Openness as a Romantic Ideal
J. Dmitri Gallow ∗,†
here is a traditional and familiar position on the ethics of open or
non-monogamous relationships. According to this position, such relationships are universally impermissible. This view is given voice in the
Catechism of the Catholic Church, which maintains that the only morally
acceptable sexual relationship is one bonded by the marriage contract, and
that
T
Adultery is an injustice. He who commits adultery fails in
his commitment. He does injury to the sign of the covenant
which the marriage bond is, transgresses the rights of the other
spouse, and undermines the institution of marriage by breaking the contract on which it is based. (Catholic Church,
2000, 2381)
The Catechism does not distinguish between consensual and non-consensual
adultery—where adultery is understood as sex with, or sexual desire for,
somebody other than one’s spouse.1 According to the Catechism, it matters
not at all whether one’s spouse condones or approves of the extra-marital
affairs; they remain impermissible, a transgression against the sanctity of
marriage.
There is another, more permissive position which maintains that open
relationships—both inside and outside of marriage—are permissible. This
position appears to be orthodoxy in the applied ethics literature. To the
surprisingly limited extent that adultery has been discussed,2 the majority
of the reasons adduced for thinking that adultery or cheating is immoral
have to do with promise-breaking,3 contract-breaking,4 deception,5 and
1
2
3
4
5
Draft of November 23, 2014; please do not cite or circulate without permission.
There may be thick ethical concepts, and if so, adultery may be one of them. I don’t
think so, but this isn’t the place for that debate. Any reader who believes adultery to
be a thick concept should substitute a descriptive equivalent throughout.
Marquis (2010) entertainingly hypothesizes that “a lack of philosophical interest in
this topic [adultery] may be explained by the fact that most philosophers are either
married or in other serious long term relationships. This may make the topic difficult
to write about if one’s significant other takes an interest in one’s philosophical projects.”
(fn. 15)
Cf. Wasserstrom (1975), Steinbock (1986), and Martin (1994)
Cf. Marquis (2010)
Cf. Wasserstrom (1975), Steinbock (1986)
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the couple’s commitment to sexual/emotional exclusivity6 —none of which
apply to open relationships.7
A number of additional views about the status of open relationships
qua romantic relationships is consistent with the view that open relationships are morally permissible. One could hold that, while morally permissible, open relationships are less ideal qua romantic relationships than
closed or exclusive relationships. This view is adopted by Steinbock (1986),
who argues that because romantic love is ideally exclusive, and because
having sex with somebody leads to feelings of love for that person, closed
relationships are more ideal than open relationships. She nevertheless accepts that open relationship are morally permissible; though she claims
that they “deviate from a valued ideal of what [relationships] should be.”8
Alternatively, one could hold that neither closed nor open relationships
are any more or less romantically ideal than the other. Finally, one could
maintain that open relationships are more ideal qua romantic relationships than closed relationships. This essay offers a defense of the final view.
To reiterate: this is not an essay about what kinds of relationships are
morally permissible or impermissible. It is an essay about what kinds of
relationships are romantically ideal. Importantly, to endorse an activity or
state of affairs as ideal in some respect or other is not thereby to advocate
that any particular person pursue that ideal. The ideal running back can
deadlift six hundred pounds. However, this doesn’t mean that John ought
to try to deadlift six hundred pounds, even though John is a running back,
since John is recovering from a back injury. It is plausible that an ideal
state is democratic. However, this doesn’t entail that a state in which the
populace lacks adequate education ought to start holding elections. Most
of us fall short of ideality in myriad ways. Many times, these departures
from ideality mean that we ought not attempt to even approximate ideality.
Additionally and relatedly, to say that a relationship is ideal qua romantic relationship is not to say that it is ideal in other respects. It could
be, for instance, that what is ideal romantically is not ideal with respect to
social justice. For illustration, Overall (1998) argues that
6
7
8
Wreen (1986).
Interestingly, Wreen (1986) takes a commitment to sexual/emotional exclusivity to be
constitutive of the very concept of marriage, making an open marriage not immoral,
but rather conceptually impossible. This is a bit much to swallow, but it need not detain
us. In any case, long-term open relationships, whether they constitute a ‘marriage’ or
not, remain unaffected by Wreen’s arguments for the impermissibility of adultery.
Steinbock (1986) confines her discussion to marriage. However, most of her arguments appear to generalize straightforwardly to other kinds of romantic relationships.
Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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although there is nothing inherently morally superior about
monogamy, the development of sexual relationships under
patriarchy is such that one’s partner’s nonmonogamy may cause
considerable pain, especially for women. (p. 11)
If this is true, then heterosexual couples may have conclusive reason to
avoid open relationships.9 In our current cultural milieu, it could be worse,
all-things-considered, to be in an open heterosexual relationship than to
be in a closed one, not only because of the negative impact upon the wellbeing of the partners, but additionally because of broader concerns of social justice; given other aspects of our culture, a norm of openness in heterosexual relationships could constitute a social injustice by creating conditions that bring pleasure to men at the price of women’s pain.10 None of
this, however, would speak against the ideality of open relationships qua
romantic relationships, any more than John’s back injury speaks against
the ideality, qua running back, of being able to deadlift six hundred pounds—
any more than a state’s under-educated populace speaks against the ideality
of democracy. It would simply mean that current injustices preclude the
possibility of attaining the romantic ideal. Romance would be just another
casualty of our patriarchal society.
Nor does the ideality, qua runningback, of being able to deadlift six
hundred pounds mean that John ought, solely in view of the considerations
of football, attempt to deadlift six hundred pounds. John wouldn’t just be
worse off overall if he attempted to deadlift that much with a back injury—
he would be a worse runningback. Similarly, the ideality of an open relationship qua romantic relationship does not entail that any couple ought,
solely in view of the considerations of romance, pursue an open relationship. It may be that certain couple’s romantic lives would be wrecked by an
open relationship; they may be so irredeemably possessive that they would
be incapable of emotionally investing in a partner without the assurance
that they will not be romantically involved with others. There may also be
9
10
For the purposes of this essay, I’ll restrict my attention to relationships between two
people.
Here, I am simply trying to illustrate that considerations of social justice should be kept
apart from considerations of romance. In point of fact, I don’t accept the reasoning outlined above. To use the terminology I will introduce in the following section, Overall’s
concerns provide at most a reason to forego opened relationships; they do not provide
a reason to forego merely open relationships.
1. Closed, Open, and Opened Relationships
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couples—though these are no doubt rarer in our current cultural milieu—
who are so irredeemably possessive that they are incapable of emotionally
investing in a partner without an assurance that they will not have serious
friendships outside of the relationship. In that case, it may be that these
couples ought, solely in view of the considerations of romance, have a relationship closed to the possibility of friendship with others. However, this
does nothing to speak against the ideality of having a relationship which
is not closed to friendship with others.
1
Closed, Open, and Opened Relationships
As I will use the terms, what distinguishes an open from a closed relationship is the existence, or non-existence, of the normative expectation that
one of the partners either not engage in sexual activity with, or not develop
romantic feelings for, anybody else.11 If such a normative expectation is
present, in any form, then the relationship is closed. If no such normative expectation is present, then the relationship is open. These definitions
are purely stipulative; I have chosen them so as to make my argumentative work cleaner and easier. I do not pretend that they line up with our
ordinary use of the terms.
The kind of normative expectation in question is not the expectation
that one’s partner not have sex or fall in love with anybody else for any
reason, or in any circumstances. Rather, the kind of normative expectation which makes a relationship closed is an expectation against sex or
love outside of the relationship as such. Even in an open relationship, the
11
As I’ll use the term here, to normatively expect somebody to ϕ is to take it to be common
knowledge that their failure to ϕ is a legitimate target of blame. So, if I normatively
expect my beloved to be sexually exclusive, then I take it to be legitimate for me to
blame them for having sex with another, and I take it that they know that I take this to
be a legitimate target of blame, and that I know that they know this, and so on and so
forth. To normatively expect somebody to ϕ is therefore to take there to be a kind of
public prohibition on not ϕ-ing.
In this definition, it doesn’t matter whether such blame is legitimate, or whether it actually is commonly known—simply whether I take it to be legitimate and commonly
known. Normative expectations can be imposed explicitly—“I expect you to remain
faithful, you know”—or they can remain implicit, if, e.g., we live in a society in which
the expectation of sexual and romantic fidelity in long term relationships is nearly universal, such expectations can become a default, deviation from which must be made
explicit.
Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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couple might normatively expect of each other that they not have sex outside of the relationship without prophylactics. This is a normative expectation deriving from the couple’s desire to not be exposed to the risk of
sexually transmitted diseases or unwanted pregnancy; it is therefore not
a normative expectation against sexual activity outside the relationship as
such. Normative expectations like these do not make a relationship closed
anymore than normative expectations that one’s partner use contraception
inside the relationship makes a relationship asexual.
Given these definitions, there is no guarantee that the closedness of
the relationship be symmetric. It could be the case that one partner has,
while the other does not have, the normative expectation that their significant other not engage in sexual activity with, or develop feelings for,
anybody else. We can call a relationship like this asymmetrically closed.
Open relationships, on the other hand, are necessarily symmetricly open,
since a relationship only counts as open if both partners lack any kind of
normative expectation of sexual or romantic exclusivity.
Simply because a relationship is open, in my terminology, it does not
follow that either of the partners ever actually has sex with, or develops
romantic feelings for, anybody other than their significant other. So long
as the normative expectation is lacking, the relationship will count as open,
even if the couple only ever has sex with, and only ever develops romantic
feelings for, each other. Call such a relationship merely open; and call an
open relationship in which at least one of the partners actually has sex with,
or develops feelings for, somebody other than their significant other an
opened relationship.
There are two dimensions along which a relationship can be closed—it
can be closed with respect to sex or with respect to love—and along each
dimension, closedness comes in degrees. A couple might normatively expect of each other than they not have penetrative sex with anybody else
without normatively expecting that they not have oral sex with anybody
else. They might normatively expect of each other that they not fall in love
with anybody else without normatively expecting that they not develop
crushes on, or flirt with, anybody else. They might normatively expect of
each other that they not spoon or be spooned by anybody else without
normatively expecting that they not kiss anybody else.
Nevertheless, my contention will be that an ideal romantic relationship
2. Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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will not be closed in any degree, along either dimension. My contention
will be that an ideal romantic relationship is characterized by complete
openness. Because a relationship may be open without being opened, this
is not yet to say that an opened relationship is ideal, or even superior to a
closed one. It is consistent with the conclusion I will be arguing for that,
though a merely open relationship is more ideal than a closed one, a closed
relationship is more ideal than an opened one. It is also consistent with
the conclusion that I will be arguing for that, in an ideal relationship, there
may be normative expectations against having sex or love outside of the
relationship for some reasons, or in some circumstances. For instance, it is
consistent with the conclusion I will be arguing for that an ideal romantic
relationship is characterized by a normative expectation that the partners
not have sex with a person who is HIV positive—in virtue of the fact that
they are HIV positive, and not in virtue of the fact that it is sex with somebody else. What is inconsistent with my conclusion is the claim that an
ideal romantic relationship is characterized by a normative expectation
that the partners not have sex or love with anybody else—in virtue of the
fact that it is sex or love with somebody else.
2
Openness as a Romantic Ideal
The basic outline of my argument that an ideal romantic relationship is
open is as follows.
1.
The selfless desire that the beloved’s well-being be maximized is a
necessary condition on ideal romantic love.
2.
Ideal romantic love is a necessary condition on an ideal romantic
relationship.
∴ 3.
So, the selfless desire that the beloved’s well-being be maximized is
a necessary condition on an ideal romantic relationship. [from 1 &
2]
4.
Sex and love outside of the relationship can be conducive to the
beloved’s well-being.
5.
If sex and love outside the relationship can be conducive to the beloved’s
well-being, then the selfless desire that the beloved’s well-being be
Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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maximized precludes the normative expectation that the beloved
not have sex or love outside of the relationship.
∴ 6.
So, an ideal romantic relationship is open. [from 3, 4, 5, & def. open]
Throughout the argument, when I speak of an ‘ideal romantic relationship’,
I mean that the relationship is ideal qua romantic relationship. As mentioned above, a relationship that is ideal qua romantic relationship need
not be ideal qua child-rearing partnership, sexual partnership, or roommate relationship. It need not be ideal with respect to promoting social
justice, just as it may not be ideal with respect to promoting economic
growth.
The first premise claims that what it is to romantically love somebody
is, at least in part, to selflessly desire that their well-being be maximized.
This claim, or one that comes close to it, is sometimes used in order to fix
just what it is that the philosophical term-of-art well-being (or welfare) is
supposed to be talking about in the first place. For instance, Heathwood
(2010) writes that “a person’s welfare is what those who care about him
will look after.” Presumably, if you ideally romantically love somebody,
then you will care about them. In that case, it follows that you will look
after their well-being. And presumably, what is involved in looking after
somebody’s well-being is, in part, wishing that their well-being be maximized.
Desires can come into conflict. I can both want to get eight hours of
sleep and to not sleep through my office hours, even though, on many
mornings, these desires cannot be jointly satisfied. And the lover may desire that the beloved’s well-being be maximized, but also want something
else which, in certain circumstances, cannot occur if the beloved’s wellbeing is to be maximized. For instance, imagine that there is one last piece
of cheese on the plate at dinner which is too small to split; and that I know
that my beloved’s well-being will be greater if they have this piece of cheese.
Also imagine that, while I do want my beloved’s life to go as well as possible, I also want the last piece of cheese for myself. When desires come into
conflict like this, one of the desires will usually get trumped. Either my
desire that my beloved’s life go well will win out and trump my desire for
the last piece of cheese (so that, all things considered, I’d rather they have
2. Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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the cheese than I), or my desire for the last piece of cheese will win out
and trump my desire that my beloved’s life go well (so that, all things considered, I’d rather that I have the cheese than they).12 When I say that the
desire that the beloved’s life go best is selfless, what I mean is that the desire
doesn’t get trumped in this way. If I selflessly desire that my beloved’s life
go best, then my desires are such that, even though I want the last piece of
cheese for myself, all things considered, I’d rather that they have it. This is
a stipulative use of the term ‘selfless desire.’ I don’t pretend that it lines up
with ordinary usage.
A potential worry: if premise 1 is correct, then, if my beloved ideally loves me, then they would, all things considered, prefer that I get the
last piece of cheese if my life would go better were I to have it. If ideal
love requires me to prefer, all-things-considered, my beloved’s getting the
last piece of cheese, then it should also require my beloved to prefer, allthings-considered, me getting the last piece of cheese. Does this show that,
if premise 1 is correct, then reciprocal ideal love is in some sense selfundermining? I do not think so. Nothing about premise 1 requires that
in these circumstances my beloved actually get the last piece of cheese;
merely that I’d all-things-considered prefer them to have it. Similarly, it
does not require of my beloved in these circumstances that I actually get
the last piece of cheese; merely that they’d all-things-considered prefer me
to have it. All this worry shows, then, is that it is consistent with premise
1 that two ideal lovers have preference rankings which cannot be jointly
maximized. I’ve said nothing about how such conflicts are to be ideally
resolved—though, presumably, it wouldn’t be ideal if I were always the
one whose life ended up going worse, and it wouldn’t be ideal if my beloved
were always the one whose life ended up going worse. Beyond that, I don’t
have much to say. However, unless we think that there’s no in-principle
way to settle such conflicts without making the relationship less than ideal,
their possibility does not threaten the truth of premise 1.
We may also worry here that you could ideally romantically love somebody while still wishing that their well-being be diminished, and even tak12
It could also be that these two outcomes are incomparable in my preference ranking,
so that I don’t prefer either over the other. For my purposes here, I don’t think that it
matters whether I call preferences like these ‘selfless’ or not. Premise 1 is slightly more
plausible if I don’t; whereas premise 5 is slightly more plausible if I do. In any case, I
think both premises 1 and 5 are true on either disambiguation of ‘selfless.’
Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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ing steps to diminish their level of well-being. Imagine, e.g., that a simple
hedonist theory of well-being is correct and that the beloved receives pleasure from immoral actions. In that case, it might seem that one could ideally romantically love a reprobate thief who derives pleasure from thieving
and stands little chance of getting caught while still wishing that they not
thieve, and taking steps to keep them from thieving. In the first place, to
the degree that we find such cases compelling counterexamples to premise
1, we probably find the theories of well-being that get these results unsatisfactory. Secondly, ideal romantic love need not be ideally moral. The
relationship of Bonnie and Clyde may have been quite well-off romantically even though it was quite badly-off morally. Thirdly, we need not say
that it is a good idea to ideally love somebody in these circumstances—
merely that, what it is to ideally love them is, at least in part, to wish that
their life goes well. So, in particular, we need not endorse the claim that
one ought to ideally love such a person—not even that one ought, solely
in light of the considerations of romance, ideally love such a person.13 So
premise 1 need not entail that in these circumstances, the lover ought to
wish that their beloved steal; merely that, in conditions of ideal love, they
would.
In general, the argument’s premises do not suppose that the selfless
desire that the beloved’s well-being be maximized is the only characteristic
of ideal love or an ideal relationship. There are a great many other things
that are also required in order for a love or a relationship to be ideal. And
if those factors are lacking, then it certainly doesn’t follow that the lover
ought to still desire that the beloved’s well-being be maximized. When
one component of ideal love is lacking, it can be that the others ought not
be pursued either. Sexual intimacy is plausibly a necessary condition on
ideal romantic love. However, if one’s partner is sexually abusive, then it
certainly doesn’t follow that one ought to—even just in light of considerations of romance—pursue sexual intimacy with them.
Premise 2 says that an ideal romantic relationship is characterized by
ideal romantic love. There may be loveless relationships which are ideal in
a variety of respects—with respect to friendship, child-rearing, etc. How13
Throughout this section, when I use the word ‘ought’, I should be understood as saying
‘ought, solely in light of the considerations of romance’, rather than ‘ought, all things
considered.’
2. Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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ever, if romantic love is lacking, then even if the relationship is ideal in
other respects, it is not ideal romantically. Nor should we say that the relationship is ideal romantically if the romantic love is present, but less than
ideal. No relationship can be ideal romantically in the absence of ideal
romantic love.
From 1 and 2, it follows that an ideal romantic relationship is characterized by the selfless desire that the beloved’s well-being be maximized.
So, in an ideal romantic relationship, both partners will selflessly desire
that the other’s life go as well as possible.
Premise 4 claims that sex and love outside of the relationship can be
conducive to the beloved’s well-being. The ‘can’ here should be read epistemically. Premise 4 is therefore roughly translatable as ‘for all the lover
knows, sex and love outside of the relationship will, at some point in time,
be conducive to the beloved’s well-being.’ That is, for all the lover knows,
the beloved’s life will go better if they have sex with, or develop romantic
feelings for, somebody else. I’m inclined to respond to a denial of this
premise with an incredulous stare rather than reasoned arguments. In
fact, I am willing to endorse the stronger thesis: for any beloved, sex and
love outside of the relationship is, in some circumstances, conducive to
the beloved’s well-being.14 Sex and love are intrinsic goods. A life without
them is an impoverished life. A life with more love and more sexual intimacy is, all else being equal, a better life. We might deny this if we think
that the good of the love or the sex we have with one person is diminished
by having love or sex with another—if, that is, romantic love is a scarce resource, ideally allocated entirely in a single individual. I am dubious that
this is the case. No other form of love appears to demonstrate this kind
of scarcity. Parents do not love their first child less when a second enters
their lives.15 Close friends do not love each other less when they form other
friendships. However, no matter whether we accept this stronger thesis or
not, we still ought to accept the claim that it is at least epistemically possible, from the standpoint of the lover, that the beloved’s well-being would
14
15
The order of the quantifiers here is important. I’m not saying that there are circumstances such that sex and love outside of the relationship would be conducive to the
well-being of any beloved in those circumstances. I’m saying that, for any beloved, there
are circumstances such that sex and love outside of the relationship would be conducive
to their well-being in those circumstances.
Cf. Wasserstrom (1975).
Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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be enhanced by sex or love outside of the relationship.
The heavy lifting of the argument comes in premise 5. Notice that I
have not said that “For any ϕ, if ϕ-ing can be conducive to the beloved’s
well-being, then the desire that the beloved’s well-being be maximized precludes the normative expectation that the beloved not ϕ.” That’s because
there are many normative expectations that we have of all of our fellow
humans qua fellow humans. Not all of these normative expectations go
away when we enter into a romantic relationship with somebody, even
though some of them do. The point is not that an ideal lover does not
have any normative expectations of their beloved, but rather that any normative expectations they have of their beloved that they do not have of
a friend, acquaintance, or stranger must be engendered at the inception
of the romantic relationship. It is only ever when two people enter into
a romantic relationship with one another that they begin to take it to be
legitimate to blame one another for having sex or love with others. And
if the selfless desire that the beloved’s well-being be maximized is a necessary condition on an ideal romantic relationship, then two people entering
into an ideal romantic relationship would not normatively expect of each
other that they categorically refrain from activities or relationships that
might enhance their lives and make them better off, for the simple reason
that they wouldn’t want, all things considered, each other to refrain from
these activities. If I all-things-considered prefer white wine to red wine in
every circumstance, then it simply wouldn’t make sense for me to, on my
own, generate the normative expectation that dinner guests bring red wine
and not white, if I’m the sole person with say-so, and my interests are the
only relevant interests at stake.16 Similarly, if I all-things-considered prefer
my beloved to have sexual or romantic relationships with others if those
relationships enhance and enrich their life, and I think that those relationships might enhance and enrich their life, then it simply wouldn’t make
sense for me to, on my own, generate the normative expectation that they
refrain from such relationships, if I’m the sole person with say-so, and our
interests are the only relevant interests at stake.17
16
17
To generate a normative expectation to ϕ is to take yourself to make it publicly known
that you take failure to ϕ to be a legitimate target of blame.
All-things-considered, there may be many others’ interests at stake—for instance, the
interests of any children that the two lovers have. However, insofar as romance is concerned, no other interests are relevant.
2. Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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This distinction between normative expectations which are prior to
and posterior to the romantic relationship allows us to forestall the potential objection that the kind of reasoning used here will overgenerate. Consider, for instance, the normative expectation that the beloved not have
sex with anybody else without adequate prophylactics. Isn’t it epistemically possible that there are situations in which sex with somebody else
without adequate prophylactics would be conducive to the beloved’s well
being? So can’t we conclude, via the same kind of reasoning employed
above, that an ideal romantic relationship lacks the normative expectation
that the beloved not have sex outside of the relationship without adequate
prophylactics? We cannot. The normative expectation that one not be exposed to unnecessary health risks is a normative expectation that exists
prior to the relationship. It is not one that is generated at the inception of
the romantic relationship. One may legitimately blame anybody for exposing them to unnecessary health risks. Romantic love need not, and ought
not, dissolve this normative expectation. (Of course, in conditions of ideal
love, normative expectations like these will never be frustrated.) However,
the normative expectation that the beloved not have sex or love with anybody else is not generally one that exists prior to the romantic relationship.
Almost nobody takes it to be legitimate to blame a friend, acquaintance,
or stranger for having sex or love with somebody besides themselves. The
point of premise 5 is just that, if there is to be a normative expectation that
the beloved not have sex or love with anybody else, then that normative
expectation must be generated at the inception of the romantic relationship. And if it’s a necessary condition on that relationship being ideal that
both lovers selflessly desire that the other’s well-being be maximized, and if
sex or love outside of the relationship might be conducive to the beloved’s
well-being, then such a normative expectation will not be generated, if the
relationship is ideal.
We may object that, when we enter into a romantic relationship, even
an ideal romantic relationship, normative expectations are generated that
the beloved do things which may, for all we know, run counter to their
best interest. For instance, it may be thought that, even in an ideal romantic relationship, lovers may normatively expect that their beloved will
spend valentine’s day with them, remember their anniversary, etc.—even
if the beloved would rather not spend valentine’s day with them, and even
Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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if remembering the anniversary causes them considerable stress. Here, I
simply want to bite the putative bullet. I deny that any such normative
expectations exist in an ideal romantic relationship. This is not to say,
however, that an ideal lover may not take themselves to legitimately blame
their beloved for failing to spend valentine’s day with them, or remember their anniversary, or what-have-you.18 Rather, it is to say that, if they
take themselves to legitimately blame their beloved for this, then the legitimacy of their blame is not grounded in the normative expectation that
the beloved spend valentine’s day with them, or remember their anniversary, or what-have-you. What may give an ideal lover reason to blame
the beloved in these cases is, for instance, that these actions provide evidence that the lover is not loved back, or not loved back in the kind of
way that they treat as a precondition of being in a romantic relationship
with them in the first place. Insofar as the beloved represents themselves
to the lover as loving them back in this way, these actions provide evidence
that the beloved is misrepresenting their feelings. And a normative expectation that the beloved not behave deceptively is one that exists prior to
the relationship, and which the relationship itself need not dissolve. (Of
course, no one incident of forgetting an anniversary or missing valentine’s
day could be reasonably taken to provide evidence of this kind of deception; however, a pattern of such incidents could be reasonably taken to
indicate that the beloved does not care about the lover in the way that they
treat as a precondition of being in a romantic relationship with them.)
Moreover, and more importantly, even if there is no normative expectation that the beloved not miss valentine’s day or forget anniversaries,
or what-have-you—and even if there’s no deception on the part of the
beloved about their feelings—it could still be the case that a lover, even an
ideal lover, ought to respond to repeated instances of their beloved missing
valentine’s day or forgetting anniversaries or what-have-you by ending the
romantic relationship. In general, nothing in the argument says that ideal
romantic love is or ought to be unconditional. Nor does anything I say
there get us the conclusion that an ideal lover should put up with abuse or
neglect from their beloved. If one partner treats the other in an abusive or
neglectful manner, that is good evidence that the lover is not loved back in
18
Nor that they may not take this to be common knowledge between them and their
beloved.
2. Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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the manner requisite for even a satisfactory romantic relationship, to say
nothing of an ideal romantic relationship.
Thus, even though a relationship can lack a normative expectation that
one’s partner not ϕ, the fact that one’s partner ϕs can still provide sufficient
grounds for ending the relationship—not because a normative expectation
has been frustrated, but rather because the partner’s failure to ϕ constitutes
independent reason to end the relationship. For example, if a romantic
partner confesses that they no longer love you, and they are incapable of
getting themselves to love you, this is a pro tanto reason to end the relationship, but not because there is or ought to be a normative expectation
that one’s partner love you. It would be insane to normatively expect this
of anybody. Having one you love fall out of love with you is, of course,
tragic. But it is not a legitimate cause for blame.
If it were the case that sex with or romantic feelings for somebody outside of the relationship was evidence that the beloved no longer loves you,
then similar reasoning could apply. Moreover, it could be that discovering that your beloved has sex or love outside of the relationship causes
you emotional distress, and that your beloved knows this about you. In
that case, discovering that the beloved has had sex or love with another
could provide reason to think that the beloved does not care about your
emotional well-being to the degree that you treat as requisite for being in a
romantic relationship with you in the first place. It could therefore provide
sufficient reason for you to end the relationship—even if your love is ideal.
This is not in conflict with my conclusion. My conclusion is simply that an
ideal romantic relationship lacks the normative expectation of sexual or
romantic exclusivity. It is consistent with this conclusion that an ideal romantic lover would leave their beloved if they were to learn that the beloved
had developed or physically expressed feelings for another. It is even consistent with my conclusion that this be common knowledge between the
two lovers. That’s because an ideal lover could leave their beloved for not
caring enough about their emotional well-being without blaming them for
not caring enough about their emotional well-being (see the definition of
normative expectation in footnote 11). Let’s say that a relationship like this,
even though it lacks any normative expectation of exclusivity, nevertheless
has a ‘non-exclusivity kill switch.’ In virtue of lacking the normative expectation, such a relationship would still be open; so the claim that it is ideal
Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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is not in conflict with 6.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that a relationship with a non-exclusivity
kill switch is ideal. And the fact that the claim that is consistent with 6
detracts slightly from the bite of that conclusion. We could rule out the
possibility that a relationship like this is ideal with the following premise:
7.
Ideal lovers are not emotionally distressed by the fact that their beloved’s
life is going better.
7 is quite plausible; and, if true, it blocks the reasoning of the previous
paragraph. Note that 7 does not say that ideal lovers are never distressed
to learn that their beloved’s life is going better—merely that they are not
distress by the very fact that their life is going better. It could be, for instance, that even an ideal lover is distressed to discover that their beloved
has received a promotion which will take them to a distant location or
which will regularly keep them at the office late. In these cases, things are
going well for the beloved, but the fact that things are going well for the
beloved means they will have less time to spend with the lover. There is no
reason that the lover could not be distressed by the latter fact, even while
being pleased by the former. This is consistent with 7, since what makes
the lover distressed is not the very fact that things are going well for the
beloved. Rather, what makes the lover distressed is the distinct fact that
they will have less time to spend together. It is true that one of these facts is
a consequence of the other; but it is still the latter fact, and not the former,
that causes the beloved emotional distress. This differs from the case of sex
or love outside of the relationship because there, what usually causes the
emotional distress is the very fact that the beloved is receiving sexual pleasure from another, or the very fact that the beloved feels love for another.
And these are both facts which make it the case that things are going well
for the beloved. We could of course consider a lover who was distressed,
not by the very fact that the beloved is receiving sexual pleasure from, or
experiencing romantic feelings for, another, but rather by the fact that this
means that they will be spending less time with the lover. If we say this,
then we will have to treat new romances on a par with new friendships.
It is, of course, fine to be slightly emotionally distressed by the fact that
one will be spending less time with one’s beloved, since they have found a
new, close friend. Consider, however, what you would think about a re-
2. Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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lationship with a ‘friendship kill switch,’ or the romantic love of a partner
who required no friendship outside of the relationship as a precondition
for being in a romantic relationship with them. Is love like that truly ideal?
Alternatively, perhaps we could imagine a—slightly more realistic—
lover who was distressed, not by the very fact that the beloved receives
sexual pleasure from, or has romantic feelings for, another, but rather by
the putative fact that this means that the beloved loves them less. As I’ve already said (back on page 10), I’m dubious of the background supposition
here: namely, that romantic love is a scarce resource; that when we love
one person more, we love everyone else less. As I said before, no other
love appears to operate in this manner, and I see no reason to think that
romantic love is unique in this respect. However, I don’t (descriptively)
expect most readers to be persuaded on this point. In any case, it is consistent with the conclusion I am arguing for that non-exclusivity provides
some evidence that one is not loved, or not loved as much; and that this evidence might cause even an ideal lover some distress. Such evidence must,
of course, be evaluated not in isolation, but in the light of the total available evidence. And if it is truly the worry that they are not loved which
is causing the lover distress—and not the fact that the beloved is having
sex or love with another—then there ought not be any difference between
the evidence to this effect provided by an extra-mural romantic or sexual
relationship and the evidence to this effect provided by the fact that the
lover is showing less affection than usual or is reserved and withdrawn. In
both of these cases, I believe that the appropriate response is not to end
the relationship on the sole basis of this evidence, but rather to take it as
a reason to seek out more evidence. Of course, ceteris paribus, one ought
not remain in a loveless relationship, or even a relationship in which love
has severely dwindled. However, this is not to say that one ought to leave
a relationship at the slightest indication that one is not loved, nor that it
ought to be commonly known ahead of time that the response to any evidence of a lack of love will be a swift end to the relationship. Again, I would
ask the reader to consider a romantic relationship with a ‘momentary-dipin-the-level-of-affection kill switch,’ or the romantic love of a partner who
required no momentary dips in the level of affection of their partner as a
precondition for being in a relationship with them. Is love like that truly
ideal? If not, then can the putative evidential import of sex or love with
Openness as a Romantic Ideal
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another really justify a ‘non-exclusivity kill switch’?
3
Openedness as a Romantic Ideal?
That concludes my positive defense of the argument that openness is a romantic ideal—that is, that an ideal romantic relationship is open. Before
concluding, I’d like to consider the question of whether an ideal romantic
relationship could be, not merely open, but also opened. I won’t directly
argue that it could be; but I will argue that many of the reasons which have
been adduced for thinking that it could not be are bad reasons. I will conclude that no good reason has been presented for thinking that ideal lovers
would eschew sex or love outside of the relationship—that is, no good reason has been presented for thinking that an ideal romantic relationship
must be merely open, and not opened. Insofar as my survey of the reasons
against the ideality of opened relationships is comprehensive, this constitutes a positive argument for their ideality. I leave that to the reader to
judge.
As I mentioned in the introduction, some authors have argued that
sexual and romantic exclusivity is a romantic ideal. For instance, both
Steinbock (1986) and Halwani (1998) contend that an ideal romantic
relationship is exclusive.19 For both of these authors, the argument for sexual exclusivity being a romantic ideal is that sexual non-exclusivity tends
to lead to romantic non-exclusivity, and romantic exclusivity is a romantic
ideal; therefore, sexual exclusivity must also be a romantic ideal.20 The first
thing to note about this argument is that its conclusion is not in conflict
with the claim that an ideal romantic relationship is open, 6. Both Steinbock and Halwani are talking about a couple’s sexual behavior, and not
about the existence or non-existence of normative expectations about that
behavior. It is consistent with 6 that an ideal romantic couple never has sex
or love with anybody other than each other. However, if the arguments of
Steinbock and Halwani are sound, then it would follow that an opened
relationship is less than ideal.
The second thing to notice about this argument is that it is invalid.
19
20
Though both Steinbock and Halwani confine their attention to marriages, their arguments appear to generalize straightforwardly to any romantic relationship.
A similar argument shows up in Martin (1994). The same objections I raise to Steinbock and Halwani’s arguments apply with equal force to the arguments of Martin.
3. Openedness as a Romantic Ideal?
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From the premise that ideally q, and the premise that not-p tends to lead
to not-q, it does not follow that ideally p. We can accept that ideally, the
state is secure, and that freedom tends to lead to insecurity, without accepting that ideally, the state limits freedom. We can accept that stability is a
romantic ideal and that the financial independence of both lovers makes
a romantic relationship less stable without accepting that financial dependence of one partner on another is a romantic ideal. Similarly, we can
accept that romantic exclusivity is ideal, and that sexual non-exclusivity
tends to lead to romantic non-exclusivity, without accepting that sexual
exclusivity is ideal. Moreover, just because p tends to lead to q, this does
not mean that there cannot be certain circumstances in which p could be
known to not bring about q. So just because sex tends to lead to love,
this doesn’t mean that a partner couldn’t find themselves in a situation
in which they know that a sexual encounter won’t lead to love. In such
circumstances, Steinbock and Halwani’s argument would not establish
that it is ideal to remain sexually exclusive; so their argument cannot get
the conclusion that, in general, sexual exclusivity is a romantic ideal.21
What about Steinbock and Halwani’s other contention—that romantic exclusivity is a romantic ideal? Steinbock offers two arguments in defense of this claim. First, she argues that, because the logistics of having a
romantic relationship with somebody else means that one partner will be
spending less time with the other, outside relationships detract from the
ideality of the couple’s romantic relationship. If we accept this reasoning
with respect outside romantic relationships, then we should also accept it
with respect to outside friendships. Serious friendships with people other
than one’s beloved require large amounts of time. Should we conclude
that, in an ideal romantic relationship, lovers will have no other friends?
I do not think that we should. Ideal lovers share their lives with one another, but they may still have their own separate lives; they may still spend
time apart, for work, friendship, hobbies, etc. It is thus no objection to an
opened relationship that it requires the couple to spend time apart.
Secondly, Steinbock defends the claim that romantic exclusivity is
21
Later on, Halwani explicitly acknowledges this possibility, when he notes that “many
gay couples...allow themselves to have...highly impersonal [sex] so as to avoid the possibility of emotional intimacy with the new sexual partner” (Halwani, 1998, p. 15). It
is unclear why he does not think that this possibility undermines the validity of his
argument that sexual exclusivity is a romantic ideal.
Openness as a Romantic Ideal
19 of 22
ideal by offering the following intuition pump: “Imagine Romeo pouring out his heart to both Juliet and Rosalind!” The ridiculousness of this
scenario is supposed to support the idea that it is intrinsic to the nature of
ideal love that it be exclusive. In passing, I might note that, if we are to look
to literature as a guide to ideal romantic love (and this doesn’t strike me
as a great idea), we might want to look beyond the story of two hormoneaddled teenagers who know each other for no more than six days, and have
but a handful of largely superficial conversations. In any case, the thing to
do with intuition pumps is to pump back. To that end: Romeo begins
the play with romantic feelings for Rosalind. In a play in which romantic
attraction is never clearly distinguished from physical attraction, he says
of Rosalind that “The all-seeing sun / ne’er saw her match since first the
world begun.”22 Romeo goes to the Capulet’s ball in the first place in order to catch a glance of Rosalind. Is it really credible that all of this love
he felt for Rosalind vanishes instantly upon seeing Juliet? Are we really to
imagine that he doesn’t still get butterflies in his stomach when looking
at Rosalind? More to the point: does it really matter whether he does? If
Shakespeare had included a scene in which Romeo fondly kissed Rosalind
before leaving for Juliet’s tomb, would our estimation of Romeo’s love for
Juliet really decrease? I can only speak for myself, but while my estimation
of Romeo’s love for Juliet is already fairly low, I certainly do not think less
of it when I imagine him still feeling pangs of love for Rosalind, or fondly
kissing her before poisoning himself at the foot of Juliet’s tomb.
The reader may not feel the same way; they may think that, if Romeo
has any lingering traces of romantic affection for Rosalind, then his love
for Juliet isn’t really ideal. In any case, this question appears to be closely
linked to—indeed, barely indistinguishable from—the question of whether
ideal love is necessarily exclusive. If the reader is willing to accept this
claim without argument, as I suspect many will, then I will not have much
to say to persuade them otherwise—other than, of course, the argument I
have already trotted out: that no other kind of love—not the love between
friends, nor the love between family—appears to demonstrate this kind of
exclusivity. It appears to me, then, that the defenders of ideal romantic
love’s exclusivity owe an explanation of what it is that makes romantic love
different. They may, of course, insist that this is a brute difference between
22
I.2.99-100
3. Openedness as a Romantic Ideal?
20 of 22
romantic love and filial love. In any case, the conclusion I am defending
here is just that Steinbock’s argument does not provide a good reason for
thinking that an opened relationship is not ideal; and table-pounding is not
a good reason. That’s not to say that the position that ideal love is exclusive
is wrong, nor that those who believe that ideal love is exclusive are not justified in so believing. It is just to say that Steinbock hasn’t yet provided a
good reason to think that an opened relationship isn’t ideal. That may not
move her much. After all, you can’t give the skeptic a good, non-question
begging reason to think that we know that the world didn’t come into existence ten minutes ago. But we still do know that the world didn’t come
into existence ten minutes ago. I think that Mooreanism is out of place in
this disucussion. Given the history of marriage and monogamy, given its
intimate relationship to the unjust practices of male possession and subjugation of women—the treating of women as property—and given the
intimate relationship between our conceptions of romance and our practice of marriage,23 I find unbridled confidence in the ideality of romantic
exclusivity unwarranted. A serious look at our conceptions of sexuality
and romance—our eroticization of rape or rape-like behavior, e.g.—ought
not inspire confidence that our deeply-engrained conceptions of ideal romance are trustworthy. On the contrary, it ought to inspire deep and unremitting doubt. Given what we know about the history of our cultural
attitudes towards marital and therefore romantic exclusivity, this is not
the kind of conclusion we ought to accept without good reason.
Halwani offers another defense of the claim that romantic love is ideally exclusive. He says that the pain that the lover feels, or might feel, upon
discovering that their beloved has had sex or love with another could lead
to the relationship ending. Since ideal relationships don’t end, we should
conclude that an ideal relationship would be romantically exclusive. This
argument is invalid for the very same reason that the argument for the
ideality of sexual exclusivity was invalid. Simply because q is ideal, and p
tends to lead to q, it doesn’t follow that p is ideal. Even if we suppose that
ideal relationships are stable and long-lasting, it doesn’t follow that anything which tends to make romantic relationships stable or long lasting is
ideal. A pact which condemns the lovers to death should the relationship
ever end will surely help to make the relationship stable and long-lasting;
23
Cf. McMurtry (1972)
Openness as a Romantic Ideal
21 of 22
but such a death pact would be far from romantically ideal.
However, there is a closely related argument that is valid. That argument goes as follows: an ideal lover would not want to cause their beloved
pain; since sex or love outside of the relationship would cause the beloved
pain, an ideal lover would not have sex or love outside of the relationship.
While valid, this argument contains a false premise, if 7 is true.
7.
Ideal lovers are not emotionally distressed by the fact that their beloved’s
life is going better.
if we accept 7, then we will deny that sex or love outside of the relationship
would cause the beloved pain, if the relationship is ideal.
There may yet be other, better arguments to the effect that an ideal
relationship cannot be opened. Nevertheless, I contend that the arguments
for that conclusion which I have surveyed here are not good arguments.
Insofar as my survey has been comprehensive, this gives us some defeasible
reason to believe that an ideal relationship can be opened. I leave that to
the reader to judge.
4
Conclusion
I have argued that an ideal romantic relationship is open—that it lacks
any normative expectation of sexual or romantic exclusivity. I have additionally argued that many reasons offered for thinking that an opened
relationship cannot be romantically ideal—that, in an ideal romantic relationship, the partners do not have sex with or love for others—are not
good arguments. They are either invalid or they invoke premises which
are in conflict with quite plausible claims about the nature of ideal love.
As I said in the introduction, I have not argued that openness is all-thingsconsidered ideal. However, if my conclusion is correct, then it must surely
play some role in our evaluation of this broader question.
References
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Halwani, Raja. 1998. “Virtue Ethics and Adultery.” Journal of Social
Philosophy, vol. 29 (3): 5–18. [17], [18], [20]
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