EVALUATING THE IRAQ WAR BY JUST WAR PRINCIPLES
John W. Lango
Hunter College
In his case study of the Iraq War, Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez asks,
“Is this a just war?” and “Can an unjust war be fought justly?” In the history of the ethics of war, such questions have been raised by supporters
of just war theory.1 According to that theory, the first question should be
answered by means of jus ad bellum principles — for instance, the principles of just cause, legitimate authority, proportionality, and last resort.
And the second question should be answered by means of jus in bello principles — for instance, the principles of proportionality and noncombatant immunity.2 In terms of these principles, I shall raise some additional
moral questions, thereby expanding the final section of Palmer-Fernandez’s case study, which is entitled “Questions.” Of course, in a paper of
this brevity, I can only raise the questions. I cannot provide answers to
them.
The Iraq War3 has been called a “preemptive war.” Usually, however,
the term “preemption” has meant “striking first when one believes the
enemy is about to try to strike.”4 In contrast, the term “preventive war”
has meant striking first when one believes (among other things) that
“waiting longer before resorting to [military] force would only allow the
enemy to inflict greater damage later.”5 Since the Bush administration did
not believe that a strike by Iraq was imminent, it is more accurate to call
the Iraq War a “preventive war.” Consequently, in order to answer
Palmer-Fernandez’s two questions by means of just war principles, the
following question needs to be investigated. How can just war principles
be used to morally evaluate preventive wars?6
Because war is so destructive, there must be a moral presumption
against it. If one wants to override this moral presumption, one has the
burden of proving that the jus ad bellum principles are satisfied. In the
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absence of an adequate proof, one is morally required not to engage in
war.7 Did the Bush administration prove adequately that the Iraq War satisfied these just war principles?
Uncontroversially, a state has a just cause for war when it is attacked
by the armed forces of an aggressor, but there was no such just cause for
the Iraq War. Instead, as Palmer-Fernandez relates, the primary goal
announced by the Bush administration was to eliminate Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction, in order to prevent them from being used by Iraq
itself or by terrorists.8 Is this goal a just cause for a preventive war?
Even if the Iraq War has a just cause, it would not be a just war if it
did not also satisfy the other jus ad bellum principles. The last resort principle requires (roughly) that measures other than war — e.g., diplomacy
and economic sanctions — must be tried first. Especially because of this
principle, there is considerable doubt about whether a preventive war
could be a just war. For, when a strike by the enemy is not imminent,
there could be ample time to try measures other than war first. Did the
Iraq War satisfy the last resort principle? For example, one measure other
than war would have been to continue the search by the UN inspectors in
Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. When the U.S. invasion of Iraq
began, was there still ample time for this other measure?
The legitimate authority principle requires (roughly) that a war must
be declared and controlled by legally authorized persons. In accordance
with Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, the United States must be in
compliance with the UN Charter. Prior to action by the Security Council,
the UN Charter permits a state to engage in a war of “self-defence if an
armed attack occurs” (Article 51). However, prior to action by the Security Council, the UN Charter does not allow a state to engage in a preventive war. Did the Iraq War satisfy the legitimate authority principle? In
particular, did the principle require the Iraq War to be authorized beforehand by the Security Council?9
The jus ad bellum proportionality principle requires (roughly) that the
benefits of a war should outweigh the harms. At the outset of the Iraq
War, what were the benefits and harms that reasonably could have been
expected, and how should they have been weighed?
Similarly, the jus in bello principle of proportionality requires
(roughly) that the benefits of each battle or engagement within a war
should outweigh the harms. For example, was the principle satisfied during the assault on Baghdad?
Roughly speaking, the principle of noncombatant immunity (or discrimination) prohibits intentional harm to noncombatants while permit-
John W. Lango: Evaluating the Iraq War
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ting foreseen but not intentional (and yet not disproportionate) harm to
them. Was this principle satisfied during the Iraq War? For instance, was
it satisfied when the U.S. Air Force made precision strikes? Arguably, the
most challenging moral question that can be raised about the Iraq War by
just war theory is as follows. Does the noncombatant immunity principle
require “saving innocent Iraqi lives at the cost of more U.S. casualties”?10
John W. Lango is Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College of the City University of
New York.
NOTES
1
For an introduction to just war theory, see Gordon Graham. Ethics and International Relations. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).
2
I have space to consider only the stated just war principles. Hence I cannot
consider the controversial topic of jus post bellum principles, a topic PalmerFernandez mentions at the end his paper. Somewhat different lists of just war
principles are found in various writings on just war theory. For separate discussions of some just war principles, see Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion.
Moral Constraints on War: Principles and Cases. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2002).
3
For an account of that war, see Wesley K. Clark. Winning Modern Wars: Iraq,
Terrorism, and the American Empire. (New York: Public Affairs, 2003).
4 Richard K. Betts. “Surprise Attack and Preemption.” in Hawks, Doves, and
Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War. ed. G. T. Allison, A. Carnesale, and J.
S. Nye, Jr. (New York: Norton, 1985), p. 57 (emphasis added).
5
Ibid. p. 56. The quotation concerns preventive nuclear wars. To generalize it
to preventive wars of all sorts, the word “nuclear” is replaced by the word
“military.”
6
For an answer to this question, see my “Preventive Wars, Just War Principles,
and the United Nations.” The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2005).
7
For an interpretation of just war theory in terms of W. D. Ross’s conception
of prima facie duties, see James F. Childress, “Just-War Criteria,” in his Moral
Responsibility in Conflicts: Essays on Nonviolence, War, and Conscience. (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1982).
8
Later, another goal was announced: making Iraq a democracy, thereby helping democracy to spread throughout the Middle East. By contrast, the European Union could help democracy to spread there, by admitting a sufficiently
democraticized Turkey as a member. How should states be democratized, by
military measures or by peaceful measures?
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9 In a recent report to the United Nations commissioned by Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, it is recommended that, whenever the Security Council deliberates about the use of force, it should utilize “five basic criteria of legitimacy,”
criteria that resemble just war principles. See “A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility.” Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change. (New York: United Nations, 2004).
10
James Dobbins, “Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War.” Foreign Affairs, Vol.
84, No. 1 (January/February 2005): 20.