Re-Constituting NATO
…
Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Joint Session
Workshop “Theorizing NATO”
14 – 19 April 2009, Lisbon/Portugal
Gabi Schlag
Goethe-University of Frankfurt am Main
[email protected]
Under construction – comments are most welcome!
Introduction
The concept of security – practically and theoretically – has tremendously shaped our thinking
about the main forces and pattern of international relations. While military defence has been the
predominant “political challenge” during the heydays of the cold war, human security and energy
security describe the most recent moves within the field of security. It seems that the references
of security have widely changed. However, the key grammatical structure of security, i.e. the
protection of a threatened referent object by extraordinary means, is remaining unchallenged.
Security institutions, most obviously a military alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), are closely connected to these changing references of security. While
NATO’s double goal during the cold war was to civilize relations between its members and
protect each member against a (likely military) attack of its main enemy, the Soviet Union, the
alliance is nowadays engaged in global peace-keeping missions1, part of a worldwide war on
terror, and entangled with cyberspace and energy security.
1
The presence of NATO troops focuses on the Balkan, Afghanistan and a training mission in the Iraq.
1
The unexpected survival of the transatlantic alliance after the dissolution of the Eastern block is
commonly described as a “key puzzle” for IR. Debates between realists forecasting the
dissolution of the alliance and liberals as well as social constructivists relying on the durability of
institutions have dominantly shaped research on the transatlantic alliance in the 1990s. However,
the exclusive focus on “causes” and “explanations” based on a methodology of testifying preestablished hypotheses has narrowed our understanding of the alliance’s security dynamics to
mono-causal explanations, either notions of a balance of power and threat or a security
community with durable shared norms and values. Unable to describe and understand the
contradictory trends of NATO’s reconstitution, common approaches such as realism,
institutionalism and social constructivism are exclusively fixed on large-scale transformations,
external forces, and law-like explanations. How actors are constituted in the first place and
change is made possible are rather marginalized research topics.
While most scholars would prefer to speak of the alliance’s transformation from collective
defence and nuclear deterrence to global conflict management and rapid reaction forces, I will
address the questions of NATO’s re-constitution in this paper. By re-constitution I understand
those practices which enable to speak of the alliance as a collective and capable actor authorized
to act for someone, even a larger entity such as “the West”. This question is often framed in
terms of “NATO’s identity”. I prefer the term re-constitution because it underlines the
procedural and contingent dimension of identity formations. Then, identity is not something an
actor (persons, groups or organizations) inhabit but a set of re-productive practices and
structures of signification which are able to change.
The paper will proceed with a short overlook concerning key theoretical approaches which
address the formation and trans-formation of NATO. A central dividing line within recent
research on the Atlantic alliance can be drawn between those approaches which mainly rely on a
positivist set of causal explanation and those which are interested in a rather constitutive
understanding of NATO. The later is a quite diverse field of research addressing questions of
identity and power, language, practices and processes.
The second part of the paper deals with securitization theory and how its conceptual repertoire
may be helpful to understand the re-constitution of the transatlantic alliance more systematically.
I have selected three “cases” – détente, NATO’s out-of-area debate and energy security – in
order to empirically map the field. Last but not least, I will sketch out some questions and
avenues for further research in the conclusion.
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Why NATO is Still Alive – Theoretical Approaches
Since its foundation after the Second World War, the question of NATO’s existence has strongly
formed the evolution of IR as a (scientific) discipline. While neorealists focused on NATO’s
ability to counterbalance and deter an “Eastern threat” (Walt 1990), varieties of institutionalism
were interested in understanding the institutional design and evolution of the alliance
(Haftendorn/Keohane/Wallander 1999). However, NATO seems to losing its centrality within
the discipline as an object of theoretical reflection. Although the alliance has been a central object
of political contestation, current conceptual debates on power, legitimacy and order are
increasingly addressing alternative institutions and organizations, mainly the European Union
(EU).
In the heydays of NATO research most scholars discussed the question whether the transatlantic
alliance would survive or collapse after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Mostly liberals argued
that the Atlantic alliance was certain to carry on through institutional adaption (Ikenberry 2001:
193-194, Keohane 1992: 25, Wallander/Keohane 1999: 34), while realists believed that NATO’s
time would be over sooner or later (Walt 1990: vii; Waltz 1990: 210; Mearsheimer 1990: 75-76).
Hardly anyone would doubt, that an organization called NATO is still alive, even expanding its
geographical and political scope. But is it still the Atlantic alliance founded in 1949? While recent
research on NATO has mainly explained the durability of institutions, fewer scholars are
interested in the question of the re-constitution of the alliance. The former camp includes
institutionalists and most social constructivist; the latter group is more diverse including strands
of poststructuralism and critical security theory.
Institutionalist and constructivist explanations of NATO’s survival
Offending the neorealist prediction of NATO’s demise, Celeste Wallander argues that
“[i]nstitutions persist because they are costly to create and less costly to maintain” (Wallander
2000: 705). She emphasizes that institutions may have the ability to change their goals in order to
persist. These changes are dependent on the assets of an institution, i.e. its rules, norms and
procedures. Institutions composed of general assets may better comply with changing
circumstances than institutions with very specific and specialized rules, norms and procedures
(Wallander 2000: 706). Although Wallander’s rationalist (and positivist) framework helps to
explain why institutions persist or vanish according to transaction cost calculations, it says little
about how the alliance is constituted as an actor, how these processes elapse and relate to
3
practices of re-production on a micro-level. How are we able to speak of NATO as an institution,
even as a collective (security) actor?
The question of NATO’s collective identity is closely linked to a conceptualization of the
Alliance as a security community. While realists argued that NATO was founded as a military
alliance counterbalancing the USSR, Deutsch (et al.) emphasizes the peaceful change of nation
state relations according to the formation of a community in the transatlantic area. The absence
of force as a legitimate instrument and the institutionalization of political relations founded a
community of mutual trust and common interests. Most prominently, Adler and Barnett (1998)
have furthered the security community framework in order to explain the absence of war
between states, i.e. security cooperation and peaceful change. Recently, Emanuel Adler has
renewed the community approach by including practices as an explanation of the expansion of
security communities (Adler 2008). Here, Adler suggests that peaceful change is based on
individual expectations and dispositions which are institutionalized in practices. In order to
explain the spread of institutions, he argues that practices “make possible actor’s socialization and
persuasion and ultimately their rational calculation” (Adler 2008: 196). Adler considers that the
institutionalization of self-restraint accounts for the “social construction of rationality” and
“normative evolution” (Adler 2008: 197). NATO’s transformation after 1990 is then explainable
by the successful expansion of cooperative security practices once used within the alliance
context (Adler 2008: 208). However, Adler’s rhetorical connection of constitutive practices and
the explanatory mechanisms causing the substance of social structure, i.e. communities, is
confusing. He mostly takes social structures and communities as taken while emphasizing the
transformative power of practices. The link between the conceptual dense description of his
practice approach and the issue of NATO’s transformation remains a bit too artificial.
The foundation of NATO as a value community – an interpretation Adler supports – poses one
of the most prominent depictions of the alliance. Thomas Risse argues that not the Soviet threat
created the Alliance in the first place but the shared liberal, mostly democratic norms and values
of the founding states. Thus, “cooperation among democracies” describes the core rationale of
NATO’s existence rejecting the neo-realistic argument about the dominance of military power
and threat perception (Risse 1997). Although the value community thesis may sound convincing,
Helene Sjursen has criticized that it is problematic to conceptualize NATO as a community of
liberal democracies for two reasons: First, NATO as an institution lacks a democratic mandate
causing tensions between the so-called democratic foundation and the day-to-day practices of the
Alliance. Second, without a cosmopolitan law NATO cannot convincingly refer to foundational
4
principles of justification (Sjursen 2004: 688). Sjursen concludes that NATO can be perceived as
an organization governed by multilateralism or bilateralism; but describing the Atlantic Alliance
as a community of democracies is mistaken. The cooperation of democracies does not lead
inevitably to a community based on liberal values.
Social constructivism (and its main opponents) proclaimed to explain change in a more
sophisticated manner by focussing on the constructiveness of world politics. Adler and Risse
argue (or their arguments imply) that the durable collective identity of the Atlantic alliance has
enabled its continuity based on shared norms and values. Even NATO’s geographical
enlargement is explained with the impact of norms. For example, Alexandra Gheciu analyses the
mechanisms of how NATO teaches liberal democratic norms of security in Eastern Europe.
Thus, the social power of the Alliance forced Eastern candidate states to change their concepts of
interests and identity in order to comply with NATO’s interpretations (Gheciu 2005).
Beyond paradigmatic lines: NATO in the focus of poststructuralism and critical security studies
Most social constructivist work on the Atlantic alliance has been criticized for their compliance
bias, their reified concept of collective identities and their naïve (uncritical) reliance on “NATO
talk”2. Bially Mattern argues that the security community framework advocated by Adler and
Barnett shies away from making a clear statement on the epistemological relation between
security and identity (Bially Mattern 2000: 301). Lingering between constitutive and causal
explanations Adler and Barnett (as well as Risse) are unable to clarify how security and identity
relate to each other. While Adler and Barnett seem to privilege causality, Bially Mattern shows
that a causal understanding of identity would disconnect it from the material world and establish
identity and (material) power as competing explanations (Bially Mattern 2000: 302). Instead, she
argues that identity implies representational force (a specific language game) in order to trap a
would-be dissident within the community (Bially Mattern 2000: 305). Then, non-compliance with
the established identity would be a risky and dangerous endeavor. Within a security community
power politics are not absent but exercised through threats of identity “erasure” (Bially Mattern
2000: 306; 2001).3 The question I’m addressing in this paper – the re-constitution of NATO –
follows the pathway of Bially Mattern’s argument and the work of others, especially Williams,
e.g. NATO as a “community of democracies”, “value community” …
Further, theoretically innovative work on NATO includes Franke (objective hermeneutics), Fierke (language
games), Neumann/Williams (self/other), Villumsen (Bourdieu and practices), Behnke (security discourse), Klein
(representations).
2
3
5
Neumman, Jackson and Klein. With a quite similar intention, Neumann and Williams have
showed how identity constructions of the transatlantic alliance are constitutively linked to
representations of Russia (Neumann/Williams 2000). [add more]
Analyzing the power of language, representations and discourses poses a quite large research filed
concerning the Atlantic alliance. Andreas Behnke argues that NATO survived the end of the
Cold War because of its strong interconnection with the representation of the “the West”
(Behnke 2007). Adressing NATO’s expansion, he shows how the alliance exercised power and
violence over the candidate states by framing itself as the superior master of the process and
setting up the applicants as “dupes”. While Behnke relies on Carl Schmitt’s concept of a
“Grossraum” and the distinction of enemy/friend as the source of the political, Neumann has
articulated convincingly his doubts whether a territorial thinker such as Schmitt is helpful to
understand recent trends of NATO’s transformation in an increasingly globalizing world
(Neumann 2008: 263).
[add Fierke, Villumsen, Klein, Jackson]
This short overview concerning post-paradigmatic research on NATO nicely shows that the field
of transatlantic studies is very rich. The power of language, its performative quality functions as a
key conceptual reference point in order to understand the Atlantic alliance and its politics. In the
next chapter, I will discuss securitization theory as one strand of this linguistic turn. Securitization
theory shares the post-paradigmatic tone with the work done by the authors mentioned so far. Its
strong emphasis on the performative quality of language makes securitization theory an ideal
candidate for understanding NATO’s re-constitution. One could presume that institutional
changes are triggered by processes of securitization/desecuritization, by changing patterns of
security associated with the transatlantic alliance.
Securitization Theory and the Atlantic Alliance
Securitization theory has mainly addressed European and transatlantic security issues by analyzing
the the EC and EU (Wæver 1998). Wæver argues that the “Western European non-war
community” was achieved through a process of de-securitization as “a progressive
marginalization of mutual security concerns in favour of other issues” (Wæver 1998: 69), e.g.
economic integration. However, security dynamics are not absent within a non-war community
but less important and mostly non-military. The “fear of fragmentation” (Wæver 1998: 89) and
6
disintegration has replaced traditional power politics within Europe and triggered a common
European security identity after 1992.
From this perspective, NATO partly poses a “non-war community” where relations between the
member states are largely pacified but relations between the alliance and other actors are more
ambivalent, even martial. The insecure situation after the Second World War and the perception
of a growing Soviet threat was a main source of the foundation of a Western military alliance in
order to provide mutual security. The cooperation within NATO produced a phase of security
between the West and the East, interrupted by incidents of insecurity (e.g. Korea war, Suez crisis,
the invasion of the Soviet army in Afghanistan). Simultaneously, it induced a process of desecuritization between the member states as well as occasionally towards the Soviet Union during
détente. However, security dynamics never were completely absent, even not between the NATO
members. When the Turkish-Greece struggles over Cyprus escalated in 1974, the U.S. congress
imposed an embargo on a NATO member, i.e. Turkey.4 Since the 1990s, especially since 9/11,
there has been a parallel process of securitization, mostly expressed by and through NATO’s
“out-of-area debate” and the engagement of the alliance in combating terror. The military
engagement of the alliance in the Balkan, especially the Kosovo air campaign in 1999, and the
ongoing war in Afghanistan pose the most obvious examples of this trend. These patterns of
securitization and de-securitization are accompanied by sectorial transformations. While military
security has been the key task of NATO during the cold war, the alliance has tremendously
enlarged its security concept, including the protection of human rights, cyberspace and energy
infrastructure.
This short description of NATO’s development in the last 60 years leads to the question how
Securitization theory may be an excellent “candidate” to understand the re-constitution of the
alliance. In the next section, I will discuss three modes of addressing security issues –
securitization, de-securitization and silencing –, their ordering effects as well as the sectoral
approach to security, advocated by Buzan, de Wilde and Wæver.
A Brief Introduction to Securitization Theory
Processes: Securitization, De-securitization and Silencing
President Johnson already warned Turkey not to invade Greece in 1964 and suggested that this would provoke an
Article 5 mission in defence of Greece (Kaplan 2004: 71).
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7
In the last fifteen years, securitization theory has triggered a tremendous body of research
literature addressing the empirical, conceptual and normative implications of understanding
“security as a speech act”. Whether one addresses the war on terror (Stritzel), migration
(Huysmans), gender, violence and self/other relations (Hansen), the power position of NATO
and its changing identity (Villumsen, Bially Mattern, Neumann/Williams) or conceptual (Taureck)
and normative issues (Aradau) the Copenhagen School has immensely influenced IR, at least in
Europe. Although some scholars aim to take securitization theory beyond the word (for images,
see Williams, Hansen; for practices, see Villumsen, Büger), I will focus more narrowly on the
conceptual and normative discussion of securitization and de-securitization. I will also introduce
a third concept – silencing – as a specific form of the impossibility to address security in a
specific institutional context, leading to a “downgrading” of existing institutions and a “transfer”
of security issues from one institution to another.
Securitization5
When the “linguistic turn” (Rorty 1969) had finally arrived at IR’s disciplinary edge attention
turned on processes of signification and the constitution of meaning by language in use (for an
introduction in the field of IR see Fierke 2003, 2002). Especially the concept of security has
aroused special attention (Baldwin 1997; Wolfers 1952; Walt 1990; Krause/Williams 1996;
Kolodziej 1992; Lipschutz 1995). The conceptual work of the Copenhagen School departed from
the rather narrow focus of a ‘wide’-vs.-‘narrow’ definition of security by advocating an explicitly
constructivist/linguistic perspective.6 In this view security is neither an objective fact (like
rationalist approaches assume) nor just a subjective perception (like soft-constructivism and
cognitive approaches suggest). Instead, they claim that security rests on an intersubjective
understanding (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998: 29-31). Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argue that
security is essentially a speech act7 – a performative act – with a specific grammar
(Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998: 23-26; Wæver 1995: 55). As a performative act, security is a selfThis chapter on securitization is copied from “Securitizing the West – The Transformation of Western Order”, coauthored by Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann and me. This paper outlines a research project funded by
the Cluster of Excellence “The Formation of Normative Orders” at the Goethe-University Frankfurt
a.M./Germany.
A
version
of
this
paper
is
available
at
http://web.unifrankfurt.de/fb3/hellmann/projekt/Draft_Final_West_DVPW_BISA_08.pdf
6 Wæver himself has emphasized that the Copenhagen School provides a “conceptual apparatus” rather than a
"theory" (Wæver 2003: 21). For critical appreciations of the securitization approach see McSweeny 1996, 1998, 1999
(for a reply see Buzan/Wæver 1997), Williams 1998, 2003; Huysmans 1998a, b; Balzaque 2005; Hansen 2000, 2005;
Behnke 2000; Eriksson 1999; CASE 2006.
7 Buzan et al. refer to Austin’s and Searle’s speech act theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969). Opposing a representational
understanding of language, language is understood as a relational, differential and rule based system where meaning
(the signified) is constituted by the specific use of signifiers.
5
8
referential practice with a specific rhetorical structure: Security is about the survival of a
threatened referent object articulated by a securitizing actor. Because the survival of the referent object
is considered a just cause securitization justifies the use of extraordinary measures, including the use
of force, to protect it. To be successful, this move of securitization has to be accepted as
legitimate and appropriate by an audience. As an ordering mechanism, securitization entails far
reaching political and ethical consequences because „[s]ecurity is the move that takes politics
beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics
or as above politics“ (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998: 23). While politicization presents an issue as a
matter of choice, ie. normal politics, securitization frames an issue as urgent and existential calling for
extraordinary measures which reduce the possibility of choice to an either-or level, ie. whether we
act or not. Especially Wæver has stressed the “anti-democratic implications” of securitization
(Wæver 2003: 12; Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998) because it represents a failure of handling
challenges politically, ie. within the normal procedure of (democratic and deliberate) politics.
De-securitization
The concept of de-securitization has gained increasing academic attention in recent years. Being
advocated as the normatively preferable mode of handling security issues by Ole Wæver, the
meaning of the concept remains rather diffuse. What is de-securitization, what are the
performative effects of de-securitization? And, how does it relate to securitization?
In his 1995 article entitled “Securitization and Desecurtization”, Wæver describes desecuritization as an effort “to keep issues off the security agenda, or even to de-securitize issues
that have become securitized” (Wæver 1995: 58). De-securitization is mostly implicit in his
discussion on securitization and introduced as an empirical phenomenon one can observe.
Hence, Wæver describes détente as “negotiated de-securitization” (Wæver 1995: 60) limiting the
use of security speech acts. The radical changes of 1989/1990 in the Soviet Union were made
possible “via a sudden de-securitization through a speech act failure” (Wæver 1995: 60). The
collapse of the USSR was mainly caused by a loss in legitimacy within the elites and a decreasing
acceptance of common patterns of securitization.
So far, Wæver leaves us with a first impression that de-securitization refers to an attempt to keep
issues off the security agenda, or – if issues have been already securitized – as an endeavor to
limit and dismiss security speech acts. Thereby, de-securitization is associated with processes of
institutionalization and legitimation changing taken for granted security practices and patterns.
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In the introduction of the 1998 book on security, the authors underline the normative
implications of de-securitization:
“Security should not be thought of too easily as always a good thing. It is
better, as Wæver argues, to aim for de-securitization: the shifting of
issues out of the emergency mode and into the normal bargaining
process of the political sphere” (Buzan, de Wilde, Wæver 1998: 4).
This statement describes de-securitization as a normative valuable act presupposing that issues
have already been (successfully) securitized. De-securitization aims to dissolve the state of
emergency associated with securitization in order to return to a more open mode of problem
solving. Buzan, de Wilde and Wæver explicate their understanding of politics as public and
deliberative opposed to a Schmittean legacy of friend/enemy as the foundation of politics (e.g.
Herborth, Huysmans, xx). They argue that securitization (and de-securitization) is a choice one
makes, not a necessity. The book goes on to present a variety of empirical examples of desecuritization, e.g. changing relations between the USA and the USSR, changing relations
between South Africa and its neighbors after the end of apartheid.
Close to Wæver’s understanding, Michael Williams emphasizes that de-securitization is “a moving
of issues off the ‘security’ agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and
‘normal’ political dispute and accommodation” (Williams 2003: 523). Rather a process than a
move, successful de-securitization can be judged by public contestation. The outcome of desecuritization is asecurity, i.e. a pattern where problems are handled within the normal, slow and
democratic decision making process without using the language of security (threat, exception,
extraordinary measures). However, like Wæver and his colleagues, Williams remains rather
unspecific how de-securitization elapses, whether it is performed as a speech act at all.
Recent academic debates on securitization theory have focused more explicitly on the concept of
de-securitization. Claudia Aradau argues that a specification of what de-securitization means has
to be political rather than analytical (Aradau 2004). Aradau criticizes that Securitization Theory
lacks a clear understanding of politics and politicization (Aradau 2004: 389). Choosing between
securitization and de-securitization is “a choice about the politics we want” (Aradau 2004: 390),
either a Schmittian politics of exception, enemy and decisionism or deliberate and democratic
politics. The formulation of securitization as a move towards a state of exception is measured
against the background of the normalcy of democratic procedures as Aradau explicates (Aradau
2004: 392). While democratic institutions are slowing down the decision making process enabling
contestation and participation securitization moves attempt to fasten a decision. Thereby,
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democratic control exercised by publics or courts is suspended. Elaborated from this perspective,
de-securitization becomes a political choice to restore democracy in order to return to normal
deliberative politics. Aradau continues to show how the concept of emancipation, mostly
advocated by Critical Security Studies (Welsh School), and de-securitization share the goal of
establishing alternatives to predominant, state-centered constructions of security (Aradau 2004:
397). Although Critical Security Studies has aimed to speak for the poor and tortured, it mostly
relied on counter-securitization rather than de-securitization (Aradau 2004: 399). The side effect
of securing one group has been the insecurity of “other others”. Therefore, unmaking security,
i.e. de-securitization, requires “a process of re-thinking the relation between subjects of security,
and of imagining localized, less exclusionary and violent forms of interaction” (Aradau 2004:
400). By linking emancipation to democratic politics, Aradau moves on to reformulate desecuritization as “the possibility of contestation and the openness of the locus of power”, the
need to “democratize institutional loci”, and to activate a “different logic based on universal
address and recognition” (Aradau 2004: 401). In practical terms, this means to “dis-identify”
dangerous others and reframe them as part of a universal principle, e.g. “migrants are not
migrants but workers with equal rights”.8 Araudau’s answer to the question “what politics do we
want” is the liberal-constitutional claim of equal rights for all citizens (Aradau 2004: 404). Those
who are not part of this political community have to be addressed or even included by
challenging the authoritative practices of the state (Aradau 2004: 405). Aradau concludes, that
“[i]f securitization orders social relations according to the logic of
political realism and institutionalizes an exceptionalism of speed,
extraordinary measures and friend/enemy, de-securitization is a
normative project which reclaims a notion of democratic politics where
the struggle for emancipation is possible” (Aradau 2004: 406).
Aradau’s endeavor to re-think de-securitization as a normative project linked to emancipation is
quite impressive. However, there is no contradiction to use her argumentation as an analytical
guideline as well. If de-securitization aims at reclaiming democratic politics, we can observe
political moves of slowing down decision making processes, of political contestation and of disidentifying the other (and the self). As Rita Taureck has clarified, securitization and desecuritization are political choices political actors make which analysts seek to uncover (Taureck
2006: 58).
8
Aradau primarily refers to the philosophical work of Étienne Balibar and Jacques Rancière.
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Jef Huysmans discusses these normative implications of studying security and addresses the
relation between the researcher and the object of research. He argues that security studies “tend
to re-iterate and reinforce securitization because they presuppose the interpreter to use a security
lens for reading political and social situations” (Huysmans 2006: 126). This reflexivity-problem
leads Huysmans to “re-locate the question of migration (i.e. as a securitized issue, GS) to a
context of ethico-political judgment in which one does not seek to found the political on the
basis of existential insecurity (Huysmans 2006: 127). Huysmans shares the normative, ethical goal
with Aradau but focuses more on the question of how analysts can produce security knowledge
without the negative consequences of exceptionalism. Then, one should not study historical
processes of de-securitization but engage with “the politics of the production of security
knowledge” (Huysmans 2006: 127; italics in the original).
Huysmans continues to situate securitization within Schmitt’s understanding of the political
based on the distinction between friend/enemy. Political acts differ from other decisions because
they are based on the recognition of an enemy. According to the superiority of the political,
plurality of opinion can be limited to defend the community against the enemy. Paradoxically, an
enemy has the capacity to unite a functionally differentiated society. Huysmans shows two
different meanings of de-securitization. On the one hand, de-securitization shifts a securitized
issue from one sector (the political based on the distinction between friend/enemy) to another
functional sector, e.g. addressing migration as an issue of labor market performance (Huysmans
2006: 129). On the other hand, de-securitization can aim at “dissolving relations of enmity as the
foundation of political community” (Huysmans 2006: 130). Then, de-securitization describes a
political strategy to challenge the Schmittian foundation of a political community without simply
removing issues from the security agenda.
The discussion of de-securitization leaves us with three possible interpretations: primarily, desecuritization is considered as an act/attempt of moving issues off the security agenda in order to
handle them otherwise or “normally” understood as politically (Williams, Aradau, Huysmans).
Then, unmaking security presupposing already securitized issues and a state of exception. Desecuritization understood as a failure of securitization is a rather marginalized understanding in the
recent debate. A breakdown of a securitization move would primarily depend on the refusal of
the audience to accept it as a justified and legitimate act. Then, the decision making process and
the struggle for public support would be the focus point to trace “negative” acts of desecuritization as a form of dismissal. Addressing the political realism of securitization, Huysmans
(and Aradau) addresses a third interpretation of de-securitization as the reformulation of the founding
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sources of a community. Then, a community is not based on friend/enemy distinctions but rather on
practices of dis-identifying the self/other which may lead to a more inclusive, deliberate order.
I will use de-securitization as a twofold concept addressing a sector specific and a constitutional
logic: On the one hand, de-securitization can mean to move an issue off the security agenda in
order to handle it otherwise, either in economic, social, or cultural terms.9 On the other hand, desecuritization may use the grammar of inclusion, deliberation and recognition in order to dissolve
the foundation of a community based on friend/enemy distinctions. This process would trigger
tremendous institutional changes replacing practices of exclusion and exception by inclusionary,
deliberative rules and reframing the threatening other and self as subjects with shared values and
interests10.
In the next chapter, I will refer to silencing as one form of securitization failure, i.e. the impossibility to
address an issue in either security or political terms. From my perspective, the failure of a
securitization move cannot be fully addressed as an attempt of de-securitization because the later
one presupposes a securitized issue.
Silencing
The issue of silencing has been mainly addressed by Lene Hansen (2000). While the Copenhagen
School delivers a constructivist understanding of security, it fails to acknowledge the importance
of voice and body for speaking security successfully and thereby disregards the “silent subject”.
Hansen argues that “’[s]ecurity as silence’ occurs when insecurity cannot be voiced, when raising
something as a security problem is impossible or might even aggregate the threat being faced”
(Hansen 2000: 287). Acts of silencing are mostly apparent if one studies gender related violence
where security is subsumed to the gendered identity of the individual subject. However, acts of
silencing are not limited to gender and body. The reasons for the inability to address a threat may
be personally or institutionally. During the Cold War, the Atlantic Alliance was unable to name
human rights abuses and civil war as threat to the West because doing so would have aggregated
a much bigger danger, namely the USSR. Only the Helsinki process broke this silence and
initiated a limited negotiation – and I will argue later de-securitization – of human and social
rights beyond the grammar of security.
It’s important to mention that this sectoral logic is not identical with the sectoral approach to security.
However, this brings us back to the underlying topic of Aradau’s contribution, the tension between universalism
and particularism. I will not address this problem any further here because the aim of the paper is to clarify the
concept of de-securitization for analytical purposes.
9
10
13
I’m aware that this re-framing of “silencing” sets the concept apart from its critical intention and
relocates it as a normatively neutral process we can observe. The impossibility to address security
within a specific context could trigger a “downgrading” of an existing institution, e.g. silencing
European security within the OSCE after 1990, and a “transfer” of an an issue to another
institution, e.g. addressing European security within NATO and the EU.
Security Sectors
The ordering effects of speaking security also resonate within the sectoral approach of the
Copenhagen School. Security sectors are „types of interaction“ (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998:
27) which differ according to their (dominant) referent objects of security. While the military and
political sector traditionally refer to the securitization of the state and its sovereignty, societal
security refers to threats in identity terms. The referent objects in the economic and ecological
sector remain rather unspecified. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde emphasize that sectors have no
ontological status but are analytical devices (Buzan/Waever/de Wilde 1998:168). Although they
stress that the boundaries and referent objects of the sectors are contingent the survival of the
state and its sovereignty has traditionally been at the core of securitization. The concept of
security sectors has been commonly applied to the study of European migration, the question of
societal security and identity politics (Wæver et al. 1993).
While most research has focused on political, military or societal security the issue of economic
security remains rather underspecified. On the one hand Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde have
argued that securitization in the economic sector is least successful regarding the competitive
nature of market relations where it is difficult to separate attempts to securitize economic issues
from the more general political disputes (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998: 99, 165). On the other
hand they stress the security implications of economic security in other sectors triggering
intersectoral dynamics of securitization and de-securitization. However, recent bailout plans in
the USA pose a clear attempt of securitizing the national economy (and companies) where the
state is re-instituted as the ruling authority.
The sectoral approach refocuses our perspective to the contingency of referent objects. Desecuritization and securitization are relative and sector specific processes constituting different
subjects and objects. Although security as a speech act has always the same (rhetorical) form, its
content might be quite diverse.
14
Outcomes: Security, Insecurity and A-Security
Securitization, de-securitization and silencing are productive of different orders, i.e. a state of
security, a-security or insecurity. While security as a state of exception seems to be the easiest case
to observe, a-security could be the outcome of de-securitizing and silencing as well. However,
failed securitization – whether dependent on de-securitizing moves or (non-) acts of silencing –
may primarily be constitutive for an insecure order as a system where actors are unable to
articulate defence measures.
Security refers to an order where moves of securitization have successfully addressed a threat and
extraordinary measures were implemented in order to protect an endangered referent object. This
order legitimizes a state of emergency, delimiting plurality and deliberative rule. The institutional
consequences of security can be ground-breaking, e.g. the exposure of international law in
Guantanamo Bay.
A securitization move without calling for or implementing measures of defense can be called
insecurity. Either the move has failed in the first place (i.e. it was not accepted by the audience) or
it never caused any serious consequences of protecting the threatened referent object.11 This
order produces a significant state of insecurity, the perception of a threat without a response.
Such a situation will most likely be very instable, tending towards a new attempt of securitization
or initiating a process of de-securitization and/or silencing.
A-security poses an order where threats have mainly disappeared and normal decision making
procedures are followed. Constitutional, political and practical barriers for securitization are high,
democratic institutions are strong enough to resists moves of securitization. However, such an
order is not immune against re-securitization in the face of a new threat. European integration
has triggered such an order based on a-security in Europe.
The unfolding of the ordering effects of security associated with NATO could be described in
this way: When NATO members recognized that the USSR had deployed new SS20 missiles they
were left in a situation of perceived insecurity. German chancellor Helmut Schmidt was one of
the key securitizing actors who forced a collective decision of the alliance in order to deter this
threat (Haftendorn 1986). Therefore, NATO’s double track decision reestablished the security of
the alliance members, especially Germany. Under the new leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev
negotiations of force reduction and disarmament initiated a phase of de-securitization leading to a
partly order of a-security between Russia and NATO in the early 1990s. The basis for détente
11
For a long time, the human rights violations in Dafur have been an example of such an order of insecurity.
15
was already laid out in the Harmel report in 1967 and the SALT negotiations in the 1970s but
only fully developed after the leadership had changed in the Soviet Union. Formal relations
between the former enemies were continuously institutionalized in the context of NATO
downgrading the CSCE/OSCE. The NATO-Russia Council provided an institutionalized basis
for further negotiations on a new European security architecture. Beside an intensified
cooperation with Russia, some NATO members also pushed for a stronger, more visible role of
the EU and tried to transfer security issues to this institutional context. However, the complex
and partly unsettled relation between the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and
NATO has not triggered a reliable institutional arrangement yet. The so called Berlin-Plus
agreements and the recent return of France into the military structure of the alliance seem to be
the beginning of a more lasting interconnection of both organizations. Nevertheless, the OSCE,
once the core institution for negotiating European security, has been continuously “downgraded”
by NATO (and to a lesser extent by the EU).
The following chapter will link the conceptual framework of securitization theory closer to the
question of NATO’s reconstitution. By re-constitution I understand those practices which enable
to speak of the alliance as a collective and capable actor authorized to act for someone, even a
larger entity such as “the West”.
Re-Constituting NATO
In this paper, NATO has appeared as “something out-there” scholars, politicians and opponents
have to deal with. But the key question is how we are able of speaking of “NATO” in the first
place. What – analytically understood – “is” the transatlantic alliance?
From the perspective of securitization theory, NATO can play very different roles: as a securitizing
actor, the North Atlantic Council framed the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as an existential threat
directed against all its members and invoked Article 5 for the first time in the history of the
alliance. As a referent object of securitization, the political and military structures of NATO were
perceived as an important transatlantic asset which should “survive” the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact in the 1990s, as well as the unilateral action of Britain and France during the Suez
crisis in the 1960s. As a perceived threat, the military capabilities and the growing political
ambition of the alliance were part of the problem concerning NATO’s Eastern enlargement from
the perspective of Russia or NATO’s double track decision as argued by European peace
movements. Last but not least, the transatlantic alliance itself represented an institutionalized
16
extraordinary measure after the Second World War in order to provide European security, i.e. “to
keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down”.
“Defending the West”: Practices of Securitization, De-Securitization and Silencing
At first sight, the question how NATO relates to de-securitization may be contra-intuitive. Many
scholars would suspect that NATO as a security alliance is hardly engaged in moving issues off
the security agenda because security and defence is its constitutive language game.12 The sectoral
approach of the Copenhagen School – political, military, economic, environmental and societal
security – helps to understand the “excessive” and “widening” nature of security. If security is
not exclusive linked to military threats, then nearly everything can become an issue of security.
That’s the reason why security speech acts may not vanish completely but just travel to another
sector. Hence, military relations between NATO member states have been mostly de-securitized
while economic tensions between EU-Europe and the USA (e.g. struggles over protectionism
and tariffs) or Western states and Russia (e.g. disputes over energy) are still present or actually
increasing. The success of institutions, such as the EU, OSCE and the Partnership for Peace,
bind potential rivals and constrain moves of securitization but they do not eliminate their
possibility (Buzan, de Wilde, Wæver 1998: 65). However, the “hard-won desecuritization
achievements of liberalism” (Buzan, de Wilde, Wæver 1998: 210) – and I would say not only
liberalism but institutionalization – have their costs13. The de-securitization of economic relations
between North America and Western Europe during the Cold War facilitated the U.S.-American
hegemony and penetrated the economic and security interests of states in the periphery. Thereby,
“[l]iberal states were able to delegitimize the non-military security claims of other actors, in the
process subordinating them to the ‘normal’ politics of the market economy and pluralistic
politics” (Buzan, de Wilde, Wæver 1998: 210). Consequently, the success of the liberal project
gave rise to the demand of a wider security agenda.
In order to illustrate how securitization theory provides us with a conceptual repertoire to
understand the re-constitution of NATO, I have selected three “cases”14. First, arms control
negotiations between the USA and the USSR in the 1970s nicely show how de-securitization
developed as a process beside the transatlantic alliance and triggered the foundation of a new
On YouTube, NATO describes its job as “crisis management and peacekeeping”. See
http://www.youtube.com/user/NATOiOTAN
13 The author’s refer to the success of the nation state to civilize relations of the people and the de-securitization of
economics towards the ideology of capitalism.
14 not George/Bennett
12
17
institution, the CSCE. Second, the out-of-area debate in the 1990s and the self-legitimation of the
alliance as a defender of human rights show how the concept of European and transatlantic
security was enlarged and provided NATO with a powerful “new mission” downplaying
alternative institutions such as the UN and the OSCE. Third, the issue of energy security
illuminates how the widening of security within the alliance is going on and, thereby, dissolving
former de-securitized relations between NATO members and Russia.15 This selection of cases
should provide a first empirical mapping of areas where research questions generated by
securitization theory could be applied.
The Harmel Report, SALT Negotiations and the Foundation of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in
Europe
In 1967, the Harmel report initiated a period mutual cooperation concerning issues of military
security between NATO member states and their Eastern counterparts. This document describes
two main tasks of the alliance: providing military security and conducting a policy of dètente as
complementary. The Strategic Arms Limitation treaty, signed by the USA and the USSR in 1971,
limited the number of strategic ballistic missiles and initiated a phase of de-securitized military
relations between the East and the West. By the end of the 1970s, Americans and Soviets
assigned to an additional limitation of nuclear weapons. These bilateral negations were
accompanied by an international conference on security and cooperation in Europe, including the
USA and the USSR. The institutionalization of non-military relations within the CSCE enabled
negations about social and economic issues. East-West relations were shifted to either bilateral
negations (SALT) or non-military issues between Europe, the USA and the USSR (CSCE). While
the SALT negotiations moved armament and nuclear planning partly off the security agenda and
into an area of technical and bureaucratic control, the Helsinki process aimed at creating a new
forum (or community) where the USA and the USSR could talk about social and economic issues
without addressing their predominant military confrontation. The CSCE changed the constitutive
basis for East-West relations by including the block powers into a new institutional arrangement
as equal partners. Hence, the Helsinki Final Act expresses the commitment to promote better
The text-selection the following analysis is based on includes 1) the anniversary communiqués of the NAC, 2)
topic relevant documents dealing with SALT, CSCE, energy security and the justification of interventions, and 3) the
key strategic concepts of the alliance, including the Harmel report and the strategic concepts of 1992 and 1999. This
project tries to make use of a specific reconstructive methodology, named Objektive Hermeneutik (e.g. Oevermann
xx). So far, the impressionistic citation of documents does not ensure the rigorness the methodological guidelines are
requiring. However, the cases only aim to show how research questions generated with the help of securitization
theory are able to improve our understanding of NATO.
15
18
relations between the signature states solving the problems that separate the societies and states
“in the interest of mankind”16.
During this period of de-securitizing East-West relations, NATO played a relatively marginal
role. One could argue that the military alliance was mainly perceived as part of the problem
instead of a solution and limited in its authority to negotiate arms control issues. The alliance was
not a sovereign entity allowed to speak for the community and “downgraded” to an arrangement
where the SALT-negotiations were merely commented. Hence, both issues – arms limitations
and East-West cooperation – were regularly discussed at NATO meetings. All NAC document in
the 1970s explicitly express a support for the negotiations between the USA and USSR.
Especially the preparation for a conference on security and co-operation in Europe was appraised
as an initiative to ‘de-securitize’ East-West relations:
“Ministers considered that a Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe should not serve to perpetuate the post- war division of Europe
but rather should contribute to reconciliation and co-operation between
the participating states by initiating a process of reducing the barriers that still
exist.”17 (italics added)
Accordingly, the Council expressed its “long-standing belief that a mutual and balanced reduction
of forces in Central Europe which preserves the legitimate security interests of all concerned
would maintain security and enhance stability in Europe” (ebd.). They thanked the U.S.
government for close alliance consultations during the SALT negotiations. However, this explicit
reference also showed that NATO’s endeavors to achieve sufficient defence capabilities were
framed as complementary to the ongoing talks on arms reduction between the superpowers.
They argued “that sufficient and credible defence is a necessary corollary to realistic negotiations
on security and co-operation in Europe.” (ebd.).
In contrast to the cited paragraph above, the NAC communiqué accuses the USSR of rearmament.
“They (the ministers of the NATO member states, GS) noted the growth
of Soviet military efforts in recent years and the indications that the Soviet
Union continues to strengthen both its strategic nuclear and
conventional forces, especially naval forces. They therefore agreed on the
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf
North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 9th-10th December, 1971, Brussels. The North Atlantic Council met
in Ministerial Session. The Foreign and Defence Ministers were present.
16
17
19
need for continued and systematic improvement of NATO's conventional forces
and for the maintenance of adequate and modern tactical and strategic
nuclear forces in order to ensure that the deterrent remains effective at
all levels, and in order to avoid weakening the basis of NATO's search for
detente.” (ebd.; italics added)
The improvement of sufficient collective defence is framed as the precondition for effective
negotiations, partly legitimized by the rearmament efforts of the USSR. The NAC reassured the
member states that the founding principles of the alliance were still valid and a possible period of
détente between the USA and the Soviet Union would not destroy the Atlantic alliance. The
NAC reaffirmed NATO’s common language game of effective mutual defence and solidarity as
the precondition for negotiations reassuring that its existence still was necessary. Accordingly, the
bilateral negotiations between the U.S. government and Soviet leaders downplayed the alliance
and excluded NATO from the talks. The transatlantic alliance was silenced in so far as it was
perceived as a military burden constraining the scope of possible results. This enabled a
“transfer” of security issues towards bilateral negotiations and an alternative form of
institutionalization, i.e. the CSCE.
According to the sectoral approach of the Copenhagen School, the developments in the 1970s
illuminate a modification in military security. The CSCE process stressed non-military issues
between the East and West, human and social rights, cooperation in science and technology for
example. Security was set free from its narrow military meaning. Main securitizing and desecuritizing actors were rather the states than the alliance. Negotiations between the USA and the
USSR, Western Germany’s ‘Neue Ostpolitik’, the establishment of the CSCE initiated a process
of de-securitization while NATO still tried to perpetuate its central language game of mutual
defence and solidarity. Thereby, the NAC tried to reassure the existence of the alliance although
it was rather downgraded to a mere information forum.
Out-of-Area or Out-of-Business – Identity Threats to the Western Civilization
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact NATO was entrapped in a situation of confusion. What
would be the assets of an military alliance if its main enemy was lost? The emerging “out-of-area
or out-of-business” debate framed this question in rather existentialistic terms. In an important
speech in 1993, NATO’s General Secretary Manfred Wörner made clear that the Atlantic alliance
would be a key institution to challenge new security tasks.
20
“To provide stability in a world that has become more unstable you need
NATO. To prevent, manage and resolve major crises and conflicts in the
wider Europe you need NATO. To prevent Europe from sliding back
into renationalisation and fragmentation you need NATO. To keep
transatlantic relations working smoothly and effectively you need
NATO. To face the new kinds of risks emerging from proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, from mass migration and from extremism
you need NATO.”18
The reiteration of the “need for NATO” also expressed the fundamental crisis of the alliance.
Wörner articulated his confidence that the transatlantic alliance is the “only organization that
possesses the right package of political-military tools for effective crisis management”. As the
statement shows the spectrum of alliance tasks is widened, but also becoming more diffuse. What
does it practically mean to face new risks such as mass migration and extremism in the
institutional context of NATO? What is it that has to be defended?
At its tenth anniversary in 1959, the NAC explicated the main goal of the transatlantic alliance:
“The Alliance was established to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and
civilization of its peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual
liberty and the rule of law, and in response to a common fear that
without an effective security system, another war might erupt in a
divided Europe.”19 (italics added)
Safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilization of Western societies is established as
the main referent object of the alliance. Hence, the alliance is constituted as the defender of a
“Western civilization” and its democratic and liberal values. The Atlantic alliance is invented as a
value community defending the West. Thirty-five years later, Wörner uses this value rhetoric to
legitimize the existence and probably (political and geographical) enlargement of NATO.
The protection of its civilizational heritage combined with the debate on a “new NATO with
new missions” has entrapped the alliance to intervene in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. The
climax of these developments were NATO’s military air strikes against Serbia in 1999. Without
an explicit UN mandate, the alliance justified its intervention with references to the protection of
values which were bluntly violated in the Kosovo:
A New NATO for a New Era, speech by the Secretary General of NATO Manfred Wörner at the Press Club
Washington D.C., 6 October 1993.
19 10th-11th January 1969, Washington, North Atlantic Council
18
21
"The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for
which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and
the rule of law. It is the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic
cleansing and violence pursued by the Belgrade regime under the direction of
President Milosevic. We will not allow this campaign of terror to succeed. NATO
is determined to prevail.“20
The articulated embarrassment about President Milosevic’s “campaign of terror” is perceived as a
fundamental challenge to Western values. Civilization (in the singular) must be defended against
the barbarism of ethnic cleaning and violence. Here, NATO performs a clear claim of authority
and rule by using the rhetoric of securitization.
The further establishment of the civilizational language game within NATO becomes obvious
when we reconsider its role in the U.S. American “war on terror”. After the terror attacks on
September 11, the defence ministers and representatives of NATO met informally two weeks
later in Brussels. In a press conference, NATO’s General Secretary Lord Robertson stated:
“These barbaric acts are an intolerable assault on humanity and the values we all
share. They are an affront to everything this Alliance stands for and they are a direct
threat to international peace and security. That is why the Council in
Permanent Session decided on 12 September that, if it was determined
that the attack was directed from abroad, it should be regarded as being
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in other words that this
attack on the United States was an attack upon all the Allies.”21
The invocation of Article 5 was officially proclaimed and called upon the U.S. government that
further actions should be conducted in consultation with other NATO members. Already the
first sentence introduces the distinction between barbarism and civilization where humanity must
be defended. The terror attacks were described as a “direct threat to international peace and
security”. This phrase represented the event as a problem the international community - and not
only the NATO members – had to face.
In their meeting on December 6th, the foreign ministers of the NATO members reaffirmed the
activation of collective defense and issued a special statement on terrorism:
Statement on Kosovo, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999
21 Opening Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on
26 September 2001. Surprisingly, there is no official document dated on September 12th available on the NATO
homepage.
20
22
“Terrorism threatens the lives of our citizens, and their human rights and civil
liberties. It also poses a threat to the development and functioning of
democratic institutions, the territorial integrity of states, and peaceful
relations between them, and to international peace and security. There is
no justification whatsoever for terrorist actions. We categorically reject
and resolutely condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We,
the 19 NATO Allies, are determined to combat this scourge. Our security requires
no less.”22
Terrorism is represented as a threat “to the lives of our citizens, and their human rights and civil
liberties” and democracy, territorial integrity and peace in a broader sense. This articulates a
securitization move by naming threats to a referent object which is supposed to have the right of
survival. While Lord Robertson framed the terror attacks as a “direct threat to international peace
and security” in September 2001, the NATO council established a more civilizational
interpretation by referring to “our citizens” and democracy.
Accordingly, the declaration affirms that the “US-led military operations against the terrorists” is
supported “individually and collectively” by the alliance members. These extraordinary measures
include the deployment of NATO’s surveillance aircraft and naval forces. Further institutional
consequences are mentioned, e.g. the improvement of military capabilities and a reconsideration
of NATO’s strategic concepts.
The main securitizing actor in this case is the NAC. Calling for collective action of the NATO,
the NAC self-authorizes the alliance on the expense of the UN. Thereby, the transatlantic alliance
is re-constituted as a capable, collective actor and re-affirmed as a powerful institution able to
speak and act for a larger entity, namely the “civilized”.
Russia, NATO, the EU and the Quest for Energy Security
Energy security has become a prominent topic in recent years. The latest conflict between
Russia/Gazprom, Ukraine and the EU mark a new climax in this regard. However, the
availability of energy resources has been a key issue for quite some time. The oil crisis in 1973
and 1979 made relations between Western states and the oil-producing countries of the OPEC
more complex. Already in 1969, NATO member states initiated talks on energy security and
M-NAC- 2(2001)159 - 6 December 2001, NATO's Response to Terrorism - Statement issued at the Ministerial
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 6 December 2001
22
23
alternative resources and established a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS)
within the alliance structures. The NAC “welcomed the start on co-operation in the development
of supplemental energy sources through the use of solar and geothermal energy”23. The aim of
CCMS was to address non-military issues of security, providing pilot studies and expertise on
environmental, social and health matters. The question of energy was mainly framed within the
broader movement of environmental security focusing on alternative resources.
Energy security has explicitly risen on NATO’s agenda since the mid 1990s. The Strategic
concept of 1999 outlines the broad security approach of the alliance and states that the “Alliance
security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism,
sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources”24 (italics added). Also
Operation Active Endeavor is presented as such an instrument to maintain “security for key
resource routes in the Mediterranean”25. In 2006, the Atlantic alliance organized a forum on
energy security in Prague as a get together of representatives of the alliance, states, science and
industry. The background of escalating disputes between the Ukraine and Gazprom had quickly
moved energy on the European security agenda. The final communiqué of NATO’s Riga summit
in 2006 declares:
“We support a coordinated, international effort to assess risks to energy
infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure security. With this in mind,
we direct the Council in Permanent Session to consult on the most
immediate risks in the field of energy security, in order to define those areas
where NATO may add value to safeguard the security interests of the Allies and,
upon request, assist national and international efforts.”26 (italics added).
The focus lies primarily on energy’s infrastructure, the security of transportation routes and
supply lines. The specification of NATO’s role – its “added value” to safeguard the security
interests of the Allies – was clarified by a report two years later. The final declaration of the
Bucharest summit in 2008 states:
“We have noted a report “NATO’s Role in Energy Security”, prepared
in response to the tasking of the Riga Summit. Allies have identified
principles which will govern NATO’s approach in this field, and outlined
23
North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 10th-11th December, 1973, Brussels.
24
NATO homepage, http://www.nato.int/issues/energy_security/index.html (date: 22/01/2009).
Riga Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006
25
26
24
options and recommendations for further activities. Based on these
principles, NATO will engage in the following fields: information and intelligence
fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional
cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of
critical energy infrastructure. The Alliance will continue to consult on the
most immediate risks in the field of energy security.”27 (italics added)
Enhanced cooperation and the protection of energy infrastructure are presented as the key
challenges for the alliance. While NATO publicly proclaimed a growing responsibility for energy
security, differences between the USA and EU member states remain. The European
Commission approaches the sustainability of energy resources primarily in economic terms, e.g.
published a proposal to building a European energy market where Russia is included. The recent
conflict between Gazprom, Ukraine and the EU in 2008/09 has tempted EU’s Commission
President Barroso to state that the EU cannot trust Russia or the Ukraine. He considered using
legal action against both states if the flow of gas would be interrupted again28. The continuous
widening of the meaning of security has enabled a strong re-affirmation of the Atlantic alliance as
a key actor in Europe. However, the institutional consequences of this attempts to securitize
energy resources are fairly unpredictable.
The securitization of energy has been advocated by different actors. The coalition of political
representatives, social movements and the industry is rather loose but able to stabilize a new
pattern of security. Here, the self-description of NATO’s operation in the Mediterranean Sea as a
mission protecting supply routes is demanding.
While military security between East and West has moved off the security agenda, the quest for
energy, also rooted in the 1970s, has increasingly moved on the security agenda of NATO and
the EU. However, whether energy will be securitized or handled as an economic issue advocating
free markets remains an open question. But this topic nicely illustrates how the alliance is
reinventing and enlarging its task and missions and therefore relies on the widening of the
meaning of security. NATO is authorized to secure Western economies, even its way of living.
Thus, calling upon the alliance functions as a rhetorical structure of self-authorization whereby
NATO is continuously re-invented, re-constituted as an indispensible actor defending “Western
civilization”.
Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008
28 Philippa Runner, EU cannot trust Russia or Ukraine, Barroso says, EUobserver, 20 January 2009.
27
25
Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to show how the conceptual repertoire of securitization theory helps to
understand security dynamics associated with the transatlantic alliance. NATO’s reconstitution is
mainly enabled by a continuous self-authorization of the alliance as the defender of the Western
civilization, either in terms of values or economics. The ability to re-invent the tasks and goals of
NATO is based on successful securitization moves accompanied by silencing alternative
institutions, especially the OSCE and the UN. However, the period of détente also illustrates how
the transatlantic alliance was downgraded and thereby a process of de-securitization between the
two superpowers was enabled.
If NATO’s survival is enabled by the continuous self-authorization of the alliance, then a
transatlantic order is limited in its normative scope. The constitutive reliance on securitization
and a state of emergency disqualifies the alliance as a promoter of de-securitization. Then,
alternative institutions, mainly the OSCE and the EU, could represent better contexts in order to
civilize inter-national relations.
Further research could focus more systematically on how structures of signification (“NATO’s
self-authorization”) are established by key alliance documents, namely the strategic concepts.
Accordingly, the continuity of NATO rises the question how a truly alternative order based on asecurity rather than security could be realized. What kind of institutional arrangements would
“secure” a politicization of transatlantic, even international affairs?
[03/04/2009]
26
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