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TOPIC 1
1.1
THE ERAS OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT
About as far back as early 1900s, we can begin to see progress being made in safety;
however, progress in industrial safety prior to then was practically non-existent. With no
workers’ compensation laws, all states handled industrial injuries under a common law,
which afforded defenses to the management of industry that almost ensured they would
not have to pay for accidents. Without any financial incentive, little was achieved in
safety. Workers’ compensation legislation provided the financial atmosphere to bring
industrial safety to the forefront. In effect, Workers’ Compensation states that, regardless
of fault, the employee will be compensated for injuries if they occur on the job. The
passage of these laws, starting in 1911, marks the beginning of the first era in industrial
safety management.
AN INSPECTION AREA
When management found itself in the position, because of legislation, of having to pay
for injuries on the job, it decided it would be financially better to stop the injury from
happening. This decision gave birth to the industrial safety movement.
In the early years of the safety movement, management concentrated heavily, if not
entirely, on cleaning up the deplorable physical conditions that existed. Remarkable
results were achieved during the period from 1911 to 1931. In deaths alone (at least
accurate indicator), the reduction went from an estimated 18,000 to 21,000 lives lost in
1912 to about 14,500 in 1933. This reduction came from merely cleaning up the working
areas. Cleaning up physical conditions came first, possibly because they were so
obviously poor, possibly because people believed these conditions were actually the
cause of injuries.
It was during this era that H.W. Heinrich published his text, Industrial Accident
prevention. This volume had a monumental impact on industrial safety – even more than
most of us in safety realize to this day. It set the stage, in effect, for practically all
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organized safety work from that time on. The principles espoused by Heinrich in 1931
are actually the foundation for most elements of our current safety programmes.
Heinrich’s text also ushered in the second stage of safety management.
THE UNSAFE ACT AND CONDITION ERA
Heinrich suggested that more accidents are caused by people than are caused by
conditions. He suggested that unsafe acts are the cause of a high percentage of
accidents (he said 88 percent) and unsafe conditions are the cause of the rest (except
for some acts of God). This notion and other thoughts he had were a departure from
safety thinking of the time. So the safety professionals of the 1930s and 1940s started a
two-pronged approach: cleaning up conditions and trying to teach and train workers in
the safe way of working. Thus, 1931 ended the inspection only period and heralded an
era marked by a concentration split between removing unsafe conditions and stopping
unsafe acts in the workplace.
THE INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE ERA
Occupational diseases have been recognized since the beginning of civilization.
Hippocrates wrote in 500 B.C. that many miners had difficulty breathing, and by 100 B.C.
respirators were in use by miners to prevent the inhalation of dust. Ramazzini, in 1700,
wrote a comprehensive book on occupational medicine in which he identified specific
diseases related to certain occupations.
Until the twentieth century, physicians were the primary group interested in occupational
diseases. An interest in occupational illnesses was thrust upon the safety professional
when they became compensable in the early 1930s. So the safety manager of the 1930s
and 1940s split concentration three ways: looking at physical conditions, looking at
workers’ behaviour, and looking at environmental conditions.
THE NOISE ERA
In 1951, in Green Bay, Wisconsin, a worker in a drop forge plant put a claim for the
hearing ability he felt he had lost while on the job, and the fourth era of safety
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management began. Prior to this claim, loss of hearing had not been considered
compensable because deafness did not impair earning power, and a fundamental
concept of workers’ compensation had been that its purpose was to compensate for loss
of earning power as well as medical bills.
After years of litigation, scores of articles, and much talk, it became law in most states to
reimburse employees on some level for hearing loss. The result for the safety manager
was that company efforts had to concentrate in yet another direction: protecting workers
from any hearing loss and protecting the company from paying for hearing lost
elsewhere. A look at the professional literature since 1951 reflects the amount of interest
in noise and the high percentage of time safety managers concentrate on this problem.
THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT ERA
During the 1950s and 1960s, a period evolved that we might call the era of real safety
management – although, during that time and perhaps even today, the term is illdefined, and the concepts are fuzzy. During the 1950s, safety professionals started
thinking in management terms for perhaps the first time. Safety engineers found that
setting policy, defining responsibilities, and clarifying authorities served their purpose.
The safety professional began to discover tools from other disciplines that might be
adapted. Statistical techniques used by their quality-control counterparts were useful in
making control charts and in safety sampling.
The scope of safety management also widened to include more than injuries to
employees on the job. Safety managers began to look at fleet safety, property damage
control, off-the-job safety, and other areas. In the 1960s, the safety professional began
to think about professionalism by attempting to better define the scope and functions of
the position, by developing curriculums for formal education to prepare a potential
professional, and by evolving a professional certification programme.
Safety had progressed markedly after 1931. According to the National Safety Council,
frequency rates, as measured by the standards of that time, had dropped from 15.12 to
5.99 in 1961; severity rates from 1,590 to 666. These indicators told a story of success.
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Safety people had indeed been proud of their accomplishments, and this achievement
has been made by doing what Heinrich had laid out in 1931.
At the beginning of the 1980s, safety managers had evolved to the point at which
controlling physical conditions, environmental conditions, and the behaviour of workers
were a given. Midway through this era, we approached the threshold of a new concept in
safety management – the psychology of safety management. At its foundation is
Heinrich’s original 1931 thesis: Accidents are caused by people, not things. Within this
framework, safety programmes evolved that consisted of new and different components,
each based on things that had proven effective in influencing the behaviour of people.
THE OSHA ERA
In 1970, with the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the world of safety
management changed, at least temporarily, and perhaps permanently. Much has been
written and said about OSHA’s impact on safety, both pro and con, for there seems to be
a considerable amount that can be said on each side.
The OSHA era appeared to emphasize inspection, with federal and state control, and to
deemphasize the human approach. This is not necessarily to say this was bad or should
not have been; only the perspective of time will verify that. OSHA became the era of the
1970, and required the safety professional to concentrate on two primary things: (1)
removing those physical conditions mentioned in the standards and (2) documenting
everything that was done. The more competent safety professionals and the more
successful safety departments found they had two separate and distinct duties,
complying with the law (the standards) and controlling losses, instead of only one –
controlling losses. The OSHA era was marked by changing physical conditions to meet
federal standards and by maintaining documentation to protect the company.
THE ACCOUNTABILITY ERA
Late in the 1970s, a new era had taken shape. It looked at different ways to measure
performance, at new definitions of managerial roles, and at better definitions of what is
acceptable safety performance at all levels of an organizations. It seems that the key
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word in performance since that time has been accountability. In earlier eras we talked of
management’s responsibility; today, the emphasis is on accountability.
In the accountability era, safety professionals began to understand and utilize auditing
systems, objective-setting approaches, and building safe operation into performance
appraisal system. In this era we began to shift the emphasis from hazard-finding to
hazard-correcting, looked less at how to find things wrong (inspecting, developing
checklists, using job safety analysis approaches), and began to look more at how to get
things corrected and done (prioritizing, systems evaluations, organization).
THE BEHAVIOUR-BASED ERA AND HUMAN ERA
Sometime after the start of the accountability era (perhaps in the early 1980s), another
direction emerged – a direction that again looked at the people side of the safety
problem. It was logical in 1931, with Heinrich’s original book, to start down the path of
behaviour-based safety approaches. When Heinrich suggested that 88 percent of all
accidents are “caused by” unsafe acts, it should have been logical to put 88 percent of
out time and our effort into behaviour-based approaches. But we didn’t, until much later.
In the human era, we have begun to use the principles of human behaviour in our safety
programmes. We have begun for the first time to structure safety programmes out of
things that make some psychological sense. We are now talking about safety
programmes that involve the hourly workers, and are seeking their participation. Some
approaches being used – not just talked about – utilize positive reinforcement instead of
only correcting people. Finally, we are concerned about hourly employee’s perceptions
of the organization and the climate we have created.
1.2
SAFETY MANAGEMENT’S PRINCIPLES
In 1931, Heinrich spelled out a foundation for industrial safety programmes for the first
time. His foundation was a set of principles shown in the Figure 1 (next page). Since
that time, we have relied heavily on those principles. Consider. For instance, that:
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1.
Most accident investigation forms and procedures are built on the domino
theory espoused in axiom 1.
2.
Most record keeping we do is so organized around axioms 3 and 6 that
we are constantly looking for trends in the belief that trends will predict
the future and that the severe injury will occur in the same way the minor
one occurred.
3.
We inspect, based on axiom 3, to find the hazard before the accident.
4.
Based on axiom 8, we are constantly pleading for management support.
5.
Most of our effort is directed toward the supervisor because we believe in
axiom 9.
6.
We preach hidden costs up and down the organization based on axiom
10.
THE DOMINO THEORY VERSUS MULTIPLE CAUSATION THEORY
Most safety people have preached this theory numerous times. Many of us have actually
used dominoes to demonstrate it. As the first domino tips, it knocks down the other four
dominoes unless a domino has been removed at some point to stop the sequence.
Obviously the easiest and most effective domino to remove is the centre one – the one
labeled “unsafe act or condition”. This theory is quite clear; it is also a practical and
pragmatic approach to loss control. Simply stated, “If you are to prevent loss, remove the
unsafe act or the unsafe condition”.
We use this theory in two fundamental areas today: in accident investigation and in
inspection. In accident investigation, almost invariably, the forms that we use, or that we
give to our supervisors to use, ask that one unsafe act and/or unsafe condition be
identified and removed. This, of course, seems very logical, considering the statements
and principles expressed by the domino theory. It is, in fact, a very practical and
pragmatic approach.
Perhaps, however, our interpretation of this domino theory has been too narrow. For
instance, when we identify a single act and/or a single condition that caused the accident
in the investigation procedures today, how many other causes are we leaving
unmentioned? When we remove the unsafe condition that we identify in our inspection,
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have we really dealt with the cause of potential accident? Today we know that behind
every accident there are many contributing factors, causes and sub causes. The theory
of multiple causation is that these factors combine together in random fashion, causing
accidents.
Let us briefly look at the contrast between the multiple causation theory and our too
narrow interpretation of the domino theory. We will look at a common accident: a man
fall off a stepladder. When we investigate this accident using our present investigation
forms, we are asked to identify one act and/or condition:
The unsafe act: climbing a defective ladder
The unsafe condition: a defective ladder
The correction: getting rid of a defective ladder
This would be typical of a supervisor’s investigation of this or any accident under the
domino theory.
Now, let’s look at the same accident in terms of multiple causation; which asks, “What
are some of the contributing factors surrounding this incident?” We might ask:
1.
Why was the defective ladder not found in normal inspection?
2.
Why did the supervisor allow it use?
3.
Did the injured person know not to use it?
4.
Was the employee properly trained?
5.
Was the employee reminded?
6.
Did supervisor examine the job first?
The answers to these and other questions would lead to the following kinds of
corrections:
1.
An improved inspection procedure
2.
Improved training
3.
A better definition of responsibilities
4.
Pre-job planning by supervisors
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With this accident, as with any accident, we must find some fundamental root causes
and remove them if we hope to prevent a recurrence. Defining the unsafe act of
“climbing a defective ladder” and the unsafe condition of “defective ladder” has not led
us very far toward any meaningful safety accomplishments. When we looking at the act
and the condition, we are looking only at symptoms, not at causes. Too often our narrow
interpretation of the domino theory has led us only to accident symptoms. If we deal only
at the symptomatic level, we end up removing symptoms but allowing the root causes to
remain to cause another accident or possibly some other type of operational error.
Root causes often relate to the management system. They may be due to
management’s policies and procedures, supervision and its effectiveness, or training.
Root causes are those which would affect permanent results when corrected. They are
those weaknesses which not only affect the single accident being investigated, but also
might affect many other future accidents and operational problems.
Figure 1 – Heinrich’s original principles
THE AXIOMS OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
1.
The occurrence of an injury invariably results from a completed sequence
of factors, the last one of these being the accident itself. The accident in
turn is invariably caused or permitted directly by the unsafe act of a
person and/or a mechanical or physical hazard.
2.
The unsafe acts of persons are responsible for majority of accidents.
3.
The person who suffers a disabling injury caused by an unsafe act, in the
average case has had over 300 narrow escapes from serious injury as a
result of committing the very same unsafe act. Likewise, persons are
exposed to mechanical hazards hundreds of times before they suffer
injury.
4.
The four basic motives or reasons for the occurrence of unsafe acts
provide a guide to the selection of appropriate corrective measures. They
are:
a.
Improper attitude
b.
Physical unsuitability
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5.
6.
c.
Lack of knowledge or skill
d.
Improper environment
Four basic methods are available for preventing accidents:
a.
Engineering revision
b.
Personal adjustment
c.
Persuasion and appeal
d.
Discipline
The severity of an injury is largely fortuitous – the occurrence of the
accident that results in injury is largely preventable.
7.
Methods of most value in accident prevention are analogous with the
methods for the control of quality, cost and quantity of production.
8.
Management has the best opportunity and ability to initiate the work of
prevention; therefore, it should assume the responsibility.
9.
The supervisor or foreman is the key man in accident prevention. His
application of the art of supervision to the control of worker performance
is the factor of greatest influence in successful accident prevention. It can
be expressed as a simple four-step formula:
10.
a.
Identify the problem
b.
Find and verify the reason for the existence of the problem
c.
Select the appropriate remedy
d.
Apply the remedy
The
humanitarian
incentive
for
preventing
accidental
injury
is
supplemented by two powerful economic factors:
a.
The safe establishment is efficient productively and the unsafe
establishment is inefficient.
b.
The direct cost for compensation and for medical treatment of
occupational injuries is but one-fifth of the total cost which the
employer must pay.
Source: Heinrich, H.W. Industrial Accident Prevention, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1931.
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MANAGEMENT BLESSING OR DIRECTION (Axiom 8)
Consider the difference in how we handle safety compared to quality, cost, and quantity
of production. Ask “How does management get other things done?” When management
wants a certain level of production, it first tells someone, “You do it.” Management
defines responsibility saying, “You have my permission to do whatever is necessary to
get this job done. It grants authority and, finally, it says, “I’ll measure to see if you are
accomplishing the job.” Management fixes accountability. This is the way management
motivates its employees to do what it wants in production, in cost control, in quality
control, and in all other areas, except safety.
When it comes to safety, industry seems to have taken quite a different track.
Management officials have not effectively used the tools of accountability, responsibility,
authority, communication; rather, they have opted for committees, safety posters and
literature, contests, gimmicks, and a raft of other things they would not consider using in
quality, cost, or production control. In those other areas, management has not worried
too much about motivating people, but has decided what it wants and then made sure it
gets exactly that. In safety, we have gotten into the ludicrous position of pleading for
management support instead of advising how management can better direct the safety
effort to attain its specified goals.
WHO IS THE KEY PERSONS?
Axioms 9 states that the supervisor or foreman is central to accident prevention. It is that
person between management and the worker who translates management’s policy into
action. It is the person who has eyeball contact with the workers. Is that the key person?
In a way, yes, it is. However, although the supervisor is the key to safety, management
has a firm hold on the key chain. It is only when management takes the key in hand and
does something with it that the key becomes successful.
THE ROLE OF SAFETY FUNCTION
The role of safety function should play used to be that of making periodic inspections,
taking part in training, participating in meetings to coordinate safety work, and acting as
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a liaison with higher executives. It has been only in recent years that most safety
professionals have been able to define their role in the safety work to be accomplished.
If permanent results can be effected by dealing with root causes, the safety professional
must learn to go deeper than the symptomatic level.
If accidents are caused by management system weaknesses, the safety professional
must learn to locate and define these weaknesses and unfold a method for
accomplishing this. Inspection may remain one tool or it may not. Certainly new tools
must be used and old tools modernized, for the direction is different today, and the
duties are also different.
BETTER ROLE DEFINITION
The key to an effective safety programme today is the crisp, clear definition of roles at
each level of the organization: who is to do what and when, and what precisely will be
considered to be acceptable safety performance. The roles of upper, middle, and lower
management can be summarized as follows:
The role of the supervisor in the safety programme is to:
1.
Carry out some previously agreed to tasks to an acceptable level of
performance.
The role played by middle and upper levels of management is to:
1.
Ensure subordinate manager performance through a system of
accountability (measurement).
2.
Ensure the quality of that performance so that performance does get
results.
3.
Carry out some predetermined tasks personally that visibly shows all
subordinates that safety performance is important and even upper-level
bosses are involved.
The role of supervisor is singular. The role of middle and upper managers is three-fold.
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NEW PRINCIPLES
Figure 2 ( in page 10) spells out the newer principles of safety management. Principle 1
embodies the concept of multiple causations, of symptoms versus causes, and of
management-system weaknesses. This principle suggests not what we boil down our
findings to a single factor, but rather that we widen our findings to as many factors as
seem applicable. Hence, every accident opens a window through which we can observe
the system, the procedures, and other aspects of the situation. Different accidents would
unearth similar factors that might be wrong in the same management system. Also, the
theory suggests that, aside from accidents, other kinds of operational problems result
from the same causes. Production tie-ups, problems in quality control, excessive costs,
customer complaints, and product failures are affected by the same things that bring
about accidents. Eliminating the causes of one organizational problem will eliminate the
causes of others.
This applies to any accident. If we view that accident and its unsafe act and/or condition
as only a symptom of what is wrong, not a cause, we must then look behind that act or
condition to determine why. When we diagnose and treat the causes, we affect
permanent control.
The function of the safety professional then is similar to that of a physician: diagnose
symptoms to determine causes, and then treat those causes or suggest an appropriate
treatment to management.
Principle 2 states that we can attack severity directly, instead of merely hoping our attack
on frequency will also affect severity.
Principle 3 restates the notion that safety is analogous with quality, cost, and quantity of
production.
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Figure 2 New principles of safety management
1.
An unsafe act, an unsafe condition, an accident: all these are symptoms
of something wrong in the management system.
2.
Certain sets of circumstances can be predicted to produce severe
injuries. These circumstances can be identified and controlled:
3.
a.
Unusual, non-routine
b.
Nonproductive activities
c.
High-energy sources
d.
Certain construction situations
Safety should be managed like any other company function. Management
should direct the safety effect by setting achievable goals, by planning,
organizing, and controlling to achieve them.
4.
The key to effective line safety performance is management procedures
that fix accountability.
5.
The function of safety is to locate and define the operational errors that
allow accidents to occur. This function can be carried out in two ways: (1)
by asking why searching for root causes of accidents, and (2) by asking
whether certain known, effective controls are being utilized.
6.
The causes of unsafe behaviour can be identified and classified. Some of
the classifications are overload (improper matching of a person’s capacity
with the load), traps, and the worker’s decision to err. Each cause is one
which can be controlled.
7.
In most cases, unsafe behaviour is normal human behaviour; it is the
result of normal people reacting to their environment. Management’s job
is to change the environment that leads to the unsafe behaviour.
8.
There are three major subsystems that must be dealt with in building an
effective safety systems; the physical, the managerial, and the behavioral.
9.
The safety system should fit the culture of the organization.
10.
There is no one right way to achieve safety in an organization; however,
for a safety system to be effective, it must meet certain criteria. The
system must:
a.
Force supervisory performance.
b.
Involve middle management.
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1.3
c.
Have top management visibly showing their commitment.
d.
Have employee participation.
e.
Be flexible.
f.
Be perceived as positive.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
The means and methods used to manage occupational safety and health have evolved
greatly since the early to mid 1900s when the occupational safety and health profession
was developing.
In the early days of OSH activities, the focus was on accident
prevention (e.g. elimination of amputations, trips, falls, etc.), engineering controls, and
developing an understanding how various materials (e.g. silica, lead, zinc oxide, etc.)
affected workers.
As this understanding of workplace hazards and their controls
evolved, along with the development of governmental and non-governmental standards,
attention shifted to the methods by which evaluation and control activities were
managed. The emphasis during this phase was on OSH programs.
In the early 1990s, OSH management entered a systems phase. That is, management
system concepts, theories, and practices were applied to the well-established
anticipation, recognition, evaluation, and control-based program approaches. This was
seen in the development of the Australian Safety Map approach, the U.S. OSHA’s
Voluntary Protection Program (VPP), the Chemical Manufacturers Association’s
Responsible
Care
program,
and
numerous
International
Standardization (ISO)-based standards around the world.
Organization
for
Management system
approaches in OSH have matured today to the point where common elements can be
found in most, if not all, of the prominent approaches.
Defining a Management System
In the simplest terms management systems can be thought of as a way to organize OSH
management activities. They contain a body of key activities and functions that have
been found to affect OSH performance. They also provide a way to measure OSH
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performance, particularly in the case of leading indicators (i.e., measures that alert
management to risky activities before an injury or illness occurs).
i.
Definition in ILO-OSH 2001 and ISO 1400
The term management system is defined in several standards, including
ILO-OSH 2001 as:
•
ILO-OSH 2001
A set of interrelated or interacting elements to establish OSH
policy and objectives, and to achieve those objectives.
•
ISO 14001(1996)
The part of the overall management system that includes organizational
structure, planning activities, responsibilities, practices, procedures,
processes, and resources for developing, implementing, achieving,
reviewing and maintaining the environmental policy.
ii.
A Generic System Model
The systems approach presented in ILO-OSH 2001 and other OSH
management systems can be traced to a long lineage of systems
thinking. The most common is the link to Edward Deming’s Plan-DoCheck-Act concept. Links can also be found to other system thinkers
such as Ludwig vonBertalanffy (open systems theory), Stafford Beer
(organizational cybernetics), Russel Ackoff (interactive planning), Peter
Checkland (soft systems approach), C. West Churchman (critical
systemic thinking), Peter Senge (the Fifth Discipline), and others.
From a systems theory point of view, a system can also be described in
terms of four components: inputs, process, outputs, and feedback. It is
possible to arrange the components of the major management system
approaches in terms of these four system components.
Such an
arrangement can facilitate an understanding how the components relate
to each other. The relationship between these four elements is depicted
in Figure 1a.
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Input
Process
Output
Feedback Loop
Figure 1a
A system can be further characterized as being either open or closed. In the case of
open systems, there are identifiable pathways whereby the system interacts --exchanging information with and gaining energy --- from its external environment. This
phenomenon is readily observed in biological systems. Conversely, closed systems do
not have such pathways, and thus limit their ability to adapt or respond to changing
external conditions.
In traditional OSH management approaches, the focus has been on trailing indicators
(outcomes or outputs), such as illness, injury, and fatality statistics.
In a systems
approach, regulatory compliance and trailing indicators are not neglected; however,
commonly there is a shift in focus towards performance variables and measurements
from the input and process components (e.g., % of employees wearing the correct
personal protective equipment as determined in a surprise inspection) of the system.
These components can be thought of as being "upstream" from the system output.
Systems v. Programs
A question that often arises when considering OSH management systems is the
difference between management systems and OSH programs. One way to describe this
difference is in terms of an information feedback loop. That is, feedback in a system is
essential and an integral component of the system. Conversely this is not always the
case with programmatic approaches where feedback is not necessarily part of a
structural design. This is depicted in Figure 1b.
Input
Process
Output
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Figure 1b
In the shift suggested by the development and implementation of OSH management
systems, a program can be defined as singular, vertical, and based on traditional
command-control regulations. The focus is on compliance with the program
standard/regulation, not the broader impact on OSH performance in the organization. In
this conceptualization, programmatic approaches have neither strong, if any, feedback
or evaluation mechanisms whereby the program is adjusted or modified, as depicted in
Figure No.1b, nor “horizontal strength” as depicted in Figure No. 2.
Figure No. 2
Finally, a systems approach --- while not losing sight of programmatic requirements and
opportunities for improvement --- broadens in perspective to address the manner in
which the program(s) affect other programs, and the extent to which the program may or
may not improve worker safety and health. Furthermore, a systems approach is driven
by OSH and organizational improvement, more so than by regulatory compliance. A key
distinction of a systems approach is that there are clear feedback and evaluation
mechanisms whereby the system responds to both internal and external events.
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Key System Distinctions
Since the development of some of the forerunner management system standards (e.g.
ISO 9001, 14001, Safety Map, OSHA’s VPP, BS 8800, etc.) there have been dozens of
OSH-MS standards and guidelines developed by nations, non-governmental standards
organizations, and professional/trade associations.
An analysis of many of these
systems was conducted by the ILO as a precursor to the development of ILO-OSH 2001.
In that analysis and other scholarly work done on management systems, several
common elements can be identified that distinguish management system approaches.
i.
Management Leadership and Commitment
The importance of strong management leadership and commitment is
reflected in many, it not all OSH-MSs. It is widely asserted among OSH
professionals that management leadership and commitment is the most
important element of an OSH-MS.
Management leadership and
commitment to OSH can be demonstrated in numerous ways. Allocation
of sufficient resources for the proper functioning of the OSH-MS is one.
Other ways include the establishment of organizational structures where
managers and employees are empowered and supported in the execution
of their OSH duties and the designation of a management representative
who is responsible for overseeing the proper functioning of OSH
arrangements.
ii.
Worker Participation
As with management leadership and commitment, active and meaningful
worker participation in the development, implementation and continuous
improvement of OSH arrangements is critical. This is a critical distinction
in ILO-OSH 2001.
iii.
Continual Improvement
The concept of continual improvement is found in all management system
approaches. Continual improvement can be defined and expressed by
organizations in numerous ways. The basic idea is that the organization
seek ways to achieve ongoing improvement of OSH performance. Some
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standards state this in terms of improvement of the management system,
other in overall OSH performance. Within the ILO-OSH 2001, the goal of
Continual improvement recommendations is ultimately the elimination
worker injury, illness, disease, and death. Continual Improvement does
not mean or imply a requirement to attain better-than-compliance
conditions as measured against specification regulations or standards.
While
better-than-compliance
conditions
may
be
a
goal
of
an
organization, it is not a requirement of the definition of continual
improvement suggested by the ILO. Successful OSH-MSs continually
seek to improve procedures that support efforts to minimize OSH hazards
and associated risk factors.
iv.
Evaluation (e.g. auditing, accident investigation, medical surveillance, etc)
Within a systems framework, the evaluation functions can be thought of
as being part of the feedback loop where organizations assess the
performance of system elements and use the information to make
changes when needed. Management review is a function that provides
an overall assessment of the management systems performance in
relation to organizational norms, regulatory expectations, and stakeholder
concerns. This is opposed to the audit function that looks more closely at
specific issues associated with conformance to OSH-MS elements and
clauses.
v.
Integration
The concept of integration in management system approaches addresses
the extent to which OSH values and safe behavior permeate an
organization and can be identified as core values.
Integration is
described in terms of integration of management system elements among
themselves, then among OSH programs and functions, and then with
other business systems.
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Copyright © Institute of Professional Development, Open University Malaysia
TOPIC 1
vi.
Management Review
Some level of management review is suggested in all management
system approaches. This activity demonstrates that senior managers are
engaged in, and maintain a current understanding of OSH arrangements
and performance in the organization.
It demonstrates that senior
management
on
make
decisions
based
this
involvement
and
understanding that are consistent with their commitment to worker safety
and health. The general purpose of management review is to assess the
overall OSH management system, to aggregate lessons learned, improve
performance, and modify existing systems in response to changing
conditions and activities. It is through this activity that the OSH-MS, the
organization, and the environment external to the organization are linked.
This involves evaluating the OSH-MS ability to meet the overall needs of
the organization, its stakeholders, its employees, and regulating
agencies.
Management review is different from more specific audit
(3.13) efforts that address specific aspects of the OSH-MS elements.
Management review is necessary for a successful system. Without
consideration of feedback, there can be no meaningful planning (3.8) or
continual improvement (3.16).
By identifying these key management system distinctions, it does not negate the
importance of traditional OSH activities such as prevention and training. The point with
identifying the six distinctions above is to highlight them and their central role in a
systems approach.
Systems development around the world
Systems concepts have been used in the managing OSH arrangements for decades. A
new era was entered with ISO’s entry into the management system codification arena
with 9001 in the late 1980s. At that time there were few formal OSH management
system approaches throughout the world. In the early 1990s, OSH and environmental
management professionals and standards-developers began to consider how the ISO
9001 principles could be applied to environmental and occupational safety and health
arrangements. By the mid 1990s, ISO published its environmental management system
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TOPIC 1
documents (14001, 14004, etc.). Around this same time several OSH management
systems were also published (e.g. BSI 8800 and Australia’s SafetyMap). By the late
1990s, numerous nation states, along with professional organizations (eg. the Japan
Industrial Safety and Health Association, the American Industrial Hygiene Association,
the Chemical Manufactures Association, etc.) had started to develop OSH management
system standards and guidelines.
In 1996, ISO considered the development of an OSH management system standard. It
elected at that time to not proceed. It was during those deliberations that standardsmaking experts put forth the idea, and recommendation, that the ILO would be a more
suitable international organization to develop standards and guidelines in this area. With
this mandate, in 1997, the ILO began to conduct background research on management
systems as a precursor to forming the tripartite group of experts that developed ILOOSH 2001.
The International Occupational Hygiene Association (IOHA) assisted the ILO with this
research endeavors. The IOHA report, titled, Occupational Health and Safety
Management Systems: Review and Analysis of International, National, and Regional
Systems; and, Proposals for a New International Document provides a comprehensive
overview of many different management system approaches.
While the ILO was performing these background efforts, two developments occurred.
First, ISO elected for a second time to not develop an ISO OSH-MS. Second, in Britain,
the British Standards Institute published OHSAS 18001 which generally follows the
structure of BSI 8800. This document was published specifically for use as an auditable
standard.
In its introduction, OHSAS states that the document was developed “in
response to urgent customer demand for a recognizable occupational health and safety
management system standard against which their management systems can be
assessed and certified.”
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