CHANGES IN TRADE POLICIES FROM MING, CHINA
In the 1550s, some Ming officials began to argue that the maritime
prohibition caused smuggling, and in 1567, a new emperor took their
advice and instituted an Open Seas policy, allowing Chinese traders
to sail legally to some foreign ports. There were still four
important restrictions.
First and foremost, any contact between Chinese and Japanese traders
was prohibited because Japan was considered too friendly to pirates.
Second, foreign traders were still forbidden to land in China except
in tribute missions.
Third, anyone who wished to undertake a voyage would have to apply
for a license and pay tolls and taxes.
And fourth,private trade would take place only through a single port
in Fujian Province: Yuegang (later known as Haicheng).
The new Open Seas policy achieved its aim: piracy and smuggling
decreased. At the same time, Chinese overseas traders expanded their
reach dramatically, especially those based in Fujian.
To understand the vast reach of Fujianese trade networks, just look
at the trading permits given to Fujianese merchants as part of the
new Open Seas initiative.
Each permit allowed its bearer to call on a fixed place overseas.
Destinations were divided into two spheres: the Western Oceans,
which contained all of mainland Southeast Asia, Sumatra, and Java;
and the Eastern Oceans, which held the Philippines, Borneo, and the
Moluccas.
The most popular port was Luzon (Manila), at sixteen permits per
year.
Other popular destinations were Banten, Palembang, Siam, Tongking,
Cambodia, Sunda, Melaka, and Hue (Vietnam), but there were scores of
other Southeast Asian destinations as well.
Ten permits were also awarded each year for ships sailing to Taiwan.
An examination of Spanish records shows that the number of Chinese
ships that called at Manila was at least twice the number of permits
granted for Manila.
Similarly, Japanese records indicate that scores of Chinese ships
called in Nagasaki, despite the fact that no permits were available
to Japan.
Because of such smuggling, it is difficult to estimate the volume of
Fujianese maritime trade, but the gross value of imports was
probably around two million ounces (taels) of silver annually.
Obviously, the trade altered Fujian’s economy.
The Open Seas policy was a reluctant recognition of the status quo
rather than a return to the glory days of Chinese maritime trade as
it had existed in the previous two dynasties. Chinese who traded
abroad were still viewed with suspicion, and they rarely received
recognition or support. Thus, the Ming tolerated overseas trade but
did not foster it. Chinese who had ambitions in foreign lands were
on their own. They were, as one scholar puts it, "merchants without
empire."
Sources: James C. Boyajian, "The Chien-wen, Yung-lo, Hung-hsi, and Hsüan-te
Reigns,1399–1435," in The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1, 182–304. & Chang Pintsun,"Chinese Maritime Trade: The Case of Sixteenth-Century Fu-chien; pp 20–25."
Silver Production and Taxation in Ming, China
Ming China's silver monetization resulted in an insatiable desire
for silver, but gradually, silver mining tax became an enormous
burden on local people, and could not be collected on an annual
basis. Consequently, silver resources in Yunnan were exhausted under
the existing technology, as reflected in numerous official reports
and memorials.
The continual development and the significance of silver mining in
Yunnan during the Ming Dynasty can be reflected by mining taxation.
Song Yingxing of the sixteenth century pointed out that silver
output in Yunnan constituted over half of the national output, more
than what was mined from all other provinces combined.16 Other
documents affirm his conclusion. In 1458, the quota for the silver
mining tax (yinke) in Yunnan was set as 52,380 taels, followed by
Zhejiang Province (21,250 taels) and Fujian Province (15,120
taels).17 Two years later, silver mining tax in Yunnan reached over
100,000 taels, that is, it was almost doubled.18 Table 6.1 provides
a general account of the silver tax in Yunnan in terms of its
national significance.
Table 6.1 Silver Taxation in Yunnan during the Ming Period
Year
1458
1459
1460
1462
1467
1473
1482
1483
1484
1488
1504
1562
Yunnan Silver Tax (taels)
52,380
76,206
102,380
102,420
102,604
102,789
102,543
102,376
72,380
52,380
51,276
50,020
Percent of National Silver Tax
50
51
53
58
59
57
58
60
62
65
70
72
These figures, though incomprehensive, illustrate the significant
contribution of silver of Yunnan to the Ming economy, because the
annual average silver mining tax of the empire throughout the Ming
period was around 100,000 taels.19 This table shows that in the
worst years, Yunnan's silver tax accounted for half of the national
figure. Quan Hansheng estimates that total silver mining tax from
1390 to 1520 was 11,395, 775 taels.20 If Yunnan dominated half of
the national production (which is a very conservative estimate),
that is, 5.7 million taels, and if the silver mining tax in the Ming
was around 30 percent, as Quan concludes, then Yunnan in the Ming
period would have produced 19,000,000 taels of silver. This figure,
nonetheless, was far below what James Lee estimated. Lee concluded
that by the end of the Ming period, Yunnan produced 2.5 million
kilograms of silver, which was three-quarters of China's total
output, as much as what the Portuguese trade brought to Ming China.21
Footnote Sources:
16. Song Yingxing, Tiangong Kaiwu (Exploitations of works of nature), annotated by
Zhong Guangyan (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 1976), 343-344.
17 & 18. Mingyingzong Shilu, juan 290, in Li Chunnong ed., Yunnan Shiliao Xuanbian
(Selected sources on Yunnan) (Kunming: Yunnan Minzu Chubanshe, 1998): 535.
19 & 20. Quan Hansheng, "Mingdai de Yinke yu Yinchanye" (China's silver mining tax
and silver output during the Ming Dynasty), Xinya Shuyuan Xueshu Niankan 9 (1967):
65-66 and 245-267
21. James Lee, "State-Regulated Industry in Qing China, The Yunnan Mining
Industry: A Regional Economic Cycle, 1700–1850," paper presented at the 1984
Conference on Spatial and Temporal Trends and Cycles in Chinese Economic History,
980-1980, sponsored by the ACLS and SSRC, at Bellagio, Italy, August 17–23, 1984,
p. 3, cf. Armijo-Hussein, Jacqueline Misty 1996, 179
The Ming Shi-Lu:
Imperial Reports on Japanese Piracy
The Ming Shi-lu contains the imperial annals of Ming dynasty emperors
(1368-1644) and is the single largest historical source for the dynasty and
"plays an extremely important role in the historical reconstruction of Ming
society and politics." [1]
According to documents contained in the Ming Shi, ―Ming China had
been engaged in campaigns against Japanese Pirates for one hundred
years.‖ In the eyes of the Ming Shi, Japanese pirates were the
equivalent to ―Chinese Merchants,‖ who raided the coasts of Fujian
Province during the late Jianging Era (1522 – 1566). Official
records actually indicate that Japanese Pirates consisted of
merchants and navigators from coastal Guangdong-Fujian-Zhejiang
provinces and the mouth of the Yangtze River. The greatest example
of these famous Japanese pirates was a merchant called Wang Zhi.
As a result of Japanese Piracy, Emperor Jiajing banned seafaring
activities beginning in 1523. Hence, Japanese pirates (i.e. "Chinese
merchants")popped up in rampage as a method of protest to the
Chinese policies against their merchant trade.
Often, there are entries in the "Ming Shi" claiming that Japanese
pirates pretended to be diplomatic delegations checking Chinese
defenses and acting as pirates during times when they noticed that
there was no Chinese defense.
The "Ming Shi" also states that even though the Japanese king
continued the tributes (like other vassals of China), the rest of
the Japanese island lords had resorted to piracy in collusion with
Chinese outlaws. Pirates, knowned as Wo-k'ou, who had been
plundering the Chinese coast for hundreds of years, used Taiwan as a
base or hideout. When chased by the Ming forces, these pirates would
flee to Penghu Islands (Pescadores), and then to Taiwan. Zhu Wan
often decapitated whoever trafficked with Wo-k'ou, regardless if
they were Japanese or Chinese "outlaws".
Further, the "Ming Shi" claimed that wealthy people on the coast,
who treasured the Japanese as big clients, often complained about
Ming China's sea ban policy. Hence, Zhu Wan was hated by FujianZhejiang people. Zhou Liang, a merchant of Fujian Province, managed
to lodge accusations against Zhu Wan by means of acquaintances in
the court, forcing Zhu Wan into a suicide. For the next four years,
Ming China did not fill in the "xun hu" [i.e., governor-equivalent]
post vacated by Zhu Wan.
Further, Ming Dynasty records indicate that they revoked the
"customs officer" position and closed down the market at Ningbo
during Ming Shizong's reign. Cunning Chinese merchants took over the
job of trade evaluation and assessments during this period and often
treated Japanese traders bad in compensation.
As a result of sea ban, major merchants such as Wang Zhi, Xu Hai,
Chen Dong & Ma Ye fled to neighboring islands to engage in trade
with the Japanese Merchants. In fact, the “Ming Shi” also indicates
that Wang Zhi, Xu Hai, Chen Dong & Ma Ye adopted Japanese clothing
and banners on their ships for the purpose of pillaging the coast
disguised as Japanese Pirates instead of conducting legitmate
trading. By July of 1552, Ming China restored the "xun hu" [i.e.,
governor-equivalent] post. However, by that time it was too late.
The "Ming Shi" claims that the ancestral garrison at Ningbo had been
replaced with fishermen as watchtower guards, which was a no match
for pirates. In March of 1553, Wang Zhi invaded China with hundreds
of ships along the Jiangsu-Zhejiang coast. As a result, the
Changguo-wei garrison was sacked. Additionally, in April, pirates
attacked Taichang, Shanghai, Jiangyin and Zhapu. In Aug, they raided
Jinshanwei, Chongming, Changshu, and finally Jiading.
Some scholars have agreed that the Ming ―Sea Ban‖ policies and
Eunuch policies can be blamed for the decline of China at a time
when the Portuguese still acknowledged China's wealth as something
Europe never could match.
Source: The Ming Shi-lu as a source for Southeast Asian History by Geoff Wade,
Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2005
Views on the Status of the Merchant Gentry in China
By the beginning of the 15th Century, the Ming Emperors found themselves ruling over a much larger kingdom the any earlier dynasty,
with 3 million men in the army, many garrisoned on distant borders
and in need of supplies. Merchants willing to transport grain there
received salt certificates as pay in exchange for delivery, which
entitled them to trade the government salt at lucrative prices. They
were also encouraged to colonize these outposts by farming the land.
But surprisingly, in 1492, when payment was changed over to money
instead of salt, the merchants lost interest and stopped. However,
Many had become rich having ―commonly some hundreds of thousands of
ounces of silver.‖ Therefore, their influence in government could no
longer be ignored.
As the key economic areas became settled and affluent - by the late
15th century 85% of the population and two thirds of the national
wealth were located there. Market towns sprang up along the Grand
Canal and the main waterways with storage points and customs
services to support the inter-regional trade. It was the chief
center for silver mining, the textile and tea industries: and
Szechuan, had its advanced salt technology and minting money
skills.
Their center soon became the city of Hsin-an, a city on the border
of Chekiang and Anhui, or in more general terms, the cities in the
district of Hui-chou. When the grain transportation to the frontiers
came to an end in early Ming time, the Hsin-an merchants first
specialized in the silver trade. Later in Ming time, they spread
their activities all over China and often monopolized the silver, as
well as the salt, rice, cotton, silk or tea businesses.
In the sixteenth century they had well-established contacts with
smugglers on the Fukien coast and brought foreign goods from the
Portuguese and Dutch into the interior. Their home was also close to
the main centers of porcelain production in Kiangsi which was
exported to overseas urban centers in Europe and the Americas.
The demand for porcelain had increased so much that state factories
could not fulfill it. The state factories seem often to have
suffered from a lack of labor: indented artisans were imported from
other provinces and later sent back on state expenses or were taken
away from other state industries. Thus, private porcelain factories
began to develop, and in connection with quickly changing fashions a
great diversification of porcelain occurred.
However, according to official records, ―those odd, unsettled people
...the traders and merchants,‖ were often ranked below the gentry,
the peasant, the artisan and craftsman in a rigid social hierarchy
based on birth, occupation, and honor. They were subject to personal
harassment and traditionally forced to wear distinctive dress such
as one white and one black shoe or having their name and business
displayed on their turban.
Although the ―gentleman merchant‖ was usually a member of a gentry
family having capital, or a loan from wealthy backers, and typically
working in the grain or salt monopoly business; he could not own
land or enter the civil service examinations except by illegal means
and was therefore excluded from a government career. In fact, these
merchants were usually forced to pay extra transit dues, duties and
registration fees by local nobles as a method of common penalties
for their dishonorable status in Chinese society.
Source: Timothy Brook. The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming
China. Berkeley: University of California, 1998.
Viewpoints of a Ming County Official: Ye Chunji
Ye Chunji (1532–1595) was a Chinese county official during the Ming
Dynasty (1368–1644) of China. He was a native of Guangdong province
and served as a county official of Huian County in Fujian province.
He came up with a model of county commerce with goods of greatest,
great, and lesser importance—the latter being non-subsistence
surplus goods that could be traded out of the county for commercial
profit.
Ye Chunji came up with a ranking model for consumptionary products
on the local level that could be applied to his county and many
others in the empire. At the top of this pyramid was the "greatest"
(zui) product, which was grain; this vital item of subsistence was
not traded out of the county as a commercial item.
Taxes were paid
in grain throughout the Ming Dynasty, but as early as 1436 a portion
of the grain tax was commuted to payments of silver instead; the
1581 Single Whip Reform of Zhang Juzheng finally assessed land taxes
entirely in silver and not in grain. The middle level of importance
in Ye's pyramid of county-level consumptionary goods were so-called
"great" (zhong) products, which were mulberry, cotton, hemp, and
ramie, the essential raw materials for local textile production. The
lowest level in Ye's pyramid of goods were the "lesser" (ci)
products, which were salt, cloth, vegetable oil, lumber, sugar,
fruit, vegetables, fish, and livestock—all of which were traded out
of the county by peddlers, itinerant retailers, or merchant
wholesalers shipping large amounts of commercial goods.
Ye Chunji noted that most of these goods from his county made their
way to the nearby prefectural capital at Quanzhou. He also noted
that outsiders handled the trade in his county and many other Fujian
county, which often led to profits being repatriated out of the
local county. He did note, however, that linen produced from the
county's production of hemp did generate profit that entered the
county from outside. Historian Timothy Brook writes that Ye's
description of his county gives the impression that most counties in
the Ming Dynasty relied on self-sufficient agriculture and textile
production while they were largely unaffected by and disengaged with
regional commodity networks between large urban markets.
As a result of the growing importance of Silver in China’s monetary
system, Ye Chinji issued an order to limit wedding expenses in the
1570s, stating "The frugal man with only one bar of silver currency
can have something left over, whereas the extravagant man with a
thousand can still not have enough". However, the elites of Huian
county and others did not care much for fiscally conservative
warnings such as this, and flaunted their wealth in silver.
Source: Brook, Timothy. (1998). The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture
in Ming China. Berkeley: University of California Press
Opinions on Chinese Currency and Silver by the
Ming Minister of Works: Guo Zizhang
Perhaps the most trenchant analysis of the currency problem can be
found in a series of essays written by Guo Zizhang (1543-1618) near
the conclusion of Guo's lengthy tenure (1575-82) in a series of
posts in the Ministry of Works, overseeing coinage.
In these essays Guo challenged the government to reassert its
prerogatives over the currency system. At the same time, Guo
delineated a greatly expanded role for the private sector and
entrepreneurial energy in order to augment the money supply.
While other policymakers feared dependency on silver, Guo regarded
increasing the stock of metallic money, both silver and coin, as the
empire's most urgent concern.
Guo Zizhang saw the problem of coinage as fundamentally a question
of sovereignty, and he blamed the court for relinquishing their
power and control over currency in the empire. Throughout his essays
Guo repeated the familiar argument that coin will circulate only if
the state uses it in its own expenditures and revenue collection;
the value of coin will rise if the people see that the court itself
uses it.
He especially emphasized the need for the state to control the
sources of silver. Like many others, Guo Zizhang held the view that
short-sighted concerns with profitability and sovereignty had
obscured the long-term benefits of augmenting the wealth of the
empire. Echoing Yang Cheng, Guo asserted that the circulation of
coin in effect multiplied its value.
While Guo emphasized the necessity of coinage as a means of
controlling the supply of money, he also refused to into any of the
hostility toward silver expressed by Jin Xueyan. Guo emphatically
stressed that silver should be the "mother" or primary currency,
while coin was its child, a subsidiary currency.
What most troubled Guo was the insufficiency of money in either
form. In his essay "On Money and Grain," Guo presented a remarkably
coherent analysis of the causes of China's economic doldrums. Guo
began with the conundrum that the Ming empire was simultaneously
experiencing both food shortages and low grain prices. He explained
the persistence of low prodution prices, even after successive years
of bad harvests, as a consequence of an insufficient supply of
silver. Grain was dear, but the dearth of silver was even more
severe.
Thus prices failed to rise in response to the intensifying demand
for grain. As a result the people suffered a double loss: food
shortages threatened urban consumers with starvation, while low
prices discouraged investment and production, leading to a further
contraction in the food supply. Ironically, Guo blamed the shortage
of silver on the increased tempo of trade, both foreign and
domestic, following the repeal of strict limits on maritime commerce
in 1567.
Reiterating an argument against opening China's ports to foreign
traders, he maintained that unrestricted foreign trade invariably
led to a drain of Chinese goods to foreign lands. He also claimed
that silver lost in shipwrecks or taken by pirates subtracted
substantially from the total stock of silver. These losses, coupled
with the failure of Zhang Juzheng's expansionary monetary policies,
reduced the money supply to the feeble condition of, as Guo put it,
a "motherless and childless widow."
To redress the problem of chronic currency shortages, Guo proposed
that the state must stimulate domestic production of silver, while
increasing the influx of silver bullion acquired from other sources.
He presented what were no doubt controversial proposals to enhance
the output of silver mines by relaxing government controls and
allowing entrepreneurs a free hand in mining and smelting ore.
Guo based his plan on the precedents of the imperial textile
intendancies in Jiangnan and the porcelain intendancy at Jingdezhen.
Private investors would undertake the actual production of silver,
but with the stipulation that they must sell their entire output to
the state. Then, returning to his theme of the need for a single,
sovereign currency, Guo adamantly insisted that the state must issue
a uniform coin whose use would facilitate the smooth flow of both
goods and coin throughout the empire.
The bullionist views of Guo Zizhang reflected the powerful influence
silver imports exerted on the Chinese economy. Despite the dramatic
rise in imports of silver from abroad and the accelerating velocity
of money as commercial activities intensified, discussions of
monetary policy throughout the 1570s and 1580s were pervaded by
persistent fears of shortages in silver. In this respect Guo
Zizhang's analysis resonated with that of Jin Xueyan, who likewise
worried about the deficiency of silver. But Jin attributed the
scarcity of silver to the hoarding by the wealthy, and thus in his
view increasing the supply of silver offered no solution to the
problem. Both Guo and Jin drew attention to the fact that despite
elevated harvests, the price of grain had stagnated, to the
detriment of its primary producers. And both concluded that the
cause of this deflation in grain prices was an inadequate stock of
raw silver to make coin money.
Other contemporaries echoed this view. The chief grand secretary
Wang Xijue, in a letter of 1593, commented that hoarding of silver
in state treasuries was to blame for deflation:
―The venerable elders of my home district [Taicang, near Shanghai]
relate that the reason why grain is cheap despite poor harvests in
recent years is entirely due to the dearness of silver. The dearness
of silver in turn results from the fact that the state absorbs
silver as tax remittances but disburses little silver in its
expenditures. As the price of grain falls, tillers of the soil
receive lower returns on their labor, and thus less land is put into
cultivation.‖
Sources:
Man and Land in Chinese History; By Kang Chao(Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1986), pp. 112-13.
Fountain of fortune: money and monetary policy in China, 1000-1700; By Richard Von
Glahn (University of California Press, 1996)