Building Democracy in Burma
PRISCILLA CLAPP
Former U.S. Chief of Mission in Burma, 1999-2002
July 24, 2007
www.usip.org
Working Paper-02
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20036-3011
© 2007 by the United States Institute of Peace.
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United
States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions. This is a
working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the
author at [email protected].
About This Report
There is no easy answer to the question of whether and to what degree external actors
should intervene to trigger or force transition in extreme cases of autocratic or failed
governance. Often in the zeal to hasten the demise of bad regimes inadequate consideration is
given ahead of time to how the international community can best prepare a backward country
for effective democratic governance. Burma – a prime case of arrested development brought
about by decades of stubborn, isolationist military rule – provides ample illustration of this
dilemma.
The great hope for instant transition to democracy that was raised by the 1990
parliamentary elections in Burma was dashed almost immediately by the failure of the military
regime to seat the elected parliament.
Motivated by despair, many governments adopted
policies making regime change a sine qua non for engagement with Burma, hoping this would
force the military to follow through on its original promise to return to elected government.
Seventeen years later, however, the military remains firmly entrenched in power and the
country’s political, economic, and human resources have seriously deteriorated. Even if an
elected government could be seated tomorrow, it would find itself bereft of the institutions
necessary to deliver stable democratic rule.
Starting from the assumption that some degree of transition is inevitable in the not-toodistant future, this study explores the depth of Burma’s deprivations under military rule, focusing
on questions of how to make the country’s political, social, and economic institutions adequate
to the task of managing democratic governance.
It identifies the international mechanisms
available to assist in this task, as well as innate strengths that can still be found in Burma, and it
discusses what the limitations on assistance might be under various scenarios for political
transition. Concluding that some degree of political transition will have to be underway before it
will be possible to deliver effective assistance, the study suggests that the most productive
policy approaches will require greater coordination and collaboration with Burma’s Asian
neighbors.
About This Series
USIP Working Papers are unedited works in progress and may appear in future USIP
publications, peer-reviewed journals, and edited volumes. This product is only distributed online
and does not have a hard copy counterpart.
0
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
CONTENTS
Building Democracy in Burma....................................................................... 2
1. Introduction................................................................................................ 2
2. Historical Background ............................................................................... 6
3. Conditions in Burma Today ..................................................................... 14
3.1 The Nature of Military Governance .................................................... 14
3.2 Its Impact on the Economy ................................................................ 16
3.3 Governance and the Capacity of State Institutions ............................ 22
3.4 Health and Education......................................................................... 23
3.5 Rule of Law........................................................................................ 26
3.6 The State of Civil Society and Non-Governmental Institutions........... 26
3.7 Religious Institutions.......................................................................... 29
4. Considering the Possibilities for Transition.............................................. 31
4.1 The SPDC model for gradual transition ............................................. 31
4.2 Transition triggered by regime infighting or internal coup .................. 33
4.3 Transition triggered by an unexpected, unforeseen event ................. 34
4.4 Transition triggered by widespread social unrest/economic distress . 34
4.5 Violent Overthrow .............................................................................. 35
5. Challenging Traditional Notions of Transition and Democratization ........ 36
6. Burma’s Most Urgent Needs and Potential Areas of Strength................. 38
6.1 Economic ........................................................................................... 38
6.2 Political .............................................................................................. 43
6.3 Health and Education......................................................................... 45
6.4 Security.............................................................................................. 48
7. Sources of International Assistance ........................................................ 49
7.1 International Financial Institutions...................................................... 51
7.2 UN Agencies...................................................................................... 52
7.3 International NGOs ............................................................................ 53
7.4 Donor Governments .......................................................................... 54
7.5 Exile Resources................................................................................. 55
8. Adjusting International Assistance and Policy to Different Scenarios...... 56
9. Conclusions and Policy Implications ....................................................... 59
9.1 China and India.................................................................................. 60
9.2 ASEAN............................................................................................... 62
9.3 The United Nations ............................................................................ 63
9.4 The United States .............................................................................. 63
Appendix 1. Principles For Good International Engagement in Fragile
States ............................................................................................................. 67
ABOUT THE AUTHOR ...................................................................................... 72
ABOUT THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE .................................. 72
1
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
2
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE – WORKING PAPER
Building Democracy in Burma
Building Democracy in Burma
PRISCILLA CLAPP
Former U.S. Chief of Mission in Burma, 1999-2002
1. Introduction
Noted observers of trends in democratic transition reckon that the last quarter of
the twentieth century may prove to be “the greatest period of democratic ferment in the
history of modern civilization.”1 The disintegration of the Soviet Union and dissipation of
the East-West divide gave dramatic impetus to this trend, providing us with a wide
perspective on the process of political transition and the many pitfalls faced when
striving to replace entrenched autocracies with pluralistic liberal democracy. Eastern
European states under the sway of Soviet communism represent an example of
relatively stable and orderly transition in which political and economic development were
supported by a wealth of underlying institutions and encouraged by the prospect of
joining the European Union. On the other hand, former Soviet republics that became
independent states have, with the exception of the Baltics, experienced more difficulty
shedding the Soviet heritage of authoritarian government, centralized economic controls,
the culture of corruption, and unfamiliarity with individual rights and responsibilities
inherent in democracy to develop effective political and economic institutions. While
they have all experienced political transition, it has not necessarily brought these new
countries closer to liberal democratic governance.
The same period has seen generally positive trends in Asia, where a number of
countries formerly dominated by military regimes have undergone successful political
evolution toward democracy, buoyed by strong economic growth and the development of
free market economies. Economic globalization and the end of the cold war have also
given rise to political and economic liberalization in China and Vietnam, despite the
persistence of communist political structures. Both countries are now engaged in fullscale economic, social, and political reform that appears to be paving the way for
1
Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Second Edition), Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 1996, p. ix.
2
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
eventual pluralistic governance of some sort. By contrast, political transition in Africa
during this period has been generally characterized by inability to build stable political
and economic institutions to bridge and offset tribal rivalries and competition over
resources.
Although there are notable exceptions, more often than not, African
countries have struggled with the process of nation building, including the creation of
central state structures strong enough to serve disparate constituencies adequately.
Even Latin America, which appeared by the early 1990’s to be a continent in
transition to vibrant, stable democracy, by the turn of the century was experiencing
dangerous trends in economic stagnation and, in some cases, authoritarian perversion
of democratic rule. Although the hemisphere’s military governments had largely been
replaced by civilian democratic structures and economic growth had been robust in the
mid-90’s, other internal and external forces were working against the smooth
development of economic, social, and political institutions that would help the emerging
democracies deliver the expected fruits of democracy to their people.
In some
countries, state institutions were not adequate to cope with criminal drug cartels and
militias, as well as rampant corruption. In many places political institutions, legislatures,
and judicial systems were still too weak to deliver reliable governance, although great
strides had been made in some of the larger, more established democracies.
Encouraging political transition that provides space and peaceful evolution for all
elements of a society is an extremely complex proposition. No two cases are the same
and no single element of democratic behavior, such as the formation of political parties,
elections, religious freedom, free markets, freedom of the individual, racial and gender
equality, can provide the magic solution. Social, economic, and political development
must be comprehensive to lay the foundation for stable pluralistic government. In some
countries, such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and South Africa, a sense of
national identity and purpose has been strong enough to overcome tribal and ethnic
differences. Moreover, solid economic structures and considerable previous experience
with civil and political plurality have allowed their societies to navigate relatively smooth,
but nonetheless revolutionary, transitions. In countries where diverse societies have
been held together by autocratic rule, which purposely exacerbates internal animosities
and impedes the development of complex civil society, transition has often been plagued
by internal conflict and tension, making democratic outcomes all the more difficult. In
3
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
fact, not only does the lack of political and civil institutions and a reliable economic
structure, let alone civil tolerance among diverse ethnic and religious groups, impede
and prolong transition to pluralistic governance, it often sets the scene for anarchy and
reversion to autocratic rule.
When it comes to the question of whether and to what degree outside actors
should intervene to trigger or force transition in extreme cases, where autocratic or failed
governance is brutalizing people, there is no easy answer.
If the horrors of ethnic
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda taught us what may happen when the
world lets nature take its course, then the American intervention in Iraq to topple the
Saddam government can be seen as a lesson in the dangers of acting decisively to force
regime change.
In both cases, the international community has, to some extent,
inherited the responsibility for dealing with the chaotic consequences, struggling with the
extreme difficulty of fostering democratic institutions and effective free market
economies in societies that have not yet learned how to negotiate among themselves.
Yet the profound frustration in advanced democratic societies with the senseless and
seemingly needless brutality of extreme dictatorships, particularly those who threaten
their neighbors, often creates public pressure on these governments, as well as on
international institutions, to force change, regardless of the consequences.
In most
cases, it is simply assumed that any outcome would be better than the present state.
Unfortunately, in the zeal to hasten the demise of bad regimes, inadequate thought is
given ahead of time to how the international community can best deal with the aftermath
of “regime change.”
These are the dilemmas that confront us in contemplating how to deal with one of
East Asia’s two remaining anomalies to the generally positive political trends underway
in the rest of the region -- the truculent, intractable military dictatorship in Burma. 2
U.S.
policy toward Burma has, since 1990, been premised on the requirement to seat an
elected parliament before serious international economic, humanitarian, and other forms
2
The other Asian anomaly, North Korea, presents a somewhat different set of issues, because
considerable thought and planning, especially in South Korea, has been devoted to dealing with the likely
consequences of regime change in this case.
4
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
of material assistance can be undertaken. This premise has, in turn, had the effect of
confining policy discussion in the U.S. to the question of how to unseat the stubborn
military regime. Discussion of policy toward Burma seems generally to assume that,
because the country succeeded in electing the main opposition party overwhelmingly in
1990, the removal of military rule would ipso facto allow democracy to flourish. In fact,
however, many of the same expectations held by senior officials in the Bush
Administration that regime change would allow democracy to spring forth and flourish in
Iraq may be just as misguided in the case of Burma, because decades of politically
repressive and economically regressive military rule have left the population without the
tools to navigate the troubled waters toward stable, pluralistic, democratic governance.
This study will focus not on questions of how to bring about political transition in
Burma, but rather on how to make the country’s political, social, and economic
institutions adequate to the task of managing democratic governance, once transition is
underway. It will begin with the premise that some degree of change is inevitable in
Burma within a not-too-distant timeframe and that, therefore, the international community
should be concerned now with identifying the most appropriate forms of assistance and
intervention to help Burma develop the means for sustaining stable democracy, a dream
that eluded the country fifty years ago. The study also proposes – as will be explained in
subsequent sections -- that effective international assistance to address economic,
health, humanitarian, and governance deficiencies is simply not possible under the
current government and that political transition, or at least the beginnings of political
transition, will be necessary for serious work to begin on building and rebuilding Burma’s
social, economic, legal, and governmental institutions. Although this task will require
substantial and wide-ranging international assistance, there are also many positive
elements inside Burma today that can be encouraged to develop rapidly once transition
is underway. In addition to surveying potential international resources for assistance,
the study will attempt to identify the most important of Burma’s inherent strengths, some
of which might be bolstered by international assistance even before serious transition is
underway.
In brief, this study is not concerned so much with current bilateral or international
policy options or political initiatives aimed at forcing change in Burma.
Rather, it
anticipates a point in the future when transition - in one form of another - will be
5
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
underway and when serious, effective international assistance and investment may be
possible.
We will begin with a brief review of post-colonial political developments in
Burma and then explore in more detail the degree to which political, economic, and
social development in Burma has been arrested and distorted by decades of harsh
authoritarian rule. We will then postulate a series of possible scenarios for transition in
order to evaluate how the form that transition takes may affect the possibilities for
assisting the development of the institutions and conditions necessary for stable
democracy.
2. Historical Background
A textbook case of arrested development, Burma falls more in the pattern of
post-colonial Africa than it does Asia. From nearly a century of British colonial rule it
inherited the structures and institutions of free market parliamentary democracy, but like
many countries in Africa, was not able to translate these into an enduring foundation for
sustainable democratic governance.
The quasi self-rule that obtained in the latter
colonial years produced a functioning parliamentary system after independence, but did
not succeed in developing a sense of national identity and common interest for Burma’s
multi-ethnic society as a whole.
Furthermore, preferences within the ethnic Burman
ruling elite for socialist, centrally controlled economic structures derailed the
development of a vibrant market economy.
The underlying political ferment and
discontent within the non-Burman ethnic groups and the deep political divisions among
those elected to government created fertile ground for the country’s strongest institution
– the military – to grasp the reins of power in the name of bringing order to the country’s
chaos.
Independent democratic governance in Burma lasted less than 14 years. Since
1962, the country has been ruled continuously by army generals, who have steadily and
inexorably brought almost all of its political, social, and economic life under strict military
control.
Even as other military governments in Asia were giving way to civilian
governance and budding democracy in the latter decades of the 20th century, Burma’s
military leaders were tightening their harsh controls and systematically draining the
strength from civilian institutions, effectively sapping Burmese civilian society of its ability
to take collective responsibility. At the end of the long reign of General Ne Win in 1988,
6
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
a popular uprising against military rule, inspired by student activists, was brutally
suppressed by the army. In the aftermath, a triumvirate of generals emerged at the
head of a new military regime. Apparently attempting to return the country to a form of
military-controlled parliamentary government (as had prevailed under Ne Win), the
generals held an election in 1990, in which their chosen party failed to win the majority
vote and was, on the contrary, overwhelmed by the large vote for the opposition.
Stunned by the outcome, the generals refused to seat the elected parliament, insisting
that a new constitution would have to be drawn up first under terms dictated by them.
The party that won the election in 1990, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and
its charismatic leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were effectively excluded from the
constitutional process and subjected to harsh repressive measures, including jail. More
than 15 years later the new constitution has yet to emerge and the forces of political
opposition are repeatedly constrained and harassed by the regime.
Interestingly, for a few years during this period, until mid-2004, there were some
tentative openings to the international community from the military regime, spurred
largely by one of the three ruling generals – General Khin Nyunt - who, unlike the other
two, seemed to recognize that progress and prosperity would elude Burma without wider
exposure to the outside world. He understood that, in order to facilitate the regime’s
trade and investment goals, certain concessions would have to be made to assuage
international concern about the lack of political transition.
As a consequence, a portion
of the economy was opened to free market commerce and foreign investment was
solicited.
One of the most enduring results of the new foreign investment was
development of an infrastructure for tourism, opening Burma to a wider range of foreign
visitors than previously during the period of military rule.
At the same time, UN
assistance agencies and international NGOs were allowed to establish programs in
various areas of the country to address health, education, agriculture, income
generation, refugees, and a variety of humanitarian problems. The ICRC (International
Committee for the Red Cross) was given access to the large prison population, most
importantly the political prisoners who had been languishing in detention for a decade or
more. The ILO (International Labor Organization) was able to post a representative in
Rangoon to address the problem of forced labor. Burma became a member of ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and began participating in regional activities.
Under the guidance of General Khin Nyunt, Burma’s foreign policy became more
7
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
interactive, particularly in the Asian region. Finally, in the 2000-2003 timeframe, the
military leadership agreed to talk directly with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD about
conditions for establishing a multi-party political system. As a consequence of the talks,
in 2002, Aung San Suu Kyi was allowed freedom of movement within the country for the
first time since 1989. Unfortunately, when it became obvious to the generals that Aung
San Suu Kyi’s popularity had only grown during her long years of detention and isolation,
she was arrested once again and, after a few months in prison, has been held under
house arrest since September 2003.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s arrest also signaled the beginning of the end of General
Khin Nyunt’s membership in the ruling triumvirate. He continued during the ensuing year
to pursue an active foreign policy agenda, attempting to mitigate the international fall-out
from the attack on the NLD, and to reestablish the groundwork at home for including the
NLD in a managed political transition. (In fact, one close observer believes that Khin
Nyunt’s team’s discussions with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD leadership during 20032004 concerning the terms of their participation in the National Convention were even
more serious and potentially productive than the “confidence building” period of 20002002.)3 However, Khin Nyunt was apparently becoming a thorn in the side of the highly
autocratic top general, Senior General Than Shwe, perhaps because he appeared to be
aggrandizing his own position within the ruling triumvirate by taking the lead in political
transition. On the eve of the reconvening of the National Convention in May 2004, the
SPDC rejected the understandings General Khin Nyunt’s team had reached with the
NLD for its participation. General Khin Nyunt was unceremoniously arrested in October
2004 and subsequently sentenced to 44 years in jail (which he was then allowed to
serve under strict house arrest). The military and civilian structures under his authority
were dismantled and more than 30,000 military forces were discharged, demoted, or
sentenced to long jail terms.
Several ministers were fired and threatened with
punishment. Many members of the business community, who had profited from Khin
Nyunt’s patronage were disenfranchised.
The remaining two military factions,
3
Interview with an international mediator who worked with both the SPDC government and Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi.
8
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
associated with Generals Than Shwe and Maung Aye respectively, competed with each
other to grab the spoils of Khin Nyunt’s purge.
In a matter of months, the various openings to the international community
inspired by Khin Nyunt began to close. Burma’s diplomacy within the region and with
the United Nations withered. The UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Burma,
who had helped broker the earlier talks between the government and Aung San Suu Kyi,
was denied access to Burma and finally quit in frustration.
The UN Human Rights
rapporteur was also blocked from visiting the country. New constraints were levied on
the activities of UN agencies and international NGOs in Burma. The ICRC was denied
access to prisoners without the accompaniment of government agents, and the ILO
representative was subjected to death threats. Burma’s relations with ASEAN began to
deteriorate, largely because of ASEAN’s reaction to the negative turn of events, but also
due to inept diplomacy on Burma’s part. Under pressure from ASEAN, Rangoon agreed
to postpone its presidency of the organization in 2006, until such time as it had made
progress with political transition.
In late 2005, things took a bizarre turn when the regime suddenly ordered all
government ministries to decamp abruptly from Rangoon to a new, previously
undeveloped administrative center in a relatively remote area called Pyinmana, halfway
between Rangoon and Mandalay.
Thousands of civil servants and military troops,
along with their office furniture, were transported in trucks to Pyinmana, where they were
left for months to subsist largely without housing, food, electricity, or running water.
Vacated government buildings in Rangoon were leased out to Burmese and Chinese
companies in return for their services in helping to build the new capital.
Former
inhabitants of the Pyinmana area, especially in the Karen villages, were brutally
displaced from their homes by the army and scattered to other parts of the country.
Foreign embassies were given two years to relocate to Pyinmana, as well.
4
4
The generals undoubtedly took their cue for this move from historical patterns during Burma’s days of
empire. In his history of Burma, The River of Lost Footsteps ( 2006), former UN Secretary General U
Thant’s grandson Thant Myint-U describes how ancient Burmese kings would suddenly move lock, stock,
and barrel to a new capital, carrying even the walls and beams from their palaces to reconstruct them in the
new capital. The old capital would be largely depopulated and shorn of its royal trappings.
9
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
Not surprisingly, the mass transfer to Pyinmana, subsequently renamed
Naypyitaw (loosely translated as Royal City or Seat of the Kingdom), did not go entirely
smoothly. With inadequate utilities, transportation, and communications infrastructure
during its first year, the new capital functioned more as a military stronghold than an
effective administrative center. By the end of its first year, the intense construction effort
devoted to Naypyitaw had produced dramatic results in the form of grand new
government ministry buildings, wide avenues, massive apartment blocks for government
employees, palatial residences for the top generals, extensive military fortifications and
ceremonial facilities, and hotels for visiting foreign guests. Most of the amenities of
urban life, however, have yet to emerge and government officials forced to move to
Naypyitaw find it difficult to convince families to accompany them and are said to seek
every possible opportunity to return to Rangoon. Doing business with the government
now requires a much greater investment of time and resources on the part of both
Burmese citizens and foreign entities.
In typically Burmese fashion, there has been no satisfactory explanation for the
sudden move to Naypyitaw. Although government spokesmen have suggested that it
was a strategic necessity to place the seat of government in the center of the country,
where it could relate more closely to the various ethnic minorities and ensure stability,
few have accepted this as the real reason. Many believe it was inspired more by the
irrational fears and ambitions of Senior General Than Shwe, who is believed by some
Burmese observers to be increasingly detached from reality as he ages. Than Shwe
has made no secret that he equates himself with the ancient Burmese warrior kings and
feels a responsibility to restore the glories of Burma’s royal traditions that were abolished
by British colonialists.
Among other things, it was customary for Burmese kings to
consolidate their regimes by building elaborate new capitals to leave their own unique
imprint on history.
Similarly, there is no doubt among Burmese that the move to
Naypyitaw, especially its surprise timing, was conditioned heavily by the leadership’s
interpretation of advice from the ever-present astrologers and soothsayers.
The
emerging outlines of the new capital suggest strongly that the move was inspired
fundamentally by a perceived need within the military leadership to remove the final
vestiges of colonialism represented by the capital of Rangoon, to return to a bygone era
when kings ruled the realm from grand strongholds in the center of the country, to fortify
10
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
the government against unwanted foreign influence, and to consolidate a firm ethnic
Burman cultural and political dominance in preparation perhaps for the return of some
form of parliamentary government.
Whatever its motivation, the capricious move has been a very expensive decision
for the government, because in addition to building infrastructure, it has had to offer
incentives to military and government officials to buy their acquiescence. In April, 2006,
for example, the salaries of all military and civil service employees were increased by a
multiplier of between five and twelve, depending on rank and position. In addition to
grand residences in Naypyitaw, senior officials have been given new houses in Rangoon
for their families to offset the inability or unwillingness of families to accompany
government employees to the new city. Many commodities and resources have been
diverted from Rangoon to Naypyitaw, creating significant market disruptions and a new
wave of inflation in Rangoon, which is home to more than ten percent of the country’s
population.
As might be expected, the sudden salary increase for government
employees propelled the inflationary wave to new heights. As with previous government
salary increases, the government simply printed more money to finance it.
By the end of 2005, it became evident that the regime was placing increasing
emphasis on its diplomacy with India, Russia, and its long-standing protector China.
This is undoubtedly explained by two major concerns: first, the need to generate reliable
sources of large-scale external capital to support its strategic goal of building
unassailable military domination of every corner of the country; and second, the need for
powerful patrons in the international community to offset and prevent any moves in the
United Nations or elsewhere to internationalize sanctions on the military government in
an attempt to force political transition.
Indeed, when the United States and others tried
to pass a Security Council resolution on Burma in early 2007, it was vetoed by China
and Russia.
Nevertheless, despite outward appearances that its power is unassailable, there
are also strong indications that the regime is under increasing pressure both internally
and externally.
Internally, the purge of General Khin Nyunt and his supporters has
exposed strong fault lines within the military leadership that were previously blurred by
the trilateral balance of power. The competition between the faction of the senior ranks
11
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
aligned with Senior General Than Shwe and that aligned with his deputy General Maung
Aye is barely disguised.
The placement of general officers in various key military
positions is like a game of chess, with Than Shwe and Maung Aye constantly trying to
outmaneuver the other, playing by intricate rules of military protocol and tradition. These
games add an element of uncertainty to decisions on advancement, placement, and
retirement within the upper ranks of the military, leaving everyone off balance. With the
two top generals advancing in age and declining in health, they are both trying to outlast
each other in order to determine which faction will inherit the mantle of leadership.
Considering their age and poor health, the prospect of a generational transition in the
military leadership cannot be very far in the future, thus increasing the stakes of the
current state of play in the internal competition.
Chief among the external factors weighing on the military leadership is the
abysmal state of the economy. Burma’s reliance on imported fuel, its energy shortages,
trade deficits, the huge cost of maintaining its unprofitable state-owned enterprises, and
many other deficiencies resulting from decades of inept military management leave the
economy in a constant state of instability and uncertainty. The bulk of the economy is
informal, rife with black market activity and subject to temporary disruptions in the supply
of critical commodities, such as rice, cooking oil, gasoline, and electricity. Petty thievery,
pilferage, and even murder are becoming more visible, as those at the bottom of the
food chain struggle to make ends meet. While the majority of the population ekes out a
subsistence existence off the land, the urban population suffers both materially and
psychologically from its vulnerability to the regime’s haphazard economic management.5
Although the SPDC appears to be reaping windfall hard currency profits from
natural gas deposits, as energy prices rise, we should be careful not to overestimate the
significance of this gain. First, the current gas revenues derive mainly from sales to
Thailand that have been underway for several years. The significant revenues expected
from the underwater deposits off Sittwe will not develop until after 2009.
Second, the
regime appears to be spending these profits on showpiece projects, such as the new
5
Because Burma’s rural economy tends to be largely non-monetary, it is not affected as seriously by
inflation as the urban economy. Urban inflation has been spiraling uncontrollably in recent years. Australian
economist Sean Turnell (see below) cites IMF estimates that is it now running at about 50 percent annually.
12
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
capital Naypyitaw, its sister city near Maymyo (Pyin Oo Lwin), and a frivolous nuclear
research facility, which do not contribute materially to economic growth and the
betterment of the country’s population. And finally, there are as yet no visible plans to
direct enough of this gas into Burma in order to ease the country’s reliance on imported
fuel.
As the ADB (Asian Development Bank) noted in early 2007, Continuing
macroeconomic fragility will keep the economy vulnerable to sharp downturns in gas
prices, as will shocks such as political strife, poor harvests, or instability in the banking
system. 6 In other words, the gas revenues do not improve economic stability so long as
the SPDC refuses to address macroeconomic reform.
Externally driven pressures are also being mounted by the rapid development of
new communications technology, such as the internet, satellite telephones, and satellite
TV and radio.
It is now increasingly difficult for the regime to insulate its urban
population from the outside world. The dismantling of the old university structures has
not dimmed the thirst for education and knowledge.
Many private institutions for
advanced education have sprung up and the younger generation is eagerly reaching for
modern skills. While the older generation may have become resigned to life under harsh
military rule, there is no guarantee that the younger generation, coming into its own
today, has the same attitude.
In essence, the ruling military regime is out of touch with reality, internally
unstable, and increasingly challenged by competing interests, both domestic and
foreign, which it is much less equipped to anticipate and evaluate without the capability
of its former intelligence services. Some form of leadership change at the highest level
will probably take place in the foreseeable future, if only because both top leaders are
elderly and unwell, but this change is only likely to bring another committee of generals
to power, at least for a while. The possibilities for real transition appear to be farther out
on the horizon. While transition would be greatly facilitated by a decision on the part of
the military to proceed with a negotiated transition, including serious reforms, sadly it is
more likely to emerge eventually from some combination of internal events, triggered by
a convergence between inept leadership decisions and popular frustration.
6
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2007, March 2007, p. 221.
13
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
3. Conditions in Burma Today
3.1 The Nature of Military Governance
In many ways, Burma’s military regime, the self-appointed SPDC (State Peace
and Development Committee), embodies the sum total of the country’s past.
character has been shaped by every period in Burmese history.
7
Its
The top general Than
Shwe considers himself to be the modern embodiment of Burma’s ancient warrior kings
and, to a certain extent, he models his deeply authoritarian rule on royal tradition. Like
the ancient royalty, the power of the SPDC relies not on popular support, but on popular
fear and servitude, using the Buddhist sangha (organization of monks) to legitimize itself
with the people. The tatmadaw, today’s Burmese armed forces, traces its roots to the
anti-colonialist nationalistic Burmese army, formed originally by General Aung San, and
it still harbors all the fervor it once had against foreign control, meddling, and influence
inside the country. The military leaders are discomfited by the structures of government
inherited from the colonial masters and have indoctrinated their ranks in the belief that
Burmese are not culturally suited to Western style democracy and need to be ruled with
a firm hand in order to avoid national disintegration. The decision to move the seat of
government from Rangoon to Naypyitaw is an apt illustration of these historical
characteristics in the military leadership: first, it represents a return to the practice of the
ancient kings who would build lavish new capitals to consolidate their respective reigns;
second, it can be seen as an effort to expunge the final vestiges of the colonial period by
abandoning the capital established by the British, which is still dominated by the old
colonial buildings; and third, the regime perceived it as a strategic move to the center of
the country from where the military would be well placed to control potential
insurgencies. Ironically, Pyinmana was a stronghold of Burma’s Communist Party when
it was mounting an armed challenge to the young democracy in the late 1940’s and early
1950’s. 8
7
Thant Myint-U’s River of Lost Footsteps, op. cit., provides an excellent description of all the historical
factors over the centuries that have molded the mentality of today’s tatmadaw.
8
Ibid. p. 260.
14
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
The SLORC/SPDC itself is more or less the natural outgrowth of Ne Win’s
socialist dictatorship, maintaining and even tightening military control over the country
and clinging to the centralized command economy. Undoubtedly viewing the events of
1988 as the result of deficiencies in Ne Win’s administration, they made a series of
adjustments over the years to avoid a repeat of these events. There were, for example,
adjustments in economic management to allow a small sector of free market activity and
attract foreign investment, to bring more commodities and natural resources under the
direct control of the military (at least in part to improve the military’s revenue stream),
and to regulate more carefully the supply of essential commodities in urban areas to
avoid disruptions that might trigger riots.
There were also adjustments to the
educational system to reduce the potential for student movements and protests by
scattering the universities and abolishing dormitories.
Ne Win’s personal rule was
replaced by a committee structure dominated eventually by three senior figures,
Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Khin Nyunt. With the removal of General Khin
Nyunt from the triumvirate in 2004, however, the SPDC seems to have reverted to the
pattern of personal whimsy that characterized Ne Win’s regime, with General Than
Shwe now providing the dominant personality.
The twelve members of the SPDC today are all military officers holding the most
senior responsibilities in the army hierarchy. Cabinet ministers are also, with only two
exceptions, military officers with little or no background in governance.
The SPDC
does not meet on its own as a body, but joins the once monthly cabinet meetings and
the thrice yearly meetings of all senior cabinet and military officials at which broad policy
and strategic issues, including military activity, are decided.
The Vice Senior General
Maung Aye chairs the Trade Policy Committee, which meets once a week and rules on
all decisions, both general and detailed, affecting external and internal economic
regulation.
Senior General Than Shwe chairs the Special Project Implementation
Committee and the Special Border Projects Committee, which approve all decisions on
major economic undertakings, such as resource concessions (mining, forestry, etc.),
infrastructure construction (bridges, dams, irrigation, etc.) energy projects, and
agricultural policy. Than Shwe’s committees are more consequential than Maung Aye’s
committee, although together they make all major economic decisions and are
responsible for the irrational and seemingly haphazard quality of the government’s
15
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
approach to economic policy. The generals, especially Than Shwe, do not ask for
advice, and those beneath them do not dare to give it. Facts are routinely constructed to
meet perceptions of what the generals want to do or believe about the economy.
Unpleasant facts are scrupulously avoided. Those at the top framing the issues and
making the decisions have little to no expertise in economic management and lack longterm vision. Their main concern is simply to make it through another day without any
serious challenge to their absolute rule. In the end, however, the inner workings of the
Burmese military hierarchy are largely inscrutable, even to those inside the regime. The
internal dynamics of the armed forces are deliberately hidden and the essential
decisions are made at the top with little involvement of people at lower levels.
Ultimately, the absolute power of the SPDC may be more a matter of appearance
than of reality. In a recent monograph, noted authority on Burma, Mary Callahan argues
that the SPDC apparatus exercises little coherent and absolute control over day-to-day
governance in Burma, because it is unable and unwilling to impose its authority
consistently on government agencies that tend to operate against each other, often at
cross purposes with stated government policy and local forces tend to govern life in
outlying ethnic areas.
Furthermore, government officials, military authorities, and
various economic actors routinely participate in the informal and illegal economy,
according to their own rules, in order to support themselves. She concludes that, The
scale of corruption by government officials -- unprecedented in postcolonial history –
may indeed represent the most significant limit on state omnipotence. Thus the degree
to which the SPDC actually rules the lives of the country’s citizens varies widely from
one region to another, with the outlying ethnic areas being largely the domain of
alternative powers. 9
3.2 Its Impact on the Economy
Aside from humanitarian considerations, the most serious result of four decades
of autocratic, inward looking military rule in Burma is the creation of massive
9
Mary P. Callahan, Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and
Coexistence, Policy Studies 31 (Southeast Asia), East-West Center, Washington, D.C. 2007, p. 11.
16
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
macroeconomic distortions. 10
As one of the preeminent external observers of the
Burmese economy, Sean Turnell, has described it:
Burma has a deeply unstable
macroeconomic environment. The country lacks the fundamental institutions of a market
economy, policy-making is arbitrary and uninformed, inflation is rampant, the currency is
distrusted and trades via a multiple of exchange rates, unemployment is endemic,
taxation is chaotic and the Government finances its spending by printing money. To this
list can then be added all-pervasive corruption, a growing trade deficit, foreign debt
arrears, the imposition of economic sanctions and negligible foreign investment (Turnell
2006). Burma, in short, is in possession of almost every conceivable macroeconomic
malady. 11
These distortions are so serious today that they constrain the capacity of the
national economy for sustained development and make it very difficult for foreign
investment or foreign economic assistance to contribute to sustainable economic
development.
Most land is held by the government and cannot be used to leverage
capital, the banking system does not function in support of economic growth, but acts
rather as a siphon for hard currency to offset massive government deficits. Local
currency devalues so rapidly that entrepreneurs have no incentive to monetize their
profits.
Foreign economic assistance is directed mostly at infrastucture projects
designated by the military, which may or may not have an economic development
rationale.
How the military government approaches decisions on the development of the
country’s sizeable offshore gas reserves is a case in point. When Total and Unocal
developed the Yadana gas deposit, they proposed not only to build a pipeline eastward
to provide gas to Thailand for hard currency profits, but also to run a separate pipeline in
10
The discussion of macroeconomics in this section draws heavily on the work of Stefan Collignon, in
particular his chapter in Robert Taylor, editor, Burma: Political Economy under Military Rule, Hurst &
Company, London, 2001. See also Stefan Collignon, “Why Do Poor Countries Choose Low Human Rights?:
Lessons from Burma,” Revised Inaugural Lecture at the Faculty of Economics, Freie Universitet Berlin,
November 17, 1999.
11
Sean Turnell, “A Survey of Microfinance in Burma,” in Burma Economic Watch, No. 1, 2005, online
resource of Macquarie University, Australia.
17
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
the direction of Rangoon to supply Burma with the energy it needed to develop industry
and generate electricity for the large urban center. The cost of the second pipeline
would have been financed easily by the profits from the pipeline to Thailand. The top
general, however, ruled against the second pipeline, reportedly because he believed the
price tag was too high and he could only conceive of the project as a net economic loss.
At the present time, India, China, Singapore, and South Korea are competing to pay the
SPDC many billions of dollars to extract natural gas for export from another large offshore deposit. Right now the SPDC appears to have no plans to divert any of this fuel
into Burma itself for power generation and economic development. It seems interested
primarily in harvesting the hard currency returns for its own discretionary use. Thus,
despite windfall profits from energy exports, the country’s economic development will
continue to be severely constrained by lack of access to energy and investment capital.
Another telling example of this syndrome can be found in the recent study of
UNDP’s experience with micro-finance projects in Burma by Australian economist Sean
Turnell, which found that the greatest stumbling block to making micro-finance
sustainable was the plethora of underlying macroeconomic distortions, most especially
the monetary system. Even after years of negotiation with government agencies, UNDP
has not succeeded in fostering the legal instruments necessary to allow micro-finance
schemes to sustain themselves independently or to connect with the legal banking
system, primarily because the Ministry of Cooperatives has been unwilling or
unauthorized to draft laws legalizing microfinance practices. 12
Successive military regimes in Burma have managed to keep the economy at a
bare subsistence level because the military leadership controls most of the country’s
means of production through one device or another and holds the key monetary
mechanisms in its own hands.13 Although there are a number of private enterprises,
they operate at the pleasure of the military authorities and must pay princely bonuses to
individual military officers in order to survive. If they do not, they are quickly taken over
12
Ibid.
13
David Steinberg provides a detailed account of the history and extent of military control of Burma’s
economy in “Burma/Myanmar: The Role of the Military in the Economy,” Burma Economic Watch, 1/2005,
www.econ.mq.edu.au/BurmaEconomicWatch.
18
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
by the military authorities. Although there is a handful of private banks, none of them is
allowed to handle hard currency; this function is reserved exclusively for the two
government-controlled banks, the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and the
Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB), whose coffers of hard currency are
regularly diverted to military priorities. There are at least four widely different exchange
rates for kyat, the local currency, against the dollar: the official rate of roughly 6 kyat to
the dollar; 14 the customs valuation rate of 850 kyats to the dollar; the official exchange
rate of one dollar-denominated Foreign Exchange Currency (FEC) to the dollar, and the
unofficial black market rate, which is currently hovering between 1250 and 1350 kyat to
the dollar. The FEC also trades on the black market at a slightly lower exchange rate
than the dollar. The government itself often sanctions crony trading firms to buy dollars
on the black market in order to purchase commodity or other essential imports. This, of
course, can create a spike in kyat devaluation against the dollar, which the government
then attempts to control by arresting the money traders.
Military leaders control trade policy, taxing both imports and exports and often
banning the export of certain food commodities in order to manipulate the domestic
market. Shortages and distortions in the supply of basic commodities, such as rice,
cooking oil, gasoline, and electricity, are common occurrences that can most often be
explained by shortsighted, politically motivated decisions by the top military leadership.
While the regime maintains elaborate controls over the production, distribution, import,
and export of these commodities, fears about the political consequences of commodity
shortages regularly cause sudden policy changes in one area without any regard for how
this may affect activity in another area of the economy. This policy capriciousness is
compounded by the constant demand the military system itself puts on the supply of
food, gasoline, and electricity.
The way the military government manages the country’s rice production and
marketing provides another telling example of its general approach to economic
management and is worth exploring here in some detail.
15
Since Ne Win’s time, all
14
The official rate is actually pegged to the IMF SDR, but it works out to approximately 6 kyats to the US
dollar.
15
The discussion of rice management is taken from a research paper by Pen Incognito, entitled “The
Sanction that Kills,” which was written by a Burmese student as an academic work. An accomplished
19
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
agricultural land in Burma has belonged to the state, which grants inheritable “land tilling
rights” to farmers.
In return for these rights, farmers must meet annual production
targets set by the state and sell most of this production to the state at a fixed price. The
farmer is allowed to keep only enough rice to feed his or her household. Failure to
deliver the compulsory quota can result in a farmer’s arrest and termination of land tilling
rights.
A central authority then distributes the rice to urban and rice-deficit areas
throughout the country for sale at a subsidized rate, according to family quotas. The
highest quality rice is held back by the central authority for export.
Recalling that rice prices had become a rallying cry for the 1988 uprising in
Rangoon, the SLORC/SPDC established elaborate structures for regulating rice supply
in urban areas through arbitrary controls over exports and domestic prices.
As the
author of this case study describes, after 1988, the Rangoon Military Command began to
hold frequent meetings with the leadership of the Rangoon Chamber of Commerce.
Major traders were routinely rebuked in those ‘meetings’ whenever the prices rose to a
politically incorrect level.
Rangoon Command also imposed a ceiling on bills the
transporters could charge in moving basic commodities.
A special committee was
formed with the sole purpose of streamlining the loading and unloading of cargo in
Rangoon port.
Import and export of basic commodities are kept under constant
surveillance. 16
It was therefore encouraging in early 2003, when the SPDC announced that it
would liberalize the rice market, ending government involvement in the rice trade and
allowing private entrepreneurs to run the rice trade, including exports. Subsequently,
rice production in the 2003 monsoon season rose to the highest level in ten years and
rice traders signed many contracts with foreign importers. The government, however,
had not provided a mechanism for keeping domestic rice prices within an acceptable
level to ensure supplies for the urban poor and it had done nothing to correct or even
take into account the serious underlying macroeconomic distortions. In January, 2004,
economist, the student cannot risk identification for fear of being jailed in Burma for his scholarly integrity
and candor.
16
Ibid, p. 8.
20
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
when it was clear that rice prices were soaring in the unregulated domestic market, the
government made an about-face, banning further rice exports and returning to its original
methods of regulating rice production and sale.
The government was clearly not
prepared to risk the potential for rice shortages to spark unrest in urban areas, especially
Rangoon. Indeed, rice prices dropped immediately by more than 40 percent when the
export ban was announced.
Noted international political economist Stefan Collignon has concluded that two
fundamental conditions underlie the severe economic distortions that the country faces
today. First is the failure of successive military regimes to develop confidence in the
domestic currency, without which there can be no development of domestic assets. The
government has established the practice of simply printing money to cover debt, thereby
increasing the volume of kyat in circulation in the absence of an expanding economy and
leading inevitably to rapid devaluation of the kyat against foreign currencies and
property. Inflation is so rampant that wealth owners are unwilling to bank or monetize
their capital and give impetus to economic development. So long as the military feels
the need to control the monetary system arbitrarily and in secrecy to ensure its own
strength and well-being, there can be no correction of this basic economic weakness.
Second is the lack of secure property and individual rights. The very concept of
rights accorded the individual in a liberal democratic setting in terms of both property and
human rights, has never had a chance to take hold in Burma. As Collignon explains, 17
the essential element that establishes people’s trust in democratic government is the
trade off between the interests of the collective, which are established by how the
majority votes, and the interests of the individual, which are protected by the individual’s
claims against society in the form of guaranteed human rights and property rights,
through which they may make claims against other individuals. Needless to say, this
concept is entirely absent under the current military rule in Burma and only dimly
perceived in the majority of the population.
17
Stefan Collignon, in Robert Taylor, editor, Burma: Political Economy under Military Rule, Hurst &
Company, London, 2001, p. 73. The discussion of macroeconomics in this section draws heavily on the work
of Collignon, including the above chapter and his paper “Why Do Poor Countries Choose Low Human
Rights?: Lessons from Burma,” Revised Inaugural Lecture at the Faculty of Economics, Freie Universitet
Berlin, November 17, 1999.
21
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
Thus the significance of the severe economic distortions in Burma is not only
economic, there are profound political implications. As Collignon has put it: Because
the monetary economy is severely distorted and property rights are neither clearly
defined nor enforced, … the value references of an individualistic society are not …
sufficiently reproduced in Burma’s daily life. Hence, dialogue and compromise, but also
the cognitive framework for human rights, remain alien concepts.18 We will return to this
point later, but suffice it to say here that there is a fundamental and inseparable
connection between the deficiencies in Burma’s economy and the deficiencies in its
political governance. They must both be addressed simultaneously to make democratic
governance sustainable.
3.3 Governance and the Capacity of State Institutions
Burma’s state institutions, like almost everything else, have deteriorated badly
under military rule.
At both national and local levels, the structures of government
function more or less as instruments of the military through the mechanisms of the
SPDC and the army’s regional commands, although with certain key exceptions. For
example, the military structures are almost nonexistent in some ethnic areas, such as
the Wa and Kokang, and most ethnic areas also have their own militia and local
government authorities. Furthermore, in recent years, the SPDC has been replacing
military authorities at the local level with civilians, who are often retired military.
In the central government the traditions of an educated and dedicated civil
service that carried over from the colonial period have largely dissipated as senior and
mid-level ministry positions have been filled with military officers and their families on the
basis of patronage and not merit. When Ne Win took control of the government, he fired
most of the talented civil servants who had been trained during the colonial years, and
many more experienced public servants were forced out of government for political
reasons in the aftermath of 1988. The rush to “militarize” ministries at all levels has
accelerated in recent years, as the SPDC appears to prepare for restoration of
18
Ibid, p. 82.
22
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
constitutional government. It is not surprising under these conditions that government
institutions are rife with corruption and sheer incompetence.
Perhaps most debilitating of all is the concentration of almost all decision making
power in the very top levels of the military leadership, where the SPDC and its
committees dictate policy to the civilian bureaucracy.
This leaves the institutions of
government with very little authority over decisions and consequently little sense of
responsibility.
The military’s supremacy over the allocation of national resources
deprives civilian ministries of adequate means to perform their functions properly. Civil
servants are paid so poorly that they must use whatever bureaucratic power they have
for personal gain in order to support their families, thus entrenching corrupt behavior as
a norm. This syndrome pervades military structures, as well, especially at mid and lower
levels where salaries do not support basic necessities. To the extent that individual
military officers are enriching themselves lavishly from their positions in government, it is
largely at the highest levels, both nationally and regionally.
On the whole, Burma’s state institutions have almost no capacity to provide
governance. All direction comes from the military leadership, which – like the Communist
Party in the former Soviet Union – serves as the central nervous system for the
organism of government. In addition, a culture of corruption and irresponsibility acts as a
cancer on the organism, guaranteeing that the bureaucracy will take every opportunity to
translate the functions of government into rent-seeking activity and not into service of
benefit to the community.
3.4 Health and Education
With the lion’s share of the government’s resources being devoted to the needs
and priorities of the military, there is very little left to meet the needs of civilians. The
country’s bloated army enjoys the services of a separate health and educational system,
which is, in some places, much better than those provided for the civilian population and,
in other places, at least marginally better. By contrast, the government’s health and
educational services for civilians have been deteriorating for many years, starved for
funds, and attracting fewer qualified and dedicated professionals. Today people are
forced to pay relatively large amounts of money to get any value out of government
health services and schools.
Government hospitals, clinics, doctors, and nurses
23
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
generally charge a large fee up front before dispensing any care to patients. Those who
cannot afford the fee are left to fend for themselves.
Medicines, modern medical
equipment and supplies are in short supply and can be very expensive when available,
because they all have to be imported. This leaves the poorest people in both urban and
rural areas with little access to real medical care, a fact which is reflected in the country’s
poor health indices. For example, the incidence of HIV/AIDS is approaching African
proportions with an adult prevalence rate of 1.2 percent in 2005. 19
According to
UNICEF, in 2004 infant mortality was 76 per 1,000 for children under one and 105 per
1,000 for children under five.
Recent years have seen the rapid growth of private medical services to fill gaps
in the government system, including private hospitals and clinics financed by foreign
investment.
The foreign-financed services are generally better than the government
facilities, but are often well beyond the means of most Burmese to afford. There are,
however, a number of inexpensive private clinics here and there, run by doctors, who
are not allowed to practice in the government system because of their perceived
sympathy for the country’s democratic forces. Unlike government facilities, these clinics
provide medical care first and collect fees later, thereby ensuring that the very poorest
can be served.
UN agencies, such as WHO, UNDP, and UNICEF, have engaged in
limited programs with the government health system in an attempt to reach the
underserved civilian population, as have some international NGOs.
International
assistance, however, can only be a drop in the bucket under the current circumstances,
because the military leadership imposes difficult restrictions on the operations of
international groups and attempts, when at all possible, to extract money or expensive
equipment from them as a cost of doing business with government ministries.
All
international assistance groups are required to partner with one or more government
ministry or department.
The government educational system has also become increasingly expensive,
often leaving the poorest without access to primary, let alone secondary education.
19
“Silence Adversary in Myanmar’s HIV/AIDS Fight: UNICEF Regional Director,”
www.unicef.org/myanmar/new.html
24
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
Schools must be financed by local communities or a private benefactor.
The
government provides teachers and curriculum, but the teachers are not paid a living
wage by the government. Their salaries must be supplemented by the local community.
To increase their wages, teachers provide private tutoring outside of normal school
hours and make it clear that students will not graduate without such tutoring.
In
Rangoon, where the dearth of schools has made it necessary to run double sessions in
primary and secondary schools, the amount of time spent on formal class work, as
compared with private tutoring, is said to be less and less.
Furthermore, the
deterioration in higher education with the dispersal of the university system over the past
decade has had a serious impact on the quality of the teachers in the public school
system. On the whole, the public education system in Burma leaves a large proportion
of the population with limited or no access to schooling. Only an estimated 30 percent of
the country’s youth today completes primary school.20
Aside from providing too little education to its students, the curriculum of the
Burmese educational system is based largely on rote methods of learning, which leave
even those with advanced degrees unequipped to think analytically. Many of the
subjects fundamental to good governance and democratic political activity are simply not
taught. There is an enormous education gap, from primary all the way through tertiary
levels.
Since General Khin Nyunt’s purge in 2004, the operating environment for
international assistance organizations addressing health, education, and poverty has
deteriorated significantly. It appears that the prevailing powers in the regime believe that
international assistance constitutes a form of intervention in their “internal affairs” and
that international aid workers often act as “intelligence agents,” seeking to liaise with
insurgent groups.
Many of the small advances that had been achieved earlier in
addressing some of the country’s most difficult problems have dissipated under the
weight of new restrictions on the ability of international organizations to operate outside
of Rangoon.
In particular, the government has been trying to force international
agencies to work with or through the USDA (Union Solidarity Development Association,
the regime’s monster civilian arm), apparently attempting to channel the assistance to
20
David Tegenfeld, in Robert Taylor, ed., Burma: Political Economy under Military Rule, op cit., p. 112.
25
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
the regime’s favored groups and enhance the public appeal, authority, and resources of
the USDA. 21 USDA itself seems to be expanding its control of the civilian population
throughout the country, in some cases even challenging the authority of regional military
commanders.
3.5 Rule of Law
There is no rule of law in Burma today. 22 Although there are laws, courts, and
other legal structures that were established under colonial rule, they have ceased to
function legitimately, because they have been manipulated and misused for decades by
the military to punish perceived enemies and harass the civilian population.
The outcomes of trials concerning political activists or critics of the regime are
decided arbitrarily beforehand, so-called evidence is manufactured, and only those
arguments leading to a guilty verdict are allowed by the judge. Often defendants cannot
have a lawyer of their own.
People are routinely imprisoned for political reasons and
there is a constant level of between 1,000 and 1,500 political prisoners languishing in
prison, as some are released and others are taken in. The harsh legal system is fortified
by layers of surveillance, with military intelligence at the top, the police Special Branch
now doing most of the legwork, and community wardens keeping watch over all
individual families in their districts. The civilian population has virtually no recourse in the
legal system to defend its individual or collective rights against the will of the military
government. It is quite understandable, therefore, that the legal system and those who
enforce it enjoy little respect among the Burmese people.
3.6 The State of Civil Society and Non-Governmental Institutions
Strict limits on the ability of civilians to form community organizations have been
a hallmark of Burma’s military governments. It is perhaps telling that a law forbidding
21
In a recent report, the International Crisis Group details the problems international assistance agencies
and INGOs are having with government interference, in efficiency, and unwillingness to make decisions.
“Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid,” Asia Briefing No. 58, Yangon/Brussels, 8 December 2006.
22
For an excellent description of SPDC manipulation of the laws to control the population, see Zunetta
Liddell, “No Room to Move: Legal Constraints on Civil Society in Burma,” in Strengthening Civil Society in
Burma, Burma Center Netherlands and Transnational Institute, Silkworm Books, 1999.
26
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
more than five people to hold a public meeting without government authorization has
been on the books since the brief democratic years and the preceding colonial period,
stemming from concern about seditious elements in the society. The military regime, of
course, makes ample use of this law to suppress the emergence of civil society
organization, in general, when it is perceived as a threat to military rule. After years of
pervasive military surveillance to prevent a recurrence of the popular movement that led
the 1988 uprising, people in urban areas, particularly Rangoon, do not trust each other
and are disinclined to form associations.
Recently there have been some glimmers of hope that this trend may be starting
to reverse itself. With the arrival of UN assistance agencies and international NGOs in
Burma during the decade of the ‘90s, local home-grown NGOs began to spring up to
help with the implementation of health and educational programs by the international
organizations. This seems to have spawned a growing interest in the development of
NGOs for community service.
The largest and most prominent of these organizations
are in reality GONGOs (government-organized NGOs), such as the Myanmar Women’s
Maternal and Child Welfare Association, which employ the generals’ wives. However,
an increasing number of smaller NGOs, while licensed and monitored by the
government, still manage to operate relatively independently of it.
They have been
greatly strengthened, supported and encouraged by the presence of international aid
organizations for which many act as local program implementers.
Two recent studies have found that welfare-oriented non-governmental
organizations and community-based self-help organizations are much more numerous
and extensive than generally assumed by outside observers.23 The studies conclude
that, while religion is the single largest driving-force for these organizations, there are
two major social needs making it necessary for civil society to organize for its own
survival: first, the government’s utter failure to provide social welfare services and
23
Brian Heidel’s study, The Growth of Civil Society in Myanmar, surveys 64 NGOs and 455 CBOs. In Civil
Society under Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Myanmar, Jasmin Lorch explores the development of civil
society organizations in four areas: from inside the government to address welfare needs, welfare NGOs
independent of government, community self-help organizations, and civil society organizations in cease-fire
areas.
27
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
second, the need for coping mechanisms in rural areas where the majority of people live
at a subsistence level.
They find that the majority of community-based self-help
organizations engage in activity related to religion or religious schools, but many are
organized for health, education, funeral services, and other community needs. Most of
the NGOs surveyed were formed to provide health and educational assistance,
attempting to make up for the government’s lack of funding in these areas.
Some
cease-fire areas appear to have been successful in developing independent NGOs to
perform welfare and community services, probably because this was a provision of the
cease-fire agreements. To an extent, the development of welfare NGOs and community
self-help organizations has been tolerated – and in the case of GONGOs, encouraged –
by the government to compensate for the lack of government programs and services.
Consequently, the military often attempts to associate itself with the work of civil society
organizations, even if they are independent or religion-based.
In considering the state of organized civil society in Burma today, one simply
cannot avoid the overwhelming presence of the USDA (Union Solidarity and
Development Association), which was formed by the SLORC in 1993 as a “civil society”
organization to rally civilian support for the regime’s plans to discredit the results of the
1990 elections and suppress the democracy movement. Over the years, USDA has
grown in both size and importance. Official Burmese media claim the USDA has a
membership of 22 million, nearly half the country’s population, but a significant
proportion of this membership is coerced. For example, all members of the Myanmar
Red Cross, the fire brigades, professional organizations, and government ministries
must belong to USDA.
With Senior General Than Shwe as its top patron, USDA
provides the military with a civilian structure that reaches all the way down to village
levels, operating in tandem with the regional military commands.
USDA is often
employed by the military leadership to attack the NLD and other opposition forces,
pretending that it represents popular sentiment. USDA, for example, carried out the
attack on Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade in May 2003, for which the SPDC jailed Aung
San Suu Kyi and many other NLD members. Although the military leadership continues
to portray USDA as a civil society organization, it functions more like a political party
today, working hand in hand with the SPDC and regional commanders to rally local
people to the government’s causes. Its annual meetings resemble a party convention,
with delegations from each of the 16 states and divisions presenting reports on
28
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
economic and social conditions and endorsing government policy.
Many Burmese
anticipate that the USDA will eventually become a political party – perhaps even the sole
political party – when and if the military decides to return to a parliamentary system it
can control.
Viewing civil society according to its broadest definition as a nexus of relatively
free individuals and groups without reference to the state, 24 encompassing a great
variety of social movements, village and neighbourhood associations, women’s groups,
religious groupings, intellectuals, and where they are reasonably free, the press and
other media, civic organizations, associations of professionals, entrepreneurs, and
employees, whose purposes and direction are not controlled by the institutions of state, 25
one must conclude that it is severely underdeveloped in today’s Burma. And it will not
have much chance to grow into a force for change, so long as the military government
operates on the assumption that it must control virtually every aspect of its citizens’ lives.
3.7 Religious Institutions
Not surprisingly, Burma’s military leadership takes great pains to control religious
activity, as it does everything else. Its first priority is making Burma’s Buddhist monk
order, the sangha, serve the regime’s political purposes. But this is nothing new in
Burma; the sangha have played a critical role in legitimizing government since the days
of King Anawrahta in the 11th century, and even during the democratic period of the
1950s.
Monks themselves have not shied from taking a political role at various stages
in Burma’s history. During the colonial period, prominent monks led early nationalist
rebellions and during the 1988 rebellion, monks took an active part in the antigovernment movement. As a consequence, the military regime keeps a close watch on
the Buddhist clergy, they place spies among them, and they don’t hesitate to jail monks
who display views critical of the government. On the other hand, they also pay constant
obeisance to the sangha, particularly the senior monks whom they have anointed as the
sanctioned leaders of the order. The generals, in the tradition of all the governments
24
Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, editors, Civil Society: History and Possibilties, Cambridge University
Press, 2001, p. 33
25
Ibid, p. 276.
29
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
before them, make a public display of devotion by attending religious ceremonies
regularly, building new pagodas to their own personal glory, and making large donations
to monasteries and temples.
They see Theravada Buddhism as the essence of
Burmese culture.
Christianity expanded in Burma during the colonial period, particularly among the
non-Burman ethnic groups and is considered by the military as an example of
unwelcome foreign influence on the society.
Although Christianity is now fairly
widespread in the country, even among Burmans, the regime regularly discriminates
against Christians in the military ranks and in government employment.
They also
encourage the USDA and local authorities, including military, to restrict Christian
religious activity.
The regime is probably even more paranoid about the rising influence of Islam in
Burma. The proportion of Muslims in the population is increasing steadily and there are
often clashes between Buddhist monks and Muslim leaders. Burmese credit the regime
with provoking these clashes and that is undoubtedly true in some cases. However,
much of the antagonism is probably spontaneous, because there is a strong anti-Muslim
sentiment among the majority Buddhist population, which tends to view the Muslim
population as alien.
Therefore, the fault line between Buddhists and Muslims could
easily intensify, regardless of the complexion of government. It is certain, in any case,
that anti-Muslim sentiment in the Buddhist population will not be addressed by the
government, so long as it is military.
The deep devotion of Burma’s Buddhist population to religion is often thought to
be a form of escape from the tedium of life under harsh military rule and there may be
some validity in this view. Buddhist meditation provides a respite from daily life and
helps its practitioners deal with hardship and adversity.
The traditional role of the
sangha in service to the community also affords Burmese people a means of giving to
the community through their contributions to monasteries and to the sangha themselves.
The schools run by monks are a good example: monasteries have traditionally offered
educational services to the poor who could not afford government schools or whose
families were even too poor to support their children. This practice has continued and
expanded as economic and educational conditions have deteriorated in recent years.
30
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
The sangha represent a significant alternative education system.
Burma’s Christian
churches and Muslim communities are similarly involved in community service, although
their activities are probably more constrained by government scrutiny than those of the
sangha. Indeed, religious organizations of all sorts appear to be the most extensive
form of community-based self-help.
4. Considering the Possibilities for Transition
Some form of political transition is inevitable in Burma. The question is when and
how. With the signs of Than Shwe’s ill health and aging becoming more publicly visible,
not to mention the failing health of all five top generals, it appears that a degree of
evolution in the top military leadership will come relatively soon. At least in the first
stages, this transition is likely to be relatively orderly, with either Gen. Maung Aye or
Gen. Shwe Mann taking the place of Than Shwe, depending on how much longer Than
Shwe remains in office. If, for example, Than Shwe dies in office or is forced to retire for
reasons of health, then we might see Maung Aye take his place, at least for a short
while. If Than Shwe can outlast Maung Aye in office, he is likely to hand the reigns over
to his chosen successor, Shwe Mann.
In either case, there is not likely to be an
immediate difference in the leadership style, and we are unlikely to see political
instability in the near term.
Over the longer term, however, the country’s deteriorating living conditions, the
possibility of a period of uncertainty in military leadership, and international pressures
will probably push the country in the direction of more consequential transition. While it
is impossible at this stage to predict exactly how transition might unfold over time, there
are five broad categories of possibility, ranging from the most gradual to the most abrupt.
This section will explore those categories in order to assess how the various forms of
transition might affect the process of assisting the development of stable, sustainable
democracy in Burma, which we will address in the following section.
4.1 The SPDC model for gradual transition
As described earlier, the SLORC/SPDC began to develop its own model for slow,
deliberate and carefully managed transition from “interim” military government to multiparty parliamentary government shortly after the elections of 1990, when the
31
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
overwhelming victory of the NLD foiled the military’s plan to seat a parliament dominated
by its own party, the National Unity Party. According to the SLORC timetable, the first
step would be to convene a National Convention of political parties and other nationally
significant groups, including a large delegation of uniformed military, to draw up
guidelines for a new constitution. Once a constitution has been written and ratified, a
parliament would be seated, either through new elections or through a negotiated
formula that would substantially modify the results of the 1990 elections.
In the
meantime, “interim” military government would also have to accomplish two other major
tasks: first, the restoration of law and order and second, the establishment of peace and
development. This was clearly not a plan for rapid, or even near-term political transition.
Nearly twenty years later (dating from the September 1988 coup that brought the
SLORC to power), the “interim” military regime is still in place and the basic guidelines
for a new constitution have not yet been completed.
Although we may never know for sure, it is possible that the deposed General
Khin Nyunt actually hoped to begin moving forward seriously with that plan when he
drew up the seven-step program for managed transition that he presented to ASEAN in
2003.
While the military leadership still claims to be following that plan, it has yet to
move beyond the first step and the transition seems unlikely to be completed so long as
the current elderly generals are in control. Although many observers predict that Gen.
Than Shwe will step aside to become head of a new military-controlled parliamentary
government, the number of steps involving public participation (constitutional
referendum, parliamentary elections, etc.) required to reach that stage will be daunting
for these elderly leaders who have spent their many years in the leadership scrupulously
avoiding situations involving mass public action. The longer they cling to the status quo,
the more tenuous their grip on power becomes, and the less confident they will be of
taking on new political challenges. Of course, the successors to Than Shwe and Maung
Aye could decide to bring this process to a conclusion more expeditiously. On the other
hand, if there is a lack of clear authority at the top after the departure of Than Shwe and
Maung Aye, even the current slow political transition could grind to a halt. Thus the
SPDC model for transition is doomed to be so gradual that it could be overtaken by
events before it has accomplished any measurable transition.
32
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
4.2 Transition triggered by regime infighting or internal coup
Considering the iron grip that Senior General Than Shwe has maintained on the
reins of power for the past 15 years and the intense rivalry between the two top
generals, the possibility remains that SPDC may not experience a smooth or seamless
transition, should their successors fail to establish authority and allegiance with their
military peers. There could be a period of serious competition and infighting within the
military, perhaps even another internal military coup, during which time the country will
continue to drift. The period of drift could, in turn, witness the gradual rise of other
centers of power, more civilian in nature, such as the national police, crony business
empires, and the USDA. There are already signs that these entities are extending their
influence in Rangoon and other parts of the country, especially since the SPDC moved
to Naypyitaw. Such a trend might also give rise to greater lawlessness and certainly to
even more profound corruption. There is plenty of precedent for this pattern in Burma’s
long history.
At the same time, with the military losing its grip on surveillance and population
control, there will also be more space for civil society to expand its own organizational
base, perhaps to begin taking more control of villages and neighborhoods. As described
earlier, some of this is already apparent in neighborhoods and villages, where self-help
organizations are relatively widespread.
Some Burmese observers believe that, to the
extent the police begin to assert their own authority and refuse to carry out harsh orders
from the military against the civilian population, restrictions on the civilian population may
begin to ease.
With much weaker and less firmly established military leadership at the top,
civilian and business activity might develop and begin to give rise to pressure for reform,
particularly in the economic area where business interests would certainly welcome
banking and monetary reform.
Thus, while there might no longer be a nationally
articulated plan for transition in place, there could still be a great deal of positive
transitional activity underway.
Alternatively, a weaker military leadership might have
more interest in moving forward with the SLORC/SPDC design for transition, agreeing to
work on a new constitution in a more inclusive process than the current National
Convention.
33
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
4.3 Transition triggered by an unexpected, unforeseen event
In a setting, such as Burma, where society is so comprehensively impoverished
and repressed, the country has few devices for coping with significant man-made or
natural disasters. Despite the image of power and authority that the SPDC projects, in
reality the military and the government ministries are very poorly managed and
astoundingly incompetent at accomplishing even simple tasks.
Faced with a large
disaster, the SPDC would be likely to respond entirely inadequately.
If the
circumstances were dire enough to elicit a massive international response, it is possible
that various factors might coincide (e.g. extent and location of the damage, personality of
top military leadership at the time, degree of international pressure to intervene, etc.) to
create an opportunity in the aftermath for a period of reconciliation in which the military
leadership could be convinced to commit to real transition, including serious economic
reform. We have seen something analogous in Aceh, Indonesia, where the massive
international response to the effects of the tsunami, in coordination with Indonesian
government and military forces, triggered the psychological breakthrough needed for
negotiation of an autonomy agreement for Aceh.
4.4 Transition triggered by widespread social unrest/economic
distress
The events of 1987 and 1988, when poorly conceived economic decisions
suddenly impoverished people holding their savings in local currency, have provided a
classic example of how easily urban populations can turn on inept government when
they feel there is nothing left to lose. Taking a strong lesson from the events of 1988,
the SLORC/SPDC have gone to considerable lengths to eliminate what they perceived
to be the origins of this political crisis and its particular manifestations. For example,
they appear to have adjusted the flow of traffic in Rangoon to eliminate the bottlenecks
that became the locus of showdowns and mass protests in 1988, they have dispersed
the university campuses and placed controls on student gatherings to prevent student
movements from forming, they have positioned military units within and around Rangoon
to react immediately to snuff out any sign of a public gathering or protest, and they have
scrupulously avoided demonetizing the local currency or letting the price or supply of
34
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
critical commodities negatively impact poor neighborhoods in Rangoon. And
notwithstanding all these measures in Rangoon, they have decided to remove
themselves for safety’s sake to another, heavily guarded, capital in Naypyitaw.
Although it is now very unlikely that the conditions triggering the 1988 protests
would repeat themselves exactly, it is still entirely possible that a different set of
conditions could arise that would elicit mass public reaction of some sort, particularly
with weakened and indecisive military leadership at the top. As power evolves at the
top, forces within the society inevitably shift, bringing about imperceptible changes and
creating a new environment in which weakened, untested military leadership could easily
miscalculate the consequences of economic or other decisions affecting the society.
Public groups might be more emboldened to protest, particularly if widespread looting
and banditry were to arise from an economic crisis. This kind of activity would very
quickly test the ability of the police and military to control the streets and could render
Rangoon and other cities anarchic, at least for a while. If the military leadership were
still unwilling to work with civilian leadership to bring things under control and move
forward with political transition, the situation would be likely to descend into chaos and
anarchy, as has happened in the past. Unfortunately, this would probably have the
effect of renewing the military’s conviction to retain its firm grip on the country. It could
also cause enough strain within the military leadership to set off another internal coup,
as we saw in 1988.
4.5 Violent Overthrow
The democratic opposition in Burma has consistently advocated non-violent
means of bringing about political change and there appears to be a very limited popular
base in the country to support a serious attack on the government or its leadership.
Furthermore, the leadership -- being military – has gone to considerable lengths to
protect itself from such attack. Violent overthrow would require a well equipped and
managed organization, which would probably be impossible to mount under current
conditions.
If violence were to become a real possibility, then it would probably come
only after an extended period of confusion and chaos, where it was clear the military and
police no longer had the ability to maintain control.
35
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
Unfortunately, the least likely, most improbable scenario for transition in Burma is
a rapid and direct peaceful transition to democratic government. We are more likely to
see either a protracted transition to pluralistic government or a period of disorder brought
about by economic conditions, which sets the stage for a return to authoritarian rule. As
Collignon has argued quite persuasively,26 decades of backward military rule have
robbed the Burmese population of the economic and political development necessary to
make a direct transition to sustainable democracy.
5. Challenging Traditional Notions of Transition and
Democratization
To add another dimension of complexity to the question of addressing political
transition and capacity building, we must consider what the key determinants of progress
toward democracy are likely to be in Burma. Thomas Carothers, a noted observer of
democratization, has convincingly challenged the five “core assumptions” of the
transitional paradigm that has formed the analytic model for the US policy and
democracy advocacy community, particularly in the post-cold war period. 27
First, he takes issue with the common notion that political transition away from
dictatorial rule should be considered a transition toward democracy. He argues, rather,
that recent trends demonstrate that of the nearly 100 countries generally identified as
“transitional,” only 20 have remained clearly on the road to democracy. The rest have
either stalled in a “political gray zone” or regressed toward dictatorship.
Second, the assumption that democratization is a natural process that unfolds in
a set sequence has proven unfounded, because most cases of transition have been
“chaotic processes of change that go backwards and sideways as much as forward, and
do not do so in any regular manner.”
26
Collignon, “Why Do Poor Countries Choose Low Human Rights,” op cit. throughout. Collignon’s
comparison/contrast of the development experiences of Burma and Thailand is especially instructive.
27
Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 1,
January 2002 is the inspiration for this section of the paper.
36
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
Third, Carothers disputes the idea that elections are the key determinant of
democratization and a prime generator of further democratic reforms. He claims that, in
fact, elections cannot compensate for or correct serious structural deficiencies in
countries attempting to get beyond dictatorship, particularly where there are wide gulfs
between political or power elites and the citizenship.
Consequently, the democracy
policy community has come to expect too much of elections, per se.
Fourth, the assumption that underlying political, economic, institutional, ethnic,
and cultural conditions in transitional countries are not major factors in either the onset
or outcome of the transition process, he argues, has proven unfounded.
On the
contrary, experience with successful transition in Central Europe, the Southern
hemisphere, and East Asia has demonstrated clearly that economic wealth, previous
exposure to political pluralism, and institutional legacies all contribute significantly to the
achievement of democratization. In particular, he challenges the notion that democracy
assistance should be focused exclusively or even primarily on political process to the
exclusion of economic and socio-cultural development.
Fifth, the assumption that political transitions from dictatorship proceed on the
foundation of a functional, viable state and that the road to democracy is merely a matter
of redesigning and reforming existing state institutions is misguided, according to
Carothers. In fact, he argues, most transitions, both successful and unsuccessful, have
immediately confronted the critical problem of weak and ineffectual state structure and
revenue bases, which tends to encourage those in power to engage in behavior
antithetical to democracy, in order to assure the state’s access to power and resources.
Carother’s arguments are nowhere more cogent than in the case of Burma.
Whatever the form that transition eventually takes, it will not be a simple step from
dictatorship to democracy.
The underlying political, economic, ethnic, and cultural
conditions are, as we will discuss in the next section, not adequate to the demands of
liberal democracy. The state itself only functions as an adjunct of military discipline and
not as an entity with its own culture and powers. The state institutions and civil service
founded during the colonial years and transposed into the young democracy have long
ago been subverted and twisted into instruments of nearly blind allegiance to the will of
37
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
its military leaders. Burma’s history is replete with evidence that political transition leads
more likely in the direction of autocratic government than democracy, and elections have
been more an instrument of authoritarian political manipulation than a means to
implement popular will.
All in all, it is clear from Burmese history – both ancient and
modern – that political transition is never smooth and does not follow a single trajectory.
It has gone forward, backwards, and sideways for centuries and certainly cannot
reasonably be expected to proceed naturally forward toward viable liberal democracy
from its current state of being. Much work on underlying political, economic, and social
institutions will be required, along with enormous time and patience.
6. Burma’s Most Urgent Needs and Potential Areas of
Strength
Recognizing that the task of building the foundation for liberal democracy in
Burma is mammoth, the question becomes where to begin. This section will attempt to
identify the most urgent needs and to set priorities, pointing out how different transition
scenarios might affect the ability to address these needs. Issues will be divided roughly
into four categories: economic, political, health and education, and security.
6.1 Economic
As Collignon has argued, the most fundamental requirement for building
sustainable democratic institutions in Burma is the correction of two critical deficiencies:
1) the badly distorted monetary and fiscal systems and 2) the lack of individual property
and human rights (and the corollary individual responsibilities that accompany them).
Both of these tasks will take considerable time to achieve and should be approached
simultaneously in sequential steps. For example, monetary and fiscal reforms should
probably be accomplished gradually with carefully orchestrated restructuring of the
banking system and taxes, designed to encourage and support both local and foreign
investment and regularize public revenue.
Monetary and fiscal reforms should be
accompanied by a concerted effort to revamp property rights and establish reliable,
consistent economic legal protections.
38
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
In
2003,
an
accomplished
Burmese
economist
described
the
major
characteristics of the “unstable and unsustainable macroeconomic environment” as
follows:
(a) Domestic inflation is raging at double digits;
(b) The official exchange rate has no relation to the market or parallel rate at
which most exchange transactions are conducted; the exchange rate is subject to violent
fluctuations; and the external value of the kyat has nose-dived and probably will continue
to sink further…
(c) The official interest rate has no relation to the informal rate at which most
business deals are conducted;
(d) Many private commercial banks have not fully recovered from the recent
liquidity and financial crisis;
(e) Uncertainty and confusion created by lack of transparency, accountability and
consistency with respect to government’s rules and regulations, unavailability of timely
and reliable macroeconomic data and essential information, and difficulty in trying to
understand and to predict government’s moves and decisions that vitally affect business
interests;
(f) Systemic official corruption; and
(g) A large underground or parallel economy which is crucial for the survival of
the private sector, and which operates mostly outside the sphere of the government and
its rules and regulations. 28
In 1999, the World Bank presented a draft report to the Burmese government,
recommending a number of fundamental economic reforms, including the abolition of:
•
the artificial official exchange rates;
•
the inefficient mechanism for rice procurement, distribution, and export;
•
restrictions on private sector activity; and
•
inefficient state enterprises.
And finally, it urged significant expansion of budgetary expenditures on social
services and infrastructure. 29
28
Anonymous discussion paper on market liberalization, September 19, 2003, pp 5-6. (Identification of the
author could expose him to persecution by the regime.)
39
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
Attempting to carry the World Bank recommendations forward, the Japanese
government established a bilateral working group, including both government and nongovernment participants, to examine what would be involved in implementing two or
three of the recommendations without causing socio-economic destabilization.
Apparently the bilateral study succeeded in developing a detailed plan for
implementation that was acceptable to the Burmese participants. The recommendations
made their way into a bilateral meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and Senior
General Than Shwe at an ”ASEAN plus three” meeting a couple of years later.
According to those involved in the project, the recommendations were more or less
summarily rejected by General Than Shwe. Despite this setback, it appears that a
bilateral Japan-Myanmar consultative group continued to develop a detailed program for
economic reform while General Khin Nyunt was still in office.
The reforms recommended by the World Bank in 1999 identify the key areas that
are causing the severe distortions in the Burmese economy today. As anticipated in the
Japan-Myanmar study group, these reforms would have to be phased in gradually to
avoid destabilization or public panic over monetary reform. There is a variety of limited,
but valuable, private enterprise activity in banking, manufacturing, tourism, technology
marketing, construction, and other areas that probably should be protected from possible
adverse effects of sudden implementation of radical reforms. Once structural distortions,
artificial restrictions, and the uncertain regulatory environment begin to recede, the
business sector can be expected to expand naturally and rapidly.
The capital and
human potential is already there.
Economic reform in Burma will be enhanced greatly if it is accompanied by a
strong, comprehensive educational program to provide Burmese with the economic and
business skills to operate in a radically different context than they have experienced thus
far in their history. Just as the limited opportunities for free market enterprise have been
embraced by Burmese, educational opportunities to acquire business skills would be
warmly welcomed by Burmese civilians.
Under conditions of relative economic and
29
“Myanmar: An Economic and Social Assessment,” unpublished draft report of the World Bank, December
1999. Because the SPDC refused to accept and approve the World Bank draft study, it was never published
in final.
40
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
political stability during transition, a robust business class could be expected to emerge
rapidly. One note of caution concerns the danger of cronyism. Some of the wealthiest
of the current private sector businessmen have succeeded through crony relationships
with senior military leaders, whom they have in turn been enriching. Because this part of
the business class and its patrons depend on access to government resources and
favors, the military can be expected under any transition scenario to resist yielding
control over government monopolies and other mechanisms that facilitate personal
corruption. In fact, in any reform scenario the military can be expected to insist on
continuing to profit from personal business connections.
The development of a culture of individual rights and responsibilities will involve
multiple tasks and must be underpinned by a new constitution, as will be discussed in
the next section. Among other things, the constitution must lay the basis for redrawing
the legal system to establish clear property rights and the protection of these and other
individual rights.
While some private property provisions exist now, they are by no
means consistent or assured. The military regularly dispossesses people for its own
purposes, adding to the general uncertainties and instabilities in the economy. In the
critical area of agriculture, which sustains the majority of the country’s inhabitants,
property rights must be made more conducive to productivity, encouraging a return to
robust agricultural exports. The current system, which ties “tilling rights” to government
production quotas and holds the farmers’ compensation well below market rates, is a
proven recipe for agricultural failure. It is possible that historical experience will lead the
Burmese to define property rights somewhat differently than is done in the United States,
for example, but the definition must be clear, consistent, and legally protected.
Rule of law must be reestablished as quickly as possible, not only to stabilize the
economy and facilitate economic growth, but also to provide the tools to begin tackling
the corruption that has been institutionalized throughout the military economy.
The
degree to which various levels of government and society currently engage in rent
seeking in virtually every arena of Burmese life, if it cannot be brought under control and
significantly reduced, will encourage economic chaos and stymie economic reform once
transition begins. Fortunately, there are skilled lawyers in Burma who understand where
the current problems lie in the legal system and they are well trained in British common
law, the basis of the original Burmese legal structure. They would need only a modicum
41
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
of assistance and encouragement from outside experts. The greatest need would be
resources to restructure the courts and train new lawyers.
Perhaps the only hope of being able to address macro-economic reforms
comprehensively and strategically would be if transition scenarios two or three were to
occur in such a way that they led to the development of a negotiated reform agenda
between government and non-government forces.
This would make it possible to
address outstanding constitutional questions that affect rule of law and property rights. It
might allow, for example, the establishment of national commissions for economic and
legal reform that could harness the right combination of expertise and authority. Such
commissions would help manage public anxiety and temporary hardships caused by
economic change. They could also help guide decisions on foreign assistance and force
the international community to coordinate its efforts. One recent study has asserted that
…it is essential that a country be able to identify its own set of objectives with respect to
development and poverty reduction. Otherwise, only the IFIs, and not the county and its
people, determine the agenda. The study concludes that: It is up to the people of Burma
to work with and direct the international financial institutions so that when a national
development strategy is ultimately adopted, it reflects the real needs and priorities of the
people, and not merely the interests and priorities of the financial institutions and donor
countries. 30
In the other three transition scenarios, internal conditions would probably be
either too constrained or too chaotic to allow a comprehensive approach to
macroeconomic reform.
With continued tight military control over government and
policy, the prevailing tendency is likely to be risk aversion, which more or less rules out
macroeconomic reform or substantial legal and constitutional progress.
If internal
conditions are politically unstable or chaotic, some change might be possible, but it is
more likely to be of a spontaneous nature, because government would be too weak and
ineffectual to develop and guide fundamental reform.
For example, there might be
pressure from farmers for liberalization of agricultural policy, which could force change, if
30
Yuki Akimoto, Opportunities and Pitfalls; Preparing for Burma’s Economic Transition, Open Society
Institute, New York, 2006, pp. 16 and 72.
42
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
the military were no longer able to maintain its grip on the current economic and trade
policy levers. But it would be difficult to address monetary and fiscal reforms, property
rights, rule of law, and constitutional issues without strong central government. And, as
the SPDC has discovered, liberalization in discrete sectors of the economy is difficult to
sustain without addressing the key underlying macroeconomic distortions.
6.2 Political
Political reform must begin with a new constitution. After years of struggle over
unresolved issues in the 1947 constitution, the flaws of the 1974 one-party constitution,
and the total absence of a constitution since 1988, the issues to be resolved are quite
clear. The steps toward resolution of these issues are not so clear. If one begins with
the 1947 constitution, for example, the chief issue would be clarification of the degree of
autonomy and self-determination for the ethnic minorities, which might be resolved by
specifying the division of responsibility between the central government and state
governments.
It is unlikely, however, after so many decades of military rule that a
constitutional process could get underway without some form of participation by the
military.
This fact, in itself, will add new layers of difficult issues to resolve in the
constitutional process and suggests that it would probably have to be approached in
stages, with a succession of governments serving under a succession of transitional
constitutions until the final goal was reached. Perhaps it could be achieved in one or two
stages; perhaps it would require more.
In any case, the deliberation currently underway in the National Convention to
determine the constitutional principles gives us an idea of the constraints and concerns
the military would bring to the process. Above all, they will resist strongly the devolution
of power and authority from the central government to state and local government,
making it very difficult to arrive at a formula for self-determination that would satisfy most
of the ethnic minorities. Although we do not know exactly the contents of the cease-fire
agreements, they seem to have conferred some degree of self-determination. However,
it is neither consistently applied, nor apparently guaranteed. Since the agreements were
originally signed, the SPDC appears to have rescinded some of the autonomy the
cease-fire groups assumed they had achieved, particularly with regard to control over
economic and security matters.
43
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
The military will also insist on receiving a constitutional guarantee of powersharing in an elected parliament by being able to appoint its own representatives to a
significant block of the parliament. They may even insist on holding the top leadership
position in some form for a substantial period of time. For people accustomed to freely
elected government, this appears unreasonable and antithetical to democracy, but to
Burmese who have suffered so long under military rule, it might be considered
acceptable as an interim measure, if it were the price of achieving ultimate democratic
freedoms at the end of a well-defined process of transition and if the military did not
exclude the major democratic forces from the process.
Any new constitution, however, whether transitional or final, should not attempt to
place constraints on universal human rights, on legal reform and the rule of law, or on
economic reform and free market principles. On the contrary, the constitution should
guarantee a set of basic rights and should reinforce the principle of rule of law, laying the
foundation for a long process of legal, economic, political, and social adjustment and
reform.
A second fundamental and concomitant reform must occur in Burma’s general
political culture and civil society institutions. This is not to suggest that Burma should
model itself on foreign cultures or institutions, but rather that it needs to develop its own
form of “civilized” society, which it has been denied by increasingly paranoid military rule
that fears the idea of civilian initiative, responsibility, and sense of community. To a
certain extent, the development of civil society will accelerate when current restrictions
on group activity are eased, but there are certain aspects of “civilized” society that still
need to be fostered.
For example, even during the democratic period of the 1950s
Burmese political actors did not display much national vision, political tolerance, or ability
to negotiate differences; and the institutions of civil society that existed at the time did
not force them to do so. Thus special attention must be paid to the social and political
skills that facilitate cooperation in an ethnically and religiously diverse society, probably
at least partially with the assistance of external partners. Even something as simple as
outside facilitation in the constitution-making process could, for example, help to
encourage a new political culture in Burma.
44
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
Fortunately, the fundamentals of elections are not alien to the Burmese. Once
the prerequisites for elections are in place and assuming the military does not severely
distort the process, the Burmese people will know generally how to form political parties
and how to choose their parliamentary representatives. Despite attempts by the military
in 1990 to split the political opposition into many small ineffective parties and to
manipulate the voting process in favor of the government party, the electorate managed
to combine major opposition parties into a single more powerful unit, the National
League for Democracy, and to exercise its vote relatively freely. Burmese do not require
much coaching to conduct free and fair elections. The main task will be how to keep the
military and its agents from interfering.
These political reforms are a long-term proposition and will be considerably more
difficult to accomplish under transition scenarios one, four and five, where civilian activity
either remains under severe military constraints or is impeded by chaotic conditions
and/or extreme corruption. The most favorable situation for the development of civilian
institutions that contribute to a democratic political culture would be a gradual negotiated
transition to liberal democracy in which various sectors of the society – economic,
political, and social – are developed simultaneously.
6.3 Health and Education
As discussed earlier, the health and education sectors have been so distorted
and financially deprived by military rule in Burma that they both require urgent attention.
In other countries, it might be possible to address such tasks even before it was possible
to undertake political and economic transition.
In Burma, however, the military
leadership imposes such onerous constraints on humanitarian assistance that it can only
be delivered sparingly to the needy and it can have only a very limited effect on
institution-building.
Furthermore, because of the current monetary and banking
structure in Burma, any significant increase in foreign assistance, even if it is confined to
humanitarian goals, will also have the perverse effect of offsetting the SPDC’s perennial
domestic borrowing and deficit spending, as did the surge in ODA and foreign loans in
1977-87 during the Ne Win period. 31
Furthermore, the restrictions placed on the
31
In “Human Rights and the Economy in Burma,” op. cit., Stefan Collignon demonstrates how the 1977-87
“aid bubble” created the appearance of economic growth in Burma, but did not contribute to economic
development, because local wealth owners never trusted the distorted economic environment enough to
45
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
operations of international agencies and NGOs by the SPDC since 2005 are an
apparent attempt to force international agencies not only to channel funds to the
government, but also to incorporate USDA representatives in their assistance programs.
USDA participation in international assistance programs can be expected to limit how
and to whom aid can be delivered, as well as to maximize credit to the SPDC.
A recent report by the International Crisis Group, surveying the assistance
picture through the eyes of international agency staff on the ground in Burma, details the
problems that have developed in aid delivery since the purge of Khin Nyunt. These
include: 1) difficulty getting decisions from government because of less access to
decision-makers and a reclusive, unresponsive attitude on the part of the top leaders,
which has been compounded by the move to Naypyitaw; 2) more intense and intrusive
police surveillance of aid activities, with restrictions on travel by foreign staff,
interrogation of local staff, and demands to sit in on internal meetings; 3) growing
pressures from USDA and GONGOs who are trying to position themselves as welfare
providers, undoubtedly in anticipation of a constitutional referendum; 4) serious
restrictions on programs, including tougher control measures and the forced closure of
entire programs in some cases; 5) the imposition of new government guidelines that
subject all aid programs to “coordination” by local committees at the central, state, and
township levels, which include members of GONGOs. The report concludes that, all in
all, these new conditions “raise concern about [the aid community’s] ability to continue to
deliver assistance effectively and responsibly.”32
Once it is possible to assure reliable delivery of higher levels of health and
medical assistance without the threat of diversion by the military and its agents, it will be
a relatively straightforward matter to rebuild and improve the public health structures.
There are still some talented and dedicated people left in this system and more can be
monetize their wealth through domestic financial institutions.
32
International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid,” Asia Briefing No. 58,
Yangon/Brussels, 8 December 2006, p. 5.
46
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
marshaled quickly from the local staff of UN agencies and NGOs.
Assistance with
medical supplies, training, and management will be the most critical inputs required from
external sources, at least in the first instance.
With regard to education, massive reform and restructuring will be required at all
levels.
The chief problems in primary and secondary education are twofold:
1) a
curriculum that depends very strictly on rote learning; and 2) poorly trained and
underpaid teachers who are spending more and more time outside the classroom with
private tutoring. These problems are easy to identify, but will be very difficult to correct
until better teachers can be trained and resources are available to pay them adequately.
Tertiary education is even more a shambles after years of mindless manipulation
by military regimes attempting to minimize what they view as a breeding ground for antigovernment thought and activity. It will need comprehensive reform and restructuring in
which international assistance in the form of resources, training and advice on
restructuring and curriculum reform would be essential.
Although there are still well
educated and talented academics to be found in Burma, they are sorely lacking in the
resources or authority to resist the government’s efforts to downgrade the quality of
tertiary education. The tertiary educational system needs to be built back into a vibrant
center of intellectual debate and development.
Because the Burmese place a premium on education and once had an excellent
public education system in the major cities and most well populated areas, they can be
expected to place a priority on restoring education when it becomes possible. Monetary
and fiscal reforms that provide assured government revenue and stimulate economic
growth and development will be critical to building adequate public health and
educational systems. Religious institutions of all kinds, Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim,
can be expected to help with education and other forms of community service, and are
doing so even now.
Under transition scenario one, which is essentially a continuation of current
conditions, or scenarios four and five, in which disruption and chaos would be likely to
bring a return to authoritarian military control, it would be extremely difficult to reform and
rebuild the health and educational systems. Because reform will require that resources
47
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
and new thinking are allowed to flow freely and reliably into health and education
structures from the center, transition scenarios two and three, which envision some
possibility of negotiated political and economic transition, appear to offer the most
potential for improving health and education.
Furthermore, programs to reform both
areas, reinforced by substantial international assistance, would help a transitional
government gain popular support during a period of inevitable sacrifice and uncertainty
engendered by change.
6.4 Security
Political development and democracy in Burma have been stymied by a
tendency for the country to dissolve into chaos and confusion when it is not held
together by a firm hand.
Each time this has happened during the period since
independence, the military has interpreted the confusion as a rationale for grabbing
more power, gradually managing to transform its firm hand into an iron fist. Ne Win was
the first to take control in the midst of chaos, having developed a centralized military
procurement and manufacturing base during the democratic years.
After 1962, he
consolidated the syndrome of centralized and systematic military control, although he
maintained at least the pretense of parliamentary government, albeit under single party
rule. The SLORC took power in the wake of the confusion caused by the massive civil
protest of 1988 and Ne Win’s abrupt departure from government. Starting from the
premise of Ne Win’s parting order that the country should return to multi-party
democracy, the SLORC nonetheless continued to believe that the country would fall
apart without the military in the driver’s seat, it resisted transition and gradually became
an authoritarian instrument to wield even greater control over the country than Ne Win
had.
Thus, the single greatest challenge for successful political transition in Burma will
be the problem of breaking this syndrome by ensuring a modicum of law and order that
still allows peaceful and stable political development. This is a very difficult proposition,
because it will require not only the prevention of social and economic chaos in urban
areas, but also the avoidance of relapse into ethnic minority insurgencies in outlying
areas, if certain groups attempt to take advantage of a transitional period to grab de
facto autonomy in the absence of constitutional guarantees. The particular form that
security guarantees might take to accomplish these goals is difficult to predict without
48
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
knowing what form transition will take. However, it is clear that abolition of military and
police forces would most certainly lead to chaos and anarchy, and would open the door
to a variety of militia and organized banditry. In any scenario it should be a fundamental
objective of transition in Burma to retain as much organized, responsible government
military and police force as necessary to assure law and order. Ideally these forces
should not interfere in the process of political transition. Realistically, however, some
degree of military interference is probably unavoidable considering the history and
mentality of the tatmadaw today.
Therefore, when and if real transition becomes possible, it will be essential for
the international community to act as immediately as possible to begin retraining and
reorienting military and police leadership to understand and respect the rules of
democracy. While it would be best to begin this process well before serious transition is
underway, the restrictions most donor countries have placed on military assistance to
Burma and the reluctance of the current regime to accept such training probably make
this unlikely.
Perhaps some Asian donors would have more flexibility eventually to
undertake such training.
(Indeed, some are probably already engaged in training
Burmese forces, although not with a view to reorienting military attitudes.) In any case,
once transition is possible, this should be addressed urgently. If their curricula were
reformed, Burmese military training institutions could provide an excellent venue for
introducing such training into home-grown programs.
7. Sources of International Assistance
In the post-cold war period, the international community has been called upon
constantly and increasingly to assist countries in transition from some degree of
authoritarian government to elected pluralistic rule.
Government aid programs,
international agencies, and international NGOs have developed a variety of programs
designed to build the elements of democracy and to reform faltering economies.33 There
is a large body of cumulative knowledge in this field, although different governments and
33
Opportunities and Pitfalls, op cit, provides an excellent overview of the various types of agencies,
organizations, and government programs engaged in international aid.
49
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
institutions may have different views on how to approach development assistance.
However, there is always some degree of coordination, for better or worse. Cambodia,
East Timor, Indonesia, various parts of the former Yugoslavia, would probably all provide
examples of complex international assistance programs, both coordinated and
uncoordinated.
In April 2005, the OECD led a consultative process among aid donors that
resulted in an agreement on “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile
States,” drawing especially on the experience of the past decade. Designed to guide
international donors in prioritizing and coordinating programs to help national reformers
in fragile states build “legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions,” the 12
principles stress the importance of local context, moving rapidly from reaction to
prevention, state-building as the central objective, avoiding activities that undermine
state-building, recognizing the political-security-development nexus, coherence between
various programs of donor government agencies, practical coordination mechanisms
between international donors, and mixing and sequencing aid instruments. Because
these principles provide an excellent framework for conceptualizing wide-ranging
international assistance to Burma one day, they are attached here as an appendix.
When the time comes for serious transition, it would be best, of course, to
address Burma’s political and economic deficiencies strategically – and not piecemeal –
in order to minimize hardship and avert chaos. Ideally, those concerned with this task
should coordinate on a strategy that sets priorities, that sequences reforms, that
rationalizes the strengths of various international donor organizations, and that builds
effectively on Burma’s existing advantages. Unfortunately, events and the human
condition, rarely, if ever, allow this.
More often than not, there are overlaps,
inefficiencies, inappropriate focus, and competing objectives in any given situation.
Recognizing this reality, the best we can do is reinforce the OECD recommendation to
establish practical mechanisms for coordination.
The following suggests a range of
governments and institutions that might be appropriate for the priority tasks that will need
to be addressed to achieve a successful political transition to stable democratic
government in Burma.
50
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
7.1 International Financial Institutions
The World Bank, IMF (International Monetary Fund), and ADB (Asian
Development Bank) will be key to economic reform in Burma.
All three have been
analyzing the Burmese economy for many years and are well aware of the
macroeconomic distortions that must be tackled. All three are currently prevented from
engaging in programs in Burma, because the major donor governments will not allow it.
Moreover, the SPDC has consistently refused to undertake any reform measures
suggested by IFIs, so even if the donors agreed to ease their restrictions, the banks
would not be able to engage seriously with the SPDC on reform under current
conditions. At this point, any serious economic assistance that is not focused on reform
will be largely wasted investment.
When macroeconomic reforms become possible in Burma, the correction of
monetary policy must begin with the Central Bank of Myanmar and the two militarycontrolled banks that manage currency transactions for the SPDC. A unified exchange
rate must be established, interest rates for lending and savings must be pegged to real
market conditions, and policies based on accepted international monetary practices
must be introduced.
As for fiscal policy, the state’s demand on national resources, which is currently
massive and uncontrolled, must be brought into synchronization with the state’s ability to
realize revenue. In the words of economist Sean Turnell, Macroeconomic policy-making
in Burma is coloured by one overwhelming fact – the irresistible demand of the state
upon the country’s real output. This demand far exceeds the state’s ability to raise
taxation revenue, and accordingly has led to a situation in which the state ‘finances’ its
spending by the simple expedient of selling its bonds to the central bank. This policy (in
economics parlance ‘printing money’) distorts every other aspect of policy-making in
Burma. 34
34
Dr. Sean Turnell, “Burma’s Economic Prospects,” p. 4. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 29 March 2006.
51
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
It will probably take the huge resources of the IFIs to manage these tasks,
backed up by a substantial cash reserve to offset any negative social impact of the
reforms. This means that the IFIs should be at the center of international assistance to
Burma during a transition, particularly inasmuch as they also play a coordinating role
among the major donors who must approve the banks’ involvement and major programs.
The task of correcting major macroeconomic distortions must be underway before other
contributions to economic development, either in the form of ODA (official development
assistance) or FDI (foreign direct investment), can be effective.
Despite the heavy hand of uninformed military economic management, civilian
economic talent can still be found in Burma, both inside and outside the government.
There are some skilled economists with integrity in government departments and
institutions, including the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, the
Central Bank, etc. Rangoon University has a graduate institute of economics with a
cadre of past and present faculty schooled in the fundamentals.
There are some
talented economists in private banking and business. It would make sense for Burma to
establish a national advisory council of skilled Burmese economists to play a central role
in designing programs for macroeconomic reform in order to exercise control over IFI
activity. The Burmese economic experts will understand better than any outsider the
potential advantages and risks of any given reforms and they will add a sense of
ownership to foreign assistance.
7.2 UN Agencies
A representative group of UN agencies currently operates in Burma under MOUs
with specific government ministries. The most important of these are: UNDP, UNICEF,
WHO, FAO, UNHCR, UNODC, and UNAIDS. Their current programs focus on basic
humanitarian needs, health, education, agriculture, environmental preservation, poverty
reduction, income generation, microfinance, refugee resettlement, and drug control. On
the whole, their programs are constrained by severe government restrictions, inadequate
donor funding, and limited access to the Burmese population and thus have little impact
on overall needs. Indeed, taking into account the severe macroeconomic distortions and
current SPDC restrictions on the operations of humanitarian aid agencies, it is correct
that donors should restrict funding to international assistance programs in Burma.
52
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
The UN agencies do, however, play a very important role in marshaling and
educating human resources for the future. There are many local employees in all of
these organizations who either cannot or will not work for the government because of
their political convictions. Many of them are dedicated to the cause of improving the
lives of the poor, including ethnic minorities in remote areas of the country, when they
can reach them. These people will be an invaluable resource during transition and will
be critical to the reform and restructuring of government ministries when this becomes
possible. They are well versed in how the ministries now operate, because many came
out of government service and/or now work closely with counterparts in the ministries to
implement foreign assistance programs.
They tend to know where and who the
competent civil servants are.
Furthermore, it is extremely useful to have the UN agencies in place in Burma
and familiar with conditions on the ground. When transition begins in earnest, they will
be well placed to establish priorities, expand their operations and advise the individual
donor government programs that will inevitably follow.
7.3 International NGOs
A handful of international NGOs is currently on the ground in Burma, including
several European groups, a few American groups, several Japanese groups and one or
two Australian groups. They work both on their own and in coordination with the UN
agency programs. Some of them focus particularly on assistance to ethnic minority
areas.35 Like the UN agencies, these NGOs nurture and develop local talent. The bulk
of their staff is Burmese and, like the UN agencies, they work with local Burmese NGOs.
It is very difficult for foreign NGOs to negotiate and conclude an MOU with the Burmese
government to work in the country; the process can take three or more years. Thus
there is not likely to be a large increase in INGO activity in Burma so long as the current
SPDC leadership is in place.
35
David Tegenfeldt, former Burma country representative for World Concern, provides an instructive
summary of INGO presence and activity in Burma, as well as a sense of the particular role they can play
with minority ethnic groups, in his chapter entitled “International Non-governmental Organizations in Burma,”
in Robert Taylor, ed., Burma: Political Economy under Military Rule, op. cit.
53
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
Transition, on the other hand, will bring a plethora of new NGOs to Burma and
they will compete with each other and with UN agencies for funding from donor
governments to implement programs. In fact, these NGOs can play a unique role in
reaching the more remote areas of the country and should be encouraged in this
direction so that international assistance is not concentrated solely in the Burman areas,
but also reaches the ethnic minorities.
UN and INGO activity in Burma over the past decade has helped the
development of small local NGOs, who often serve as implementers for their programs.
The rise of these NGOs has, in turn, encouraged a second layer of local NGOs and
community help organizations of various types that are not necessarily connected with or
financially dependent on international aid.
Even before transition is underway, the
international community should consider ways to support and encourage the expansion
of this trend.
This could be an important element in instilling a greater sense of
cooperation, tolerance, and community in the Burmese civilian population. It can also
help develop benevolent community activists as an alternative to the predatory USDA
and other GONGOs.
Many international assistance programs in South Africa during the final years of
apartheid, including that of the US, emphasized the development of local civic and nongovernmental groups in the black townships in order to foster future leaders for a
democratic South Africa. Many of those who came to the fore, either as politicians or
senior civil servants, in the transitional South African government after 1994 got their
start in local NGOs and civic groups nurtured by foreign donors.
7.4 Donor Governments
Very few donor governments are active at present in Burma. Chief among these
are the EU and a few individual European governments, such as the UK and France.
Japan is probably the single largest donor for grant aid, with particular emphasis on
infrastructure, such as schools, clinics, and bridges. China, of course, finances large
infrastructure projects through loans, but does not provide much, if any, grant
assistance.
(Perhaps some of China’s loans could be considered a form of grant
assistance, since the SPDC rarely repays such debt.)
54
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
When transition comes, each donor government will undoubtedly wish to pursue
ODA in Burma according to the proclivities of its own aid agency and national interests.
Some, such as Japan, will prefer infrastructure projects, while the US and European
governments will favor democratization, health, education, and other programs with
political and social value. Many donor governments may also favor investment in
ASEAN programs that could help with Burma’s development and integration into the
regional economy.
Although there is some assistance of this kind now, it is limited by
donor government hesitation to support programs that might benefit the SPDC.
Donor governments will also be well positioned to help Burmese military train and
restructure to adjust to a security role more appropriate for democratic government. This
will be one of the most critical types of foreign assistance and should not be the domain
of a single donor government, but can be undertaken by many, including Asian
neighbors.
7.5 Exile Resources
After so many years of harsh conditions in Burma, the Burmese diaspora has
become rather extensive. Some left during the Ne Win years; many more left after 1988
because of political persecution. The former group of Burmese expatriates tends to be
engaged in professional pursuits in Western countries. The latter group includes a large
number of political activists, who have remained focused on overthrowing the military
regime and bringing about transition to democracy in Burma. With the assistance and
encouragement of US and European foundations and governments, some of these
activists have also formed specialized groups that study various aspects of Burma’s
institutional structures, articulating and planning the necessary reforms. For example,
some look at economic reforms, some at legal reforms, and others at free press and
political debate.
When the opportunity for serious transition presents itself, these groups will be
extremely helpful, not only as sources of ideas and advice for Burmese, but also as
bridges between foreign donors and local Burmese institutions and society.
Among
them, they have amassed considerable experience with democracy in practice and a
55
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
large body of information on the institutions of democracy worldwide.36
It will be
important for the international community to assist in engaging them systematically and
productively in transition activities.
Among the Burmese expatriates who came out earlier and settled into
professions abroad, there will also be many who wish to assist in the country’s transition
to democracy. Some are already engaged to a limited extent in some business
endeavors in Burma and are able to come and go regularly.
This may be another
resource for foreign assistance to transition when the time comes.
8. Adjusting International Assistance and Policy to
Different Scenarios
The major objective of foreign assistance policies for Burma must be to build the
foundations of sustainable democracy through both political and economic reforms that
help the Burmese build effective state institutions. To this end, the basic set of political
and economic reforms required in Burma and the international assistance necessary to
support them, as described earlier, will be the same no matter what form transition may
take. However, decisions about when and how to provide this assistance, as discussed
earlier, will be critically affected by the pace and nature of the transition.
The
opportunities for both reform and assistance will be very different under the conditions of
a slow, hesitant transition than they would be in a rapid transition scenario, such as we
saw with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Transition scenario one, in which the military remains firmly entrenched, will offer
few opportunities for serious international assistance so long as there is no willingness to
undertake macroeconomic reform or to allow the population to begin participating
actively in political activity. The level of international assistance currently underway in
Burma may be the best that can be achieved. Moreover, if the degree of restriction and
interference in aid programs intensifies further, it may become difficult even to maintain
36
The Open Society’s Burma Project has inspired and funded the creation of a website in English,
Burmese, and several ethnic languages, guiding the reader to sources of information relevant to transition in
Burma, compiled by Burmese expatriates and others. Its URL is www.burmaguide.net.
56
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
current aid levels.
On the other hand, there might be some possibility of working
increasingly with local NGOs and civil society organizations through indirect means, but
this would have to be done carefully to avoid negative countermeasures by the military
or USDA. Nevertheless, it might be useful, even under this scenario, to explore the full
range of political and economic reforms required in Burma and determine whether there
might be some opportunities for introducing educational programs or supporting local
education initiatives that might help strengthen civilian institutions.
On the other hand, the development of scenario two, which might come with the
transition to new military leadership, should alert the international community not only to
seek new opportunities to encourage and support political reform, but also to begin
thinking seriously about how to encourage economic reform through dialogue with new
military, civilian, political, and business leaders.
In the case of government officials,
such dialogue might be initiated by ASEAN, India, or China in the context of their
cooperative relationships with the Burmese.
In the case of political and business
leaders, representatives from Western countries and Japan could take the lead. Donors
should also try to expand assistance to health and educational institutions, attempting to
press civilian ministries to allow more access for international assistance programs,
including in outlying ethnic minority areas. The devastated areas along the Thai border
should get urgent attention.
Special programs should be devised to support the
development of civil society institutions, including community structures and business
organizations.
In scenario three the international community would undoubtedly attempt to
respond in the first instance with an outpouring of disaster relief. The SPDC, for its part,
would undoubtedly try to limit and control this relief, giving Asian neighbors and friends
priority access. A large international relief effort, even if predominantly Asian, would
quickly strain Burma’s infrastructure and government resources, creating openings for
non-governmental activity in support of relief efforts.
Under such circumstances,
international donors should try to support non-governmental groups and harness them to
their aid delivery efforts at the local level.
Donors should also seek opportunities in the
aftermath of disaster relief to encourage reform and change with senior government
officials.
A major disaster could also have the effect of destabilizing the military
leadership, creating the conditions for scenarios two or four to develop.
57
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
The emergence of scenario four should cause particular concern among Burma’s
neighbors, especially Thailand, China, and India, who would be likely to experience spillover from widespread unrest in Burma.
These governments should therefore be
prepared to act as quickly as possible, preferably in coordination, to encourage major
economic and political reform to begin immediately. If the IFIs were able to assist with
economic restructuring, with the clear support of Burma’s neighbors, it could give people
hope that major change was coming.
It might also encourage serious work on political
reform, beginning with constitutional negotiations that included all major players. The
international community should not, however, anticipate a smooth transition under such
conditions. The pace at which political change could be achieved would depend on the
presence of leadership, the will to compromise, and strong outside support for a
negotiated outcome. At the same time, outside forces should refrain from attempting to
affect the course of the negotiations, unless they are specifically invited to become
involved. The complex constitutional negotiation that took place in South Africa in 199394, which has already been well documented, provides an excellent example of how to
strike a balance between the dynamic of intense multi-party negotiations and the
activities of well-meaning outside observers. In any case, the initiation of economic and
political reform would be only the first step on a very long journey to stable democracy.
Scenario five would not be a situation amenable to international economic,
humanitarian, or political assistance. The most important international actors would be
Burma’s neighbors, because of their proximity to the conflict. And the most immediate
objective would be, through mediation, to stem the violence and prevent a harsh military
backlash. Although Western governments, Japan, and the United Nations were able to
play a moderating and mediating role quite effectively in Cambodia when the
Vietnamese withdrew, regional dynamics are quite different today. It is not clear that
Western or UN intervention would carry the weight in Burma that it did in Cambodia. On
the other hand, Western intervention might be welcome if there were concern among
Burmese about the intentions of their immediate neighbors (as there has been
historically during periods of instability and uncertainty). It might also be advisable to
consider offering a large international assistance package, as has been done in
Cambodia, East Timor, and other countries experiencing instability in the midst of rapid
political transition.
58
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
9. Conclusions and Policy Implications
All in all, it is difficult not to conclude that the chances for peaceful transition to
stable, sustainable democracy in Burma are very slim in the near future, largely because
the conditions required for sustainability are absent and there is no opening at present to
foster these conditions.
First, the intractability of the economic situation and the
regime’s refusal to entertain reforms that would begin to deal with the severe
macroeconomic distortions act as a serious inhibition to political development in the
broadest sense of the term. Second, existing government institutions are incapable of
functioning effectively to maintain central administration of the country without
authoritarian control. And finally, the impoverished educational system with its severe
limits on political and social science, as well as onerous restrictions on civil society and
public organizations, make it very difficult for the population to develop the civic
institutions necessary to support democratic government.
Since 1945, most Asian countries -- notable exceptions being Burma, North
Korea, and perhaps Laos -- have experienced significant, sometimes dramatic,
economic and political advancement under a great variety of seemingly adverse
conditions, such as foreign occupation, communism, insurgency, and partition. In all
these countries the governments, even under communist and/or autocratic rule, have
placed a premium on economic development, education, and building civilian
communities to advance their societies. Why does the military regime in Burma not
ascribe to the same values as its Asian friends and neighbors? We may never be able
to answer this question fully, but the fierce desire of successive Burmese governments
to prevent and expunge perceived foreign influence on Burmese society and culture has
undoubtedly played a large part, along with the obsession of military regimes with
maintaining comprehensive control over the population and severe restrictions on civilian
activity in the name of security and internal stability. As the world around them moves
forward in step with the global community, it will inevitably become impossible for future
Burmese leadership to continue insulating their society from the rapid pace of economic
and political modernization in Asia and starving their population for information.
Technological development is already overtaking them.
59
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
The most advantageous outcome for Burma would be for its future leaders to
have the foresight and understanding to initiate a wide-ranging, rational, and phased
transition back to pluralistic democracy – a process in which the kind of political and
economic reform and social transformation necessary for stability could be undertaken
with adequate international support and assistance. Unfortunately, this appears to be
the least likely scenario from the present vantage point. All signs seem to point instead
to the probability of a hesitant, confused, and troubled period of transition in which it is
difficult to take comprehensive measures to lay the basis for economic and political
development.
The foregoing sections of this paper have outlined in general the range of major
reforms and change that will be required to stimulate economic development, to
reconstitute and build civil society and civilian institutions, and to lay the foundations of
stable, competent governance.
The tasks are massive and will take more than a
generation, but they cannot be tackled in earnest until the country’s leadership
recognizes realistically the need for transition to civilian government. Thus it is important
for the international community, particularly Burma’s Asian neighbors, to understand the
depth of Burma’s economic, social, and political dislocations and the measures that will
be necessary to correct them. If a relatively consistent and coordinated message about
the need for basic reform in political, economic and educational structures could be
delivered to the country’s leadership over time, it would be much more difficult for the
leadership to dismiss or ignore it, and some degree of enlightenment might eventually
emerge.
Just as sanctions regimes can work against our ability to help, it is also
irresponsible of Burma’s friends and neighbors to conduct their relations with Burma
totally in pursuit of their own interests and without regard for the Burma’s political future.
We all share this responsibility.
9.1 China and India
China and, to a lesser degree, India have become the greatest facilitators for the
SPDC, providing financial resources and military assistance in return for access to
Burma’s natural resources. They are now engaged in avid competition for Burma’s large
off-shore natural gas reserves in the Bay of Bengal, promising billions of dollars of
revenue to the government in years to come.
While it is quite natural that the world’s
two most populous and rapidly developing countries, who straddle a small neighbor
60
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
relatively rich in natural resources, should see their relations with Burma in strategic
terms, it is not wise for them to disregard the country’s future welfare and stability. The
kind of economic investment, loans, and assistance they are providing Burma today do
not contribute much to the country’s economic development. So long as the SPDC’s
monetary and fiscal structures do not provide the business sector with a stable,
predictable return on investment and the government with a regular stream of public
revenue, Chinese and Indian investments are most likely to be diverted to the generals
and their families or to be used to finance hard-currency imports at the expense of
domestic economic development.
Both India and China should be giving the SPDC a strong message about the
importance of restructuring the economy to expand the business sector and they should
be managing their own economic relations with Burma to reinforce this message. Even
with much less leverage over the SPDC, Japan – through patience and persistence –
was able to make considerable progress with the Burmese government in outlining a
program for phased macro-economic reform. Although the senior leadership appears to
have taken no interest in this program since the purge of Khin Nyunt, the institutional
memory is still there and there are those at levels just below the top generals who
understand the benefits of reform, although they may not know exactly where to begin.
India and China should be participating actively in this effort.
They should also be sending a clear message on the need for political transition.
It is particularly unseemly for India, the world’s largest democracy, to be reticent about
promoting democracy in Burma.
It is perhaps an encouraging sign that China’s
Ambassador to the UN, even though he vetoed the proposed UNSC resolution urging
democratic transition in Burma, regretted that he had to do so, because “it was clear
Myanmar was not moving quickly enough to promote stability. He urged the military
regime to move toward ‘inclusive democracy’ and ‘speed up the process of dialogue and
reform.’”37
He also suggested that the SPDC should consider “constructive
recommendations” from ASEAN and “listen to the call of its own people.”38 China’s
37
Associated Press, “China, Russia Cast Veto Against U.S. Resolution on Myanmar,” January 14, 2007.
38
Financial Times, US edition, “US Wants China to Push for Reforms in Burma,” February 12, 2007.
61
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
public stance is undoubtedly indicative of messages that are being sent through
diplomatic and other channels.
9.2 ASEAN
Since accepting Burma into its midst against the advice of the United States and
Europe, ASEAN has suffered a heavy political cost in its relations with these two large
partners.
Having anticipated that membership in ASEAN would give Burma the
confidence and support to develop economically and politically, ASEAN governments
have been dismayed by the sheer intransigence of the SPDC. In recent years, the rise
of parliamentary consultative groups within ASEAN has translated into strong pressure
on ASEAN governments by elected officials to speak out against the SPDC’s harsh
repression of Burma’s democratic forces and its refusal to move forward seriously with
its own plan for political transition. ASEAN’s political frustrations are further compounded
by the SPDC’s role in fostering a hostile investment climate that has produced
substantial losses for Southeast Asian investors.
Although some ASEAN voices have raised the question of expelling Burma from
the organization, this is probably not a practical course, because it would eliminate an
important channel of communication and coordination with the seriously xenophobic
Burmese leadership.
ASEAN has a multitude of economic structures and regional
programs, which provide a variety of measures ASEAN might take to encourage
economic reform and transition in Burma. Perhaps it would be useful for ASEAN and its
partners, particularly the US, EU, Japan, and China, to explore the possibility of
developing a strategy for integrating Burma more firmly into ASEAN economic
structures.
It is also vitally important for ASEAN to remain a source of political pressure on
Burma. The SPDC and its successors will continue to value membership in ASEAN as a
collective means of dealing with China and other large countries, and therefore will have
to pay some heed to ASEAN’s concerns about how Burma’s actions affect the welfare of
the collective organization.
Fortunately, we can expect the ASEAN parliamentary
consultative group to demand that the organization hold the SPDC accountable for its
failure to live up to its commitments.
62
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
9.3 The United Nations
As a long-standing member and the fatherland of former UN Secretary General U
Thant, Burma places the United Nations at the center of its diplomacy. During the years
that General Khin Nyunt managed Burma’s diplomatic relations, UN activity in Burma
expanded substantially. UN agencies were allowed to set up missions in the country
and establish programs for various forms of welfare and humanitarian assistance, after
having been expelled and excluded by Ne Win.
From time to time, the Secretary
General’s representative was received to facilitate communication between the SPDC
and political opposition groups. The UN Human Rights Rapporteur was allowed, off and
on, to visit the country and report extensively on humanitarian conditions.
Annual
meetings of the UN General Assembly have traditionally served as a forum to chronicle
and inveigh against the SPDC’s record of repression and failure to move forward with
political transition. Calculating that the SPDC was particularly sensitive about its image
in the UN, Burmese exile groups and their supporters have placed great hope in the UN
as a means of forcing change, particularly when the Security Council agreed in 2006 to
put Burma on its agenda. With the veto of a UNSC resolution on Burma by China and
Russia and the SPDC’s reduced responsiveness to the UN since Khin Nyunt’s purge,
the UN’s role as an engine for change in Burma appears substantially less promising.
As a practical matter, the UN cannot become a central force in bringing about
change in Burma, unless the Burmese government seeks and accepts its assistance.
Short of this, it can only be a forum for debate, as it has been in the past, and a vehicle
for the international community to exert rhetorical pressure on the generals. If and when
genuine transition begins in Burma, the UN may become a more important source of
advice and support, not only through its assistance agencies, but also through the ability
of the Secretary General to facilitate mediation of internal disputes.
Because of
historical Burmese respect for UN neutrality, the UN might ultimately be the most
acceptable external interlocutor for all sides in an internal dispute, if mediation is sought.
9.4 The United States
Under the current circumstances, U.S. policy is focused appropriately on
pressuring the SPDC to return Burma to civilian democratic government. The fact that
Burma is considered to be of little to no strategic interest to the United States, especially
63
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
when compared to the many more urgent concerns the U.S. faces abroad, has allowed
the development of multiple layers of U.S. sanctions inhibiting relations with Burma as a
means of pressure on the SPDC.
There are, for example, laws prohibiting U.S.
investment in Burma and Burmese exports to the U.S. There is an executive order
denying Burma the use of U.S. financial services, making it impossible for the dollar to
be traded legally in Burma. (The dollar is still the basis for a large portion of black
market activity.)
Senior Burmese military and government officials and their family
members are not allowed to visit the United States. The U.S. Congress will not approve
the posting of an Ambassador to Burma, but maintains diplomatic relations in all other
respects, with the Chief of Mission carrying the title Charge d’Affaires. The Congress
allows very little of the annual foreign assistance earmark for Burma to be used inside
the country and then only through international NGOs. Aside from EU prohibitions on
visits by senior Burmese military and government officials, the U.S. sanctions against
Burma are not reinforced at the international level, with one major exception: As
governors of the major international banks, the U.S. and its partners have managed to
prohibit the World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank from undertaking any
significant programs in Burma.
Since various U.S. attempts to seek broader
international sanctions through the UN, the EU, and ASEAN have not succeeded over
the years, it now appears that most U.S. sanctions against Burma are destined to remain
largely bilateral.
With the possibility of some degree of generational evolution in Burma’s military
leadership growing increasingly likely, this might be an opportune moment for U.S.
policymakers to undertake a fundamental review of the assumptions underlying the
policy that has been in place for nearly two decades and reevaluate it in the context of
today’s international environment and evolving U.S. interests. Among other things, such
a review should encompass a number of fundamental issues. First is the question of
U.S. strategic interests in the Southeast Asia region, particularly in light of the rapid
economic development in China and India that will inevitably affect power balances in
the region, as well as the way those two countries deal with regional partners. Does the
United States perhaps have a greater strategic interest in Burma than has commonly
been assumed?
Second is the notion that total isolation is the most appropriate
response to repressive and seemingly defiant autocratic regimes. Has this produced
positive results in Burma? Finally, policymakers should take a hard look at how we have
64
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
been interacting with regional and international partners in seeking to maximize pressure
on Burma’s military regime. While such a review might conclude that current U.S. policy
toward Burma remains well founded and most appropriate to the current situation, it
would at least have the beneficial effect of drawing attention to the gradual subterranean
changes that are always underway in any situation, no matter how glacial it appears on
the surface. It would also focus attention on what modifications and adjustments in U.S.
policy would be effective and appropriate in response to changes in Burma, and it might
shed light on new international strategies for bringing pressure to bear more effectively
on the SPDC.
It is inconceivable that the United States would not want to play a central and
constructive role in supporting transition in Burma, once it begins. Yet some of the
constraints built into current U.S. policy will make it difficult for the U.S. to contribute
quickly and constructively to potentially positive developments in Burma, let alone to
facilitate gradual changes in Burma that would encourage transition and build the
foundations for stable democracy. For example, strict prohibitions on private business
activity and on economic assistance, both bilaterally and through IFIs, may serve to
assure that the U.S. is not contributing to the financial gain of the SPDC. However, they
also have the effect of prohibiting some kinds of economic activity that could encourage
economic reform and the development of Burma’s free market sector, if carefully
targeted. The United States should therefore consider positioning itself better to play a
leading role in facilitating the development of democratic institutions during a process of
staged transition, which is the course that Burma is most likely to take before returning to
full democracy.
Finally, the U.S. sanctions regime and its confrontational style with Burma’s
military leadership, no matter how well justified, have relegated the United States to a
backseat position in the effort to persuade the SPDC to proceed with transition. It is
simply a fact of life that Burma’s Asian neighbors will remain its key interlocutors and
points of contact until the appropriate time comes for the United States to ease its
sanctions and adjust its demeanor. Therefore, the U.S. should consider whether it might
be more productive to work in partnership with Burma’s neighbors to ease the generals
into reform and transition, rather than simply exhorting their governments to copy U.S.
policy.
This would only require a change in style and not in the fundamentals of U.S.
65
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
policy toward Burma, and might help to uncover new possibilities for encouraging the
process of change inside Burma.
For example, during this period when transition is still prospective, the United
States might consider spearheading a wide-ranging effort to develop coordinated
international plans to offer Burma assistance with economic and political development at
specified points in the future.
The OECD principles for assistance to fragile states
(appended to this study) represent a comprehensive starting point and roadmap for such
an effort.
Burma and its specific conditions would provide the ideal case study for
testing the viability of these principles. This kind of effort might even make it possible to
involve Burmese experts in articulating some of the tasks and proposed assistance
programs.
Whatever policy adjustments the United States might decide to make in the
future, however, U.S. policy must remain firmly fixed on the objective of achieving
democratic government in Burma and therefore on unfailing support for the country’s
democratic forces, especially the embattled National League for Democracy and its
General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi,
Under Aung San Suu Kyi’s guidance, the NLD
has kept the promise of democracy alive for 17 years, braving the threats and
intimidation of the military regime at great personal sacrifice. It is a testament to the
NLD’s durability that, after a 17-year struggle for survival, it is still the beacon for other
democracy forces in the country. When the time comes for real transition, Burma will
need a steady point of reference to articulate and demarcate the route to democracy.
Although it will certainly be a healthy sign if many new democratic voices emerge, it will
be a long time before any of them can attain the national stature and democratic vision
of the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi.
66
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
Appendix 1. Principles For Good International
Engagement in Fragile States
OECD Development Co-Operation Directorate
DCD(2005)8/REV2
April 7, 2005
PREAMBLE
A durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world’s most fragile states will
need to be driven by their own leadership and people. International actors can affect
outcomes in fragile states in both positive and negative ways. International engagement
will not by itself put an end to state fragility, but the adoption of the following shared
principles can help maximize the positive impact of engagement and minimise
unintentional harm.
The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help
national reformers to build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions.
Realisation of this objective requires taking account of and acting according to the
following principles:
1.
Take context as the starting point.
All fragile states require sustained
international engagement, but analysis and action must be calibrated to particular
country circumstances. It is particularly important to recognize different constraints of
capacity and political will and the different needs of:
(i) countries recovering from
conflict, political crisis or poor governance; (ii) those facing declining governance
environments, and; (iii) those where the state has partially or wholly collapsed.
Sound
political analysis is needed to adapt international responses to country context, above
and beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength.
2. Move from reaction to prevention. Action today can reduce the risk of future
outbreaks of conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term global
development and security. A shift from reaction to prevention should include sharing risk
analyses; acting rapidly where risk is high; looking beyond quick-fix solutions to address
67
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
the root causes of state fragility; strengthening the capacity of regional organizations to
prevent and resolve conflicts; and helping fragile states themselves to establish resilient
institutions which can withstand political and economic pressures.
3.
Focus on state-building as the central objective.
States are fragile when
governments and state structures lack capacity – or in some cases, political will - to
deliver public safety and security, good governance and poverty reduction to their
citizens. The long-term vision for international engagement in these situations must
focus on supporting viable sovereign states. State-building rests on three pillars: the
capacity of state structures to perform core functions; their legitimacy and accountability;
and ability to provide an enabling environment for strong economic performance to
generate incomes, employment and domestic revenues. Demand for good governance
from civil society is a vital component of a healthy state. State-building in the most
fragile countries is about depth, not breadth – international engagement should maintain
a tight focus on improving governance and capacity in the most basic security, justice,
economic and service delivery functions.
4.
Align with local priorities and/or systems.
Where governments demonstrate
political will to foster their countries’ development but lack capacity, international actors
should fully align assistance behind government strategies. Where alignment behind
government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance,
international actors should nevertheless consult with a range of national stakeholders in
the partner country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or
regional level. Another approach is to use ‘shadow alignment’ – which helps to build the
base for fuller government ownership and alignment in the future - by ensuring that
donor programs comply as far as possible with government procedures and systems.
This can be done for example by providing information in appropriate budget years and
classifications, or by operating within existing administrative boundaries.
5.
Recognise the political-security-development nexus.
The political, security,
economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others.
International actors should move to support national reformers in developing unified
planning frameworks for political, security, humanitarian, economic and development
activities at a country level. The use of simple integrated planning tools in fragile states,
68
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
such as the transitional results matrix, can help set and monitor realistic priorities and
improve the coherence of international support across the political, security, economic,
development and humanitarian arenas.
6. Promote coherence between donor government agencies. Close links on the
ground between the political, security, economic and social spheres also require policy
coherence within the administration of each international actor. What is necessary is a
whole of government approach, involving those responsible for security, political and
economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian
assistance. Recipient governments too need to ensure coherence between different
government ministries in the priorities they convey to the international community.
7. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors. This
can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership.
In these fragile
contexts, it is important to work together on upstream analysis; joint assessments;
shared strategies; coordination of political engagement; multi-donor trust funds; and
practical initiatives such as the establishment of joint donor offices and common
reporting and financial requirements.
Wherever possible, international actors should
work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared
analysis of challenges and priorities.
8. Do no harm. International actors should especially seek to avoid activities which
undermine national institution-building, such as bypassing national budget processes
1
or setting high salaries for local staff which undermine recruitment and retention in
national institutions. Donors should work out cost norms for local staff remuneration in
consultation with government and other national stakeholders.
9. Mix and sequence aid instruments to fit the context. Fragile states require a mix
of aid instruments, including, in particular for countries in promising but high risk
transitions, support to recurrent financing. Instruments to provide long-term support to
health, education and other basic services are needed in countries facing stalled or
deteriorating governance – but careful consideration must be given to how service
delivery
channels
are designed to avoid long-term dependence on parallel,
unsustainable structures while at the same time providing sufficient scaling up to meet
69
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
urgent basic and humanitarian needs. A vibrant civil society is important for healthy
government and may also play a critical transitional role in providing services,
particularly when the government lacks will and/or capacity.
10. Act fast... Assistance to fragile states needs to be capable of flexibility at short
notice to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions
on the ground.
11. ...but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. Given low capacity
and the extent of the challenges facing fragile states, investments in development,
diplomatic and security engagement may need to be of longer-duration than in other lowincome countries: capacity development in core institutions will normally require an
engagement of at least ten years. Since volatility of engagement (not only aid volumes,
but also diplomatic engagement and field presence) is potentially destabilizing for fragile
states, international actors commit to improving aid predictability in these countries, by
developing a system of mutual consultation and coordination prior to a significant
reduction in programming.
12. Avoid pockets of exclusion. International engagement in fragile states needs to
address the problems of “aid orphans” - states where there are no significant political
barriers to engagement but few donors are now engaged and aid volumes are low. To
avoid an unintentional exclusionary effect of moves by many donors to be more selective
in the partner countries for their aid programs, coordination on field presence and aid
flows, and mechanisms to finance promising developments in these countries are
essential.
i The piloting of the Principles will draw on the experience of the Good Humanitarian
Donorship Principles endorsed in Stockholm (June 2003).
ii For governments where political will exists and capacity is the main constraint,
supporting state-building means direct support for government plans, budgets, decisionmaking processes and implementing structures. In countries where political will is the
main constraint, support for long-term state-building does not necessarily imply shortterm support for government - but it does mean moving beyond repeated waves of
70
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
humanitarian responses to a focus on how to support and strengthen viable national
institutions which will be resilient in the longer-term. A vibrant civil society is also
important for healthy government and may play a critical transitional role in providing
services, particularly when government lacks will and/or capacity.
iii
The Addis Ababa principle developed in November 2001 as part of the Strategic
Partnership for Africa Initiative states: “All donor assistance should be delivered through
government systems unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary; where this is
not possible, any alternative mechanisms or safeguards must be time-limited and
develop and build, rather than undermine or bypass, governmental systems."
71
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Priscilla Clapp is a retired Minister-Counselor in the U.S. Foreign Service. She is
currently involved in community and academic work with several institutions.
During her 30-year career with the U.S. Government, Ms. Clapp served as Chief
of Mission at the US Embassy in Burma (1999-2002), Deputy Chief of Mission in the US
Embassy in South Africa (1993-96), Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Refugee Programs (1989-1993), Political Counselor in the US Embassy in Moscow
(1986-88), and chief of political-military affairs in the US Embassy in Japan (1981-85).
She also worked on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, in its East Asian,
Political Military, and International Organizations Bureaus, and with the US Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency.
She speaks Russian, Japanese, French, and some
Burmese.
Prior to government service, Ms. Clapp spent ten years in foreign policy and
arms control research, under contract to the MIT Center for International Studies and as
a research associate at the Brookings Institution. She is a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
include:
Her books
with Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Brookings,
2006), with I.M.Destler et al., Managing an Alliance: the Politics of U.S.-Japanese
Relations (Brookings, 1976), with Morton Halperin, U.S.-Japanese Relations in the
1970's (Harvard, 1974). She is the author of numerous chapters, articles and other
publications on foreign policy.
ABOUT THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent nonpartisan institution established and
funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict stability and development, and increase peacebuilding capacity and tools. The Institute
does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly
engaging in conflict management efforts around the globe.
72
This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author.