With the contras in
Nicaragua's killing fields
WITH THE CONTRAS
A Reporter in the Wilds of
Nicaragua
By Christopher Dickey. Simon
& Schuster. 327 pp. $18.95.
Illustrated.
By Walter LaFeber
On May 30, 1983. at Xally's Ho
tel In Danli, Honduras, the whores
backed away as two top field com
manders of the Nicaraguan Demo
cratic Front (the FDN, or contras.
as they are best known to North
Americans), lurched into a fight.
The struggle erupted "because of a
girl, or a remark, or maybe a look
in the eye." Christopher Dickey re
calls in this riveting account. One
contra pulled out a Browning auto
matic pistol and blew the other
man away. A contra simply ex
plained to Dickey that the war
among the FDN leaders sometimes
resembled "the Wild West with
submachine guns and AK-47s."
Earlier, another contra leader had
dispatched troops on a suicide mis
sion against the skilled Nicaraguan
government forces the contras are
trying to overthrow. He ordered the
mission because he lusted after the
wife of one of those troops. "That
son of a bitch Krlll ambushed his
own troops, just to get rid of them."
an associate observed with both
wonderment and hatred.
These murderers. Dickey writes.
were the contra commanders
whom Ronald Reagan later com
pared with the US Founding Fa
thers. Such ignorance is not limit
ed to the president. After evidence
mounted that one contra leader
alone had murdered more than 30
contra commandos, prisoners and
civilians. CIA director William Casey made a quick trip to Honduras
(where the contras and their CIA
sponsors share facilities), "held
court" at the US Embassy and
gave the impression that every
thing was fine. Reagan began to
call the FDN "freedom fighters."
News soon leaked, however,
that the contras needlessly massa
cred civilians (as well as each oth
er) and that top leaders, including
Enrique Bermudez, a former officer
under the Somoza dictatorship
who had been cleaned and pressed
by the CIA for US congressional
and television audiences, were
pocketing large amounts of CIAprovided funds. The CIA and Ber
mudez agreed that Hugo Villagra
should be brought in to clean up
the mess. Villagra. Dickey drily
notes, was a protege of the Somozas. an associate of the Salvadoran
death-squad leader Roberto D'Aubuisson and a former terrorist in
Costa Rica. Villagra rounded up
four of the contra murderers and
convicted them before a tribunal of
old Somoza followers especially
flown down from Miami for the oc
caslon. Rumor has it that several
of the convicted were executed at a plays the pivotal role, but Dickey
seems to hold special contempt for
huge US airbase in Honduras.
But the executions produced an the US Congress. From the start of
odd result. They eliminated some of the Reagan policy In 1981, Con
the contras' ablest field command gress could see that the real objec
ers. The FDN has never been able tive was not to interdict arms sup
to carry out a successful, sustained posedly moving from the Sandin
campaign against the Sandinistas. istas to the Salvadoran revolution
but in 1983-84 the Front's units aries, or simply to pressure the
s into negotiations, but
virtually stopped fighting. The Sandinista
to
use
the
CIA
to overthrow a sov
anti-Sandinlsta cause became to
ereign
Nicaragua
n government.
tally dependent on CIA operatives
When
the contras' atrocities came
and their "unilaterally controlled to
light
Latino assets" - Washington bur tion's in 1983. the administra
explanation to Congress
eaucrat ise for ClA-hired killers was "a minuet of hypocrisy."
from other Latin American coun Dickey writes. Few seemed to care.
tries. Meanwhile, the Reagan ad
Reagan and Casey sold their
ministration told Congress and policy with abstractions ("democ
other North American audiences racy," "freedom") that had no re
that the contras were "our broth lationship to Central American
ers."
realities but further dulled the
Dickey relates many of these mind of those In Congress and testories from firsthand experience. levlsionland. When a stupidly
A widely respected Washington written CIA manual advocated
Post reporter who has spent many breaking US law by "neutraliz
years in Latin America, he moved ing" Sandinista officials, a top
with contra guerrillas inside Nica CIA operative, Duane R. Clarridge
ragua as well as exploited his (alias "Dewey"). stilled criticism
sources in the CIA and FDN lead by telling a congressional commltership. His account of how he . tee that only the killing of heads of
barely survived a Sandinlsta at state should be counted as assas
tack and then a nonstop trek over sination. After presiding over var
mountains to the safety of Hondu ious contra fiascoes and murders.
ras is harrowing, but it is also In Dewey. as Dickey records, received
structive about the contras' talent a promotion and the ClA's "high
at fighting and surviving, even if est bonus of 1983." The lawmak
they seem to be fighting more for ers finally mustered the courage to
the thrill of killing than for any cut off aid in 1984, only to have
conscious political ideology.
Dewey's successors and Reagan
Dickey's analysis Is balanced. convince them to reopen the sup
He sketches the process whereby ply line for "non-lethal" aid in
the triumphant Sandinistas of 1985. Dickey's story graphically
1979 became a Nicaragua depen demonstrates that the business of
dent on Soviet supplies and Cu the CIA and -the contras In Nicara
ban advisers by 1986. He regrets gua is killing, and that any dis
that the revolution parted com tinction between lethal and nonpany with its more moderate lethal aid is ludicrous.
members, but he also carefully
As far as the subject of Nicara
notes how US actions since 1979. gua is concerned, there are two
and especially 1981. left the San categories of North Americans.
dinistas little choice. Dickey's his One has little concern about the
tory is sometimes shaky. He •/ record of US and contra activities
misses the Carter administra since 1979. The other believes
tion's determination to abort the that the Reagan administration is
Sandinisla victory In 1979. even willing to fight to the last Central
to the point of working for a joint American to remove the Sandinis
intervention with Latin American tas. regardless of who might re
governments to prevent the tri place them. Dickey's account can
umph. He also neglects the evi enlighten the first group and pro
dence uncovered by Roy Gutman vide compelling evidence for the
that as early as 1981-82 the Rea fears of the second.
gan administration publicly
claimed that it wanted to negoti
Walter LaFeber teaches at Cor
ate with the Sandinistas while pri nell. His most recent book is "In
vately setting terms that made evitable Revolutions: The United
talks Impossible.
States in Central America" (Nor
But these are minor criticisms ton).
'
ol a work that vvill become a stan
dard account of how Reagan's
Central American pulley was con
ducted by the CIA and its contra
associates. The story is well-docu
mented, grippingly told and care
fully argued. The CIA certainly
© Copyright 2026 Paperzz