Linking Knowledge and Action: Political Science and Campaign Finance Reform
Author(s): Thomas E. Mann
Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Mar., 2003), pp. 69-83
Published by: American Political Science Association
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Articles I LinkingKnowledgeandAction
Linking
Science
Action:
Knowledge and
and
Campaign Finance
Political
Reform
By ThomasE. Mann
The 2002 enactment
of the firstmajorreformof U.S. federalcampaign-finance
lawin a quarter
a moresubcenturyfeatured
stantialengagement
of politicalscientists-through
andexperttestimony-thanhadbeenthecasein
research,
publicadvocacy,
the past.Thisessayreviewstheevolutionof research
on campaign
financefromtheearlytwentiethcenturyto thepresent,the
intellectual
tensionsbetweenthe scholarly
andreformcommunities,
the conditionsin the 1990sthatpromotedcollaboration
overhow bestto managethe problemsassociated
with moneyand
amongthesegroups,and the continuingdisagreements
aroundtheworld.
politics-in theUnitedStatesandin democracies
ollowing yearsof protractedbattles in Congress,President
GeorgeW. Bush signed into law on March 27, 2002, the
first significantreformof federalcampaign-financelaw in
over a quarter century. That law, the BipartisanCampaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), was quickly the focus of a
contentious rule-making process by the Federal Election
Commission (FEC), and of lawsuitsfiled by 84 plaintiffschallenging its constitutionality.Most provisionsof the law were
scheduledto go into effectin the 2003-2004 electioncycle.The
litigationwas subjectto expeditedjudicialreview,initiallyby a
special three-judgepanel of the D.C. District Court, and then
througha directappealto the SupremeCourtfor its spring2003
docket.
These developments in campaign-financepolicy provide
bountiful grist for the political-sciencemill. Legislativescholars
havea fascinatingchallengeexplaininghow a bill facingsuch formidableobstacles-including philosophicaldifferences,partisan
calculations,incumbentself-interest,low publicsalience,interest
group opposition, and absent presidentialleadership-actually
becamea law.Studentsof the administrative
processcan trackthe
continuitiesand discontinuitiesbetweenlegislativelanguageand
F
ThomasE. Mann is the W AverellHarrimanChairand seniorfellow in governance
studiesat theBrookings
Institution
He
the research
edu). gratefullyacknowledges
(tmann@brookings.
assistance
a
summer
intern
Bailard,
of Emily
Brookings
from Yale
and
Larissa
Davis.
Bruce
Cain,AnthonyCorrado,and
University,
TrevorPotterprovidedvaluablecommentary
as discussants
whena
versionof thispaperwaspresentedat the2002 meetingof the
AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociationin Boston.Specialthanksto
SarahBinder,RichardE Fenno,Jr., CharlesO.Jones,Sheilah
Mann, NormanOrnstein,thisjournal'seditors,and two anonymousrefereesfor
theirhelpfulcomments.Theauthorwouldlike to
notethathe aloneis responsible
for whatevererrorsoffact and
remain.
judgment
intent on the one hand and detailed regulationson the other.
Legal scholarswill no doubt mine the public documents and
mobilizationactivitiesof the eclectic coalitionschallengingand
defending the law's constitutionality,as well as plumb the
jurisprudentialimplicationsof the Court'sultimateruling.And
once the dust settles from these administrativeand judicial
processes,politicalscientistswill pursuea rich agendaof research
exploringthe bill'simpact on campaigns,elections,parties,the
flow of money,congressionalbehavior,and policy outcomes.
This paperhas a differentpurpose.I want to explorethe linkages between political-scienceresearchand campaign-finance
reform.Is therea bodyof knowledgeaboutcampaignfinancethat
is widely acceptedby the researchcommunity?Do theseresearch
findings have policy implications?Do political scientiststhemselvesdrawthesepolicy implicationsand advocateor opposespecific reforms?Was the new campaign-financelaw shapedin any
noticeablewayby the workof politicalscientists?Arepoliticalscientistsand/or their researchfindingsplayinga significantrole in
the litigationprocess?More broadly,is the financingof election
campaignsan areain which politicalscientistscan make a constructivecontributionto the improvementof democracyin the
United Statesand aroundthe world?
My perspectivein addressingthese questionsis shapedby my
own experience as a political scientist in Washington, D.C.,
operatingat the intersectionof scholarshipand politics/policy.
At times this has led me to counter the frequenthyperboleof
reformers-about the cost of elections,the impactof money on
electionsand policy making,and the likely resultsof reform.Yet
at other times I have felt obliged to needle my colleaguesin
academefor being complacentdefendersof a statusquo that no
longer exists. In a 1983 William Bennett Monroe Lectureat
Stanford University called "Money in Congressional Politics," I
argued that we were much better at systematicallyrefuting
inflatedrhetoricand exaggeratedclaimsabout money in politics
than at understandinghow money was changingCongressand
representativedemocracy or at exploring what, if anything,
www.apsanet.org 69
Articles I LinkingKnowledgeandAction
could be done about it. During this most recent round of
reform, I took a more active role in working with some colleagueson a reformagendathat might avoidthe substantiveand
politicalpitfallsof earlierefforts,be responsiveto the most serious problemsin the regulatoryregime, and be consistentwith
knowledgeproducedby the researchcommunity.I subsequently servedas an expertwitness for those defendingthe constitutionality of the BCRA. These activitiesput me in more of an
advocacy position than is comfortable for many scholars.
Whether they clouded my judgment about the linkages
between knowledgeand action on campaignfinance is for the
readerto determine.
Early Scholarly Consensus: The Limits
of Regulation
Priorto the enactmentof the firstcomprehensiveschemefor the
regulationof money in federalelections-the 1974 amendments
to the FederalElectionCampaignAct (FECA)-a scholarlyconsensuson campaign-finance
regulationprevailed.That consensus
was built on the pioneeringworkof LouiseOveracker,Alexander
Heard,and HerbertAlexander.Overackerwas the first political
scientistto engagein systematicempiricalresearchon campaign
finance.Her book Moneyin Electionsis basedlargelyon political
financingpracticesin the 1920s.1Overackerchallengedmuch of
the reformistthinking of her day. She noted that electoralcorruption dates back to ancient Greeceand observedthat, when
adjustedfor the size of the economyand population,the cost of
campaignshad remainedfairlyconstantover the ages-a point
rediscoveredby politicalscientistsin recentyears.2She demonstratedhow flawed design and inadequateenforcementmechanisms renderedthe FederalCorruptPracticesAct of 1925 ineffectivein banningcorporatecontributions,limitingexpenditures,
and providingdisclosure.She describedthe dominanceof political partiesin campaignfinanceand their increasingrelianceon
verylargedonors.
Overackerarticulateda normativeposition on money in elections that would dominate the political-scienceprofessionfor
decadesto come. She arguedthat restrictionson politicalfinance
designedto achieveequalityamong candidatesand among voters wereill-conceived.The goal should be not to "startall candidates from scratch"but ratherto ensurethat "eachcandidateat
least [has]a chanceto bringhis case beforethe voters."3In contemporaryjargon,that meansfloorsbut no ceilingsfor spending.
In fact, she asserted,more money is needed to providecitizens
with adequateknowledgeto inform theirvotes. Publicsubsidies
can servethat purpose.Tryingto equalizespendingamong candidatesthroughlimits, however,does nothing to guaranteethat
all candidatesget their messageout. In addition, she argued,
contribution limits do not solve the problem of corruption,
which can come with donationsof any size;they areeasilyevaded, and thereis no scientificbasisfor determiningtheirsize. She
noted that historical precedent and comparativeexperience
offeredno examplesof successfulregimesof spendingor contribution limits.
In addition to public subsidies,Overackerarguedfor public
disclosure;a nonpoliticalpermanentenforcementagency with
70
March2003 I Vol. 1/No. 1
accessto the courts;and lawsdesignedto eliminateforcedassessments on governmentalworkers,supportfrom organizedcrime,
corporatecontributions,and largefees to electionday "workers."
Almost threedecadeslater,AlexanderHeardprovideda fresh
examinationof campaigncontributionsand expendituresin his
landmarkbook, The Costsof Democracy,
basedprimarilyon the
recordof the 1950s.4While Hearddescribeda patternof campaigningand politicalfinancethat departedin importantrespects
fromOveracker's
rendering,his broadconclusionsand normative
were
remarkablysimilar.Money is not an evil in elecposition
tions, he said,but an essentialcomponent.The cost of campaigns
is neither outlandishlyhigh nor rising significantly.More, not
less,moneyis neededin campaigns.Campaignspendingdoes not
determinethe outcome of elections.Voters,not contributions,
drivepolicy decisions.
In Heard'sview, reformsthat fail to recognizethe inherent
financialneedsof the electoralsystemand that smackof unrealistic ethicalabsolutismaredoomed.He arguedthat "negativeregulation"shouldbe supplantedby positivemeasuresto easethe burden of fundraisingandlowerthe cost of campaigns.In additionto
abandoningunworkablelimits on contributionsand expenditures,he advocatedpublicfinancing(bothcashassistanceandsubsidizedcommunications),tax creditsto encourageprivatedonations, neutraland bipartisansolicitationof funds, public disclosure, and an enforcementagencyinsulatedfrom politics. Heard
had an opportunityto promotehis ideas as a consultantto the
SenateSubcommitteeon Privilegesand Electionsandas chairman
of PresidentJohn F. Kennedy'sCommissionon CampaignCosts,
but theseeffortsdid not bearfruitin the policyarena.
HerbertAlexander,who has devotedhis entireacademiccareer
to the studyof campaignfinance,workedcloselywith Heardas a
researchfellowon TheCostsof Democracy
and as executivedirector of the Commissionon CampaignCosts.Aftercompletinghis
dissertationat Yale, in 1958 Alexanderbecame directorof the
Citizens'ResearchFoundation,wherehe compiledand published
quadrennialstudiesof campaignfinance.He was the sole source
of authoritativecampaign-finance
databeforethe FECdisclosure
mandated
the
law.
1974
regime
by
Alexanderfit comfortablywithin the intellectuallegacy of
Overackerand Heard.His prioritieswere competitiveelections,
informedvoters,and financialtransparency.
In Moneyin Politics,
he sharplycontested the argumentof Progressives(and their
modern-dayincarnations,such as the lobbyinggroup Common
Cause) that money plays an inherentlycorruptingrole in elections. He argued that more money is needed for competitive
campaignsthat informvotersand providea basisfor governmental responsiveness.Spendinglimits reinforcethe statusquo and
deprivecandidatesof their free speechrights.Contributionlimits produce the same malady of underfundedcampaignsand
depressedcompetitionby denyingcitizenstheirspeechrights.He
extended this argumentbeyond Overackerand other political
scientistsof his generationby opposingthe banson corporateand
labor-unionelectioneering,which wereenactedinto law in 1907
and 1947, respectively:"Thereis nothing inherentlyimmoralor
corruptingabouta corporateor labordollar,no morethan other
privatedollars."5
He supporteda strongsystemof public disclosureand public
subsidies,such as tax creditsfor privatedonations;frankingprivilegesfor all candidates;and voter registrationcosts borneby the
government.But he wasconcernedthatdirectpublicfinancingof
candidatesand partiescould weaken the ties between national
and state partiesand disrupt relationsbetween candidatesand
theirparties.
While Overacker,Heard,andAlexanderdid not agreeon every
point, they shareda broadview of moneyand electionsthatcame
to dominate thinking about campaignfinance among political
scientists for many decades.That view-that more money is
needed in campaigns,spending limits protect incumbentsand
therebyweakenelectoralcompetition,contributionlimitsareeasily evaded,interestedmoney does not corruptthe policyprocess,
effectivedisclosurecan disciplinethe campaign-financemarketplace, and publiclysubsidizedspendingfloors (but not ceilings)
will increasecompetition-continues to hold swayin many academic precinctstoday.
The Federal Election Campaign Act and
Its Aftermath
This scholarlyview of money in electionshad some resonancein
the burstof campaign-finance
regulationin the early1970s, but
the motivationfor and directionof reformhad roots elsewhere.
There were two majorfactors:a substantialincreaseduring the
1960s in the costsof campaigning,especiallythoseassociatedwith
media advertising,and the emergenceof wealthy,self-financed
candidates. Since both developmentsthreatenedincumbents,
membersof Congressbeganto considernew regulatoryinitiatives.
The RevenueAct of 1971 createda presidentialpublic-financing
systemfundedwith an income tax checkoff,but its effectivedate
was delayeduntil the 1976 election.In 1971 Congressalsopassed
FECA,which strengthenedrequirementsfor reportingof financial transactionsand repealedexistinglimitson contributionsand
expenditures(except for the ban on corporateand labor-union
contributions).But it also put in placenew limitson the amount
candidatescould contribute to their own campaignsand on
expendituresfor media advertisingin presidential,Senate, and
House elections.Politicalscientistscould take satisfactionin the
initial steps towardpublic subsidies,vastlyimproveddisclosure,
and repealof ineffectuallimits on contributionsand spending
even while lookingskepticallyon the wisdom and constitutionality of the new limitations.
Scandals associatedwith Watergateand the committee to
reelectPresidentRichardNixon promptedCongressto returnto
the campaign-financedrawing board. In 1974 they produced
majoramendmentsto FECA,which constitutedthe most serious
and ambitiouseffort in historyto regulatethe flow of money in
federal elections. One is hard-pressedto detect any politicalsciencefingerprintson the new law.Perhapsthe most influential
outside playerin craftingthe 1974 amendmentswas Common
Cause, whose rhetoricand reformproposalscontrastedstarkly
with the dominant view of our profession.Congressadopted
publicfinancingof presidentialelections-matching fundsin the
nominationphase,full grantsin the generalelections-but conditioned the public subsidy on acceptanceof spending limits.
Ceilings,not floors, prevailed.Publicfinancingof congressional
electionswas defeatedin the House. Congressalso scrappedthe
1971 limitson mediaadvertisingbut replacedthemwith an elaborateset of limits on contributionsand expenditures.Capswere
placedon what individuals,politicalaction committees(PACs),
and politicalpartiescould contributeto candidates;on the total
amountindividualscould contribute;and on the amountparties
could spendon behalfof theircandidates.Limitswerealsoset on
spending by congressionalcampaigns,on the amount of selffinancingby federalcandidates,and on what other individuals
and groups could spend independentlyto urge the election or
defeatof a candidate.Both sets of restrictions-on contributions
and spending-flew in the face of receivedwisdom within the
political-sciencecommunity.Finally,Congresscreateda separate
agency, the FEC, to administer the disclosure system and to
enforcethe law. But it designedthe new agencyto be the very
antithesisof the nonpolitical,independententity espoused by
Overackerand Heard.Congressestablishedde factocontrolover
the appointment of the six commissioners,divided equally
betweenthe two majorparties;requiredfouraffirmativevotesfor
any action to be taken;prohibitedthe agencyfrom investigating
anonymouscomplaintsor conductingrandomaudits;imposed
elaborateproceduralrequirements;withheld authorityto exact
penalties; and denied the commission multiyear budgeting
authorityenjoyedby other independentagencies.6The FEC was
betterequippedto dischargeits responsibilityfor the collection
and disclosureof data on campaigncontributionsand expenditures, a developmentthat stimulatedmuch subsequentresearch
by politicalscientists.
Barelya yearafterthe 1974 amendmentsto FECAweresigned
into law, the SupremeCourt in Buckleyv. Valeoupheldthe constitutionalityof the contributionlimits, the disclosurerequirements,and the presidentialpublic-financingsystem.But it struck
down the caps on expenditures(by a candidate'scampaign,by a
candidatewith personalfunds, or by others spendingindependently), except for voluntarylimits tied to public financingin
presidentialelections,and narrowedthe classof politicalcommunicationsby independentgroupssubjectto regulation(i.e., disclosureand limits on the sourceand size of contributions).The
Court also ruledthat congressionalappointmentof some members of the FEC was a violation of the separationof powers,a
problemquickly remediedin Congressby giving the president
the formalauthorityto appointall six members.What remained
on the statutebookswas a regulatoryresiduedesignedby no one.
FECA after Buckleymarkedthe beginning of the end of a
scholarlyconsensuson the role of money in electionsand on the
wisdom of various approachesto its regulation. Differences
emerged as many new scholars were drawn to the subject
matter-by controversysurroundingthe Buckleydecision,rapid
changesin formsof campaigningand politicalorganization,and
the availabilityof systematicdataon campaigncontributionsand
expenditures. That is not to say there were no continuities with
the consensusprevailingbefore the 1970s. In his pathbreaking
and highly influentialwork on the impactof money in congressional elections-based largelyon data from the 1972, 1974,
and 1976 elections-Gary Jacobson provided theoreticaland
www.apsanet.org 71
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Articles I LinkingKnowledgeand Action
empiricaljustificationfor argumentslong made by politicalscientists.7He showed that inadequatefunding by challengers,not
excessivespending by incumbents,dampenselectoralcompetition. Limitson contributionsand expendituresharmchallengers
more than they do incumbents.The valueof publiclysubsidized
spendingfloorsfor challengerswould be vitiatedif accompanied
by spendingceilingsdeterminedby incumbents.Jacobsonargued
that most restrictionson the flow of money enactedby incumbent politicians,including those in the 1974 law, work to the
advantageof those in power.
Other scholarscautionedthat politicalpartieshad been weakened by changesin FECAand were likely to become bit players
if not complete bystandersin the financing of federalelection
campaigns.8Public financing of presidentialcandidates, they
argued, reinforced the growing candidate-centerednature of
Americanelectionsand furthermarginalizedthe partyhierarchy.
Restrictionson how partiesraisedtheirfundsand how much they
could assist their candidatesthrough direct contributionsand
coordinatedspendingput them at a distinctdisadvantagerelative
to the universeof interestgroups,whose collectivecontributions
to candidateswere unlimited.Contemporarypoliticalscientists,
like theirpredecessors,stronglyembracedthe view thatpartiesare
essentialinstrumentsof accountabilityand responsibilityin democraticsocieties.Regulationsthat constraintheir ability to raise
and spend funds on behalf of their broad objectivesdo more
harmthan good.
Additionalcontinuitieswere evident in the responseof political scientists to elements of the post-Buckleyreform agenda
championed by Common Cause and other activist groups.
Followingtheir rapidgrowthin the decadeafterthe adoptionof
the new law and administrativerulingsby the FEC,PACsbecame
the demons of choice within the reform community. Endless
press releasesfrom Common Cause touted the supposedcausal
implicationsof studies linking PAC contributionswith votes in
MoneyCan
Congress.Philip M. Stern wrote The Best Congress
Buy. Working well within the tradition of the pioneers of
researchon moneyand politics,politicalscientistsproducedstudies documenting the diversityamong PACs in structure,size,
objectives,strategies,constraints,and degree of engagementin
congressionalelections. They examined the opportunitiesthat
PACsaffordedmillions of citizensto engagein organizedpolitical action,and the extentto which politicianswerethe dominant
playersin theirfinancialexchanges.They also rebuttedthe simple
propositionthatcampaigncontributionsbuy votes in Congress.10
Politicalscientiststook part in the new policy debatespretty
much as they had in earlierdecades-by (1) challenging the
accuracyof factualassertionsof reformers,(2) questioningthe
efficacyof negativeregulation,(3) warningof the risksassociated
with the law of unintendedconsequences,and (4) emphasizing
the values of free speech, increasedcampaigncommunication,
strongparties,a pluralisticinterestgroup environment,and vigorous electoralcompetition.We fanciedourselvesan intellectual
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truthsquad,endowedby our trainingand researchto cut through
the cant in the public debate, exposingspeciousclaims and illadvisedreformproposals.
Beneaththis comfortableposture of professionalskepticism,
however,a more proteandiscussionwas developingamong students of money and politics.The writingsof FrankSoraufprovide a window on the emergenceof this debate. A respected
scholar of political parties and public law, Sorauf began his
researchon campaignfinancein the early1980s by staffinga task
force that investigatedthe implicationsof PAC growth for the
campaign-financesystem. Over the next decade, he produced
Money in AmericanElections"Iand Inside CampaignFinance:
the most comprehensiveand nuancedtreatMythsand Realities,"2
ments, at that point, of the contemporarycampaign-financesystem. Much of Sorauf'swork fit comfortablywithin the professionalmainstream.He subjectedmajorelementsof the reformist
critiqueof campaignfinance-too much money is spent in campaigns, money buys elections, money buys policy decisions-to
witheringscrutiny.He persuasivelyrebuttedthose who took an
alarmistview of PACs,and challengedthe wisdom of effortsin
Congressto abolishor severelyconstrainthem. He documented
the manyconstraintson the flow of money in electionsand cautioned aboutthe law of unintendedconsequences.And he championed the values of electoralcompetition, strong parties,and
robustcampaigncommunications,as well as freedomof political
speech,activity,and association.
At the same time, Sorauftook exception to those colleagues
who accepteda largelybenignview of the role of money in elections. He arguedthat Congressgot most things rightin its 1974
amendmentsto FECA but the SupremeCourt erredin Buckley
by strikingdown limits on campaignspendingand independent
expenditures.In his view,an arms-racedynamichad developedin
campaignfundraising,and the money chasewas becominga serious problem. The presidentialpublic-financingsystem with
spendingceilingshad been remarkablysuccessfulin achievingits
objectives.Spendinglimits set at relativelyhigh levelscould help,
not hurt, challengers,especiallyif combined with public subsidies. National parties,takingadvantageof more generouslimits
on their contributors(relativeto candidatesand PACs)and on
coordinatedspendingon behalfof their candidates,were boosted, not harmed,by FECA.The greaterrisk now was that they
would become instrumentsof incumbent politicians to evade
contributionlimits upheld by the Court in the interestof preventingcorruptionor the appearanceof corruption.Leaksin the
regulatory fabric-soft money, independent expenditures,
bundling-needed patching,not defending.
One need not agreewith Sorauf'sjudgmentabout Buckleyor
endorsethe specificsof his approachto reformto appreciatethe significanceof his argumentsfor politicalscience.He demonstrated
that a sophisticated,empiricallybasedunderstanding
of money in
electionsdid not leadinexorablyto a normativerejectionof regulation. Serious students of campaignfinance discoveredfertile
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www.apsanet.org 73
Articles i LinkingKnowledgeandAction
ground to plow betweenthe hyperbolicclaimsof many reform
activistsand the libertarianembraceof a deregulatedpolitical
Overthe pastdecade,dramaticchangesin campaignmarketplace.
financepracticeand new scholarshipon money and politicshave
producedlivelydebateswithinthe professionand raisedimportant
questionsaboutknowledgeand policy.
The Rise of Soft Money and "Issue
Advocacy"
The regulatoryregime that emergedafter Buckleywas a patchwork of rulesthat contributedto a diverseset of practices,some
intended,othersnot.13Publicfinancingslowedthe money chase
in presidentialelections and contributed to a rough parity
betweenthe majorpartiesin campaignspendingand competitive
opportunitiesfor challengers.Smalldonorscame to playa significant role in campaignfinanceas very largecontributionsfrom
individualsand organizationsto candidatesand partiesceased.
Disclosureof contributionsand expendituresimproveddramatically.Well before the explosion of soft money, political parties
took advantageof the new law to become significantplayersin
federalelectioncampaigns.
Other consequencesof FECAmay not havebeen intendedby
policymakers,but theysurelycouldhavebeenanticipated.Setting
contributionlimits to candidatesfrom politicalcommitteesfive
timeshigherthancapson contributionsfromindividuals,with no
aggregatelimit on what those committeescan contribute,helped
fuel the growthof PACs.The streakof pragmatismand concern
aboutaccessthatwasso evident(andpredictable)in corporateand
trade-associationPACs in turn contributedto the advantages
enjoyedby incumbents.Failureto index contributionlimits for
inflationspawnedan importantnew role for fundraisingbrokers
and intensifiedthe money chase.And it was no surprisethat the
Court'sbanishmentof limitson congressional
campaignspending,
independentexpenditures,and self-financingby wealthycandidatesquickenedthat samemoneychase.
The factorslargelyresponsiblefor the difficultiesof the FECA
regime in recent years originatednot in legislationpassed by
Congressbut in administrativeand judicialrulings.A seriesof
rulings by the FEC provided the legal basis for soft money.
Nationalpartieswere permittedto keep two sets of books-one
for federalfunds or hard money,subjectto limits on the source
and size of contributions,and anotherfor nonfederalfunds or
soft money,not subjectto any restrictionson contributionsand
ostensibly used for purposesother than federalelection campaigning.'4Initially,the nationalpartiesusedsoft moneyfor genuinely nonfederalpurposes,which limited the demand for it.
Entrepreneurial
politicalconsultantsand politicians-beginning
with Robert Farmerin the 1988 Michael Dukakispresidential
campaignand reachinga new level of audaciousnesswith Dick
Morrisand Bill Clinton in 1995 and 1996-figured out waysof
financing important parts of their federal election campaigns
with unregulatedfunds. Soft-moneyreceiptsgrewfrom roughly
$20 million in the 1980 and 1984 electioncyclesto $86 million
in 1988 and to $495 million in 2000.
Startingin the 1996 cycle, much of that money was used to
financecandidate-specific
issueadvocacyin presidentialand con74
March2003 I Vol. 1/No. 1
gressionalelections.This campaignweaponof choice for parties
had its genesisin Buckley.In that decision,the Courtestablished
an expressadvocacytest as a way of narrowingthe scope of disclosure requirementsand contributionlimits for independent
expendituresin light of a concern that the languagecraftedby
Congressin the 1974 amendmentsto FECAwas unconstitutionThe standardwas defined by the
ally vague and overbroad.15
Court as communicationsthat "in expressterms advocatethe
election or defeat of a clearlyidentified candidatefor federal
office."In a footnote,the Courtofferedexamplesof expressadvocacy (including such words as vote for, vote against, support, or
oppose),and this becameknown as the "magicwords"test.
The Court acknowledgedthat this standardwould leaveoutside the regulatoryarenamuch communicationthatwaselectionrelated.But it concludedthat it was betterto err on the side of
noncoverageand avoidthe riskof a vaguestandardchillingpolitical speech.This express-advocacy
standardwas constructedto
determine which communicationsby individualsand groups
independentof any candidateor partywould be subjectto regulation.The Court did not requireexpressadvocacyin candidate
and political-partyads for theirfinancingto be subjectto federal
campaign-financelaws. Buckleystated that spending by candidates and politicalcommittees(includingparties)is "by definition, campaign-related."'
This express-advocacy
standardhad little noticeableeffect on
the conduct and financingof federalcampaignsfor almost 20
yearsafterit was set by the Court.To open the floodgates,it took
the creativityand bravadoof Morrisand Clinton, and the failure
of the FEC to challengetheir use of party soft money toward
politicalads. Startingin the fall of 1995 and continuingthrough
the middle of 1996, DemocraticPartycommitteesspent an estimated $34 million on television ads designed to promote
Clinton'sreelection.17
None of these costs were chargedas coordinated expenditureson behalf of Clinton'scampaign.Instead,
the Democratic Party argued that party communicationsnot
usingexplicitwordsadvocatingthe electionor defeatof a federal
candidatecould be treated like generic party advertisingand
financedwith a mix of soft and hard money.The Republican
NationalCommitteerespondedwith its own $20 million "issue
advocacy"advertisingcampaignon behalfof its presidentialnominee, Bob Dole. Veryquicklythe partiesbegan to use the same
funding strategyto campaignon behalf of their congressional
candidates.The congressionalpartycampaigncommitteesshifted
theirfocus from hardto soft money raising.
Outside groupssoon followedin their wake. For groups,the
advantageof electioneeringthrough"issueadvocacy"ratherthan
was that the former
throughFECA "independentexpenditures"
couldbe conductedwithoutdisclosureandcouldbe financedwith
soft (i.e., unregulated)ratherthan hardmoney.This meant that
groups,like parties,couldnow solicitcontributionsfromcorporations and unionsas well as fromwealthydonorsto financecandidate-specificelectioneeringcommunications.Politicalconsultants
routinizedcampaigncommunicationsas issue advocacy.In spite
of the plainmeaningof federalelectionlaw,after1996 partiesand
groupscould campaignfor and againstspecificcandidatesfor federalofficewith unlimitedamountsof unregulatedresources.
The accelerationof spendingin a shrinkingnumberof targeted
constituenciesis much morerapidthan the aggregatefiguressuggest. Between 1976 and 2000, the averagecost of a successful
challengeto a House incumbent increasedfrom $145,000 to
$1.98 million-several times the growth of national income.
Comparableincreasesoccurredin seriouslycontestedopen House
seats.And theseoutlaysin 2000 includeonly hard-moneyexpenUsable Knowledge?
ditures.New researchsuggeststhat millionsmorearespentin key
A large literatureon political financing has been producedin
Houseand Senateracesby partiesandgroupsunderthe bannerof
recentdecades,and it is growingrapidly.Researchon practicesin
issueadvocacy.22
partyleadersnow orchestratemasCongressional
the United States-at federal,state, and local levels-has been
sive fundraisingand redistributionoperations in which safe
complementedby studies of other countriesand cross-national incumbentsaremobilizedto raiseor transfer
fundsfor the highly
comparisons.A thoroughreviewof this literatureis beyond the selectlist of
races.23
targeted
Here,I will limit myselfto sketchingout the
scopeof this essay.18
The normativeimplicationsof this dynamicarestarklydifferstateof scholarlyknowledgeon severalsubstantivequestionscenent
and decidedlyless benign.The instabilityand concentration
tralto the reformdebate.
of politicalfinancingcontributeto a franticmoney chase,serious
The costs of elections
conflictsof interest,and a declinein electoralcompetition.Since
As recountedabove, political scientistssince Louise Overacker this dynamicis shapedby the rulesgoverningcampaignfinance,
have looked with skepticismon public concernsabout the esca- as well as by strategiccalculationsof politicalactors,a changein
latingcostsof campaigning.The amountof moneyspenton elec- those rulescan alterthe volumeand directionof the flow of polittions in the United States-a populous,sprawling,federalpolity ical money.
in which political communicationsmust compete with much
more generouslyfinancedcommercialadvertisingfor the atten- Campaignspendingand election outcomes
tion of citizens not naturally drawn to politics and public Beyondthe broadconsensusthat campaignspendingaffects(but
affairs-is not self-evidentlyunreasonable.Scholarshave docu- does not determine) election outcomes, scholarscontinue to
mented that sharpincreasesin nominal outlays in federalelec- wrestlewith and disagreeover the specificsof that relationship.
tions are much less precipitouswhen adjustedfor inflation,the One element of Jacobson'sexplanationfor why the highest
rising cost of campaign communication, and the growth in spending House incumbentsfare the worst on election daynational income.19Moreover,strikingjumps in particularelec- becausethey face the most serious,well-fundedchallengerstions arerelatedto an increasein the perceivedstakes.Forexam- continuesto hold sway.But the otherelementof his argumentple, politicalfundsflowedmuch morefreelyin the 2000 elections that only challengerspending has a significantimpact on the
becausethose stakeswereexceptionallyhigh:the partiesat parity, vote-remains a matter of some dispute.24Donald Green and
an open-seatcontest for the presidency,razor-thinmajoritiesin JonathanKrasno,25and Alan Gerber,26
estimatemodels producthe House and Senate,the specterof redistricting,and the ideo- ing roughly comparablespending effects for incumbents and
logicaldivisionof the SupremeCourt.20
challengers, for the House and Senate, respectively.James
From this perspective,the total amount of money spent on Campbellfinds that the campaignspendingadvantageincumelectionsreflectsthe overallsize of the economy (andof the gov- bentsenjoyoverchallengers,not the absolutelevelof spendingby
ernment that regulatesit), as well as the political incentives challengers,accountsfor the lion's shareof the overallincumuniqueto each election.The normativeimplicationsof this con- bencyadvantagein House elections.27
clusion are straightforward.
Concernsabout increasingcorrupNo one contests the criticalimportancefor competitiveelection aremisplaced,and attemptsto restrictor channelthe flow of tions of adequatespendingby challengers.The argumentis over
money are self-defeating.The metaphorof choice is a hydraulic the productivityof reactivespending by incumbents.If this is
systemin which money-like water,whose weight and forceare inconsequential,then spending limits would be of no help to
determined exogenously-relentlessly searches for the open challengersand could harm their prospects if set too low.
faucetsor weakestlinks in the system.
Figuresreportedaboveon the rapidlyrisingcosts of a successful
Yetothersarguedthat a focus on total spendingmaywell miss House challengereinforcethat concern. On the other hand, if
the essentialdynamicat work. Soraufsuggestedthat an interna- incumbent spending buys votes at the margin,even at a lower
tional arms race may be a more apt metaphor.Ratherthan a level of efficiency,spending limits could boost challengersby
gradualbut relentlesstesting and probing of the system'scon- reducing the spending advantage of incumbents. In policy
straints,an arms-racedynamiccan easily lead "to a destabiliza- terms, this is a debate about spending floors, with or without
tion of the system,the resultof which is a lack of confidencein ceilings.
all limits, a decliningsenseof how much is enough, an escalating
All of this researchis basedon candidate-spending
datareportinsecurity,and a consequent scramblingfor more weapons." ed to the FEC. Unfortunately,we know relativelylittle aboutthe
What follows, Sorauf continued, "is overkill, the raising and impactof the substantialsums now being spent in targetedraces
spendingof money out of all proportionto a reality-basedassess- by partiesand groupswith soft money, underthe guise of issue
ment of need."21
advocacy.A new paperby Krasnosuggeststhat the televisionad
This was the context in which the latest round of campaignfinance reform was launched, culminating in 2002 with the
BCRA.I now turnto the questionof whetherpoliticalsciencewas
producingknowledgegermaneto this debate and then explore
how politicalscientistscontributedto policydevelopment.
www.apsanet.org 75
Articles I LinkingKnowledgeandAction
component of such spending is much less productivethan is
spending by incumbentsand challengers,possibly becausethe
contendingforcesmatch one another'sspendingin a handfulof
targetedcontests.28Soundslike Sorauf'sarmsrace.
Warchestsand challengerquality
The fundraisingadvantageof incumbentscould work indirectly:
a reputationas a strong fundraiseror a war chest filled well in
advanceof the electionmight deterqualitychallengers.In a study
of House contests between 1972 and 1980, Krasnoand Green
detected no impact of preemptiveincumbentspending on the
PeverillSquireobtainedthe same
entry of strong challengers.29
resultwhen he examinedthe impactof earlyfundraisingby senators:"Largesums of earlymoney do not . . . deter betterchallengers from running."30However, Janet Box-Steffensmeier,
examiningHouse incumbents'cash-on-handover the courseof
the 1990 election cycle, found that incumbent war chests do
affect the probabilityof a strong challengerenteringthe race.31
David Epsteinand PeterZemskydevelopeda signalingmodel in
which incumbentsuse fundraisingstrategicallyto wardoff quality challengers;they demonstratedthat such effectsare prone to
But more recently,Jay Goodliffe
systematicunderestimation.32
concludedthat once one includespreviouslyomittedvariablesin
the analysis, there is no evidence that war chests deter
challengers.33
Parties and campaignfinance
Most studentsof Americanpoliticalpartiesagreethatpartieshave
adaptedsuccessfullyto the forcesthat gatheredin the 1960s and
1970s to challengetheir centralityin electionsand policy making. In recentyears,partiesin the electorate,in government,and
as organizations have shown impressive signs of vitality.35
Although FECA enshrinedcandidatesas the centralplayersin
campaignfinance and placed limits on party fundraisingand
spendingon behalfof candidates,the partiesfiguredout how to
thrivein a candidate-centered
politics.They becamerepositories
of professionalcampaign expertise and built strong national
Since parties, unlike
organizationsto boost their candidates.36
most PACsand individualdonors,havea clearinterestin assisting challengers,theirmorerobustcampaignroleis widelyviewed
as constructivefor electoralcompetition.
Morescholarlycontroversyattendsthe growingimportanceof
partysoft money.Do partiesdilute the influenceof largedonors
or facilitatetheir access to policy makers?Do parties operate
independent of incumbent officeholders,or are they largely
instrumentsof those incumbents?Does soft money support
party-buildingand grass-rootsactivities,or is it usedprimarilyto
financecommunicationsabout specificfederalcandidates?Have
statepartiesthrivedin the eraof nationalpartysoft money,or are
they more agents of nationalpartiesand politicians?Does soft
money increasethe electoralprospectsof challengers,or is its
impact neutralizedbecause the two parties concentratetheir
resourcesin the same targetedcontests?Will a soft-moneyban
significantlyreducepartyresources,or will the partiescompensate by raisingmorehardmoney?
These questionshave a direct bearingon the reformdebate,
but initial answersproducedby new researchare far from consensual.Scholarshave had to laborwith less-than-idealdata on
the preciseuses ratherthan sourcesof partysoft-moneycontributions. National and state parties are requiredto reportsoft
money disbursementsthey makein relationto a federalelection.
However,thereareno uniformcodes for the purposesof the disbursements,and informationis often incomplete.It is virtually
impossibleto discernfrom the FEC reportswhich racesinvolve
soft money.Transfersand swapsamongnational,state,and local
partycommitteesmakethe researchtaskall the moredaunting.
Workingwith reportsfiled with the FEC between 1992 and
1998 by the 100 state partiesas well as the national parties,
RaymondLaRajaconcludesthatsoft moneyhasdone muchmore
than financeelectioneeringissueads for federalcandidates:it has
also strengthenedstate partyorganizationsand supportedtraditional grass-rootsactivities.37
Scholarsat the BrennanCenterfor
Justiceat the New YorkUniversitySchool of Law,workingfrom
the samereportsfiled for the 2000 election,producesimilarestimatesfor spendingon mediaads but concludethat little is spent
on votermobilizationand genericpartyactivities.38
Maglebyfinds
evidenceof substantialsoft-money-financed
groundwarsin contested races, but these campaignactivitiesare overwhelmingly
focused on candidates,not parties.39Expertreportsfiled in the
BCRAlitigationby Greenand by Krasnoand Soraufdocument
that a very smallshareof partysoft money is used to strengthen
The broaderquestionraisedin this researchis whetherpotential challengersare systematicallydiscouragedfrom runningfor
federaloffice by the dauntingexpenseof a seriouscampaignand
a beliefthat incumbentscan raisemuch moremoney if they need
to do so. Studiesof candidaterecruitmentsuggesta diverseset of
incentivesand disincentivesat work, including a more multifaceted assessmentof an incumbent'spotential vulnerability.
Nonetheless,potentialchallengershavereadyaccessto campaignfinancedata in previouselection cycles.They can see, for example, that the 324 House incumbentswho won comfortably(with
60 percent or more of the vote) in 2000 spent on average
$646,703, compared with $148,507 by their opponents.
However,the 70 incumbentswho won with less than 60 percent
spent on average$1,444,256, while the mean expenditureof
their opponents was $854,690. The Herculean fundraising
achievementof these 70 challengerswas morethan offset by that
of the incumbents.Awarenessof these funding patternsmight
well discouragesome of those contemplatinga challengeto an
incumbent.
Another indirect measure of the impact of incumbent
fundraisingprowesson the supply of quality challengersis the
growinginterestamongpartyleadersin recruitingwealthycandidates who can generouslyfinance their own campaigns.The
recordof self-financedcandidatesis decidedlymixed.Millionsof
dollarshavebeen squanderedby wealthyindividualswho learned
the painfullessonthat personalwealthdoes not converteasilyto
electoral success.34Jon Corzine, Maria Cantwell, and Mark
Dayton, three successfulDemocraticsenatorialcandidateswho
financedtheir own campaignsin 2000, are the exceptions,not
the rule. Nonetheless,the numberof candidatesable and willing
to financetheirown campaignsis likelyto increase.
party organization or to support grass-rootsactivities.40
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I Vol. 1/No. 1
A number of scholarshave documentedthe growingimportance of congressionalparty campaign committees in raising
soft money, and the sharp drop in their direct (hard money)
They have also noted the more recent
supportfor candidates.41
innovations of "Section 527" leadership PACs and joint
fundraisingcommittees, both of which allow federalpoliticians
to raisesoft money and steer it to their own direct or indirect
advantage.
of the commission in implementing the public-disclosure
requirementsof federal election law (except for the growing
shareof campaignactivitiesdesignatedas issueadvocacyand not
subjectto disclosure).
The disputeis overwhetherany regimeof regulatoryenforcement of campaign-financeviolationsis workableand desirable.
Basedon a carefulempiricalstudy of how the FEC has handled
its enforcementcaseload,Todd Lochnerand Bruce Cain conclude that the answeris clearlyno. The costs of a more effective
enforcementsystem, they argue,would be an increasein legal
contestationand political controversyand an abridgementof
FirstAmendmentrights.Lochnerand Caindo not shy awayfrom
the broaderimplicationsof their research.They unabashedly
embracethe abolitionof contributionand expenditurelimitsand
a sole relianceon publicdisclosure.49
There is no denying that removingall legal restrictionson
campaign-financetransactions(beyond disclosure of express
advocacy)would greatlyreduce the problemsof enforcement.
But at what cost?Verylittle researchor criticalthinkinghas been
done on "deregulationand disclosure"regimes. Relying on a
political marketplaceto police the role of money in politics
entailsa host of theoreticaland practicalproblems.50
Achieving
full information,presentingvoters with a clear differencein
fundraisingbehavioron which to casttheirballots,and requiring
votersto choose a candidateexclusivelyon that patternof campaign contributionsall pose formidablehurdlesto such a deregulated marketplace.So it is not surprisingthat others have
searched for enforcement models-in the United Kingdom,
Canada,and the City of New York-consistentwith some restrictions on the flow of money.51
Issue advocacy
Whateverthe spillovereffectson parties(positiveand negative),no
one disputesthat the strikingincreasein soft-moneyfinancing
beginningin the 1996 electioncyclewasdrivenby the new opportunities to wage campaignsunder the cover of issue advocacy.
Anecdotalevidencesuggestedlittledifferencein purposeand content between express-advocacy
and issue-advocacycommunications financedby partiesand groups.Researchby politicalscientists soon confirmedthat suspicion,with importantimplications
for the Buckleyexpress-advocacy
standardand the efficacyof alternativebright-linetestsfor politicalcommunicationsproperlysubject to regulation.Examiningtelevisionads sponsoredby candidates,parties,and groupsin the 75 largestmediamarketsin 1998
and 2000, Krasnoand Goldsteinfound that few candidateads
usedwordsof expressadvocacy;virtuallyall partyissueads mentioned the nameof a federalcandidate,mostlyin an attackmode,
but few mentionedthe nameof a party;and almosteveryissuead
featuringthe nameof a candidateandrunningnearan electionwas
clearlydesignedto supportor attacka candidate,not to expressa
view on an issue.42Maglebyused focusgroupsand a WebTVsurvey to confirm that votersare unableto differentiatecandidatespecificissue ads (broadcastand print) sponsoredby partiesand
outside groupsfrom campaignads run by candidates.43
He also
and policy making
documentedthe massiveuse of soft moneyby partiesand outside Fundraising
Eachof the substantivequestionsreviewedthus fardealswith the
groups to finance election-orientedissue advocacycommunicaimpactof politicalfinancingon elections.This finalsectionlooks
tions in targeted races.44
at researchon the linkagesbetweencampaign-financepractices
Overwhelming evidence indicates that candidate-specific and
policy making.Since the SupremeCourt'sBuckleydecision,
issue advocacynear an election has an explicit electioneering
(or the appearanceof corruption)has been the domicorruption
purpose.RichardHasen45used this evidenceto rejectthe con- nant
rationalefor regulatingcampaignfinance.
legal
stitutional argument that the new campaign-finance law's
Much scholarly energy has been expended attempting to
bright-linetest for distinguishingissue from expressadvocacy measure whether
campaign contributions corrupt the policy
suffersfromoverbreadth.46
Criticsof the new standardmust perin Congress. The vast bulk of this
force base their argument(that it would limit free speech) on process by buying votes
researchhas examinedthe connectionsbetweenPAC contribusomethingother than the evidenceof how it would haveworked tions
(a surrogatefor interestedmoney) and votes in the House
in recentelections.
and Senate.52While there is ample evidence that PACs behave
Enforcement
strategicallyin their contributionbehavior,53there is little eviScholars have long observed that the best intentions of dence that campaign contributionsto members of Congress
Washingtonpolicy makerscan be dashedin the implementation directlyaffect their roll-calldecisions.Party,ideology,and conprocess.In a study of state campaign-financepractice,Michael stituencyaremuch moredominantin shapingvoting behaviorin
Malbin and Thomas Gais observed numerous administrative Congressthan are PAC contributions.Only when these forces
hurdlesto effectiveimplementation.47Criticismof the enforce- diminish in importance-for example, on financial-services
ment of federalcampaign-financelaw is widespreadamongprac- regulation-do opportunitiesarise for influence via contributitionersand academics,but political scientistshave done rela- tions.54PACsfacetheirown organizationalconstraints,members
tively little work on the FEC. Most activists and students of of Congressoften are more principalsthan agentsin the districampaignfinance accept the argumentthat Congresswas mar- bution of PAC contributions,and interestgroups expend subvelously successful in structuring the FEC to be a captive stantiallymoreresourceson lobbyingactivitiesthanon campaign
agency.48At the same time, they acknowledgethe broadsuccess contributions.
www.apsanet.org 77
Articles I LinkingKnowledgeandAction
sional staff, and advise legislativesponsors and opponents of
reformproposals.They issue reportssynthesizingresearchfindings and advocatingor opposingspecificreformproposals.They
talk to journalists,writeop-eds, participatein publicevents,and
consult with activists and organizations.And they conduct
researchthat bearsdirectlyon pending reformproposals.All of
theseactivitieswerein evidencein the yearsleadingup to passage
of the BCRA and in the subsequentcourt battlesover the new
law'sconstitutionality.
One exampleof this engagementoccurredwhen the Citizens'
ResearchFoundationconveneda taskforceon campaign-finance
reform.The task force produceda 1997 reportentitled "New
Realities,New Thinking."56Nine political scientistsunder the
chairmanshipof HerbertAlexanderproducedunanimoussupport for 36 of the 39 recommendationsin the report.The report
takesexceptionto much of the reformistrhetoricand policyproposalsbut also acknowledgesthe problematicnatureof many of
the new developmentsin campaign-financepractice.In light of
Alexander'searly prominence as a critic of contribution and
spendinglimits, it is strikingthat the reportendorsesa ban on
soft money, a prohibition on corporate and union treasury
financingof issue advocacy,and a retentionof spendinglimits
associatedwith the presidentialpublic-financingsystem.At the
sametime, it balancesthese restrictivemeasureswith recommendationsto increasethe flow of money, includingincreasedcontribution limits, elimination of limits on party coordinated
spending,and partialpublicfinancingof congressionalelections.
Severalothereffortswerelaunchedduringthis periodto bring
politicalscientiststogetherto diagnosethe most pressingproblems
in the campaign-financearena and to propose a new reform
agenda-but with moreactiveengagementin the policyprocess.In
1995 I assembled,via the Internet,the BrookingsWorkingGroup
on CampaignFinanceReformto follow the congressionaldebate
and evaluatethe versionof the McCain-Feingold
bill then under
consideration.A diversegroupof scholarsreachedoverwhelming
agreementthat this approachto reform-characterizedby new
limits on fundraising(from PACsand out-of-statecontributors)
and on spending in congressionalraces-was ill-advisedand
unworkable.Our conversation,availableon the BrookingsWeb
site, was monitoredby congressionalstaff,reformadvocates,and
That versionof the bill was subsequently
journalists.57
jettisoned.
Followingthe 1996 elections,Norman Ornsteinconveneda
small group of political scientists (Anthony Corrado,Michael
Malbin,and me, plus formerjournalistPaulTaylor)to assessthe
wreckageto the regulatoryregimeand to hammerout a reform
agendathat dealtwith the most criticalproblemsand had some
political viability.We produced a report entitled "Reforming
CampaignFinance"that endorseda ban on partysoft moneytied
to an increasein hard-moneylimits, regulationof candidatespecific issue advocacynear an election, strengthenedenforcement, freebroadcasttime, and taxcreditsfor smalldonors.58This
Linking Knowledge and Action
packagewas endorsedand championedby the Leagueof Women
In recentyears,politicalscientistshavebecomemuch moreactive Votersunderthe title "FiveIdeasfor PracticalCampaignReform"
participantsin debates on campaign-financereform. Scholars in a national advertisingcampaignand in scores of meetings
serveas expertwitnessesand submit amicusbriefsin important aroundthe country.Collaborationwith the Leaguewas a critical
court cases.They testifyat congressionalhearings,briefcongres- step in persuadingthe broaderreformcommunityto reconsider
This scholarlyconsensusremains,but interestis growingin a
broaderset of questions.RichardHall and FrankWaymaninitiated an importantline of researchon the myriadways in which
groups receive or are denied favors beyond roll-call votes.55
Memberscan expresspublicsupportor oppositionin variouslegislativevenues, offer amendments,build coalitions,help place
itemson or off the agenda,speedor delayaction,and providespecial accessto lobbyists.They can also declinerequestsfor eachof
thesethings.Beyondthe chamberfloor,venuescan includerules
governingfloor consideration,party leadership,party caucuses,
standingcommitteesand subcommittees,conferencecommittees,
and other collectionsof membersinside the House and Senate.
Groups may use their campaigncontributionsin conjunction
with theirlobbyingoperationsto reinforceor activateratherthan
convertmembers.And the currencyof campaigncontributions
extendswell beyond PAC contributionsto members'campaign
committees.These include brokeredif not bundled individual
contributions,contributionsto leadershipPACs controlledby
members, contributionsto parties and candidatesin targeted
racesearmarkedfor creditto members,soft-moneycontributions
to partiesand "Section527" groupsconnectedto members,and
directexpenditureson issue ad campaigns.The ways and means
of potential influence (and corruption)are much more diverse
than those investigatedin the earlyscholarlyresearch.
Soft money poses a specialchallengeto this literature.Instead
of $5,000 or $10,000 PAC contributions,corporations,individuals, and unions make six- or seven-figuredonationsfrom their
treasuriesor personalcheckbooks.In the 2000 electioncycle,800
organizationsand individuals provided $300 million of the
$487 million in soft money raisedby the parties.Fifty of these
donors each contributed$1 million or more. Incumbentpoliticians, including presidentsand congressionalparty leaders,use
partyorganizationsto aggressivelysolicit such donations.Many
of those who make very largecontributionshave high stakesin
congressionaland regulatoryagencyactions.It is not unusualfor
them to contributeto both majorpoliticalparties.The potential
for abuseby public officialsand privateinterestsis not insignificant. Conflictsof interestareglaring.And all of this fundraising
is basedupon the transparentlie that the funds arebeing raised
for purposesother than influencingfederalelections.These relatively new developmentsin campaign-financepracticeprovided
much of the policy rationaleand constitutionaljustificationfor
the new campaign-finance
law.Forthe most part,however,political scientistshavenot done researchthat directlyaddressesthese
issues.Findingsbasedentirelyon hard-moneyPACcontributions
to individual members shed little light on the policy consequences of these developments.This may well account for the
strikingdisconnectbetweenthe political-scienceperspectiveand
the policy communityon the centralquestionof whethermoney
affectspolicy outcomes.
78
March2003 | Vol. 1/No. 1
ones before the Supreme Court: Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
GovernmentPAC and FEC v. ColoradoRepublicanFederal
Both opinions-the firstdefendingcontriCampaignCommittee.
bution limits, the second upholdinglimits on partycoordinated
spending-cited argumentsand evidenceprovidedby politicalscientists.Duelingteamsof politicalscientistsarefeaturedin the litigation challengingthe constitutionalityof the new campaignfinance law.61Politicalscientists-some with pride, otherswith
annoyance-see theirworksused as ammunitionby advocatesin
the campaign-financewars. Bradley Smith on the right and
KathleenSullivanon the left havecited political-science
literature
to buttress their cases for deregulatingcampaign finance.62
Profounddifferencescan be found within single departmentsof
politicalscientists.One generationof BerkeleygraduatestudentsincludingDavidMagleby,JonathanKrasno,and DonaldGreenhasproducedimportant,policy-relevant
researchthatis beingused
law.A facultyadviser,
by supportersof the new campaign-finance
RaymondWolfinger,has joined them in amicusbriefsand public
statementssupportingthis broadapproachto campaign-finance
regulation.A newer generationof Berkeleygraduatestudentsworking with Bruce Cain and Nelson Polsby, and including
RaymondLa Raja,ToddLochner,andJustinBuchler-is producing a body of scholarshipthat is embracedby opponentsof the
BCRA.
In one sense,we should be neithersurprisednor dismayedby
thesedisagreements
amongpoliticalscientists.The lawjournalsare
filled with competinganalysesand argumentsabout campaignfinanceregulation.And economistshavelong demonstratedthat
impressivescholarlycredentialsare no guaranteeof consensuson
the most basicquestionsof publicpolicy.If MartinFeldsteinand
Paul Krugmancan hold such profoundlydifferentviews of the
economicand fiscalimpactsof Bill Clinton'smarginaltax increase
and GeorgeW. Bush'stax cut, we shouldnot be overlyconcerned
when Nelson Polsby63and FrankSoraufreachsharplydivergent
conclusionsaboutthe efficacyof campaign-finance
regulation.
Moreover,there is more agreementamong politicalscientists
than theremight appearto be. Politicalscientistswho haveadvocatedand defendeda ban on partysoft moneyand the regulation
of electioneeringunderthe guise of issue advocacyretaina professional appreciationof the limits of reform.That legacy of
Overacker,Heard, and Alexanderis very much evident among
supportersas well as opponentsof the BCRA.
Indeed,on the basisof our scholarlyresearch,I believewe can
agreeon a numberof importantmatters.First,the most recent
tial nominations.
regime for regulatingcampaignfinance collapsedin the afterIn conclusion, these efforts by politicalscientiststo drawon mathof the 1996 election.It encouragedpoliticalactorsto speak
scholarlyknowledge to shape the public debate on campaign and act in a way that fostereda widespreaddisrespectfor the rule
finance and specific reforminitiativesshould not be taken as a of law and corrodedthe legitimacyof our democracy.The status
sign of professionalconsensus.As was clearin my reviewof the quo ante pre-BCRAis simplyunacceptable.How best to change
research, substantial disagreementsabout political financing that systemis properlya matterof dispute.Some counselrepairremain.And many criticalpolicy questionshave not been seri- ing the regulatorysystem,othersremovingthe limitsthat precipously addressedby the researchcommunity,forcingscholars,like itatedthe regulatoryend runs.
Second,the new law is a relativelymodest,incrementalunderpoliticiansand activists,to rely on a mix of educatedguesswork
and a bit of ideologyin judgingvariousreforms.
taking,not a revolutionin campaign-finance
regulation.Itsmajor
Politicalscientistsoften find themselveson opposingsides of provisions would leave the system to operate largely as it did early
cases in court, includingthe two most recent in the 1980s. It is designedto repairthe most egregioustearsin
campaign-finance
its traditionalcampaign-financeagenda and embrace a more
incrementalstrategy.
At the same time, we participatedin a seriesof meetingswith
the principal sponsors of previous legislation (SenatorsJohn
McCain and Russ Feingold, and RepresentativesChris Shays
and Martin Meehan), with a bipartisangroup of House freshmen interestedin forging their own legislation,and with other
membersof the House and Senateseekingto play a constructive
role in moving the issue forward.We made the case for a new
reformagendain the public arena-through op-eds, television
appearances,discussionswith editorialboards,and speechesin
Washington,D.C., and aroundthe country.
Our efforts were rewarded when Senators McCain and
Feingoldintroduceda drasticallyrevisedbill built aroundthe first
two elements of our package:soft money and issue advocacy.
Later,at the invitationof SenatorOlympia Snowe, we worked
with severallegal expertsto give the issue-advocacyproposalthe
strongest possible constitutionalstanding. The result was the
Snowe-Jeffordsamendment,which helped increasesupport for
McCain-Feingoldin the Senateand becamea centralpartof the
version that became law in 2002.59 Throughout the tortuous
journeybetweenthe reintroductionof the legislationin 1998 and
the bill's passage in 2002, we remained actively and visibly
engagedin the policy debate.
Research(conductedprimarilyby Corrado,Goldstein,Krasno,
and Magleby,and discussedabove) on party soft money and
issue-adelectioneeringwas criticalto congressionalproponentsof
BCRA.This workwas featuredprominentlyin the congressional
debateand providedmuch of the evidentiarybasisfor the passage
and constitutionaldefenseof the new law.
This experiencewas unusual, our involvementidiosyncratic.
In a move to institutionalizethat experience,Michael Malbin
launchedthe CampaignFinanceInstitute.Its purposeis to bring
objective scholarly researchon campaign finance to bear on
importantpolicy questions,in a deliberative,politicallyneutral,
and policy-connectedsetting.60More than a dozen politicalscientists are servingas trusteesor academicadvisersto the institute. Interestingreports have been releasedon the impact of
higher contributionlimits on fundraisingby challengers,problems of disclosurein an eraof issueadvocacycampaigning,political partiesunder McCain-Feingold,and interestgroup adaptations to the new world of campaign finance. The institute
recently establisheda new task force to deal with the serious
problemsconfrontingthe public-financingsystemfor presiden-
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Articles I LinkingKnowledgeandAction
the regulatoryfabric,not to charta new courseor to removefreedoms long enjoyedby citizensand organizations.It is bestviewed
as a prerequisitefor other changes (includingfree air time and
publicsubsidies)to increasecompetitionand easethe burdensof
fundraising,not as a comprehensivereformpackage.Some political scientists believe that it is unwise, unworkable,and even
unconstitutional.But they cannot reasonablyconcludethat it is
revolutionary.
Third, the alternativesto the BCRAapproachhave their own
problems.Those advocatingfull public financing of elections
(and the abolitionof virtuallyall privatefinancing)64must perforce grapple with the same issues of soft money and issue
advocacythat haveunderminedthe full publicfinancingof presidentialelections.Those who advocateremovinglimits on contributionsand expendituresand relyingexclusivelyon disclosure
facetheirown dauntingobstacles.This requiresthe repealof laws
on the books for up to a century,or else a reversalof Buckleyand
its progeny at the very time the public and policy makersare
A return
demandingnew regulationson corporateaccountability.
to a state of naturein campaignfinance, in which major economic interestscan give unlimitedsumsto competingcandidates
and parties,is not self-evidentlysusceptibleto policingby voters
in a politicalmarketplace.And given the emergenceof electioneeringas issueadvocacy,it would eitherproduceonly partialdisclosureor requiresome versionof the new law'sprovisionsgoverning disclosure now vigorously opposed by champions of
deregulation.
Finally,politicalscientistsof all stripesrecognizethat regulating the flow of money in electionsis hardwork that often leaves
reformers with unfulfilled objectives and undesired consequences.Ensuringthat adequateresourcesareavailablefor a free
flow of informationamongcitizens,groups,candidates,and parties is essentialto healthyelections,yet the mannerin which that
money is raisedand spent can underminedemocraticpolitics.
Tensionsbetweeneconomic inequalityand politicalequalityare
inevitable.FirstAmendmentguaranteesproperlylimit the reach
of regulators.Effortsto limit corruptionand to achievegreater
equalitycan inadvertentlyreduceelectoralcompetition.Political
money is fungible, and legal constraintson its flow will divert
some through other, possibly less accountable, passageways.
Politiciansand interestgroupswill exploit the weaknessesof the
regulatoryfabricto advancetheir interests.
Political science advocatesof the BCRA recognizefully the
imperfectionsof the new law and the ways in which political
actorswill adapt to its restrictions.For us, the question is how
best to respond to troublesome developments in campaign
financewithout makingmattersworse.The problemsassociated
with politicalfinancingcan neverbe solved,only managedaswell
as possible in light of these constraintsand other, sometimes
competing,goals for the politicalsystem. Politicalscientistscan
contributeto this ongoing processof reform,maintenance,and
repair-at all levelsof governmentin the UnitedStatesand in sister democraciesaround the world grapplingwith many of the
same problems-through rigorous thinking, relevantresearch,
and judicious engagementin the public and policy arena.We
havebegun to do so.
80
March2003 I Vol. 1/No. 1
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Notes
1 Overacker1932.
2 Ansolabehere,Gerber,and Snyder2001.
3 Overacker1932, 99.
4 Heard 1960.
5 Alexander1972, 298.
6 Mann 2002a.
7 Jacobson 1980.
8 Ranney 1977; Kayden 1977.
9 Stern 1988.
10 Sorauf 1992.
11 Sorauf 1988.
12 Sorauf 1992.
13 This section drawson Mann 2002b.
14 Corrado 1997; Corrado2000a.
15 Potter 1997.
16 Buckleyv. Valeo(1976), 424 U.S. 1, 79.
17 Corrado2000a.
18 My initial effort at a more generaland comparativetreatment of issues in campaign-financeregulationcan be
found in Mann 2001.
19 Ansolabehere,Gerber,and Snyder2001; Ansolabehere,
Figueiredo,and Snyder2003; Mann and Corrado2002.
20 Magleby2002.
21 Sorauf 1999, 50.
22 Magleby2000a; Magleby2003.
23 Corrado2000b.
24 Jacobson 1978; Jacobson 1980.
25 Green and Krasno 1988; Green and Krasno 1990.
26 Gerber 1998.
27 Campbell2002.
28 Krasno2003.
29 Krasnoand Green 1988.
30 Squire 1991, 1,158.
31 Box-Steffensmeier1996.
32 Epstein and Zemsky 1995.
33 Goodliffe 2001.
34 Steen 2000.
35 Aldrich 1995; Rohde 1991; Bartels2000; Pomper 1998;
Kelley 2002; Cohen et al. 2001; Green, Palmquist,and
Schickler2002.
36 Herrnson 1988; Kolodny and Dwyre 1998.
37 La Raja 1999; La Raja 2001.
38 BrennanCenter for Justice 2001.
39 Magleby2000a; Magleby2003.
40 Green 2002; Krasnoand Sorauf2002.
41 Krasnoand Sorauf 1999; Corrado2000b; Dwyre and
Kolodny 2002.
42 Krasnoand Seltz 2000; Krasnoand Goldstein 2002.
43 Magleby2000b.
44 Magleby2003.
45 Hasen 2001.
46 This bright-linetest defines electioneeringcommunication
as a broadcast,cable, or satelliteadvertisementthat refers
to a clearlyfederalcandidate,is made within 60 days of a
generalelection or 30 days of a primary,and is targeted
to the relevantelectorate.
47 Malbin and Gais 1998.
48 Mann 2002a.
49 Lochnerand Cain 1999.
50 Mann 1998.
51 Democracy21 EducationFund, ProjectFEC 2002.
52 Useful summariesof this literatureinclude Sorauf 1992;
Wright 1996; and Ansolabehere,Figueiredo,and Snyder
2003.
53 Snyder 1990; Snyder 1992.
54 Stratmann2002.
55 Hall and Wayman 1990.
56 Citizens'ResearchFoundation1997.
57 BrookingsInstitution 1996.
58 Ornstein et al. 1996.
59 Ornstein 2001.
60 CampaignFinanceInstitute2002.
61 Politicalscientistsprovidingexpertreportsfor the plaintiffs
in McConnellv. FEC includeJamesGibson, John Green,
RaymondLa Raja,Sidney Milkis, David Primo, and James
Snyder.Those submittingreportsfor the defendantsinclude KennethGoldstein,Donald Green,JonathanKrasno,
ArthurLupia, David Magleby,Thomas Mann, Robert
Shapiro,and FrankSorauf.Their reportsare availableon
the Campaignand Media LegalCenterWeb site
(www.camlc.org).
Anthony Corradoalso playeda major
role
for
the defendants'legal team. The reports
consulting
are cited extensivelyin the briefssubmittedto the court.
62 Smith 2001; Sullivan 1998.
63 Polsby 1996.
64 Public Campaign2002.
www.apsanet.org 83