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Summary: Ian Bremmer and
Mark Leonard see the Western
liberal order in danger. They
identify shifts in Germany’s
international outlook as a trigger
and see Germany’s narrow focus
on economic stability as running
roughshod over other nations.
In their understanding, Germany
is a geo-economic power, using
commerce to extend its influence
and interests. But Thomas
Kleine-Brockhoff argues change
has many sources. The focus
on Germany as a trigger is too
narrow and the assessment
of dramatic changes in Berlin
is overblown. Germany does
not appear to be any more
disoriented than other Western
nations in a global environment
that is characterized by rapid
shifts of power.
Paper Series
New Dangers to the Western Liberal Order
Is a widening divide between Berlin and Washington
threatening the alliance? Two viewpoints
The U.S.-German Relationship on the Rocks
by Ian Bremmer and Mark Leonard
It should be a marriage made in
heaven. Barack Obama and Angela
Merkel are quiet, pragmatic politicians less interested in grand gestures
than in results. Merkel gives Washington someone to call when Europe
is in crisis. Obama gives Europe the
longed-for U.S. leader willing to invest
in multilateralism and multinational
institutions.
So why does a widening divide
between Berlin and Washington
threaten the entire Western alliance?
A fundamental shift in interests and
outlook is leaving the United States
and Germany with potentially irreconcilable differences. U.S. grand
strategy relies not just on diplomats,
Rocks continued on page 2
Too Much Alarm
by Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff
1744 R Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 683 2650
F 1 202 265 1662
E [email protected]
Ian Bremmer and Mark Leonard
decry “irreconcilable differences”
between Washington and Berlin. A
“fundamental shift in interests and
outlook” now threatens the “entire
Western alliance.” The authors see
Germany’s ever-more narrow focus on
economic stability as running roughshod over other nations, including
traditional allies. In Bremmer’s and
Leonard’s understanding, Germany
is a “geo-economic power, using
commerce to extend its influence and
advance its interests.” Increasingly
it associates itself with non-aligned
and mercantilist states while showing
disinterest in cooperation with its
NATO allies on matters of common
security. The good counsel of the
U.S. president, especially during the
euro crisis, is constantly rejected. In
the authors’ assessment, the divide
between Germany and the United
States now endangers the liberal world
order.
Alarm continued on page 3
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Rocks continued from page 1
soldiers, and sailors but also on trade negotiators. But
economic initiatives serve geopolitical goals. Promotion of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a promising multinational
trade deal, is as much about establishing a counter to rising
China as is the shift of more U.S. warships into Asian
waters.
German officials, on the other hand, are focused ever more
narrowly on economic stability and sustainability. Before
the eurozone descended into crisis, Germany appeared
to be becoming a “normal” Western power, interested in
extending its political influence and willing to commit
troops to defend its liberal values and security in Kosovo
and Afghanistan. More recently, however, Germany has
become less multilateral, at least on security questions, and
less willing to transfer sovereignty to supranational institutions such as the European Union or to take part in international missions. The result is a strange mix of economic
assertiveness and military abstinence. Germany has
become a geo-economic power, using commerce to extend
its influence and advance its interests.
And U.S. geopolitical ambitions and Germany’s geoeconomic agenda are clashing. Eighteen months ago,
Germany infuriated the White House by joining Brazil,
India, Russia, and China in abstaining on the U.N. Security
Council proposal to create a no-fly zone over Libya. The
decision provoked speculation that Germany wanted to
shed its supporting role in the U.S.-led Western alliance in
favor of the more independent, non-aligned, and mercantilist-driven positions taken by leading emerging powers.
But the real rift had begun to open six months earlier,
during the Group of 20 summit in South Korea. President
Obama, who had spent weeks trying to rally developing
countries behind the idea of global rebalancing, was taken
by surprise when the German chancellor made common
Germany has become a geoeconomic power, using commerce
to extend its influence and
advance its interests.
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cause with China and other export nations to oppose this
stance. The German abstention on Libya made no difference to U.S. plans, but at the G20, Berlin and Washington
stood on opposite sides of the most fundamental questions
facing world leaders: How can governments rebalance the
world’s trade relations, and should they stimulate demand
or impose austerity?
Unfortunately, there is little Obama can do to win the
Germans back. Washington can bolster the loyalty of other
allies with offers of political access, military hardware and
intelligence. The commerce-minded Germans are not
interested in these. U.S. officials gripe that Merkel will not
listen to the president’s advice for managing the eurozone
crisis. German officials say that the world’s second-largest
creditor has little to learn from its leading debtor.
Meanwhile, Berlin and Beijing, a match made in mercantilist heaven, are turning heads. On her recent trip to
China, Merkel notably did not allow fundamental differences in political values to complicate a budding “special
relationship” between the countries.
In the coming months, the United States and Germany are
likely to become further estranged. Differences over how
to refloat the global economy will become more obvious.
U.S. officials may lecture their European counterparts on
the need for sharing military burdens. Europeans are likely
to insist that the demands of austerity do not allow them to
spend more on militaries while cutting everywhere else.
In the medium term, economic realities will limit U.S.
geopolitical ambitions. It will take time for Washington to
get what it wants from negotiations for the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, and it’s not clear how Washington will respond
if Beijing tries to force neighbors to choose between
expanded security partnerships with the United States and
deepening trade and investment ties with China.
Germany’s focus on trade power is also likely to encounter
head winds. Berlin’s lack of geopolitical influence will seem
much more important if German demands for extended
austerity in Europe feed anti-German fury and if closer
relations with Beijing force German officials to ignore
Chinese abuses of state power. Merkel’s government could
find itself short on influential foreign friends.
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But the biggest challenge posed by the U.S.-German
estrangement extends to the foundation of a liberal world
order. Since the Cold War ended, the United States and
Europe have advanced the principle that democracy,
not single-party rule, is key to political stability and that
market-driven capitalism, not state-directed development, is crucial for lasting prosperity. If the United States
becomes less willing or able to advance these values abroad,
and if Germany, Europe’s engine, allies with fellow creditors
over fellow democracies, who will be left to advance the
principles that have politically and economically empowered hundreds of millions of people since the wall fell?
Published October 18, 2012 © The Washington Post
Company
Alarm continued from page 1
It is certainly true that transatlanticism isn’t what it used
to be. The end of the Cold War and the rise of the rest
have transformed the relationship. The United States is no
longer Europe’s protector and Europe is no longer at the
core of the United States’ foreign policy interest. Whether
the United States and Europe can go global together is
increasingly uncertain; and it is uncertain not least because
the United States and Germany don’t look eye to eye on
key issues of the international agenda. But Ian Bremmer’s and Mark Leonard’s claim is bolder. In their essay,
they don’t seem to attribute the changes they decry to
anything the United States does, and neither to anything
that happens elsewhere. Virtually all change appears to
originate in Berlin. The authors see Germany’s willingness
to commit troops to international missions waning; they
see the country as less multilateral than it used to be and
more aligned with mercantilist-driven rising nations. These
claims warrant closer inspection.
1. Germany is becoming less willing to commit troops to
defend its liberal values
Bremmer and Leonard correctly observe that the willingness to deploy troops, while never high, has faded
over the past few years. The question is: why? The
authors assume that this reluctance is part of a larger
trend of Germany going it alone, becoming ever more
trade and ever less security minded.
However, there are other forces at play. Disillusionment
about the mission in Afghanistan and the military
alliance with the United States is one. Germans did not
feel felt that they were abandoning the United States.
Tather, they felt that the United States was abandoning
them through the endless tug of war about the accept-
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ability of civilian deaths, of drone strikes, of targeted
killings, the fallout of the torture scandals and the
treatment of prisoners, the ripple effects of a controversial war in Iraq. In sum, the United States’ loss of moral
compass during its neoconservative moment brought
Germany’s slow and conflict-laden emergence as a
more “normal” member of the Western interventionist
family to a standstill.
This recent trend is by no means irreversible. After
more than a decade in Afghanistan, the Germans
are tired of the war. In that sense they are not an iota
different from their peers in other Western countries.
At the same time, the German Chancellor is already
contemplating a new “out of area” mission, albeit a
The United States’ loss of
moral compass during its
neoconservative moment
brought Germany’s slow and
conflict-laden emergence as a
more “normal” member of the
Western interventionist family to a
standstill.
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small one, this time to Mali. For the foreseeable future,
Germany will not be interested in becoming a military
power. It will continue to exercise military restraint
and sit out some missions as it did in Iraq and Libya.
The concern, however, that the country is becoming
disconnected from the Western mainstream hardly
squares with German intentions, actions or attitudes.
2. Germany is becoming less multilateral
For postwar West Germany, multilateralism was a
religion. In the German mind, foreign relations should
be governed by rules, treaties, and international organizations. Not coincidentally, this seemingly benign
strategy was also the only way for a tainted nation to
regain respect and influence. As if a default setting
remained in place, Germany remained committed
to multilateralism after achieving full sovereignty
with re-unification. But the world around Germany
changed. Much to the surprise of many Germans,
the emergence of a multipolar world created nations
more interested in their own rise than in working
global institutions, global rules, and conflict mediation
bodies. It came as a shock to the German foreign policy
elite that the infamous Climate Summit in Copenhagen
in 2009 was, to many nations, about gaining power, not
about saving the world from global warming.
Since then, Germany has been slower than other
nations to abandon the UN imperative and adopt a
new climate realism that relies less on multilateralism.
Much to the surprise of many
Germans, the emergence of a
multipolar world created nations
more interested in their own rise
than in working global institutions,
global rules, and conflict
mediation bodies.
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On the other hand, cooperation with the United
States improved after the election of President Barack
Obama, as the United States has rediscovered multilateralism just when other (mostly rising) nations begin
to see multilateralism as a constraint. This has allowed
the Federal Republic to act more multilateral, not less.
Take relations with Russia. Here, indeed, Germany has
had a tendency to go it alone, especially under Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. But the election of Angela
Merkel, combined with President Obama’s “reset”
policy, has resulted in Germany going multilateral on
Russia. Iran is another case in point. Since the United
States no longer sees the combination of pressure and
sanctions as simply the necessary prelude to an inevitable war, but rather as a strategy to possibly avoid war,
Germany has joined France, the United Kingdom, and
the United States to get tough on Iran. In this instance,
too, Germany has become more multilateral, not less.
3. Germany has become a geo-economic power that is
aligning with mercantilist-driven emerging powers
Here, Bremmer and Leonard are certainly onto something. But they exaggerate their point, thus reducing its
usefulness.
For half a century, most Western nations were in a
comfortable position. Their most important strategic
and economic partners were aligned or even identical. Take Germany. Strategic partner: the United
States. Trade partners: France, the United States, the
Netherlands. Take Australia. Strategic partner: the
United States. Largest trading partner: also the United
States. But things have changed. China has triggered
a lasting boom down under by buying up the continent’s mineral wealth. Consequently, a debate has been
waging about whether Australia should realign and
accommodate its new most important trading partner.
Yet Australia has resisted the temptation. It recently
invited more American troops into the country.
Australia’s actions demonstrate that countries have
choices.
As of late, Germany is in a similar position. Over the
past five years, exports to China have doubled. China
is surpassing France as Germany’s most important
trading partner. Many entrepreneurs see tomorrow’s
major profit margins in China, not in the eurozone
or the Single Market. Quite naturally, these business-
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people will become a strong lobbying group which will
promote accommodation of China. Their voices might
be listened to more frequently as the stewardship of the
eurozone becomes ever more costly and burdensome.
They will find support in the relatively strong neutralist
and pacifist schools of German foreign policy. And
neutralism and pacifism rhyme with nationalism.
So, what’s wrong with Bremmer’s and Leonard’s
theory? Not much, except that they conflate future
and present tense. They describe as reality what lies
far in the future and, therefore, may never happen. A
geo-economic Germany as a high-tech wingman of
the rising powers is certainly the country’s strategic
alternative to the present Western integration. But it
is a remote future option, nothing more. Currently,
no more than a handful of foreign policy strategists
in Germany advocate such a strategy. And while the
gravitational pull of the trade relationship with China
is getting stronger, the mainstream school of Western
integrationism remains dominant.
Ian Bremmer and Mark Leonard ring the alarm bell in
their claim “the foundation of a liberal world order” at
stake given the ever widening cleavage between a geopolitical the United States and a geo-economic Germany.
Their focus on a Germany as trigger is too narrow and
their assessment of the changes in Berlin is overblown. In
some ways, the authors give too much credit to Germany.
Reading their claim, one wonders whether they assume
there is deliberate, if devious, German strategy. Obviously,
there isn’t. There isn’t even an unintentional one that the
country is stumbling into. If one were to criticize Germany,
a broadside about its lethargy in strategic matters might
be warranted. Little brainpower is invested in Germany’s
long-term aspirations vis-à-vis Europe, the United States
and NATO, Asia, and the emerging powers, as well as
Germany’s role in the global order. But given the fast pace
of global change, Germany’s disorientation is not any larger
than that of any of its major partners.
Countries make strategic choices. So will Germany.
Choices are influenced by the geopolitical and commercial
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environments as well as well as by partners and adversaries. If Great Britain, for one, chooses to flee the EU and
go global alone, this will be a strong trigger for Germany
(maybe together with a core of the eurozone) to contemplate doing the same. Another trigger would be a United
States that chooses to pursue a post-Western foreign policy
that sidesteps Europe. It would most certainly strengthen
Germany’s neutralist and anti-Atlanticist camp. In that
sense, Bremmer’s and Leonard’s alarm, while sounding
shrill, may serve as an opening salvo to a valuable debate
about a new Western instead of a post-Western world.
About the Authors
Ian Bremmer is the President of the Eurasia Group. Mark Leonard is
the Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Thomas
Kleine-Brockhoff is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States where he leads the EuroFuture Project
About The EuroFuture Project
The German Marshall Fund of the United States understands the twin
crisis in Europe and the United States to be a defining moment that
will shape the transatlantic partnership and its interactions with the
wider world for the long term. GMF’s EuroFuture Project therefore
aims to understand and explore the economic, governance and geostrategic dimensions of the EuroCrisis from a transatlantic perspective. The Project addresses the impact, implications, and ripple effects
of the crisis — in Europe, for the United States and the world.
GMF does this through a combination of initiatives on both sides of
the Atlantic, including large and small convening, regional seminars,
study tours, paper series, polling, briefings, and media interviews.
The Project also integrates its work on the EuroCrisis into several
of GMF’s existing programs. The Project is led by Thomas KleineBrockhoff, Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Senior Director for
Strategy. The group of GMF experts involved in the project consists of
several Transatlantic Fellows as well as program staff on both sides of
the Atlantic.