The EU as an ‘influence maximiser’? Neoclassical realism and the contemporary global order Dr Robert Kissack Assistant Professor Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) [email protected] 17 September 2013 Words: 6889 EISA, Warsaw. First Draft – do not quote Abstract: This paper contributes to the literature on the application of realist IR theory to the study of the European Union. It argues that variants of realism – classical and structural – have been used to critique the assumption of automated mechanisms within the integration process, and the EU’s role as a security actor. Building on Hill and Smith’s classification of the EU as a ‘sub-­‐system’, a ‘power’ and a ‘process’ in international relations, it argues that realism has only been applied to the first and second classification. The paper then presents a brief overview of neoclassical realism, and suggests a number of ways in which it might be applied to an understanding of the EU as a process in international relations. Keywords: European Union, IR theory, realism
Studying the European Union (EU) has traditionally involved deciding between using bottom-­‐up and top-­‐down approaches. Is the governance of the European Union an elaborate extension to the domestic political structures of its member states, or an elaborate form of international organisation with highly developed methods of cooperation? Within political science, the discipline of Government takes the former route, while the discipline of International Relations the latter. If the EU is seen as a highly complex form of governance between sovereign states based on the pooling of sovereignty, it comes as little surprise to IR scholars that realism, despite its centrality to the development of the discipline, has been seldom applied to the EU. This paper asks whether recent develops in realist thinking might be more relevant to the EU than has traditionally been the case. In particular, it focuses on the strand of realism known as ‘neoclassical realism’ or ‘modified realism’ (Schmidt 2007) expounded by Wohlforth, Schweller and Zakaria, among others. What sets these scholars apart from classical realism is there ambition to produce positivist theory about the world, while what sets them apart from structural realism is their rejection of purely systemic-­‐level theorising, and acceptance of state-­‐level causal variables. In the early 1990s their original aim was to explain why the balance of power appeared to have stopped working (and thereby rejecting Mearshiemer’s (2001) claim that it was simply a matter of time before China rose to challenge US hegemony). More recently, they have tried to explain how US decline can be managed in the face of rising powers from the Global South. The paper develops two arguments about the applicability of neoclassical realism to the EU. The first is that their preoccupation with global power transitions, the (relative) decline of the West, and a general existential pessimism in the aftermath of the global recession from 2008 are relevant to the EU. The second draws on the work of Hill and Smith (2005) and their conception of the EU as a ‘sub-­‐system’, a ‘power’ and a ‘process’ in international relations. Realism has been applied to the study of the EU as a ‘sub-­‐system’ ever since Stanley Hoffmann critiqued the logic of perpetual integration in 1966. Furthermore, many recent scholars using realism focus on the CFSP and the EU’s (lack of) force projection in security matters, as well as the potential for the EU to balance the US (c.f. Posen 2006). Here, the EU is seen as a power. But what can realism say about the EU as part of the process of IR? The processes that Hill and Smith have in mind are the ‘legal, institutional and political mechanisms through which the problems of international conflict and/or political economy are addressed’ (Hill & Smith 2005: 7). Examples include regionalism and globalisation, and a logical extension from here is to ask how the EU fits into the trend of emerging new poles in the ‘post-­‐post Cold War world’. A body of scholarship emerged in the 1990s assessing the relation between Europeanisation, globalisation and regionalisation, (for an overview see Lynggard 2011), leaving us to wonder what role the EU might play in future changes. Does neoclassical realism have insight into how the EU belongs to the processes of IR? The paper proceeds in the following stages. It briefly outlines the some notable applications of realism to the study of the EU, before moving on to sketch out a little of the diversity of within the realist cannon. It then develops further the conceptualisation of the EU as process in IR, and ends by mapping the core research agenda of neoclassical realism onto a conception of EU-­‐as-­‐a-­‐process. It concludes by asking whether this strategy provides reasonable grounds for pursuing this line of research further. Realism and the study of the European Union Sten Rynning’s recent survey of the application of realist IR scholarship to the European Union concludes that the theory has been marginalised, and this is partly its own fault through the prevalence of structural realism within the discipline (Rynning 2011). Structural realism is, following Waltz, designed to provide explanatory theory about the behaviour of states in the international system, generated at the level of the international system (Waltz’s third image). It assumes functional equivalence between units (sovereign states), the centrality of power to maximise the likelihood of state survival, the rational behaviour of states towards the goal of survival, and an anarchical international system. The culmination of these a priori assumptions about international politics is that a balance of power will be maintained over time between the units of the system – in fact according to Waltz, the balance of power is ‘the theory of international politics’. While states have the capacity to act as they choose, rational states will behave in predictable ways under the influence of structural forces (the distribution of power and the need to balance it) that they are unable to individually control. The parsimonious nature of the theory is both a strength and a weakness, depending on one’s general disposition towards realism. To critics, it suggests that realism is ‘genetically biased against an understanding of European politics’ (Rynning 2011, 25). One reason is the unwillingness to consider domestic level variables, meaning that EU states are no different from any other state either in the contemporary system, or at any point in time when the international system exhibited anarchical characteristics.1 To most observers of EU politics, the sui generis process of European integration is the departure point for studies, not a variable to be excluded for the sake of theoretical parsimony. A second is the focus on power, and the way European states neither collectively project power beyond their borders so as to act as a unitary actor in the international system, nor balance power among themselves as a regional security balance would expect. In reality, refinements to structural realism have a number of answers to the second point, explaining it as bandwagoning behind the US hegemon, as well as seeing the US as the offshore balancer ensuring peace on the continent, to give but two. Rynning rejects structural realism and advocates a return to classical realism, which he asserts offers ‘a sophisticated view of power’s purpose in Europe’ that is ‘steeped in traditions of European diplomacy and statemanship’ (Rynning 2011: 25). While this paper accepts his arguments about the limited utility of structural realism, it goes further to 1 Buzan and Little (2000) show in their analysis of international systems in history that the anarchical nature of the Westphalian system is, historically, a rarity. challenge the way realism has been applied primarily in recent years to questions of collective defence (under NATO) and the CFSP/CSDP (post Lisbon). It is both logical and obvious to use a theory predicated on power to assess the capacity of the EU to shape its external environment through the projection of power. One of the most widely challenged tenets of realism is its conception of power, and whether seeing it as an attribute ignores the considerable insight from sociology on its relational component. There is insufficient space to deal with these issues here (see Guzzini 2009 for an overview). Regardless of whether or not realism is ‘genetically biased against an understanding of European politics’, it has been instrumentally used in EU studies, occasionally as a straw man but more often as an intellectual foil with which to demonstrate theoretical pluralism. Most significant has been the adaptation of its usage, firstly exclusively on the internal process of integration, and later more widely in the more ‘natural’ environment of external relations/foreign policy. Rynning identifies the first realist intervention in the debate on European integration as ‘Stanley Hoffmann’s classical realist assessment of why the European political project was bound to be tied down by sovereign nations’ (Rynning 2011, 28). Hoffmann’s 1966 work became the foundation of the intergovernmental perspective on European integration, and continues to this day to play an important role in challenging the assumptions of neo-­‐functionalism and other theories of the integration process. He coined the phrase the ‘logic of diversity’, meaning that ‘in areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer the certainty, or self-­‐controlled uncertainty, of national self-­‐reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of untested blunder.’ (Hoffmann, 1966: 882). While not a realism himself, Hedley Bull’s (1982) critique of Duchene’s (1972) thesis of Europe as a civilian power was based on the belief that the capacity to act in global affairs must be predicated on military power. ‘Bull’s remedy was to suggest that the EU should become more self-­‐
sufficient in defence and security’ (Manners 2002, 237). Bull’s intervention was significant because it turned the realist lens (i.e. one trained to observe the significance of military power as a prerequisite for being an influential actor in world affairs) to the field of Europe’s external relations. More recently realist-­‐inspired theory focused on EPC and CFSP. While European integration is no longer contested, the likelihood of the EU becoming a coherent foreign policy actor remains discredited by realists. As Alfred Pijpers argued, EU member states were involved in an economic enterprise that did not fundamentally alter their national interests in the field of security and defence, which always has been guaranteed by the US through NATO. In an analysis of the history of EPC, the collective ‘European’ foreign policy that it produced was only possible because no substantive issues relating to the security of the Member States needed to be addressed. The removal of the most salient political questions from the nascent EPC agenda simultaneously made its chances of success greater, while also making it less relevant (Pijpers 1988; Pijpers 1991). Philip Gordon concurs with this, saying that as ‘the 1990s began, European foreign policies were still nationally made, with EPC playing little more than a consultative function.’ (Gordon, 1997: 85) The same shortcomings affect the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), since (echoing Bull) ‘creating a truly effective common European foreign and security policy would mean endowing the EU with the military power to back up its diplomatic and economic initiatives’ (Gordon 1997: 89). The benchmark for effective action is the US, and although comparing ‘the EU’s foreign and security policy to that of the United States is, of course, unfair’, the comparison ‘does serve to highlight just how far the European Union is from possessing the sort of unity, credibility and military power necessary to be an influential actor in global diplomatic and security affairs’ (Gordon 1997: 74-­‐75). While this represents only a snapshot of realist-­‐
inspired literature on EU integration from the 1990s, it serves to illustrate the focus was primarily on the limitations of the CFSP, both in terms of the ineffectiveness of an intergovernmental decision-­‐making process between sovereign states prioritising their national interests, and the aspirant EU’s lack of credibility due to its military power shortfall. In 2002, Robert Kagan published ‘Power and Weakness’, his widely cited thesis that ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less’ (Kagan 2002: 1). The argument is undoubtedly realist in nature, using power as the core analytical component to explain different strategic views of the world and the importance of military force in providing security. Yet it is also peculiar, insofar as Kagan sidesteps the obvious realist Achilles’ heel of its application to European politics – state centricism – by treating ‘Europeans’ and ‘Europe’ as a homogeneous block rather than a group of sovereign states (apart from the occasional reference to Britain, France or Germany). Unlike previous scholars’ focus on the unique and complex mechanisms for pooling sovereignty in Europe, Kagan for the most part treats Europe as a counterpart to the US.2 Specifically, he is concerned about European free-­‐riding on American security guarantees, and the paradoxical way in which Europe perceives itself as having ‘rejected power politics’ while all the time relying on America’s power. Kagan frames this as a realisation of Kant’s perpetual peace, albeit through the externalisation of the coercive means of maintaining order. ‘By providing security from outside, the United States has rendered it unnecessary for Europe’s supranational government to provide it’ (Kagan 2002: 15). In terms of realist contributions it also returns to more familiar realist preoccupations with global power structures and balancing and bandwagoning behaviour. Finally, in recent years, Adrian Hyde-­‐Price has become a leading critic of the tendency in EU scholarship to focus on the liberal, normative nature of the EU (and its ‘power’), favouring a neo-­‐realist analytical framework with which to assess the EU’s position in the world and the evolution of the CFSP. He argues that post Cold War Europe is characterised by a ‘balanced 2 The US-­‐led invasion of Iraq in 2003 both affirmed and rejected Kagan’s assumption in near-­‐
equal measure. The war led to one of the most serious political divisions between European states in recent times, yet it nonetheless substantiated the underlying assumption that Americans were more disposed to making war than Europeans. multipolar’ regional power configuration, with ESDP institutions firmly driven by the interests of the ‘Big Three’ European powers (Hyde-­‐Price 2007: 61). Rynning’s comprehensive survey of the literature includes many more authors, from Raymond Aron to recent interventions by Barry Posen (2006). The purpose of this brief overview is to illustrate that realists focus on two areas of the European Union, the institutionalisation of decision-­‐making structures between sovereign states (intra-­‐EU politics), and the role of the EU in foreign affairs, including its common foreign and security policies. Following Hill and Smith (2005), I wish to argue that one aspect of the EU in international relations has been overlooked, and I in the following section I will argue why the application of neoclassical realism is particularly insightful in this manner. The EU as a Power, a Process and a Sub-­system Christopher Hill and Michael Smith have developed a framework for analysing the European Union in International Relations, arguing that it can be seen in three distinct ways; a power, a process, and a sub-­‐system (Hill & Smith 2005: 7). From the preceding literature review it is clear that realism, or realist-­‐inspired theorising, has informed the analysis of the EU as a sub-­‐system of the international system since Hoffmann’s 1966 article. While some scholars such as Robert Cooper argue that the norms of Westphalia – that power is the ultimate determinant of relations between states – is being eroded in Europe and international law is becoming the primary determinant of relations, realism rearticulates the important of power – especially the power of larger member states over smaller ones. As Hyde-­‐Price notes, while realism has frequently been overlooked in the analysis of the EU as a power in the international system, insofar as it remains on the margins of the discourse or else ‘presented in highly jaundiced terms in order to set up a ‘straw man’ with which to demonstrate the sophistication of other approaches and theories’ (Hyde-­‐Price 2007: 51). How can we understand the EU as ‘part of the wider processes in international relations, a term which refers to the legal, institutional and political mechanisms through which the problems of international conflict and/or political economy are addressed’ (Hill & Smith 2005: 7)? The purpose of the lens of ‘process’ is to gauge the extent to which the EU can operate in the ‘environment’ of international relations, as ‘an international actor’ and as an ‘international interactor’ within the current international arena’ (Hill & Smith 2005: 11). Realism, broadly understood, might be thought of as a strange place to start looking for a theory to identify processes in international relations. Through the highly influential (but contested) presentation by E.H. Carr of realism juxtaposed with liberalism (Carr 2001, Smith 1995, Schmidt 2002, Wilson 1998), one would not expect realism to say very much about processes, other than noting their cyclical nature and timeless qualities, albeit limited to a narrow range of security-­‐related questions derived from the anarchical nature of the system. This is most evident in neorealism, where structural forces dictate to state-­‐units patterns of behaviour (balancing) that maintain a distribution of power across the system sufficiently diffuse to ensure that no one state or group of states can establish hegemonic control. For Kenneth Waltz, the balance of power is the theory of international relations, and change only comes when the nature of the system fundamentally alters, from one of anarchy to one under the control of a hegemonic power (empire). The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition from a bipolar to unipolar system presented structural realism with a number of problems, not least answering the question of when ‘normal service will be resumed’ – i.e. the emergence of a state capable of balancing the US. The principal reason for this was the widely perceived instability of a unipolar system (Wolhforth 1999: 7) Mearshiemer’s articulation of offensive realism (contra Waltz’s defensive realism) identifies China as the most likely challenger to US hegemony, through becoming the Asian regional hegemon (2001). Mearshiemer’s argument is widely contested, by liberals who see the scope in liberal order to accommodate China (Ikenberry 2008), by classical realists who argue that a much more nuanced understanding of power politics is needed (Kirchner 2010), or neoclassical realists (Schweller &Pu 2011). Below I set out the arguments of neoclassical realism – principally using Wohlforth, Schweller and Zakaria – in detail. At the same time, I will present three processes that they identify, and through which we can attempt to apply neoclassical realist thought to the EU. They are (i) the explanation of unipolarity, (ii) the transition of power away from the West, and (iii) Schweller’s argument about increasing entropy in the international system. i. Unipolarity As William Wohlforth has put it, ‘[s]ince 1991 one of the central questions in dispute has been how to explain continued cooperation and the absence of old-­‐
style balance-­‐of-­‐power politics despite major shifts in the distribution of power’ (Wolhforth 1999: 6). The challenge to structural realism presented by unipolarity cannot be underestimated, for on the one hand it questions the central premise of Waltz’s presentation of the theory, namely the balance of power. On the other hand, unipolarity also questions the predictive qualities of structural realism, to the point of refuting its explanatory capacity outright. It neither explains how the world works, nor even explains. In order to overcome these concerns, neoclassical realism does a number of things. Firstly, it has explored alternative strategies to balancing power through matching military capability. Secondly, it has sought to explain why variations in balancing strategies take place, and for what reasons. The consequences of this are serious; as Brian Schmidt has commented, neoclassical realists accept that the structure is does not determine state behaviour, domestic factors (particularly state-­‐
society relations) matter, and elite perceptions and motivations cannot be overlooked (Schmidt 2007: 57-­‐60). In short, neoclassical realism advocates a return to unit-­‐level analysis in order to increase empirical accuracy, and their rejection of structural determinacy casts them outside the neorealist camp. The synthesis of these concerns is the question of why American hegemony brings about the responses from other states that it does; EU unwillingness to balance, Chinese preferences for soft balancing, the accommodating nature of the liberal order. By contrast, Mearshiemer’s offensive realism, considers only the significance of American hegemony in predicting the eventual emergence of China as a rival.3 The closest these authors come to accepting structurally important variables is Schweller’s observation that any challenger to a unipole is a revisionist power, insofar as they seek to alter the fundamental character of the international system from unipolarity to bipolarity. Nevertheless, neoclassical realism would continue to stress the importance of who that country was, and the perceptions of other national elites over the challengers intentions. ii. Decline of the West / Power transition The second major preoccupation with neoclassical realism is understanding the post Cold War world, and by extension mapping the transition to the post-­‐Post Cold War world in which American hegemony is in decline. In Fareed Zakaria’s view, this is ‘one of history’s greatest period of change’, the third significant power shift in the last 500 years, characterised as ‘the rise of the rest’ (Zakaria 2008, 42). Despite the enormity of the US military budget, both in relative and absolute terms, economic indicators tell a story of gradual US decline over the coming decades, to the point expected sometime after 2025, when the Chinese economy overtakes the US to become the largest in the world (measured by PPP). Liberals are keen to point out that this will lead to greater interdependence (consider the volume of transatlantic trade and FDI to see the way the EU and US have grown together), even though there is a high degree of asymmetry in the terms of trade (which is somewhat offset by the moral hazard the Chinese central bank is exposed to through its holding of US securities). Ikenberry argues that ‘the West’ is much more than the US, and using instead the combined size of OECD economies, the tipping point in favour of China is postponed until the middle of the 22nd century.4 Regardless of the ranking of national economies, the fundamental issue is that transition of power is taking place between the West and emerging powers in the Global South, such as India, Brazil and South Africa too, but one might also consider Indonesia and Turkey becoming longer-­‐term regional powers, alongside a reinvigorated Russia. The nature of the power transition is of central concern, and while the existence of nuclear weapons lead some neoclassical realists to reject the likelihood of all out war (Schweller 2010), there is likely to be greater competition between states in shaping the international system according to their own preferences. One of the most significant is over the type of political system best suited to a market economy – while the West prefers liberal democracy, authoritarian systems as seen in China and Russia offer an alternative to the Western model (Duedrey & Ikenberry 2009; Schweller 2010). Zakaria contrasts the decline of the British empire at the turn of the 20th century with the position of the US today – viewing the British 3 The parallel with Ruggie 1992 is entirely intentional, since he was concerned with the unique properties of American hegemony on the creation of multilateral institutions, much as neoclassical realists are interested in the unique properties of America as the unipole. 4 Additionally, assumptions about the sustainability of aggregate growth rates so far into the future makes speculation all the more difficult. case as a politically astute management of economic decline. The US faces the opposite challenge – its economy is fundamentally resilient but its political system must adapt. ‘The test for the United States is political – and it rests not just with the United States at large but with Washington in particular’ (Zakaria 2008: 42). In summarising the general position of neoclassical realism, Schmidt labels them ‘influence maximisers’, in contrast to structural realism’s dictate of ‘security maximisation’ or classical realists ‘power maximisation’. iii. Entropy and the international system Rynning’s preference for classical realism over neoclassical realism stemmed from his dissatisfaction the latter’s retention of a strongly positivist epistemology and commitment to predictive theorising. To this end, he suggests ‘neo-­‐structuralism’ as a better name for their collective enterprise.5 These are certainly justified criticisms, and I do not wish to engage here in a discussion on the decision between explaining and understanding (Smith & Hollis 1990). Instead, I want to briefly summarise a recent article by Schweller in which he posits a theory of entropy in the international system, which while borrowing heavily from natural science to explain the process of moving from a highly ordered state to one of lower order and greater equilibrium.6 Rather than concentrate on the applicability of natural science models to the social world, I choose to highlight some of the implications that Schweller draws from the analogy to illuminate processes in the international system. The first is the process of decreasing polarity over time, ‘from many poles to two poles to one pole’ (Schweller 2010: 151). As mentioned above, a central question to all realist scholarship is what next? While a number of new powers are emerging, do they constitute the formation of a multipolar order? Is the rise of China the logical step, to begin a balancing process again? Or will the revisionist nature of any new pole make a shift away from unipolarity too costly for the challenger? If one accepts Schweller’s position that nuclear weapons rule out the likelihood of war between major powers, while ‘a spontaneously generated equilibrium develops not from balancing behaviour but from uneven rates of growth among egotistic actors seeking wealth, not power’ (Schweller 2010: 153). Rising standards of 5 Schweller, in recent work, as mentioned above, refers to the ‘social purpose’ of a ‘given unipolear system’ (Schweller 2010: 147), while more general preoccupation with elite perception also brings into focus the role of collective/shared narratives of the world. While these do not constitute an ontological shift from the individual to the social, it is notable that Rynning overlooks this, preferring to concentrate on the efforts to bridge classical realism with constructivism. We should bear in mind that the combination of positivist epistemology and social ontology is found in Wendt’s Social Theory of International Relations, Schweller’s colleague at Ohio State University. 6 Specifically, the nature of order is interpreted through the amount of exact information required to map/describe that order. Schweller uses the example of two bottles of coloured gas, one yellow and the other blue, which when mixed over time become a uniform green (Schweller 2010: 149). The level of information required to map the initial stage is higher, since each molecule must be in its given bottle (yellow or blue), while in the latter stage the random distribution means no specific information is required. A second element of entropy is the role of energy in creating physical systems, and the extent to which there can be a return to an earlier stage. living and the gradual equalisation of wealth away from current levels of inequality is the trajectory for the future, hand-­‐in-­‐hand with a greater likelihood of peaceful relations between states. In this respect, following his use of entropy as a mechanism for understanding the international system, energy and information become defused, and the progressive direction of the international system is towards ever-­‐more peaceful relations between powers. European Union as a process in international relations It is the central claim of this paper that if one wishes to apply realist theorising to the European Union, an overlooked and potentially insightful method to do this is to relate neoclassical realism’s work on change in the international system with Hill and Smith’s description of the EU as a process in international relations. The preceding discussion has articulated the two parts of the argument, now all that remains to do is assess the degree to which they fit together. I reiterate again that the scope of this paper is modest, insofar as epistemological issues regarding the predictive nature of neoclassical realism must be left to one side. I would like to make four brief remarks outlines the degree of compatibility, specifically about centricity, unipolarity, Western decline, and entropy. As noted above, one of the most fundamental points of disagreement between realism and theories of European integration is the unit of analysis. Realism explains the behaviour of sovereign states in an anarchical system, and in its application to the EU it is either required to downplay the degree of legal institutionalisation at the European level, or treat the EU as a proto-­‐state (a la Kagan). All of the neoclassical realists discussed here assume states as the primary unit of analysis, but all are happy to accept that unit-­‐level specificity determines behaviour. EU states can be ‘special’, indeed, this is an issue of fundamental importance, as is the highly institutionalised network of cooperation between them, is significant. Additionally, the perception of elites regarding the intentions of other European states cannot be ignored for the sake of parsimonious theorising. Neoclassical realism begins to resemble quite closely liberal integovernmentalism to the extent that it incorporates their unique characteristics, not assuming them away. What is the relationship between the European Union and unipolarity? Neoclassical realism is preoccupied with the conditions under which unipolarity exists. As Schweller says, ‘the social structure (or social purpose) of a given unipolar system, not its material structure, determines the kind of politics that take places within the system’ (Schweller 2010: 147). Today’s unipolar order is based on a series of strategic decisions taken by the US in the decade after WWII, with regard to creating a liberal economic order and establishing a number of collective security and collective defence structures – the UNSC, NATO, and bilateral treaties in Asia. European peace is widely accepted as being a product of both NATO and the EU, and as such the European Union as process is partly responsible for giving the current unipolar system the specific social purpose that it has. This can be explained by theories of bandwagoning, soft balancing, or other strategic behaviour by the member states – it is beyond the scope of this paper to weigh up the pros and cons of each argument. What remains crucial is the contention that understanding what the EU is, the nature of its relations with the US (over time, and as political, economic, social and security ties) helps to explain systemic unipolarity. The third point – the decline of the West – is directly related to the former. The very same bonds that describe the unique nature of the current unipolar system also tie the EU to the argument of the ‘rise of the rest’ (Zakaria 2008: 42). Over recent years there has been a growing interest in the decline of EU influence over global institutions – such as the Gowan and Brantner’s Audit of EU Power in the UN (2008, 2009, 2011). Between 2008 and 2010 they charted a decline in EU influence in the face of a ‘axis of sovereignty’, illustrating a ground swell of opinion among UN members against the EU’s human rights agenda. While the declining trend has been halted in 2011, the EU remains more frequently in the minority than majority in key votes, recording a ‘voting coincidence’ of 44%. In short, many scholars paint a picture of increased multipolarity in the international system, where the new poles are sovereign states that cherish their Westphalian sovereign right to non-­‐intervention and are sceptical to some, or all, of the political agenda of the Western liberal democratic capitalist system, with its tendency towards cosmopolitanism. Significantly, the ‘degree of fit’ between the European Union as a sui generis actor with a post-­‐Westphalian (Cooper 2000) political character and a foreign policy geared towards the milieu goals (Smith 2003) of promoting international law, human rights, free trade, etc. and the world of multipolarity seems to be decreasing. Coupled to this, the sovereign debt crises within the eurozone and the prolonged recession have led even some enthusiastic supporters of Europe to question the long-­‐term viability of the Union.7 Such existential questions about the future of Europe resonate with American preoccupation with its declining position in the world. To what extent does the focus on shifting global structures central to neoclassical realism also speak to Europe? Zakaria’s concern over gridlock in Washington in 2008 is echoed in Brussels with the prolonged inability and unwillingness of member states to agree a comprehensive solution to the eurocrisis. This remains a tentative suggestion – considerably more work would need to be done to fully substantiate this claim. Fourthly and finally, let us turn to consider the systemic trend towards increased entropy as hypothesised by Schweller. Assuming that one accepts its basic proposition, it still requires a degree of abstraction to conceive of changing entropy as a ‘process’ in the manner Hill and Smith use it. To them, processes are 7 See for example, Timothy Garton Ash ‘Hollande
and Merkel can't save the eurozone by old
methods alone’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/09/hollande-­‐merkel-­‐
eurozone-­‐maastricht (accessed 15 June 2012). concrete insofar as they are tools used by states to manage international relations, rather than a characteristic of the system.8 There are two basic mechanisms for entropic change – technology and egotistic pursuit of wealth over power. Nuclear weapons established the balance of terror across Europe during the Cold War, and to this end, as Kagan notes, they remain vital to Europe’s Kantian peace project. The flipside of Kagan’s analysis of Europe the money it has saved on defence by free-­‐riding under America’s nuclear umbrella has been used to construct more elaborate social welfare systems that those available to Americans. This forms another important attribute of the European project – social solidarity between members – with the end of closing wealth inequality by spurring growth through investment and direct transfers. European social perspectives are also characterised by reference to ‘solidarity’ – the belief in a European social model encompassing social legislation, social welfare and social infrastructural investment. Although most authors agree that there is no one ‘European social model’ there is a strong argument that high levels of spending, broad social programmes and considerable employment protection are found across Europe. (Manners 2006: 23) Europe, therefore, resembles closely Schweller’s conception of how the world is developing, in terms of increasing entropy. The key issue is whether European Union member states are ‘egotistic’ as Schweller’s definition demands. If one is prepared to accept that egotism as ‘self-­‐interest’ is compatible with ‘enlightened self-­‐interest’, then there the final part of the argument fits into place. Why are rich European states prepared to be net-­‐contributors to the European project and fund the growth of net-­‐recipients? This question obviously rehearses the neo-­‐neo debate about the motivation of states to accept relative gains over absolute ones. In short, greater long-­‐term security, and greater long-­‐term economic gains through establishing wealthier trading partners are the answers provided by neoliberal institutionalism. While structural realism (following Grieco) emphasises the importance of absolute gains, neoclassical realism’s inclusion of elite perception and unit-­‐level characteristics into their analysis potentially disposes them to relativist arguments. Provided this is so, we come to the rather surprising conclusion – namely the type of world foreseen by Schweller is a European one, and more specifically the European Union. As such, the EU is at the vanguard of the process in international relations of increasing systemic entropy. Conclusion The purpose of this paper has been to explore the application of realist IR scholarship to the study of the European Union. More specifically, it did made two modest claims. The first is that realism has overlooked the EU’s involvement in the processes of international relations (as defined by Hill and Smith 2005). In many respects this is not unexpected, given the focus on continuity rather than 8 Having made this point, Cooper’s argument about the changing nature of Westphalia inside the European Union is equivalent to the entropy argument on the grounds that both address systemic attributes. change in the international system. The second claim was that in seeking to address this shortcoming, neoclassical realism was chosen a relevant and useful variation of realist cannon. To this end, its attempts to explain unipolarity, the transition of power from West to ‘rest’, make it an applicable to the EU. Finally, Schweller’s concept of entropy was considered, and it was argued that European Union resembles closely the type of international future he sees emerging. 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