Thinking the Revolutions of 1989
Author(s): Sasha Weitman
Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 11-24
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SashaWeitman
Thinking the revolutionsof 1989
ABS I RAC I
The revolutionsof 1989havebeen, aboveall, revolutionsfor liberty
(from the yoke of the State).The question raised here is whether
they are likely to achieve their main objective.Since 1789, there
have been many such revolutions, but very few have achieved
regimes of genuine self-government.What little social theory we
have on this subject (mostly from de Tosqueville) suggests that
societiesunder totalitarianregimes are even less likely than other
authoritarianregimes to spawn the kind of social and cultural
infrastructuresnecessary for self-government to function on a
self-sustainingbasis.So the prospectsof libertarianregimesemerging from these revolutionsseem slimat best.A more likelyoutcome
is for them to replace the old totalitarianregimes with 'statedominated'regimes, characterizedby powerful centralizedstates,
significant domains of functional autonomy (economy, cultural
production, etc.), and relatively extensive individual freedoms.
Such regimes come in two types - or go through two phases 'hegemonic'and 'domineering',depending on how effectivelythe
Statecontrolsnon-Stateformations.
Historianssay it is too earlyyet to relateto the dramaticdevelopments
that began during the latter half of 1989 in Central and Eastern
Europe,adding that 'thisis a time for journalists'.I agree that in the
absence of many of the relevant facts, it is too early to advance
well-supportedclaimsaboutthesedevelopments.But it is not too early
to begin thinkingaboutthem or, to be more precise,to begin thinking
about how best to think about them. In fact, a varietyof ambitious
claims(and counter-claims)have alreadybeen advanced.Some have
suggested that what we have been witnessingis humanity'srepudiation of communism.Others have gone further and proposed that
what we have been seeing is the final triumph, no less, of liberal
democracy and the market economy over all possible alternative
BJS Volumeno. 43 Issueno. 1
March 1992
Sasha Weitman
12
regimes.Others yet have
age of major wars, hot seen in these developmentsthe end of the
and cold, and the dawn
of an age of
'transnationalism'.
I have even heard it
communismmightbe bestviewedas suggestedthat the collapseof
partof the fallof
of its supercessionby
modernismand
post-modernism
Ratherthan engage in
withthese and other prematureand, at this point, steriledebates
theses, I propose to add still
lookingat these dramatic
another
developmentsand of thinkingaboutway of
drawnfrom my own
them,
substantive
perspective
of historicalsociology.interestsand my own disciplinary
Given the repeated
interventionand impact in these
masses
of people, it is clear
events of
thatwe
phenomenaproperlyso-called.Asare confrontedhere withcollective
such,
sociological
analysis.One wayto perform their elucidationcalls for a
such an analysiswouldbe to
beginwith an interpretation
of
them,
go
on to their causal explanation,
proceed to a predictionof
their
probable
appropriate)
outcomes,and (if
concludewitha recommended
courseof politicalaction.
(Or,
as the late Alvin
Gouldnerwouldsay,a good
entails
four moments:diagnosis,
sociological
aetiology,prognosis,and analysis
Because
of spacelimitations,I shall
therapy.)
and
prediction,and passover the deal here only withinterpretation
explanatoryand politicalmoments
oftheanalysis.
00X000;000
;0X;Xt
The interpretationof
mass movements such as
entails
occupy us here
gaining an understanding
of
mind,
concerns,and aspirationsthat the dominant ideas, states of
drivethose participatingin
to
orientthemselvesas they do
them
and
to
pursue the objectivesthey
bent
on achieving.This
are
analysiswill
interpret
them in this sense. Then, inbegin, then, with an attemptto
a second moment,the
the
analysiswill shift to a
focus
consideration
of the actual results of
movements
are likelyto achieve,
these
aspirations
and objectives.My especiallywith respectto their initial
however,
is not predictionas principal aim in this presentation,
such, but to propose an
frame
for ferretingout from the
appropriate
those
developmentsof last year
factorsand processeswhichcomplex
it seems useful to focus
tK about. n1n
on and to
.
.
IN'rERPRE'I
A l ION: REVOLUI
IONS OF
LIBERI Y
Perhaps
the single moststriking
featureof the upheavalsof
been
their revolutionary
1989 has
character.
As
Revolution
exactly two hundred years in the case of the French
earlier, they entailed the
sudden,
total, irreversiblecollapse
of the old regime
immediately
and were
followedby the rapid,
and seeminglyradical
transformation
of the entire orderirresistible,
of society, almost beyond
nition.
A comprehensive
interpretationof the upheavals ofrecog1989
Thinkingtherevolutions
of 1989
13
should accountfor the actionsnot only of the new elites brought to
powerby the massmovements,butalso thoseof the rulingelitesof the
old regime. Since, however,this paper is aboutthe likelyoutcomesof
these revolutions,not abouttheircauses,I willpassover the old elites,
and focus on the actionsof the new elites and of the massmovements
behind them.
These actionshave been revolutionaty
both in termsof the changes
they have pressed for and the modalities of these pressures for
change. Concerning the changes themselves,what has been revolutionaryabout them has been their radicalness,their sheer variety,
their quantity,and their simultaneity.Together, they constituteclear
casesof changeof the system,notjust in it. As for the modalities,what
made them revolutionaryincludes the repeated irruption into the
political process of masses of people clamoring for this or that
measure,the high hopes pegged on the revolution,the totalityof the
repudiationof the old regimeand of everythingconnectedwithit, the
impatiencefor immediateresults,the unwillingnessto compromise,
and the readiness to bypass legal niceties and resort to emergency
measures.'
And yet, despite the apparentcommitmentto transformsocietyin
toto, a closerlook revealsthe exclusivelypoliticalfocus of thiscommitment. By this I meanthatthe dominantconcernhasbeen withthe politicalregimesin power,whilesocialclaimsand aspirationsproperhave
been shining by their absencefrom the agenda of these revolutions.
This does not mean, of course,that no socialchangeswillresultfrom
these revolutions:they surelywill. But it does mean that the manifest
concerns and targets of these revolutions have been political, not
social. In this, they differ importantlyfrom the French Revolution,
whichhad been impelledby the determinationto transformthe social
order no less than to overhaulthe politicalregime.
As for the specificobjectivesof these politicalchanges, the revolutions of 1989 have all been anti-State,in the sense that their central,
overridingaspirationhasbeen the drasticdisempowerment,dismantling, and curtailmentof the huge Stateapparatusof the old regime.
(Not all politicalrevolutions,of course, have been anti-Statein this
sense - those of Mussolini,Hitler, and Franco had been explicitly
committedto the opposite aspiration.)Corollarily,these revolutions
have been fought to achieveliberty:their moral force has come from
their commitment to institute and guarantee as many rights and
liberties as possible which, in the old regime, had been severely
curtailedor denied altogetherby the State.2
So much for the interpretationof the mass movementsof 1989. I
have proposed that they have been revolutionary,
that their dominant
concernshavebeen essentiallypolitical,and thattheirspecificcommitmentshavebeen to passmeasuresagainsttheStateandforliberty.
Let us
turn now to theirlikelyoutcomes.
14
Sasha Weitman
Ll KELYOU'I'COMES:FROM'I'O'I'ALI'I'ARIAN
'1'0 S'l'A'I'E-DOM
INA'I'ED
REGIMES
Since these revolutionshave only barelybegun, the questionof their
outcomesis of coursegrosslypremature.But, if these revolutionsare
indeed essentiallyabout libertyand the State, it is not prematureto
beginaskingourselveswhatsociologicaltheoryhasto sayon these two
subjects.Curiouslyenough, the pickings are slim, this despite the
importanceof the issues at stake.3The only substantialcorpus of
theory I know of that grapples with these issues is the one de
Tosquevilleleft froma lifetimeof comparative-historical
explorations
into forms of political liberty and their conditions of possibility.
Unfortunately,de Tosqueville'snumerousinsightsand ideas on this
subject- many of which are scattered in his extensive informal
writings- have not yet been systematicallycompiled, analyzed,and
codified, let alone verifiedand built upon. Whatfollows, therefore,
has been guided by whatMertonwouldcalla 'theoreticalorientation'
inspiredby de Tosqueville,not by any actualtheoryof his.
Terminological
Excursus
Before going any further,it is necessaryto clarifyseveralof the terms
and expressionsI willbe using- like the 'State','centralgovernment',
'non-Stateformations','powers','liberty','libertarianregime','regime
liberation','freedom','liberal','formal'and 'actual'liberties,'libertiesfrom'and 'liberties-to'.
The State refers to the whole centralized complex of national
bureaucraticapparatusesthat administerthe activitiesusurpedby it.
Thus conceived,the State is not limitedto the centralgovernment,i.e.
the cabinet of ministers at the head of it. Nor is it limited to its
apparatusesof repression (army, police) or of surplus extraction
(taxation).
Non-Stateformationsis a catch-all,residualterm,coveringthe whole
gamut of corporate,institutional,and individualagenciesnot under
the directadministrativeautllorityof the State.
Note that not all non-State formations are przvate. Counties,
townships,tradeunions,publicutilities- alltheseare publicyetoutside
the administrativesphere of the State. It follows that transfersof
powers from the State to non-State formationsare not necessarily
instances of privatization.Decentralization,separation of powers,
federalization- all these are instancesof restructurationof public
powers- of 'perestroika',if you will- not of privatization.
State powersrefer to the activitiesthe State has usurped or been
empowered to exercise, even against opposition by non-State formations.Liberties,percontra,refer to the activitiesnon-Stateformations
are empoweredto exercise,even in the face of Stateopposition.
of 1989
Thinkingtherevolutions
15
Note that both libertiesand state powers may be actualor merely
formal.Formal liberties and powers refer to legal entitlements to
engage in certain activities. Actual liberties and powers refer to
sustained enactments of these entitlements. Formal liberties and
powers may or may not be actualized,just as actual liberties and
powersmayor maynot be formalized.Unlessstatedotherwise,in this
paperlibertiesand powerswillrefer to their actualizedversions.
Statepowersand libertiesare relatedto one anotheras the twoends
of a seesaw.In any given regime, the more powersthe Statehas, the
fewer the libertiesof non-Stateformations,and vice versa.A regime
as a functionof the number,range,and scope
willbe termedlibertarian
of the liberties it sustains.The more liberties it sustains,the more
the
libertarianthe regime.The fewer the liberties,the more autocratic
regime.
Changeswherebya regime becomesmore libertarianare gathered
I don'tfind this term
liberation.
here under the generalrubricof regime
satisfactorybut all the alternativesthat came to mind- polyarchization, pluralization,corporatization,consociation, etc. - have
struckme as even more problematic.
Note that not all the autonomiesof non-Stateformationsconstitute
libertiesin the sense I havejust determined,becausenot all of them
are viewed by the State as imposing limits on its own powers.
Autonomies not seen as impinging on the powers of the State are
(It bears repeating:as here conceived,
referred to here as freedoms.
libertiesalwaysand necessarilystand in an agonisticrelation,real or
potential,vis-a-visthe powersof the State.)
A regime will be termed liberalif it sustains a broad range of
freedoms. Liberalregimes are not necessarilylibertarian,and libertarianregimes are not necessarilyliberal.Autocraticregimes can be
liberal;they cannot,by definition,be libertarian.
are rightsof exempLibertiesmay be 'from'and 'to'.Liberties-from
tion from specific impositionsby the State, e.g. from conscription,
are rights to engage in specific
forced labor, taxation. Liberties-to
activitieswithout interference by the State, e.g. to form a political
party,to investabroad,etc.
liberation
ofreg7me
theprospects
factorsaffecting
Some
Let me return now to the question of the prospects of regime
liberationas a result of the revolutionsof 1989. Armed with a de
Tosqueville-inspiredtheoreticalorientation, I propose to consider
three sets of factorsthat may affect the eventualpoliticaloutcome of
these revolutions. Other factors, no less pertinent, could be considered,but thesewilldo for the purposeat hand,which,afterall,is no
morethanto launchthe discussion.The firsthasto do withthe specific
for regime liberation pressed for by the revolutionary
measures
Weitman
Sasha
16
likely
consequences
The secondconcernscertainunintended
movements.
certain
to
refers
result from some of these measures.The third set examination.In
to
under
societies
the
in
andculturalinfrastructures
social
how are these
three cases, the same question will be asked, viz.
all
regime
likelyto affect the prospectsof lasting,self-sustained
factors
of
revolutions
in these societies as a consequence of the
liberation
1989?
butquiteanotherto
1.It is one thingto wantto disempowerthe State,
proclaim,in
whichStatepowersto abolishand whichlibertiestoeffectivelyto
know
order and at what pace, so as to contributemost
what
a few working
theirinstitutionalization.In the absence of theory,
maybe advanced:
hypotheses
Libertyis less likely
a. The proclamationof a GeneralPrincipleof
of
to contribute to regime liberation than the introduction
specificliberties;
to regime
b. Individual freedoms are less likely to contribute
liberationthancorporateand institutionalliberties; liberation
regime
c. Liberties-fromare less likelyto contributeto
thanliberties-to;
the conditions
d. Similarly,the grantingof formallibertieswithout
to regime
necessaryfor theirrealizationis unlikelyto contribute
liberation,and mayeven havethe oppositeeffect; the State had
e. The transferto non-Stateformationsof powers
measure;
mismanagedin the old regimeis a bonafidelibertarian
authoritarian
but it may be used by the State to enhance its
capacltyto exerclseltSremalnlngpowers;
the State to
f. Secessionist struggles by ethno-nations against in their own
constitutethemselvesinto sovereign nation-states
achievement
right also constitutelibertarianstruggles.But the that the new
of sovereignstatehoodper se does not guarantee
regimewillbe morelibertarianthanthe old;
to try and
g. The revolutionarytendencyby the new government
ordershort
in
liberate many domains simultaneouslyand - is morelikelyto
ratherthan doing so piecemealand gradually
retardthanto promoteregimeliberation.
passed by these
To sum up, the specific package of measures the liberties of
increase
revolutions to reduce State powers and
simultaneity,the order
non-Stateformations,as well as the degree ofintroduction
- all these
of priority,and the pace of their attemptedanythingbut a foregone
is
it
mustbe carefullytakeninto account,for
pursued, will
conclusion that such measures, however vigorously
men may
Marx,
paraphrase
To
actuallyproducethe intendedresults.
history
the
know
seldom
they
but
knowthat they are makinghistory,
theyare making.
purposive action
2. It is an axiom of sociological analysis that
.
.
*
.
fi
Thinkingtherevolutions
of 1989
17
intended to bring aboutspecificresultsin societyinevitablyproduces
unintended consequences as well. (Boudon dubs them 'perverse
effects'.)Unintendedconsequencesare particularlysalient,pervasive,
and intractablein revolutionssuch as occupyus here, in whichthe old
regime collapses at once, and improvised, inexperienced leaders
suddenly find themselveswith the reins of power thrust into their
hands. The question I want to consider now is whether among the
unintended but foreseeable consequences,there may not be some
which, in a second moment, are likely to have negative feedback
effects on the projectof regime liberation.
Consider for example, the economic liberalizationprograms to
whichvirtuallyall these revolutionshave committedthemselves.The
predictableeffects of these programswill be a dramaticrise in social
inequalities in the society. These, in turn, are likely to rekindle
preciselythe sort of socialresentmentsthat providedthe old regimes
with what legitimacy they once had. Since the resulting clamors
againstinequalitiesand for compensatorymeasurescan be satisfied
by, perhaps only by, State intervention and interference in the
internalaffairsof non-Stateformations,the likelyresultof economic
liberalizationmaywellbe, in a second moment,a re-empowermentof
the State,hence a setbackfor regimeliberation.
Likewise,revolutionaryattemptsto revamp all at once the entire
regime inevitablyproduce an acute state of anomie throughout the
society. Among the salient outward consequences of this state are
spectacularrises in rates of so-called 'social problems'- pervasive
corruption,violent crimes, drug addiction, truancy,juvenile delinquency,alcoholism,prostitution,suicide,mentalillness,and the like.
These are likelyto giveriseto widespreadalarmand to clamorsfor the
restoration of 'law and order', even if such restoration entails
returningto the State powersthe revolutionhad just taken from it.
This, too, is liable to have adverse effects on the overall project of
regimeliberationof these revolutions.
3. The third set of factors, perhaps the most important of all,
concernsthe socialand culturalinfrastructureswithoutwhichformal
liberties- no matterhow enshrinedin constitutionsand guaranteed
by law- havelittlechanceof turninginto actualliberties.Amongthese
infrastructureswe find, to mention but a few, a fierce spirit of
independence,even of rebellion,at the very suggestionof being told
by others what to do or not to do; a reflexivedistrustof unsolicited
offers of outside 'aid',and a preference for doing things one's own
way, using one's own limited resources;well-honed organizational
skillsand deep-set habitsof sustainedcooperation;the inclinationto
viewothersin synergeticratherthanin zero-sumtermsand to relateto
them accordingly;a pragmaticand opportunistic rather than an
ideologicalorientationto others,whencea capacitynot only to tolerate
18
Saslul Weitman
them despite profound differences, but also to actuallywork with
them; an ethic of responsibilityrather than of commitment (in
Weber'ssense); a high regard for horse-tradingskills, for flexibility
and for the readinessto compromise,and a correspondinglylow regard for High-PrincipledIntransigentLast Stands;an appreciation
for laws, rules, and proceduralnorms, and an instinctivedistrustof
those inclinedto bypassthem or manipulatethem cynically.This list
is of course neither exhaustivenor systematic,nor is it meant to be.
All it is meant to do is point to the kind of socialand culturalinfrastructureswhicha de Tosqueville-inspiredtheoryviewsas conditions
of possibilityfor formallyestablishedlibertiesto, in time, turn into
actual, self-sustainingpatterns of self-government.4Whether such
conditionsexist in today'ssocietiesof Centraland EasternEuropeis,
of course, a matterto be empiricallydetermined.The impressionwe
have been given (by the press, by the media, by literarysources,and
also by scholarlyworks)is that these socioculturalinfrastructuresare
almostcompletelyabsent from these societies.This absence may in
part be due to the lack of a 'democratictradition'in many of these
countries,but also and mostlyto their havingbeen systematicallydestroyedby the totalitarianStateunder the old regime.
So far, I have emphasizedfactors which will likely have negative
effects on the prospectsof regime liberationin Centraland Eastern
Europe. This is not to say that there are no forces mitigatingin the
opposite direction.Let me mention two of them here, if only in the
interestof nuancingthe picturesketchedso far. One mitigatingforce
is the memory of life under totalitarianism:this memoryalone will
likely cause people to look askance(if not with outright hostility)at
attemptsto re-empowerthe State.The second force is culturaland is
mass-diffusedby the electronic media, particularlyfrom the West.
Just as radioand televisedbroadcastsfrom the Westhavelikelyplayed
a decisiverole in discreditingtotalitarianregimes in the eyes of their
subjects,so it may be assumed that the continued mass-diffusionof
such cultural materialswill stoke - as it does in the West itselfaspirationsand fantasiesof freedomand liberty.
Prognostication:
whatpost-revolutionarw
regimes?
What kinds of regime, then, may we expect will emerge in the
countriesthat have undergone the revolutionsof 1989 - allowingof
coursefor inter-and intra-nationaldifferences,5and assumingthatno
deusexmachinafi
and no massivearmed interventionwill roll backthe
entireprocess,as happenedin ChinainJune 1989.Whatkindof State,
then, and what kind of liberties, will likely emerge from these
revolutions?
First,thepost-revolutionary
stateswilldivestthemselves
offunctionswhich,
Thinkingtherevolutions
of 1989
19
undertheoldreggme,
theStatehadprovedunableto exercize
effectively,
and
transfer
themtonon-Stateformations.
This divestment,however,need not
mean that the State will lose all interestin them, or that it will cease
tryingto maintaincontrolsover at leastsome of them. Rather,it may
try acting on them indirectly, prefering performance,judiciary,
budgetaryand Keynesiancontrolsover directadministrativecontrols.
Consequently,liberatedspheresmaybe grantedsignificantfunctional
autonomiesin the managementof their affairs and turn into what
Bourdieu calls 'dominated fields'. The various branches of the
economy (agriculture,industry, commerce, even banking) will be
most prominent among these liberated-yet-dominatedfields, but
therewillno doubtbe othersas well,suchas organizedreligion,higher
education,culturalproduction,medicalservices,scientificand technologicalresearch,and localgovernment.
Second, it may be expected that thenewstateswillbefar moreliberal
thantheirtotalitar?an
predecessors
withrespecttoall activitieswhich,in their
view,poseno significantthreatto theirrule.Forexample,theywill likelybe
'generous'
in grantingand garanteeingto individualsa broadrangeof
personalfreedomsthathad beendeniedunderthe olzltotalitarianregime.
These willincludesuchindividualrightsas the freedomof conscience,
of speech,of travel,of occupation,of residence,of life style,of sexual
choice, of healthcare, of emigration,and of voting for one's favorite
party.(Moreon these rightsshortly.)
If so, it follows that thedaysof totalitarian
regimesproperareprobably
gone,nevertoreturnagain.It does not follow,however,thatthey willbe
replacedby significantlylibertarianregimes.A more likelypossibility
is that thepost-revolutionary
regimeswill be 'State-dominated',
as distinct
from their totalitarianpredecessors,which may be said to have been
'State-saturated'.The essential difference between the two is as
follows. In totalitarianregimes, virtuallyall spheres of activityare,
potentially if not actually, directly subordinatedto the State and
supervisedby it. They are, indeed, integralpartsof the State:in such
regimes autonomiesof any kind are virtuallynonexistent. In Statedominatedregimes,by contrast,three domainsmaybe distinguished
in terms of their relation to the State. One consistsof all the fields
that continue to be under direct State rule, just as they had been
under the old totalitarianregime. A second domain consistsof the
semi-autonomous, remote-controlled,dominated fields discussed
above. The third domain, that of individualfreedoms (alsojust discussed)is the one which differentiatesmost clearlyState-dominated
from totalitarianState regimes. State-dominatedregimes tolerate a
range of individualfreedoms not only because the State perceives
them as not really interferingwith the discretionaryexercize of its
powers. A more telling reason is that individualfreedoms provide
the State with legitimacy,that most precious of State resources of
which totalitarianregimes have been short even more than of hard
Weitman
Sasha
20
freedomsis
functionof individuala vert real,
The regime-legitimating
public with
currency.
imbue the bulk of the in a 'free society'. Two,
they
First,
twofold.
of living
sense of freedom, thatfreedoms ties down considerable
experienced
have
of many of these
cultivation
that, otherwise,mightof the
the
preoccupations
and
the powers
resources,
energies,
includingto challenge
affairs,
astute elite,
public
to
politically
turned
been
ruled by a
regimes
In State-dominatedjust tolerate these innocuous personal
State.
the State may not
their exercize and defend
then,
encourage
actively
very own
even
it may
freedoms:
on them, even by itsbejealous
encroach
to
againstall attempts State-dominatedregimesmay
them
Paradoxically,then, theircitizens.(Franceand Israelaretwo
officials.
of the civilrightsof
guardians
and
hegemonic
ln polnt.)
cases
come in two broad types,the regimesto
regimes
among
State-dominated
whichwill likelybe found
of
betweenthem
both
difference
domineer?ng,
The
1989.
of
revolutions
from the
not the Statemachinery
emerge
governmentcentral
domithe
fromwhether
sense), or is merely
stems
Duverger's
is
(in
actuallydominates
the central government
itselfregimes,
state
from
is
formations
In hegemonic
neering.
even if itscontrolof non-State
regimes,
charge,
in
effectively
In domineeringstateachieving
manipulations.
artful
on
and relieson
no less bent
afar
centralgovernmentisso- muchas domineering
the
while
contrast,
by
in doing
it is largelyineffectual
theirchildren.Typically,
hegemony,
dominating
in
ineffectual
is divided,
be
tend to
parents
the central governmentand forever
regimes
state
inconsistent,
domineering
in
ineffective,inconstant,
unstable,
Republicand Israel
Fourth
indecisive,
under the
(France
viewed
itself.
to reform
trying
As a result,besidesbeingends up
point.)
in
cases
two
State
the
are, again,
today
of the non-Stateformations,
many
manipulating.
in
the
doing
nuisance
a
in
as
it succeeds
than
public
less
no
repeated
riseto
manipulated
being
of thistypeoften give capableof restoring
regimes
surprisingly,
Not
the kind
that
for strong,decisivegovernment,
anotherwayof sayinginto
clamors
but
Whichis
State.
the
evolve
of
to
full authority
the
have built-in tendencies
domineeringstate regimes
in
stateregimes.
saythat,whenviewed
would
hegemonic
I
clearthatthe Revolutions
Inwindingup thisprognostication,
perspective,it seems waves of revolutionthat
historical-comparative
class with the earlier
- of the
of 1989 belong in a of empires in the contemporaryeraOttoman
accompaniedthe fall empires,the Austro-Hungarian&
the
Spanishand Portugueseand Frenchcolonialempires.Whatever
gave
they
to which
empires,and the British
empires,the revolutions 'independence',
these
between
differences
in the name of 'liberation',
And what
rise were all fought they too were revolutionsof liberty. against
Those
word,
'self-rule'- in a wavesof revolutionsof libertyyield?
regimesnow in
did these earlier
empires yielded the
Portuguese
the
the Spanishand
t
*
Thinkingtherevolutions
of 1989
place in LatinAmerica.Those againstthe Ottomanand the AustroHungarianempires yielded the regimes in place in Central,South,
and EasternEurope before the Firstand Second World Wars.And
those againstthe Frenchand Britishcolonialempiresyielded today's
regimesin BlackAfrica,in Southand South-EastAsia,in North Africa
and in the MiddleEast.Whateverbenefitsthese revolutionsmayhave
brought to their peoples - most notably, liberation from foreign
oppression, exploitation and humiliation,and the achievement of
sovereign statehood- real self-governmenthas rarely been among
these benefits.A centralquestionof this paper has been whetherthe
presentwave of revolutionsmight succeed where earliersuch waves
had not. To be sure, it is muchtoo early,and the availableinformation
muchtoo scanty,to be ableto tell. But the littlewe know,and the little
theory we have, leave little room for optimism. Given time and
favorablecircumstances,some of these revolutionsmay eventually
institutionalizea modicum of regime liberation. A more likely
outcome,however,is for the old totalitarianregimesto be replacedby
autocratic,state-dominatedregimes,whetherof the hegemonicor the
domineering variety. For the peoples directly involved in such a
transition,thispetitedifference
maymakeallthe differencein the world.
As for those on the outside applaudingalreadythe Dawn of a New
GoldenAge of 'Democracy',they mightas wellbracethemselvesfor a
mightyjolt of disappointment.
Writingof the kibbutzin the 1950s,all Buberwould say was that it
was'an experimentthatdid not fail',since it had succeededat leastto
surviveas a going concern,even if it had failed to realizethe goals it
had set for itself. Likewise,if, in a few years'time, the countriesof
Central and Eastern Europe will have succeeded at least in not
revertingto the old totalitarianmold,then we shallbe ableto sayof the
eventsof 1989 thatthey, too, were revolutionsthatdid not fail.
CONCLUSION
Let me recapitulateand conclude.
This paper'smainobjectivehas been to proposea particularframe
of referencefor rethinking1989'sdramaticdevelopmentsin Central
and EasternEurope. WhatI proposed,essentially,is that they be interpretedas revolutionsof liberty,i.e. for the replacementof the totalitarianregimes by what I called regimes of liberty.The media have
been quick, too quick, in labellingthese revolutions'democratic',a
termwhichconflates,and confounds,two distinctand not necessarily
compatiblegreat aspirations:the politicalaspirationfor libertyand
the socialaspirationfor equality.The prototypicalrevolutionof the
modernera, the FrenchRevolutionof 1789 was, in this sense, democratic,in that,at leastearlyon, it hadindeedbeen committedto bothof
these powerfulaspirations.Viewed,however,from the standpointof
21
22
Sasha Weitman
its actualhistoricalachievements,the FrenchRevolutionturnsout to
havebeenegalitarianandstatist,butfarfromlibertarian.Withintwo,at
most three years from its onset, it becamein fact violentlyanti-libertarian, discreditingand persecuting as reactionariesand counterrevolutionariesallwhoopposedstatismand continuedthe strugglefor
liberty.As for the revolutionsof 1989in Centraland EasternEurope,
theywillalmostcertainlynot advancethe causeof equality(sincethisis
nowhereon theiragenda),nor,as I havetriedto showin thispaper,are
theylikelyto achievemajorbreakthroughsforthatof liberty.Hencethe
problemwithcallingthese revolutions'democratic'.
Interestinglyenough, the twinproblemsof equalityand of effective
Statemanagement,the centralissuesof the FrenchRevolution,turn
out also to be the issueson whichclassicalsocialtheorieshavecentred
and aroundwhichthey wereworkedout. As for the issueof liberty,it
was suppressedor passed-overnot only by all the 'democratic'revolutionsever since 1789,but alsoby the greatsociologicaltheorieselaboratedin the wakeof these revolutions.The singlemajorexceptionin
this respectwasAlexisde Tosqueville,who not only paid attentionto
the problemof liberty,the perenniallypassed-overitemon the agenda
of the great revolutions,but also gave it pride of placein his substantive concerns.8Whence my heavy relianceon him for analyzingthe
currentwaveof revolutionswhich,it bearsrepeating,havebeenessentially revolutionsconcerned with achieving liberty from the State,
ratherthanjustice,or equality,or materialbenefitsfrom it.
Regardlessof the eventualoutcomesof these revolutions,it is important that they be closely monitored, carefullydocumented, and
systematicallyanalyzedby sociologists,for there will certainlybe significanttemporaland regionaldifferencesin the waysand degree to
whichthe drive to institutelibertywillsucceedand fail. These differences, far from givingthe lie to the broadgeneralizationsadvancedin
thesegeneralthis paper,constitutethe verybasisfor 'problematizing'
izations,that is, for translatingthem from the discourseof political
philosophyinto the discourseof sociology.The opportunisticexploiresearchof these differencesamong
tationfor comparative-historical
and withinthese revolutionswillgive us the opportunityto begin producing, at long last, alongsideexisting theoriesof socialequalityand
its conditionsof possibility,long-overduecomplementarytheoriesof
politicallibertyand of its conditionsof possibility.
SashaWeitman
(Dateaccepted:March1990)
of Sociology-Anthropology
Department
Tel-AvivUniversity
NO I ES
It gives me pleasure to acknowledge the
This paper was read at annual ISA
helpful comments and encouragements I
meetings(8.ii.90)Bar-IlanUniversity.
Thinkingtherevolutions
of 1989
receivedon earlier drafts of this paper
from Edith Astruc, Rod Aya, Jose
Bruner,Lewis(Joser,SeymourDrescher,
Francois Furet, Shaul Friedlander,
MichaelKimmel,RobertPalmer,Robert
Parish, and Jose-Enrique RodriguezIbanez.
1. (Jommentingon an earlierdraft of
this paper, Francois Furet (personal
communication)wrote:'I thinkyou missed one of the essentialelements. . . by
passing under silence that [the revolutionsof 1989]havebeen"counter-revolutionary revolutions",that is, destructions of an order founded on a
revolution,that of 1917. It is from this
thattheydrawtheirnoveltyin the history
of the world,notablywith respectto the
revolutionsof the 18th and l9th centuries.'The crucialquestion,of course,is
whether- or, moreprecisely,underwhat
conditions- it is feasibleto instituteby
revolutionarymeans a 'counter-revolutionary'regime- or, for that matter,to
pursue peace by means of warfare,
moderationby extremistmeans,and the
like.This is one of the basicissuesraised
in thispaper.
2. One of the most frequentlyvoiced
comments I hear concerning my claim
that the central motive-forceof these
revolutionshas been the aspirationfor
liberty,in particularfrom the totalitarian
state,hasbeen,'whataboutthe aspiration
for a higher materialstandardof living,
as in the West?' Robert Palmer, for
example, wrote (personal communication): 'I think you and ToKqueville
underestimate the economic side of
"democraticrevolutions".
On the current
scene the basic complaintagainstcommunism is that it is unproductiveand
impoverishingratherthan thatit doesn't
give [...] free speech and contested
electionsthat most people are not concerned with. They therefore think they
want a "marketeconomy"and a whole
rangeof relatedthingson whichT(Kqueville(andyoutoo I guess)havelessto say.'
The aspirationfor a 'freemarket'instead
of a 'commandeconomy', however, is
everybit as mucha politicalaspirationas
it is an economic aspiration.Even the
muchpublicizedimagesof massesof East
Germansthrongingthe shopping malls
23
in the Westand returningloaded down
with consumerdurablesdoes not mean
thatthe meaningof thisconductis strictly
economic.Afterall,one of the firstthings
inmatesjust releasedfrom prison,army
recruits from bootcamp,patients from
hospital,havebeen knownto do is alsoto
go on shopping (or window-shopping)
sprees.Onewouldnotconcludefromthis
that their urge to get out from the total
institutionsin whichthey were confined
was motivatedmore by economicaspirations for consumergoods than by the
exhilarationof beingfree.
3. It is not that sociologists(especially
in America)havehadnothingto sayon the
subjectof liberty.It is, rather,that what
they have said has not been very enlightening.Thus, most of them seem to
subscribeto somevariantof the myththat
all people, everywhereand at all times,
aspireto 'life, libertyand the pursuitof
happiness'.Up to the 1960s, this myth
was explicitlypostulatedin socialtheory
with regardto individualactors- in the
guiseof the homoeconomicusmodel- by
micro neo-utilitariansat one end (Homans, Blau, Coleman, Boudon, et al.),
and by macro structuralists(notably
Parsons) at the other. More recently,
Americanconflict sociologistshave explicitelyextended this mythof libertyto
collectiveformationsas well. Amongthe
bestknownto havedone so in the fieldof
revolutionarystudieshavebeen resource
mobilizationtheoristslike CharlesTilly
and Marxist historicalsociologistslike
Theda Skospol.For these, if and to the
extent that an underclassfails to act as a
free agency - i.e. as a 'class-for-itself'
rationallypursuingits own best interests
- it cannot possiblybe becausethey are
not disposedto do so. Rather,it mustbe
(a)becausetheyareeffectivelyprevented
from doing so by the repressiveapparatusesof the State (Skospol),and/or (b)
becausethey havedfailedto mobilizethe
resourcesnecessaryfor such an endeavour (Tilly).It is clearthattheseoptimistic
theoriesassumepreciselythatwhichthey
should problematize,namely,the disposition of individualsor of larger social
formationsto, when left to their own
devices,rationallypursuetheir own best
interests. (If matters were indeed that
24
simple,one wonderswhy an underclass
such as women - to cite but the most
obviousexample- haveyet to come into
theirown.)
4. de Tosqueville's most sustained
treatmentof the conditionsof possibility
of libertyis in his Democracyin America
volumes.
5. I am aware, of course, of crossnationaland intra-nationalvariationsin
the revolutionsof 1989.If I haveset them
aside in this paper, it was to highlight
what all these revolutionshave had in
common,namely,the repudiationof the
totalitarianstate regime and the aspirationto replaceit witha regimeof liberty.
This is the phenomenonwhich, in my
view, cries out to be researched and
theorized.Once it has been placedat the
centerof inquiry,the existenceof interand of intra-national variations in
patternsof revolution,far from impeding the progressof inquiry,becomethe
veryconditionof thisprogress.
6. Oneimportantandhighlypertinent
theoretical perspective that has been
passed over in the present analysis is
world system theory. This perspective
emphasizes supra-macro (i.e. globalcontextual) factors and processes that
Sasha Weitman
impinge on intra-societalphenomena.I
havepassedoverthisperspectivebecause
I am not sure how best to link it
forces
theoreticallywiththe intra-societal
and processesthat have occupiedme in
thispaper.Socialtheoristshavelongsince
worriedabout the micro/macrolinkage
problem.Sincethe Wallersteinianrevolution, there is ample reasonto worryas
linkage
wellaboutthe macro-supramacro
problem(i.e.betweennationalandsupranationalphenomena).
7. The linguisticequationof freedom
with liberty enables (or rather causes)
peopleto misrecognizetheirownsenseof
freedomwith the presenceof structural
libertiesin the larger societyeffectively
limiting the discretionary powers of
mammoth-likecollectiveagents such as
the State, large municipalities,multinationalcorporations,and the like.
8. Another social theoristwho wrote
extensivelyon libertywas Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon,buthe hasbeenoverlookedby
sociologyeven morethanhasde Tosqueville.See on thisCraig(alhoun, 'Classical
SocialTheoryandthe FrenchRevolution
Theoty,vol. 7, no. 2,
of 1848',Sociologzeal
Fall1989,pp. 214}25.