CHAPTER II
GEO-POLITICAL SETTING OF MANIPUR
Chapter II
Geo-political Setting of Manipur
Geographical understanding of politics in the world today or the phrase ‘world
polities’ conveys a sense of a geographical scale beyond that of any particular state or
a locality in which states and other actors come together to engage in a number of
activities. This includes diplomacy, military action, aid, fiscal and monetary activities,
legal regulation, charitable acts, etc. that are intended to influence others and extend
the power of the particular actors who engage in them. But the activities also rest on
more specific geographical assumptions about where best to act and why this makes
sense. Thus, the world is actively ‘spatialised,’ divided up, labeled, sorted out into a
hierarchy of places of greater or lesser ‘importance’ by political geographers, other
academics and political leaders. This process provides the geographical framing
within which political élites and mass publics act in the world in pursuit of their own
identities and interests (Agnew John, 1998, 2). Seen from this perspective, since the
ancient times, Manipur has occupied an important strategic location although
wavering in between the Southeast Asia or South Asia as its politico-legal structure,
history and geopolitical setting changed over the times. As a sovereign kingdom,
which many historians agree to have started in the 33 AD, its geo-political setting was
aligned in the Southeast Asian region, a position which continued into existence even
during the British paramountcy. As it had attracted attention of the imperial powers in
the past, the present location of Manipur as a part of the Indian Union since 1949,
bordering a fragile and military ruled country called Myanmar of the South East
Asian Nation continues to attract the eye of those countries who are interested in this
region.
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The term geopolitics has long been used to refer to the study of the geographical
representations and practices that underpin world politics. The word ‘geopolitics’ has
in fact undergone something of a revival in recent years. The term is now used freely
to refer to such phenomena as international boundary disputes, the structure of global
finance, and geographical patterns of election results (Agnew John, 1998, 2). Here,
when global war on terror is in place and different revolutionary groups and resistance
movements have been termed as anti human and terror organization, there is need to
study and differentiate between the terror groups and the people who are fighting for
self-determination. The Chapter begins with an introduction the physical setting and
ethnic composition. Then it proceeds with a brief historical prelude, and examines the
geopolitical setting of Manipur in the context of the political geography in an attempt
to identify the major elements of the geopolitical approach in a specific historicogeographical context, starting with the British Imperial interest, as a “Flower on the
Lofty Heights” (E. Nilakanta, 1999) by the Japanese during the World war II, and its
merger with India Union in 1949, which altered its spatial location altogether and also
formed a strategic part of India both in terms of trade and military. Finally, it deals
with the emergence of insurgency and associated problems in the state.
2.1 Physical Setting & Ethnic Composition
With a total area of 22,327 Sq.Km. present day Manipur is divided between Hills and
valley. The valley account for only of 2,238 Sq.Km. that is only 10.02percent of total
area, but it represents 58.85 percent of the total population of state, which is
27,21,756 (2011 Census). Its hill areas with 20,089 Sq.Km. represent 41.15 percent of
population. With about 350 Km. of international border with Burma (now Myanmar)
Manipur is bounded by upper Burma in the east, Chin Hills of Burma in the southeast,
Nagaland in the north, Mizoram in the south and southwest and Assam in the west.
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The state is presently having nine administrative districts including five in hills
namely Churachandpur, Ukhrul, Chandel, Tamenglong and Senapati and four in
valley which includes Imphal East, Imphal West, Bishenpur and Thoubal.
Map 2 District Map of Manipur
The arrival of British brought about major changes in the boundary of Manipur, thus
undermining its own notion of geopolitics. For example, the Kabaw Valley became a
part of Burma officially in 1834 in return of compenzation (Tarapot, Phanjoubam,
2003, 125). Regarding the Kabaw Valley, Sir R Temple said, “Then there came some
territorial adjustment of the Eastern frontier of the Kingdom of Upper Burma, and we
actually had to arrange for a small transfer of territory from Manipur to Burma in
consideration of which the Maharaja was glad to receive a small sum per annum in
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rupees” (quoted in Sanajaoba, 1993, 126). Secondly, in 1834 it was declared by the
Governor General and the Supreme Council of Hindoostan, “With regard to the two
ranges of hills the one called the Kalanaga Range, and the other called the Noonjai
Range, which are situated between the eastern bend of the Barak, and the western
bend of the Barak, we will give up all claim on the part of the honourable Company
thereunto, and give him (the King) the line of the Jiri and the western bend of the
Barak as a boundary, provided that the Rajah agrees to the whole of what is written in
this paper which is given in the agreement between Rajah Gumbhir singh and
Commissioner F. J. Grant in the year 1835 (Sanajaoba, 1993, 19).
The Marquess of Ripon, in rising to call attention to the papers relating to the affairs
of Manipur lately laid before the house, and referring to the state of Manipur, he said
“ it is a small state probably until these events took place very little known to your
Lordships, unless, indeed, some of you may have heard of it as the birthplace of the
game of Polo; but it is a protected state, which has been under our protection for a
considerable time, and where we have had for long a political Agent to represent us.
In the year 1851 the Government of India took a step , in guaranteeing the then
Maharaja in the possession of his state, which made somewhat closer our connection
with that state than it had before” (Proceedings of the House of lords on Manipur,
1891, quoted in Sanajaoba, 1993, 169).
Finally, according to the Pemberton Report in 1935, the territory of Muneepoor was
declaraed to lie the routes leading from the districts of Sylhet and Cachar to the
Ningthee river, and central portion of the northern province of Ava (Proceedings of
the House of lords on Manipur, 1891, quoted in Sanajaoba, 1993, 21) The territory
comprised within the boundaries thus specified, occupies an area of 7000 square
miles, of which a valley of 650 miles of rich alluvial soil, constitute the central
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portion; the remainder is formed by an encircling zone of hilly and mountainous
country inhabited by various tribes, who have all been brought under subjection to the
paramount authority of Muneepoor (Proceedings of the House of lords on Manipur,
1891, quoted in Sanajaoba, 1993, 23).
2.1.1 Landlocked and Buffer State & Underdevelopment
Manipur was not considered to be landlocked until the Indian sub-continent was
divided into India and Pakistan. Before Manipur came under the control of British
India, the state connected with Chittagong tract of Northern Bangladesh and accessed
easily upto the Brahmaputra River and the Barak River on the western boundary and
the Chidween River in the Burmese side on the eastern border away from the coastal
area. After the merger with India Manipur has become a landlocked state. Even the
states of Northeast altogether can be considered as landlocked though M. S. Prabhakra
(2004) would prefer to call them internally locked by the existing conditions on
infrastructures and socio-political developments in the region.
Manipur is linked to the Indian mainland by a slender 21 Km corridor through North
Bengal. At present there are four roadways which came under the category of
National Highways. These four national highways are the major roads. But of all
these National Highways are all-weathered road, the National Highway No. 39 goes
from Nagaland border in the Northern side to Moreh, a border town adjacent to
Myanmar border. Next important national highway is the NH 53 which connects
Imphal and Silchar in Assam. Whenever there is blockade in NH 39, people use it as
an alternative route. On the eastern side of Manipur lies Myanmar. This not only
makes Manipur a strictly landlocked region of India but also render the state very
much isolated from the international community on account of ‘closed door’ policy of
India towards the eastern neighbours known as the ‘Protected Area Permit (PAP)’
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system imposed in the region. Under the system, no foreigner is allowed to stay in the
Northeastern states beyond ten days. Along with the policy of discouraging foreign
tourists in the name of ‘security’ virtual absence of tourism related infrastructure like
roads, hospitality based institutions such as hotels, restaurants, recreation centres,
theme parks, gardens, holiday resorts and high-tech banking, etc. have been making
tourism a non-starter.
Land-lockedness and mountainous topography of the Noreastern region of India in
general, and Manipur in particular, were considered to be chief factors for
underdevelopment until recently. Landlocked states can be defined as those countries
with no direct coastal access to the sea and thus also to maritime trade. Being
landlocked, these states are deprived of the cheapest means of transport/shipping,
putting them in a disadvantageous position as compared to coastal countries. Going
by this definition, Manipur is a landlocked state and thus vulnerable in terms of the
following points. First, such states are vulnerable on their own account and secondly,
on account of being dependent on one or more transit states or countries.
Neighbouring states and countries enjoy the leverage to extract economic and military
incentives to block their access to the sea or transit through their territory. Secondary
higher transport costs incurred by whatever infrastructure deficiencies, delays, fees or
procedures in the transit state make the land leg of the shipping of goods from and to
landlocked countries very costly and oblige the landlocked state to maintain high level
of inventory. In fact, for most landlocked states, high transport cost is the single most
prominent hurdle to their equitable access to global markets and competition with
other states. Inaccessibility may, of course, be due essentially to physical factors - of
extent, altitude, relief, climate and vegetation cover - but the situation may also reflect
a low degree of social control of the environment.
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Map 3: Manipur in Asia
Manipur is also treated as ‘buffer zone’, strategically positioned between Myanmar
and China. In the present context ‘buffer’ by analogy relates to familiar apparatus at
railway stations or on motor cars, and has the sense of ‘shock absorber’. ‘Buffer State’
refers to small or weak state between two large ones diminishing the chance of
hostilities. By virtue of this, there is always chance for ‘step-motherly’ treatment by
the Central Government. S0, the existence of one land-locked State, with lands lying
around the centre of the continent, has an obvious convenience to all the seaboard
States for defence and for administration.
2.1.2 Ethnic Composition
Of the three major ethnic groups, the Meiteis mostly settled in the valley constitute
the largest segment of state population which is classified as non-tribal and the hills
are the abode of the remaining Naga and Kuki groups with their sub-tribes. Muslims,
locally called Pangals who from East Bengal of British period, erstwhile East Pakistan
and Bangladesh form about 8 percent of state populations are also mostly settled in
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the central valley. Remaining non-tribal populations known as Mayangs (outsiders),
are from different parts of the country. Meiteis, the Vaishnavite Hindus are not only
debarred from special constitutional privileges granted to Scheduled Tribes but not
even permitted under state Land Reform Act to settle in the hill districts. However,
there is no such restriction on Nagas and Kukis, who are largely Christians to settle in
the valley. This is one of the reasons for a gap of mistrust between Meiteis and the hill
tribes. In the absence of any social homogeneity these various ethnic groups maintain
their respective distinct identities.
The Christian Missionaries, who followed the British flag in Manipur and landed
there in 1894 gradually, converted the tribes into Christianity. In 1901 census there
were only eight Christians against 60 percent Hindus, 36 percent tribes and four
percent Muslims (Sanajaoba, 2003, 220). But by 1991 the number of Christian
population in this state increased to 34.11 percent. However, the percentage of Hindu
population was reduced to 57. 67 percent and the number of Muslims increased to
7.27 percent of state population. According to census report the Christian population
of the state is almost the same, but it would have increased if some places like
Paomata, Purul and Mao-Maram (2001 census) are included. Thus, through
Christianization of the native tribes they not only cut off the latter from the mainland
of this country but also debarred them to integrate in the socio-cultural national
stream with their new religion. This was a major obstacle against their constitutional
integration in post Independence India. Wide socio-cultural gaps even between the
Hindu Meiteis of Manipur valley and the Christian tribes of the hill areas became a
permanent source of their socio-political rivalry.
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2.2 Brief Historical Background
The State of Manipur is one of the earliest states in the continent of Asia, including
the Indian sub-continent. The independent political history of Manipur has been
recorded in the Royal Chronicle known as “Cheitharol Kumbaba”. This ancient Asian
State was known by different names to different countries. The Manipuris, themselves
knew the State by as many as 22 (twenty two) names in different ages and at different
times (Kabui, 1991). It was known as ‘Poirei Meitei Leipak’ or ‘Kangleipak’ to the
indigenous people of Manipur or Meiteis; ‘Kathe’ or ‘Ponnas’ to the Burmese; ‘Hsiao
Po-lo-mein’ to the Chinese; ‘Cassay’ to the Shans; ‘Moglai’ to the Cacharis and
Bengalis and ‘Mekle’ to the Assamese (as well as to the British in the 18th Century)
in the pre-Christian period. Manipur Kingdom was known to various medieval
historical periods to advanced races and nations including one of Middle West people
of Europe by different names (Kabui, 1991).
The location is identified with places within the jurisdiction of Tugma, Triglipton,
Mareura and Kirrhadia as per the sources of Ptolemy. The early state of
Pragjyotishpur or, Kamrup or, present Indian state of Assam has been for millennia a
buffer between State of Manipur and State of India. All the available maps available
with India depict Manipur as an independent state till the state’s merger with the
Indian Union in 1949.Manipur was under independent monarchial system of
governance enjoying the status of princely state till the British annexed it in 1891.
(http://archive.org/stream/Memorandum..).
The time from the founding of the Ningthouja principality in A.D. 33 upto A.D. 428
falls into a period by itself. There was a settled condition in the principality under the
strong government. A.D. 429 to A.D. 1074 is old period. A.D. 1074 to 1709 is early
medieval period. Shan influence was strong from 1074 to 1469. The year 1470 is an
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important watershed in the cultural history of Manipur as worship of Vishnu is
supposed to have started in this year. The Kabaw valley became a part of Manipur in
1470 and the river Ningthee River became its eastern boundary (Kabui, 1991).
Immigrants from the rest of India came in small batches but without stop, settled in
Manipur and merged in its population augmenting the Manipuri speaking population.
The last day of the year 1485 was an important landmark in the history of the
chronicle. On that day, the institution of Cheithaba was introduced. Under the
institution, a ceremony was held before the king at the end of every year (Manipuri).
A previously selected man imprecated on his head all the misfortunes that might
otherwise befall the king and the country in the following year and pray that they
might be spared. The man was called Cheithaba (Kabui, 1991). Before the Burmans
arrived in the Irrawaddy valley about the ninth century A.D. from their mountainhome in China, the Manipuris were a settled people in the Manipur valley. The first
recorded contact with Burmans was in 1563, through armed conflict (Kabui, 1991,
25).
The dominion of Manipur in 1500 A.D. as provided by Caroline Courtauld (1984)
exhibits that its boundary lines stand at 93 degree East to 95.15 degree East longitudes
and 22.65 degree North to 25.70 degree North latitudes. The boundaries are tabulated
and demarcating place names are plotted out as under:
“There lies Thibomei (present Kohima Town, the capital of Nagaland) on the north,
the left bank of Ningthi/ Chindwin river where the Laiyi/Ngari/ Nariya river after
meeting with the Tazy river empties to the Chindwin at Tamanthi on the North-East,
Moungryaung ( present Sagain state of Myanmar) on the east, Chin hills on the south,
Changhai and Cholam (both present in Mizoram) on the south west and Silchand and
Maibong on the west” (Courtauld C, 1984, 22).
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Meitei-Lord-King Kiyamba (1467-1508 A.D.), the founder of the foreign diplomatic
policy in Manipur, had established foreign diplomat relation between the Meitei and
the Pong/Bong (the Tai-Mao or Mao-Shan) kingdom capitalised at Mogaung (the
present Mogaung town in the southernmost district of the same name in the Kachin
stage of Myanmar) and their allied force attack the Myanmar dominion in or about
1470 A.D (Courtauld 1984, 23). This attack conquered some part of the dominion of
Myanmar King and the conquered area was divided between the two allied. Thus,
Kiyamba was in the position of possession of a dominion in the Mirap-shan more than
the Kase-shan of the then Burma.
During the reign of Garib Niwaz, the Burmese capital was located at Sagaing, just on
the right bank of the river Irrawaddy, known to Manipuries alternatively as the
Airavati (located at the latitude about 24 degree 51 mins. North and Longitude 96
degree East). In December, 1739 Garib Niwaz invade Saigaing and conquest
Saigaing. As per the Burmese and Manipuri accounts, he occupied Sagaing and force
his way into Kaungmuda pagoda, which had four doors, on which Garib Niwaz made
deep marks with his sword in commemoration of his conquest of Sagaing (Jhaljit,
2009, 218). R.K. Jhlajit asserts, “By expanding the territorial limits of Manipur
beyond its territorial limits towards both the east over the Kabo valley and the west to
Cachar, Garib Niwaz proved that he was out to become a major Asian power to rise
above the constraints of the natural barriers to which all his predecessors succumbed”
(Jhaljit, 2009, 218).
Constant skirmishes with the Burmans necessitated Manipur to enter into the Anglo
Manipuri Treaty (14th September 1762), signed between Harray Das Gussein, acting
on behalf of Jai Singh and Mr.HarryVerelst, Chief of Chittagong Factory on behalf of
the British. Article No. 8 of the Treaty states, “Jai Singh shall not enter into any
36
accommodation with the Burmah Rajah without the advice and approbation of the
English nor shall the English enter into a separate and distinct treaty with the Burmah
Rajah without previously advising the said Jai Singh”. This was also agreed that the
said Englishmen were to reside in Meckley (Sic. Manipur) as merchants in the full
terms as privileges as stipulated in the Treaty (Sanajaoba, 1993, 15). In 1819 the
Burmese invaded Manipur and the reigning king, Marjit, fled to Cachar. They
returned to Manipur in 1825 with the help of the British.
2.2.1 British Imperial Interest in Manipur:
Because of the location and status of a regional power, Manipur had always occupied
a central strategic position right from the British imperial expansion. Geopolitics of
imperial powers coupled with strategic location, played a pivotal role in shaping the
history of Manipur. After the Battle of Plassey, the British East India Company
(hereafter the Company) annexed the Chittagong Hill Tract in 1760 from the Nawab
of Bengal. In a subsequent development the company acquired the dewani (revenue
collecting authority) of Bengal in 1765 and gradually its power reached the borders of
Sikkim, Bhutan, Cooch Behar, Assam and Arrakan, besides the Garo and Khasi Hills
(Chaube, 1999, 3). Since 1760, there was ceaseless expansion of the Company’s
power and influence over the well functioning kingdoms located in the confluence of
South and South-East Asia.
The first half of the 18th century and early part of the 19th century witnessed constant
wars between Manipur and Burma. During the reign of Pamheiba alias Garibniwaz
(1714-54) Manipur as a regional power reached its zenith during his reign, Manipuri
forces defeated the Burmese army in 1725, 1735, 1738, 1739 and 1749 (Sanajaoba,
2005, xliv) thereby containing Burmese expansion and intrusion towards states of
Ahom, Cachar and Manipur. However in the post Pamheiba period the power
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equation was tilted in favour of Burma which subsequently led to the Burmese
devastation of Manipur in 1755-58, 1769 and 1819-1826 and subsequently, the
Burmese came in to fill up the power vacuum. On the other hand, from the middle of
the 18th to the early part of 19th century there was constant competition for colonial
possessions and market in South and South East Asia among the British, the French
and the Portuguese. So, the French and the Portuguese supplied tactical weapons and
guns to the Burmese who were opposing the British intrusion in its sphere of
influence. Thus, the Alaungpaya rises from the ordinary ranks to the highest position
of ruler which led to the establishment of a strong Konbaung dynasty by consolidating
the human and material resources of a greater, stronger and enlarged Burma.
Conversely the abdication of King Pamheiba was followed by almost ritualistic palace
intrigues and fratricidal wars for throne. The occurrence of natural calamities such as
floods and epidemics (Sanajaoba 2005, xiv-vi) during the same period led to the
decline of Manipur’s power and position. Against this backdrop of shifting power
equation and constant Burmese invasion of Manipur, Raja Gourshyam of Manipur
concluded Anglo-Manipur defence treaty in 1762.
In the circumstances Manipur needed a friendly diplomatic relation with the British to
protect her sovereignty against the frequent Burmese invasion. For the British, allying
with Manipur was essential to consolidate, protect and advance her imperial interests,
both political and commercial, in Assam (Ahom), Burma and in greater South-East
Asia. In the British perspective, a stronger and stable Manipur was inevitable to
counter the Burmese expansion towards Ahom (Assam), Cachar and Jaintia Hills.
British calculation was borne out true when Burmese invasion and occupation of
Manipur in 1819 led to the former’s influence and domination over Ahom, Jaintia
Hills and Cachar, which were British sphere of influence.
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The British on the eve of the Anglo-Burmese War in 1824, Mr. Swinion sent a letter
to David Scott stating that the British has “decided to establish Manipur as an
independent buffer state between Burma and the British India in the North to make
British interests more conducive” (quoted in Sanajaoba, 2003). Subsequently, the
Government of India also wrote, “His Lordship in Council is decidedly of the opinion
that the favourable opportunity should not lose for enabling a friendly Chief like
Gambhir Singh to establish and regain independent Government between us and the
Burmese. By assisting Gambhir Singh to recover Manipur, we should impose most
powerful and effectual check on the Burmese” (Sanajaoba, 2003).
The British declared war against Burma on 4th March 1824. It was convergence of
interest between Manipur and British against the common enemy (sic Burma) that
Manipur Levy of 500 strong soldiers under Gambhir Singh and Nara Singh fought the
invading Burmese along with British soldiers. After the conclusion of the first Anglo
Burmese War by an article of the Treaty of Yandaboo on 24th February 1826, the
independent political status of Manipur was restored with Gambhir Singh as its king
in recognition of his the heroic contribution in driving away the Burmese from Cachar
and Manipur during the First Anglo-Burmese War and in pursuit of the considerate
British policy of maintaining Manipur as an independent buffer state between Burma
and the British India. After the Treaty of Yandaboo, Manipur was referred to as an
“Asiatic Power in Alliance with the Queen”. The strategic significance of Manipur
was borne out by the fact that both British and Manipuri soldiers even took joint
expeditions such as Burmese expedition in 1825, Naga Hills expedition of 1879, and
third Anglo-Burmese war of 1885–86. In the third Anglo-Burmese war (1885-86)
Burma was defeated and she came under the control of British. The British
perspective on the political status of Manipur was essentially to create a buffer state
39
between the British Indian and the Burmese empires in order to enhance the interests
of British Indian Empire (Dena 1991, 9).
In 1891, after the Anglo Manipur War there was a debate in the British Parliament
regarding the type of political treatment to be given to Manipur. Sir R. Temple
remarked,
[…] Let me remind the House that Manipur holds a very important
position, for it is the half-way house between the Assam and Upper
Burma. It is essentially a point – strategically and politically – on our
Eastern Indian frontier which must be traversed by all expeditions of a
political and military character between Bengal and Burma; therefore, its
geography is of the highest importance (Proceedings of the British House
of Commons on Manipur, 1891, quoted in Sanajaoba, 1993, 82).
To this Mr. Bryce (Aberdeen, S.) said, “I quite agree with the Hon. Baronet (Sir R.
Temple) as to the strategic importance of Manipur as to the route to Assam from
Burma: but I should regret a policy of annexation” (Proceedings of the British House
of Commons on Manipur, 1891, quoted in Sanajaoba, 1993, 83). The reason why the
British Empire wanted to keep Manipur under their domain is specifically the
geostrategic location and its importance. Had there been no geostrategic importance
of this state the British would have never touched this state which has no economic
and resource importance. The proceedings of British Parliament on Manipur
Hansards, 1891 to Sanad, 1918 really gives the reason more clearly (Sanajaoba,
1993). The political mechanism that ensued was that of dual administration, whereby
the power of the king was completely withdrawn, and British Political Agent as Vice
President of the Durbar wielded power, Manipur became a colony of the British.
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Writing against the backdrop of European powers’ occupation of third world
countries, prominent British historian Eric Hobsbawn opined that independence of
third world countries were mainly rested “either on their convenience as buffer-states
(as in Siam-now Thailand-which divided the British and French zones in South-east
Asia, or Afghanistan; which separated Britain and Russia), on the inability of rival
imperial powers to agree on a formula for division, or on their sheer sise” (Hobsbawn
2002, 57). One can argue that Manipur lost its significance by virtue of being a buffer
zone between British India and Burma. Ultimately the British also put Manipur under
their control as a consequence of Anglo-Manipur war of 1891, the last war that
Manipur fought as an independent nation against any foreign power. The war of 1891
removed the lone independent country between the British India and British Burma;
by virtue of Manipur’s defeat in the war she became part of British Empire consisting
of whole of South Asia, Burma and Malaya in South-East Asia. The onset of World
War II and Japan’s expansion in Asia-Pacific region and occupation of countries of
South-East Asia only reinforced the strategic importance of Manipur.
2.2.2 Japanese Imperial Expansion:
In the 20th century, geographically, Manipur as well as the so-called the North-East
presented a buffer zone between Indian sub-continent and South-East Asia. The
strategic importance of Manipur became all the more evident, when looked against
the backdrop of imperial powers’ colonization of South and South East Asia. In
political sense, the region acted as the interface between the imperial powers that were
consolidating and expanding their sphere of domination on and across the interface.
One may observe that British’s competition with the France and the Netherlands later
on with Japan for the possession; consolidation and defence of their colonies in
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South-East Asia had put Manipur into central stage of British and Japanese
geopolitical thinkers particularly during the period of the World War II.
Japan, a small country, which emerged as a major colonial power in the later phases
of the history, considerably expanded its sise by way of colonizing Asiatic countries
and transforming itself into a large empire. The clash of colonial ambitions of Japan
with those of European and Western powers was one fundamental factor for spilling
over World War II in Asia. By the beginning of 20th century, Japan emerged as a
formidable imperial power in the Asia-Pacific, opening a new chapter of
confrontation with the European powers ultimately plunging the South-East Asia into
a bloody war for a prolonged period.
2.2.3 The Battle of Imphal:
The Japanese occupation of South-East Asia had converted Manipur once again into a
buffer zone between Japan and British India bringing the war to the doorstep of
British Empire and Manipur remained the last bastion of Allied’s counter attack. In
view of the strategic vitality and urgency to consolidate and launch an offensive,
Britain had initiated construction and widening of Imphal-Dimapur, Imphal-Tiddim
and Imphal-Tamu roads from the later part of 1942 in order to ensure speedy
movement of troops and other logistic supplies besides the development and
construction of Koirengei airport, Tulihal airport and one temporary airport near
Pallel. On the other hand after the conquest of Burma in the early part of 1942,
Japanese were planning for the next move whether to defend what they had conquered
or to push on in India. In 1943 certain disturbing events and reports began to cause
concern in the Japanese High Command and led to the revision of their strategy. In
the north the Chinese Army were reorganising and developing with American
assistance to press for an early Allied offensive to re-open the Burma Road. In
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Manipur the British were reported to be developing a base and making roads
eastwards and southwards from that place. Such events clearly indicate the impending
Allied offensive. The best option left before the Japanese was to forestall the attack by
destroying the base from which the British would launch their attack (Evans and
Brett-James 1962, 54-57). During this atmosphere that a decision was taken in
September 1943 to issue orders to 15th Army to prepare plans for the invasion of
Manipur and capture of Imphal. General Mutaguchi, with his senior commanders,
went ahead to make the detailed plans for what was termed Operation ‘U’ (Evans and
Brett-James 1962, 59). This operation was to be executed by 15, 31, 33 Divisions and
the best part of Ist Division Indian National Army under the overall command of
General Mutaguchi.
The 33 Division had to advance towards Imphal on March 7, 1944 from Tiddim and
Tamu and to attack the British 17 Division and 20 Division while the Japanese 15
Division had to start advancing towards north-west Imphal through Ukrul district of
Manipur and the Japanese 31 Division had to advance directly to Kohima on March
15, 1944. The task assigned to 15 and 31 Divisions was to capture Imphal and
Kohima and to prevent British reinforcement. This enables the Japanese to
consolidate their position and ultimately further advance towards British India. At the
same time, the British 20 Division on the Chindwin front, 23 Division and 254 Tank
Brigade in Imphal valley, 17 Division around Tiddim were preparing to engage
Japanese troops. It is not wrong to emphasise that the British and the Japanese troops
engaged in one of the bloodiest and decisive battles in Imphal. The faith of the
Japanese position in the South-East Asia so much depended on the outcome of battle
at Imphal. This can be gleaned from the Special Order of the Day issued by General
Mutaguchi:
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This operation will engage the attention of the whole world and is eagerly
awaited by 100,000,000 of our countrymen. By its very decisive nature,
its success will have a profound effect upon the course of the war and
may even lead to its conclusion. Our mission is thus of the greatest
importance and we must expend every energy and talent in the
achievement of our goal (quoted in Evans and Brett-James, 1962, 111).
Among the important battles in Manipur mention can be made of the Battle of
Sangshak and Tank Battle around Bishenpur. By April 1944 the Japanese were on the
verge of capturing Imphal, but the British troops with support from Royal Air Force,
Indian Air Force and American Air Force withstood the Japanese offensive. By June
1944 General Slim’s Fourteenth Army successfully withstood the Japanese offensive
and launched a massive counter attack and by the end of June 1944 the Japanese were
defeated.
2.3 Merger with the Indian Union:
At the time of Indian independence, India was divided into two parts – “British
India”, which was under the direct control of the Indian Office in London and the
Governor-General of India, and the “Princely states,” the territories over which the
Crown had suzerainty, but which were under the control of the native rulers. In
addition, there were several colonial enclaves controlled by France and Portugal. The
political integration of these territories into India was a declared objective of the
Indian National Congress, which the Government of India pursued over the next
decade. Vallabhbhai Patel and V. P. Menon convinced the rulers of almost all of the
hundreds of princely states to accede to India. Although this process successfully
integrated the vast majority of princely states into India, it was not as successful in
relation to states such as Kashmir, Hyderabad, Tripura and Manipur. Therefore, Patel
44
and Menon used instruments of treaties to co-opt the rulers of princely states. The first
treaty was the Standstill Agreement, which confirmed that the agreements and
administrative practices that existed as between the princely state in question and the
British would be continued by India. The second was the Instrument of Accession, by
which the ruler of the princely state in question agreed to the accession of his
kingdom to independent India, and to granting Indian control over specified subject
matters (Ramusack 2004, p. 273). The states which had internal autonomy under the
British signed an Instrument of Accession which only ceded three subjects to the
government of India such as defence, external affairs, and communications, in
accordance with the Government of India Act 1935.
Between 1947 and 1949, smaller states that were not seen by the Government of India
to be viable administrative units were merged either into neighbouring provinces, or
with other princely states to create a “princely union” (Copland 1997, 262). This
policy involved the dissolution of the very states whose existence India had only
recently guaranteed in the Instruments of Accession. Patel and Menon emphasised
that without integration, the economies of states would collapse. They pointed out that
many of the smaller states were very small and lacked resources to sustain their
economies and support their growing populations (Menon, 1956, 193-194). Although
the Merger Agreements were principally intended for smaller, non-viable states, they
were also applied to a few larger states. Kutch in western India, and Tripura and
Manipur in North-East India, all of which lay along international borders, was also
asked to sign Merger Agreements, despite being larger states, following which they
became Chief Commissioners’ Provinces.
The mode of integration of the Manipur and the other states of Northeast has been
sought through negotiations, promises, baits and force. These attempts at assimilation
45
of the region and its people with the Indian mainstream have resulted in resentments
amongst different ethnic communities. Some areas like Manipur and Naga Hills
refused to merge with India and expressed desire for withdrawal from the Union
which resulted in secessionist demands and prompted withdrawal declarations from
several quarters (Haokip, 2011, 232).
2.3.1 Manipur’s Integration with India
After the end of British suzerainty, Manipur enjoyed a brief period of independence in
terms of putting in place a democratic constitution with the monarch as the
constitutional head of the state, and holding of a democratic general election based on
the principles of adult franchise. On midnight of 14th August, 1947, Manipur
promulgated the Manipur State Constitution Act, 1947 on 26th September, 1947 with
announcement by Maharaja Bodhchandra Singh that election would be held within
eight months. With the holding of the election based on universal adult franchise in
June, 1948, the Maharaja inaugurated the first Assembly Session on 18th October,
1948. Once Manipur was forcefully merged with India, the State Assembly with 53
seats, which enjoyed the mandate of the people and which was in place before the
instance of merger, was dissolved and the Asiatic Kingdom was degraded to the status
of a Part C State.
The signing of the Manipur Merger Agreement on 21st September, 1949 subsequently
led to the integration of Manipur to the Indian Union on October 15th, 1949 (Singh,
1988, 93). Finally, with the signing of the Merger Agreement, the Manipur State
Constitution Act, 1947, and the democratically elected Manipur State Assembly were
dissolved by promulgating two orders, namely, the Manipur (Administration) Order,
1949 and the State’s Merger (Chief Commissioner’s Provinces) Order, 1950 (Singh,
1988, 125 & 127). However, merger with the Indian Union resulted in the suspension
46
of the sovereignty of the erstwhile ancient kingdom. The emergence of armed
opposition movement is, today, understood to be on account of the forced annexation
of Manipur in 1949. Since then, the armed movement for restoration of sovereignty
and self-determination has been the scourge of Manipur and disturbing the
neighbouring regions. Insurgency centres around not only on historical and cultural
configurations but also on the centrality of geopolitical imagination both by the nonstate actors and the Indian State itself. In other words, understanding insurgency
problems from the perspective of geopolitics can help in bringing about a lasting
solution and peace in the state.
The contentious merger was resisted through an armed movement led by legendary
leader Hijam Irabot. His idea of an independent Manipur was endorsed by the people
of Manipur at a public meeting on 3rd August, 1949. Under the banner of Manipur
Students’ Federation a protest was registered by hoisting “Black Flag” and holding a
meeting at Porompat, Imphal East, on 15th August, 1949. All political parties, except
the Manipur Congress Party (which itself was divided on the merger issue), passed
resolutions against the merger. Possible tragic consequence of the merger was
anticipated by a lot of intelligentsia. Media reported on the possible bad consequences
of the merger (Nag, 2002).
2.4 Strategic Importance of Manipur in the Changing Geopolitical Landscape of the
world
Manipur’s colonial encounter marked the integration of the region to global
capitalism albeit imperialism. Shift from feudal mode of production to capitalism did
not necessarily mean emergence of native bourgeoisie or a working class, as
establishment of factories and other manufacturing units were conspicuously absent.
Inherent logic of imperial integration was extraction of surplus from any given source
47
viz. forest, agriculture or others. Moreover, in the eyes of the colonial power, the
region was regarded as an ‘enchanted frontier’ and an essential security zone towards
its extension or preservation of power in the South East corridor.
With departure the British from the continent and the region’s integration with the
successor - India, expectations of the paradigm shift in the development framework
have been deluded with massive poverty and underdevelopment still persisting.
Development debate on the North-East continued to be perceived as complex and
inconclusive in mainstream Indian economic discourse. Explanations of the region’s
underdevelopment from different vantage positions underscored the geographical
location, topography, cultural traits of the indigenous population, scarcity of resources
and skilled manpower among a horde of other factors as impediments to development.
Policies and descriptions have not been able to successfully transform economic
landscape of the region (Indrakumar and Thangjam, 2010, 3).
Notion of numerous variables regarded as barrier to development in the region
continued to be ‘preserved’ by the Indian State in the post-independent era. For
example, the region was termed as landlocked inhabiting a hostile geographical
terrain, and that such are the impediments to development (Indrakumar and
Thangjam, 2010, 1). To some extent, it is true that the present geography of NorthEast possesses characters of land-lockedness; it is enclosed by land on all sides and
thus it suffers from lack of sea route or access to sea ports. However, such a
proposition is devoid of historical truth as the present map of North-East is a creation
mainly driven by ‘partition’ of Bengal in the west, appeasement policy to Myanmar in
the South East. As a result, historical trade routes and access to sea across the
Chittagong Hill Tracts (for example Cox Bazaar) in present day Bangladesh was
48
severed and access to the Chindwin River that flows into the Bay of Bengal denied
(Indrakumar and Thangjam, 2010, 1).
New Delhi proposed a deep sea port at Cox’s Bazaar district of Greater Chittagong
which is located at only 75 Kms. from South Tripura township of Sabrum. The
proposed port was mainly to facilitate movement of transhipment cargo to NorthEastern India. Currently shipping lines that ferry cargo to Bangladesh have to unload
at Haldia or Kolkata port (http://defence.pk/threads/deep-sea-port-in-making-way-togo.24876/page-3). However, Bangladesh was reluctant to co-operate the deep sea port
venture, on the ground that the Chittagong port was unable to cater to the domestic
demands of Bangladesh. New Delhi then proposed to open a new route for the region
through Myanmar avoiding Bangladesh. The proposed port is at Akyab (Sittwe) port
on the Bay of Bengal in Myanmar as a transit seaport for a sea-and-river trade route
for the North-East region through Mizoram. The new plan envisages goods
transportation from Akyab along the river Kaladan to Mizoram. The distance between
Kaladan to Mizoram is less than 200 Km. Opening an alternative new route for the
North-East ships can also sail to Kolkata or Visakhapattanam from Akyab.
What has shaped India’s imagination of the North-East, from landlocked to ‘potential
area of opportunity’ (after nearly six decades) is its eagerness to go ahead with its
Look East Policy. The current official understanding is, “the Northeast is a region rich
in resources. However, due to lack of access, the potentials have always been
underutilised. A gateway through Burma will allow a resource-led growth in the
Northeast” (Chatterjee, 2009). But the question remains, whether the Look East
Policy stands to benefit the people of the region or not. For more than six decades
after the departure of the British, if India has made North-East region a dependent
region on finished goods from mainland India, without developing the manufacturing
49
bases, the Look East Policy cannot be looked upon without suspicion, as such an
extension and integration into a larger economic block suggests to convert the region
into a transit route and highway economy.
2.4.1 Chinese Threat and Geopolitical Significance of the Northeast and Manipur
China ever since its emergence as a monolithic communist state in 1949 was involved
in boundary disputes with virtually every nation on its peripheries which led to border
wars with the former Soviet Union, Vietnam and India. The border wars were
perceived by China as punitive wars. China undertook boundary settlements with
virtually all countries with which the country had disputes with the exception of India
(https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/dhakamails/conversations/topics/4312). China
laid large territorial claims in the Indian territory in the Ladakh region, Himachal
Pradesh, hills of Uttar Pradesh, the whole of the then North-East Frontier Agency
(NEFA) now called Arunachal Pradesh, right up to hills of the Assam, Sikkim.
Arunachal Pradesh acquired an independent political status in January 20th 1972,
when it was declared as Union Territory, an administrative division of India ruled
directly by the national government. The state of Arunachal Pradesh Bill was passed
by the Parliament in 1986 and with effect from February 20th 1987; Arunachal
Pradesh became the 24th State of Indian Union. Even though Arunachal Pradesh is
administrated by India as a state, China still claims most of it as a part of the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR). The Chinese also claims the Bhutan territory especially
the areas with Sikkim as their land. Thus, the apprehension that China is trying to help
Manipur and other rebellions in the Northeast cant be ignore at all.
The China factor has created more issues and the region is getting more militarised on
account of it. The Indian Government claims that violence in the Northeast India is
reducing except in Manipur and Nagaland, but they are continuously building up
50
military infrastructures. India’s strategic moves to deploy two additional army
mountain divisions to the Northeastern state of Assam will bring India’s troop levels
in the region to more than 100,000. India has taken some critical strategic decision to
countering emerging Chinese threats over claims on Arunachal Pradesh. The
deployment of the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, which has a flight range of 290
kms, in the eastern sector to strengthen its defence posture vis-à-vis China. A five
year expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in
the eastern sector is also underway. Already, there are 120,000 Indian troops stationed
in the eastern sector, supported by two Sukhoi 30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in
Assam. The distance from Tezpur to Tawang is 345 kms and from Tawang to the Line
of Actual Control (LAC) is 60 kms. The Sukhoi 30 MKI will cover the distance in
less than 15 minutes given its cruise speed of 860 mph (1380 Km/h) at 32780 ft
(10000 m) and 1350 Kmph over sea level (http://asifahmed081.blogspot.in/2012/08..).
2.5 Conclusion
Manipur had always occupied a central strategic position right from the British
imperial expansion into the region because of the former’s location and status of a
regional power. Geopolitics of imperial powers coupled with strategic location,
played a pivotal role in shaping the history of Manipur. Recognizing, the strategic
significance of Manipur, the British on the eve of the Anglo-Burmese War in 1824
decided to establish Manipur as an independent buffer state between Burma and the
British India in North to make British interests more conducive. The Treaty of
Yandaboo referred to Manipur as an “Asiatic Power in Alliance with the Queen”. The
strategic significant of Manipur was borne out by the fact that both British and
Manipur soldiers even took joint expeditions such as Burmese expedition in 1825,
Naga Hills expedition of 1879, and third Anglo-Burmese War of 1885–86. The
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British perspective on the political status of Manipur was essentially to create a buffer
state between the British Indian and the Burmese empires in order to enhance the
interests of British Indian Empire. However, after the Anglo Manipur War of 1891,
the British put Manipur under their control as a protectorate kingdom.
In the 20th century, the strategic importance of Manipur became all the more evident,
when looked against the backdrop of imperial powers colonization of South and South
East Asia. More precisely, the Battle of Imphal highlights the strategic importance of
Manipur with regard to the geopolitics of imperial powers such as British and Japan.
Geographically, Manipur, as well as the so-called the North-East presented a buffer
zone between the Indian sub-continent and South-East Asia. On account of their
strategic location, many neutral countries were dragged into wars among the imperial
powers. The Japanese occupation of South-East Asia had converted Manipur once
again into a buffer zone between Japan and British India. The event had brought the
war to the doorstep of British Empire and Manipur remained the last bastion of
Allied’s counter attack.
The strategic importance of Manipur was the primary reason behind the annexation of
the erstwhile kingdom by India. After British suzerainty lapsed on midnight 14
August 1947, Manipur promulgated the Manipur State Constitution Act, 1947 on 26
September 1947 with announcement by Maharaja Bodhchandra Singh that election
would be held within eight months. Once Manipur was forcefully merged with India,
the State Assembly was dissolved and the Asiatic Kingdom was degraded to the status
of a Part C State. With a total area of 22,327 Sq. Km. present day Manipur has about
350 Km. of international border with Myanmar. Moreover, the state in general and in
particular the Northeast Region’s proximity to China is also responsible for the level
of militarization in the region, and at the same time for regarding it as strategic.
52
Besides its strategic location, on the developmental path, notion of numerous
variables regarded as barrier to development in the region continued to ‘preserved’ by
the Indian State in the post-independent era. This includes hostile and mountainous
terrain and land-lockness. In short, development as an issue remains central in the
context of the North-East ever since the integration of the region into the world
capitalist system through the insinuation of the British colonial policy. It is only
recently, after India undertook neo-liberal reforms and in the context of the Look East
Policy, the region has received optimistic interests from the policy makers in New
Delhi. Today, it is also considered to be the land bridge between South Asia and
South East Asia, and in fact India’s Gate Way to the East. Geography ultimately has
given way to geo-politics of India and in this framing; geography of Manipur has
come to be understood as an opportunity.
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