Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 18(3&4), 194–212
Copyright © 2003, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Truth, Trust, and Telepresence
Paula S. Tompkins
St. Cloud State University
o Computer-mediated communication (CMC) raises anew traditional questions of
truth and trust. Challenges to communicating with truth and trust are exacerbated
by qualities of CMC which encourage users to communicate mindlessly, particularly
its capacity to evoke a sense of being present to an Other, despite different locations in
time or space. Rhetorical presence and dialogic presentness are used to explore the
communication dynamics of CMC and delineate some of the challenges of truthful
and trustworthy CMC.
The capacity of cyberspace to transcend physical materiality, time, and
space has freed individuals to develop online relationships and communities that before were impossible to imagine. As increasingly sophisticated
technology enables a greater sense of immediacy and interactiveness, of
being seemingly present to another in cyberspace, computer-mediated
communication (CMC) provides an important alternative or supplement
to face-to-face (F2F) communication (Barnes, 2001; Horrigan, 2001; Kraut
et al., 2002; Turner, Grube, & Meyers, 2001). Despite the sense of an Other
being present, we recognize that CMC has a less than accurate correspondence with our cultural notions of time, as well as space and physical materiality, because it occurs in cyberspace (Jones, 1997). This sensory displacement prompts traditional questions of communication ethics, about
truthfulness and trustworthiness of communicators and their messages.
Jensen’s (2001) survey of truth and trust as goals across cultures and
throughout history, from ancient China, India, and Greece to more current
theoretical and theological discussions, posited truth and trust as twin
goals of ethical communication. Communicators need some degree or dimension of truth to develop trust for maintaining relationships and communities. Jaska and Pritchard (1994) argued that a society must have some
presumption of truthfulness to exist; otherwise, defensiveness and distrust
resulting from presumptions of deceit threaten a society’s existence. Truth
also requires some degree of trust in discovering truth, lowering one’s defenses, and discovering what exists beyond one’s experience and understanding. When we consider truth and trust in CMC, questions arise about
their nature in cyberspace. The questions themselves are not
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new—whether we have been deceived, whether the reality we believe to
be true is indeed true, or whether we can trust what we perceive.
Questioning our perceptions can be more challenging in cyberspace.
“What gives us our sense of being in direct touch with reality is that we
bring about changes in the world and get perceptual feedback concerning
what we have done” (Dreyfus, 2000, p. 57). Several factors contribute to
our perception of causality—proximity (Borgmann, 2000), time, perceiving
consequences to our actions, and performance, as well as the corporeality
of our experience (Dreyfus, 2000). Because cyberspace transforms our notions of space, distance, time, and our bodies, our reference points for
checking our perceptions become attenuated and may disappear. For
some, cyberspace has reinvigorated the position of Descartes, that the only
thing of which one can be certain is private subjective experience (Dreyfus,
2000). Such thinking leads us into debates of what is real and how we may
discern with varying degrees of certainty what is real.
Questioning perceptions can be
more challenging in cyberspace.
I follow the lead of Sissela Bok (1989) in her discussion of lying concerning debates about certain knowledge and skepticism. In communication,
the relevant ethical question is not truth but whether there is a preference
for truth as one understands it. Rather than aiming for the epistemological
certainty of truth, my aim is truthfulness or the principle of veracity. We
may not be able to know with absolute certainty, but we can communicate
to the best of our abilities and with truthful intent. The framework of truthfulness recognizes the difficulties of discerning authenticity, accuracy, reliability, sincerity, or deceitfulness in communication messages and communicators. Individuals may unintentionally deceive others, telling
falsehoods which they believe are truthful. Furthermore, as Jensen (2001)
noted, Hans Kung, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sissela Bok, and the proposed
U.N. Declaration of Human Responsibilities each argued that in extreme
circumstances, such as when being truthful threatens one’s survival as in
war or under torture, we are under no obligation to tell the truth. Skillful
deception also can occur by being truthful to a point, with deceivers relying on a combination of true statement and concealment or omission,
rather than communicating a complete falsehood. Such deceivers may try
to defend themselves with the claim that they did not lie.
Our acceptance of the truthfulness of a message is partly influenced by
perceptions of the trustworthiness of the sender. Trust is based on a judgment about how an individual makes choices that affect others, specifically
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the extent to which an individual’s intentions are benevolent (Van
Avermaet, 1999). Trust, however, is not the same as security, for it entails an
acceptance of the risk that those one trusts also possess the freedom to harm,
but chooses not to do so (Nissenbaum, 2001). This is the paradox of trust—it
is born of trusting, of lowering one’s defenses and making one’s self vulnerable to another in order to trust and be trusted. Rawlins’ (1992) study of the dialectics of friendship reveals another complexity of trust, that it includes a
judgment about a communicator’s capacity to make trustworthy choices
within a dialectic of contradictory responsibilities that organize a relationship (e.g. candor and protectiveness). Although each responsibility is valued, it is not always possible to meet both simultaneously; thus, we grant
trust to a friend’s judgment about which goal is in our best interest in a particular situation. Rawlins’ research raises the possibility that trust is characterized less by reliability and consistency than by responsiveness, flexibility,
and discernment about what is in the best interest of another. Cyberspace
raises anew concerns about truth and trust in communication because reference points for checking our perceptions are difficult to discern. If recognizing the truthfulness of what others say becomes problematic, trust fundamental to relationships and community is weakened, making on-going
communication difficult and sometimes impossible.
Qualities of CMC
To explore issues of truth and trust in CMC, I shall first discuss three formal
qualities of this medium—its asymmetry, its dematerialized qualities, and
particularly the human-digital interface as telepresence. Second, I will draw
upon the concepts of “presence” from rhetorical theory and “presentness”
from dialogical communication theory to explore how these qualities can influence communication dynamics of CMC and delineate some implications
for enacting and discerning truthfulness and trustworthiness. Finally, I will
discuss some of the implications of this analysis for the study of CMC.
Asymmetrical Communication
The asymmetry of CMC foregrounds a dialectical tension between the
linear and social constructionist elements of the communication process.1
Senders create messages with little assurance that anyone will receive the
messages they craft, because receivers also create the messages they receive. Examples of how receivers create messages include choosing settings or preferences for software, using a search engine, clicking on
hyperlinks, choosing not to read an e-mail or instant message (IM), creating or editing IM buddy lists, deleting unread e-mails, setting up filters to
automatically delete messages on a particular topic or from particular
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senders, or silently leaving a chat room. Receivers may use software technology to select in varying degrees the content of the messages they receive, as well as whether they will receive messages at all. In CMC, co-construction of meaning arises less from the dynamic interplay of message
exchange between communicators than from the asymmetrical assembling of messages by receivers, often sent asynchronously by senders.
Meaning for receivers is constructed by selecting from possible messages
received from unseen and often unknown senders, who typically have no
guarantee that someone would indeed receive their message. Samuel
Becker’s notion of communication as a mosaic of meaning illuminates this
capacity of receivers to construct meaning by selecting from available messages (Fisher, 1978). In an individual mosaic of communication, meaning
construction depends to a greater extent upon a receiver’s selective exposure and attention to available messages, than on social negotiation.
Meaning arises less from
dynamic interplay of messages
than asymmetrical assembling …
by receivers.
CMC’s technological form (software, hardware, and networking systems) enables communicators to limit social negotiation of meaning, granting them greater control over what messages they receive and when they receive them. As receivers construct meaning from the messages they create,
they also may produce a self-reflexive feedback loop for meaning construction (Johnson, 1997; Walther, 1996). The asymmetrical form deemphasizes
the sociality of communication, attenuating the possible relational connection between communicators while also reinforcing the meanings and perceptions of individual communicators. Senders create and transmit messages not knowing who, if anyone, will receive them. Because receivers have
greater facility in creating what messages they receive than in F2F communication, there is less reliability in mutual resources for relational connection
and for negotiating trust. It is not surprising that studies have found that online communities can have difficulty responding productively to conflict or
crisis when they lack the resilience and flexibility of interpersonal resources
such as trust (Haythornthwaite, Wellman, & Garton, 1998; Reid, 1998).
Dematerialized Communicators
When communicators create an online persona, they have the freedom
to decide what degree of correspondence will exist between their online
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persona, physical presence, and F2F communication style. This freedom
provides space for both creativity and duplicity. Verification of online
personae can be unlikely, since there are few or no social controls to assure correspondence, short of a real-time visit in physical reality. Facility
with technology makes it easy to construct a virtual social actor, enabling
a communicator to be anonymous. Even what appears as a real-time
camera cannot assure correspondence to a physical presence.2 It is a truism that inhabitants and objects in cyberspace may have little or no correspondence to those in the physical world, as evidenced by the popular
media periodically publishing stories about the dangers of anonymous
CMC for unwitting users.
Inhabitants … in cyberspace
may have little or no
correspondence to those
in the physical world.
Even when limited to text, communicators project a personality or
persona online using clearly stereotypical characteristics of personality,
gender, or ethnicity. Such communication often is direct and blunt, lacking nonverbal or conversational cues used for flexibility and nuance in
F2F communication. Such a communication style, which may reinforce
stereotypical perceptions and thinking among users, magnifies the importance of these minimal cues (Burkhalter, 1999; O’Brien, 1999; Riva &
Galimberti, 1998; Walther, 1996). In some interactions the result may be a
type unique to technologically mediated communication, in which the
level of affect experienced by communication partners not only parallels
F2F interaction but surpasses it, creating what Walther calls a
“hyperpersonal” relationship. Without the corrective of physical proximity, the asymmetry of CMC may encourage communicators to inflate
their perceptions of similarity or dissimilarity with their partners. The result may be a relationship negotiated in cyberspace between cyber-personae who have limited correspondence with their creators in physical
space and time, and whose creators may have limited awareness of the
lack of correspondence.
Human-Digital Interface as Telepresence
Although CMC may approximate F2F, even intimate communication,
those whose primary interaction occurs online may never—or only occasionally—be physically present to one another. It is well documented that
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significant interpersonal experiences, such as creating relationships and
communities online, do occur though users never meet in physical reality
(Horrigan, 2001; Igbarria, Shayo, & Olfman, 1998; McLaughlin, Osborne, &
Ellison 1997; Walther, 1996). The concept of telepresence, developed by
those who study the human–digital interface, is helpful in understanding
the sense that another is “present” in CMC. Telepresence is a psychological
state in which an individual does not recognize that the current experience
is either filtered through or generated by a human-made technology
(Lombard & Ditton, 1997). Software and hardware designers strive to find
ways to achieve telepresence of sensory perception and social interaction
by simulating or conveying the social richness and interactivity of human
interaction, such as the richness of sensory information, speed, or
interactivity; thus, online chat has more speed and interactivity than e-mail
or a bulletin board.3
Telepresence may also be conceived as “flow,” a state of mind in which
the user immerses herself so much in a task that outside stimuli recede
from awareness (Draper, Kaber, & Usher, 1998). When telepresence is experienced as flow, the capacity of technology to simulate real time or physical
reality is less important than its capacity to evoke or trigger user involvement. Research by Reeves and Nass (1996) provided a clue to the
immersive power of telepresence as flow. They concluded that humans
mindlessly interact with technology (computers and even television sets)
as social actors, to the point of stereotypically interacting with technological artifacts according to gender or ethnicity. Their research subjects were
not technologically naive, but were sophisticated users who, recognizing
the absurdity of this stereotyping, still dissociated their interaction with
technological artifacts from a cognitive realization they were stereotypically interacting with these artifacts. This research suggested that humans
respond to technological artifacts as if they were human, when artifacts
present cues that trigger cognitive scripts of familiar F2F interaction routines (Nass & Moon, 2000; Reeves & Nass, 2000). The technological threshold for triggering scripts may be minimal, for the key factor is consistency
of whatever medium is used—text, sound, or visual.
Telepresence as flow may require a lower level of technological sophistication than telepresence as social richness. Process cues, such as the sound
message from our CPU that we have just received an e-mail, evokes a communicative response to read the e-mail and respond immediately. The
sound also is an immediacy cue triggering a script and rules characteristic
of F2F communication—it is impolite to ignore someone who is speaking
to us. So we stop to respond to the e-mail. If we become aware of this trigger, we turn off the warning sound for incoming e-mail messages. As technology provides more cues that trigger both reciprocity and interactivity,
such as chat and instant messaging, the quality of CMC is more character-
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istic of the flow of scripts for personal and private F2F communication. The
hypothesis that cues mindlessly trigger communication scripts may help
explain why we have difficulty internalizing the fact that CMC is public
and not private communication.4 Common CMC practices are based on a
presumption that messages are private and will not be forwarded, copied,
or researched. Yet, the public context of CMC allows for such practices, the
consequences of which for the unwary communicator could range from
the mildly embarrassing to the indictable.
Communicators become mindful
when they are faced with
[the] unfamiliar.
To what degree are users mindful of cues for communication scripts and
how they influence their communication choices? Typically, communicators become more mindful when they are faced with unfamiliar, unsuccessful, or adverse circumstances or routines (Burgoon, Berger, & Waldron,
2000). The psychological transparency of technology may diminish a communicator’s awareness of how technology influences communication interaction, leaving the user psychologically immersed in the act of communicating. Reeves and Nass’ (2000) observation that the impetus to develop
a perceptually rich computer-mediated experience may not be “good,” if
the perceptual experience is not also “right,” recognized that telepresence
raises questions of communication ethics, as well as theoretical and research questions. In a computer-mediated context, how do communicators
communicate “rightly”? How do they communicate truthfully or enact
trustworthiness? How accurate can communicators be in discerning truthfulness and trustworthiness of others? To explore these questions, I now
turn to rhetorical and communication theory.
“Presence” and “Presentness” in CMC
Technological efforts to achieve telepresence enables CMC to increasingly approximate F2F communication evoking an “as if” quality, as if communicators are physically present to one an Other despite the technological
interface. Perelman’s (1982; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969) rhetorical
concept of presence and Buber’s (1970) dialogical concept of presentness are
useful in exploring implications of CMC’s evocative quality of being virtually present to an Other for discerning and enacting truthfulness and trustworthiness in communication.
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Rhetorical Presence
Rhetorical “presence” is predicated on the idea that “It is not enough indeed that a thing should exist for a person to feel its presence” (Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p.117). Effective communicators use rhetorical
tropes to draw attention to the existence of a thing or to its particular qualities, to foreground it amidst competing information in our sensory field, as
Perelman (1982) illustrated in the following Chinese story. “A king sees an
ox on its way to sacrifice. He is moved to pity for it and orders that a sheep
be used in its place. He confesses he did so because he could see the ox, but
not the sheep” (p. 33). Rhetors evoke presence for an audience by strategically using symbols to foreground certain qualities of a person or elements
in a situation. It is also possible to suppress presence, rhetorically obscuring the existence of persons or things for audiences. In a telling, but brief,
observation drawn from an author writing about his involvement in the
Spanish Civil War, Perelman and Olbrects-Tyeca (1969) alluded to the ethics of obscuring presence.
“Your friends are allies and therefore real human beings …. Your opponents
are just tiresome, unreasonable, unnecessary theses, whose lives are so many
false statements which you would like to strike out with a lead bullet.” Applying this conception to reactions he felt … when confronted with the atrocities committed by the pro-Franco and Republican sides, he adds: “In the first
case I saw corpses, in the second only words.” (p. 119)
The notion of rhetorical presence contributes to our understanding of
telepresence as “flow.” When telepresence evokes a state of mind in which
the user is psychologically immersed in the computer-mediated experience, other sensory cues recede from awareness, as the sheep disappeared
for the Chinese emperor or the humanity of victims of Republican atrocities vanished for the Spanish Civil War soldier. Process or contextual cues
may be tropes that initiate cognitive scripts of human communication by
foregrounding the “human,” triggering an interaction characteristic of F2F
or private communication. As the research by Reeves and Nass (1996) and
Nass and Moon (2000) previously discussed suggested the technological
threshold for tropes triggering scripts may be very low, with audio, visual,
and textual tropes triggering scripts of F2F communication.
The limited sensory richness of CMC also may sharpen perceptual
awareness of whatever information is available for understanding who is
one’s communication partner. Limited message elements—text, graphics,
or audio—function as a synecdoche, helping communicators draw inferences about qualities of a communication partner in physical reality. A
synecdoche is a rhetorical trope in which a part represents a whole, a con-
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tainer the thing contained. A name or quality associated with a specific
gender or ethnicity represents actual gender or ethnicity. Limited textual
or visual cues as tropic markers of gender or ethnicity, for example, function as synecdoches of the actual gender and ethnicity of senders
(Burkhalter, 1999; O’Brien, 1999). Yet, without the sensory richness characteristic of F2F communication, it is difficult to discern the accuracy of a
synecdoche in CMC. The technological form (software, hardware, and networks) obscures the physical presence of users, granting them pseudonymity. With pseudonymity, the nature of the trope changes from
synecdoche to metonymy in evoking presence for receivers. Metonymy is a
symbol or name used in place of an idea, often represented by another
symbol or name. The symbol of a flag is associated with the idea of nation
or the idea of patriotism. The phrase “direct your eyes here” utilizes “eyes”
as a metonymy of sight. In CMC, receivers may presume that stereotypical
language is a synecdoche of a particular ethnicity or gender in real time
and space, although in actuality it may not correspond with a communicator’s actual ethnicity or gender. Stereotypical language may instead function as a metonymy rather than a synecdoche, evoking the idea that one is
communicating with a woman or an African American, for example. Successful pseudonymity in cyberspace relies on the confusion of synecdoche
with metonymy in the evocation of presence.
Successful pseudonymity …
relies on the confusion of
synecdoche with metonymy.
One of the more infamous instances of pseudonymity in cyberspace is
recounted in Julian Dibbell’s “A Rape in Cyberspace” (1998). Setting aside
ontological questions about whether or not it is possible to commit virtual
sexual violence, Dibbell’s search to understand what happened in
LambdaMoo is relevant to this exploration of the tropic qualities of presence. Dibbell attempted to locate the actual people who created the virtual
characters in LambdaMoo—victims, bystanders, and Mr. Bungle, the rapist. Besides discovering information about gender and relationships, including that two of the online characters were married in physical reality,
Dibbell discovered that
The Mr. Bungle account had been the more or less communal property of an
entire New York University dorm floor, that the young man at the keyboard
on the evening of the rape had acted not alone but surrounded by fellow students calling out suggestions and encouragement. (Dibbell, 1998, p. 30)
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Dibbell’s (1998) narrative illustrated how metonymy can be confused
with synecdoche. Participants in LambdaMoo drew inferences about the
qualities of the person they believed created Mr. Bungle, using textual elements of Mr. Bungle’s communication and his vaguely threatening, yet
clownish graphic persona as synecdoches of personal qualities of his creator. The discovery that the Mr. Bungle account was used by a group of
people and not one person, illustrates the potential for inaccuracy of this
tropic reasoning. The graphic image of Mr. Bungle and the form of his messages functioned as a metonymy for the idea of a single creator, rather than
as a synecdoche of the creator. Dibbell’s narrative indicates that
LambdaMoo participants thought Mr. Bungle had a split personality, but
did not consider that he was the creation of more than one person. Apparently, no one on LambdaMoo considered the possibility that an account
might be a group account, in part because Mr. Bungle’s rhetorical presence
was that of a single individual. Without the opportunity to check the correspondence between an online persona and the physical reality of its creator(s), participants in LambdaMoo repeatedly misinterpreted the graphic
and textual messages of Mr. Bungle as representing a single person rather
than a group account, confusing metonymy with synecdoche in evoking
the rhetorical presence of Mr. Bungle. This confusion facilitated deception
and subsequent cyber violence on LambdaMoo.
Participants repeatedly
misinterpreted … the messages
as representing a single person,
rather than a group.
The confusion of metonymy with synecdoche may also produce charges
of deception when the style of a communicator includes qualities associated with more than one ethnicity or gender. Thus, women who self-identify online and whose communication style is more aggressive than that of
the stereotypical female, may be accused by others of gender crossing
(Herring, 1996). Without a capability to check the truthfulness of a cyber
persona, the difference between synecdoche and metonymy in evoking
presence is indistinguishable for receivers. In cyberspace, a symbol representing a part of a whole may be indistinguishable from a symbol representing an idea associated with that symbol. Arguably, increasing the social richness of CMC would increase its accuracy to the point that the
interface would be so transparent it would be as if one is physically present, F2F. Then one might be capable of checking if the online persona corresponds with its creator as a synecdoche or a metonymy. Events in
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LambdaMoo might have proceeded differently if telepresence had greater
social richness, allowing participants to check this correspondence. When
the social richness of presence limits our capabilities to assess correspondence with physical reality, communicators would be well served to be
skeptical of the veracity of those with whom they communicate, and withhold trust.
Dialogic Presentness
A second approach to exploring truthfulness, trustworthiness, and
telepresence may be found in Buber’s (1970) dialogical communication
theory. Making one’s self present, or presentness, is a characteristic of
dialogical communication. Johannesen (2000) posited four attitudes toward another that characterize dialogue—authenticity, inclusion, confirmation, and presentness. Presentness is fully attending to one’s partners
during communication, immediate and full involvement with another, being accessible and authentic, spontaneity and risking attachment with
one’s partners (Johannesen, 2002, p. 59). Friedman (1955/1976) argued that
for Buber, presentness occurs in the action of an I–Thou relationship, in
one’s encounter with another’s subjectivity. Achieving presentness in dialogue is momentary, fleeting, and unplanned, disappearing once a person
has realized what it is. Dialogue is not limited to supportive communication, but can occur in a moment of honest yet intense disagreement, as
when one understands another’s position from his or her viewpoint rather
than one’s own. Johannesen (2002) described the communicative practice
of presentness as giving
a full concentration to bringing their total and authentic beings to the encounter. They must demonstrate willingness to become fully involved with
each other by taking time, avoiding distraction, being communicatively accessible, and risking attachment. One avoids being an onlooker who simply
takes in what is presented or an observer who analyzes. Rather, what is said
to us enters meaningfully into our life; we set aside the armor used to thwart
the signs of personal address. The dialogic person listens receptively and attentively and responds readily and totally. We are willing to reveal ourselves
to others in ways appropriate to the relationship and to receive their revelation. (p. 59)
As a guiding attitude, dialogue orients communicators to open themselves to the possibilities of their communication partners, to see past limitations of social expectations, language, and technology.
The opening up of self to another’s presence would appear to compensate for the mindlessness engendered by the tropic qualities of pres-
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ence in CMC discussed preciously. As hardware and software developments produce an increasingly transparent interface, telepresence as
social richness creates the possibility of communicators enacting dialogic
presence in communication. Yet, each quality of presence as richness—speed, interactivity, visual, audio, touch—remains a synecdoche of
humanness, a token, not a human being. Research into computer-mediated haptic communication indicates that communicators may experience
feelings of relational closeness, even when the haptic message is initiated
by a software program (Canny & Paulos, 2000). Although visual cues
may reduce the pseudonymity of communicators, questions about the
accuracy or reliability of messages will arise whenever there are concerns
about either the integrity or security of the computer network or infrastructure (Nissenbaum, 2001). Additionally, differences in the relative
technological sophistication of users raises concerns about the capabilities of users to discern truthful or trustworthy CMC. More sophisticated
users have more resources for deceiving their communication partners.
Although relatively simple uses of technology may deceive unwary users, increasingly sophisticated software or “bots” that simulate human
communicators are already developed, with some available for downloading (see Botspot, 2003).
Sophisticated users have more
resources for deceiving.
For the sake of argument, however, let us suppose that interaction in
CMC is truthful, in that there is a relatively accurate correspondence between virtual personae and communicators and that the integrity of the systems and infrastructure is not compromised, laying the foundation for negotiating relational trust. To achieve dialogic presence as conceived by Buber
(1970), communicators would need to be aware of the asymmetrical form of
CMC that encourages users to construct their individual mosaics of meaning in a process of self-reflexive message “co-construction.” This self-reflexive quality enables communicators as receivers to amplify the meaning or
significance of messages or the tropic tokens of presence of which they are
perceptually aware, creating a feedback loop that magnifies the intensity of
those messages or tropes. Such a self-reflexive process would contribute to
the heightened sense of trust and intimacy characteristic of hyper-personal
relationships (Walther, 1996) or the anger and frustration of flaming. The
spontaneity of CMC, facilitated by the speed and interactivity of presence as
richness, could encourage the construction of self-referential “relationships” of simulated mutuality based upon tropic tokens of a person. The ten-
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dency toward mindless self-reflexive cycles of interpretation drawing upon
tropic condensation of the humanity of communicators may unintentionally attenuate authentic human connection, precluding dialogic presence.
Communicators mindful of self-reflexivity and tropic condensation within
CMC could redouble their efforts to create authentic human connection critical to dialogue, embrace these processes as a playful simulation and forego
authentic communication, or approximate truthful and trustworthy communication as best as they can.
Truth, Trust, and Telepresence
The concepts of rhetorical presence and dialogic presentness help explain
some of the limitations of CMC in enacting and discerning truthful and
trustworthy communication. Telepresence as both flow and richness presume that increasing the perceptual transparency of the digital interface
helps CMC approximate F2F communication. An unexamined assumption
appears to be that increasing the flow and richness of telepresence increases
the perceptual accuracy of communicators, making more accurate, truthful,
and trustworthy communication possible. In CMC, individual human presence is evoked tropically by triggers for cognitive scripts of human communication or rhetorical tropes such as synecdoche and metonymy. Communicators are challenged to creatively condense their identity or construct a new
one using whatever textual, graphic, visual, or audio tropes—as well as triggers of cognitive scripts for communication—the hardware and software allow. Receivers’ understanding of who is their communication partner is limited not only by the tropic quality of CMC, but also by its asymmetry. By
selecting which messages or tropes within messages they will attend to, receivers construct the messages they receive, creating a more individualistic
mosaic of meaning rather than socially constructed meaning. The tropic
quality of CMC, particularly the confusion of metonymy with synecdoche
in evoking the presence of communicators, creates a fertile environment for
deception. The self-reflexive form of CMC also can magnify inaccurate perceptions, creating a fertile environment for self-deception, even when a
sender’s message is truthful.
CMC can magnify inaccurate
perceptions, creating a fertile
environment for self-deception.
I am not claiming that CMC is inherently deceptive because of its
technological form. Rather, my claim is that truthfulness and trustworthi-
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ness are possible, but more difficult when all communication is computer-mediated. The human connection needed for discerning and enacting truthfulness and trustworthiness is more fragile and tenuous in
cyberspace than in F2F contexts. Whereas cyberspace transcends time
and space in making connection possible, our humanness is condensed
and refracted by the formal qualities of the medium. My claim of the difficulty of discerning and enacting truthfulness and trustworthiness in
CMC is comparable to the criticism of the “new” technology of writing
made by Plato (1961) in the Phaedrus (pp. 274c–276a), or alarms about the
dangers of manuscripts or of excessive book reading made by leaders of
the Christian church over the centuries (Horsfield, this issue; Osborne
1959), criticisms which raise questions about what it means to be literate.
Besides possessing the knowledge needed to function in a society, literacy includes being competent in employing available technology, such as
reading and writing and, today, using e-mail. Individuals often differ in
their capacity to use a technology competently and, thereby, becoming
literate. This may be the case with CMC. Research by Kraut et al. (2002)
indicated that extroverts and introverts differ in gaining relational benefits of CMC, specifically social support. They argued that this difference
is best explained by a “rich get richer” model in which those with “deficient” qualities (introversion) are penalized whereas those with qualities
more suitable to CMC (extroversion) gain more of the benefits.5 They reject the “compensation model” which argues that CMC provides a context in which more introverted individuals can compensate for the anxiety and difficulties of F2F communication. This research suggests that a
computer-mediated context penalizes individuals with deficiencies in
communication competence.
Computer-mediated context
penalizes individuals with
deficiencies in communication
competence.
If a concept of CMC competence is to be useful in helping us discern
the challenges to ethical CMC, it must include more than competence in
using hardware or software. The concept of CMC competence needs to
be informed by a theoretical understanding of communicative processes,
how the technological form of CMC influences communication dynamics, and sensitivity to issues of communication ethics. For questions of
enacting and discerning truthfulness and trustworthiness explored here,
competent computer-mediated communicators need to be cognizant of
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how the form of CMC not only influences messages and relationships,
but also encourages us to draw inferences mindlessly—to trust too much
or too soon and create hyperpersonal relationships, or to distrust too
much or too soon and engage in flaming. To become more truthful, trustworthy, and competent communicators, we need to become more mindful communicators, sensitive not only to the tensions inherent in trustworthiness and truthfulness but also to the dialectical tensions inherent
in CMC—to be simultaneously skeptical and open to our own interpretations and meanings and also simultaneously skeptical and open to the
interpretations and meanings of others. This would appear to preclude
the possibility of the truthful and trustworthy communication, for how
can one be skeptical yet open to one’s self and to another and create
trust?
The notion of dialogical presence may help in addressing this tension.
Dialogue is an attitude toward another, not a technique or skill. It occurs in
moments in which we open ourselves to the human presence of another.
Once we recognize that we have been in dialogue, the moment is over. In
dialogue we are sensitive to the authentic presence of another, sensitive to
who they are. One approach to ethical CMC competence is to become
mindful communicators employing a dialogical attitude in which we acknowledge the limits of what we understand and know, to be open to possibility. One possibility may be that we are being duped by tropes that create a simulated identity that has little correspondence or connection with
its creator. Another could be that our suspicions about a communication
partner may be unfounded or exaggerated by the self-reflexive tendencies
inherent within CMC. When our resources for checking our perceptions
are limited, both these possibilities exist in tension with one another. Because CMC technology is constructed of binary language, wires, and silicon that mediate our relationships, it obscures our perceptions, particularly our capacity to recognize the human qualities of our communication
partners.
Clarity in recognizing the human qualities of others depends, in part, on
maintaining a tension between both openness and skepticism in our communication. This is not a new communication problem. Students of communication have long recognized that language can also obscure the humanity of our fellow human beings, as it did for the Spanish Civil War
veteran cited by Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca (1969), who looked at the
dead bodies of those who fought against him and saw words, theses, not
human beings. Mindless engagement in the computer-mediated context
can further obscure our recognition of the humanity of our communication
partners. Developing a notion of CMC competence that encourages communicators to manage the dialectical tension between skepticism and
openness may allow us to suspend our self-reflexive cycles of meaning
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construction and aid us in discerning the humanity of another amidst the
digital.
Notes
1. This analysis juxtaposes the linear and social constructionist models,
which traditionally are treated as mutually exclusive, to explore some of
the implications of asymmetry in CMC for the creation and communication
of meaning.
2. For over 1 year, a supposedly real-time camera displayed the picture of the
web-creator holding up a sign that he would be back in 5 min. The web designer eventually removed the picture (Mankato, MN Homepage, 2001).
3. The expanded bandwidth capabilities of Internet2 allows for the seemingly simultaneous exchange of video and audio messages, allowing real-time
video-conferencing and even real-time music and dance instruction, for example (Internet2, 2002). Arguably, the limited bandwidth of the original or
commodity Internet will remain the norm in the near future due to economics
and technical limitations of the commodity Internet infrastructure, particularly at private residences.
4. Hardware, quality of transmission and the physical environment of technology use provide contextual cues for selecting the appropriate cognitive script,
often one of private communication. Single-user technology makes the immediate location personal space, a cue for private or intimate communication. Integrity of the transmission evokes a privacy script that was apparent with the
advent of portable phones and cell phones, when occasionally television
viewers unwillingly listened in on unsuspecting conversationalists. CMC
typically occurs in a relatively private space (e.g., one’s home, office, or car).
Conflicting cues for scripts of private and public communication are evident
with the use of cell phones in public spaces. The simultaneous cues of private
communication (triggered by hardware) and public communication (triggered by public space) evokes scripts of eavesdropping of bystanders and
rudeness of cell phone users. Determining which cue has priority helps us
choose the appropriate cognitive script and communication rules. Another
example of confusion between the differing cues of hardware and physical
space is viewing pornographic web sites at public computers in libraries. Our
society’s communication and legal rules for viewing pornography are triggered by spatial cues, limiting it to the privacy of one’s home or restricted locations; adult bookstores or theaters. However, CPU hardware enables access
in public rather than private or restricted physical spaces. Determining what
are appropriate communication rules depends, in part, on deciding the degree
to which the hardware or the spatial cue has priority.
5. Kraut et al.’s (2002) study focused on individuals who mingle CMC with F2F
communication in their relationships, and argues that research indicates that “a
diet filled with on-line relationships would be harmful to the social and psychological health of Internet users” (p. 69).
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