japan in December 1941. Spreewald
was returning to Germany, but she did not make it. The only source for the claim of contact
between Tokyo and either ship is what David Kennedy says that Larsen thinks that Herrmann
meant to imply. (See section on wireless signals.)
Bathgate has concocted a wonderful tale linking iron ore mining in the Kimberleys to a
Japanese submarine that sank Sydney. He writes: ‘Japan gained access to iron ore after
occupying Manchuria in 1905.’ [p. 151] Historians generally agree that Japan did not invade
Manchuria until 19 September 1931. Bathgate may be thinking of Korea. He mentions a
Japanese delegation in 1934, led by Captain Ohya and including Okada, Fujimora, Omori and
Umeda. [p. 152] The error here is unimportant unless you are writing a history of iron ore
mining at Yampi, but it is indicative of Bathgate’s tendency to set down as fact any halfbaked random memory that comes to mind. There were three ‘delegations’: 1928, 1934 and
1936. Nobutaro Umeda and Masunobu Omori spent years in Australia; Shinsaku Ohya visited
several times but, as far as immigration and shipping records show, Koichi Fujimara did not
visit Australia until 1936. (He disembarked from Centaur at Derby on 27 November.)
Bathgate writes that there was concern that the Japanese planned to build a naval base, and
that some were spies, so the Australian media launched a sustained campaign against the
venture. Yes, that will pass muster, except for the associated claim that this campaign was
triggered by the arrival of seventy Japanese engineers. Asian immigration at that time was so
restricted that it would have caused a massive outcry and have left a highly visible paper trail.
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Seven, maybe, though probably not at the same time; but seventy? This is background; the
really significant part follows.
Bathgate then writes that the contract was signed in October 1935, with mining to start in
March 1936, but this lasted only until July 1938. There was a specially equipped laboratory
ship for analysis of ore, and it was always accompanied by a submarine that probably came
from the nearest submarine and seaplane base in the Caroline Islands; they were regularly
observed by coastal state ships. [p. 152] This is magic mushroom stuff. There was no Japanese
mining in Australia before the war; the equipment was still on the way when export licences
were refused in 1938. There was no laboratory ship; so there was no accompanying submarine
that came from anywhere, so there was nothing for the State Ships to observe. He then links
this non-existent submarine to the equally mythical submarine that destroyed Sydney.
Now to Bathgates’ claim that a Japanese submarine was involved. He writes that the
distance from Japan to the engagement site was about 4,200 nautical miles, but that the return
distance to Hainan was 2,800 miles via Sunda Strait, and 3,100 miles via Sunda and the Celebes.
I suspect these distances, but will work with them as I am not going to check them. He writes
that the distance to the engagement site could have been covered ‘at a sedate average speed of
14 knots’. [pp. 156-57] This is an illusion. A submarine on a secret mission, passing through
sensitive areas, would have been at great risk if she had not travelled submerged in daylight
hours. As a ball-park figure: few submarines could manage more than eight knots submerged,
and to travel right through the night they would have been reduced to a much lower speed:
four knots or less. Where fuel supplies and battery capacity are concerned, speed and range
are in inverse proportion. To make an average speed of 14 knots, after a much slower speed
at night, would have entailed belting along on the surface through the darkness, in an area
dotted with islands, at a far from sedate speed, or even an achievable one.
He suggests that it is significant that no details are available for the location of I-15, I-60,
RO-33 and RO-34. [p. 157] Records say that I-59 and I-60 were in Kobe for repairs on
8 December, and that RO-33 and RO 34 left Sasebo for Camranh Bay on 8 December. But
what is the point of going on? Scratch one suggested aggressor, and somebody pops up with
another. Scratch the whole lot, and then it is claimed that the records are all faked (including
the American cryptanalysis ones) or that there was another secret one that nobody knew
about. [For I-59, see I-159; it was renamed.]
Bathgate then picks up the claims that Michael Montgomery started running in 1981: that a
Japanese submarine was somehow involved in a conspiracy between Churchill and Roosevelt
to trick the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor. He writes that Churchill ‘even confided [sic]
with President Roosevelt’ to acquire a Purple machine from SIS (which was a British entity,
not an American one), while the ‘events leading up to Pearl Harbour are further damming
[sic] of the motives of the British Intelligence and of Churchill’. [pp. 165-67] He continues
by writing that the book Betrayal at Pearl Harbor, by James Rusbridger and Eric Nave,
revealed that Japan began hostilities on 19 November. In fact, Rusbridger wrote the book
using Nave’s private documents, and Nave was very annoyed with what he had done, for he
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knew that there was nothing to indicate Japanese involvement in the sinking of Sydney, and
no warning that Pearl Harbor was a target in December 1941. [Personal contact with Captain
Nave.] The story of the Japanese submarine was foisted on Rusbridger by Montgomery, and
is so acknowledged in his endnotes on page 271.
One gaffe apparently unique to Bathgate is his statement: ‘Churchill’s display of annoyance
when Curtin recalled Australian trooped serving in the Middle East eventually resulted in the
token presence of two capital ships (HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales) in Keppel
Harbour.’ [p. 167] It is difficult enough to see how his annoyance at Curtin would have
resulted in the sending of two battleships to help defend Australia (or in the first instance,
Singapore), but the sequence of events is wrong. Curtin did not recall the troops until early
1942, whereas the battleships had been sunk in December 1941. If Bathgate gets anything
right, it is something of an accident.
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JOHN SAMUELS:
(Somewhere Below: The Sydney Scandal Exposed, John Samuels, 2005, Halstead, Broadway)
Until I came across John Montagu’s book, I thought that this book by John Samuels was as
inconsistent, illogical and malicious as it was possible to be on the topic of the SydneyKormoran encounter. Montagu has been dealt with in the section on forgeries, and some of
that which Samuels has written in incorporated into other sections. His fixations on the story
of the impostor Grossmann, the Cape Otway bodies, the bodies on the beach, the alleged
autopsy by Snook, the non-existent wireless signals, the plan to waylay Aquitania in
collaboration with a Japanese submarine and other tales have already been analysed in the
appropriate places, but many are unique to Samuels and do not fit in elsewhere.
Prisoner of the “Kormoran” as History:
This book, published in 1944, was admittedly written by James Taylor, although it bears also
the name of W. A. (Syd) Jones and is written in the first person as autobiographical. It differs
somewhat from the story that Jones told to the Deputy Director of Navigation when he returned
to Australia in an exchange of merchant seamen prisoners of war in 1943, and from the story
told after the war by his shipmate, Jack Bottomley. (William Alfred Jones, born 1901, Eccles,
Manchester.) Samuels takes a lot of his dates from the Taylor-Jones book, although Taylor’s
dates are all over the place and seldom correct. He has trusted it absolutely in the face of
contradictory evidence, and he writes, in regard to the rendezvous between Kormoran and
Kulmerland: ‘[It] is not credible that Syd Jones could be weeks out in his dating.’ Actually,
the dates are more likely to have been invented by Taylor than Jones, and it should have rung
alarm bells when Taylor gave the date of the death of Alex Matheson as 31 November.
[Taylor, p. 126. ‘Matheson’ cannot be traced in records under this spelling.] Dodgy dates and
other inaccuracies would not have bothered Taylor’s downmarket target readership, but they
should never have been accepted by anyone with pretensions in the field of real history.
The Stamatios G. Embiricos blunder:
Samuels does not seem to know whether he is coming or going with this ship. He writes: ‘Just
after dark on 21 October 1941 Kormoran found the Greek ship Stamatios G. Embiricos.’ [p. 72.
The time was actually 2228 hours.] This date is unique to the Taylor-Jones book. [p. 61]
However, he also writes: ‘[Kormoran] had just sunk the Greek ship Stamatios G. Embiricos
on 23 December 1941.’ [p. 66] Oh, please! Ghost ship? The correct date is 23 September.
Samuels also writes regarding this ship: ‘Lying in wait east of Mombassa [sic], Kormoran
had launched one of the Arado reconnaissance aircraft the day before, which duly reported
that ship’s departure from port en route to Colombo.’ [p. 72] This is from Taylor again. In
fact, Stamatios G. Embiricos had left Mombasa on 16 September, seven days before she
encountered Kormoran, and was nearly two thirds of the way towards her destination. As for
the sighting by the aircraft, Kormoran’s War diary shows that at noon on 23 September, she
was at 1º34’S 65º40’E; Mombasa is at 4ºS 39º04’E. The aircraft did not have that range. (The
distance is about 1,730 n.m.) The presence of the ship was not known until the evening when
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the lights that she should not have been showing were seen. The aircraft did not find the ship;
it found two lifeboats on the day after the sinking.
The Kulmerland Rendezvous:
According to Kormoran’s War Diary and Detmers’ ‘Action Report’, the rendezvous with
Kulmerland for the purpose of taking on fuel, victuals and other supplies lasted from 16 to 26
October. This does not suit Samuels, who writes: ‘But when we look at Detmers’ calender
[sic] of event [sic] nothing tallies with the account of the prisoners.’ [p. 73] The War Diary
was an official legal document that had to be submitted to the German Naval High Command,
and any significant error of fact would not have been overlooked; it would be expected that
Kormoran’s War Diary would be compared with a report by Kulmerland, and these had to
tally. Note that Samuels says ‘the account of the prisoners’ (plural); there was only one man
involved: the sea cook Jones. Let us see where it leads us if we follow Samuels’ belief in
Taylor’s claims to the inevitable logical conclusion.
‘[The] prisoners began Thursday 5 November like any other day… At 4 pm a ship was sighted on the
horizon and Kormoran made a slow progress that clearly indicated she had no fear of it.’ [p. 72]
A calendar would have shown that, 5 November was a Wednesday. Kormoran’s War
Diary logs the first sighting of Kulmerland as 1002 on 16 October.
‘According to Syd Jones the two vessels spent three days moving massive amounts of stores and fuel
into Kormoran.… on Saturday morning, the second at the rendezvous…’ [p. 72]
[Read: according to Taylor.] If they spent from a Thursday to a second Saturday, that
meant they were together ten days. If it took them only three days to transfer provisions
and fuel, what were they doing the other seven days?
‘An Arado was launched a number of times during the ten-day encounter consistently with the
reported number of fly-overs of Geraldton and Syd Jones’s dates. However it doesn’t fit with Detmers’
claim that the rendezvous with Kulmerland took place 600 miles west of the coast. The Arado aircraft
would then have been flying 300 miles each way. Arado seaplanes of the type carried by Kormoran
only had a serviceable range of just under 500 nautical miles which places the ten day lay-over closer
to the coast than Detmers states.’ [p. 73]
There is a horrendous error in mathematics here, as well as logical errors.
1. If Kormoran was 600 miles off the coast, then the Arado would have had to fly 600
miles each way, not 300 miles.
2. Since the dates given by Taylor are incorrect, and the rendezvous was in fact from 16
to 26 October, these dates do not correspond with alleged sightings made at Geraldton in
November. His reasoning that the rendezvous was closer to the coast thus lapses.
3. When the aircraft was launched, this was entered in the log. It was a tedious and
dangerous business. There is no entry during the period of the re-provisioning.
4. Taylor’s book, on which Samuels relies so heavily, is quite explicit on this subject.
‘[The] Nazis were confident that they would not be disturbed. Not once did the raider
launch a reconnaissance plane.’ [Taylor, p. 82] This does not suit his theory, so he takes
no notice of the book he considers so reliable.
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‘Given that Kormoran and the supply ship sent by Admiral Wenneker met on Thursday 5 November
and remained together through two Saturdays, the departure date from the ten day meeting was then
14 November 1941, only five days before HMAS Sydney bailed up the raider at sea.’ [p. 73; cf the
mention of three days on p. 72.]
But we do not ‘give’ that the ships met on 5 November, which was not a Thursday, any
more than we ‘give’ that Jones’s shipmate died on 31 November. (Prisoner of the
Kormoran, page 126.)
A comparison of figures: On page 73, Samuels accepts the claim by Jones that Kormoran and
Kulmerland met in the Indian Ocean on ‘Thursday’ 5 November, and as they separated on the ‘second
Saturday’, which was 14 November. On page 74, he accepts that Kulmerland and a supply ship met
(in the Pacific) on 17 November.
That is a really neat trick: over 5,500 nautical miles in three days, which would entail
an approximate speed of some 80 (eighty) knots. Kulmerland’s cruising speed was 11
knots. However, 14 November was a Friday, and the ‘second Saturday’ after 5
November was 15 November. So that would have given Kulmerland only two days to
get from the Indian Ocean rendezvous to the Pacific, and would have needed a speed of
about 110 knots. Samuels has taken leave of his senses.
The facts: from Kormoran’s War Diary, which Samuels dismisses as a pack of lies:
1. Kormoran and Kulmerland met on 16 October 1941 near at ‘Marius’, 27º 30’S, 87º 30’E.
2. Because Kulmerland had sighted a mysterious ship in the vicinity the previous day,
Detmers shifted the transfer of supplies to an area ranging from about 26 to 27º S, 95-98 º E.
3. They parted on 26 October. Detmers estimated that it would take 21 days for Kulmerland
to cover the 5,564 miles from ‘Marius’ to ‘Balbo’ at 11 knots. (In fact, owing to the weather,
it took 29 days, and she met Spreewald on 24 November.)
Whether one believes Detmers or not, the figures are reasonable. Those presented by
Taylor and Samuels are mathematically and technically impossible, so the claim by Samuels
that Taylor (ghost-writing for Jones) is an authentic, reliable witness collapses.
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Major Austin Chapman’s ‘photographic memory’:
Samuels props up his contention that a Japanese submarine sank Sydney by repeating a claim
by Major Austin Chapman to the Parliamentary Inquiry. [Vol. 1, Submission 2, pp. 141-43] In
this Chapman claims that, while with the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF)
in Japan, he saw in the foyer of the former Naval Academy at Etajima (Samuels 41; Eta Jima,
Chapman 141) a painting depicting Sydney being sunk by a Japanese submarine. He knew it
was Sydney, because she was wearing the Australian White Ensign, and Sydney was the only
Australian cruiser attacked by a Japanese submarine. (Inquiry, 142) When Samuels interviewed
him in March 2005, he gave a detailed description of the painting, from which Richard Gregory
drew a sketch, with the blue stars on the Ensign instead of the red cross of the British Ensign.
(Samuels, 142)
Here the story falls apart, so let’s take a cold shower.
First: Chapman writes that he arrived in Kure, Japan, in January 1946 (Inquiry, p. 141).
Samuels writes he arrived in September 1945 (p. 134). Either Chapman changed his story
between 1997, when he made the submission, and March 2005, when Samuels interviewed
him, or Samuels made a mistake. Not important, but indicative of other things that go wrong.
Second: The Japanese artist would have drawn a picture from his imagination, or a sketchy
description, but it probably represented a general idea of a battle rather than a specific action.
Third: The Gregory sketch, ‘based on Chapman’s recall’, shows:
A) The Japanese submarine is at conning tower depth and very close to the warship; it would
have been readily visible from the cruiser. According to Samuels’ account, as well as
common sense, it would have to have been submerged to periscope depth.
B) The Japanese submarine is on the warship’s starboard bow; according to Samuels, it was
on the same side as Kormoran; that is, the port side.
C) All the above could be argued away, but this cannot be: According to Chapman, the cruiser
was wearing the ‘Australian White Ensign’, as shown in the Gregory sketch, so it could only
have been Sydney. However, this flag, with blue stars instead of a red cross, as mentioned by
Chapman and indicated in the sketch, was not introduced until 1 March 1967. Chapman could
not have seen it in 1945 or 1946, despite claiming a ‘photographic memory’ in his submission
to the Inquiry. Sydney would have been wearing the standard White Ensign used by all British
Commonwealth naval vessels, so there was no way of telling whether the ship was RN or
RAN. The Japanese artist would have needed an astounding degree of clairvoyance to have
dreamed up by 1945 the Australian White Ensign with the blue stars.
Chapman’s entire claim disintegrates owing to an erroneous factual basis. He claims
(p. 143) that he ‘mentioned this subject’ to ‘a number of Officers and, in particular, members
of the Royal Australian Navy’ with whom it ‘aroused great interest’. Did he mention to them
that the ship was allegedly flying an ensign that did not exist during the war? He also states:
‘Except on November 19th 1941 there has never been an engagement in which a Japanese
submarine targeted an Australian cruiser.’ [p. 134] So what hit HMAS Hobart on 20 July
1943 was a whale, not a Japanese torpedo?
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This is the sketch showing the non-existent Australian Naval Ensign.
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Orion’s glorious career :
Samuels claims that Orion captured the Norwegian vessel Tropic Sea in the Caroline Islands while
disguised as the Greek Rocos. [p. 27]
Point 1. Orion abandoned the disguise of Rocos after leaving the Atlantic, and was then
disguised as Japanese, probably as Maebasi (Maebashi) Maru.
Point 2. This did not take place in the Caroline Islands, but near the Cook Islands. That
is a discrepancy of nearly 30 degrees of latitude and over 30 degrees of longitude –
over 3,500 nautical miles.
His next claim is that, in addition to sinking Niagara, Orion laid off Auckland the mines that sank Port
Bowen and Batavia. [p. 27]
Samuels may not know that the original source for this was David Woodward’s book,
The Secret Raiders, 1955. At the time the book was published, only gossip and newspaper
reports would have been available to Woodward, and this is a further example of his
unreliability as a respectable historian. Unfortunately for Samuels, it is on record that
Port Bowen, the only vessel at the time with this name, ran aground on Castleshore
Beach, New Zealand, on 19 July 1939. But it is carelessness, not misfortune, that
Samuels has turned Woodward’s claim that the mines sank Baltavia into Batavia. In
fact, Orion’s mines sank neither a Baltavia nor a Batavia. (Samuels does not mention
that one of the mines sank HMNZS Puriri.)
The British allegedly reported that Orion’s ‘sister ship’ Widder hunting in ‘those areas’ (i.e. near
Noumea). [p. 27]
It is unlikely that the British reported this, for Widder was never in the Pacific. Where is
this report?
He then goes on to claim that the three ships, Komet, Orion and Kulmerland, working together, sank
Triona, Vinni, Komata, Triadic, Triaster. ‘Another 1,665 reluctant passengers came aboard.’ [p. 30]
That is, an average of 333 per ship. These ships were not primarily passenger ships and
would seldom have carried more than 20 or so actual passengers, with seldom more
than 60 crew members. Figures given in Komet’s log show a total of 675 prisoners
aboard the three German ships involved, 303 of these being from Rangitane, plus those
from Holmwood, Ringwood and Kota Nopan. Eyssen kept a very detailed War Diary,
and his figures also show numbers from individual ships.
Crew Passengers
Vinni
32
Nil
Triona
64
7
Komata
33
Nil
Total
129
7
=
136
Figures for Triadic and Triaster would be in Orion’s log, but they could not have carried an
additional 1,529 between them. Whence Samuels dredged up the figure of 1,655 is a mystery.
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Japanese submarines:
The ‘Japanese submarine’ story has been disproven so many times that it is pointless to go
into detail explaining why there was no Japanese submarine available to have been in the
position where Sydney was sunk. There are others who can do this at least as well as I could,
and those who are not convinced are not amenable to reason and evidence. Samuels writes
that I-58 ‘was in the Indian Ocean on November 19th 1941, when HMAS Sydney was
destroyed and all her survivors were slaughtered.’ [p. 12] No, she was not; she was at Kure,
which she left on 20 November in transit to Samah (Hainan). Everything that Samuels wrote
about how she sank Sydney or the allegedly brutal character of her commander therefore loses
any relevance to the Sydney-Kormoran engagement. (Records relating to I-58 mostly appear
under the number I-158, as she was one of the boats re-numbered in 1942.)
Michael Montgomery tried to link the alleged wreck of a Japanese submarine, bearing the
name He-Toi, off the coast of New South Wales, though there is little logic in that. [p. 196,
1981 edition] Besides, Japanese submarines did not have names, only numbers. Tom Frame
refers to the claim by a retired commercial diver, Colin Sampey, that he had found the wreck
of Sydney in 1969, 120 miles south-west of Carnarvon at a depth of 110 feet, and had made a
dive on it. Sampey also claimed that a ‘hermit’ on Dirk Hartog Island saw Sydney sink. He
said that the submarine, named ‘Tiger Lily’, had been commanded by Captain Fujita. [Frame,
pp. 227-28. He rightly dismisses these mischievous claims.] However, as said above,
Japanese submarines did not have names, certainly not English names, while the only
Japanese submarine commander named Fujita was Hidenori Fujita, who received his first
command – RO-103 – on 21 October 1942.
Let us look at some of the things that Samuels claims. For example: ‘By 24 November,
Australian Naval Board was satisfied that a Japanese I-class submarine had been operating in
conjunction with Kormoran and had sunk Sydney.’ [p. 51] NOT SO; this is irresponsible
distortion. It was not until late on 24 November that they realised that Sydney might have
been sunk. For a time there was a suggestion that a Vichy submarine might have been
involved, but the ACNB soon dropped the idea of a submarine. Samuels has homed in on I-58
as the boat responsible.
The record of I-58’s movements – as revealed in Japanese and American archives of naval
movements – locates the submarine and its crew from early September at the Japanese naval base
at Samah, Hainan Island, along with some “accounted for” subs which departed Samah for operations
off the Malayan coast on December 1st 1941. [p. 129]
Whatever claim Samuels makes that I-58 was at Samah in September 1941, it is totally
untrue that American archives ‘reveal’ this. If he thinks they do, let him cite the reference
number. If he cannot do that, and cannot cite a source that claims to give a verifiable
reference number, then he must necessarily withdraw his assertion. In fact, records do
not show any submarines at Samah before mid November 1941, and none is known to
have returned after 1 December. It was not a proper submarine base, just a holding area.
The dates of arrival of I-53 to I-58 are not recorded precisely, but it was already
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November when they left Kure. I-62 and I-63 left Sasebo on 26 November 1941; I-63
arrived at Samah on 3 December, I-62 probably but not certainly the same day.
Samuels writes that researchers isolated I-58 as the submarine that left the others in October
1941 for a long cruise. Three dockside workers were contacted; two said, I-58 left on 12
October; one said, near the end of October, heading for Sunda Strait; it was ‘no secret’.
[p. 129] I find it hard to believe that Samuels could have located dockside workers and
interviewed them in an intelligent way. (Did he check their credentials?) I find it even harder
to believe they could have remembered the dates when individual submarines put to sea, since
they had no special reason to commit them to memory. There are no available records showing
that any Japanese submarines were at Samah until mid to late November. [Movements can be
traced on several internet sites and will not be detailed here.] He writes that he spoke to Sakae
Hasegawa, an engineering hand on I-58, who said that they were at Samah in September
(They were not.), and in early October they were informed that they were going on a training
exercise, but he did not know where. He also said that they sank two warships. [p. 130] In
fact, I-58 sank four merchant vessels and damaged one, but no warships at all. That is not an
indication of reliability.
Samuels comments on several commanders, apart from the Torisu mentioned below.
Concerning Lieutenant-Commander Soshichi Kitamura, commander of I-58 from 31 October
1941 to 25 July 1942, when he took over I-27, he writes that Kitamura retired at the end of
January 1944 at 37, allegedly on the grounds of illness, but probably because his attack on
Sydney had endangered the secrecy of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. [p. 133] If he had
done something to incur the disapprobation of his superiors, he would not have been given a
new command in 1942; but he did not sink Sydney, so he had not endangered anything.
His account of how I-58 could have kept pace with Kormoran, seeing that the raider was
travelling at 15 knots and the submarine could not make that speed while submerged, and of
how it manoeuvred to put three torpedoes into Sydney, is a fantastic delusion. The U-boat
accompanying Atlantis tried very hard to reach a position from which it could torpedo
Devonshire; it was a virtually impossible task. Of course, it has now been shown that Sydney
received only one torpedo strike, so his story collapses for this reason as well.
Lack of verisimilitude does not deter Samuels, and early in his book he makes the emotive
and quite unsubstantiated allegation that I-58 ‘was in the Indian Ocean on November 19th 1941,
when HMAS Sydney was destroyed and all her survivors were slaughtered’. [p. 12] He is quite
shameless in his attitude to facts and logic. Concerning claims that all Japanese submarines
can be accounted for just prior to the Pacific war, Samuels writes: ‘This statement can only be
taken as fanciful and irrational.’ [p. 38] Now, there speaks a real expert on irrational fancies.
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Odds and Ends:
Herewith follow samples of a plethora of silly errors, most of which do little to advance
Samuels’ hypotheses, but merely serve to demonstrate his slovenliness. Everybody makes
mistakes, but the number made by Samuels is overwhelming.
Rupert Basil Michael (Cocky) Long. [p. 14]
Michel, not Michael. It was a Huguenot name.
Long gained the substantive rank of Lieutenant-Commander in September 1939. [p.14]
In fact he was promoted to Lieutenant-Commander on 15 January 1928.
‘As soon as Long was appointed Director of Intelligence in September 1939…’ [p. 14]
He was appointed de jure Director on 25 August; he had been de facto Director from
20 April 1936.
Reference to the female coastwatcher, Ruby ‘Boyes’. [p. 14]
It was Ruby Boye, not Boyes.
[I wrote the entry on Long for the Australian Dictionary of Biography, and I was asked to write
the entry for Ruby Boye, but I declined, as I did not know enough about her.]
‘Another obsession of Churchill’s, as the 1930s closed, was called Ultra – a name he’d chosen
himself.’ [p. 16]
NO. The name Ultra was not used until June 1941. Apparently, this material had
previously been attributed to an agent called ‘Boniface’.
The crew of Zealandia were ‘a motley crew of latter-day pirates with rum on their minds and their
breaths’. [p. 19]
This is an unwarranted slur on the Zealandia crew, for which Samuels produces no
justification. True, they had been on strike over conditions; that is a different story.
Edgerton Mott [p. 19]
Egerton Mott.
‘Orders to break off escort with Largs Bay and proceed with all haste for an interception could only
have originated from the Commander-in-Chief China Station.’ [p. 20]
Even if Sydney had been escorting Largs Bay, the ‘only’ is misplaced, and there were
no such orders. What are the sources for his allegations? In any case, she was not with
Largs Bay. (See section on Aquitania and Largs Bay.)
‘Aquitania was not free to proceed to sea until 6.00 pm on November 19th 1941, by which time
Admiral Layton in Singapore had learnt that HMAS Sydney had indeed found Captain Burnett’s
“strange ship”.’ [p. 21]
Nonsense. This sort of allegation should not be made without a reference to a source.
Re a German vessel: ‘Singapore had been monitoring it as wireless opportunities arose.’ [p. 21]
There were precious few opportunities to ‘monitor’ wireless transmissions from raiders;
they sent very few messages. Besides, Singapore concentrated on Japanese signals.
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‘When transmissions were intercepted by Singapore in the later part of the afternoon November 17th,
between the raider and a respondent, they were able to fix a position…’ [p. 21]
This is absolute nonsense. See section on wireless transmissions. Samuels sees no need
to cite any source or authority for his allegations.
‘Captain Bernhard Rogge, a fanatical Nazi…’ [p. 22]
What is the justification for this comment on Rogge’s political inclination? In order to
support his accusations, Samuels must represent all Germans as Nazis, almost always
preceded by ‘fanatical’. I wonder what his personal agenda is.
Atlantis was disguised as Dutch when she met Automedon. [p. 22]
Whatever her ‘disguise’, she represented herself to Automedon as the armed merchant
cruiser HMS Antenor.
In transcribing the translation of German report, he refers to Atlantis as Ship 161. [p. 24]
NO. She was Ship 16. This is probably just another typo.
Emperor Hirohito presented Rogge with ‘a magnificent gold samurai sword shortly after the fall of
Singapore’. [p. 26]
Samurai sword – yes. Gold – oh, please! Who invented this?
Regarding Automedon’s documents: ‘Why had the British Government entrusted such a secret
envelope to a civilian ship which had to pass through raider infested waters …? [p. 25]
It was a common practice to send even highly secret matters: ‘By Safe Hand. British
Master Only’ and it is an exaggeration to describe the Indian Ocean as ‘infested’.
HMS Gloucester stopped the merchant ship Asama Maru for a routine inspection and they were
surprised to find aboard twenty-one German technicians on their way to Japan to service raiders and
U-boats. [p. 26]
They knew exactly what they would find; British warships at that time did not routinely
take the political risk of stopping Japanese vessels. In addition, these men and others
leaving South America would mostly have been trying to return to Germany via the
Trans-Siberian Railway.
In 1948, Commodore Collins was appointed ‘Chief of Naval Staff and First Naval Member of the
Australian Commonwealth Naval Brigade’. [p. 31]
NO. Naval Brigades were abolished when the RAN was formed prior to World War I.
He was Chief of Naval Staff and 1NM of the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board.
Re Collins: ‘It is difficult to believe that such a man would have been one of the few privy to and
charged to keep silent the dark secret of HMAS Sydney’s fate, but with the facts as they stand, it is
still harder to believe he could not have known the truth.’ [p. 32]
No doubt he did know the truth, but the truth is not what Samuels wants to believe.
Sydney and Hobart were recalled as the need for convoy shadowing grew more critical. [p. 33]
Does Samuels think that ‘shadowing’ a convoy has the same meaning as ‘escorting’ a
convoy?
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‘To assist the Japanese further they had reliable charts thoughtfully provided by military exercises
carried out in conjunction with Australian forces for years.’ [p. 34]
Australian forces had not been carrying out either land or sea exercises with Japanese
forces, and the Japanese had better charts of large tracts of the northern waters than
Australia could have provided, thanks to their merchant ships and pearling luggers.
‘In Australian cities and seaports, members of Japanese secret societies, including the Black Dragon
Society, whose members operated fifth column radio transmitters and exchanged intelligence with the
Spanish Mission in Australia…’ [p. 34]
This is mostly nonsense. There was only one adherent of the Black Dragon Society in
Australia: Professor Ryonosuke Seita, lecturer at the University of Queensland. No
member of any other secret society is recorded. No Japanese in Australia had a
transmitter, not even the Consulate-General or the Legation. Messages could have been
sent by merchant ships once they put to sea, but this entailed risk, and the material was
seldom urgent. The involvement of a member of the ‘Spanish Mission’ is rumoured but
unsubstantiated. His antics were thought to involve smuggling rather than espionage.
Their ranks included many Chinese, who had a secret symbol tattooed under their armpits. [p. 34]
The tattoos, under the shoulder blade, or between thumb and forefinger, were used for
coolies working for the Japanese; to tattoo a spy in this way would have been a death
warrant.
‘[Nave] was brought back to Australia in 1940 to form the internal intelligence wing of Rupert Long’s
signals interception branch.’ [p. 35]
Nave was sent back for health reasons, as unfit for further tropical service, and Long
took advantage of this.
The Japanese naval code was changed on 1 November 1941. [p. 36]
No. The code remained the same; the encipherment changed.
Nishi Maru and Tokashino Maru were being sent to Australia to evacuate agents in November 1941.
[p. 37]
There was talk of trying to recover important businessmen and the pearl divers around
Broome and Thursday Island, but how many Japanese agents does Samuels think there
were in Australia? The number of actual agents could have fitted into a rowing boat.
What is his source for the involvement of these two vessels? (Takachiho Maru
evacuated civilians from the Netherlands East Indies.)
When certain secret material had been destroyed by Japanese embassies and consulates, they were
to cable the one word ‘HARUNAI’. [p. 37]
NO. HARUNA.
‘Detmers joined the Nazi Party in 1934…’ [p. 37]
NO, he did not, if only for the very good reason that it was against German military
law. The armed services were supposed to be apolitical, and servicemen were not even
allowed to vote; this regulation pre-dated the Third Reich. Besides, the membership
lists for German residents were closed from 1 May 1933 to 1937, except for youngsters
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who went straight from the Hitler Youth to the Party. With some exceptions, only
merchant seamen and German citizens residing outside Germany were accepted.
British Union and Eurylochus ‘atrocities’. [pp. 39-42] ‘These murders were a documented fact known
to the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy, but never acted upon.’ [p. 40-41]
Samuels does a big beat up, basing his claims on material by Michael Montgomery. The
alleged murders were just that: allegations. They were not ‘acted upon’ because they
were not true. Britain had little hesitation in trying Captain von Ruckteschell of Widder
for abandoning survivors. If Captain Caird’s alleged statement that ‘none of us were
intended to get out alive’ had been true, how would he account for the fact that 43 of his
crew were picked up by Kormoran and survived? It would take up too much space to
go into this matter thoroughly here.
‘We now know that Germany and Japan were cooperating closely by this stage: that interaction between
German raiders and Japanese vessels, including submarines, was common if not ordinary.’ [p. 47]
We know nothing of the kind. No German vessel of any kind met a Japanese submarine
at sea prior to December 1941. The only meeting of any kind was between Komet and a
Japanese whaling ship, which was unaware of the type of ship she was.
‘Unlike other Australians, Captain John Collins had access to intelligence Britain had gathered by
cracking the enemy’s Ultra code system.’ [p. 48]
‘Ultra’ was not a German ‘system’; it was a British security grading for the circulated
product of intelligence gathered from cryptanalysis of a German cipher system. Even
‘Enigma’ was not a term used by the Germans for either a system or a machine. They
called it simply the ‘Schlüsselmaschine’ (cipher machine).
Re Ultra: ‘British authorities were not permitted to let Australia or America know of it…’ [p. 48]
Australia was receiving such Ultra material as was of material use to Australia Station.
It was channelled through Commander Long.
‘At a time not exactly known possibly in the last two weeks of September and at least ten days prior to
the early departure of I-58 from Samah, Hainan Island, on 12 Octobr [sic] 1941, Yoshitomi Setsuzo
put forward a plan to Nobutake.’ [p. 65]
The Japanese custom is to put the family name before the given name; the practice
adopted by writers in the English language fluctuates according to the experience and
knowledge of the writer, and an assessment of the target readership. Samuels has
trouble determining which name is the family name and which isthe given name.
‘Nobutake’ is a given name; he means to refer to Vice Admiral Kondo.
‘Prior to 1938, Jurien Point south of Geraldton had been used by the Imperial Japanese Navy as a
submarine training area, with the Australian Government’s approval.’ [p. 66]
Source? Untrue, unless restricted to ‘prior to 1918’ and means surface vessels. Why
would the Japanese Navy compromise its tactics by practising them in an area where
they could be observed by foreigners? There were allegations of some suspicious
activity in the region of Jurien Bay, but if they were true it was more likely they had
something to do with smuggling or poaching.
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‘Detmers’ dates are pure fabrication. As we shall see, Kormoran and Kulmerland did not actually
meet until 5 November.’ [p. 67]
The fabrications are in the Jones-Taylor book, and they are repeated by Samuels.
Mareeba sailed from Sydney on 17 April 1941. [p. 70]
NO. On 17 April, Captain Skinner took command of the ship, having previously been
captain of Tanda. Mareeba left Sydney on 13 May.
‘Coincidentally Mareeba encountered Sydney on 13 May.’ [p. 70]
NO. Sydney was in Fremantle harbour that day. Captain Burnett joined her on 14 May
to take command on 15 May. Samuels takes a lot of dates from the Taylor-Jones book,
Prisoner of the Kormoran. As already mentioned, Taylor’s dates are seldom correct. It
would not have been very difficult for Samuels to have checked the Port Registers.
Stamatios G. Embiricos could not be taken as a prize because she had been converted to use both
coal and oil. [p. 71]
NO. She had been converted from using oil to using coal. If she could still have used
oil, there would have been no problem taking her in prize.
Germany learned of the fate of both Sydney and Kormoran very soon after the action; ‘the only means
by which Germany could have gained that knowledge so soon (including the fact that none of
Sydney’s crew had survived) was from a report by Kitamura aboard I-58 passed on to Germany by
Japan’. [p. 77]
NO. There are a number of points amiss with this statement, but the basic flaw is that
on 25 November it became known in Germany from cryptanalysis that something had
happened, because they had broken the Merchant Navy Code for November 1941, and
had read the message sent to Trocas by the ACNB. It was not until 28 November that
they obtained a fairly full picture from a message from Australia to Britain in a naval
cipher. In addition, the Far East Combined Bureau in Singapore was reading the
Japanese naval cipher fairly well in November 1941. As usual, Samuels does not
acknowledge any credible source.
‘The next batch [of prisoners] recovered by Trocas were taken to Fremantle before they were
transported to Carnarvon for questioning.’ [p. 78]
What nonsense! The interrogators were in Fremantle. The prisoners from Centaur and
Yandra, who were taken first to Carnarvon, had to be transported to Fremantle.
‘The conventional story is that Kormoran identified herself as the Dutch merchantman Straat
Malakka, another name thoughtfully provided by Admiral Wenneker in Tokyo.’ [p. 89]
The ships as which raiders might disguise themselves were allotted by the Seekriegsleitung before they left Germany, not by Wenneker. My source: Admiral Rogge,
commander of Atlantis. Kormoran had been disguised as Straat Malakka briefly from
23 April to 13 May, and then again from 8 July; Detmers he had had no direct contact
with Wenneker.
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Re Shu Ah Fah: ‘His evidence confirms the presence of a submarine, although he was unaware that I58 was there.’ [p. 93]
The Chinese mentioned meeting submarines, but these were U-boats that Kormoran
had supplied in the Atlantic. He did not mention a submarine being present during the
encounter with Sydney. How could Detmers and Kitamura have communicated unless
the submarine surfaced? And how could it have surfaced without every crewman,
including the Chinese, knowing this?
‘Neither the FBI or the then fledgling CIA has anything to offer, but their files are far from complete.’
[p. 98]
Is Samuels implying that the lack of files means that the Americans are also covering
up the submarine allegations? It is rather evidence that the claims have no substance.
There is no reason in the world why the FBI should hold any records relating to Sydney;
nor was it CIA business. In fact, the CIA was not formed until 1947. If anything
resembling Samuels’ claims had happened, it would have been covered by the Navy or
the State Department. (The CIA was not yet a fledgling; it was not even an egg.)
Samuels writes that the navy historian ‘was clearly misinformed as to how diligent Captain Burnett
and Sydney’s officers and men were’ and Keith Homard, an aircraftsman aboard Sydney, gave a
different picture. ‘Suddenly our searchlights were switched on and outlined in the beam some
hundreds of yards away was another ship. While we were signalling to each other our ship was slowly
cruising around the other one in ever narrowing circles and all guns trained.’ [p. 100]
Are we supposed to think that Sydney was as manoeuvrable as a jet ski? Think of the
implications. Sydney was a few hundred yards away from an unidentified vessel; she
was circling around it, which she could not have done without being broadside on; and
she was going closer. Guns trained or not, that was a recipe for the disaster that
happened on 19 November.
‘In chapter 3 we established that the Commander-in-Chief China Station in Singapore knew on the
19th that Sydney had been involved in an action. [p. 101]
NO; we did not establish this. Samuels made this unsubstantiated allegation from
unverified and unverifiable material.
Re Collins: ‘Anyone reading his less than accurate account may ponder the extent of his well known
devotion to the Navy and ask whether such a man might sacrifice decency for ‘the sake of the
service’. [p. 101]
This slur against Collins is outrageous. There are indeed errors in his booklet, the most
notable one being the photo caption stating that he was captain, 1939 to 1942. (Possibly
captioned by someone other than Collins) An occasional mistake does not mean
dishonesty.
Zealandia was handed over to HMAS Durban. [p. 112]
NO; HMS Durban.
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‘Sydney had encountered a flotilla of Japanese trading luggers also heading south and joined them
for a while.’ [p. 113-114]
Whence came this silly story? There were no trading luggers around Broome; they
were pearling luggers and would not have left their working area, except to make port –
a Japanese one. In November 1941, Japanese luggers were being recalled to Palau, not
being allowed to wander all over the place.
‘Sydney was taking on water in the bows and was down in that section, not the stern as Detmers
claims.’ [p. 115]
Detmers claimed nothing of the kind. This was a translator’s error. Detmers wrote
‘Back’, which means ‘forecastle’. An inadequate translator assumed that ‘Back’ had to
be the rear of the ship.
The ‘war lords of Downing Street and Washington were the puppet masters’ who made people ‘dance
to their tunes of glory’. [p. 135]
Overblown journalistic hyperbole with no basis of fact in the Sydney case.
Port Gregory ‘was shelled by a Japanese submarine. I-156, a sister-boat to I-158, left Surabaya on
January 21st 1943. Around midnight on January 28 the submarine surfaced 7 km off Port Gregory, 64
km north of Geraldton. Commander Tatenosuke Tosu scrambled crew and fired about ten 100 mm
shells from the deck gun.’ [p. 137]
I-156 may have been a ‘sister-boat’ to I-158, but the submarine that shelled Port
Gregory, I-165, was not. The commander of I-156 in January 1943 was Lieutenant
Commander Minoru Yonehara, and she was then at Kure. The commander of I-165 was
Kennosuke Torisu, not Tatenosuke Tosu. (The name ‘Jorisu’, given by Jim Davies in his
book, The Lady was not a Spy, is a misreading of Japanese handwriting.) Torisu became
an eminent historical writer after the war, and there are many references to him on
Internet.
(For what it is worth: ‘tate’ and ‘ken’ are alternative readings of the same nine-stroke
character. Thus, a building is ‘tatemono’, but architecture is ‘kenchiku’. There is often no
way of guessing which of several readings a Japanese person will be using for the characters
with which the name is written. That is why Japanese so frequently had out meishi: cards
with their names in the kanji characters and the pronunciation in the basic syllable form.)
‘Failure to ask help from the public to sweep the sea with every vessel available and every aircraft in
private hands that could fly there. There was no excuse for these failures.’ [p. 142]
In 1941, there were few aircraft ‘in private hands’, and still fewer capable of flying long
distances over the open ocean, and all suitable available vessels were sent out. Besides,
going public would have been highly detrimental.
Samuels gives the impression that he has compiled his book from a superficial reading of
three or four of the worst books on the topic and has never consulted Archives anywhere. (If
he has, it does not show.) I have worked in Archives and Record Offices, Federal and State,
all around mainland Australia except Darwin, as well as in Washington DC, San Francisco,
Kew (London), Cambridge, Wellington NZ, Ottawa, San Francisco, Freiburg i. B. and maybe
others I have forgotten. National Archives Australia is usually very pleasant to work with; so
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is National Archives and Records Administration, Washington. I have tried to work in FBI
Archives, but when staff members are not being obstructive, they can be quite obtuse.
As for the endorsements on the back cover:
Captain Alan Norton-Smith (formerly RAN): – Alan Norton (no hyphen) Smith may have
been a merchant navy captain, but highest rank I could find for him in the navy was at his
discharge in 1946 as Lieutenant RANR(S). If this is correct, then to foster the impression that
he was a Captain RAN is to deck him out with borrowed plumes. Was this Samuels’ idea? I
am willing to revise my judgment if evidence of further service is provided.
Professor Bruce Horsfield: a professor would surely not endorse a book he had not read,
would he? But how in the world could he have read this book without noticing some of these
glaring errors? How could he then have endorsed it? Or did Samuels use his name without
permission?
Halstead Press: how could this long-established, reputable publishing company jeopardise its
reputation by lending its imprint to such a silly production? Would it have published a book
without running it past a reader, who ought to have noted some of the obvious errors and
inconsistencies, or an editor who would at least pick up such mistakes as ‘ship’s compliment’
(43) or ‘halloed confidential trust’ (48), or at the very minimum a proof reader? Whatever
happened?
After working on the Sydney story on and off for some thirty years, I have heard most silly
stories about the battle, from the wreck of the cruiser being towed to Japan by a submarine to
having her abducted to an alien galaxy by a space ship. Usually, I no longer respond to
allegations that are merely weird; readers might speculate as to my reasons for making an
exception of Samuels’ book.
Dr Tom Lewis concluded a review of Samuels’ book thus:
The saddest aspect of "Somewhere Below", however, is the anguish it will bring anyone
related to a member of Sydney's ship's company who is unlucky enough to read this book.
They have suffered enough already without going through the torment of imagining their
loved ones being secretly buried in an unmarked grave. I urge them not to buy this book for
that reason alone, and for anyone else, you will get far better entertainment from a good
Roswell flying saucer story, for it is alongside such fantasies that "Somewhere Below" should
be shelved. [I have not been able to find the full article; the extract is taken from an email
circulated by James Eagles.]
The comments apply with even greater force to Montagu’s book. (See section on forgeries.)
In naval parlance: I concur.
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Herewith are a few oddments that I located after the sections into which they could have been
incorporated had already been submitted.
German-Japanese collaboration: As Germany refused to tell Japan where the raiders were
operating, or to arrange recognition signals, this alone makes the story that Kormoran
collaborated with a Japanese submarine in mid November 1941 totally untenable, though I
suspect that adherents of the ‘Japanese submarine’ theory will find some excuse to sidestep
this evidence.
Admiralty Records file, PG33479: Records of telegrams between Skl and Naval Attaché,
Tokyo.
Tokyo to Berlin, 21 November 1941.
Considering possible imminent outbreak war America Japan Admiralty indicating intended
cruiser and submarine warfare in Pacific and Indian Ocean requested number and operational
areas German naval forces until end year also suggestion for recognition signals.
Endorsed by hand in Berlin:
a. Should we not wait a bit? I still do not believe in war between Japan and US. [Signed] I.c.
b. The question of recognition signals must receive early consideration; let us be reticent
about operational areas. [Signed] Wagner. Head of I.Abt. Skl.
Berlin to Tokyo, 11 December 1941.
Arrangement of recognition signals between Japanese and German forces at present not
necessary. [Endorsed] Skl/Chef MND.
Evidence of the connection between John Samuels and Pastor Ivan Wittwer, with David
Kennedy and Professor Horsfield on the fringes.
Email from Professor Bruce Horsfield to David Kennedy, circulated to a wide net of contacts.
Also on the circulation list: Michael Montgomery, John McArthur and Warren Whittaker.
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2006 11:14 PM
Subject: RE: I-158 & all those
Dear All
Happy New Year to everyone and hopefully 2007 will be the year of the breakthrough in all
things Sydney.
Further to David's comment below that Wittwer may have "had personal issues to handle
about the Japanese".
Earlier this year Wittwer visited John Samuels in Warwick and I was asked to videotape his
story at the USQ tv studios. This took about 2 hours or so in front of the camera. Having
heard previously - from David - that he had some bad issues about the Japanese I asked him
directly if that was the case and followed up his convincing dismissal of the idea with some
probing questions.
I was finally satisfied that Wittwer's testimony was not in the least influenced by any negative
feelings towards the Japanese. The man was imbued with self-awareness and self-knowledge.
His calling as a Pastor also underwrote his directness, ethical regard for accuracy, veracity
and detachment. I have met some real ravers in this Sydney research environment over the
years but Wittwer was certainly not one of them - far from it.
1
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Barbara Poniewierski
Also, Wittwer had two very good PhD's, one of which was in historiography - the
methodology of being a good historical researcher and writer. [The other PhD was in
Linguistics, I believe]. I mention these PhDs only because they help explain why he made a
very methodical and coherent interviewee.
Regards
Bruce
________________________________
An observation on Wittwer’s Ph.D.s: no doubt he did some research for his theses. However,
he has stated (almost as some sort of a virtue) that he has read nothing on the loss of Sydney,
and I would suspect that he has not read much on any other aspect of naval history. That does
not qualify him as an expert on the topic of Sydney.
The Rolley letter:
This letter is in fact totally irrelevant, but a comment is being included, because some people
have tried to use it to show that Captain Burnett was aware of the presence of a raider. It
contains the sentence: ‘At the moment we are waiting for a enemy ship to show up so as we
can sink it, but I am afraid they take some finding.’
However, examination of the letter shows that there is a postscript along the left margin.
This says: ‘By the way – we were unlucky enough to have spent Easter at sea.’ Easter Sunday
in 1941 fell on 13 April; Sydney returned to Fremantle on 15 April. It is obvious that this
letter was written while Collins was in command, and it has nothing to do with Burnett.
(Letter is appended.)
2
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Barbara Poniewierski
3
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Barbara Poniewierski
Although of no real use, this may be of some interest: This greetings card for
Christmas (1934?) and New Year, signed by officers of Köln, was confiscated
from an Adelaide resident during the war.
The top signature is Captain Otto Schniewind, who was later in charge of
sending out raiders.
Three lines from the bottom, in the centre: Günther Gumprich, commander of
Thor and Michel.
Just above that, extreme right, is Detmers’ signature.
4
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Barbara Poniewierski
Extract from an article by Arthur Lane on NESA website, with a recommendation for
John Samuel’s book. ‘Read the book.’)
Unsung Heroes 3.
http://www.nesa.org.uk/bp/b.unsungheroes3.htm
[For some reason, this site can no longer be accessed at this address as a link, nor can I find a
path through the NESA site, but it can still be found at present by typing in the address
directly, or by using key words in a Google search.]
A PRELUDE TO WAR SECRET EXPOSED.
November 19th 1941 just 28 days before Japans attack on Pearl harbour The Australian war
ship HMAS Sydney was operating off Western Australia. when she came across the German
raider Kormoran. In the short battle which ensued The Kormoran was sunk and as the Sydney
started to limp away, she was hit by one or two torpedos and she sank with the loss of all the
crew.
The disappearance of the Sydney caused no immediate alarm, as ships often went missing for
several days before reporting, and it was not until the end of December that the ship was
officially reported missing presumed sunk.
It was not until the end of the war that enquiries were made concerning this missing ship. The
time Sydney went missing, Japan had not entered the war. Ashore the Naval authorities were
aware that HMAS Sydney had engaged with a German raider, and it was presumed that both
ships had sunk each other, until enquiries revealed that nothing remained of the Sydney. no
survivors, no wreckage, no radio messages etc.
Further investigations discovered that 360 of the Kormorans crew had been rescued. those
questioned were of the opinion that Sydney had sunk their ship and then retired. One of them
remembered that as the warship retired, there was an explosion which lit the sky. Over the
following years further enquiries suggested that a Japanese submarine had fired two torpedos
into the Sydney, after which the crew of the submarine machine gunned all survivors and
destroyed and sunk any wreckage.
As late as 1998 it was established that a Japanese submarine 1-58 had been illegally operating
off Western Australia at the time the Sydney was sunk.
These facts raised many questions which included the following,
• It is now a well known fact that the Japanese were lured into the war, in order to bring
the Americans with all their wealth and manpower into the war. It was well known
that the Japanese would attack Pearl on the 7th December. In fact the Japanese fleet
had been shadowed since leaving home waters.
Had the fact that a Japanese submarine had attacked and sunk an allied warship while
supposed negotiations between Japan and the west were still being held, it would be
considered an immediate declaration of war, which under normal circumstances the British
government would have retaliated
However Churchill and Roosevelt had already made preparations for the Japanese to attack
an American naval base in order to bring the Americans into the war. They had no wish for
anything to divert their plans. So although the British and Australian governments were fully
aware that Japanese submarines were operating in the Australian hemisphere, the matter had
to remain secret. The British government were in possession of machinations from which
they were able to listen and record every movement of Japanese shipping. Read the book
(“Somewhere Below ISBN 192083131 2 ) .
5
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15 BEL
LATED OD
DDMENTS
S
Barrbara Ponieewierski
This artticle is from
m the neo-Nazi Adelaid
de Institutee: to my surpprise, I was able to locaate it
again att http://adelaideinstitute.org/Dissenters1/zund
del/reports_april22.htm
m
It had, after
a
all, nott been takenn down. I apppend it herre so that it will be avaiilable to
researchhers even iff the site is lost.
l
Left-w
wing proponeents of the ‘Japanese
‘
suubmarine’ th
heory
may be surprised too learn that they have strange
s
bedffellows.
Friday, 22
2 April
From: Michael Walsh
W
Sent: Friday,
F
Aprril 22, 2005 7:43 PM
Subjectt: Round One
O to the Barbarians
B
s
HMAS
S SYDNEY WAS FIRS
ST. PEARL
L HARBOR CAME SECOND.
S
Not suurprisingly and largelyy due to the Govern
nment’s reluctance too release pertinent
p
documeents, * the sinking of the
t Australiian battle crruiser HMA
AS Sydney w
with the loss of 645
crew onn November 19, 1941 was crediteed to the Geerman raideer Kormorann. This wou
uld have
made heer the only warship to succumb too a raider in the whole course
c
of thhe war.
The eviidence how
wever pointss to her being sunk by
y a Japanesse submarinne in an acction for
which the
t Kormorran’s comm
mander wass eternally grateful. Five
F
days laater the Au
ustralian
Navy was
w still dennying all knnowledge off the Sydneyy’s fate whhilst the Adm
miral Comm
manding
was reccording in his
h diary thhe Naval Booard’s findiings that shhe had in faact been su
unk by a
submarine.
w the sinkking of the HMAS
H
Sydnney deliberaately set up to
The queestion beingg asked is, was
convincce Roosevellt that Japann, goaded beeyond endu
urance by ann oil blockadde, was inteent on
fightingg a defensivve war? Suchh was Churrchill’s desp
peration to bring
b
Ameriica in to thee war
that the sacrifice off 645 crewm
men would have
h
been a small pricee to pay. Hee (and Roossevelt)
got theiir wish whenn a fortnighht later Pearrl Harbor waas attacked.
* Churcchill wartim
me correspoondence filee PREM 3 252/5
2
and PREM
P
3 252/6B are cllosed ‘in
the national interesst’ and may be releasedd in 2011.
[This iteem comes toowards the end of a tiraade on the saintly
s
Hitleer and the beeastly Churcchill and
Roosevelt.]
6
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Barbara Poniewierski
Daily Telegraph and Steve Gee:
No doubt Steve Gee did not foresee the consequences when he wrote an article for the Daily
Telegraph, 18 March 2008, which began: ‘The arrogance of the British captain in command of
the ill-fated HMAS Sydney was to blame for the ship's loss under a barrage of gunfire from the
German raider Kormoran, it was claimed yesterday.’ A little more thought would have forestalled the emotional, incorrect and politically motivated comment by ‘John of Bairnsdale’:
If true, not surprising. With what the English upper class military has done time and time
again to serving Australians over nearly 130 years, thank God we will never be under the
influence of privileged, arrogant and incompetent English private school boys again.
Of course Burnett was British: a British Australian; but he was not a ‘privileged, arrogant and
incompetent English private school boy’. He came from a fairly ordinary, average Australian
background. It was also unjust to call him ‘arrogant’. Over-confident, yes; lacking in relevant
experience, yes. But that does not equal arrogance. Gee could have chosen his words more
carefully, and the anonymous ‘John of Bairnsdale’ should shut up when he does not know
what he is talking about.
Equally inane is the posted comment by the similarly anonymous ‘Hell Fire Rod of Tweed’.
Its illiteracy is an indication of his incapacity for logical thinking and disregard for accuracy:
If you are interested in the HMAS Sydney, have a look at the book by Naval intelligence
officer John Samuels called, SOMEWHERE BELOW, his investigation of the sinking
of the Japanese submarine I-52 commanded by Kitamura Soshichi, while the Sydney
stood off at a distance trying to get Kormoron, which was illegally under a dutch flag
disguised as a dutch ship to respond to a coded identification call sign, Soshichi is the
person responsible for making sure the Sydney was the only warship to, ever, have no
survivors from it’s sinking. This sub commander has form in criminal war atrocities,
being the commander that sunk the well marked and lite up Hospital ship Centaur off
Morton Is QLD. Read the book and make an informed decision on the huge amount of
evidence that is available form Samuels investigation.
1. According to my research, Samuels was never an officer of Naval Intelligence, though he
likes to give this impression. Perhaps he could provide details of his service?
2. ‘[The] sinking of the Japanese submarine’? Presumably he means ‘by the Japanese
submarine’.
3. Samuels claimed that it was I-58 that sank Sydney, not I-52.
4. It is Kormoran, not Kormoron.
5. It is not illegal for a vessel to adopt a disguise. Sydney had done this under Collins.
6. ‘Soshichi’ is a given name; the surname was ‘Kitamura’.
7. Sydney was far from being the only warship to sink without survivors.
8. Kitamura had nothing to do with Centaur. She was sunk by I-177, commanded by Hajime
Nakagawa.
9. Moreton Island, not Morton.
10. Read something a lot better than the dodgy account by Samuels.
7
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Barbara Poniewierski
Cole Inquiry Submissions:
I have deliberately refrained from reading submissions to the Cole Inquiry. It is unlikely that
much will turn up that I have not already covered in my submissions and I become depressed
by the ignorance and incapacity for logical reasoning constantly displayed. However, I came
across some material by one George Karlov, which appears to be a submission, and it is a
good example of why I do not want to have any more of this inflicted on me. Having seen it
accidentally, I shall make a few comments.
He cites as his sources John Samuels, Michael Montgomery, John Doohan, John Macarthur
and ‘others’. He could hardly have chosen a worse set of characters. If he had added John
Montagu, the list would be almost complete. Then he refers to ‘a litany of lies’, meaning the
‘official story’ and derides those who support it as roughly the truth.
He writes that ‘a British merchant seamen held prisoner on her has described in detail how she once
rendez-vous’ed with a Japanese submarine’.
He probably has the unreliable Taylor-Jones book in mind, but his reference is not
correct. Would he please cite the page number on which this was allegedly claimed?
‘On November 18, according to the ship's official Vessel Service History, he was specifically
instructed by C-in-C China in Singapore to intercept her and put her out of action.’
Nothing of the sort appears in any official ‘Service History’. I know the site he means;
it is not official, and it is wrong.
‘SYDNEY was sighted off Dirk Hartog Island around 10AM steaming South at full speed.’
Sydney was not sighted off Dirk Hartog Island, and I have seen no other claim that she
was. This claim may be related to an alleged sighting of Uco.
Karlov repeats the claims by Arthur Lane and Julius Ingvarson regarding wireless signals
from Sydney. Lane denies that he ever made such claims and he disowns them. Ingvarson’s
claims have a very frail foundation. Both these are covered in my section on wireless signals.
‘Captain David Burnett another son of the captain of SYDNEY, in an interview with Michael
Montgomery, was scathing about the claim that Carley float showed only damage from shrapnel.’
Captain Burnett had two sons: Patrick and Rory. Who is this ‘David’ blow-in?
‘In early 1942, Captain Laurence Snook of the Army Medical Corps was ordered to perform an
autopsy on a very badly decomposed male body. We don't know the exact date because Snook is
dead and part of his file was closed in 1995.’
I have covered this story in my section on ‘Bodies’, but it must be repeated that the file
on Snook was not closed, and is in fact digitised on the internet site of National
Archives Australia.
‘The Dutch set up a 3 man intercept station at Carnarvon in mid 1941 which would have picked up
SYDNEY traffic.’
As I understand it, the Dutch intercept station was not ‘at Carnarvon’ but further north,
and it was not set up until the Dutch were driven out of the East Indies in early 1942.
The reason why I find submissions of this type so depressing is that they indicate a weakness
in our democratic system. People with so little capacity to evaluate evidence have a vote of
equal value to that of people capable of thinking, and with the freedom to express opinions
comes the freedom to peddle irresponsible absurdities. The problem seems insoluble.
8
SUBM.005.0409
1
ACCOUNT BY OBERLEUTNANT HEINRICH FRIEDRICH AHL (AIR OBSERVER)
CONCERNING THE BATTLE BETWEEN SYDNEY AND KORMORAN
(The ‘First Phase’ evidently concerns part of the raider’s cruise prior to encountering Sydney,
and the first sighting off the cruiser. The story resumes.)
Second Phase
Sydney’s Pursuit of Kormoran
The Commandant decides to avoid being seen by the cruiser by heading away in a southwesterly direction, thus widening the distance from the opponent and at the same time
showing the narrow silhouette. Running away does not make him seem at all suspicious. On
the contrary! Determined precisely by the danger of auxiliary cruiser activities, there was the
order for all ships plying in Allied service to turn away immediately upon sighting mastheads
or smoke columns, in order to remain undetected. – The auxiliary cruiser was equipped with
very modern diesel-electric engines, which however, like all new things, had their problems.
In lengthy practical usage, complications almost always eventuate. Thus at that time repairs
to the fourth engine had just been carried out successfully. The order is given to turn this one
on, in order to bring the ship up to full speed. In wartime it is particularly important to travel
without smoke, for the column of smoke can be seen a very long way. Unfortunately this time
switching on was not done without generating smoke. Whether the smoke column was seen
by Sydney will never be known, as there was no survivor from the cruiser. What is certain is
that Sydney turned towards Kormoran and took up the pursuit immediately after the smoke
became visible.1 It is however most probable that the cruiser could not have overlooked its
opponent, since the distance grew rapidly less owing to the high speed with which it was
approaching, despite the evasive course of the auxiliary cruiser.
As soon as it became clear on the auxiliary cruiser that the cruiser was pursuing, the
corresponding orders were given: ‘Load with armour-piercing shells with base fuse and
secure.’ And the order, which must have brought the seriousness of the situation to the
consciousness of the most hard-boiled optimists aboard: ‘All men to put on life-jackets.’ (In
general, when stopping merchant ships, the aim is inflict only enough superficial damage to
force the opponent to surrender or to stop using its weapons or wireless. If possible, serious
damage is avoided at first, as the ship might be sent back to one’s own country as a prize.
Therefore normal shells are used with a so-called nose fuse. Against armoured targets, base
fused shells are used, for this causes a delay and they pierce the armour-plating before
detonating.)
What happened now was an inconceivable nervous strain for the Commandant and crew,
particularly for the Commandant, who bore the whole responsibility. It is not the case that the
chances in battle are simply proportional to the distance, i.e. the greater the distance, the less
the less the chances for the auxiliary cruiser and vice versa. Many other factors play a role,
such as the penetrating power of the shells at various ranges, the possibility of making it more
difficult to hit by evasive tactics … etc. It would be carrying it too far to enlarge here upon
these purely technical considerations. What should be mentioned in this connection is the
condition that, although the cruiser in every phase of the battle was decidedly superior to the
auxiliary cruiser, there were however certain changes in the degree of this superiority, and
SUBM.005.0410
2
that above all the prospects for the auxiliary cruiser did not simply become continually better
through lessening distance. Otherwise the nervous tension would not have been as great for
the Commandant as it was in fact. Since however the favourable and unfavourable phase
alternated, there was always the big risk of letting the cruiser run out of the former and into
the latter. How easily it could begin the battle just then,
The plan that Captain Detmers2 followed was this: to risk everything on maintaining the
disguise. This was similar to the behaviour of the auxiliary cruiser Pinguin when this was
challenged by the English cruiser Cornwall and was sunk after extremely brave and stubborn
resistance. It was however theoretically possible, that Sydney would let Kormoran go. The
second possibility, which had the advantage over the other of being to a certain extent in
practice more probable, was that the cruiser could be tempted into carrying out an
investigation. For this purpose it would have to approach to a distance at which it would
sacrifice important advantages.
Let us now transfer ourselves to the after gunnery control, which stands right at the stern of
the ship. The tension is great. How will the cruiser behave? It has more modern guns and thus
a greater range. The least risk for it is to demand that we stop by a shot across the bow
outside our range or right at the extreme range, in order to make its own behaviour dependent
on the reaction of the auxiliary cruiser. If the latter for example would not obey the order,
then Sydney could open fire almost without danger to itself. For even if Kormoran could just
have managed to reach it with its guns, the penetrating power of the shells would have been
too weak to reach the vital parts of the ship, which naturally were all armoured. On the other
hand, its shells would always be effective against the unarmoured German ship, if they hit at
all. In addition, the cruiser was more likely to score hits than the auxiliary cruiser, owing to
its modern artillery controls.
Thus the shot to stop us is expected at any moment. But the time passes, and the distance
decreases steadily and quickly. Already the bow wave of the cruiser can be recognised. It is
travelling at high speed, probably full speed; that is almost twice as fast as its opponent. From
the latter can easily be seen that the aircraft has been made clear for a reconnaissance. The
catapult had for a time stood at an angle, but had been swung back in when it became clear
that Kormoran could not escape. With its enormous superiority of speed, the cruiser was in a
position to dictate both the battle range and the position from which its artillery would have
the best visibility and possibility of scoring hits. Moreover, if it stayed far enough away, it
could quickly get out of range of the opponent, if the fighting power of the latter should be
unexpectedly high (as for example the cruiser Cornwall did in the previously mentioned
battle with the auxiliary cruiser Pinguin). It could, if necessary, keep within sight until
reinforcements came. The auxiliary cruiser in the mean time was doomed to passivity in the
matter.
At this point in time, one of the sailors came running astern and did something to the
smoke generator there. It is now not long until twilight, which is short in the tropics. Does the
Commandant intend to save us in the darkness by a smoke screen? Would this however be
SUBM.005.0411
3
any use with an opponent equipped with radar?3 In this tricky situation, which has existed
since sighting the cruiser, the comradely and human bonds between crew and Commandant
are particularly valuable. This model seaman and soldier4 is the axis, and everyone trusts that
he will exploit the situation as much as is humanly possible. Therefore everyone has only one
thought, to carry out orders and instructions even faster and more exactly than usual – if that
is possible – in order to translate the Commandant’s intentions into deeds as effectively as
possible.
There – a flash of light from the cruiser! Was it a shot? Is it the long-awaited shot across
the bow? No, not yet. It begins to signal with a searchlight. It wants to know the name,
nationality, and where-from and where-to of the merchantman. The Commandant plays the
part of the phlegmatic freighter, which feels too secure in the vicinity of the Australian coast
to keep an intensive lookout. And certainly not astern. The cruiser shows astonishing
patience. It comes quickly closer, constantly signalling its questions. It has just passed the
range at which things are not too unfavourable for the auxiliary cruiser, that is, provided all
good luck is with the latter and all bad luck with the former. It is the distance between long
and middle range. Here the cruiser, despite its modern artillery control, still needs a fair time
to get the range. Besides, the flight time of the shells was great enough for the auxiliary
cruiser to take successful evasive action despite its slowness. If especially bad luck was on
one side, and especially good luck on the other, it was possible for the German ship to score
hits about as quickly as its opponent. At this distance, the penetrating power of the shells was
also great enough to break through the armour plating.
Meanwhile, the Sydney has come near enough to begin to signal with flags. Now
Kormoran must react, if it does not want to appear even more suspicious. Slowly and
unhurriedly, as is done on merchant ships which will not have drilled in flag signalling, the
answers are given. (as footnote in original: which are protracted even more by deliberate
errors on the part of the signals Petty Officer) The watchword now is to gain time! The
cruiser must already reduce speed in order not to overshoot its opponent. Now the possibility
is there for the auxiliary cruiser to use its camouflage to the full, that is, to open fire suddenly
and effectively. Every metre by which the cruiser comes nearer is favourable. At this distance
no shot can miss! The auxiliary cruiser sends across: ‘Name of ship: Straat Malakka.
Nationality: Dutch. Underway from Freemantle to Batavia.’5 One can almost hear the
referring to ship identification books that is now going on aboard the cruiser. In Kormoran’s
wireless room the airwaves are monitored attentively. Would Sydney check with Freemantle
in order to check the claims of the auxiliary cruiser? If so, it would no longer hesitate to open
fire. Meanwhile, nothing stirs in the air waves.
The cruiser is lying on a parallel course at the same speed as the auxiliary cruiser.
Distance: half a nautical mile (900 metres). It is an incredibly short range. It is known that
moist air makes everything appear nearer. In addition, the surface of the water makes things
appear closer in any case. It is no exaggeration when one claims to have had the impression
that the cruiser was only a stone’s throw away. Details on the cruiser can be seen without
binoculars. On the bridge the caps of the officers and seamen gleam. One looks into the
SUBM.005.0412
4
barrels of the guns as into the muzzle of a pistol. It is therefore even more astonishing that the
cruiser lets itself be deceived. To be sure, Kormoran’s disguise is excellent, but they should
surely have recognised with the naked eye that the gun on the poop deck was not genuine. A
roughly-carved gun had been set up in sight there, as it was known that in the course of the
war all ships travelling in Allied service had been equipped with guns on the poop to combat
U-boats. The wooden contraption was not designed for such a close distance.
The tension on the auxiliary cruiser has reached its climax; now it is inevitable that
something happens. Will they perhaps let us go? The wish is so much father to the thought
that one considers the cruiser capable of this degree of recklessness. It had up till now shown
a very high degree of it.
Then Sydney does the thing that is right, and in the war situation the most suitable – and in
doing so brings on its own downfall. It asks for the secret name that all ships in AngloAmerican service have.6 Captain Detmers has relayed to the crew: ‘The cruiser has just asked
for our secret name. We cannot give it to him. Now the battle begins.’ Shortly after that the
order: ‘Decamouflage! Open fire!’7
Third Phase:
The Battle (cf. sketch – not included)
Before the description of the battle begins, a comparison of battle characteristics should be
given, as well as depicting which of them could be particularly effective on the basis of the
quite extraordinary situation that now arose.
(Meanings in this explanation: S = Sydney, K = Kormoran.
1.) Speed:
S. 32.5 knots (1 nautical mile = 1852 metres)
K. at that time, 16.5 knots.
2.) Artillery:
a) 15 cm guns:
S. 8 modern ones in four double turrets, all could be swung almost 360º.
K. 6 obsolete ones, of which only 2 could be used on both sides and all with a
significant restriction on account of the limitation of the field of fire; in addition, a shorter
range and greater dispersal that those of the cruiser (the latter particularly disadvantageous
for chances of hitting at long range).
b) 10.2 cm guns:
S. 8 anti-aircraft guns, also usable in surface battle against unarmoured targets.
K. none.
3.) Small calibre weapons:
The small-calibre weapons, which come into question only for fighting aircraft and
not for bombarding surface targets, need not be mentioned as regards Sydney. Kormoran,
which was dependent on every weapon, be it ever so small, of course exploited the
opportunity to use them against a ship that gave it an abnormally short battle range.
SUBM.005.0413
5
K. 5 2-cm anti-aircraft; also a 3.7-cm anti-tank.
4.) Torpedoes:
S. 2 quadruple tubes
K. 2 double tubes8
5.) Gunnery control:
S. Electric gunnery control with the advantage of finding the range quickly and better
holding of range.
K. Shooting over open sights.
6.) Reserve installations:
S. Almost all vital installations at least duplicated and situated as far as possible in
widely separated parts of the ship.
K. A few installations present in duplicate.
7.) Sturdiness:
S. Armour-plating, particularly of the parts mentioned in 6.)
K. No armour-plating at all.
8.) Disguise:
S. No opportunity for the cruiser, as for all warships.
K. This was the only advantage for the auxiliary cruiser against the crushing
superiority of the cruiser. (To be sure, the effectiveness of this ‘weapon’ depends very much
on the opponent, i.e. how far he lets himself be deceived.)
Of points 1 to 7, which normally all showed the decisive superiority of the cruiser, the
latter had itself negated the effectiveness by approaching to 900 metres:
a) Superior speed;
b) Greater range of his guns;
c) Accuracy at long and middle ranges (Electric gunnery control)
d) Better effectiveness of the armour plating at long range.
Kormoran on the contrary obtained the unique opportunity through the extraordinary
situation to exploit fully the disguise mentioned in point 8; that is, to open fire on its
opponent by surprise and as effectively as possible. The latter in particular is extremely
important. For opening fire to catch your opponent by surprise does not in itself achieve
much, if the range is greater. It is always necessary to get the range, and with the first salvo,
with which one cannot count on getting a hit, the advantage of disguise is lost. – In addition,
as already mentioned (see point 3) weapons could be used that would otherwise not come
into question, and which, as we shall see in the description of the battle, considerably
hampered the opponent.
It was necessary now, in order to obtain the greatest possible advantages right at the
beginning of the battle, to divide up the field of fire. One cannot do that at a normal distance;
one is happy to make any hits at all. Kormoran had 4 guns available in her broadside. The
first gun received both forward turrets of the cruiser as its target, the second the bridge with
the gunnery control, the third the aircraft, the fourth the two after guns.9 The first priority is
naturally to knock out the opponent’s main armament (its 10.2 cm guns were fortunately not
SUBM.005.0414
6
manned). Regarding the aircraft as a target there is this to be said: that this, as mentioned
earlier, had been made ready to start, so it was fuelled. Usually it stands without fuel on the
catapult, on account of the particularly high danger of explosion and fire; and this is exactly
why it was chosen as one of the targets. The 3.7 cm anti-tank gun, as well as the 2 cm antiaircraft guns, were to be used primarily against the unprotected torpedo tubes and the bridge,
as well as to hinder any movement and work on the open deck, for example, fire-fighting,
manning the likewise unprotected 10.2 cm guns, etc. Of course, it was intended to use the
torpedoes as well. It might be interesting to mention why the auxiliary cruiser had 3.7 cm
guns aboard at all, as they take aimed fire only up to a range of 2000 metres. In wartime ships
steam blacked out at night and can be seen as a shadow only at close range. It was very
important for the auxiliary cruiser to prevent the opposing ship from getting through a report
of its location. The 3.7 anti-tank gun was very suitable for delivering aimed fire on the
wireless room.
The order: ‘Decamouflage! Open fire!’ had the effect of releasing the nerves tense to
breaking point, for it meant the transition from the heavy load of waiting, of passivity, to the
‘liberating’ action in the real sense of the word. Decamouflaging is achieved with lightning
speed. Whole sections of the hull of bow and quarter-deck (the front and back parts of the
ship) fly up; hatch walls sink and free the guns. On the poop gunnery control stand two
signalmen are ready, one to haul down the camouflage flag, the other to hoist the German war
flag.10 They work without nervous haste, but as quickly as they can; the international law of
the sea prescribes that fire may be opened only after showing one’s own nationality. The
whole operation is designed to dovetail together and in a few seconds the Dutch freighter
‘Straat Malakka’ has become the auxiliary cruiser Kormoran.
The guns swing on their targets. At first, full broadsides are not fired. That would have
delayed the opening of fire. Every gun fires as soon as it has locked on to its target. With the
suddenness of a thunderstorm discharging itself, the battle breaks out. One has already
become accustomed to the noise of the firing, which is much greater in the armed
merchantmen than on warships (because of the better gun platforms). At first one always
thought it was hits received.
The devastating effect of the impact of the first shots can be seen clearly. The roof of one of
the forward turrets flies off. The bridge and the forward gunnery control station receive a
direct hit, which results not only in material damage, but also the decisive loss of the
personnel commanding the ship and the gunnery. It is most probable that the commander of
the ship was already killed at this point. As was foreseen, the explosion of the aircraft caused
a fire amidships. Simultaneously with the guns opening fire, the double tubes on the starboard
side let go both torpedoes. A high column of water showed the hit in the forward third of the
cruiser. The warship dips deep into the water. One could almost think Sydney was going
down. And so one could hear the enthusiastic shouts: ‘She’s on fire! She’s going under!’ The
small-calibre weapons keep up rapid fire on the bridge, gunnery control, port torpedo tubes
and for that matter on anything that moves on the open deck.
SUBM.005.0415
7
The consternation and surprise aboard Sydney must have been very great. To be sure, it
reacts with lightning speed to the decamouflaging of the auxiliary cruiser and opens fire
almost simultaneously with Kormoran. However, the first salvos go over the latter, so that the
cruiser is frightfully beaten up before it can achieve any hits itself; half its fire power – the
two forward turrets – is out of action; a torpedo sits in its insides; amidships a serious fire is
raging; the quadruple port torpedo tubes had been destroyed before the cruiser had a chance
to fire its torpedoes at its opponent; the senior officers in control of the ship and gunnery are
dead or wounded. The best chance of nevertheless rendering Kormoran harmless quickly lies
with the use of the starboard torpedo tubes. Thus the cruiser turns to port. Close, almost close
enough to touch, its bow passes behind our poop. Was it trying to ram us? That was possible.
However, nobody can clear this up. Still severely hampered by the fire of the small-calibre
weapons, Sydney fires all four torpedoes and misses.11
As the cruiser fell behind and changed from one side to the other, the disadvantage of
Kormoran’s restricted field of fire on became particularly evident. At first all 4 guns could
fire the broadside, but then only the one set up on the starboard poop deck. It could be swung
until directly astern, and it was interesting to see with what tension and impatience gun-layer
of the port poop gun, which likewise could fire directly astern, waited until it could take up
the fire. Hardly did Sydney’s bow appear in his sights than the first shot was away.
Meanwhile, Sydney had scored hits on Kormoran. Only a few, but on the unprotected ship
the effect of even a few hits is very great. And yet it was only one shot that sealed the fate of
the auxiliary cruiser. It passed through the so-called day’s usage tank and exploded in the
engine room. The oil stored in and day’s usage tank, which is situated high up – the bulk of
the fuel is stored below the waterline – streamed out into the engine room. While a normal
fire could probably have been extinguished, and it is hardly conceivable that all four engines
would be put out of action by the shrapnel effect of the shell, there was in this situation no
possibility of controlling the fire. Not even if the fire hoses, which had also been put out of
action by a hit, had remained intact. The other hits did not have any decisive effect. They lay
as follows:
1. on the gun in the forward hatch. The shell went over the ship, but is counted as a hit
because it carried away and killed one of the gun crew.
2. on the funnel, causing dead and wounded on the bridge and the gunnery control
position through particularly strong shrapnel effect.
3. behind the funnel (through the cabin of the executive officer and the ship’s doctor).
Let us return to our former observation post on the poop of the ship, in order to experience
the progress of the battle from there. The decisive hit in the engine room was felt here too.
Only at first one does not know the cause: Even before the cruiser crossed over to the port
side of the auxiliary cruiser, a sudden tremor, which made the whole poop deck of the ship
shudder, could be felt beneath the feet of those who were there. ‘We have lost one of our
propellers, and the empty shaft is racing’ is the thought that immediately occurs to several
people. While provisioning a U-boat in the South Atlantic a steel hawser had got into the port
screw, and despite intensive efforts it could not be removed.
SUBM.005.0416
8
Now the ship is losing speed and finally lies stationary. Sydney draws away slowly.
Apparently it is still under power and is not yet drifting like its opponent. Its turrets can
obviously no longer be swung. Anyway, they are pointing away from us. Would it still use its
10.2 cm guns, or does the fire that has engulfed most of the ship prevent this? But it is not
only worry about the 10.2 cm guns that causes Kormoran to continue firing with
undiminished intensity. However humane as war at sea is for people in distress at sea,
however chivalrous the conduct of both sides to those rescued and therefore prisoners, it is
pitiless as regards the destruction of an opposing warship. The destruction of the Bismarck is
an example, for, although in the end she was no longer capable of returning fire, she was put
under water using all means available. As long as a ship can still float, there is a possibility of
repairing it and returning it to service, or at least of using valuable individual parts. Only
when it has sunk in the open sea is this excluded with certainty.
Thus the commandant’s watchword arises necessarily and obviously out of the situation. It
is: ‘The cruiser must be put under water at all costs.’
Depending on the position of the auxiliary cruiser – it cannot be manoeuvred any more –
other guns join in and support the one on the port side of the poop, which shoots without
pause. The barrels glow and no longer run back into firing position. Buckets of water are
poured over them. Twilight has fallen. Sydney is already far away. The target can hardly be
seen any more. At first it seemed as though it was returning fire from its 10.2 cm guns, but
the red flashes were the ceaseless hits of our own guns. The cruiser must have taken countless
hits, through which all lifesaving apparatus on the open deck must have been destroyed. That
is the only way it can be explained that there was not one single survivor. For even though the
losses would certainly have been very high, it is hardly to be supposed that all were killed
when Kormoran had to cease fire on account of the onset of darkness. At this time, Sydney
could be seen only as a red fire-ball on the horizon. Previously it could be seen how whole
sections of the cruiser were glowing on account of the severe fires that had broken out on
board.
What is now the condition of the German auxiliary cruiser? There were no more hits. But
there was that shell that had exploded in the engine room and unfortunately had passed
through the day’s usage tank. But first let a member of the crew on the poop gunnery control
report his impression as he stepped out on deck immediately after fire ceased. ‘Actually, it
did not look too bad at all. There was no sign of destruction on the after part of the ship. Only
the funnel smoked terribly. Aha! So the logical conclusion is that we had not lost a propeller,
and the strong vibration at the stern was caused by a hit in the engine room, together with the
memory that we have been incapable of moving since that time. Through slightly wounded
men coming towards the stern, we learn of hits on the forward hatch, in and behind the
funnel, and that there were dead and wounded, particularly on the bridge and gunnery
control. There is mention also of a horn signal that meant: All officers to the bridge. Flames
are bursting from the funnel, and smoke and flames from the superstructure! So something
serious has happened after all. Now it is a question of getting to the bridge. On the lee side
(away from the wind) it is already impossible to get through. It is quite easy on the starboard
SUBM.005.0417
9
side. But up above it looks bad. The companionways have mostly been destroyed by hits.
Towards midships the superstructure is burning more fiercely. Besides, the fire, fanned by a
rising wind, is spreading rapidly. When the bridge is reached with difficulty, there is no
longer anyone up there.’
There had been an officers’ conference on whether the ship should be abandoned. However
great otherwise are the powers and independence of the commandant of a warship, and
especially of an auxiliary cruiser, there is an order that he cannot abandon ship, unless it is
already sinking, without the consent of the majority of officers. Since in our case most of the
officers had assembled on the bridge soon after the horn signal was sounded, and all could
see the commandant’s reasons for abandoning and blowing up Kormoran, it had not been
necessary to wait for the officers from the stern gunnery control.
With the commandant’s order: ‘Every man to the lifeboats’, the battle is concluded, and the
work of saving survivors begins, which is no less ticklish and dramatic than the battle itself.
Fourth Phase
The course of the rescue operation
and the abandonment of Kormoran
The fortunate circumstance that there had been comparatively few losses on the auxiliary
cruiser (estimated thirty including those killed it the engine room) meant that a large number
of life saving means were necessary. The boats that were immediately ready for use, those that
were hanging in the davits on the so-called boat deck, had become partly useless because of
shell splinters. Thus there was by far not enough life boat space to accommodate all
survivors. And time was not on the side of the German seamen, but very much against them.
For besides the ammunition for the guns and the torpedoes there were still about 400 mines
on board. Thus the German auxiliary cruiser was virtually a munitions ship. And anyone who
has seen on film or – from a distance – even in reality a munitions ship blowing up can have
some idea how unpleasant it was now to stay on the burning ship. After all available life
saving apparatus was away, the wounded being in them, of course, there were still about 120
men on board, including the officers, apart from one, who had been ordered into the by far
the largest lifeboat.12 Those who had left the ship were not all in boats. The available rafts
were also used. Normally these are adequate, as they are meant only to be a means of keeping
oneself afloat for at the most a few hours. Usually not all ships in a sea battle sink, and those
who are shipwrecked are rescued by the victors and taken aboard. That is what Kormoran
thought. And even if Sydney was no longer in a position to carry out the rescue work itself, it
would surely have reported the position of the battle by wireless and help was already on the
way. Besides, other means were used to keep oneself above water; thus one man for example
jumped overboard with a dog kennel.
SUBM.005.0418
10
One small episode, which casts a light on the all too human side, shall be mentioned here.
Germans have long been brought up to be thrifty and to look after their things, because they
are much less blessed with earthly goods than other nations. One of the crew (I myself)
stands in front of his locker in order to collect a few personal mementos that are particularly
valuable to him. He is wearing his oldest uniform, which he intended to wear out during the
cruise, and which has only a short life-span left. For a moment he considers changing into a
good one, but soon his conscience, trained to look after clothing, reports: ‘Too good for the
life boat.’ Yes, too good for the boat, but good enough to go down with the ship. The person
concerned does not realise the error of logic until his uniform, on account of days of the
effect of salt water, soon falls to pieces completely in imprisonment, while others could wear
their new ones for a long time.
Now to the state on board. There were still two big iron boats, but they could not be
brought into use, as far as human reckoning goes. They were in the forward hold and were
intended for a situation where the cruiser might have to be abandoned for some reason other
than battle. That could happen if fuel or food ran out, or if an uncontrollable fire broke out.
Then there had to be enough boat space for all crew members and possibly prisoners. It was
with this in mind that Captain Detmers had in addition had a captured life boat set up on each
side, starboard and port; they were undamaged and could be used in the rescue. Of course,
one needed intact engines in order to be able to put them out with derricks. This was even
more so for the heavy iron boats in Hold Number One. But Kormoran’s engines had failed.
What now? For the wooden boats on the forecastle, a simple solution had been found. In
order to give the guns a clear field of fire, the railing at the place in question could be
lowered. The boats were pushed there and thrown into the water. Fortunately, they survived
the fall of several metres undamaged. The two iron boats were the only hope for the 120 men
still on board. To be sure, some men had begun to build makeshift rafts, but one could hold
on to a raft for only a short time in any sort of heavy sea. One’s strength soon becomes
exhausted. And the wind, as already indicated, was constantly strengthening, so that there
was already a Force 3 to 4 sea. (At Force 3, white caps are formed, which ensure that anyone
on a raft is constantly half in the water.) The commandant ordered that an attempt be made to
get the boats out of the hold without the help of engines. As he had previously conducted the
battle from the bridge, now he conducts from the raised forecastle this manoeuvre that is,
without exaggeration, a matter of life or death.
But let us cast a glance at the condition of the ship. The whole midships is already in
flames, so that there is no longer any contact between fore and aft. The cutting off of this
contact forced one of the crew, whom the commandant had sent aft, to leave the ship without
any means of staying afloat.13 Normally, he would have been lost. Swimming in the water in
the prevailing darkness, he had no field of vision at all, and even if he had known where the
boats were, in the rising sea he could hardly have reached these by his own strength. But then
he saw directly above him, when he was in the trough of a wave, one of the lifeboats, which
took him aboard.
SUBM.005.0419
11
If the fire had burnt through to the many high explosives (mines, torpedoes, fuel,
ammunition), then it would have been the end.14 That was clear to all of us. In order to reduce
the danger from the torpedoes, the port double tubes were fired as a long-distance shot in the
direction of the cruise, which was now just a faint glow on the horizon. There was hardly any
chance of hitting, but if the torpedoes had to be fired anyway… Soon afterwards, Sydney was
lost to sight. There are three possibilities for the reason for her disappearance:
a) She went out of sight burning.
b) She has already brought the fire under control. (little likely)
c) The cruiser has sunk. (We did not dare believe in such success.)
Which of the three was correct could not be judged from Kormoran.
A miniature version of the expected fireworks display – albeit without danger – is given to
the men working like demons to get the boats out under the pressure of this impending event
when the 3.7 cm and signal ammunition on the bridge blow up. Thank goodness nobody was
injured.
A whole lot of pulleys are fitted above the derricks above Number 1 hold. While some of
the men are engaged in pulling up the boat with the help of these, there are others supporting
this work from below with hands and shoulders, always in danger of being crushed if the
pulleys do not hold the burden. Centimetre by centimetre the first boat is raised. The success
of the whole action seems so doubtful, however, that one of the men from the starboard
forecastle gun expresses his intention of awaiting the catastrophe sitting on his gun. And then
it reaches the point where the keel of the boat is resting on the edge of the hatch. For
technical reasons, it is not possible to use the pulleys to lower the boats to the deck. So it is
simply pushed. It hits with a deafening crash, but it is not damaged. It goes just as well with
the second boat. It was a great advantage that they were iron boats. And again the nervewracking grinding and scraping across the deck to the lowered railing. Two heavy splashes
into the water, and the boats are lying alongside Kormoran, full to the brim with water, but
not sunken, which could easily have happened. They float on their air tanks and are
immediately bailed out with feverish haste. Then they are equipped as well as possible, and
we begin to get in; that is, at first we get in, then we squash in. The boats were designed for
35 men. With 45, it is already thought that it is not possible to get any more in. But in the end
they are filled with up to 57. What must happen, does happen! It is a great physical effort and
nervous strain to get the first boat free of the one behind it. The boats are in the lee of the
auxiliary cruiser, so that the ship is drifting in the direction in which the boats want to pull
away, faster than they can increase the distance. In addition, the over-filled cutters are very
sparsely equipped. Four oars (for rowing) are available in the first one, and temporarily no
rudder (for steering). In any case, a heavy boat is almost unmanoeuvrable with 57 men. The
second lifeboat has to remain beside the hull, for the commandant wants to be quite sure that
his ship will not fall into the hands of the opponent even as a wreck, partly burnt out but
without exploding. For this purpose, it is necessary to use scuttling charges, so that the ship
sinks at all costs. Together with the mines officer, who is also the adjutant, Captain Detmers
undertakes this particularly dangerous task himself. Then he is the last to leave the ship.
SUBM.005.0420
12
The first of the iron boats has, in the mean time, succeeded in its efforts to put as big a
distance as possible between itself and the ship. It is really ill-advised to want to watch from a
close distance the spectacle of the explosion that can happen at any minute. The burning
Kormoran, like a giant torch, illuminates itself and the surroundings. There would not be a
crew member whose heart is not grieved to see this ship, which had been his home for so
long, in this condition.
The commandant’s boat is watched with great worry, as it can only with difficulty get away
from Kormoran’s hull. It is still quite close to the ship when the explosion occurs. The burst
of fire shoots up to the heavens, an enormous, awesome, indescribable firework show and
such a crashing and banging that it seemed the world was coming to an end. The auxiliary
cruiser breaks apart approximately in the middle. As though pushed forward by a gigantic
fist, the fore-part of the ship makes its last trip forwards, settles with the bow steeply upright
and sinks. At the same time the after part sinks. Pieces of wreckage fly even over the first
boat, which by this time had already gained a considerable distance and thinks itself out of
the danger area. In the vicinity of the auxiliary cruiser the sea seems to boil from the falling
pieces of the ship. Nobody would have given a cent for the commandant’s boat. Later it turns
out, thank goodness, that it escaped destruction as though by a miracle. The sea was actually
foaming around the boat, yet only one single fragment hit it, and this passed through the life
jacket of the coxswain without injuring him. No wounded, no damage to the boat: it was
really a miracle! –
Incidentally, the Kormoran crew did not learn until they were taken prisoner that Sydney
had gone down with all hands. Unfortunately, not all those who left the auxiliary cruiser alive
reached safety. A whole boat full disappeared.15 Most of those who were on rafts could also
not be saved. 320 survivors from 392 is however an incredibly favourable result compared
with Sydney, which went down with 645 men.16 Moreover, all Kormoran’s weapons were
intact and it had not received any hits below the waterline.
There was an attempt to ascribe to Kormoran the ‘blame’ for the Sydney tragedy, and
indeed not in the causative but in the criminal sense of the word. That it travelled in disguise
is a so-called ruse de guerre at sea, regulated and recognised by international law. Nobody on
the side of the enemy at the time thought of accusing the auxiliary cruiser Pinguin, which to
be sure did not manage to sink its opponent, although it had used its disguise to lure the
cruiser ‘Cornwall’ as near as possible, and then also at the moment that seemed most
favourable – of course after changing flags – suddenly opened fire.
If there was any ‘blame’ at all in this affair, then it is not with those who used a permitted
ruse, but with those who let themselves be deceived to such an extent. But it would be unfair
to deliver a judgment against the responsible person on the cruiser, that is, the captain. He
paid for his actions, for which we do not know the reasons, with his life, and his crew, in a
way worthy of the great English maritime tradition, fought a good fight with the aim of
destroying their opponent, despite the devastating effect of Kormoran’s first shots and the
SUBM.005.0421
13
torpedo; and their brave efforts were in the end successful: the opposing ship had to be
abandoned by its crew and scuttled.
The German auxiliary cruiser commandant, Captain Theodor Detmers, may however
without doubt claim for himself that – relying on his crew and in particular on the leaders and
crew of the guns, in the words of our former opponent ‘accomplished one of the most
remarkable deeds in the entire history of naval warfare’.
5½ days underway to the Australian coast
in an over-filled lifeboat
Let us follow the track of the first of the iron boats, which was one of the two boats to reach
the Australian coast under its own power. One of the participants describes course of the trip
as follows:
The wind strength keeps increasing. We make efforts not to come athwart the swell, which
are not always successful. Later, with a quite different state of the sea, we come side-on to the
swell. Trust in our boat comes only after we have had some good experiences with it. In the
first night, things look bad. We wish for daylight and hope to get more oars. After daybreak,
we see 2 rubber boats and a cutter. We pull towards the cutter. Perhaps we can transfer a few
men across.
We are packed together like herrings. Many had been seasick during the night; I too. The
tinned apricots that I had eaten immediately before getting into the lifeboat disagreed with
me. As quickly as the seasickness arose in me, it disappeared again, actually suddenly when I
vomited. I said then: ‘So, now I am ready for a action again.’ That was already before
Kormoran sank.
The cutter seemed near enough to touch. Nevertheless, it was only about 8.00 o’clock that
we reached it, after hours during which the distance scarcely grew less. Since we had the
impression that the boat was pulling away from us, we called, whistled and waved, which
was returned by the other boat. At one time it seemed as though they were coming towards
us, at another as though they were pulling away, and a third time as though they were not
moving their oars. The boat, the largest that we had, was likewise over-filled with about 80
men. A third of the occupants could not sit down. The wounded and seriously ill took up a lot
of space. In addition, it was shipping water. It was simply using the oars to hold itself well to
the sea. There were hardly any provisions on board. Thus we could neither send men over nor
take on oars. A small rubber raft acted as a drift anchor for the cutter. The two rafts that we had
sent to this boat could also not be taken aboard. Their fate seemed hopeless, unless they were
picked up. Fortunately, two rubber boats with a considerable number of occupants were
rescued by ships. We passed over to the large cutter: a case of milk, a case of hard tack, and a
jib. Then we rowed onwards, while the other boat simply tried to keep afloat. Their condition
was sorrier than ours, for we could at least do something in order to get closer to land.
SUBM.005.0422
14
However, the departure seemed to make little progress, as also the speed of approaching
had cause a feeling of dissatisfaction. We have a mainsail and a jib. At first we did not think
much of sailing, unless there was a following wind. Otherwise it would only be drifting.
Since the wind was coming from the south, it did not at first seem very promising. We did not
want in any case to go too far north. The desert awaited us there, in which the aviator Hans
Bertram had almost perished several years earlier. Since rowing was obviously fairly
fruitless, we changed over to sailing. We had, as previously mentioned, a mainsail and a jib.
We had no mast for the mainsail. The mainsail yard was used as a mast, and the boat rigged
with mainsail and jib. The carpenter constructed an emergency rudder, which was, however,
not sufficient. In order to prevent the boat ‘shooting into the wind’, we had to row on the
windward side, with relief every half hour (with 2 or 3 oars). The distance from the
previously mentioned boat now quickly increases. We can still see two sails in our vicinity.
We aim as far as possible for the east, always fearing being driven too far northwards. My
emergency aircraft compass gives good service. The officers man the rudder with hourly
reliefs. There is a tremendous pressure on it. Food consists of: ship’s biscuit, bacon17 and
sweetened condensed milk, all in small quantities. The rail log (for measuring progress) reads
1 to 2 knots. At first we prepare for a week, in which we hope to see some result of our trip
(change in colour of the water, formation of clouds, etc.) that indicates the nearness of land.
Irrespective of that, provisions are stretched as far as possible. We are moving towards land,
and the mood is confident. We are travelling ever more across the wind, and we make the
discovery that at 10 degrees astern of beam the boat still makes progress and astonishingly
can take the swell from the side, although it has hardly any freeboard. If you dangle your
hand over the side, it is in the water.
My travelling alarm clock is used as a regulator clock [to time watches] until later it falls
into the bilge (the deepest part of the ship). The boat was so crowded that for a long time it
could not be picked up. When we finally had it again, it was useless through having been in
the water. Towards midday a few men appear, who have been lying the whole time in the
bilge without moving, although those above them must have rested their feet on them without
noticing it. It is self-evident that they were sea-sick, as they had had no fresh air. They
recover only gradually. During the whole trip, several men always must sit below the thwarts,
but that is done in turn.
The plan to save the 4 oars as the last resort for moving forward, which had led to the
mainmast yard being used as a mast, had to be abandoned in the second night. One oar was
used as a rudder (tiller). Now it is sufficient to use one oar on the windward side sometimes.
By day we steer by the sun, whose direction of rising and setting we know from Kormoran
(110º and 250º), and at night by the stars and at the same time the compass. The swell is
bearable. We calculate at least 1 knot.
In the third night, we gybe several times involuntarily, and get back on course only with
great difficulty. The whole rigging can fall while doing this, which causes us a lot of worry, as
we have no more ropes. The boat is still rather inclined to turn to windward. An alteration to
the trim towards the stern is accomplished, despite being overfilled. In the afternoon of the
SUBM.005.0423
15
third day the wind begins to strengthen. The boat continues to sit well despite the increasing
roughness of the sea. It can now be steered by the tiller alone, without using the oars.
However, it can be held only with difficulty against the strong pressure of the water.
Three bailing positions are set up in the boat: forwards, midships (port) and astern
(starboard). Although the boat is so small, we speak of forwards, midships and aft. Bailing
(emptying out water) and rowing take space, so that at times many men must stand. The
provisions, which are stored beneath our feet, can hardly be fetched up, as it is simply too
crowded. A bit of space is created aft by the use of force. Because of the use of the tiller,
space is needed there anyway. The distribution of provisions also takes place from this area.
Only in the course of time do we get some general idea of the amount of provisions present.
The greatest value is placed on making the fluids (milk and water) last. On this afternoon we
are certainly making 2 knots. Already we begin to hope that we might reach land in less than
a week. The mood is very confident; through past experience we have a lot of faith in our
boat, which can take a sea at Force 3 or 4, although it has practically no freeboard, and can
float on this like a duck on the swell, which to us seems not inconsiderable. For some time we
have taken no account of the position of the boat to the waves and swell. Only eastwards as
much as possible! We are canting hardly at all. The mainsail drags almost continuously in the
water. The cork belt around the boat renders good service; it reduces the speed but hinders the
ingress of water. Nevertheless, it [water] still often comes in on the lee side, so that the men
sitting on the port side are constantly wet from the hips downwards. At night, everyone is
chattering with cold. It is a relief when the day finally replaces the night which seems
endless. During the day, the oncoming swell could be countered quite well, and one stays
tolerably dry and warm. At night on the other hand it was terrible. I have never cursed
anything in my life like these nights.
At 1700 hours, the mainsail is taken down. The wind has risen to Force 5 and is constantly
increasing. Soon a strong trade wind develops, Force 7-8. After the jib is taken down at 1800
hours, it is decided to set out a drag-anchor for the night (the fourth), in order to prevent the
boat coming at right angles to the sea. The drag-anchor seems to have little effect. On the
windward side, a living wall is made by putting blankets over the shoulders, in order to prevent
the water breaking in. The sea becomes noticeably rougher. There is a cross swell. Water
comes into the boat constantly. It comes down on us incredibly hard. Feverish bailing goes on
constantly. Quite without warning, a sea comes from astern and tips water into the boat.
It is miserably cold. It is surprising and like a miracle that the boat does not capsize. We no
longer give much for our chances. More and more men become apathetic and can hardly be
moved to bail or to maintain the living wall on the windward side. They are worn out. We are
drifting northwards, where we don’t want to go in any circumstances. In addition, we
overestimate the speed of drifting. It was the hardest night of my life. Our only thought is
this: we’ve got to get out of here. Lying still like this and waiting until it is all over, that won’t
do; according to our experience, it can last several days, and then we would perhaps be
plunging into a void. The wind howls and whistles, seems to let up for a while, and then
returns with stronger gusts. The waves and swell roll on uncannily. They pile up high on the
SUBM.005.0424
16
windward side of our boar. One wave breaking directly in front of the boat would swamp it.
Even then, we would have tried to bail it out. It was a question of life and death.
In the morning at dawn, the situation is reported to the boat crew: the previous good
progress of the rescue operation; the present reverse must be taken into the bargain; no reason
to despair; watchword: out of the shit! Even if we must for the time being steer an
unfavourable course, that is, away from land. Wind is south-east, later even east-south-east. A
strong trade wind is quite normal for this time of year and can last a long time. I was well
aware of that, and I must say that, exhausted by the night and in view of the unfavourable
course that we had to take, I hardly believed any longer in being saved. At this time, half in
sleep, I heard the church bells of my mother’s home village and saw the memorial service
that would take place when news of my death was received. This was the only time when I
had anything like hallucinations.
The jib was set at 0400 hours, and we sailed with the wind on the starboard quarter. The
waves coming from behind are particularly dangerous, since they can easily break over the
boat. That could happen at any moment. The steering is taken over by the officers who can do
it best. Like glassy mountains, their peaks white and pale green, the waves rise up behind us.
A dreadful yet splendid, even beautiful, unforgettable sight. After we had looked at the
disastrous side of things for a long time, the spirit of life revives. The sun begins to warm us;
the wind turns and gradually drops. An unshakable confidence that the boat could take any
sea was present after this night and morning. We turn ever a little more across the waves, and
in the afternoon we again have a course heading partly eastwards.
Until the previous day, we had seen every evening shortly after sunset the light signal of another
boat. It turned out later that it was the boat of the Chief Petty Officer Wireless18 with 46 men.
From the beginning of twilight, the control of the tiller is again restricted to a few officers,
as it again became very difficult with the prevailing rough sea. During the fifth night, which
was now beginning, many of the crew began to hallucinate because of the previous day and
the exhaustion caused by the previous exertions, and one had to be tied up because of the
danger he would jump overboard. There is one, for example, who thinks his neighbour is a
woman. He strokes the curve of his shoulder with tender words, thinking it is a woman’s
breast. For another the water outside is a sunlit meadow, on to which he wants to walk, so
that h is comrades have to hold him fast. A third continually bangs together two empty milk
bottles and is pleased that such fine beer is in them. The reason for the ineffectiveness of the
drag-anchor was not found until the next morning, when it was found that it had torn away,
probably soon after it was set out.
The wind continues to fall. After sunrise the mainsail is set. We make good progress at
Force 5. In the afternoon the wind drops further, and at last the waves abate noticeably. The
climax of the trip was at 1800 hours: sighting the Australian coast. In the afternoon, the
colour of the water and the form of the clouds in the east had already indicated the nearness
of land, but nobody had hoped to see it that day. The joy and easing of tension are
SUBM.005.0425
17
indescribably great. Extra rations are issued; plans are made for restoration before we betake
ourselves into imprisonment (we looked anything but well-groomed!); we consider carefully
the choice of a landing place, or possibly of sailing on, if we did not like it, etc. And how
happy we were when we found anywhere at all to land! - When darkness fell, we took down
the mainsail in the hope that from about midnight (6th night) the wind would keep us away
from land. The land wind did not come. We took down the jib, for we were drifting strongly
towards the coast!! The danger of running aground arose before us, based on – as is later
discovered – an optical illusion. For goodness’ sake, keep clear of the coast. To cap it all there
is a fairly strong swell, which is called a ground swell. A lot of water splashes over. This last
night is once again particularly bad. My right foot is swollen and is very painful. Other crew
members had experienced this condition earlier, owing to the constant wetness, cold, hunger
and motionlessness for several days. It is astonishing that, apart from this problem with legs
and sunburn, which in a few cases took on a more serious form so that hospitalisation was
necessary, there were no illnesses, not even colds, for which all conditions were present. As
dawn began, we noticed the reason for the optical illusion: it was caused by the shadow of a
steep coastline. The jib was set; we steer towards land and recognise that we have after all
arrived in the feared desert. That causes us a definite drop in morale. The fate of aviator Hans
Bertram rises up in front of us again. In the prevailing SW wind, no progress can be made
southwards. We are drifting strongly and consequently we do not reach the first intended
landing place. It is a great disadvantage that we have no field of vision from our little boat.
The hope of being near Sharp Bay [sic] with the port of Carnavon [sic] has to be abandoned;
all eyes search the steep coast for signs of human settlement. The only thing to be seen is a
pipeline or cable, which is taken as a guide. Above it there seems to be something like a
transformer house. We have a boat’s axe, and it is planned to make our presence known with
its help, by destroying the transformer or the cable. It is hoped that the Australians would then
take steps to try to find the location of the disturbance.
In the next bay to northwards we encounter only a steep coastline. Then at last there is a
large bay with a level beach open to the northwest. The landing takes place there at 0830 on
the sixth day of the trip. As we are coming in to land, a 2-engined aircraft sights us. We still
have something to eat and drink for a few days. We are saved! The aircraft, which circles us a
several times, belonged, as we learnt later, to the great number of ships and aircraft that had
in the mean time begun to search an area of sea of 300,000 square miles for the vanished
Sydney. They took us for survivors of the cruiser and formed their radio report accordingly. A
sign is laid out made of ‘Kulanis’ (sailors’ jackets), so that the pilots can find the position
more easily. Since we think we are in an uninhabited area, we believe that our position could
not be reached from the land. We count on being picked up by ship or flying boat.
We can hardly walk, but the extremely modest wishes which we had envisioned during the
boat trip were fulfilled: movement, lying down, and being able to perform toilet functions.
The latter was naturally so complicated in the boat that most refrained. It has already been
indicated that we had constant worries with our tackle. It was therefore made known that
nobody who fell overboard could be saved, for every special manoeuvre endangered the boat
and therefore the rest of the crew. And for the above-mentioned procedure one was forced to
SUBM.005.0426
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hang overboard a fair way, which in a rough sea brought with it increased danger of falling
overboard. – In consideration of the fact that we have been found, the rations of drink and
food can be increased. In the southern corner of the bay lay a quite protected rocky cave,
which was a great boon, as it kept off the unbearable heat of the sun. During the rest in the cave
and the shadow of the rocks, which was now ordered, most of the men hallucinated. Our
assistant doctor,19 who had already given medical attention in the boat, now worked tirelessly
from the first moment. The first thing set up, while the boat was still being recovered, was
‘sick parade’. By the way, we had saved the boat and its entire contents intact. If we had not
been sighted by the aircraft, a search for water and contact had been planned. – During the
boat trip we had the opportunity to see dolphins, sawfish, sharks and – near the coast – giant
turtles quite close. The tracks of the latter could be seen on the beach and were at first taken
for signs of human settlement.
In the afternoon, a single-engined short-range reconnaissance plane appears, and soon
afterwards 2 men on the beach. It was a strange impression, seeing these people coming
towards us. Moreover, it is a remarkable feeling to have firm land under one’s feet again after
about a year at sea; particularly when during the last 6 days the bit of iron that comprised our
life-boat was all that had stood between us and death. The Australians, who are amazed to
find that we are not survivors from Sydney but Germans, inform us that up on the edge of the
coast that falls away sharply towards the bay there are trucks ready to pick us up. Then
follows a short walk on foot to the trucks and a trip of about 5 hours to Carnavon. We learn
that we have landed about 80 miles north of this little Australian port and that 2 evenings
earlier another boat had landed further south. It was the boat of the Chief Petty Officer
wireless whose signal lights we had seen up to and including 23.11.20
On the way to Carnavon – the trip over the very bad tracks of the Australian bush seems to
last forever and is like a torture – many had the impression we were driving through water.
But it was prairie grass on both sides of the track. Because of the long boat trip, all our limbs
hurt badly. The population along the way is curious but friendly. There is water and milk
enough to drink, a great treat that can be appreciated only by those who have suffered real
deprivation in this respect.
By the way, I threw away my pistol only when the two Australians approached us. It is
questionable whether it would still have worked in an emergency. It had become damp, like
everything in the boat. We lost part of our provisions also in this way, for the tin cans had
been trampled on. There was no special place for them.
After midnight, we arrive in Carnavon and are accommodated in the village prison. We
receive tea and bread, which of course tasted better than ever before. Here at last we were
safe, but a large drop of wormwood fell into our feeling of happiness about this, for from this
moment began our time as prisoners of war, which – thank God we did not yet know it – was
to last more than five years.
SUBM.005.0427
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1
Sydney was so far away that it is unlikely that Ahl had much idea on which course she was travelling at first
though he is probably correct.
2
He was not yet a full captain.
3
To the best of my knowledge, Sydney did not in fact have radar.
4
‘Soldat’ is used for a serviceman of any kind; reference is to Detmers’ quality in the technical aspects of
seamanship, and in battle. A ‘Seesoldat’ is simply a sailor in the armed service, not a ‘Marine’.
5
The impression that is given seems false; these signals would probably have been sent separately. One could
not be given until the previous one had been answered. This protracted the exchange further. But ‘Fremantle’ is
definitely wrong. Detmers said that he did not dare say Fremantle, as there was a chance that the cruiser had been
there recently and knew that the ship was in port. Gösseln, who was on the bridge, said: Lourenço Marques.
6
An anachronism; Only British and Dutch ships had these secret call signs at that time.
7
Ahl sacrifices accuracy to drama. The orders were not given at the same time, but with a few seconds’ delay.
8
He does not mention the underwater tubes.
9
Ahl may be wrong about the target of the second gun, since Sydney’s ‘B’ turret was hit early in the action. I
think that the target for the second gun was the second forward turret, while the bridge, while the quick-firing
anti-tank gun took out the bridge, and the anti-aircraft guns targeted the aircraft, the personnel of the torpedo
tubes and anti-aircraft guns.
10
The Dutch flag was on the stern ensign staff; the German flag was raised on the mainmast. These separate
actions were carried out simultaneously.
11
The sequence of events is misleading here. Sydney’s only hits were scored on Kormoran while her guns were
still trained to port, before she crossed over. The torpedoes were fired from the starboard tubes after she crossed.
12
Leutnant Bunjes.
13
Oberleutnant von Gösseln.
14
Ahl wrote: ‘war Matthai am Letzten’. This is a reference to the Book of Matthew, Chapter 28, Verse 20: ‘Lo, I
am with you always, even unto the end of the world.’
15
He apparently means the rubber boat that left the ship first, carrying among others the wounded and some
medical orderlies.
16
A nominal roll drawn up some time during the war showed that there were 315 survivors from a crew of 395.
17
‘Speck’: not exactly bacon, but smoked bacon fat used as a spread.
18
Paul Köhn. This was the boat that landed at the Seventeen Mile Well.
19
Dr Siebelt Habben.
20
Some of Ahl’s references here are not strictly accurate.