The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
MOKHZANI ZUBIR
Researcher
Every
year, more than 60,0001 ships pass through the Strait of Malacca2
carrying various cargoes, from crude oil to finished products from all over the
world. This number is nearly three times the number of ships that navigate
through the Panama Canal and more than double the number that uses the Suez
Canal. The strait which connects the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and
the Pacific Ocean, are one of the busiest ocean highways in the world. One third
of the world trade is passing through the strait, making it to be touted as the
artery of the world economy. Since the Strait of Malacca is so vital to the world
community, its safekeeping, in terms of the security of sea lane of commerce
especially, must be served in order to ensure that the strait will continuously
facilitating world trade. Any disruption or blockage on the Malacca Strait, either
by terrorist groups or by nation states will definitely prompt many parties to
interfere and have a control it. Malaysia, which is obviously one of the littoral
states, has to understand the dynamic power play in the strait. Before any
engagement of policies can be made, it is imperative first to understand which
parties that depend on the strait, what and how high their stakes are. This
article will try to explain who are the major stakeholders in the strait and to what
extent they are relying on the freedom of navigation in the strait. Understanding
this basic strategic calculation is crucial as it could facilitate us to comprehend
the latest development in the strait, why does it happen and what are the effects
to Malaysia especially.
Mokhzani Zubir
1
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
THE CONTEMPORARY STRAIT OF MALACCA
Strait of Malacca is the longest
international
navigational
route
through a strait, where it connects
the Indian Ocean via Andaman Sea
on the north with South China Sea
on the south via the Straits of
Singapore. Nevertheless, the strait
provides the shortest route for ships
to reach between East Asia and
Europe.
With an average width
between 11 to 200 nautical miles,
the seaway in this strait is not
always wide as at certain parts of
the strait, the navigable route is less
than 1 nautical mile, and certain part
of its navigable area is less than 30
meters deep. At a particular point
on the strait, the maximum draught
recommended by the International
Maritime Organization for passing
ships is 19.8 meters.3
Even
with
the
‘unfriendly’
navigational features in the Strait of
Malacca, the strait is still an
attractive and preferred navigational
route for international shippers
compared to other alternative routes
like Sunda or Lombok-Makassar
straits. The 50 miles long Sunda
Strait is 15 miles wide on its
northeastern entrance but the strong
currents and limited depth has
prevented deep-draftships of over
100,000 deadweight tones (DWT)
from transiting this strait.4
The
Sunda Strait has a tricky channel,
depth limitations, and a live volcano,
and is not favoured by oil tankers.5
Moreover, according Chia (1995),
the Sunda Strait unsuitable as it has
“highly irregular bottom topography
of the Straits and the presence of rip
tides render it unsuitable for vessels
drawing over 18 meters of water to
use the Straits. In addition, there are
hazards posed by the numerous oil
drilling platforms to the north of
western Java. The Sunda Straits
have as yet no available detailed
navigation charts.6”
With a
minimum passage width of 11.5
miles and depth of more than 150
metres, the Lombok Strait, on the
other hand is the safest route for
supertankers because it is wider,
deeper and less congested than the
Strait of Malacca. Both Lombok and
Makassar Straits do not feature
serious navigational hazards along
the navigational channel but the
routes require an additional of three
and a half days navigating at full
commercial speed of 14-16 knots, an
extra mileage of 1600 nautical miles,
which add to transportation cost
where in the long term operation it is
not profitable to the tanker
operators.7
Based on these facts, fears and
concern has been raised by
international community that the
closure of the Strait of Malacca
would immediately raise freight
rates. Freight rates around the world
would be affected, thus adding costs
to many nations’ imports and
exports. The closure of the Suez
Canal infers that the freight rates for
ships navigating through Southeast
Asia might increase as much as 500
percent8 if the Strait of Malacca is
bound to closure.
The closure of
Mokhzani Zubir
2
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
the Strait of Malacca is not a big
problem
because
there
are
alternative routes. In reality, on the
other hand, the cost of re-routing
maritime
traffic,
especially
oil
tankers, can be expensive. To divert
the tankers on the Middle East-Japan
route from Malacca to the Lombok
Strait would involve more than
USD$340 million per year to the
Japanese petroleum industry. The
Strait of Malacca is a critical
chokepoint of world oil trade
because huge quantity of oil passes
through it, and this number is
expected to increase significantly in
the
next
coming
decades.
THE POWER STRUGGLE IN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA
The strategic feature that makes the
strait exceptionally important to the
world is that the Strait is the main
entrance for merchant ships and oil
tankers that sail from East to West
and vice versa.
The Strait of
Malacca is the main sea lane of
communication to East Asia, a region
that is predicted to have the most
progressive economy in the world.
There are many countries yearn to
have full control on the Strait of
Malacca or at least possess a
‘commanding power’ on the strait
because
of
various
reasons.
However the most visible or
prominent countries that have
The Economic Factor
East Asia is a region with dynamic
economic growth, with increasing
share to the world’s output and
trade. It is estimated that by the
year 2010, 34 per cent of world’s
total output will be contributed by
East
Asian
region,
surpassing
Western Europe and North America
with 26 per cent and 25 per cent
respectively. As with the trade, East
Asia’s share to the world’s trade will
strongly shown their desire on the
strait are the United States and
China.
The Strait of Malacca
becomes the focus of strategic and
geostrategic calculations by these
two countries because of three
intertwined factors i.e. the economic,
military and oil factors.
These
factors are interrelated and produce
distinct
dynamic
impacts
and
outcomes to each of the state. The
pursuance of strategies to make the
outcome favorable to them has
made the Strait of Malacca a venue
and a subject of silent struggle
between a superpower and a rising
great
power.
account almost 40 percent, leaving
behind Western Europe and North
America with about 37 per cent and
20 per cent respectively.9 Because of
its impressive economic growth that
could promise riches to the world,
East Asia has long been regarded as
a region that could promise
prosperity and security to the United
States.
In 1993, the Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and
Mokhzani Zubir
3
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord, stated
that East Asia is "the most relevant
to the President's (Bill Clinton)
highest priority namely his domestic
agenda, the renewal of the American
economy, getting the deficit down,
getting more competitive, promoting
jobs and exports."10 The statement
was strengthened by President Bill
Clinton himself when he described
the region as “the most promising
and dynamic area for American
foreign policy." The high priority the
United States gave to East Asia has
not changed even when the
leadership in the White House has
changed from the Democrats to
Republican. Trade volume between
U.S. and East Asia is steady and
getting higher although the region
suffered economic hiccup in 1997.
In his speech to the Heritage
Foundation, Donald Rumsfeld has
once again pledge the U.S. priority
on East Asia when he stated that
“Asia’s success will mean so much to
America’s
own
security
and
prosperity.”11
In 2002, the U.S.
export volume to East Asia was
impressive
where
the
region
becomes the biggest market to U.S.
leaving behind long-established U.S.
market; Canada and European
Union.12 Export to East Asia13 is
accounted at $169 billion which
generated more than 3 million U.S.
jobs14.
Japan itself is the third
largest single market for U.S. after
Canada and Mexico where U.S.
export to Japan is accounted at
USD$51.44 billion in 2002.15 With
that high stakes of economic
interests (and still growing), the U.S
also has a growing economic interest
in the security of sea line of
communication (SLOCs) in East Asia,
particularly in view of the impact of
the SLOCs disruption on U.S. trading
partners. The wealth, prosperity and
even economic security of the United
States will remain dependent on
continued linkages with the East
Asian
economies.
East
Asia
represents the most important locus
of
American
economic
engagement.16 Economic crisis or
slumped economic growth in East
Asia particularly Japan, South Korea
and ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations) countries will directly
affecting U.S. economy.
However, U.S. markets in East Asia
are threatened by the rise China’s
economy. With its rapid economic
growth, China is strengthening its
market across Asia, attracting
immense amount of foreign direct
investment17 and pushing away the
United States’ position as East Asia’s
economic engine. In 2003, the
United States import from Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan and ASEAN
countries
were
accounted
at
USD$268 billion.18 Even though U.S.
is still a vital trading partner for East
Asian countries, its presence is being
shadowed by China’s rise. China’s
ravenous appetite in importing
goods, parts and raw materials from
regional countries has made its
neighbors’ economy, particularly
ASEAN countries grow and the
leaders are praising China’s rapid
development as a benefit to their
economies.
China's trade with
ASEAN hit a record high of
USD$78.25 billion in 2003, surging
Mokhzani Zubir
4
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
by 42.8 per cent year-on-year.
China's import jumped by 51.7
percent to USD$47.33 billion and
export grew 31.1 percent to
USD$30.93 billion, with a trade
deficit of USD$16.4 billion.19 China’s
remarkable
economic
growth,
followed with its entrance in the
World Trade Organization is seen as
a process of replacing the U.S. as
the dominant power in Asia.20
Progressive
trade
relationships
between China and East Asian
countries have produced a mutual
courtship and as a result, many
Asian countries are shifting their
economic alliances from the U.S. to
China.
The
growing
economic
interdependence between the East
Asian states and China is not
preferred by the U.S. as it could
threaten the U.S. market share in
the region.
Moreover, smooth
economic relationship could lead to
warm bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic relationships where in the
long term, China could assert its
influence in the region.
In a
testimony before the House of
International Relations Committee,
Washington, James A. Kelly said that
the U.S. “cannot ignore the fact that
China's growing economic power has
created a competition for influence in
the region, which makes it all the
more important for the United States
The Oil Factor
With its dynamic economic growth,
energy demands in East Asian
countries are expected to increase in
to remain actively engaged with our
Asian allies. While China has not
moved aggressively to garner
political capital from its growing
economic strength, there is no
denying its prominence on the Asian
political stage. We need only to look
as far as Taiwan -- where firms are
queuing up to move operations to
China and whose executives lobby
for freer access to the Chinese
market -- to see how quickly
economics can change a political
dynamic..”21
China, with a sturdy and progressive
economy could hamper and dilute
U.S. influence in East Asia that in the
long term would diminish U.S. huge
market share in the region. East Asia
is projected to produce more middle
class society with strong buying
power than any other region in the
world. With a strong buying power,
China could influence East Asian
countries to bandwagon with it and
support its foreign policy that from
the U.S perspective would jeopardize
its interest in East Asia. The U.S.
can be denied its economic, military
and political access to East Asia if
countries in the region feel
comfortable and prosper under the
Chinese
economic
influence.
Therefore, the U.S. has no other
option except to reassert and
strengthen its influence in East Asia.
the future decades. In the year
2020, the energy demand for China
alone is expected to be at 1,353
Mokhzani Zubir
5
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
million tonnes of oil equivalent
(mtoe), while other Northeast Asian
countries (Japan, Korea, Taiwan) will
touch 745 mtoe, and Southeast
Asian countries will demand for 525
mtoe.22 While the sources of energy
are oil, coal, natural gas, nuclear
power plant, hydroelectricity and
renewable sources, oil rises to be the
most needed resource to generate
the economic growth of East Asian
countries. China, Japan and South
Korea demand enormous amount of
energy to progress in their economic
development.
In fact, energy is
probably the most important issue of
international economic development.
According to an UNCTAD report:
“… energy is one of the most important drivers of economic development
and is a key determinant for the quality of our daily lives … it is probably
the biggest business in the world economy, with a turnover of at least
$1.7 – 2 trillion a year … global investment in energy between 1990 and
2020 will total some $30 trillion at 1992 prices.”23
Northeast
Asian
countries,
particularly China, Japan and South
Korea, are the biggest oil consumer
in East Asia. Consuming about
13.2324 million barrels a day (mbd),
these countries sit at the top ten oil
importers in the world. With that
huge amount of oil needed to assist
their economy, these countries are
heavily depending on the Middle East
to supply their huge chunk of oil
demand. Oil imported from the
Middle East will be transported
across the Indian Ocean, navigating
through the Strait of Malacca and
across the South China Sea destined
to the oil consumers. The Strait of
Malacca becomes an important oil
route because the oil demand and
production does not happen at the
same place. Persian Gulf countries
are the main oil producer for
Northeast
Asian
countries.
According to Energy Information
Administration (EIA), in the year
2003 it is estimated that about 11
million barrels a day of crude oil
passed through the Strait of Malacca
destined to consumers in East Asia.
Because of this dynamic demand for
oil in Northeast Asia, the Strait of
Malacca becomes an important route
to transport oil where in 2003 alone,
19,154 tankers passing eastbound
transporting the much needed oil.25
In year 2000, Northeast Asia’s
(China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan)
oil demand, was accounted at
620,858 ktonnes but this figure is
expected to skyrocket up to
1,023,614 ktonnes in 2020.26 High
percentage of this demand will be
fulfilled by Persian Gulf’s oil and
obviously the oil will be transported
through the Strait of Malacca.
China, a country that is prophesized
to rival the US, demanded 5.56 mbd
in 2003 which enabled it to emerge
as the world’s second largest oil
consumer surpassing Japan for the
first time.27 In 1950s and early
1960s, China was an oil importer
from the Soviet Union but with the
discovery of the Daqing oil field in
1959 and the withdrawal of Soviet
advisers from China’s oil industry in
1960, China has positioned itself to
Mokhzani Zubir
6
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
produce enough oil to fulfill its
domestic needs by the mid 1960s
and was able to export small amount
of oil in 1970. However due to its
rapid economic growth and market
reform, China has become net oil
importer in 1993. With the gross
domestic
product
expected
to
average 6.6 per cent per year until
2020, China is forecasted to import
8.8 mbd in the year 202028
compared to 3.4 mbd as at April
2004.29 China’s anticipation on the
growing amount of imported oils has
pushed it to dispense a lot of money
to acquire interests in oil exploration
and production all over the world like
Russia, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Peru,
Azerbaijan, Sudan, Iran and Iraq.30
Apart from that, China is trying to
reduce its dependency on oil as a
major source of energy by expanding
the natural gas production and
consumption. Currently China’s oil
imports from the Middle East have
amounted about 58 per cent from its
total oil import. Still, with all its
efforts, the quantity of imported oil
will continue to be high.
It is
estimated that by 2015, the total of
Middle East oil will account about 70
per cent of China’s oil import.31
Japan, the world's fourth largest
energy consumer and second largest
energy importer, requires as much
as 5.57 mbd of oil in 2003, up from
5.30 mbd in 2002. This significant
amount of increase is attributed
mainly from the recovery of its
economy from stagnancy, where its
industries are demanding more
energy for production, and the
shutdown of a large number of
nuclear power plants in 2003.
Without a substantial quantity of
natural
resources
needed
to
generate energy to satisfy its
industrialized economy, Japan needs
to import large amount of crude oil,
besides natural gas, and other
energy resources, including uranium
for its nuclear power plants.32 Oil
constituted for 52 per cent of its
total energy supply, and is expected
to remain as a major energy source
With its
in the 21st century.33
proven oil reserves only 57 million
barrels
(virtually
none)
Japan
imports almost all of its crude oil and
as much as 88 per cent of Japan’s
crude oil supply came from OPEC,
particularly Persian Gulf countries
like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Iran. In
2001, Japan imported around 3.7
mbd from the Middle East which
made the country the single largest
customer for the region, where
Japan took around 21 percent of that
region’s exports.34
South Korea’s energy sources are
made up of crude oil, liquefied
natural gas (LNG), coal, nuclear
power plant and hydroelectric.
However, oil constitutes the largest
apportion of its total energy
sources.35 Approximately 97.3 per
cent of South Korea’s energy sources
came from overseas.36 As of 2001,
South Korea is the fourth largest net
oil importer and the sixth largest oil
consumer in the world. In 2002,
South Korea imported 208 mtoe of
crude oil in which 73.4 per cent of it
came from the Middle East.37
Nonetheless,
South
Korea’s
Mokhzani Zubir
7
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
dependence on oil has decreased
from 60.4 per cent in 1997 to 50.6
per cent in 2001, but dependence on
the Middle East for oil has increased
from 72.3 per cent in 1999 to 77 per
cent in 2001.38 South Korea must
import
its
entire
crude
oil
requirement because the country has
no domestic oil reserves. As an
industrialized
country
with
progressive economic growth, South
Korea is expected to increase its oil
consumption.
The Asia Pacific
Energy Research Centre projected
that South Korea’s oil demand will
grow to be around 2.4 per cent per
annum to 2020.39 Saudi Arabia and
United Arab Emirate supply about 30
per cent and 16 per cent respectively
to South Korea’s oil demand. For
South Korea, “The shipping routes
connecting the Strait of Hormuz,
Malacca-Singapore
straits
and
Southeast Asian waters form the
most important ocean routes used to
import strategic commodities.”40
It is clear that the Middle East is the
biggest oil supplier to China, Japan
and South Korea. Oil becomes the
much needed commodity as it is the
major source of energy for these
countries. For China, even though it
has many unexplored oil basin, its
incapacity
in
oil
production
technology prevented the country
from producing enough oil for
domestic demand. Furthermore, the
low quality of its oil which contain
high amount of sulphur requires
expensive refinery technology for
desulphurization. Both Japan and
South Korea, lack of domestic oil
reserves forces the countries to
import almost all of its oil demand.
For the three Northeast Asian
countries, energy determines their
survival in the globalized world.
Without enough energy, many of
their industries will fail to maximize
the production and eventually the
gross domestic products of these
countries will shrink. Uninterrupted
flow of imported energy must be
secured as not to jeopardize the
economic growth.
Thus energy
security determines directly the
economic security of Northeast Asian
region. The huge chunk of sources
of energy for these countries is
crude oil. As almost 80 per cent of
oil imported by China, Japan and
South Korea comes from the Middle
East, the issue of energy security
emerges.
For these countries,
energy security is focused on the
effect of supply interruptions and
sudden rise in oil prices in
international market. Fear of short
term unstable oil supply has led
Japan and South Korea to develop
strategic petroleum reserves. Japan
has a sizeable strategic petroleum
reserve, currently around 310 million
barrels41 that can last for 119 days.42
South Korea’s strategic petroleum
reserve, which is managed by stateowned
Korea
National
Oil
Corporation (KNOC) has a capacity
of 109 days of stocks which account
for 49 days of strategic and 60 days
of private stocks as end of July
2003.43
Both countries have
prepared themselves for unpredicted
supply
disruptions
where
the
strategic petroleum reserves serve
Mokhzani Zubir
8
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
as safety nets or cushions to their
economy from direct impact of oil
shortages or sudden increase of oil
price. By 2007, South Korea has
targeted to stockpile its strategic oil
reserve to141 million barrels of oil
and increase to 146 million barrels
by 2008.44
China, on the other hand, has no
strategic oil reserve.45 Beijing
realizes that without the reserve that
works as buffer, the country’s
economy is vulnerable not only to
the heighten tension in the Middle
East but also to the possible
disruption on oil supply route.
China’s current domestic supply can
only last a few days.46 While China
is incapable in stabilizing the
situation in the Middle East because
of lack of influence, China is serious
in keeping sealanes open and
securing
the
ships
that
are
navigating through the chokepoints
carrying crude oil from the Middle
East. The security of the transport
corridors is a big concern to China,
chiefly in the Strait of Malacca,
through which all Middle Eastern oil
reaches China and other Northeast
Asian customers.
The People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has
been assigned to secure the
The Military Factor
In Asia, the US has two vital
interests that it must secure in order
to ensure its survival. The first vital
interest is to prevent, deter, and
reduce the threat of attack on the
continental United States (CONUS)
sealanes open and to escort Chinese
tankers navigating the strategic
chokepoints. In the recent FranceChina joint navy exercise, Beijing has
clearly showed that the exercise is
centered on maintaining its sealanes
of control. Beijing has stated that oil
supply routes are one of its strategic
interests and would use naval force
to control these critical shipping
lanes. Hu Jintao, President of the
People’s
Republic
of
China
commented that the “Malacca
dilemma” is a key element to China’s
energy security. Hu stated, "Certain
powers (the United States) have all
along encroached on and tried to
control the navigation through the
strait." A Chinese military expert
recommended China to pursue both
offensive and defensive naval
strategies by building up massive
warships
and
submarines
to
challenge the domination of the
United States forces on the high
seas. Offensive military option is to
deploy rapid reaction forces when a
crisis occurs while defensive posture
is by creating credible deterrence
capability. Both strategies will show
China’s determination and strength
to safeguard the country’s interests.
47
and
its
extended
territorial
possessions from threats posed by
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
in Asia.48 In Asia, Russia, China,
North Korea, Pakistan, India and
Iran are said to have the mature
Mokhzani Zubir
9
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) warfare programs that could
inflict serious damage to the U.S.
Among these countries, only Russia,
China
and
India
have
the
sophisticated delivery systems, such
as ballistic and cruise missiles and
advanced attack aircraft. China is the
most worried country economically
and militarily49 that could pose real
threats to US.
Strong economy
means China has a lot of money to
spend on Research & Development
of warfare technology and has the
buying power to procure the latest
and most sophisticated military
equipments. The United States’
worry about this situation is clearly
expressed by James A. Kelly when
he testified
“...neither can we ignore the fact that the Chinese military is a beneficiary
of the country's rapid economic growth, which underscores the necessity
of sustaining a modest military-to-military relationship with the People's
Liberation Army within the guidelines established by Congress. U.S. Trade
and Commercial Policy Toward Southeast Asia”.50
The United States therefore has to
prevent potential adversaries (China)
from acquiring a credible military
capability that could challenge its
superiority. To achieve this vital
interest, the U.S. also has to prevent
the rise of a hegemonic state in Asia.
The existence of a hegemonic state
that dominates the internal and
external Asian land mass and the
SLOCs could pose an offensive
challenge to the safety, prosperity,
and power position of the United
States.51 The rise of a powerful
country particularly in East Asia
could deny the U.S. access to the
region’s capital, market, goods and
technology. This act of denying
access could choke the US economy,
drying up its wealth to sustain its
military which lead to the weakening
of the U.S. foreign policy.
The
combination of the multiple effects
of denying access would threaten
the U.S. economic security and
prosperity that would threaten the
relative power position of the United
States in international politics.52 To
preempt the rise of a hegemonic
state in East Asia, the US needs to
prevent a concentration of resources
in one state. To do this, it has to
control the SLOCs that are vital to a
particular country as a mean to
cumulate wealth and resources in
order to become the hegemonic
state.
The second vital interest the United
States has in Asia is to ensure the
survival of American allies.53 In East
Asia in particular, the U.S. most
important allies are Japan and South
Korea.
The main reason that
requires the U.S. to protect its allies
is the U.S. has treaty obligations to
Japan and South Korea. This treaty
also serves to ensure the economic
growth of Japan and South Korea
from external aggression.
The
assurance of security to Japan and
South Korea together with massive
investments and technical assistance
by the U.S. to both countries have
helped the countries to prosper and
developed. The highly industrialized
Mokhzani Zubir 10
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
Japan and South Korea, once the
recipients of U.S. money, are the
main trade partners of the US. In
2003 South Korea’s import from the
U.S. amounted to USD$24 billion,
which is the United States’ third
biggest market in East Asia. Since
the U.S. economic growth is directly
influenced by the success of these
two countries, the U.S. must ensure
that the industrial output and the
gross domestic product of these
countries are not threatened. One of
the situations that can directly affect
the economic growth of Japan and
South Korea is the outbreak of war
in Korean peninsular and across the
Taiwan Strait.
To prevent both
limited and large scale war, the US
stations 100,000 troops which
consist of the U.S. Eighth Army and
Seventh Air Force in South Korea,
and III Marine Expeditionary Force
and Fifth Air Force in Japan, and the
U.S. Seventh Fleet.
This large
number of troops represent as
deterrent capability and rapid
response strategy in the Korean
Peninsular and Taiwan Strait where
the U.S. is responsible in assisting
Taiwan to maintain a military
balance across the Taiwan Strait
until a peaceful resolution of the
political standoff between Taipei and
Beijing can be reached. For the
U.S., maintaining an overseas
military presence is a keystone of
U.S. National Security Strategy and a
key element of U.S. military policy of
“shape, respond, and prepare.”54
As the U.S. military bases are
scattered throughout the world,
access to the bases at any time,
either during peace, conflict, crisis or
war, requires secured airspace and
freedom of navigation especially in
the choke points or SLOCs. The U.S.
military bases in Japan and South
Korea are effectively accessed via
sea and sealift is the main strategy
for deployment and logistics during
conflict either with North Korea or
even China. If a crisis conflagrates
or war breaks in Northeast Asia, U.S.
Navy reinforcements from the Middle
East is needed to neutralize the
situation. To reach the battlefield in
Northeast Asia as soon as possible,
the SLOCs in Southeast Asia
especially the Strait of Malacca
provide the fastest route. According
to a U.S. source, if a conventionally
powered six-ship carrier battle group
traveling from Japan to the Persian
Gulf or vice versa were denied
transit through the Strait of Malacca
and the Indonesian archipelago, rerouting around Australia would add
some 5,800 nautical miles and delay
the arrival of the battle group by
sixteen days and result in US$ 2.9
million additional fuel costs.55 For
the U.S., denial of free passage and
freedom of navigation through
Southeast
Asia’s
choke
point
especially that limits the movement
of warships is their greatest concern.
In 1996, the U.S. experienced their
concern when Indonesia announced
that it intended to restrict military
and commercial shipping lane on
three of its waters which are the
Sunda Strait, the Lombok Strait and
the Moluccan Sea.
Furthermore,
access to the Strait of Malacca will
be restricted. The sudden access
restriction by Indonesia could hinder
Mokhzani Zubir 11
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
the U.S. Navy’s movement during a
crisis either in Northeast Asia or in
the Middle East. An “angry protest”
lodged to the Suharto government
by the U.S. managed to return the
U.S. rights for freedom of navigation
in the archipelago but concerns on
the closure of the choke points
especially the Strait of Malacca
remains higher than before. In 1997
the importance of the Strait of
Malacca to U.S. became evident
when the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz
that was in Asian waters was
ordered by the Clinton administration
to reinforce the Persian Gulf fleet so
as to pose a credible military threat
to Iraq which was having a crisis
with the United Nations over the
weapons inspection.
With
guaranteed navigation rights, the
Nimitz was allowed to sail through
the South China Sea, through the
Strait of Malacca, off the coast of
Western India, and then up to the
Gulf. If the Nimitz was denied its
navigation rights in the Strait of
Malacca, it would have been
impossible for the Nimitz the reach
the Persian Gulf on time and the
whole crisis scenario could have
turned out differently.
In the early 1990s after the end of
Cold War the U.S. has lessen its
concentration in Southeast Asia but
with the renewal of policy on East
Asia by the Clinton administration
and the rise of China, the US
reshaped its strategy in East Asia.
The U.S. Navy and Air Force
established bunkering, Rest and
Recuperation, and joint exercise
access to even more Southeast Asian
states than were available during the
Cold
War.56
Agreements
and
arrangements
are
made
with
Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei,
Indonesia, the Philippines and
Singapore to secure the navigation
rights on the SLOCs and for logistic
purposes. The Changi naval base has
been
newly
expanded
to
accommodate Nimitz-class aircraft
carriers and other large ships of the
U.S. Seventh Fleet that are transiting
from the Indian Ocean to the Taiwan
Strait.57 The policy of “places not
bases” developed by U.S. forces in
the Pacific for Southeast Asia is
intended to enhance U.S. strategic
interests in maintaining regional
stability and a credible power
projection capability in the region
and beyond, including the Arabian
Gulf when necessary,58 and to retain
its influence in Northeast Asia
securing its economic, capital and
military
access
vis-à-vis
the
emerging powerful China through
the domination of SLOCs. During
the Cold War, the US top strategic
objective
was
in
maintaining
freedom of navigation of SLOCs in
Southeast Asia for American military
vessels while denying that same
freedom to the Soviet Union in the
event of a conflict.59 According to
Mark J. Valencia, the US flexibility of
Southeast Asia's SLOCs during the
Cold War was meant to create
options for the U.S. Navy to navigate
its warships and nuclear submarines
from East to West and vice versa.
This navigation options will create
uncertainty and “confusion" to the
enemy to locate the nuclear
submarines. The probability of the
Mokhzani Zubir 12
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
carrier battle group for example, to
use the Lombok Strait is small as it
can use other straits as well. If
China is able to dominate the Strait
of Malacca, China has reduced the
US ability to confuse its rival by
making the probability of the U.S.
Navy to use certain straits higher.
The U.S. warships can be expected
to use either Lombok Strait, Sunda
Strait or re-routing around Australia.
Therefore, the warships can be
detected, targeted or marked easier
than before. It seems that the
resurgence
of
Chinese
naval
st
superiority in the 21 century prompt
the US to execute the same strategy
it once imposed during the Cold War.
China, a country that depends
heavily on seaborne trade for
economic vitality and energy needs,
has projected the build up of its
naval capability to secure its sea lane
of communication in the South China
Sea, Strait of Malacca and even up
north to the Indian Ocean and
further to the Persian Gulf. As part
of China’s effort to secure the Strait
of Malacca sea lane, China has built
strategic infrastructure in Myanmar
that includes roads, communication
and intelligence networks, and
military
bases.
Electronic
intelligence systems are installed in
the Great Coco Island in the Bay of
Bengal, Sittwe and Zedetkyi Kyun off
the Terrasserim coast in South
Myanmar for the purpose of
maritime
reconnaissance
and
intelligence to monitor any activity
on the Malacca Strait and Indian
Ocean that could threaten their sea
lane security.
China’s intelligence
infrastructure build up in Myanmar is
also related to its strategic step to
counter
India’s
influence
in
Southeast Asia. India has a vital
interest in seeing the Strait of
Malacca will not be controlled by
countries that are hostile to it.60
The “Look East” policy that India
pursues is meant to establish a
stronger political and naval presence
in Southeast Asia. The policy has led
the country to augment its
engagement with Southeast Asian
countries where India has increased
its attention to ASEAN. For New
Delhi, the sea lanes in Southeast
Asia have grown its importance in
terms of energy security because
New Delhi is looking for oil and gas
supplies from Myanmar, Vietnam and
Indonesia.61 Thus it is not surprising
that in 1999, India announced that
its strategic interests extended all
the way from the Persian Gulf to the
Strait
of
Malacca.
India’s
seriousness in securing its strategic
sea lane is evidenced in 2001 when
India deployed its navy to East Asia,
from Singapore to Japan. India’s
Andaman and Nicobar Command
(ANC) in the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands was established partly to
check the growing Chinese presence
in the waters close to India. The
ANC also is an infrastructure to
facilitate India’s force projection up
to the Strait of Malacca.62
For China, India’s naval power
projection in the Strait of Malacca
and its “Look East” policy is
inauspicious
because
China’s
merchant ships and oil tankers are
Mokhzani Zubir 13
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
subject to blockade or harassment
by Indian Navies if Indo-China war
breaks again. The 1962 war has led
China to seize more than 3,000
kilometer long Himalayan border on
which India deems its own territory.
The last time tensions escalated on
the border of the disputed territory
was in 1986 and since then the
situation is stalemate. Even though
high-level bilateral talks took place
since 1994, the conflagration of
tension of Indo-China border dispute
cannot be ruled out. China realizes
that its energy supply from the
Middle East is easily interrupted in
the Indian Ocean but the situation
will get worse if the Indian Navy is
able to encroach in the Strait of
Malacca and even to South China
Sea. If that happen, China’s trade
route and oil supply from Southeast
Asia are really threaten.
In the
event of Indo-China border war, the
Indian Navy which is roaming free in
the Strait of Malacca and the South
China Sea could disrupt China’s
seaborne trade and oil supply from
both the Middle East and Southeast
Asia and that could make China’s
economy totally collapse.
The
waters in Southeast Asian are
important to China’s strategic
projection and Beijing has devoted
so much of its resources for political,
economic and military purposes.
India is probably seen as an
unwanted actor in Southeast Asia by
China and its presence must be
brought to a standstill or it could
imperil China’s strategic posture in
the 21st century.
CONCLUSION
It is obvious that in the Strait of
Malacca, the United States is the
biggest stakeholder followed by
China. For the US, the importance
of the strait has grown significantly
in relation to the rise of China.
Although there are other straits in
the Indonesian archipelagic waters
that can be used both for military
and civilian purposes, the U.S. must
retain its dominance in the Strait of
Malacca for these reasons.
First, to show its rival (China) that
the US presence is the barometer of
its influence in East Asia. The U.S.
Navy’s regular traverse in the strait
is the indicator that it has the
capability both to influence and
pressure littoral states.
Second, the U.S. Navy’s firm hold on
the strait is a warning to China that
its seaborne trade and oil import is
at the mercy of the U.S.
Any
attempt by China to assert its
influence and pushing aside the US
role and market share from East
Asian countries will be punished by
the US by blocking the SLOCs
especially in the Strait of Malacca.
Third, to secure the merchant ships
and oil tankers that belongs to U.S.
allies. Japan and South Korea use
the Strait of Malacca extensively to
export its finished products and to
Mokhzani Zubir 14
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
import oil from the Middle East. The
U.S. has to guarantee its allies that it
can protect their economic interest.
Failing to do so, Japan and South
Korea might seriously consider
securing their merchant ships and oil
tankers unilaterally by dispatching
their own navies and self defense
force. If this happen, China would
feel threaten and the power struggle
in the Strait of Malacca will become
fury.
Fourth, to prevent the rise of
hegemonic state in East Asia and
possibly in the world.
China’s
impressive economic growth, its
advancement
in
science
and
technology, its achievement in
sending man to the atmosphere by
using its indigenous technology
(partly assisted by the Soviet) are
the testimony that China is rising as
a superpower. Although it is still far
for China to be at par with the US,
China has shown the trend, pattern
and
attitude
to
become
a
superpower. The United States has
no other choice except to monitor
this pattern closely and possibly
check China’s progress in the Strait
of Malacca. China may dominate the
Asian land mass therefore the U.S.
has to deny China’s domination in
Southeast Asian SLOCs especially the
Strait of Malacca.
Fifth, the US cannot afford to lose
the Strait of Malacca to China
because of morale and dignity factor.
If the PLA Navy successfully controls
the strait, it will boost up the
Chinese morale and encourage them
to control other straits as well. The
U.S. will lose its dignity as a
superpower and its allies will lose
confidence towards U.S. as a reliable
guarantor for universal freedom of
navigation.
For China, its concern on the security
of oil supply prompts their defense
apparatus to project their naval
power in the Strait of Malacca and
further to the Persian Gulf. It is
imperative for China to hold a strong
position in the Strait of Malacca. As
the Strait of Malacca is the main
entrance to East Asia from the West,
China could secure its seaborne
trade and oil supply within Southeast
Asian countries.
China needs to
create a “perimeter” of sea defense
for its ships that navigates within
Southeast Asia. China’s trade with
ASEAN
countries
must
be
“contained” or “sealed” from external
aggression that could invade via the
Strait of Malacca and other straits in
the Indonesian archipelagic water.
In fact, China has made its first step
to ‘secure’ its position in the
Indonesian water by investing in
Indonesia’s oil and gas industry. In
January 2002 the Chinese stateowned offshore oil company CNOOC
bought the Indonesian oil and gas
fields owned by the Spanish
company Repsol-YPF for $585
million. Five months after that, the
PetroChina Company won a bid to
acquire the Indonesian assets of the
Devon Energy Corporation for $262
million.63 By investing in oil and gas
industry in Indonesia, China has the
reasons to deploy its warships in the
Indonesian waters.
Besides to
Mokhzani Zubir 15
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
secure its oil tankers, the warships
can be used to ‘patrol’ Indonesian
straits and ‘plug’ the straits from
belligerent elements that might
threat China’s tankers and merchant
ships. In the future Indonesia will
likely
become
China’s
main
destination
of
oil
and
gas
investment.
With huge amount of money poured
into Indonesia, China could assert its
influence on Indonesia regarding the
navigational rights in Indonesian
waters that will benefit China and
push aside the U.S.
China also
needs to ensure that the Strait of
Malacca will not be used to threaten
its vessels in the event of China’s
crisis with Taiwan.
China
experienced the U.S. gun boat
diplomacy in 1997 when China
warned Taiwan not to hold election.
The level of tension during the crisis
is high that it could escalate into
limited war.64 Thus in the future the
possibility of the U.S. Navy harassing
the Chinese vessels that are
traversing the Strait of Malacca
cannot be ruled out.
The Strait of Malacca is a subject of
struggle between the United States
and China. The Regional Maritime
Security Initiative (RMSI), a maritime
security arrangement advocated by
the U.S. is regarded by China as a
strategy to strengthen the U.S.
domination in the Strait of Malacca
and other SLOCs in Southeast Asia
and China strongly opposed to it.
China is surely designing its own
strategy to counter the RMSI. The
struggle of the two powers will
continue in the long term and
Malaysia and Indonesia as littoral
states, are feeling the heat.
ENDNOTES
1
In 2003, at least 62,334 ships passed through the Straits of Malacca, ranging from VLCC to
fishing vessels. These ships were compulsory to report to the Vessel Traffic System under the
IMO’s Mandatory Ship Reporting System in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (STRAITREP).
See http://www.marine.gov.my/misc/indexstat.html
2
There are many interpretations of the geophysical aspects of the Strait of Malacca. In this
article, I will use Dr. Vivian Forbes’s delineation of the strait, where the strait’s northern limit is at
Pulau Rondo to Koh Phuket and the southern limit is at Pulau Karimun to Tanjung Piai. These
northern and southern limits of the Malacca Strait bring about the total length of 500 nautical
miles or 926 kilometers with a surface area approximately 52,000 square nautical miles. See
Vivian Louis Forbes, “The Malacca Strait in the Context of the ISPS Code”, MIMA Conference
Papers on The Straight of Malacca: Building A Comprehensive Security Environment, Kuala
Lumpur, October 2004.
3
Sumihiko Kawamura, “Shipping and Regional Trade: Regional Security Interests’, in Sam
Bateman and Stephen Bates ed., Shipping and Regional Security, Canberra Papers on Strategy
and Defence, No. 129, Australian National University, 1998, p.17.
4
Ibid
Mokhzani Zubir 16
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
5
Ji Guoxing, “Asian Pacific SLOC Security: The China Factor,” Royal Australian Navy – Sea Power
Centre. April 2002.
6
Chia Lin Sien, “Protecting the Marine Environment of ASEAN from Ship-Generated Oil Pollution
and Japan's Contribution to the Region”, Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, 1995.
7
Chia Lin Sien, “Marine Carriage of Petroleum with Special Reference to Northeast Asia,” Policy
Paper 33. The paper is on the World Wide Web at
http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/policy_papers/pp3304.html [accessed on 12 September
2004]
8
John H. Noer, “Southeast Asian Chokepoints: Keeping Sea Lines of Communication Open,”
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, Volume 98, December 1996.
9
Ashley J. Tellis, Chung Min Lee, James Mulvenon, Courtney Purrington, and Michael D. Swaine,
“Sources of Conflict in Asia”, in Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser ed, Sources of Conflict in the
21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy, RAND, 1998.
10
Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 20 September
1993, p. 643.
11
Donald Rumsfeld, “Strategic Imperatives in East Asia,” speech to the Heritage Foundation,
March 3, 1998, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/HL605.cfm
[accessed on 20 September 2004]
12
Growth of U.S. Exports to ASEAN & Other Major Markets, 1990-2002. The statistics is available
at http://www.us-asean.org/statistics/growth_US_export.htm [accessed on 18 September 2004]
13
East Asia includes Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. “Northeast Asia” refers to China, Japan,
the, the two Koreas, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. “Southeast Asia” comprises the ASEAN countries
(Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand), Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar.
14
According to U.S. Commerce Department calculations, USD$1 billion of exports correlate to
between 14.325K to 19K jobs. U.S. Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, National Export
Strategy, October 1995 and October 1996.
15
Growth of U.S. Exports to ASEAN & Other Major Markets, 1990-2002. The statistics is available
at http://www.us-asean.org/statistics/growth_US_export.htm [accessed on 20 September 2004]
16
Stanley B. Weeks, “Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Security and Access”, IGCC
Policy Paper. The paper is on the World Wide Web at http://wwwigcc.ucsd.edu/publications/policy_papers/pp3305.html [accessed on 16 September 2004]
17
China became the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2003, surpassing the
United States, which has previously enjoyed the biggest inflows of FDI. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) said China attracted $53 billion in 2003
compared to $40 billion for the U.S. economy. See http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-2004062931.html [accessed on 22 September 2004]
18
U.S. annual merchandise imports data made available by United States International Trade
Commission. See http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/Resions.asp [accessed on 4 November 2004]
19
China-ASEAN trade records new high in 2003. See
[accessed
on
10
http://english.people.com.cn/200402/08/eng20040208_134244.shtml
September 2004]
20
Jane Perlez, “China Races to Replace US as Economic Power in Asia”: NY Times.
http://english.people.com.cn/200206/28/eng20020628_98737.shtml [accessed on 17 September
2004]
21
James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Washington, DC, June 25, 2003.
22
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, “APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2002,”
Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, 2002, pg 15-16.
23
UNCTAD, “Analysis of Ways to Enhance the Contribution of Specific Services Sectors to the
Development Perspectives of Developing Countries: Energy Services in International Trade:
Mokhzani Zubir 17
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
Development Implications”, Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat, TD/B/COM.1/46, 10 December
2001.
24
According to the United States’ Energy Information Administration, China consumed about 5.56
mbd (2003E), Japan 5.57 (2003E) and South Korea 2.1 mbd (2001E).
25
Figures taken from Malaysia’s Marine Department on ships that reported to Klang Vessel
Traffic Separation Scheme (VTS) in 2003. There were 3,487 VLCC/deep draft carrier and
15,667
tanker
vessel
reported
to
Klang
VTS.
See
http://www.marine.gov.my/misc/indexstat.html [accessed on 16 September 2004]
Each crude oil shipment requires the tanker operator to consider the voyage length, port and
canal constraints and volume to maximize the economic benefit. Usually crude oil exports from
the Middle East which carry high volumes that travel long distances are moved mainly by
VLCC’s typically carrying over 2 million barrels of oil on every voyage.
See
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/features/fex30240.htm [accessed on 3 September 2004]
26
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2002, pg 57.
Country Analysis Brief, Environment Information Administration. The article is on the World
Wide Web at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html [accessed on 11 September 2004]
28
Erica Strecker Downs, “China's Quest for Energy Security”, RAND, 2000, pg 5.
29
Chinese net oil import up 1.4 mbd – IEA, INTERTANKO online news. The news is available on
the World Wide Web at http://www.intertanko.com/tankernews/artikkel.asp?id=7477 [accessed
on 9 September 2004]
30
Gal Luft, “Fueling the dragon: China's race into the oil market”, Institute for the Analysis of
Global Security. The article is on the World Wide Web at http://www.iags.org/china.htm
[accessed on 10 September 2004]
31
Mehmet Ogutcu, “China’s Energy Security: Geopolitical Implications for Asia and Beyond,” Oil
Gas and Energy Law Intelligence, Volume I, issue #02 - March 2003
32
Country Analysis Brief, Environment Information Administration. The article is on the World
Wide Web at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/japan.html [accessed on 11 September 2004]
33
Fundamental Philosophy of Japan's Oil Policy, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy,
Government
of
Japan.
The
paper
is
on
the
World
Wide
Web
at
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/energy/oil/policy.html [accessed on 21 September 2004]
34
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, “Energy Security Initiatives: Some Aspects of Oil Security,”
Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, pg 24.
35
Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Energy (MOCIE), “Korea’s Emergency Response Measures in
Perspective: Short term vs. mid & long term energy security policy programs,” IEA/ASEAN
Workshop, Republic of Korea, September 2003. The paper is on the World Wide Web at
[accessed
on
21
http://www.iea.org/dbtw-wpd/textbase/work/2003/asean/KOREA.PDF
September 2004]
36
Ibid
37
Ibid
38
Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Energy (MOCIE), “Towards a 2010 Energy Policies.” The
paper is on the World Wide Web at http://www.mocie.go.kr/english/policies/toward/default.asp
[accessed on 21 September 2004]
39
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, Energy Security Initiatives: Some Aspects of Oil Security,
pg 28.
40
Seo-Hang Lee, ''SLOC Security in Northeast Asia: Korean Navy's Role'', in Dalchoong Kim and
Doug-Woon Cho ed., Korean Sea Power and the Pacific Era, Institute of East and West Studies,
Yonsei University, 1990, p. 86.
41
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, Energy Security Initiatives: Some Aspects of Oil Security,
pg 24.
42
China no strategic oil reserves – FT. The article is on the World Wide Web at
http://www.intertanko.com/tankernews/artikkel.asp?id=5517 [accessed on 21 September 2004]
27
Mokhzani Zubir 18
The strategic value of the Strait of Malacca
43
Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Energy (MOCIE),
“Korea’s Emergency Response Measures in Perspective: Short term vs. mid & long term energy
security policy programs,” IEA/ASEAN Workshop, Republic of Korea, September 2003.
44
ibid
45
China no strategic oil reserves – FT.
46
Ibid
47
Charles R. Smith, “France-China Stage Joint Navy Games, Sino-French War Games Prelude to
Euro Arms Sales”, Mar. 18, 2004. The article is on the World Wide Web at
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/3/18/82202.shtml [[accessed on 18 September
2004]
48
Ashley J. Tellis, Chung Min Lee, James Mulvenon, Courtney Purrington, and Michael D. Swaine,
Sources of Conflict in Asia.
49
Even though China’s military capability is still far from the US military might, the extensive
development and build up has worried the US military planners and politicians.
50
James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Washington, DC, June 25, 2003
51
Ashley J. Tellis, Chung Min Lee, James Mulvenon, Courtney Purrington, and Michael D. Swaine,
Sources of Conflict in Asia.
52
Ibid
Ibid
54
The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998, Department of
Defense, 1998. The paper is on the World Wide Web at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/#section1 [accessed on 27 September 2004]
55
Ji Guoxing, Asian Pacific SLOC Security: The China Factor, pg 10.
56
Sheldon W. Simon, “Southeast Asia”. The paper is on the World Wide Web at
http://strategicasia.nbr.org/Report/pdf/ShowReportPDF.aspx?ID=7&f=1
[accessed on 23 September 2004]
57
Ibid
58
The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998, Department of
Defense, 1998.
59
Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa, C.R. Neu,” The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy
Toward China”, RAND publication. pg 11
60
Mehmet Ogutcu, China’s Energy Security: Geopolitical Implications for Asia and Beyond.
61
Institute for National Strategic Studies, “Oil for the Lamps of China – Beijing’s 21st Century
Search for Energy,” McNair Paper 67, National Defense University, Washington DC, 2002, pg 57.
62
Sudha Ramachandran, “India signs on as Southeast Asia watchdog”, Asia Times Online, 5 April
2002.
53
63
64
China Races to Replace US as Economic Power in Asia: NY Times
According to Mark J. Valencia, when the PLA switched on their missiles’ radar and targeted one
of the US Navy’s destroyer in the carrier battle group, the US Navy warned China that they will
fire missiles if the PLA continues to target and threaten their warships.
Mokhzani Zubir 19