Bucharest International Student MUN 2013
Historical Security Council Study Guide
The Indo-Pakistani War of
1965
A: Bd. Mihail Kogălniceanu nr. 36-46, Complexul Studenţesc Mihail Kogălniceanu, Cămin B, camera 122B
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 3
2. Historical Context ......................................................................................................... 4
2.1. The Partition of British India ................................................................................... 4
2.2. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 .............................................................................. 4
2.3. The Kashmir problem .............................................................................................. 5
2.4. The Rann of Kutch problem ..................................................................................... 7
3. The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War unfolds ........................................................................ 7
3.1. Operation Gibraltar ................................................................................................. 7
3.2. Indian response ........................................................................................................ 8
3.3. Operation Grand Slam ............................................................................................. 8
3.4. The Punjab Front ..................................................................................................... 9
4. Foreign involvement ................................................................................................... 10
4.1. The People’s Republic of China ............................................................................ 10
4.2. USSR ...................................................................................................................... 11
4.3. The United States of America ................................................................................ 12
4.4. The United Kingdom and France .......................................................................... 12
5. UNSC Resolutions prior to the 20th of September ................................................... 13
Appendix .......................................................................................................................... 13
Bibliographical references.............................................................................................. 14
Further reading ............................................................................................................... 15
A: Bd. Mihail Kogălniceanu nr. 36-46, Complexul Studenţesc Mihail Kogălniceanu, Cămin B, camera 122B
E: [email protected] W: www.unyouth.ro Tel: 0213104264
1. Introduction
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965,
also known as the Second Kashmir War
was one of the most important conflicts
in the region of South-East Asia during
the post-World War II period. The
conflict itself was not an isolated
incident. Tensions between these two
actors originated with the Partition of
British India in 1947 and diverged into
the 1947 war, along with systematic border skirmishes in the aftermath of the war and they
continued after 1965 as well, most prominently with the 1971 War over East Pakistan and the
1999 Kargil War. The region still remains in turmoil to this day, especially after both countries
decided to pursue nuclear strategies (neither country is a member of the NPT 1), with India
conducting their first nuclear test in 19742 and Pakistan in 19983 4. It is thus important to be
aware of the entire context that defined the characteristics of the conflict in order to achieve a
better understanding of the nature and causes of the given dispute.
The simulation of the BISMUN 2013 Historical UN Security Council begins on the 20 th of
September 1965, the day when the actual SC unanimously adopted Resolution 211/1965 which
demanded the implementation of an immediate ceasefire by the 22 nd of September. During the
simulation however, you will be required to go beyond a simple decision regarding the
imposition of a ceasefire on the parties and will have to come up with genuinely long-lasting
solutions to resolve the Kashmir problem from degenerating into further conflicts in the future.
1
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/index.html.
3
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html.
4
For a further discussion particularly focused on the problem of Kashmir see Hoyt (2003).
A: Bd. Mihail Kogălniceanu nr. 36-46, Complexul Studenţesc Mihail Kogălniceanu, Cămin B, camera 122B
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2
Further, unlike all the other Committees simulated at BISMUN, you will also receive a mandate
from your respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, which will contain various tasks that you will
have to pursue during the conference. Also, be advised that the situation in Kashmir as well as
in Pakistan and India is highly volatile and this could lead to the development of unforeseen
scenarios by the hour...
2. Historical Context
2.1. The Partition of British India
In the aftermath of World War II, British India was having severe difficulties in handling
social and economic problems and was to be divided into two separate sovereign states, i.e. the
Dominion of Pakistan (which was ultimately split between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and
the People`s Republic of Bangladesh in 1971) and the Union of India (later called The Republic
of India), according to religious criterions. The two countries therefore exist independently
since the 14th and the 15th of August 1947. However, even if the separation should have
finalized in peaceful, diplomatic relations, it was not easily implemented and caused numerous
problems, as it included an actual territorial and provincial partition5, complemented by an
administrative, governmental partition6. An estimated number of 12.5 million people crossed
the borders from one country to the other that year, while nearly one third of the Muslim
population of British India remained in India, causing violent actions between them, the Hindus
and the Sikhs. The tension and the symbolic conflicts brought about by the religious
fundaments that originally legitimated the partition kept rising and eventually focused upon
one central goal: the Kashmir territory claimed both by Pakistan and India. This led to the first
war between India and Pakistan, fought in 1947.
2.2. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947
The first war between India and Pakistan, fought in 1947 is also known as the First
Kashmir War, strongly emphasizing the object of the dispute itself. Even if the two newly
5
6
See for instance the Bengal province which separated into East Bengal and West Bengal.
For instance the civil service, the army, the navy etc.
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independent countries had already started to divide their territories, they were still waiting to
receive a proper answer regarding the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. But
despite of (or maybe even because of) the exposure to the high international pressure, the
ruler of the region refused both alternatives. Only after a Muslim revolution that took place
inside Kashmir, the Maharaja7 found himself in the necessity of requiring external aid and
military assistance from India. This put India in a favorable situation, meaning that it would
have agreed only if Kashmir also agreed to afterwards accede to India, which it did and thus
signed an instrument of accession on the 25th of August 1947.
However, Pakistan did not accept the legitimacy of the Indian military intervention in
Kashmir8 and therefore sent military troops of their own in the region, but they had arrived too
late as India had already taken control over a significant part of Kashmir’s administrative
territory. On the 22nd of October 1947, Pakistani troops crossed the Kashmir border. The war
started with India in a defensive stance (supported by the National Council volunteers of
Jammu and Kashmir), followed by a series of counterattacks and military operations, e.g.
Operation Gulab and Eraze, Operation Bison, Operation Easy that almost lasted a year. It was
not until the end of December 1948 that the UN implemented a ceasefire operation after the
SC adopted two resolutions related to the “India-Pakistan Question”9. The resolutions10 urged
Pakistan to withdraw all military forces from the area and to immediately cease hostilities,
while asking India to also minimize its military presence in the region after the finalization of a
plebiscite regarding the accession of Jammu and Kashmir in either one of the two states in
conflict.
The war left both parties damaged from a humanitarian perspective, but each with the
possession of a small portion of Kashmir. Apparently, it was not enough.
2.3. The Kashmir problem
7
The title of the ruler of Kashmir.
http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/onlineex/apac/photocoll/g/019pho000000394u00076000.html
9
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1948.shtml
10
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/47%281948%29
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/51%281948%29
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8
Right after the 1947 war between the two states, the population of Jammu and Kashmir
was due to be the subject of a plebiscite in order to legitimize the accession to Pakistan or
India. However, neither Pakistan nor India did fully respect the rules that the UN had set for
them: Pakistan did not withdraw its military troops from Kashmir, which determined India not
to organize the plebiscite in the given conditions11. But Pakistan did not feel at all intimidated
by India’s position, stating that either way the results of the poll would not have been sincere
and objective since they were influenced by the presence of Indian troops. The real dilemma
had been brought to light: none of the two enemy countries had incentives to withdraw their
troops unilaterally and neither of them would have done it at all without the guarantee that the
other will not further react in reciprocity. The solution identified by Pakistan was a
simultaneous withdrawal of troops, but India still did not agree, leading to the impossibility of
further organizing the plebiscite in Kashmir.
Roughly, India’s arguments related to the Kashmir problem may be summarized as
follows: 1) an accession instrument had been signed between the two states, thus Kashmir is
formally an Indian territory; 2) the United Nations did not oppose the accession; 3) the Indian
Constitution provided significant autonomy for the Kashmir territory, so their accession would
not be interpreted as constrained at any time; 4) the lack of the plebiscite was not at all their
fault, as it was the result of the Pakistani refusal to withdraw their troops.
On the other hand, the Pakistani arguments related to the Kashmir problem were
mainly the following: 1) the legitimacy of the Accession instrument is debatable, since the
Maharaja himself did not have the power to ratify it, as the symbol of the former British India
instead of an autochthonous leader; 2) the majority of Kashmir’s population is Muslim, thus it
naturally should belong to Pakistan; 3) India failed to organize a plebiscite in Kashmir,
disregarding the UN resolutions.
Jammu and Kashmir was the most powerful reason for war between the two states and
it was apparently impossible to reconcile them even after a number of UN resolutions had been
adopted in this regard. However, some of these were passed under Chapter VI of the UN
11
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1766582.stm
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Charter, meaning that they were non-binding and their enforcement was not mandatory. The
given resolutions between 1948-1952 related to the Kashmir problem and the necessity of
calling the two parties to negotiations are: 38/1948, 39/1948, 47/1948, 51/1948, 80/1950,
96/1951 and 98/1952.
2.4. The Rann of Kutch problem
Kashmir was the most powerful reason which strained the relation between India and
Pakistan, but it was certainly not the only one. Rann of Kutch is a region within the Indian state
of Gujarat, which India held in possession since 1947. The Rann of Kutch became the perfect
pretext for skirmishes and other kinds of limited military maneuvers as the Pakistani
government laid claim to the northern part of the region ever since 1947. On the 8th of April
1965 the territory became the scene of several skirmishes between India and Pakistan, which
lasted intermittently until the 30th of June, when the intervention of the United Kingdom
compelled both states to solve their conflict in a legal framework. The results were yet another
time unsatisfying for Pakistan as they attributed them almost 10 times less square miles of
territory than they did to India (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997, pp.170-171).
3. The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War unfolds
3.1. Operation Gibraltar
The first phase of the war began on the 5th of August 1965 when between 26.000 and
33.000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control instituted in 1949 which delimited the
regions of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan and India respectively, dressed as Kashmiri locals,
who spread out alongside various localities within the Kashmir Valley12. Since India had an
uneasy history in dealing with the locals, especially in the Kashmir Valley where there was an
overwhelming Muslim majority, the Pakistani government tried to spark a popular uprising by
infiltrating its own military among the locals, in what was known as Operation Gibraltar. It is
unclear to what extent Ayub Khan, who was at the time President of Pakistan, and the other
army commanders sought to engage in a full scale war against India since they were aware of
12
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1965.htm.
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India’s strong military capacities at that time. As Ganguly (1990) remarks, by following
conventional deterrence theory, we can conclude that Pakistan was not in a favorable position
to attack India, since: 1. after the defeat in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 India underwent a
massive modernization program for the armed forces, 2. India had announced on several
occasions that they would not tolerate any border incursions by foreign troops and 3. India had
a significantly greater industrial capacity then Pakistan which would have given it a clear
advantage during a protracted conflict (Ganguly, 1990, p.77). It is therefore possible that under
these circumstances, the conflict itself spiraled out of control toward a direction previously
unforeseen by the Pakistani officials and military commanders, although they were responsible
for making the first move.
3.2. Indian response
Operation Gibraltar was not the success which Pakistan expected it to be mainly
because of miscalculations regarding the discontent present among the Kashmiri locals. Instead
of being galvanized toward a rebellion by the Pakistani infiltrators, most of the locals remained
neutral, some of them even rallying to the Indian side and tipping off the army that Pakistani
regulars in disguise have advanced on several areas of the Kashmiri Valley. In all, it seems that
only 4 districts joined the Pakistani cause and fought alongside them against India 13. After being
informed on the Pakistani presence in the Kashmir Valley, the Indian army replied in kind by
crossing the Line of Control and capturing several outposts from the Pakistani side of Kashmir,
effectively dismantling one possible assumption made by the Pakistanis, namely that military
action would remain confined to the ceasefire line14. According to a much later statement made
by Gohar Ayub Khan, who was at the time the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, somewhere around
4.000 Pakistani soldiers were captured or killed after the exposure of Operation Gibraltar and
the subsequent Indian offensive, although in light of the official numbers estimated this might
be an exaggeration15.
3.3. Operation Grand Slam
13
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050603/main2.htm.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_10-6-2005_pg3_2.
15
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050603/main2.htm.
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14
In order to relieve the disorganized units being faced with annihilation in the Indian part
of Kashmir, the Pakistani army initiated a counter-offensive on the 1st of September,
codenamed Operation Grand Slam, in the Jammu province with the purpose of capturing
Akhnur and thereby cutting off the supply lines for the Indian army. Although it was met with
some initial success mainly attributed to the technological superiority of their tanks, the
Pakistani thrust did not reach Akhnur, but instead was halted by the retaliation of the Indian Air
Force16. Another version, narrated by Lt. Gen. Abdul Ali Malik who was relieved of his command
during the beginning of Operation Grand Slam, in spite of significant progress being made,
suggests that the Pakistani leaders did not want to capture Akhnur however, because of fears
that this could push the conflict into an all-out war (since Akhnur was behind the international
boundary not the Line of Control)17. The Jammu front saw further action especially in the region
of Sialkot (in Pakistani Kashmir) where the Indian army was initially repealed but managed to
retain some of the ground they had gain up to the 20 th of September after winning a decisive
victory at Phillora on the 11th of September (Wilson Prabhakar, 2003, p.84)
3.4. The Punjab Front
After the Pakistani army launched Operation Grand Slam the Indians launched a
strategic counter offensive in the Punjab region in order to thwart any potential Pakistani
advance. The initial thrust began on the 6th of September with the main column heading toward
the Pakistani city of Lahore. This attack left no doubt as to the scale of the conflict since for the
first time it was clear that the international boundary had been violated (although Indians
consider that the Pakistani offensive began on the 1st of September marked the official start of
the war18). After some initial success the Indian army was halted on several directions and even
repealed, allowing a Pakistani tank column to launch an offensive toward Amritsar and to
capture the Khem Karan which was 5 km within the Indian border. The Pakistani advance was
stopped however and its divisions routed at Asal Uttar, where one of the largest post-World
War II tank battles took place, leaving 97 Pakistan tanks on the field (Wilson Prabhakar, 2003,
16
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/underestimating-india/512676/0.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_19-9-2004_pg7_30.
18
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/underestimating-india/512676/0.
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17
p.84). After this point the Indians regained the initiative. On the 20th of September India held
about three times more Pakistani territory, especially through the advances in the Lahore and
Sialkot sectors, than the Pakistani army held Indian territory, although they had made some
smaller gains in the northern parts of Kashmir. The death toll at that time was also slightly more
favorable to the Indians who lost approximately 3000 soldiers while Pakistan had a number of
approximately 3800 soldiers lost in action19.
4. Foreign involvement
4.1. The People’s Republic of China
The diplomatic relations between the PRC and India were relatively poor at the outset of
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, mainly due to the border problems which the two countries were
arguing over for the past 6 years. Although India was one of the first countries to recognize the
PRC and establish diplomatic relations with them in 1950, by the end of the decade the ties had
rapidly deteriorated, especially due to conflicting views over the placement of borders in the
Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh regions20 but also because of India’s “hostile attitude
towards Chinese actions in Tibet” (Simon, 1967, p.176). The diplomatic conflict later
degenerated into a limited war, during the year 1962, in which the Chinese army won the
military engagement but later withdrew to its original positions. The war decisively strained the
relation between the two countries and it also provided a background for the initiation of
friendly relations between China and Pakistan. Because during the Sino-Indian War, the United
States had supplied emergency military and financial aid to India, without consulting Pakistan
(although an agreement was previously established between the two parties specifying
precisely this), the Pakistani government felt the need to foster better relations with other
foreign powers who could provide them with international support in the region and the first
choice was obviously the PRC, especially as they were also at odds with India over issues of
their own. Thus, by the year 1963 “the two countries had signed a border agreement, signed
19
20
http://onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr65/fkashmir1965.htm.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-china_conflicts.htm.
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trade and barter agreements, and concluded an air transport agreement” (Rakisits, 2012, p.84).
After 1962 the Chinese also got involved in the Kashmir problem in particular, maintaining that
“the dispute should be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as
pledged to them by India and Pakistan” (Simon, 1967, p.178), in line with the Pakistani policy of
Kashmiri self-determination. During the war itself, the PRC clearly allied itself with the Pakistani
cause, in particular during the escalation of hostilities at the beginning of September. Thus, on
the 5th of September, the Chinese Foreign Minister expressed “‘complete sympathy and
support’ for Kashmir's ‘just struggle’“(Simon, 1967, p.181) and on the 7th of September they
labeled the Indian offensive in Punjab an act of “naked aggression” (Simon, 1967, p.181).
Further, after the Indian army crossed the international boundary, the Chinese government
pursued a much more aggressive course of action, giving India a “three-day ultimatum to
dismantle all their military works on the Chinese side of the Sikkim-Chinese boundary, or else
‘bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising there from’ (Rakisits, 2012, p.85).
4.2. USSR
The relation between India and the USSR had an altogether opposite course than the
relation between India and the People’s Republic of China. Due to the tough stance in favor of
the non-aligned movement which India assumed immediately after the Partition of British
India, the USSR did not engage in friendly relations towards India as they were vehemently
opposed to the emergence of a strong non-aligned movement (Chari, 1979, p.232). In the postStalinist period however, in correlation to the influence which the PRC was beginning to gain in
Asia (Donaldson, 1972, p.476), the USSR began a process of thawing relations with India which
was also going to result in several acquisitions of military equipment, especially airplanes and
helicopters, with the trade frequency intensifying significantly after the Sino-Indian War. The
USSR still maintained amicable relations with Pakistan as well, considering that peace between
the two countries was essential to containing the Chinese influence in the region (Donaldson,
1972, p.476). Although at the outset of the 1965 conflict, the USSR had closer ties to India than
to Pakistan, a fact illustrated through the emphasis put on the “traditional friendship” relation
between the USSR and India, by Russian governmental sources (Simon, 1967, p.179), the USSR
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maintained official neutrality throughout the war, offering its good offices for the mediation of
a peace agreement at Tashkent several months after the ceasefire, in the establishment of
which they also played an instrumental role.
4.3. The United States of America
The relations between the US and Pakistan in the first years after the British Partition of
India were excellent, mainly due to the fact that Pakistan, trapped between three powerful
regional neighbors (USSR, PRC and India), was in desperate need of strong allies and that the
United States needed a strategic ally in the region, especially in order to halt the Russian
influence in southern Asia, and prevent it from reaching the Arabian Sea (Khan and Clary, 2004).
During that time, the US streamlined large sums of money in the form of economic aid, leading
some to state that during the first decades of existence, the United States was the lifeline to
Pakistan and that without U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic aid, Pakistan would have had
great difficulties surviving (Khan and Clary, 2004). The military dimension was also an essential
one and in 1954 the US and Pakistan signed their first arms agreement (Wirsing and Roherty,
1982, p.589), after which the US supplied vast quantities of military equipment to Pakistan. As
mentioned previously however, by 1965 the relation between Pakistan and the US was
somewhat cooled and it was nowhere near the excellent terms on which it was before 1962,
due to what the Pakistani perceived as a US betrayal by the shipment of arms to the Indian side
during the Sino-Indian War (Chari, 1979, p.231). Thus, the United States did not welcome the
conflict which emerged on 1965 between India and Pakistan, declaring their neutrality,
supporting efforts to end the war and being one of the primary actors supporting an arms
embargo toward both India and Pakistan.
4.4. The United Kingdom and France
Although the United Kingdom and France were not as involved as the three countries
mentioned above in the conflict, i.e. PRC, USSR, USA, they played a significant indirect role by
supplying arms in the period preceding the conflict to the belligerents. The UK was the first one
to provide both India and Pakistan with military equipment, as per the arrangements made in
the Partition of India of 1947 (Chari, 1979, pp.230-231). Later on, both the UK and France would
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continue to engage in the practice of arms trading with India but not with Pakistan (Chari, 1979,
p.231), the UK also being responsible for providing financial aid to India, alongside the US,
during the Sino-Indian War (Rakisits, 2012, p.84). Both the UK and France supported the arms
embargo imposed on the countries after the war and neither of them openly favored any of the
sides during the unfolding of the 1965 conflict.
5. UNSC Resolutions prior to the 20th of September
At the outset of the major phases of the war (the beginning of September), the UN
Security Council adopted two Resolutions, 209/196521 and 210/196522, on the 4th and the 6th of
September respectively, both of which called for an immediate ceasefire and an empowerment
of UNMOGIP23 in order to determine a swift end to hostilities between the parties. Neither
Resolution was however implemented by either of the two parties.
Appendix
Figure 1. The Jammu and Kashmir region
21
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/222/80/IMG/NR022280.pdf?OpenElement
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/222/81/IMG/NR022281.pdf?OpenElement.
23
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
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22
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/kashmir.pdf.
Bibliographical references :
A: Bd. Mihail Kogălniceanu nr. 36-46, Complexul Studenţesc Mihail Kogălniceanu, Cămin B, camera 122B
E: [email protected] W: www.unyouth.ro Tel: 0213104264
Brecher, M., Wilkenfeld, J. (1997), A Study of Crisis, University of Michigan Press, Michigan.
Chari, P. (1979), “Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review”, Asian Survey, 19(3), pp.230-244.
Donaldson, R, (1972), “India: The Soviet Stake in Stability”, Asian Survey, 12 (6), pp.475-492.
Ganguly, S. (1990), “Deterrence failure revisited: The Indo-Pakistani war of 1965”, Journal of
Strategic Studies, 13 (4), pp.73-93.
Hoyt, T. (2003), Politics, proximity and paranoia: the evolution of Kashmir as a nuclear
flashpoint, India Review, 2 (3), pp.117-144.
Khan, F.H., Clary, C. (2004), “Dissuasion and Regional Allies: The Case of Pakistan”, Strategic
Insights, 3 (10).
Rakisits, C. (2012), “Pakistan-China Bilateral Relations 2001-2011: A Deepening but Cautious
Partnership”, Security Challenges, 8 (3), pp.83-101.
Simon, S. (1967), “The Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective”, Asian Survey, 7 (3), pp.176187.
Wilson Prabhakar, P. (2003), Wars, Proxy-Wars and Terrorism: Post-Independent India, Mittal
Publications, New Delhi.
Wirsing, R., Roherty, J. (1982), “The United States and Pakistan”, International Affairs, 58 (4),
pp.588-609.
Further reading:

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LANDFORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/index.html

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1965War/Lal-65.htm

http://www.countercurrents.org/ahmad270808.htm

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_7-9-2005_pg3_1

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1965.htm

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-china_conflicts.htm

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/underestimating-india/512676/0
A: Bd. Mihail Kogălniceanu nr. 36-46, Complexul Studenţesc Mihail Kogălniceanu, Cămin B, camera 122B
E: [email protected] W: www.unyouth.ro Tel: 0213104264

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050603/main2.htm

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unipombackgr.html

http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1965.shtml
A: Bd. Mihail Kogălniceanu nr. 36-46, Complexul Studenţesc Mihail Kogălniceanu, Cămin B, camera 122B
E: [email protected] W: www.unyouth.ro Tel: 0213104264