Turkey in the 1920s
Turkification and the Kurds
Chair: Hannah Jones
Vice Chairs: Carol Shou & Ilayda Ozsan
Crisis Staffers: Colleen Cassingham & Medha
Imam
April 10 – 13, 2014
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Turkification and the Kurds
Introduction:
The Kurdish people are an Iranian, Kurdish language-speaking ethnic group that lives in
various countries in Western Asia. A significant portion of the total Kurdish population lives in
the southeastern part of Turkey and makes up an estimated 20% of the total Turkish population.
Relations between this large minority group and the government of the Turkish Republic have
faced many challenges, especially due to the Kurdish people’s unwillingness to abandon Kurdish
ethnic identity in favor of an exclusively Turkish ethnic identity. There has been a continued
armed conflict between the Republic and various Kurdish guerrilla groups, which have
demanded separation from Turkey to create an autonomous Kurdistan.
The process of Turkification, which began before the establishment of the Republic,
aggravated relations with the Kurdish minority group and other groups that did not want to
exclusively identify as Turkish. The process of Turkification attempted to solidify the unique
Turkish ethnic identity by eliminating competing ethnic identities from the Republic. Before the
government of Turkey came together, the Young Turk government engaged in border changes,
population exchanges, massacres, and genocides—all in the name of Turkification. These
policies resulted in the Armenian Genocide, the Greek Genocide, and the Assyrian Genocide.
The process of forced Turkification that continued with the Turkish Republic included
such policies as a surname law that forbade surnames that connoted foreign cultures, nations,
ethnic groups, or religions. There were also geographical name changes in Turkey, which aimed
to replace non-Turkish geographical and topographic names with Turkish names. Turkification
was also widespread in the educational system of Turkey. Turkish classes are mandatory in
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minority schools and use of Turkish language is mandatory in economic institutions. In some
cases, individuals that refused to adopt the new Turkish language were even fined for doing so.
In the conference, delegates will have to confront the government’s intent to make every
citizen of the country adhere to an exclusive Turkish ethnic identity while a significant minority
group in the country rejected the process. On the one hand, Turkification can be seen as an
attempt to strengthen the country while it was attempting to avoid partition and instead develop
as a modern, powerful nation. On the other hand, the forced process of Turkification that
occurred under the government of the Republic was extremely harmful and undesirable to a large
portion of the country’s population and was at odds with their innate ethnic identities.
Background and Current Situation:
The Kurds
The Kurds have lived in a mountainous, roughly 74,000-square-mile region known as
Kurdistan for the past two millennia. Throughout their history they have remained under the
control of various conquerors and nations. Since the early 20th century, the region has been
divided between Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq, all of which have repressed, often brutally, their
Kurdish minority. The Kurds, who currently number around 20–30 million, are the largest ethnic
group in the world without their own nation.1
In the 7th century, the Kurds were conquered by the Arabs, beginning centuries of living
under the rule of others. Their land was later occupied by the Seljuk Turks, the Mongols, the
Safavid dynasty, and, beginning in the late 13th century, the Ottoman Empire. Having put up
1
Brunner, Borgna. "Kurdish History Timeline." Infoplease. N.p., 2007. Web. 09 Feb. 2014.
<http://www.infoplease.com/spot/kurds3.html>.
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fierce resistance to the Arab-Muslim invasions, the Kurds ended up joining Islam without
becoming Arabized. Due to the weakening of the caliph’s power, the Kurds, who already had a
key role in the arts, history and philosophy fields, began to assert their own political power from
the middle of the 9th century onwards. However, the massive invasions of tribes surging out of
the steppes of Central Asia disrupted the Kurds’ supremacy and the Seljuk Turks gradually
annexed the Kurdish principalities.
Source: http://www.economist.com/node/21551111
Figure A: This map illustrates the region with high concentrations of Kurdish people compared to the political
borders that exist today.
The 12th century saw the emergence of Kurdistan as a recognized geographical entity, the
supremacy of a Kurdish dynasty in the Muslim world and the blossoming of an important written
literature in the Kurdish language. In the second half of the 15th century the Kurdish country
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recovered from the effects of the Mongol invasions by taking the form of an autonomous entity,
united by its language, culture and civilization.
At the beginning of the 16th century the Kurdish country was caught between the rivalry
of the Persian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. In 1514, the Turkish sultan defeated the shah of
Persia and agreed to recognize all the former rights and privileges of the Kurdish princes. In
exchange, the Kurds would guard the Iranian border themselves and fight with the Ottomans.
This particular status was to assure Kurdistan about three centuries of peace. The Ottomans
controlled some strategic garrisons on the Kurdish territory, but Kurdish lords and princes
governed the rest of the region. The Kurds lived in virtual seclusion and independently managed
their own affairs while paying homage to the distant sultan-caliph of Constantinople. This period
in fact constitutes the golden age of Kurdish literary, musical, historical and philosophical
creation.2
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire began to interfere in Kurdish
affairs and tried to halt their autonomy. Wars for the unification and independence of Kurdistan
mark the first part of the 19th century. In 1847, the last independent Kurdish principality,
Bohtan, collapsed. From 1847 to 1881, the Kurds instigate new uprisings for the creation of a
Kurdish state.
After annexing the Kurdish principalities one by one, the government attempted to
integrate the Kurdish aristocracy into the Ottoman Empire by distributing posts and payments
fairly generously and by setting up so-called tribal schools, intended to instill in the children of
Kurdish lords the principal of faithfulness to the sultan. This move towards assimilation led to
2
Brunner, “Kurdish History Timeline.”
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the emergence of elite Kurdish modernists, who tried to set up a structured Kurdish movement in
opposition to the Ottoman Empire.
Kurdish society approached the First World War divided and without a collective plan for
its future. Some, very open to the pan-Islamist ideology of the sultan-caliph, saw the salvation of
the Kurdish people within the Ottoman Empire but with a status of cultural and administrative
autonomy. Others, claiming to take inspiration from the principle of nationalities, from the ideas
of the French Revolution and from President Wilson from the United States, fought for the total
independence of Kurdistan. The split became accentuated in the days following the Ottoman
defeat by the Allied Powers in 1918. The Independantists formed a hurried delegation at the
Conference of Versailles to present "the claims of the Kurdish nation". Their actions helped
make sure the international community took into account the Kurdish national question. The
Treaty of Sevres, never ratified, actually recommended the creation of a Kurdish state in part of
the territory of Kurdistan. 3
The Turkish national leader Mustafa Kemal came to Kurdistan to seek the help of the
Kurdish leaders to liberate occupied Anatolia. The first forces of Turkey's Independence War
were in fact recruited from the Kurdish provinces. Until the definitive victory over the Greeks in
1922, Mustafa Kemal continued to promise the creation of a Muslim state of Turks and Kurds.
The Treaty of Lausanne invalidated the Treaty of Sèvres and, without giving any guarantee of
the Kurds' rights, gave the major part of Kurdistan to the new Turkish state.
The fate of the Kurdish province of petrol-rich Mosul remained undecided. The Turks
and the British claimed it, while its population wanted to create an independent Kurdish state.
Protesting that the Iraqi state would not be able to survive without the agricultural and petroleum
3
Brunner, “Kurdish History Timeline.”
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wealth of this province, Great Britain annexed these Kurdish territories from the League of
Nations Council on December 16th, 1925. It nevertheless promised to set up an autonomous
Kurdish government, a promise kept neither by the British, nor the Iraqi regime, which
succeeded the British administration in 1932.Thus at the end of 1925, the country of the Kurds,
known since the 12th century by the name "Kurdistan", found itself divided between four states:
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. For the first time in its long history, the Kurds in Turkey would be
deprived of their cultural autonomy.4
Source: http://www.gendercide.org/images/pics/kurdistan1.gif
Figure B: This map demonstrates the population concentration of Kurdish peoples in Turkey and
the surrounding countries.
4
Nezan, Kendal. "Who Are the Kurds?" Kurdish Institute of Paris. N.p., n.d. Web. 09 Feb. 2014.
<http://www.institutkurde.org/en/institute/who_are_the_kurds.php>.
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Ottoman Turkification
Though a centralized process of Turkification was pervasive under the government of the
Turkish Republic, the process actually began towards the end of the Ottoman Empire under the
Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Some argue that the Ottoman
Turkification policies began with the education and administrative policies of Abdulhamid II in
the late 19th century. However, the Turkification trend became even more intense during World
War I through settlement and deportation policies meant to “nationalize Anatolia as the base of a
Turkish national core” by the Young Turks.5 The relationship between the periphery and the core
of the empire shifted due to the heightening Turkification efforts of the government. This
intensely nationalistic attitude was most severe through the ethnic cleansing that the Young
Turks committed during World War I by the forceful removal or Greeks, Assyrians, and
Armenians from Turkish lands. Estimates of these massacres hover around two million nonTurks, especially Christians, that died as a result of the Young Turks’ goal of a homogenously
Turkish state. Though massive ethnic cleansing, to the point that many have labeled it genocide,
came during the rule of the Young Turks, the recent memory of these events existed during the
Republic’s government and continues to impact the relationship of Turkey with its neighbors.
As the Young Turks attempted to forge a distinctly Turkish modern nation, the non-Turk
minorities living in Ottoman lands suffered. For one, the Turkish population was
disproportionately represented by a 2.5 to 1 ratio in the 1908 Parliament.6 The unequal political
representation both reflected the Turkification trend thus far and also allowed it to intensify in
5
Ülker, Erol. "Contextualising Turkification" Nation-Building in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918." Nations
and Nationalism 11.4 (2005): 659.
6
Kayalı, Hasan. Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918.
Berkeley: University of California, 1997. Google Books. Web. 9 Feb. 2014.
<http://books.google.com/books/about/Arabs_and_Young_Turks.html?id=NX2fICZGh80C> p. 84.
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the next decade. There were various systematic means of marginalizing the non-Turk population.
The Young Turks possessed an “inflexible attitude toward the demands and organizational
initiative of the religious minorities…depriving non-Turks of their established social, political,
and cultural rights.”7 British Ambassador Sir Gerard Lowther summarized this policy by calling
it “pounding non-Turkish elements in a Turkish mortar.”8 The Young Turks were insistent on
creating a homogenous Turkish state and did so by denying rights, assimilating, and physically
removing the non-Turks under their control.
Ideological Foundation
Turkification is defined as the Turkish Republic’s project to create a state of citizens with
equal rights, who will define themselves first and foremost as Turks, their religion being a
private matter.9 The term “minority” strictly refers to the non-Muslims, as the term was
designated at the Peace Treaty of Lausanne. According to Mustafa Kemal, unity of religion was
not essential for the formation of a nation. For him, a nation was a society formed by people who
shared a common historical legacy, had a sincere desire to live together, and had a common will
to preserve their shared heritage.
Kemal’s definition of the Turkish nation did not exclude the minorities, provided that they
considered themselves to be part of the nation. Ataturk expressed this sentiment in the following
statement: “If the Christian and Jewish citizens who live among us today will bind their fate and
destiny to the Turkish nation because their conscience tells them to do so, then how can the
7
Hasan Kayali 82.
Hasan Kayali 83. 9
Rifat Bali, <http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/basel.pdf>.Published in Hans Lukas-Kieser (ed),
Turkey Beyond Nationalism, (London: I.B. Taurus), 2006
8
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civilized and nobly moral Turkish people consider them as strangers?”10
There were clear-cut conditions for becoming a Turk. These included adopting the Turkish
language as the mother language, the Turkish culture, and the ideal of Turkism. In 1925 after
repressing the Sheikh Said Kurdish rebellion, Prime Minister İsmet Pasha made a declaration,
proving the strong determination of the Republican elites: “Our immediate duty is to make Turks
all those who live in the Turkish fatherland. We will cut and throw away the minorities who are
opposing Turks and Turkism.”11
One of the people who best understood Turkification was a Jewish businessman named
Moiz Kohen. Kohen changed his name to Tekinalp, which is a Turkish name, and in 1928
published his book entitled Türkleştirme (Turkification), which he dedicated to the nationalist
organization Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearths). In his book Tekinalp argued that not only Jews
but all minorities had to be Turkified if they wanted to deserve the status of citizenship granted
to them by the Constitution of 1924. He included his address to the Jewish community in the
form of ten instructions that the community had to follow for becoming Turks. They were
modeled after the Ten Commandments of Moses, and were, in essence, a summary of the
Republican founders’ expectations. Tekinalp said to Turkify your names; speak Turkish; in the
synagogues read part of the prayers in Turkish; Turkify your schools; send your children to state
schools; interest yourself in Turkey’s affairs; socialize with Turks; eliminate the [Jewish]
community spirit; do your special duty in the field of national economy, and; know your
10
A. Afetinan, Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, 3rd edition, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu),
1998, p. 23-24.
11
Vakit Newspaper, 27 April 1925 quoted in Füsun Üstel, İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği Türk
Ocakları 1912-1931, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları), 1997, p. 173.
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constitutional rights.12
The most important factor that curtailed Turkification’s complete success was the
Ottoman legacy that the young Republic wanted to ignore but could not. The Turkish Republic,
born from the remains of an Empire run for centuries by religious Sharia Law, was not able to
change the collective memory of its elites and of its society, even in the period when the nation
applied secularism in its most rigid form. The Republican regime, in spite of its declarations that
it accepted non-Muslims as equal citizens provided they assume Turkish national identity, could
not forget the years of the National War of Independence. The Republican elites remembered
how the minorities cheered the Allied Forces when they occupied Istanbul and the Greek Army
when it occupied Izmir. They could not forget the famous Grande Rue de Péra in Istanbul, where
one could hear Ladino, Greek, Armenian and French, and practically not one word of Turkish.
They could not forget the fact that while a National War of Independence was going on, the
minorities living in Istanbul and İzmir were tending to their own businesses. All these negative
snapshots from the past formed the collective memory of the young Republic’s elites and became
a handicap in the successful implementation of the Turkification project.
Kurdish National Movement
Multiple Kurdish national separatist movements surfaced after the end of the Ottoman
Empire and heightened during the formation of the modern Turkish state. Before this time, some
Kurdish rebellions had occurred in Anatolia (the Eastern regions of Turkey), but they gained
12
Tekin Alp, Türkleştirme, (İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası), 1928, p. 63-65. The only study on Tekin Alp is the
book of Jacob M. Landau, Tekinalp, Turkish Patriot 1883-1961, (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaelogisch
Instituut), Istanbul, 1984. (Excerpt taken from Rifat Bali’s publication).
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little traction as the Ottoman Empire had enough political influence and force to quash any
attempts to create a Kurdish state. With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Kurdish nationalism
developed in tandem with the formation of the modern Turkish state.13
The first of these rebellions was the Kockiri Rebellion in 1920, which was waged by the
Kizilbash Kockiri tribe in the eastern Dersim region. This particular rebellion was unsuccessful,
primarily because of conceptual differences within the Kurdish community about the perceived
enemy. Many supported the Kemalist regime because they regarded Ataturk’s secularist policies
as a form of “protection” against the Sunni religious zealots of the time. Others saw this rebellion
as a single tribe’s attempt at nationalism, so many other Kurdish groups like the Kurmanci Kurds
did not see the rebellion as a “Kurdish” rebellion at all. Ultimately, the Kockiri Rebellion was
successful only in raising questions of granting “autonomous administration” to the area of
Kurdistan.14
The most notable Kurdish rebellion of the 1920s was the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion.
Kemalist secularism outlawed all public demonstrations of Kurdish identity, including the use of
the Kurdish language and traditional Kurdish clothing, which incited rebellious sentiment within
the Kurdish community. Sheikh Said was a Kurdish sheikh of the Sunni order revered for his
eloquent speaking and organizational ability, making him a natural leader for the cause.15 On the
night of March 6th, Sheikh Said, along with 5000-10000 Kurdish troops, laid siege to the city of
Diyarbakir in the Southeastern portion of Turkey. Though the Turkish garrisons were much
fewer in number, their use of machine gun fire and mortar grenades quickly swept through the
Kurdish army. The second wave of attacks failed, finally leading the Sheikh to lift the siege on
13
Birand, Mehmet Ali (2008-01-03). “How many Kurdish uprisings till today?”. Turkish Daily News.
Martin van Bruinessen, Mullas, Sufis and Heretics: The Role of Religion in Kurdish Society, 2000
15
Robert W. Olson (1989). The emergence of Kurdish nationalist and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925.
14
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March 11th. By the end of March, the major battles of the rebellion were over.16 Sheikh Said was
captured later in the year and executed by hanging. Many scholars consider the Sheikh Said
Rebellion to be one of the last serious attempts for Turks to revive the Caliphate and one of the
first serious attempts to form a Kurdish state.17
In 1927, the Kurdish Republic of Ararat was established as a self-proclaimed Kurdish
state located in eastern Turkey. General Ihsan Nuri Pasha led a rebellion to declare its
independence, but the Republic was not recognized by the Turkish government or any foreign
bodies. An armed struggle soon began when the militarily superior Turkish Air Force bombed
Kurdish settlements around Mt. Ararat. The Kurds decided to fight back, but within a couple of
months, the Turks mobilized over 60,000 soldiers and 100 aircraft and the Turkish forces became
too powerful for the Kurds to overcome. After years of armed struggle, the rebellion was finally
defeated in 1931 and Turkey resumed control of the territory.18
Consequences of Turkification for the Kurds
Under Ataturk’s rule, the Kurdish people were constantly persecuted. The teaching of
their language was outlawed in schools and the recognition of Kurds as a minority group within
Turkey was prohibited. They were also not allowed to wear their traditional Kurdish wear in
public. The Turkish government recognized them as “Mountain Turks” rather than identifying
them as Kurds. Many Kurdish people rose against the persecution, but their efforts were always
subdued. Even more, thousands of Kurdish people were forced to migrate to cities in central or
western Turkey away from their homelands.
16
Olson 3
Olson 3 18
Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish national movement: its origins and development, Syracuse University Press, 2006
17
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As a result of the divide, the Kurds experienced continuous underdevelopment and could
only improve through the cooperation with the dominant states. Very little modern technology
had been introduced to Kurdish areas and much of the economy is supported by simple
agriculture. The Kurdish received very little state aid and investments due to the instability of
their lands. Along with the underdevelopment, Kurdistan continues to uphold the socioeconomic
structure of feudalism. Sheiks and clan leaders constitute the leadership of Kurdish regions on
economic, political, and religious terms. To sustain themselves, these leaders need to prove that
they are reliable Kurds by oppressing the Kurds who deny their nationality. This caused even
more division within the Kurdish people and is one of the significant reasons why the people of
Kurdistan are unable to unite and revolt for their own independent states.
Even today, the Kurds’ struggle is met with adversity since they are constantly
subjugated by their oppressor states and imprisoned for speaking out for their independence.
National movements and rebellions have taken place as a result of Kurdish persecution, yet they
have always been crushed by the more powerful states. Since the division of Kurds under
Ataturk, many Kurdish people have been forced to fight against one another, dividing the group
even more than before.
Bloc Positions:
Ataturk and the Liberal Elites
Upon establishing the Republic of Turkey, Ataturk and the founding fathers had the
common belief that in order to develop Turkey, they had to establish Westernized policies and
execute Turkification policies on the population. The liberal elites emphasized that a Türk is
anyone who is a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Article 66 of the Turkish Constitution defines
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a "Turk" as anyone who is “bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship”19. These
liberal elites were very committed to the process of Turkification and supported its efforts
despite issues with the Kurds and other minorities.
Minorities
Initially, many minorities protested against Turkification and/or secularization, including
rebellions such as the Kurdish rebellions.20 The 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion constituted a reaction
against Ataturk’s policy to undermine the religious and secular status of the Kurdish sheikhs.
Although the government quashed the rebellion, the Kurdish struggle against Ataturk’s policies
did not. In October 1927, a Kurdish clandestine congress was held which decided upon the
establishment of a national movement and a rebel army. The Turkish authorities reacted
vigorously to these series of revolts. The assimilation policy entered into a new stage; it was
forbidden to use the words ‘Kurd’ and ‘Kurdistan’ in any book, newspaper, or any printed
material. The Kurds eventually ceased to exist and became ‘mountain Kurds.’21 Due to these
events and policies, there was demonstrably fervent hatred among the Kurdish minority against
the policies of Turkification.
Questions to Consider:
1. What is the main objective of Turkification? Why was this seen as important?
19
The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey: Political Rights and Duties.
<http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/con2d.html>.
20
Gunes, Cengiz. The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Representation and
Reconciliation. 2013.
21
Veenhoven,Willem Adriaan. Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Volume Two: A World
Survey. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1975.
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2. How did the government attempt to achieve its Turkification objectives?
3. How did Turkification benefit the lives of those living in Turkey?
4. How did Turkification hurt the lives of all those living in Turkey—for both members of
the majority and minorities?
5. Do the Kurdish people have a pre-existing right to live in the Turkish region? If so, does
that allow for any right to autonomy?
6. Why do you think the Kurdish peoples were so unwilling to accept the label of “Turks”
like Ataturk wanted? How would that have changed their lives?
7. Would it have been possible to prevent the Kurdish national movement from occurring?
Why or why not?
8. Could the Kurdish regions create a diplomatic solution to the problem of constant
persecution by their oppressor states?
9. Could Ataturk promote Turkish nationalism while at the same time recognize the Kurds
as their own autonomous group? What concessions might have been offered to the
Kurds?
10. Was the dream of an autonomous Kurdish state feasible in the 1920s?
Recommended Sources:
1.
Brunner, Borgna. "Kurdish History Timeline." Infoplease. N.p., 2007. Web. 09 Feb.
2014. <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/kurds3.html>.
2.
Nezan, Kendal. "Who Are the Kurds?" Kurdish Institute of Paris. N.p., n.d. Web. 09 Feb.
2014. <http://www.institutkurde.org/en/institute/who_are_the_kurds.php>.
Jones 16
3.
"Peaceful Kurdish Resistance to the Turkification." Kurdish Question in Turkey. Mount
Holyoke College, n.d. Web. 9 Feb. 2014.
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~ajiki20n/Peaceful%20Kurdish%20Resistance%20to%20the
%20Turkification.htm>.
4.
Olson, Robert. "The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion,
1880-1925." Kurdistanica. N.p., 04 Sept. 2009. Web. 09 Feb. 2014.
<http://www.kurdistanica.com/?q=node/150>
5.
"Who Are the Kurds?" The Washington Post. N.p., 1999. Web. 9 Feb. 2014.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm>.
6.
Alpay, Sahin. "Atatürk and the Kurds." TODAY'S ZAMAN. N.p., 15 Dec. 2008. Web. 09
Feb. 2014. <http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/sahin-alpay_161239-ataturk-andthe-kurds.html>.
Bibliography:
1. A. Afetinan, Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, 3rd edition, (Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu), 1998, p. 23-24.
2. Birand, Mehmet Ali (2008-01-03). “How many Kurdish uprisings till today?”. Turkish
Daily News.
3. Brunner, Borgna. "Kurdish History Timeline." Infoplease. N.p., 2007. Web. 09 Feb.
2014. <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/kurds3.html>.
4. Gunes, Cengiz, and Welat Zeydanhoğlu. The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New
Perspectives on Violence, Representation, and Reconciliation. London: Routledge, 2014.
5. Kayalı, Hasan. Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the
Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918. Berkeley: University of California, 1997. Google Books.
Web. 9 Feb. 2014.
<http://books.google.com/books/about/Arabs_and_Young_Turks.html?id=NX2fICZGh8
0C>.
6. Nezan, Kendal. "Who Are the Kurds?" Kurdish Institute of Paris. N.p., n.d. Web. 09 Feb.
2014. <http://www.institutkurde.org/en/institute/who_are_the_kurds.php>.
7. Olson, Robert W. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion,
1880-1925. Austin: University of Texas, 1991
8. <http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/organizations/presidency-of-religiousaffairs>.
Jones 17
9. Rifat Bali, <http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/basel.pdf>.Published in
Hans Lukas-Kieser (ed), Turkey Beyond Nationalism, (London: I.B. Taurus), 2006
10. Tekin Alp, Türkleştirme, (İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası), 1928, p. 63-65.
11. "The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Part II." Hellenic Resources Network. N.p.,
n.d. Web. 09 Feb. 2014. <http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/con2d.html>.
12. Vakit Newspaper, 27 April 1925 quoted in Füsun Üstel, İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete
Türk Milliyetçiliği Türk Ocakları 1912-1931, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları), 1997, p. 173.
13. Van Bruinessen, Martin. Mullas, Sufis, and Heretics: The Role of Religion in Kurdish
Society. N.p.: Gorgias Pr Llc, 2011.
14. Veenhoven,Willem Adriaan. Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Volume Two: A World Survey. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1975.
15. Ülker, Erol. "Contextualising Turkification" Nation-Building in the Late Ottoman
Empire, 1908-1918." Nations and Nationalism 11.4 (2005): 659.
16. Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish national movement: its origins and development, Syracuse
University Press, 2006.
Jones 18