What makes whistle-blowers effective? Three field studies
Marcia P Miceli; Janet P Near
Human Relations; Apr 2002; 55, 4; ABI/INFORM Global
pg. 455
Human Relations
[0018-7267(200204)55:4]
Volume 55(4): 455-479: 022463
Copyright © 2002
The Tavistock Institute ®
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
What makes whistle-blowers effective?
Three field studies
Marcia P. Miceli and Janet P. Near
ABSTRACT
Organization members face difficult choices when they encountelsituations which they consider illegitimate, Immoral, or unlawful, but
lack corrective power. They can 'blow the whistle' to authorities, but
often, their organizations do not change the objectionable practice.
Circumstances under which whistle-blowers succeed in terminating
perceived wrongdoing have not been studied, so this study tests
portions of a preliminary model of effectiveness derived from power
theories. Results from three field studies show that whistle-blowers
perceive that wrongdoing is more likely to be terminated when: (i)
it occurs less frequently, is relatively minor in impact, or has been
occurring for a shorter period; and (ii) whistle-blowers have greater
power - reflected in the legitimacy of their roles and the support of
others. Implications for research and for would-be whistle-blowers,
their organizations, and policy makers, are discussed.
KEYWORDS
human resources. organizational behavior. organizational
wrongdoing. regression analysis. studies. whistle-blowing
Organizational wrongdoing can have serious consequences for stakeholders; for example, unsafe products jeopardize the health of customers,
and unsafe production practices jeopardize employees' well-being. When
organizational leaders are held accountable for wrongdoing, these stakeholders may benefit, but financial and other costs to the organization can be
huge, reaching into billions of US dollars (Miethe, 1998). Whistle-blowing
455
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I Human Relations SS(4)
offers an alternative, as exemplified in the largest price-fixing case in US
history, against Archer Daniels Midland (ADM; Whitacre & Henkoff,
1995). Top executives at ADM lost their jobs, received jail terms, and paid
large fines; substantial adverse publicity was generated. Had they listened to
the whistle-blower and taken corrective action earlier, such negative consequences could have been avoided. Thus, a single whistle-blower may affect
the fortunes even of large companies. The ADM case is but one of thousands reported by the media recently, and many more are never made public
(Brewer, 1995).
As noted by researchers (e.g. King, 1997; Miethe & Rothschild, 1994),
the most widely used academic definition of whistle-blowing identifies it as
'the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal,
immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to
persons or organizations that may be able to effect action' (Near & Miceli,
1985: 4, see also Miceli & Near, 1997). Literature reviews (e.g. Miethe &
Rothschild, 1994; Near & Miceli, 1987) have shown that there are two
relatively well-developed streams of whistle-blowing research, identifying
conditions under which: (i) observers of perceived wrongdoing are likely to
report it, and (ii) retaliation occurs. Additional studies have appeared
recently (e.g. Ellis & Arieli, 1999).
In contrast, there is little research on the effectiveness of whistleblowing, defined as 'the extent to which the questionable or wrongful practice (or omission) is terminated at least partly because of whistle-blowing and
within a reasonable time frame' (Near & Miceli, 1995: 681), or how it is perceived. We know of only two empirical studies (Near & Jensen, 1983; Perry,
1992) of conditions under which whistle-blowing is effective. Unfortunately,
both studies relied on small, non-random samples of specialized populations
- namely, readers of women's magazines who believed they experienced sex
discrimination in the workplace and federal employees who blew the whistle
and subsequently agreed to be surveyed. However, their findings provided a
starting point for our research, as discussed later.
Thus, there is virtually no empirical research and little theory concerning the conditions associated with whistle-blowing effectiveness. Several
propositions of a preliminary model (Near & Miceli, 1995) are tested here.
Because the data were collected before that model was developed, our study
should be considered exploratory. Our purpose is to identify conditions
under which whistle-blowers believe wrongdoing was terminated, using data
from three separate surveys.
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Miceli & Near
What makes whistle-blowers effective%
457
Hypotheses
Nearly all whistle-blowers first report perceived wrongdoing to parties within
their organizations (Miceli & Near, 1992; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999).
When valid, such reports provide the opportunity for wrongdoing to be corrected and organizational functioning to be improved. Yet whistle-blowing
within the organization often is not welcomed: e.g. a classic study of the Bay
Area Rapid Transit System in San Francisco found tortured relationships
among whistle-blowing engineers, government officials, the media, and the
public, as engineers sought to finish the project safely but expeditiously
(Perrucci et a!., 1980). Additional qualitative research (Glazer & Glazer,
1989) has portrayed the difficult experiences whistle-blowers endured. In
short, whistle-blowing represents a questioning of, or a challenge to, the
authority structure of the organization; when this occurs, the foundation of
the entire organization structure may be eroded (Weinstein, 1979).
Reports to external parties may be even more threatening, because such
reports may result in adverse publicity or legal intervention (Miceli et a!.,
1991). Deviance theories (Miethe, 1998; Miethe & Rothschild, 1994;
Rothschild & Miethe, 1999) argue that a rational choice perspective would
compel whistle-blowers to initially choose internal channels over riskier
external channels. Also, 'differential association theory would argue that the
norms of loyalty held by management in an organizational climate that is
generally antagonistic toward exposing misconduct would increase the likelihood of silence, or, at most, it would increase the incidence of internal
whistle-blowing' and 'most whistle-blowers go public with their information
only after companies begin to cover up the wrongdoing and intensify their
level of retaliation against the whistle-blower' (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999:
115). Thus, we need to study both internal and external whistle-blowing.
The relationships among the whistle-blower and other parties (e.g. top
management, the recipient of the complaint, the perpetrator of the wrongdoing) are critical to understanding how whistle-blowing plays out. Two
important elements are the perceived wrongdoing and the organization,
including its culture, structure, and history as an institution. Although power
relationships among social actors may be equal or 'symmetric', they often are
asymmetric, as well as dynamic (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Thus, any investigation of effectiveness must consider the potential power imbalance and
instability among these actors and elements in the process. Indeed, theories
of power - namely resource dependence theory, minority influence theory,
and social power theory - are the basis for the only published model of effectiveness (Ncar & Miceli, 1995).
Resource dependence theory proposes that when one party controls
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Human Relations 55(4)
resources on which another depends, the first is relatively powerful (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). Where whistle-blowers or persons to whom they report
wrongdoing possess unique skills, secrets, or other resources the organization
needs and cannot easily replace, the organization is relatively more dependent on them, and may be more responsive (Near & Miceli, 1985). Similarly,
the organization's dependence on the wrongdoer or the wrongdoing will
reduce the relative power of the whistle-blower to persuade the organization
to stop the wrongdoing. When the organization's vital interests are threatened, it will respond with rigidity (Staw et aI., 1981). The greater the threat
the whistle-blower presents, the more the organization will resist change
(Perry, 1993); therefore, whistle-blowers will be more effective at stopping
wrongdoing when organizations depend less on wrongdoing or more on
whistle-blowers.
A second perspective, minority influence theory (e.g. Moscovici, 1976)
proposes that individuals who espouse a 'minority' view within a group - i.e.
not the view expressed by a majority of members - can influence the group's
decision and the process by which it is reached. Group members resist challenges to the status quo, but they also evaluate the reasons why an individual
deviates; the more credible, confident, competent and objective the whistleblower appears to be, the greater the potential influence on the group
(Moscovici, 1976). Similarly, change theory suggests that organization
members resist change when they don't trust the change agent (Kotter &
Schlesinger, 1979), and a lack of credibility undermines trust. Thus, credible
whistle-blowers are more likely to persuade powerful others to terminate the
wrongdoing.
A third perspective on power, the classic taxonomy of five bases of
social power (French & Raven, 1959) is useful. For example, lower status or
less legitimate defendants are less likely to win court suits against organizations (Black, 1989). Taken together, the three power perspectives suggest
four hypotheses.
Position power
Whistle-blowers whose jobs formally require them to report the type of
wrongdoing observed may be more powerful and effective, because they are
ostensibly acting within their authority (Near & Miceli, 1995). From a
minority influence perspective (Moscovici, 1976), they are behaving consistently and with more credibility than persons not expected to observe and
report wrongdoing. From a social power perspective (French & Raven,
1959), they draw on bases of legitimate or expert power that whistle-blowers
in other roles lack. Thus;
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Miceli & Near
What makes whistle-blowers effective%
459
Hypothesis 1: Whistle-blowing will be more effective when it is roleprescribed.
Whistle-blowers who experience retaliation may be perceived to have
little power and be less effective. The only known study of this hypothesis
showed no relationship between effectiveness and retaliation (Near & Jensen,
1983), but it was limited, as noted earlier. Alternatively, those who were
ineffective may be viewed as expendable persons, against whom others can
freely retaliate, because they were ineffective (i.e. ineffectiveness causes retaliation) or retaliation and effectiveness could be related through a third variable, e.g. when a whistle-blower's case is perceived to lack legal merit. One
study showed perceived retaliation was higher where the case was reportedly
less meritorious (Pannerlee et al., 1982), but it did not measure effectiveness.
Thus, the predicted association between effectiveness and retaliation
could occur through at least three mechanisms (retaliation causes ineffectiveness, ineffectiveness causes retaliation, or a third variable causes both). It
is also possible that no relationship exists, as some organization leaders may
disapprove of whistle-blowing, even while implementing changes in questionable practices brought to light. We cannot assess causality because the
data are not longitudinal, but we do assess degree of correlation, as a first
step.
Hypothesis 2: Whistle-blowing will be more effective when whistleblowers experience lower levels of retaliation.
Organizational dependence on the wrongdoing
One study showed that if the whistle-blower's claims required great change,
the issue was less likely to be resolved (Perry, 1992). The rational choice
model of deviance (Miethe, 1998; Miethe & Rothschild, 1994; Rothschild
& Miethe, 1999) implies that observers who report less significant wrongdoing internally may find a receptive audience and face less retaliation.
Rothschild and Miethe (1999: 127) found that lower resistance may also
enable organizations to 'self-correct', suggesting greater effectiveness 'when
the misconduct that the whistle-blower has disclosed involves an isolated
bad apple.' However, retaliation and effectiveness are not polar opposites
(Near & Jensen, 1983); organizations may halt the wrongdoing but still
retaliate against the whistle-blower - or ignore the whistle-blower and maintain their wrongdoing (Miceli & Near, 1992). Similarly, top management
may believe it is powerless to terminate wrongdoing on which the organization's survival depends; organizations that persist in serious wrongdoing
probably depend on it (Baucus & Near, 1991). And, wrongdoing that
involves large amounts of money or occurs frequently evokes higher 'moral
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I Human Relations 55(4)
intensity' or concern with moral issues (jones, 1991), which may heighten
resistance to change.
An opposing force may be present where wrongdoing is reported
outside the organization. Outsiders tend to dismiss niggling complaints, but
they listen more attentively when the wrongdoing is serious. Evidence shows
federal courts and state equal employment opportunity agencies are more
likely to decide in favor of the complainant when sexual harassment is more
severe, which may then lead to termination of the wrongdoing (Terpstra &
Baker, 1988, 1992). These findings suggest that outsiders support the whistleblower when the wrongdoing is more consequential. Since the leaders of the
organization must agree before wrongdoing is stopped, these two countervailing forces make prediction difficult for external whistle-blowers and we
focus on internal whistle-blowers.
HYIJothesis 3: When whistle-blowers do not use channels external to
the organization, they are more effective when the wrongdoing is of
lesser magnitude.
The complaint recipient's power
A powerful and supportive complaint reCIpIent lends credibility to the
whistle-blower, implying that rational whistle-blowers select recipients who
are both powerful and supportive and consequently are more effective.
However, an influence target who is powerful enough to stop wrongdoing is
also likely powerful enough to harm the influence agent, so some whistleblowers may select less powerful complaint recipients in order to reduce retaliation risk, thereby reducing whistle-blowing effectiveness.
Top management teams depend more heavily on complaint recipients
with high status (e.g. level in the hierarchy). Similarly, complaint recipients
who are officially designated to receive reports of wrongdoing may be powerful because of their legitimate authority or expert power (French & Raven,
1959), suggesting a positive relationship between complaint recipient status
and effectiveness (Near & Miceli, 1995). However, some whistle-blowers
continue the process by reporting wrongdoing to outsiders because they did
not succeed internally, so we would not expect a positive relationship
between internal complaint recipient status and effectiveness for external
whistle-blowers. Thus, we predict:
Hypothesis 4: Whistle-blowing will be more effective when whistleblowers who use internal channels report wrongdoing to complaint
recipients of high status or legitimacy.
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What makes whistle-blowers effectivet
46 I
Study I
Methods
We performed secondary analyses on anonymous survey data collected in
1980 by the US Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The MSPB sent
surveys to the homes of approximately 13,000 employees of 15 major federal
agencies (response rate of 66%), selected at random (US Merit Systems Protection Board, 1981).
Reliance on self-reported data is a limitation that is difficult to overcome
given the sensitive nature of whistle-blowing, as discussed at length elsewhere
(Miceli & Near, 1992). Both internal and external validity (Campbell &
Stanley, 1966) must be considered, as must ethical issues. Organizations will
not willingly engage in wrongdoing simply to provide research opportunities,
and laboratory settings may seem contrived. Any design requiring data taken
from corroborating sources would preclude anonymity for survey participants
and seriously undermine validity, because potential whistle-blowers concerned
about retaliation are unlikely to identify themselves on a survey.
The 8587 respondents were classified as follows. Internal whistleblowers: (i) said they had, during the last 12 months, personally observed or
obtained direct evidence of any of 10 types of wrongdoing - e.g. 'waste of
federal funds caused by buying unnecessary or deficient goods or services';
(ii) selected one type as the most serious or the one that affected them personally; (iii) said they reported it to their immediate supervisor, someone
above their immediate supervisor, the personnel office or the Office of the
Inspector General within their agency; and (iv) did not say they reported it
to a union representative, the MSPB, the General Accounting Office, a
Member of Congress, or a member of the news media. Respondents were
classified as external whistle-blowers if (i) and (ii) were true, and they
reported the perceived wrongdoing to one of the parties listed in (iv). Respondents who did not fall into either category (people who did not observe perceived wrongdoing (n = 4714) or who did not report it (n = 2522), or who
had missinglinconsistent data (n = 291)) were excluded from the analyses. Of
the 1060 whistle-blowers, 907 made internal reports only (coded' 1 '); 134
reported to both internal and external complaint recipients, and 19 reported
to external recipients alone (coded '2'). t:xternal channel was used as a
control variable and in interactions.
Measure of the dependent variable
Respondents who had observed and reported perceived wrongdoing within
the preceding 12 months were asked whether they had reported that
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462
I Human Relations 55(4)
wrongdoing to 'sources within your immediate work group' or 'to sources
outside your immediate work group' and with what effect. The codes and
response categories were: (1) 'the problem was not resolved at all'; (2) 'under
review, but I do not expect it to be resolved'; (3) 'not sure whether any action
was taken'; (4) 'partially resolved'; (5) 'under review, but I expect it to be
resolved'; and (6) 'the problem was resolved', with the highest score for either
item recorded. The average score was in the middle range (Table 1). Cases
still under review were not removed, to avoid a hiased sample.
Measures of independent variables
Where possible, variables were recoded so that positive relationships with
effectiveness indicated support for the hypothesis. To save space, results of
factor analyses are not reported, but they are available from the first author.
Role prescription was measured by the item, 'did you report the activity
because it is a routine part of your job to report such activities - for example,
as an auditor, investigator, quality control specialist, etc.?' (1 = 'no'; 2 = 'yes').
This measure relied on the incumbent's perception of in-role behavior, rather
than the formal codified statement of the organization, which may differ
(Morrison, 1994).
following precedent (e.g. Miceli et aI., 1999; Near & Miceli, 1986;
Parmerlee et aI., 1982; Perry, 1992), for all data sets, comprehensiveness of
retaliation was calculated as the total number of types of retaliation perceived
to be either threatened or suffered (or both) by the individual respondent.
Our purpose was to measure the number of types of retaliation threatened
or suffered, as opposed to simply documenting the existence of reprisal. Such
an approach was appropriate because we wanted a measure of varied experiences, rather than repeated indications of essentially the same experience
(Roznowski & Hanisch, 1990). Retaliation of different types, probably from
different sources and at multiple times, represented a more comprehensive
attempt to harass the whistle-blower, as opposed to a single, perhaps unintended slight. The rationale for this approach was documented in earlier
studies (above). Thus, retaliation was measured as the number of affirmative
responses to nine possible forms of retaliation: 'did the reprisal or threat of
reprisal take any of the following forms?' Response categories were: 'poor
performance appraisal; denial of promotion; denial of opportunity for training; assigned less desirable or less important duties in my current job; transfer or reassignment to a different job with less desirable duties; reassignment
to a different geographic location; suspension from my job; grade level demotion; other' (respondent specified). Scores could range from 0 to 18, because
respondents could check an event twice if it were threatened and experienced.
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Miceli & Near
What makes whistle-blowers effectivet
463
We did not attempt to weight the types of retaliation, although some forms
were likely judged by some respondents to be more serious than others (e.g.
firing vs denial of award). As outside researchers we cannot fairly assess
which of the forms of retaliation a respondent might judge most serious (e.g.
denial of training could have serious impact or not).
Lesser magnitude of wrongdoing was reflected in dollar amount.
Where amount did not apply (e.g. in cases of safety risks), frequency of
wrongdoing occurrence was measured, from 1 = 'more than $100,OOOlfrequently', to 3 = 'less than $100/once or rarely', as explained in prior research
(Miceli & Near, 1992); both measures were standardized.
As described earlier, respondents were asked to whom they reported
the wrongdoing; if they checked 'someone above my immediate supervisor',
they received a score of 2 for recipient-higher management (otherwise scored
1). Respondents who checked 'Office of the Inspector General' received a
score of 2 for recipient-OIG (otherwise scored 1).
We included two demographic characteristics shown to relate to
whistle-blowing in earlier research. Education ranged from 1 = 'less than high
school diploma', to 5 = 'graduate or professional degree.' Pay ('what is your
pay grade?'), ranged from 1 = '1-4', to 5 = 'over 15.' Further, we included
interactions implied by Hypothesis 3 (External channel by lesser magnitude
of wrongdoing) and Hypothesis 4 (External channel by recipient - higher
management, External channel by recipient - OIG), employing the 'centering' technique required when interaction terms were highly correlated with
at least one component as was the case in these data (Aiken & West, 1991).
Results
Preliminary analyses
Means and standard deviations, percentages and correlations are reported in
Table 1. Of respondents who blew the whistle, only 31 % believed that their
action had been at least somewhat effective (i.e. the wrongdoing had been
resolved, partially resolved, or was likely to be resolved); on average, internal whistle-blowers (m = 2.69 on a 6-point scale) and external whistleblowers (m = 2.38) said they had been relatively ineffective.
As with any study relying on individual level self-reports, common
method variance is a potential problem, but is usually not severe with the
types of variables included here (Crampton & Wagner, 1994), which refer to
actual events, rather than attitudes. Further, the correlations among predictors were fairly low, and Harman tests (Harman, 1967; Fodsakoff & Organ,
1986) did not reveal the presence of a single, underlying factor, indicating
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...
A
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3
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Table I
Ig.
Means, percentages, standard deviations, and correlations for Study I'
..
:I
Meanl%
2
SO
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
..
I ,..,
~
....,
I
I. Effectiveness
External channel
2.
3.
4.
5:
6.
7.
8.
Education
Pay
Role prescriptions
Retaliation
Lesser magnitude of wrongdoing
Recipient-higher management
9. Recipient-OIG
10. External channel by lesser magnitude of WD
I I. External channel by recipient-higher mgt
12. External channel by recipient-OIG
2.60
13.04%
3.85
3.07
1.32
0.40
0.00
44. 14%
11.12%
---{).06
0.01
0.00
1.69
0.34
0.88
0.86
0.47
1.28
1.00
0.50
0.31
0.30
0.17
0. 10
-.08
-.02
.05
.27
-.14
.21
-.10
. 16
.03
.03
-.10
-.07
.10
-.15
. 15
- . 19
.07
-.01
-.47
.1 5
.01
.44
.05
.05
-.13
.08
.07
.11
.00
.03
.11
-.05
-.15
.12
.13
.02
.04
- .03
-.07
-.06
- .02
.2 1
.15
.00
.00
an = 836; coefficients whose absolute values are above .06 are significant at p < .05; above .07, p < .0 I; above .10, P < .00 I. two-tailed .
-.11
.11
.02
-.02
-.01
.02
- .20
-.06
- . 11
.00
.08
- .02
.00
.00
.01
.09
.01
- .05
- .21
.11
.01
Miceli & Near
What makes whistle-blowers effectivet
465
empirically that neither co llinearity nor common method variance was a substantial problem.
Regression res ults are given in Table 2. To permit comparisons across
studies, Table 2 also presents regression results from Stud y 2 and Study 3, as
discussed later.
Hypothesis 1 was supported. Whistle-blowers who felt that blowing
the whistle was required by their jo bs (i.e. role prescription) re ported higher
effectiveness levels than did other wh istle-blowers. Hypothesis 2 was also
supported; whistle-blowers who did not suffer retaliation were more likely
to be effective. The third hypothesis was partia lly supported , in that the main
effect was significant, but the interaction was not, i.e. the res ults were not
reliably different for internal vs external w histle- blowers. W histle-blowers
w ho reported wrongdoing of a lesser magnitude believed they were more
Table 2
Results of regression analyses for effectiveness. all studies'
Control variables (Stage I)
External channel
Education
Pay
Study I
Study 2
Study 3
0.03
- 0.02
- 0.0 1
-O.OS
0.05
0.0 1
0. 15**"
0.04
- 0.06
- 0.02
Publ ic sector
Predictors (Stage 2)
Role prescriptions
Retaliation
Lesser magnitude of wrongdoing
Shorter duration of wrongdoing
Recipient-higher management
Recipient-O IG or AC
Predictors (Stage 3)
External channel by lesser magnitude
External channe l by recp-higher mgt
External channel by recp-O IG or AC
Mode l statistics
Adjusted R2 after Stage I
Fafter Stage I
Adjusted R2 after Stage 2
Fafter Stage 2
Adjusted R2 after Stage 3
Fafter Stage 3
0.25***
- 0.09**
0.23*"*
0. 14***
- O. IO*"
0. 19**"
0.16**"
- 0.05
O. II **"
0.04
0.03
- 0. 11 **"
0.02
- 0.07*
0.1 9**
-0.04
0.04
0.02
4. I 9*"
0. 14
IS.34*"*
0. 16
13.09**"
S36
- 0.0 1
0.12**"
0. 10*
0.0 1
3.55*
0.15
14.66*"*
- 0.32**"
0. 17
IOA7*"*
623
0.05
5.23*"
0. 18
9.67*"*
O. IS
8.32**"
242
' Standardized betas are reported to faci litate comparisons; *p < .OS. **p < .0 I, ***p < .00 I, two-tailed.
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466
I Human Relations 55(4)
effective than did those reporting more consequential wrongdoing. Hypothesis 4 predicted that internal whistle-blowing to complaint recipients of
higher status would be more effective, and it was partially supported.
Interpretation of the significant interaction and main effects revealed that
reporting wrongdoing to the ole was positively related to effectiveness of
internal whistle-blowing only; it was negatively associated with success as an
external whistle-blower. Contrary to prediction, reporting to levels of
management above one's supervisor had no effect for either group. In
summary, there was support in Study 1 for predictions based on power
theories.
Study 2
In Study 1, we relied on archival data collected in US federal agencies. In
Study 2, we tested the same hypotheses with internal auditors in the private
and public sectors, throughout North America, with similar results, suggesting generalizability across samples. Internal auditors are of interest because
empowering them might have prevented financial crisis in various US industries in the 1980s, as well other instances of wrongdoing (Miceli et a!., 1991).
Internal auditors ensure the effectiveness of their organizations' systems of
internal control; they deter, detect, investigate, and report fraud and other
wrongdoing in organizations (e.g. to police). They may appear to be required
by their jobs to report wrongdoing and thus perhaps should not be considered whistle-blowers, but this is illusory, for reasons described elsewhere
(Miceli & Near, 1992; Miceli et a!., 1991). For example, (i) most codes of
ethics in the public and private sectors require all employees to report
'possible illegal or unethical conduct' (Mathews, 1987: 116) yet obviously
they (like internal auditors) do not always do so, and hence must make judgment calls; and (ii) top managers may give 'lip service' to auditors' (or others')
vigilance, but informal norms and reward systems may actually discourage
it (Devine, 1997). Internal auditors do differ from other employees in that
they are more likely than other employees to learn of financial wrongdoing
(Miceli et aI., 1999) and to report wrongdoing (Miethe, 1998). However, this
should not have had a systematic effect on predictors of effectiveness.
Study 2 included a second measure of organizational dependence on
wrongdoing, which related to Hypothesis 3, linking dependency on the
wrongdoing with internal whistle-blowing ineffectiveness. Organizations
may be less dependent on practices that are less entrenched (Dutton et a!.,
1997); that is, when they have not been part of the organizational culture for
a long time. Wrongdoing that has been ongoing presumably serves some
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Miceli & Near
What makes whistle-blowers effective?
467
function for the organization; otherwise, it would be abandoned. Further,
changing such practices may evoke less 'moral intensity' (Jones, 1991), or
concern with moral questions. If so, then we expect organizations will be
more likely to stop wrongful practices that are of shorter duration, and consequently, that whistle-blowers will be more effective under such circumstances.
Methods
We developed a 25-page questionnaire following an extensive literature
review, pilot testing, and reviews of the instrument by members of the
Research Foundation of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). The IIA collected questionnaires anonymously from their members who were Directors
of Internal Auditing (DIAs) in North America. The 27% response rate compared favorably with those of similar firm-level mailed surveys (e.g. Klaas et
aI., 1999). Respondents' organizations varied in size and industry, but were
primarily (89%) private sector. The sample was representative of its population, with a high correlation to population 4-digit SIC codes (r(54) = .96,
P < .001) and to demographic characteristics reported in an earlier study of
members of the same professional association (Mautz et aI., 1984).
Internal whistle-blowers (n = 419): (i) had personally observed or
obtained direct evidence of any of 14 types of wrongdoing during the last 12
months; (ii) selected one type as the most serious; (iii) reported it to their
CEO/CFO, the head of the department responsible for the activity, or the
Audit Committee (AC); and (iv) did not report it to the external audit team,
the IIA or other professional organization, a government agency, or a
member of the media or any other external channel (following an open-ended
prompt). Respondents were classified as external whistle-blowers (n = 271)
if (i) and (ii) were true, and they reported the perceived wrongdoing to one
of the parties listed in (iv); thus external channel was dichotomous as in Study
1. As in prior research, few (n = 6) of these notified no internal party listed
in (iii). We excluded data from respondents who did not observe wrongdoing (n = 177), did not report it (n = 65), were missing data used to create
the categorization (n = 103), or answered items inconsistently (n = 10).
Measure of the dependent variable
The dependent variable, effectiveness, was a S-point scale based on two sets
of items. Respondents who had reported perceived wrongdoing in the preceding 12 months were asked whether they had reported that wrongdoing to
any of eight complaint recipients (described earlier). Next, they were asked
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468
I
Human Relations 55(4)
describe the results after each report. The coding and response scale for
each report item were: (1) 'wrongdoing continued'; (2) 'under review, but I
do not expect the matter to be resolved'; (3) 'function was or is being
audited'; (4) 'under review, but I expect matter to be resolved'; and (5)
'activity completely terminated'. Scores were based on the best outcome from
all reports.
to
Measures of independent variables
Position power variables included role prescription ('how did you feel when
you thought about whether to report this activity?', coded 1 = 'not required
by my job to do so', 2 = neither; or 3 = 'required by my job to do so'), based
on the role incumbent's view of the in-role job behaviors required, which may
differ from the formal codified statement of the organization (Morrison,
1994).
As cited above, retaliation was measured as the number of categories
of retaliation (up to 12) selected by the respondent. Three more categories
were added to those included in Study 1: 'termination'; 'co-workers not
socializing with me'; and 'pressure from co-workers to stop complaint.'
Lesser magnitude of wrongdoing was measured as in Study 1. In
addition we included shorter duration of wrongdoing ('how long ago did the
activity begin?' coded I = '> 10 years ago', to 5 = '1-6 months ago'). As in
Study 1, respondents were asked to whom they reported the wrongdoing.
Here, the response choices were modified to fit the nature of the sample. If
respondents checked 'CEO or CFO' they received a score of 2 for recipienthigher management (otherwise 1). Respondents who checked 'the Audit
Committee' (of the Board of Directors) received a score of 2 for reci/Jient-A C
(otherwise scored 1).
Control variables included education (ranging from 1 = 'high school
diploma', to 5 = 'doctoral degree'), pay (annual salary in 9 equal intervals)
and public sector, because Study 2 included both sectors and effectiveness
may depend on sector. Private sector organizations may change more quickly
because competitive pressures and fear of adverse publicity may influence
organizations to correct serious wrongdoing, but - in contrast - whistleblowing is more common in the public sector (Brewer, 1995; Rothschild &
Miethe, 1999), where whistle-blowers generally have greater legal protections (Dworkin & Near, 1997). Therefore, we created a dummy variable
from the industry classifications provided by respondents (1 = non-government; 2 = employed by federal, state/provincial or local governments). As in
Study 1, we employed the 'centering' technique for interaction terms (Aiken
& West, 1991).
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Miceli & Near
What makes whistle-blowers effectivet
469
Results
Preliminary analyses
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3 and regression results in Table
2. As in Study 1, evidence including Harman tests suggested common method
variance was not a problem. Of the respondents who blew the whistle, 85'10
felt that wrongdoing had been terminated or - if the situation was still under
review - was likely to be terminated. This is higher than in Study!, reflecting the credibility that internal auditors enjoy in their organizations, which
may be greater than that accorded the typical whistle-blower. However, this
higher level of effectiveness does not address the question of whether other
factors influence effectiveness, which is the point of the hypothesis testing.
The pay variable was positively associated with effectiveness, but sector was
unrelated.
As in Study 1, Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported. Whistle-blowers
were more effective where whistle-blowing was role-prescribed (H 1) and
where retaliation was lower (H2). Hypothesis 3 predicted that whistleblowers who did not use channels external to the organization would be more
effective when the organization is less dependent on the perceived wrongdoing, as in the case of wrongdoing of lesser magnitude. As in Study 1, this
was true regardless of channel. There was also support for the extension of
Hypothesis 3 to the measure of wrongdoing of shorter duration, tested for
the first time in Study 2. In Hypothesis 4, we predicted that internal reports
of wrongdoing to someone of higher status or legitimacy were more likely to
be effective, and this was supported, for both types of recipients examined,
e.g. to top management and to the Audit Committee. However, as in Study
1, one of the two interactions was significant; external whistle-blowers who
reported wrongdoing to top management were less effective. In summary,
Study 2 largely supported the model and extended the findings of Study! to
a different and more diverse population.
Study 3
In Study 3, we attempted to extend the earlier findings to an important type
of wrongdoing not specifically mentioned in Studies 1 and 2, namely sexual
harassment, using survey data collected by the MSPB from federal employees. Reporting sexual harassment clearly meets the cited definition of whistleblowing. Sexual harassment has received considerable recent legal attention
in the US, and research has documented that sexual harassment has substantial negative consequences for victims and co-workers in the workplace
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........
0
:t
:I=
~
=
Table 3
I~
o·
..
Means, percentages, standard deviations, and correlations among items for Study 2'
~
I . Effectiveness
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
External channel
Education
Pay
Public sector
Role prescriptions
Retaliation
Lesser magnitude of wrongdoing
Shorter duration of wrongdoing
Recipient-higher management
I I. Recipient-AC
12. External channel by lesser magnitude of WD
13. External channel by recipient-higher mgt
14. External channel by recipient-AC
Mean/%
SD
4.34
38.52%
3.30
4.25
10.59%
2.77
0.14
---{).04
3.31
86.84%
57.95%
---{).04
1.09
0.49
0.61
2.09
0.31
0.45
0.66
0.97
0.88
0.34
0.49
0.47
0.16
0.24
0.01
0.04
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
.....
1=
...
"'"
I.!
.00
-.01
.15
-.08
.17
-.18
.21
.24
.14
.16
.03
- .08
.02
.01
.01
- .09
.07
.09
-.09
-.02
.05
.15
-.11
.03
.08
. 12
.03 -.11
.00
.00
.06 -.11
-.12 -.16
-.06
.00
.01
.04
-.01
.13
.08
.06
-.06
.03
- .01
.02
-.02
.02
.00
-.12
-.04
- .20
.05
- .05
.07
an = 623; coefficients whose absolute values are above .08 are significant at p < .05; above .09, p < .0 I; above .1 I,
- .08
.02
.04
- .01
.12
-.01
-.03
.08
-.12
-.18
.03
-.02
-.10
.02
.01
P < .00 I, two-tailed.
.27
-.02
.00
-.03
.04
-.07
-.04
.08
.00
-.02
- .01
.11
.03
-. 14
.03
- .08
.03
-.06
.00
-.02 .12
Miceli & Near
What makes whistle-blowers effective%
47 I
(e.g. Fitzgerald et aI., 1997); it continues to be the focus of much scholarly
research (O'Leary-Kelly & Bowes-Sperry, 2001).
In Study 3, whistle-blowers are directly harmed by perceived wrongdoing; previous research showed that this is true in many instances of whistleblowing (Miceli & Near, 1992), so this probably applied to most respondents
in Studies 1 and 2. Measures were available to test Hypotheses 2 and 3 only,
and once again the centering technique for interactions (Aiken & West, 1991)
was used.
Methods
In 1994, approximately 13,200 employees, selected randomly from 1.7
million civilian employees of agencies in the executive branch of the federal
government, were asked to complete anonymous questionnaires on sexual
harassment (Erdreich et aI., 1995); the response rate was about 61 %. Internal whistle-blowers (n = 286): (i) said they had, during the last 24 months,
'received any' of eight types of 'uninvited and unwanted sexual attention';
(ii) selected one type as 'the one experience that is either the most recent or
that had the greatest effect on you'; (iii) said they 'reported the behavior to
a supervisor or other official(s) such as an EEO counselor', 'requested an
investigation by my organization', or 'filed a grievance or adverse action
appeal'; and (iv) did not say they had 'filed a (formal) discrimination
complaint or lawsuit' or 'requested an investigation by an outside agency.'
External whistle-blowers (n = 38) took steps (i) and (ii) but did report the
wrongdoing to at least one of the two parties named in (iv). All also reported
the problem to someone internal to the organization; thus again external
channel was dichotomous. We excluded respondents who did not experience
harassment (n = 5l82), did not report it (n = 2362), or were missing data on
any item used to create the categorization or provided inconsistent responses
(n = 213).
Measure of the dependent variable
As in Studies 1 and 2, the dependent variable, effectiveness, was as-point
scale based on multiple items, enabling whistle-blowers to describe outcomes
to multiple reports. For each of the categories of complaint recipients noted
above, respondents were asked to describe, 'what effect did it have?' Respondents who reported wrongdoing but took no 'formal actions' (a report to a
supervisor or other official was not considered a 'formal action') were asked
why they did not. Respondents who took 'formal actions' were asked, 'how
did your agency's management respond to the formal action you took?'
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472
I
Human Relations 55 (4)
Scores were based on the best outcome (i.e. the highest number) resulting
from all reports. Responses were coded as follows: 1 = 'made things worse';
2 = 'they did nothing' or 'made no difference'; 3 = 'the action is still being
processed' or 'I don't know whether management did anything'; 4 = 'made
things better'; 5 = 'other (non-formal) actions resolved the situation to my
satisfaction'; 'they corrected the situation'; or 'they took action against the
person(s) who harassed me.' Unlike the Studies 1 and 2 measures of effectiveness, the low end of this scale acknowledges that whistle-blowing could
worsen the situation, increasing variance in the scores and probably better
reflecting reality.
Measures of independent variables
As in Study 1 and 2, retaliation was measured as the number of types of
retaliation reported (0-6), including: 'my work assignments or working conditions got worse; 1 was denied a promotion, pay increase, good performance
rating, or good reference; 1 was reassigned, detailed, or transferred against
my wishes; 1 was fired; 1 transferred or quit to take another job; 1 quit without
having another job to go to.'
For lesser magnitude of wrongdoing, the measure reflected only frequency, as dollar valuation was inappropriate, i.e. 'how often did the
unwanted sexual attention occur?', from 1 = 'every day', to 5 = 'once.' For
shorter duration of wrongdoing, the item was 'how long did the unwanted
attention go on?', from 1 = 'more than 6 months', to 5 = 'less than 1 week.'
Control variables, education and pay, were measured as in Study 1.
Results
Preliminary analyses
Descriptive statistics are seen in Table 4. As in Studies 1 and 2, analyses suggested common method variance was not a problem. Among whistleblowers, 58% reported that their action had been effective: it 'made things
better' or 'management took action.'
Tests of hypotheses
The control variables were unrelated to effectiveness. Consistent with Studies
1 and 2, Hypotheses 2 and 3 were supported (Table 2); retaliation was negatively related to effectiveness and shorter duration of wrongdoing was positively related to effectiveness. Lesser magnitude of the wrongdoing was
unrelated to effectiveness in the regression analysis (and the interaction with
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Miceli & Near
Table 4
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
What makes whistle-blowers effectivet
473
Means, percentages, standard deviations, and correlations for Study 3'
Effectiveness
External channel
Education
Pay
Retaliation
Lesser magnitude of wrongdoing
Shorter duration of wrongdoing
Meanl%
SD
3.88
10.00%
3.31
2.46
0.56
3.34
2.61
1.38
0.30
0.77
0.80
0.92
1.23
1.63
--{).05
0.37
2
4
3
6
5
7
-.23
-.03 - .02
-.09
.02 .41
-. 39 .40 .06 .06
.20 - .1 3 - .09 .02 - .27
.29 - .1 9 - .1 4 - .1 2 - .27 .58
External channe l by lesser
magnitude of WD
.08 - .34 -. 11
an = 242; coefficients whose absolute values are above .1 I are Significant at
.20, p < .00 I , two-tailed.
p<
.04 -. 28 .02
.05; above . 15,
.04
P < .0 I; above
channel was not significant), but the correlation analysis showed this vari able to be highly related to shorter duration of wrongdoing (r .58), suggesting that co llinearity may have played a role in this sample. Further, post
hoc analysis showed that, when the duration of wrongdoing variable was
omitted from the regression ana lysis, the magnitude variable was significantly
related to effectiveness. In sum mary, the results were very consistent with
th ose of Studi es 1 and 2.
=
Discussion
Whistle-blowing is 'essential for exposing misconduct in the modern workplace' because 'organizational practices have become more complex, more
specialized, and less publicly visible' (Miethe, ] 998: 30). Despite considerable differences among the three samples, e.g. sector, organization size,
nature of jobs held, timing of the data collection, and demograph ic diversity,
results were similar, providing evidence of generalizability. Position power of
the wh istle-blower (e.g. role prescription) and the organization's depend ence
on the wrongdoing (e.g. magnitude of wrongdoi ng) influenced the extent of
effectiveness. The results also suggested that a high status compl aint recipient
was associated w ith more effectiveness for internal whistle-blowers, but
sometimes with less effectiveness for externa l whistle-blowers.
Role prescriptions were consistently associated with perceived effecti veness of w histle-blowing. Individuals who a re no t authorized to report the
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474
I Human Relations SS(4)
type of wrongdoing they have observed may have more difficulty convincing
others that wrongdoing was occurring and that it should be stopped, even
when they reported it to parties outside the organization. Alternatively, those
who report activities in accordance with role prescriptions may find it harder
to admit they have been ineffective, even though they are not held accountable for change but rather only for reporting.
As predicted, more effective whistle-blowers also experienced significantly less retaliation, though this relationship was far from perfect, suggesting that retaliation and effectiveness must be treated as distinct
constructs. Managers and co-workers may not like 'acts of exposure' even
when whistle-blowers suggest helpful changes and may sometimes retaliate
while also changing the objected-to practice; if so, no relationship would
occur.
Consistent with most prior research on other aspects of whistleblowing (e.g. Miethe, 1998; Miethe & Rothschild, 1994), demographic and
other control variables generally did not predict perceived effectiveness,
except that high pay enhanced perceived effectiveness for internal auditors.
In one sense, the findings are encouraging, because they suggest that effectiveness depends less on what should be irrelevant characteristics of the
whistle-blower, and more on the nature of the complaint itself.
The findings also suggest practical ways for organizations to increase
effective internal whistle-blowing and discourage frivolous complaints.
Organization leaders can provide clear prescriptions about what constitutes
wrongdoing, what members are to do when they encounter it, and how
others are to treat whistle-blowers, thereby signaling to employees that
whistle-blowing should be viewed as appropriate in-role behavior. Yet some
of the findings are troubling. Complaint recipients think that few whistleblowing reports are well founded (e.g. only about 11 % of whistle-blowing
cases filed under the False Claims Act have produced a recovery; Yang &
France, 1997). But complaint recipients, top management, and other parties
are not unbiased observers. They may: (i) not recognize wrongdoing as others
define it, (ii) not be willing to take responsibility for wrongdoing under their
control, or (iii) have vested interests in the continuation of wrongdoing. For
example, research on unfair discrimination provides evidence that perpetrators' views differ from those of victims (e.g. O'Leary-Kelly & BowesSperry, 2001). Thus, some whistle-blowers are ineffective not because they
are wrong in some absolute sense, from the perspective of a fair-minded top
management team or that of the larger society, but because of the biases of
those in power. In such cases, role prescriptions work to undermine appropriate whistle-blowing, instead of supporting societal standards. This also
implies that policy makers must take care that legal protections are not
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Miceli & Near
What makes whistle-blowers effectivet
475
limited to cases in which whistle-blowers act on wrongdoing strictly as
defined in their organizations, for their roles.
Consistent with theories of power, whistle-blowers who reported
wrongdoing with less serious consequences or that was less entrenched in the
system had higher effectiveness scores than did others. This is discouraging,
as it suggests that the most important problems may go unresolved. However,
the correspondence was not perfect; obviously in many cases involving
serious wrongdoing, the whistle-blower was effective. Their ability to persuade management that the wrongdoing is harmful to the organization, and
that correction is worthy of managerial attention, time, and risk-taking, may
be a critical, unexamined variable.
For internal whistle-blowers, going to specifically designated channels
(to the Audit Committee or the Office of Inspector General) was beneficial.
This suggests that legislators concerned with encouragement of legitimate
internal whistle-blowing through supporting these channels have been somewhat successful, but that they should focus on steps to enhance responsiveness of such channels. Anecdotal evidence suggests that internal channels
have not always operated as legislators intended (Devine, 1997), and potential whistle-blowers would do well to consider this when selecting a complaint recipient.
Reporting to higher levels of management was beneficial for internal
auditors but not for federal employees. It could not be determined from these
data whether this occurred because auditors are better trained to bring
forward legitimate concerns, or for other reasons. Future research could also
examine the quality of the relationship between the observer of wrongdoing
and the potential complaint recipient. Internal whistle-blowing that begins
with a report to one's supervisor is more desirable than external reports
because it provides the organization with the opportunity to respond quickly,
with little risk to the whistle-blower.
Limitations and other suggestions for future research
Our use of different measures with different types of samples, collected from
members of different types of organizations at different points in history may
be viewed as a strength, as most findings were sufficiently robust to hold for
all three studies. In addition, only single-item measures were available for
some of the variables, but the major problem with relying on single items,
rather than multi-item scales, is that they may be less reliable. If so, they
attenuate the findings, lowering the probability of finding significant relationships, thus making our results conservative. In fact, the variance explained
in effectiveness was low, suggesting either that we underestimated the
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476
I
Human Relations 55(4)
variance explained by using single-item measures, or that unmeasured variables influenced effectiveness. Certainly, additional situational and person
variables should be included in future studies.
Future research should focus greater attention on the process and
tactics used by the whistle-blower (Perry, 1992) and the relationship between
organizational actions to enhance responsiveness, the organization's climate,
and the effectiveness of internal whistle-blowing. Policies and training may
help terminate wrongdoing, improve the workplace and reduce the liability
of organizations, but in the only published study examining these issues
(Perry, 1992), effectiveness was unrelated to the organization's climate for
dissent. Finally, the theory of organizational learning and change could
inform research on whistle-blowing: When do organization leaders hear criticism and constructively change?
Conclusion
Before undertaking the costly, and sometimes risky, process of whistleblowing, observers of wrongdoing may want to know their chances of
success. Therefore, it is important to begin identifying those conditions
associated with effective whistle-blowing from the perspective of the whistleblower. Whistle-blowing is difficult for the parties involved: If we understand
the process, organizations and their employees alike will benefit. Findings
from the field studies described here provided evidence that perceived wrongdoing is more likely to be terminated when it is less serious or entrenched,
and when whistle-blowers have power, reflected in the legitimacy of the
whistle-blower's role. Clearly, more research is needed to extend our understanding of whistle-blowing effectiveness.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Miceli & Near
What makes whistle-blowers effective%
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Marcia P. Miceli is Professor of Management at the McDonough School
of Business at Georgetown University. Her research focuses on whistleblowing in organizations and organizational compensation systems. She
teaches in the area of human resource management.
[E-mail: [email protected]]
Janet P. Near holds the Coleman Chair of Management in the Kelley
School of Business at Indiana University. Her research focuses on whistleblowing in organizations and the correlation between job and life satisfaction. She teaches in the area of organization theory and design.
Together with Dr Miceli she has published over 20 articles and chapters,
as well as a book, on the topic of whistle-blowing.
[E-mail: [email protected]]
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.