To what extent was appeasement the correct policy
during the 1930s?
Appeasement is widely connected with Neville Chamberlain, as it is known as
the method used in the 1930s to prevent a war with Germany and to keep
Hitler as an ally. Many believe appeasement was just a way for Britain to back
down from its allies, and allow the stronger countries to gain power, wealth
and money. This can be seen in the Manchester Guardian in February 1939, as
appeasement is described as “a clever plan of selling off your fr iends in order
to buy off your enemies .” Others argue it was appeasement that prevented
another crisis for so long after the First World War, and allowed Britain to once
again build up its troops before standing up to its enemy. Although
appeasement helped in the short term, in the long term it only proved to be
encouraging towards Hitler and his aims to restore Germany.
Many can argue that it was appeasement that encouraged Hitler to be
aggressive. Each gamble Hitler took and got away with, the bigger the risk there
was of his trying again. For example, when Hitler took the Rhineland in March
1936, in hindsight, evidence shows that the Nazi officers had secret orders not
to shoot if oppos ed by British or French troops because Hitler had only 22,700
armed so ldiers. For all we know, stamping out Hitler’s actions then could have
led to his dreams being crushed and therefore no war. However, because of
blatant self -interest by France and Britain, Hitler was allowed to remilitarise
the Rhineland without any opposition. The British government justified this by
arguing that the Rhineland was Germany’s “back garden”, but in reality, the
remilitarisation of the Rhineland led to a domino effect and chain reaction for
the rest of Hitler’s aggressive actions.
Furthermore, it can be argued that it was appeasement that allowed Germany
to grow too strong. The Treaty of Versailles limited Germany’s army to 100,000
men, which Hitler saw as unfair and unreasonable. In 1935, Hitler made the
decision to once again build up Germany’s army, and by 1939, Germany’s army
had almost ten times the amount of soldiers it originally had in 1932, with a
massive number of 950,000 men. It was not only troops that appeasement
allowed Germany to expand on, but also land. Hitler felt it was right to take
back what, he believed, was rightfully and originally Germany’s. Germany’s
swift expansion of land echoed the beginnings of World War I, when the Triple
Alliance was expanding and gaining power, economy and intimidation. An
example of Germany’s expansion in the 1930s was the Anschluss with Austria in
March 1938. Although the Treaty of Versailles had expressly forbidden the
reunion of Austria with Germany, Hitler was appeased when Germany, once
again, allied with Austria. This suggests that Germany was yet again becoming
more powerful than both Britain and France.
Moreover, the policy of appeasement put too much trust in Hitler’s promises.
An example of this is the Sudetenland, an area of Czechoslovakia that
contained over 3.5 million Germans. Hitler believed Germany therefore had a
right over this particular area of Czechoslovakia and set his sights on it in 1938.
However, Britain, France and the USSR had promised to help Czechoslovakia if
it was threatened. This placed Czechoslovakia’s allies in a difficult position:
keep its promises or face Hitler’s wrath. Britain and France eventually took, in
hindsight, what is believed to be the easy way out and appeased Hitler wi th his
decision after signing the Munich Agreement in September 1938. This stated t
hat Hitler was only taking the Sudetenland and would not conquer the rest of
Czechoslovakia. This was welcomed by the British public as “peace in our time”,
but only 4 days later, Hitler said that he “regretted” that the previous
arrangements were not good enough. This shows the fact that Germany’s
needs would never be fulfilled, that Hitler was not to be trusted and that
appeasement was based on the huge mistake that Hitler was actually
trustworthy.
Appeasing Hitler also scared the USSR, who was a big defe nder of communism
in the 1930s. Hitler made no secret of wanting to expand eastwards. The policy
of appeasement showed the USSR that Britain and France would not help them
if help was needed, and this scared the Soviet Union greatly. This led to anxiety
in the USSR government and it also led to the loss of trust for Britain and
France, because it was clear to the Soviet Union that they would not stand in
Hitler’s way.
On the other hand, those who believe appeasement helped can argue that
Hitler was right, and the Treaty of Versailles was unfair to Germany, restricting
it too much and having too many harsh clauses. For example, Germany had to
limit its army to 100,000 men, making it vulnerable and leaving Germany
defenceless. It also forbade any alliances bet ween Austria and Germany, but
many Austrians were German-speaking, so felt they had a right to ally with
Germany. This is why Hitler was allowed to make an Anschluss with Austria,
and after taking a plebiscite where 99.75% of Austria ns wanted to ally with
Germany, the British and French government felt no need to prevent Germany
from its plans of peace. This led to the belief that once the wrongs by Germany
were put right, it would beco me a peaceful nation once again.
Britain also felt that it had other pro blems to worry about, rather than focusing
solely on Hitler and his actions. For example, Britain and France were still
suffering from the economic effects of the Wall Street Crash in 1939. Britain
and France did not have enough money for the reparations of another war, so
they felt that the policy of appeasement would prolong peace until their
economies were able to cope. Britain and France also saw Hitler as a buffer to
communism, as his plans for communists were made clear in November 1936
and 1937, when Hitler signed the Anti -Comintern Pact with Japan and Italy.
Britain and France were afraid that communism would spread westwar ds and
were also concerned about the potential threat S talin, the leader of the USSR at
the time, posed towards world peace. This meant that although Hitler was being
appeased frequently and often unfairly, Britain and France were able to avoid
another conflict and focus on greater matters.
Moreover, Britain did not feel as if it would be supported if it decided to go into
another w ar. After losing almost 130,000 soldiers in the First World War,
American leaders were determined not to join another war concerning Europe.
However, America was believed to be one of the greatest powers at the time,
and Britain was unsure if it would be a ble to go to war without having the
support and help from America. Britain also did not know if the British Empire
and Commonwealth states would support another war against Germany either.
This left Britain virtually defenceless and without any allies. Thi s led to the
decision by the British government to avoid war under any circumstances, and
also led to the belief that appeasement would be the only policy that would
allow that to happen .
Both British and French leaders in the 1930s remembered vividly the horrors of
the First World War, with Chamberlain stating that “in war, whichever side may
call itself the victor, there are no winners, but all are losers.” This is emphasised
by the statistics of World War I, as Britain lost almost one million men and Fra
nce lost 1.3 million. Also, as so many men were lost and so much money was
paid for the reparations, Britain did not feel physically and mentally ready for
yet another crisis, and the policy of appeasement would give Britain enough
time to re -arm and build back up its economy and morale. Although the “Great
War” was won by the allies, the horrific experiences Britain and France had to
go through led to the leaders wishing to avoid war at any costs, either until they
were strong enough to fight or until Hitler’s needs were fulfilled.
It can be argued that appeasement was a failure in the long term, as ultimately
it did not avoid another war. Historians may argue that appeasement bought
time between the First and Second World Wars. This led to Britain and France
having more time to re -arm, re-boost public morale and increase their
economy. Many see appeasement as cowardice, and a way to let bullies
succeed, but at the time appeasement was seen as the only reason another
war hadn’t already started.