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Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy : The Organizational and Motivational
Dimensions of Factionalism
Kim Eric Bettcher
Party Politics 2005 11: 339
DOI: 10.1177/1354068805051781
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V O L 1 1 . N o . 3 pp. 339–358
Copyright © 2005 SAGE Publications
www.sagepublications.com
London
Thousand Oaks
New Delhi
FACTIONS OF INTEREST IN JAPAN
AND ITALY
The Organizational and Motivational Dimensions
of Factionalism
Kim Eric Bettcher
ABSTRACT
The classification and analysis of intra-party groups remain challenging
despite several scholarly attempts. This article argues that intra-party
groups vary along two important dimensions, one which describes their
incentive structures (motivation) and one their degree of organization.
The first dimension delineates the relative mixture of selective and
collective incentives they offer, and the second dimension their organizational stability and sophistication. In brief, clienteles and factions of
interest are based primarily on patronage, while tendencies and factions
of principle are based primarily on policy beliefs. Both factions of
interest and factions of principle are more highly developed organizationally than clienteles or tendencies. To illustrate, the article details the
experience of factions in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party and Italy’s
Christian Democracy. It is shown how factions in both parties experienced shifts along the organizational and motivational dimensions and
how they may best be classified.
KEY WORDS factions intra-party groups Italy Japan
The internal politics of political parties invites study for at least a few excellent reasons. In most democracies, parties have a strong bearing on leadership recruitment, policy-making, and interest representation. Internal party
activity in these areas is equally important as parties’ overall involvement,
because parties do not automatically coordinate the diffuse members,
opinions, and interests that compose them. The coordination and organization of these components is largely a political process.
Unfortunately, characterizations of internal party politics vary widely and
it is often unclear whether accounts of individual cases differ because the
1354-0688[DOI: 10.1177/1354068805051781]
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cases are indeed different or whether they have been described by observers
using different theoretical lenses. Observers have applied different labels to
similar intra-party groups and have also applied the term ‘faction’ to groups
that are quite different from each other. Scholars such as Rose (1964),
Sartori (1976), Beller and Belloni (1978b), and Hine (1982) have proposed
several classification systems for intra-party groups, yet so far no one has
clarified how these systems are related. In an effort to draw some of these
strands together, this article introduces another typology, one which was
inspired by these scholars.
A faction, generally speaking, can be defined as ‘any relatively organized
group that exists within the context of some other group and which . . .
competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which
it is a part’ (Beller and Belloni, 1978b: 419). In the context of political
parties, the term refers to intra-party factions; that is, groups that compete
with others for power advantages within parties.1 This general set of groups
can be subdivided to accommodate different patterns of intra-party
competition. I argue that intra-party groups vary along two important
dimensions, one which describes their incentive structures (motivation) and
one their degree of organization. The first dimension delineates the relative
mixture of selective and collective incentives they offer, and the second their
organizational stability and sophistication.
The article proceeds as follows: first, certain assumptions are presented
about the goals of individual politicians and the incentives to which politicians
respond. Next, a two-dimensional typology of intra-party organizations is
elaborated. Then I apply these dimensions to describe the development and
decline of one type of faction – the ‘faction of interest’ – in Japan’s Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and Italy’s Christian Democracy (DC).
Politicians’ Goals and Incentives
Three types of goal-seeking behavior have been ascribed to parties: voteseeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking (Strom, 1994: 104–5). The goals
of parties can be nothing other than syntheses of the goals of their individual members, so here it is assumed that the goals of individual politicians
can be described in a similar fashion. Individuals may have multiple goals,
but these three types are primary. Each goal may be instrumental to the
attainment of other goals.
1. Politicians seek election or re-election, and to this end they seek votes.
Winning election to parliament can be a first step toward attaining
offices or promoting policies.
2. Politicians, once elected, seek government and party offices. Appointment to offices can improve a politician’s chances of re-election, as well
as confer status and power.
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3. Politicians seek to promote certain policies or ideologies. Policy stances
or ideological identity can influence a politician’s chances of attaining
the first two goals, but may also be valued for their own sake.
Parties provide a combination of incentives to members to obtain their
cooperation. First, there are collective incentives, which consist of collective
solidary incentives – ‘intangible rewards created by the act of associating’
– and purposive incentives – ‘intangible rewards that derive from the sense
of satisfaction of having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile
cause’ (Wilson, 1995: 34). Second, there are selective incentives, which
consist of material incentives (e.g. money) and specific solidary incentives –
‘intangible rewards arising out of the act of associating that can be given
to, or withheld from, specific individuals’ (e.g. offices) (Wilson, 1995: 33–4;
see also Panebianco, 1988: 9–11). In general, politicians motivated by policy
or ideological goals respond to collective incentives. Politicians motivated
by vote-seeking or office-seeking goals respond to selective incentives. The
goals individuals pursue and the incentive structures that help satisfy these
goals are important determinants of party organization (Wilson, 1995: 32).
Like parties, intra-party groups also distribute combinations of incentives
to maintain their organizational activity. Faction leaders can be thought of
as political entrepreneurs who organize and mobilize politicians. By supplying selective and/or collective incentives, they induce politicians to join them
and support their leadership. The types of incentives offered and the way
they are distributed shape the configuration of groups within a party.2
Typology of Intra-party Groups
The typology presented here is derived from the classification systems of
Rose, Beller and Belloni, and Sartori. The intent is to describe a wide range
of intra-party groups in as simple a manner as possible, using two dimensions. Accordingly, elements of these scholars’ systems are taken selectively
without addressing their models as a whole.
Rose distinguishes faction, ‘a group of individuals . . . who seek to further
a broad range of policies through consciously organized political activity’,
from tendency, ‘a stable set of attitudes’, on the basis of the greater organization of the former. He assumes both are oriented toward the attainment of
certain policy goals (1964: 35–8). Beller and Belloni also distinguish among
groups according to a structural criterion. They identify three types in order
of degree of organization: factional cliques or tendencies; personal or clientgroup factions; and institutionalized or organizational factions. They
acknowledge that groups of the first and third types can be formed with
either common ideological or material interests (1978b: 419–20, 422–30).
Sartori offers a highly complex terminological and classificatory scheme,
but of particular value are his first two dimensions of subparty anatomy:
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the organizational dimension and the motivational dimension. He describes
organization in terms of relative autonomy from the party. By motivation
he refers to Hume’s distinction between factions of interest and factions of
principle. For Sartori, the two dimensions are not completely independent
of each other, since he believes factions of interest tend to be clientele
groups, while factions of principle tend not to be (1976: 76–7).
Combining the above perspectives, the following typology is derived,
which is structured by Sartori’s two dimensions: organizational and motivational (see Figure 1).
Sartori’s framework, aside from being reduced to two dimensions, is
modified in two ways. First, the labels ‘clientele’ (Beller and Belloni) and
‘tendency’ (Rose) are introduced to designate two types of loosely organized groups, with self-interested and principled motivations, respectively.
(Sartori does not use any particular labels in his discussion of organization,
but refers to ‘factions of interest’ and ‘factions of principle’ in his discussion
of motivation.) Second, it is not assumed that self-interested or principled
groups should have a particular type or degree of organization as a function
of their motivation. Although Sartori asserts that logically ‘the organizational dimension must be allowed to vary independently’, empirically he
in effect groups factions of interest and clienteles together (1976: 76).
Hine’s more recent approach, like my own, does separate the organizational dimension from others: ‘The most obvious distinction is between on
the one hand what divides groups, and on the other how such groups, once
divided, are organised’ (1982: 37). For Hine, however, ‘what divides groups’
is their positioning along a policy/ideology/strategy axis, whereas in my
typology the motivational dimension captures the relative significance of
policy – regardless of particular policy leanings – versus interests as a source
of division.
One reason why organizational variation among subparty groups – and
its actual relationship to motivation – merits careful study is that it has a
bearing on how subparty politics is linked to the party as a whole. Bowler,
Interest
Clientele
Faction of Interest
Weakly
Organized
Strongly
Organized
Tendency
Faction of Principle
Principle
Figure 1. Typology of intra-party groups
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Farrell, and Katz point out that ‘factions can help rank-and-file members
discipline their leadership’ or ‘help party leaders understand where their
support or opposition lies within the party’ (1999: 15). The form of such
two-way relationships between party leadership and rank and file is
mediated by factional structures (or the lack thereof). Whether and how
organized factionalism shapes the articulation of policy or interest preferences within these relationships is an interesting and important question.
A related question that has been debated is whether factions have functional or dysfunctional effects on parties and governance. McAllister (1991)
has proposed that factions can perform an integrative function – by which
they permit a diversity of interests or beliefs to coexist within a party
without fragmenting – and an adaptive function – by which they provide a
party with a degree of flexibility in responding to social change. I would
argue based on the Japanese and Italian experiences that certain factions
may perform these functions, but this is contingent upon whether factions
represent any social interests other than their own self-interest, upon the
degree of subparty organization, and upon the nature of competition
between factions. Patronage-oriented factions will not respond to social
concerns the same way that ideological factions might. And highly organized factions have a capacity for either destructive conflict or collusion. In
any event, one can profit from classifying particular factions before making
assumptions about their functionality or dysfunctionality.
Organization and motivation are not dichotomous variables, nor are they
constants. An intra-party group’s degree of organization can range from
completely unorganized (a latent group) to informally organized to highly
organized. A group’s motivation (or, more accurately, its members’ motivations) can range from purely self-interested to purely principled, with
various combinations possible between the extremes. The labels in the
typology are intended only to indicate a group’s positioning along the two
dimensions. There are no firm lines that divide one type from another. In
practice, intra-party groups are unlikely to be located at the extremes of the
classification scheme. Some types may occur more frequently than others.
Nevertheless, each of the four types – clientele, tendency, faction of interest,
and faction of principle – has a recognizable set of characteristics.
Clientelism has many connotations in social science, including cultural,
psychological, and economic connotations. In my typology, ‘clientele’ has a
restricted meaning. A clientele is a type of organization that is highly dependent on personal relationships. Clienteles have a pyramidal structure built
up from patron–client relationships (Landé, 1977: xx–xxi; see also Beller
and Belloni, 1978b: 424–7; Fukui, 1978: 44–7; Graziano, 1980: 19–23). In
a political party, clienteles organize vertical relations among elected politicians and party officers, and these relations may extend outward and
downward into different levels of government and party organization.3 The
relationships – and thus the overall structure – are maintained through
exchanges among individuals at different levels. Lower members (clients)
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deliver votes to their superiors (patrons), and in exchange receive selective
incentives such as money, jobs, and services. In other words, members join
and remain in the clientele for particularistic, self-interested reasons.
Continued membership in the clientele also depends on an ongoing relationship with a particular patron. Consequently, clienteles are not firmly organized and become vulnerable to collapse if key patrons are lost.
Tendency in this typology has approximately the same meaning that Rose
gives the term. It may involve a modicum of informal organization, but does
not imply durability, cohesion, or discipline. Politicians identify with a
tendency because of their commitment to an ideology or a shared view of
policy; that is, they are drawn to purposive (collective) incentives. Membership is informal, fluid, and possibly not even consciously recognized.
Whatever organization may exist need not be vertically arranged. Politicians
may assemble around leaders who espouse particular views, or may cluster
in more collegial groups.
A faction of interest, like a clientele, is focused on the pursuit of patronage for its members, but its structure is not wholly dependent on the
accumulation of individual exchange relationships. Clienteles are sometimes
referred to as factions, but in this typology the term ‘faction’ is reserved for
more organized groups. The faction of interest operates consciously as a
group to obtain privileges and resources for its members. Members of the
faction recognize that their fortunes are tied to the fortunes of the faction
as much as to the protection of the leader. The membership and structure
are fairly stable, even formalized. This type of faction resembles the
‘institutionalized’ factions described by Beller and Belloni, except that
institutionalized factions include some based on principle (1978b: 427–30).
An organized faction has rules and procedures, scheduled meetings, a fixed
headquarters, and other durable features.
A faction of principle has a similarly high degree of organizational
development, but has motivations like those of a tendency. Rather than
pursue patronage on a group scale, it seeks true collective goods in the form
of policies or ideological programs acceptable to its membership. The beliefs
of members form a basis of commitment to the faction and separate it from
other factions. The organizational development of a faction of principle is
aimed more at the attainment of group purposes than at maintenance of a
structure that satisfies the interests of members. Good examples of these
factions could be found in the British Labour Party through the mid-1980s
or in the Australian Labor Party (Brand, 1989; McAllister, 1991).
In sum, clienteles and factions of interest are based primarily on patronage, while tendencies and factions of principle are based primarily on policy
beliefs. Both factions of interest and factions of principle are more highly
developed organizationally than clienteles or tendencies.
The above typology, and the dimensions from which it was constructed,
help clarify the nature of Japanese and Italian factions, the changes they
experienced, and their relationship to other factions and intra-party groups
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elsewhere. The factions of the LDP and the DC were factions of interest
which shared certain essential similarities in spite of the geographically and
culturally distinct settings of the Japanese and Italian political systems
(Sartori, 1976: 90). The factions did not always correspond closely to the
ideal type; rather, they shifted along the two dimensions in the typology.
They experienced organizational development and decay, as well as changes
in their ideological positioning and incentive structures.
LDP Factions
The factions of the Liberal Democratic Party were commonly called shidan
(divisions) or gundan (army corps), terms which suggest the high degree of
discipline they possessed. Their degree of organization, remarkable to begin
with, increased as their memberships stabilized and their structures became
differentiated and formalized. Based primarily on serving the self-interest of
politicians, the factions also had elements of principle. However, the influence of policy and leadership concerns on factions diminished over time.
LDP factions approached the ideal type of factions of interest in the 1980s,
then weakened after realignment and reform in the 1990s.
From Clientelism to Organized Factionalism
The early LDP factions were simple vehicles by which to promote the
election of their leader to the head of the party. They were largely personalistic organizations, managed by a single leader or with the assistance of a
few associates. The clientelist model characterized these factions reasonably
accurately and explained their relative instability. However, early LDP
factions were ‘more precisely defined structurally and functionally’ than
generic clienteles (Fukui, 1978: 47). They had, for instance, permanent
office facilities.
The sizes of individual factions fluctuated considerably until 1972 due to
the loss of faction leaders through death or retirement.4 The loss of a leader
typically resulted in a faction being divided up among his former lieutenants. After 1972, the five major factions all managed more or less smooth
successions until 1992.
Turnover in factional membership decreased from the 1960s to the 1980s
as the vast majority of the LDP’s lower-house politicians became identified
with a single faction. Between 1958 and 1960 (after the election), roughly
55 percent of incumbent faction members continued with the same faction.
The proportion of members continuing after an election increased to 70
percent or more by the 1980s. Defections from factions almost ceased after
1972. Once a politician was elected and joined a faction, his fate was usually
tied to the same faction until he died or retired.
During the 1980s, four major factions (the Tanaka, Fukuda, Suzuki, and
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Nakasone factions) grew at the expense of smaller factions to a peak of 62
to 87 lower-house members, to which were added as many as 23 to 53
upper-house members. Leaders of the enlarged factions encouraged organizational development in order to contain the costs involved in building and
maintaining a faction (Iseri, 1988: 14). This development helped bring in
new members and satisfy existing members. A shift in perspective occurred
such that a faction was no longer regarded as simply a means for the leader
to pursue the party leadership; rather, the leader came to be seen increasingly as an agent for the faction (Iseri, 1988: 17–18).
Offices proliferated within the largest factions as they matured. These
offices had regular functions and procedures, which became standardized
across the different factions (Ishikawa and Hirose, 1989: 212). The first of
these was the faction secretary-general (jimu socho), analogous to the
secretary-general of the party (in both the faction and the party the secretarygeneral was a different person from the leader). The secretary-general of
each faction was entrusted with the daily business of his faction, including
keeping order in the faction and handling relations with other factions. The
secretary-generals of five factions met monthly and even held special conferences to discuss and influence the selection of the party president (Iseri,
1988: 26–7; Ishikawa and Hirose, 1989: 211).
Next was the standing secretariat (jonin kanjikai), which determined a
faction’s management policies. It met prior to weekly faction meetings and
then obtained approval of its decisions from the full faction (Iseri, 1988:
30–2, 34–5; Ishikawa and Hirose, 1989: 213). Under the standing secretariat were one or more bureaus (kyoku), charged with executing its internal
policies. Some factions had specialized bureaus for handling policy issues
or elections. The secretariats and the bureaus were specialized, permanent,
hierarchical structures within the faction, governed by a set of written
faction rules. They curtailed the influence of the leader and diminished the
impact of his individual characteristics on the faction (Iseri, 1988: 32–5).
The creation of an organizational infrastructure enabled factions to
support their members in a variety of ways. The Tanaka faction was dubbed
a ‘general hospital’ (sogo byoin) for its reputed ability to meet all of its
members’ needs. The faction could assist politicians by providing information and tactical advice for campaigns, assigning senior politicians to
assist their campaigns, and introducing them to corporate sponsors and
bureaucrats. Greater size made possible economies of scale and a greater
selection of services available to politicians.
Patronage
Within the LDP, politicians and factions competed for patronage of various
kinds. Under Japan’s multi-member district electoral system (single, nontransferable vote) from 1947 to 1993, competition among fellow Liberal
Democrats was intense. Politicians required money to maintain their
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personal support organizations (koenkai) and conduct election campaigns.
Second, they sought public works, subsidies, government contracts, and
other benefits for their constituencies. Third, they coveted posts for themselves to increase their own power and electoral competitiveness.
Factions never provided the majority of a politician’s funds, but supplied
enough of a politician’s political income to mean the difference between
electoral victory and defeat. Originally, factional funds were gathered and
distributed almost exclusively by faction leaders. By the 1980s, the involvement of leaders in the actual collection and disbursement of funds had been
reduced (Curtis, 1988: 186–7; Hirose, 1989: 89–90). Fund-raising became
a function performed by and for the faction as an organization (Hirose,
1989: 93; Ishikawa and Hirose, 1989: 193–4, 216). Faction officers were
usually individuals who had proven their ability to contribute financially to
the faction (Hirose, 1989: 84, 94). Finances flowed mostly to the newest,
most marginal candidates, who if elected would expand the faction’s size.
As the average politician’s financial autonomy increased, he became
increasingly dependent on his faction for non-monetary patronage. Organized factions were adept at helping their members provide constituency
services. A large faction had specialists (zoku giin) in the prime policy areas
– such as construction, agriculture, commerce and industry, post and telecommunications, or transportation – who could assist others in the faction
with less experience, fewer connections, or a different specialization
(Inoguchi and Iwai, 1987: 148–51).
Another important role played by factions was the allocation of government and party posts. Factions recommended and backed candidates for
important government positions such as cabinet minister or parliamentary
vice-minister; and party positions such as member of the Executive Council
or the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) Deliberation Committee, or
chairperson of PARC divisions. The more numerous positions, notably in
the cabinet, were allocated in close proportion to a faction’s membership in
the Diet, whereas scarcer positions, notably the LDP secretary-general,
chairperson of the Executive Council, and chairperson of the PARC, were
balanced among the very largest factions (Iseri, 1988: 136–46; Sato and
Matsuzaki, 1986: 63–73). These methods for distributing posts, which
evolved over decades, came to be strictly applied by the mid-1980s.
Policy-Making
Liberal Democratic factions were not characterized by common policy ideas
or positions (Watanabe, 1967: 155). This is not to say the LDP did not
incorporate diversity of opinions. Policies were often debated among faction
leaders, but each leader’s standpoint did not necessarily represent the views
of his faction. Other politicians advocated policies through the party’s
policy organs and cross-factional groups such as Diet members’ leagues.
Factional involvement in policy debate was greatest from the late 1950s to
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the 1970s. By the 1980s, factional influence was essentially confined to the
selection of the party leader and the allocation of posts and election
resources (Nakano, 1997: 65, 69–70, 79).
Several attempts were made to build factions around issues, all of which
failed (Inoue, 1979: 61–76, 91–101; Uchida, 1983: 101–2). One group led
by Fukuda Takeo, the Tofu Sasshin Renmei, started out in 1960 as a party
modernization committee, ostensibly intended to combat factionalism,
strengthen the party, and oppose Chinese and Soviet imperialism. Although
the Tofu Sasshin Renmei had representation from most factions in the party,
by 1963 it no longer claimed to be impartial, and out of its core group
emerged the Fukuda faction, which developed into a large faction like the
others (Fukui, 1970: 112–14).
One of the most dramatic political conflicts in postwar Japanese history
was provoked by the revision of the United States–Japan security treaty in
1960. LDP factions plunged into this policy debate:
The struggle within the LDP over the security treaty was admittedly
caused in part by serious policy dilemmas. . . . But if there were ideological or philosophical convictions in the LDP as to the future course
of Japan’s diplomacy, one could scarcely detect them in the wild
scramble for personal power.
(Packard, 1966: 81)
The factions did not adhere consistently to policy positions. Rather, the
minority factions (‘anti-mainstream’ coalition) opposed the government’s
plans on this controversial issue no matter which factions belonged to the
minority at any moment.
In subsequent decades, the links between factions and policy ideas
loosened further. In the 1970s, two large, cross-factional groups of LDP
politicians clashed over policy toward China: the Afro-Asian Group, which
was pro-Beijing, and the Asian Group, which was pro-Taiwan. Most
factions had at least a few members in both groups, and many politicians
did not belong to either group. By the 1980s, informal policy groups known
as zoku had gained ascendancy within the party’s Policy Affairs Research
Council. Zoku were tied more closely than factions to specific socioeconomic and bureaucratic interests. Factions avoided involvement in
sectional disputes between zoku, since leaders were reluctant to offend
senior politicians who had strong connections to the bureaucracy and
interest groups (Iseri, 1988: 157–8).
Factions in Retreat
The break-up of the formerly hegemonic Takeshita faction in December
1992, combined with a wave of scandals, led to defections from the LDP
in June 1993. These paved the way for coalition governments, reform legislation, and party realignment. The LDP has nevertheless remained the preeminent Japanese party.
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The elimination of the multi-member district electoral system removed
one of the main causes of factionalism, and so the factions have eroded.
Faction leaders lost influence over the rank and file, who became less dependent on factions for endorsements and campaign support (Cox et al., 1999).
Without electoral competition from fellow party members, candidates could
postpone declaring their factional affiliation until after an election. Reduced
electoral discipline contributed to divisions in factions that yielded a total
of eight factions in early 2001.
The factions maintained their presence in the acquisition and distribution
of posts through the close of the century. Prime Ministers Hashimoto
Ryutaro, Obuchi Keizo, and Mori Yoshiro did not deviate noticeably from
the proportionality rule in selecting their cabinets (Park, 2001: 440–1).
More recently, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro has broken with this
practice, largely ignoring faction leaders’ preferences while making his selections for cabinet and party posts. The representation of the preponderant
Hashimoto faction was reduced to merely two portfolios in Koizumi’s
cabinets. The only other factions to receive more than a single portfolio in
his most recent cabinet (September 2003) were the Mori faction (the second
largest and Koizumi’s former faction) and the Eto-Kamei faction, each of
which received three.
Factions have continued to be significant actors in LDP presidential elections, but discipline has slackened and they no longer hold absolute control
over the outcomes. In the LDP’s April 2001 primary election, conducted by
the party’s prefectural chapters, Koizumi scored a surprising landslide
victory over Hashimoto, leader of the largest faction. Thus, the party recognized the wide gap in popularity between Koizumi and Hashimoto, who
had presided over the LDP’s 1998 upper-house loss. LDP Diet members saw
little alternative except to ratify this outcome. That the most powerful
faction could be defeated outright was unprecedented in LDP elections. On
the other hand, factions were not entirely irrelevant to the decision. Koizumi
received the backing of the Mori faction and a couple of small factions.
As of August 2003, the factional affiliation of almost every LDP Diet
member could still be identified. Apart from the factional splits of 1998,
substantial order was maintained in memberships. Fifty percent of incumbent, lower-house LDP politicians elected in 1996 continued with the same
faction (or largest remnant) after the 2000 election. If politicians who were
defeated or did not run are excluded, the figure exceeds 70 percent for
1996–2000.5 Thus the factions have been shaken up, but cannot yet be
described as fluid or chaotic.
DC Factions
Italian Christian Democratic factions, like LDP factions, can best be
described as factions of interest. These ‘crystallized’ groups (Sernini, 1966:
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46) carved out shares of state patronage to serve their own and their party’s
interests. They shared some resemblance, however, to factions of principle
and clienteles. With respect to motivation, DC factions identified themselves
along a left–right spectrum, justifying their alliances inside and outside the
party in ideological terms. Organizationally, their extensive regional
networks constituted a shifting, clientelistic base underlying a more clearly
defined factional superstructure. If one were to locate these factions on a
grid described by the axes in Figure 1, they would fall somewhere in the
‘factions of interest’ quadrant, near the intersection of the axes.
Fragmentation and Reaggregation
The DC factions were not very cohesive overall. Their total number grew
from 5 in 1964 to a peak of 12 in 1982. Twelve significant new factions were
formed between 1964 and 1989 through the division of older factions. At
least nine members of the DC’s National Council (and presumably some of
their followers) defected between factions over the same period (Democrazia
Cristiana, 1965–91).
Some leading politicians moved with a remarkable degree of freedom
within the party. To give one example, Vincenzo Scotti, a great opportunist,
earned the epithet ‘Tarzan’ for his ability to swing from faction to faction.
During his political career, Scotti travelled from the Forze Nuove faction
to Base, to the Andreotti faction, and back to Forze Nuove, before
founding a faction that became part of Azione Popolare (Panorama, 5
February 1989: 50).
Several factions were ruled for many years by a single national leader,
who relied on regional leaders for support. This was consistent with a clientelist model of organization. However, the faction leader was not wholly
indispensable. Factions on some occasions rebelled en masse, ousting the
leader and continuing under the leadership of another. In this way, insurrection in Iniziativa Democratica unseated Amintore Fanfani in 1959,
resulting in the birth of the Dorotei faction; and 23 years later most of
Nuove Cronache followed Arnaldo Forlani when he broke ranks with the
Fanfaniani.
The complexity of the DC’s factional configuration was most apparent in
the regional constellations of factions upon which the national factions
depended for congressional votes. It was not uncommon for local groups
identified with the same national faction or coalition to compete among
themselves, presenting divided lists in the regional congresses. Thus, in
many ways the national factions represented an amalgam of local factions,
which did not always duplicate national patterns. To cite an extreme
example, in 1982 nine separate factional lists were presented at the party’s
regional congress in Campania, and 12 lists in Veneto, but only 3 lists were
presented that year at the National Congress (Democrazia Cristiana, 1982).
This instability and fragmentation suggests weak development of the DC
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factions. Nevertheless, the factions also displayed a good deal of continuity. While their memberships did not stabilize as much as later LDP factions
did, the major factions (or key parts of those factions) endured for many
years. More so than individual factions, certain blocs of factions – especially
the Dorotei, the Fanfaniani/Forlaniani, and the left – retained relatively
stable levels of support. Defections from factions appear to have been the
exception rather than the rule. Many DC politicians were identified with a
particular faction for most of their career. In the 1980s, reaggregation
reversed years of fragmentation. The 12 factions in 1982 coalesced into 3
coalitions referred to as ‘super-factions’, and by 1989 the number of factions
was reduced to 5.
Each faction acquired a common identity and common resources. The
factions possessed well-developed organizational features, including: ‘formalized faction names, more or less distinct memberships, leadership cadres and
chains of command, faction headquarters, communications networks
including press organs, and faction finances’ (Belloni, 1978: 93). As of 1986,
the factions all had offices clustered in historic Rome (Panorama, 15 June
1986: 49–50). Meetings and conventions were held regularly at various
levels at least through the 1980s (L’Espresso, 19 February 1989: 8).
Patronage
Christian Democratic factions competed vigorously on behalf of their
members for seats in the cabinet and the party’s National Council. In 1964
the party instituted a proportionality rule for its internal elections, whereby
candidates were chosen from lists typically submitted by factions or coalitions of factions. From then on, the composition of the National Council
and Directorate faithfully reflected the factional composition of the party.
Furthermore, from 1968 all cabinets were formed in close accordance with
a proportionality formula that allocated posts to DC ministers and undersecretaries on the basis of their factional membership (Venditti, 1981). This
method of filling cabinet positions and party offices continued unbroken at
least through 1989 (Panorama, 15 June 1986: 50; L’Espresso, 19 February
1989: 8).
The factions also procured and distributed a much broader range of
patronage, including public jobs at all levels. They colonized the state
thoroughly and diverted its resources for their purposes, whereas in Japan
the public sector was smaller and the bureaucracy more autonomous. The
Italian regime was infamous for partitocrazia, a system in which political
parties held preponderance over all aspects of government and society. The
DC received the lion’s share of ministries, especially the most coveted ones
(for example, Agriculture, Post and Telecommunications, and State Holdings)
(Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 225–36).
The DC’s factions claimed most of the party’s share of the spoils for
themselves. In their quest for patronage, they evolved beyond primitive
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clientelistic networks. Starting in the 1950s, they depended less on local
notables and more on access to the state, coordinated and legitimated by
the party (Caciagli, 1977: 164–5; Graziano, 1980: 152–5). The Cassa per
il Mezzogiorno (Fund for the Development of Southern Italy), a major
agency for the redistribution of wealth to the South, was once described as
‘a fund of resonance with the needs of this or that faction of the majority
party’ (Tamburrano, 1974: 112). At the local level, from Palermo and
Naples to Genoa and the Veneto, DC factions divided up and governed
hospitals, welfare agencies, public utilities, credit agencies, housing and
construction agencies, chambers of commerce, cooperatives, industrial
associations, and professional associations (Caciagli, 1977: Ch. 6; Tamburrano, 1974: 111–16). Public entities proliferated to meet the expanding
needs of the DC and its factions.
Policy and Ideology
By the early 1950s, an ideological configuration was established in the DC,
consisting of two factions on the left of the party (Base and Forze Sociali)
and one on the right (Primavera), flanking a centrist majority led by Alcide
De Gasperi. Base and Forze Nuove (the successor to Forze Sociali)
represented the party’s left until the early 1980s. The right-wing Primavera
faction was absorbed into the centrist Dorotei faction in the 1960s. Other
factions are harder to place on an ideological spectrum, as they were generally more moderate and less consistent in their positions.
Ideology served a strategic function for factions, which outweighed its
significance for identity. A faction could leverage its proximity to another
party, or mediate between other factions. The opportunistic nature of
factional positioning is evident from the relative ease with which factions
shifted along a left–right continuum and changed coalition partners within
the party. The Fanfaniani (followers of Amintore Fanfani), for example,
traced their heritage back to followers of Giuseppe Dossetti on the left, but
in the campaign for the 1974 referendum on divorce they allied themselves
with conservatives. ‘The Fanfaniani have followed their leader’s trips to and
from the ends of the DC’s political spectrum, variously being labeled and
labeling themselves “left” and “right”’ (Zuckerman, 1979: 108). Likewise
Giulio Andreotti, who once led the conservative Primavera faction, shifted
to the left in the early 1980s and allied his faction with the leftist Area Zac.
For many years, leadership contests in the DC were structured by debates
over alliance strategy. Alternative formulas for alliances with other parties
were paralleled by alternative coalitions of factions vying for control of the
party. The Dorotei faction exemplified the connection between internal and
external alliance politics. It used its strategic position as moderator of the
center–left coalition formula, which brought the Socialists into the government, to dominate other factions. After the end of the center–left era in the
early 1970s, the Dorotei never found another formula to secure their
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position, and they fragmented. Attempting to continue mediating interests,
the successors of the faction became identified with nothing more than the
occupation of power (Follini, 1989). Doroteism became ‘indifferent to the
division of right and left so long as neither qualification placed in dispute
its domain of power’ (Orfei, 1976: 181).
Factions lost most of their policy identity as the DC’s alliance possibilities
were progressively exhausted. This was apparent in 1984 when Secretary
Ciriaco De Mita assembled a unitary list for the National Council, backed
by seven out of nine factions. L’Espresso reported (26 February 1984: 16):
The majority of the center-left and the minority of the center-right that
left the preceding congress [of 1982] have ceased to pursue different
strategic objectives and . . . have amalgamated. Today De Mita, the
victor of that time, and Arnaldo Forlani, his proud antagonist, are great
friends.
In 1986, a similar unitary list was presented, and De Mita was re-elected
without a challenger. The 1989 congress, at which De Mita was finally overthrown, was marked by intense bipolar conflict over the distribution of
power; however, the political strategy of the party was not debated (Il Sole
24 Ore, 18 February 1989).
The Collapse of Factions and the DC
Organized factions collapsed in 1992. The proportionality rule was no
longer applied mechanically after the April elections (Parker, 1996: 43), and
factional conventions planned for the autumn were cancelled. The factions
unravelled because of several factors, whose onset occurred in close succession. First, as the Communist Party came apart and the five-party coalition
formula became entrenched, factions lost some of their strategic raison
d’être. Second, conflict erupted between northern and southern parts of the
party, and this conflict was exacerbated by the rise of the Northern League
(Panorama, 28 June 1992: 56). Third, the 1991 referendum and 1993 electoral reforms removed one of the causes of factionalism by eliminating
preference voting, which had encouraged intra-party competition.
Fourth, a new party rule in June 1992 required cabinet ministers to relinquish their seats in parliament. This weakened the patronage links based on
the holding of cabinet posts. It also closed doors for some of the most electorally successful, rising leaders in the party, such as Roberto Formigoni,
Mino Martinazzoli, and Mario Segni (Panorama, 12 July 1992: 61). Finally,
many top DC politicians, including Forlani, Antonio Gava, and Andreotti,
were implicated and investigated as part of the Tangentopoli corruption
scandal or in connection with organized crime. Upon the sudden removal
of these leaders, the factions fell into turmoil.
The Christian Democratic Party disintegrated, spinning off members to
small successor parties which together accumulated less than 14 percent of
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the seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 1994. The new Italian parties each
have their share of internal divisions, but have not developed organized
factions of the Christian Democratic variety. One feature of the old system
that continues is the influence of inter-party competition on intra-party
politics. Alliance strategies have been the primary source of debate within
the Democrats of the left, the Communist Refoundation, and other parties.
Parties of the left and the right have had to balance their positions carefully
for fear of defections to the extremes or the center (Massari and Parker,
2000; Tarchi and Poli, 2000). Most ‘factions’ in such a fluid system are
unlikely to endure and develop. Changing relations among parties pull
intra-party groups in different directions, but it is difficult for any group to
establish a fixed ideological or strategic position. Similarly, while clientelism
has not been eliminated, it is difficult for any group to secure uninterrupted
control over state resources.
Conclusion
Factions in the LDP and the DC experienced shifts along the organizational
and motivational dimensions. From the 1950s to the 1980s, LDP factions
became larger and better organized. Organizational development promoted
the collective interests of faction members while subordinating policy
concerns. Factions became more sophisticated as they came to depend less
on their leaders, yet their activities were directed to a narrow range of goals:
maximizing the number of politicians elected to each faction and ensuring
that each member received a fair share of the spoils. The strength and
sophistication of the factions subsequently eroded.
The Christian Democratic factions also achieved an elevated degree of
organization, but cycled through fragmentation, reaggregation, and ultimate
collapse. Widespread clientelism, particularly at the local level, created instability. Nevertheless, faction leaders maintained broad organizations at the
national level and coordinated interests to ensure the flow of benefits to their
followers. Although factions staked out ideological positions for themselves,
ideology was increasingly subordinated to expediency. No longer debating
fundamental strategy, the factions and party leadership became entrenched
on the eve of collapse.
Although the trends were highly significant, overall these groups are best
classified as factions of interest, especially in the 1980s. The LDP factions
approximated the ideal type more closely than did the DC factions. Unlike
simple clienteles, the factions of interest could mobilize large numbers of
politicians for concerted action. And unlike factions of principle, factions of
interest could not exercise significant policy leadership, as they were
constrained by the interests of their membership and supporters. These cases
demonstrate that self-interested, non-ideological groups can achieve remarkable levels of organization. Organized factions need not have a common
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ideological identity or policy focus. In other words, factions of interest as I
have defined them represent a real, distinctive type of factionalism.
Organization does place constraints on the objectives factions may
pursue. While a faction’s members can to some extent pursue a mix of
different objectives, they are unlikely to mobilize as a unit for both policy
and patronage. A well-developed faction attracts and rewards members
with a unified system of incentives. It cannot make exceptions to its primary
goals without risking its organizational structure and members’ loyalty.
Thus, while organizational development is not associated solely with any
one type of motivation, it can accentuate the predominant motivation in a
group.
The specific characteristics of factions had implications for the evolution
of their parties. At times, factions permitted a degree of flexibility. Factionalism coexisted with seemingly perpetual dominance by the LDP and the
DC during an era of sweeping socio-economic transformation. But when
factions became almost exclusively motivated by patronage and their structures ossified, they compromised their parties’ adaptability. This was the
situation around 1990 when these dominant parties were about to rupture.
Much remains to be learned about the determinants of factional characteristics and reasons for factional change. Yet by recognizing appropriate
dimensions of factionalism, one can at least identify some of the possibilities
and limitations of factions in particular contexts. Eventually, as we learn
more about how factions and other internal groups evolve, we can hope to
better evaluate changes in the organization and behavior of parties as whole
entities.
Notes
I am grateful to the Japan Foundation for funding part of this research. I also thank
Richard S. Katz and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
1 For further discussion of the uses and connotations of ‘faction’, see Beller and
Belloni, 1978a, or Sartori, 1976: 3–13.
2 For a review of the causes of factionalism, see Bettcher, 2002: Ch. 2.
3 Clientelistic relationships exist between parties and interest groups, too, but
‘clientele’ in this typology does not refer to these relationships. See LaPalombara,
1964: 306–48.
4 Data on LDP faction memberships are taken from Watanabe for 1958 and from
Kokkai Binran (Tokyo: Nihon Seikei Shimbunsha) for subsequent years, with
reference to the Asahi Shimbun, Seiji Handobukku (Tokyo: Seiji Koho Senta), and
Sato and Matsuzaki (1986).
5 Kokkai Binran (August 2003): 430–3. Data for 1996–2000 are from Seiji
Handobukku.
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KIM ERIC BETTCHER received his PhD in political science from Johns Hopkins
University in 2002. He is currently a research associate at Harvard Business School.
His dissertation research explores the effects of factionalism on party change.
ADDRESS: Rock Center 107B, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, USA.
[email: [email protected]]
Paper submitted 3 January 2003; accepted for publication 5 April 2004.
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