‘Phase IV’ Operations in the War on Terror:
Comparing Iraq and Afghanistan
by Anthony N. Celso
Anthony N. Celso is an Associate Professor at Valley Forge Military Academy & College in
Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.
Abstract: This article identifies the obstacles and prospects of implementing
President Obama’s surge strategy in Afghanistan by examining four issues:
(1) the origins and implementation of the Iraq surge policy; (2) U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan; (3) a comparative examination of
Afghan and Iraqi tribal insurgent structures; and (4) suggestions for a counter
insurgency policy more in sync with regional social and tribal structures.
T
he Obama Administration’s December 2009 plan to send thirty thousand additional troops to Afghanistan has raised conflicting expectations and doubts that security in the country can improve. Regional in
scope, Obama’s so called Af-Pak policy envisions stronger Pakistani efforts to
fight the Taliban along the Northwest Frontier, a territory that is a support base
for the Afghan guerillas. Defeating a resurgent Taliban is critical given that
Islamic fundamentalism threatens to destabilize the region.
Based on the Iraq ‘‘surge,’’ Obama’s Af-Pak counterinsurgency policy
emphasizes protecting civilian populations. Clearing, holding and building
areas that had been under insurgent control defines much of the policy.
Enhanced force projection in Taliban strongholds of Kandahar and Helmond
Provinces aims at severing civilians from the insurgents; facilitating both
economic development and national reconciliation.
The Administration hopes that four more brigades fully deployed by
summer 2010 will turn the tide against a raging Taliban insurgency, forcing
‘‘moderate’’ and ‘‘reconcilable’’ elements among the Islamists to join the peace
process and integrate into the Afghan political process. Optimistic in scope, the
Administration expects that the security gains created by the Afghan ‘‘surge’’
can be the basis of a ‘‘conditions based’’ withdrawal that is planned to
commence in two years.
Borrowing from the Iraq Anbar Awakening Movement where Sunni
insurgents joined with American troops, the cooption of former insurgents and
their reintegration into Afghan security forces is one of the strategy’s priorities.
# 2010 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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Despite such hopes, successful implementation of an Afghan surge policy and
negotiated deals with combatants is unlikely. President Obama’s convoluted
December West Point speech announced both a surge of forces and a
projected timeline for phased withdrawal contrasts strikingly with the Bush
Administrations 2007 emphasis on victory in Iraq and a steadfast refusal to
announce future troop withdrawals.
Afghanistan’s tribal, economic and religious context has little in
common with Iraqi society. Iraq may not be a good test case for crafting a
Central Asian counterinsurgency policy. Obama’s policy, therefore, should be
more tuned to regional tribal configurations. This essay now addresses the
obstacles and implementation prospects of Obama’s surge strategy by examining four issues: (1) the origins and implementation of the Iraq surge policy;
(2) U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan; (3) a comparative
examination of Afghan and Iraqi tribal insurgent structures; and (4) suggestions for a counter insurgency policy more in sync with regional social and
tribal structures.
Iraq, The Surge and ‘Tactical-Military Success’
In 2006, Iraq was on the verge of civil war and some analysts
considered it a lost cause. Predicting sectarian regional wars, state collapse,
and terrorist sanctuaries, some called for U.S. disengagement and withdrawal.1
Repeated comparisons were made with Vietnam. Politically, all but the most
conservative and loyalist Bush Administration partisans believed the war was
‘‘lost.’’ Many Republicans had become openly critical of the war and what they
claimed to be mismanagement of the conflict. In short, the war had become
toxic.
The lack of security within Iraq was exacerbated by the Bush Administration’s disastrous postwar occupation policies. Insufficient troops and a
misguided dissolution of the Iraqi Army and state conjoined to fuel a Sunni
insurgency that morphed into a nihilistic al Qaeda suicidal bombing campaign
aimed at Shia civilians and religious centers. By late 2006, Iraq was on the
precipice of a sectarian civil war and state collapse.
Army and Marine counterinsurgency policy with its hunt and kill
operations, remote forward operating bases (FOBS), and poorly trained Iraqi
security forces aggravated the problem. By 2006, U.S. Marine intelligence
officials believed that the Sunni Triangle could not be pacified and was lost to
insurgent forces.
The 2006 Baker-Hamilton Iraq study group called for removing U.S.
combat forces by 2009 and expressed the conventional wisdom that the Iraq
1
James Dobsin, ‘‘Who lost Iraq’’ in Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007, pp. 61-75.
James Fearon; ‘‘Iraq’s Civil War’’ in Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007, pp. 2-15; Stephen Biddle,
‘‘Seeing Baghdad: Thinking Saigon’’ in Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, pp. 2-14.
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war was a costly failure. Rejecting disengagement, the Bush Administration
constructed a policy of strengthened American military commitment in Iraq.
Thomas Ricks argues the surge was crafted by critics within the U.S. military
who had reservations about the conduct of the war.2 Written by generals David
Petraeus and James Mattis, the Army-Marine field manual on counterinsurgency is a tacit repudiation of the 2003-2006 post war Iraq occupation
strategy.3
The document endorses clearing, holding and building areas formerly
bastions of the insurgency. Placing emphasis on protecting the civilian
population allows occupation forces better capabilities to isolate and neutralize insurgents. Greater security in towns and villages create the basis for
enhanced economic development, better governance, training of local security forces and national reconciliation. The manual was shaped by successful
counterinsurgency cases, including the U.S. military’s success in Iraqi towns
like Tal Afar and Ramadi; areas where increased troop strength, outreach to
former insurgents, greater respect for cultural norms and protection of civilian
population had produced greater stability. These towns would serve as the
precedent for the larger force projection of 30,000 troops contemplated by the
Bush Administration in its 2007 surge policy.
The surge received an impetus from scholar Frederick Kagan of the
American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC, who advocated a large force
to stabilize Baghdad, eventually spreading security gains to outlying areas.4
Aimed at protecting civilians, the application of a larger force was part of a
larger battle to win hearts and minds and was designed to give breathing space
to the central governments efforts at national reconciliation. Long a critic of
Secretary Rumsfeld’s light military footprint in Iraq and the Administrations’
policy of accelerated transition of security functions to Iraqi forces, John
McCain endorsed the Petraeus-Kagan initiative. Support for the surge and its
success may well have cost McCain the 2008 presidential election.
Implementing the surge strategy within the Beltway fell to NSC advisor
Steven Hadley, who pressed for a comprehensive change in the Administration’s Iraq policy. Faced with an al Qaeda-inspired wave of suicide bombings
of Shia mosques and the threat of a sectarian civil war, the Bush Administration
wanted to save its Iraq legacy. The Administration’s surge policy amounted to a
repudiation of its initial approach. The departure of Rumsfeld, the ascension of
‘‘realist’’ Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense and the elevation of General
Petraeus as commander of U.S. forces in Iraq put very human faces on the new
policy.
2
Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure
in Iraq, 2006-2008 (Penguin Press, New York: 2009).
3
David Petraeus and James Mattis, Counter Insurgency: FM3-24/MFM3-24 (Department of
the Army and Navy, Washington D.C.: 2006).
4
Federick Kagan, ‘‘Choosing Victory in Iraq: A Plan for Success (Phase I Report)’’ AEI at
http://wwwaei.org/paper/25396.html.
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Despite the grave insecurity that prompted the surge, there were some
signs that conditions were improving. The origins of Iraq’s enhanced security
predate the surge. By late 2006, the U.S. military alliance with tribal sheiks in Al
Anbar Province was beginning to bear fruit in the fight against al Qaeda.
John McCary’s study of the al Anbar Son’s of Iraq movement argues
that the Sunni insurgency began to weaken as early as late 2006.5 Threatened
by al Qaeda’s murderous suicidal bombing campaigns, its indiscriminate
killing of civilians and its efforts to destroy traditional lines of tribal authority
in al Anbar, the tribal sheiks entered into an alliance with U.S. forces. Arming
over a hundred thousand Sunni militia men tied to local sheiks is widely
credited with weakening al Qaeda and driving its remnants to Mosul and
Kirkuk. With the new strategy of local force projection, security began to
improve dramatically. U.S. troops and Iraq civilians killed by insurgents (while
spiking at the beginning of the surge) began to decline throughout 2007-2008.6
Anbar would move from the most dangerous Iraqi province to one of the safest
by early 2009.
Vivid testimony to the success of the Petraeus mantra of ‘‘clear,’’ ‘‘hold’’
and ‘‘build’’ was the stabilization of Iraq’s central government and the emergence of Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki as a respected and popular leader. His
status was underscored by the successful military campaign against radical al
Badar Shi’ite militias in Basra in 2008, the weakening of anti U.S. Shia forces
tied to Iran, and 2009 local elections that strengthened Malaki’s pro
U.S. political bloc.7
The growth of Iraqi security forces, the purging of sectarian elements
from the police and the transfer of provincial authority throughout Iraq
provides a comprehensive picture of relative success. Critics of the Iraq
war are increasingly united in at least granting that the surge has, at a
minimum, been a tactical military success.8 While tenuous and reversible,
the surge has taken hold and has given the Iraqi government the ability to
resolve contentious issues like provincial distribution of oil wealth, the
incorporation of Sunni militias into security forces, and easing Kurdish and
Sunni tensions over Kirkuk. Failure to resolve these problems could unleash a
new spiral of violence that could break the country apart.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from major towns and cities in June of
2009 is testing the mettle of Iraqi security forces that face multiple threats from
al Qaeda, and recalcitrant Sunni and Shi’ite insurgents. The Obama Administrations policy of removing U.S. combat forces at the end of 2010 from Iraq
5
John McCary, ‘‘The Anbar Awakening Movement: An Alliance for Incentives’’ in Washington
Quarterly, January 2009, pp. 43-59.
6
Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and End Game in Iraq (New York: Penguin
Press, 2009).
7
Reid Smith, ‘‘Iraq: Provincial Election Report’’ in FPRI (Feb 2009) at http://wwwfpri.org/
200902smith.iraqprovelecthtml.
8
Ricks, The Gamble.
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and its commitment to ramp up its force projection in Afghanistan ends one era
and begins a new test case for U.S. counterinsurgency policy. The decision to
increase U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan and the emphasis on a dialogue
with Taliban ‘‘moderates’’ is explicitly modeled after Iraq’s successful 2007
policy.9 Today’s Afghanistan has some ominous parallels with 2006 Iraq. It is to
the origins of post 2001 Afghan instability and the failure of U.S. counter
insurgency efforts that we now turn.
Obama and ‘Real’ Terror War in Afghanistan
The Obama Administration’s surge policy is fraught with irony. As a
prominent Iraq war critic, Obama opposed the war and most particularly the
surge in Iraq. His criticism of General Petraeus’ testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee was quite hostile. Obama would go on to make
opposition to the Iraq war a central pillar of his successful 2008 presidential
bid.
Once in power, Obama relaxed his timetable for Iraqi disengagement
and made Afghanistan his central foreign policy priority. The surge’s success in
Iraq seems to suggest that an Afghan version can be successful. Obama’s policy
speaks volumes about the failure of counterinsurgency policy since the
Taliban’s 2001 fall. After an innovative military campaign marked by special
force operations, local proxy militias and targeted air strikes, the Taliban and
their al Qaeda allies were defeated and would not recover until years later. By
early 2002 a national reconciliation government stretching across tribal lines,
led by anti-Taliban Pashtun Hamid Karzai, had been established by international coalition forces.
The promise of Afghan reconstruction and defeat of the Taliban
subsequently gave way to despair and chronic instability. The light American
military presence and the over reliance on proxy forces tied to tribal war lords
came at a heavy price.10 Critics argued that General Tommy Frank’s unwillingness to deploy substantial forces at the outset of the campaign allowed key
al Qaeda and Taliban leaders to escape.
Precious military and intelligence assets were diverted to Iraq in 2002
and Afghan reconstruction floundered as international aid donors failed to
meet their obligations.11 The effect of too few troops, lagging economic
9
Barnet Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, ‘‘From Great Game to Grand Compromise’’ in Foreign
Affairs, November/December 2008, pp. 30-44; Barnett Rubin, ‘‘Saving Afghanistan’’ in Foreign
Affairs, January/February 2007), pp. 57-78.
10
Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: U.S. and the Failure of Nation Building in Afghanistan
and Central Asia (Viking Press, New York: 2008).
11
Ashaf Ghani and Claire Lockheart, Fixing Failed States: Framework for Rebuilding a
Fractured World (Oxford University Press: New York, 2008); Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror:
How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2009).
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development, rampant corruption and poorly trained security forces led to a
resurgence of the Taliban.
Equally damaging for Afghan stability was Bush’s support for the
Pakistani government.12 Having financed and provided military support for
the Taliban, Pakistani strategic interest is in a weak Afghanistan. Pakistan’s
powerful Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI) has substantial links with
Taliban and Kashmiri Islamists. Faced with American military retaliation, Pakistani President Musharraf changed course and joined coalition efforts to destroy
the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda. Musharraf’s agreement with the Bush
Administration came with some severe caveats. With Bush’s assent, Pakistan
would only target al Qaeda and not its Pakistani Taliban and Kashmiri allies.
The subordination of U.S. interests to those of Pakistan reached an
absurd point during the Afghan war when U.S. forces ceased attacks on the
Taliban in Kunduz to permit the withdrawal of thousands of Pakistani ISI and
military personnel who had been assisting the Islamists. This Pakistani retreat,
moreover, was not well supervised by U.S. forces and may have permitted the
escape of key Taliban commanders.
While the Bush-Musharraf alliance paid initial dividends with the
capture of al Qaeda leaders—such as 9/11 masterminds Kalid Sheik Mohammad and Ramzi Binalshibh—by 2006, the utility of Pakistani cooperation in the
war on terror began to decline. After some military campaigns against Taliban
forces in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan
border, repeated peace deals with the Taliban led to the resurgence of radical
Islamists. The emergence of Islamist war lords like the late Baitullah Meshud in
Waziristan created an ample supply network and fighters for the Afghan
Taliban. Meshud’s movement, moreover, has gone international and has been
linked to failed 2008 terror plots to attack Spain and Holland.
ISI support for the Taliban and Islamist loyalties in the Pakistani army
have hampered U.S. efforts to capture and kill key al Qaeda leaders. It is quite
telling that, despite tens of billions of dollars in U.S. aid since 9/11, Pakistan still
deploys 80 percent of its military assets along the Kashmir border to counter
India.13 Pakistan’s fight against the Taliban has been characterized by sporadic
military campaigns followed by truces and amnesty. Increasing Taliban power
in Pakistan and the positioning of its forces in areas only a hundred miles from
Islamabad raises concerns of an Islamist seizure of power and control over
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The Government’s military campaign to root out
insurgent elements in the Swat Valley has raised hope that Pakistan is finally
getting serious about its fight with the Islamists. However, such hopes do not
necessarily reflect the real strategic interests of the army and the ISI, which
remain fearful of Indian influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
12
Vinni Capelli, ‘‘Containing Pakistan: Raja Mandala in South Central Asia’’ in Orbis, Winter
2007, 1, pp. 55-70.
13
Rashid, Descent Into Chaos.
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While the Pakistani military may act against the Islamists like Baitullah
Meshud who threaten the central government, it is unlikely to move against the
Pakistani Taliban and their Pashtun Afghan proxies. Similarly, Pakistani
intelligence information assisting U.S. Predator drone air strikes have targeted
only al Qaeda or Taliban warlords who challenge Islamabad’s authority.
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban North West Frontier sanctuary has been
critical in the renaissance of the Afghan Taliban insurgency. Coalition forces
have not been permitted to operate in Pakistani territory and have been
repeatedly stymied in their attempts to stem the flow of Pakistani weapons,
money and support for the Taliban.
U.S. and coalitional counterinsurgency efforts have floundered in
Afghanistan. Relying principally on hunt and kill operations and indiscriminate
airpower, large numbers of Afghan civilians have died in coalition operations.
Chronic under-funding of Afghan reconstruction and unwillingness of European allies to commit to combat operations against the Taliban have
worsened security.14 The training of the Afghan national army and police
has been slow and often ineffective.15 Afghans are increasingly resentful of the
coalition and the Taliban now reportedly constitutes a presence in 50 percent
of the country, mounting intimidation campaigns against the civilian population.16 Meager international commitment, weak Pakistani military operations,
and a resurgent Afghan and Pakistan Taliban have created a depressing
security situation in Afghanistan. Insurgent attacks employing suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices and ambushes have increased coalition
forces and Afghan civilian fatalities.
Since 2002, the drug trade has skyrocketed, enriching the financial
coffers of the Taliban. In Helmand Province, long a Pashtun Taliban stronghold,
opium production has reached record levels. Past opium crop eradication efforts
have alienated key segments of the populace, thereby threatening to increase
support for the Taliban. A coalition defeat in Afghanistan would threaten to turn
the country into a terror sanctuary that could be a launching pad for the next 9/
11. Given the similarities between Iraq in 2006 and Afghanistan in 2010, the
Obama Administration has hedged its bet on the Petraeus doctrine of protecting
the civilian population through a policy of clearing insurgents, holding villages,
and rebuilding the social-economic and political foundations.
The Administration, moreover, wants to negotiate and re-integrate
insurgent forces (e.g., ‘‘moderate’’ Taliban) in an Afghan version of the Anbar
Awakening movement. Successful negotiation with insurgents may turn on the
tribal peculiarities and religious orientations of Afghan Pashtuns, who differ
14
Gregg Mills, ‘‘Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments for Afghanistan’’ FPRI (June 2007)
at http://fpri.org/events2007ul/.millsafghanistancounterinsurgency.html.
15
Andrew Legion, ‘‘Ineffective, Unprofessional and Corrupt: Afghan National Police Challenge’’ in FPRI (June 2009) http://wwwfpri.org/events/2007ul/.millsagfghannationalpolice.html.
16
Peters, Seeds of Terror.
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dramatically from the relatively homogeneous and secular Sunni Anbar tribes.
The Pakistani experience with amnesty and truces with the Pashtun Taliban
cast doubt on the efficacy of this approach.
The Vexing Issue of Afghan Tribalism: A Comparative Analysis with
Iraq’s Anbar Experience
Counterinsurgency success in Iraq has been most dramatic in the
Anbar region, which only a few years ago was the most violent province in the
country. Ambassador Paul Bremer’s decision to disband the Sunni-dominated
army and state structure, sparked an insurgency that soon morphed into al
Qaeda suicide bombing campaign aimed at the Shia population.
Iraqi Sunni insurgents constituted a coalition of Baathist supporters,
tribal sheiks and international jihadists. Tribal sheiks in Anbar had joined with
al Qaeda to defeat U.S. occupation forces, because coalitional authorities had
tried to usurp their power base.17 As the insurgency evolved, power struggles
between the insurgents intensified.
The conflict between al Qaeda and Sunni sheiks to control Anbar
reached a tipping point in 2006. Horrified by the terror organization’s undermining of tribal authority, sheiks began to mull the possibility of an alliance
with U.S. forces. The Islamists’ seizure of towns, their killing of tribal sheiks,
their attempts to impose Islamic law, and their nihilistic violence soon became
too much for the Anbar Sunni sheiks to bear, and by late 2006 they were ready
to reach out to the U.S. military to reverse al Qaeda’s grip over the region.
America’s ability to consolidate tribal authority was facilitated by
Anbar’s sectarian homogeneity, secular attitudes and intra-tribal loyalty.
U.S. military’s financing of Sunni paramilitary forces (the Sons of Iraq Movement) employed over a hundred thousand tribal fighters anxious to preserve
traditional lines of authority. These fighters become the eyes and ears of U.S.
forces allowing for more targeted raids against al Qaeda insurgents and
affiliates.
Al Qaeda became a victim of its own extremism. Faced with a hostile
population and effective attacks against their operations, the terror organization fled to the sectarian mixed northern cities like Mosul and Kirkuk.18 The
threat to Iraq posed by al Qaeda has now been greatly diminished, but the
terror organization still remains a danger to Iraq stability, especially in the
North where ethnic passions create a breeding ground for terrorist violence.
Given the effectiveness of the U.S. military in aligning Iraqi insurgents
against extremists, what are the implications for the fight against the Taliban in
Afghanistan? One way to envision the obstacles confronting U.S. forces in
17
18
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McCary, ‘‘The Anbar Awakening Movement.’’
West, The Strongest Tribe.
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Figure 1. Tribal Diversity and Loyalty Patterns Intra Tribal
Homogeneity/Heterogeneity
Afghanistan is to compare the intensity of tribal loyalty with the degree of intra
group homogeneity and what these links imply for successful negotiation with
insurgents. Figure 1 (illustrated above) identifies these intersections.
As the matrix indicates Cell A (Sunni Anbar Tribes) and Cell D (Afghan
and Pakistani Pashtuns) are diametric opposites. Pashtun tribal structures are
diverse, fractured and characterized by low levels of leadership fidelity, where
Sunni Sheikdoms are unitary and loyal to sheiks.19 The Pashtuns, moreover,
lack the secular, pragmatic orientation of the Anbar sheiks that had facilitated
its alienation with al Qaeda.
The lack of homogeneity among Pashtuns and the paucity of tribal
loyalty complicate the ability of coalitional forces to convert insurgent forces in
Afghanistan. Pashtun tribes are split into five different confederations, some of
whom are hostile to each other.
The Durrani confederation has frequently fought over territory and
trade issues with the fundamentalist Ghilizai. The segmented nature of the
Pahstuns with their rampant localism is likely to confound even the most
sophisticated effort to lure them from the battlefield.
Fidelity to leaders, moreover, is at best transitory and highly volatile.
Power struggles within clans are highly bloody, with little stable leadership
emerging. Pashtun infidelity contrasts strikingly with the Anbar militiamen’s
commitment to their sheiks. In addition, the Pashtuns lack the cosmopolitan
secular pragmatism of the Iraqi Sunnis.
The religious fundamentalism of Pashtun Taliban supporters suggests
that it would be difficult for the Afghan insurgents to reconcile themselves to a
central government. Taliban religious identity was defined by its training in
19
Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason, ‘‘Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in
Afghanistan’’ in Orbis, Winter 2007, pp. 71-99; John McCary, ibid.
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Pakistani madrassas. Often dominated by radical Saudi trained and financed
clerics, these religious schools indoctrinated millions of Afghan refugees
during the Soviet occupation.
Ahmed Rashid argues that fundamentalist Afghan Deobandism and
radical Saudi Wahhabism mix quite well, forming the basis of the Taliban’s
ideology.20 Emerging from Pakistani refugee camps as committed fundamentalists, their seizure of power in 1996 resulted in the most xenophobic and
ideological regime since the Khmer Rouge. Breaking the grip of an ideology
combining nationalist xenophobia and religious fanaticism is likely to be
difficult, if not impossible. Pakistani experience in negotiating with the Taliban
is far from encouraging. The Taliban has repeatedly violated its deals with
Islamabad in the North West Frontier Territories. Such agreements have been
linked with the growth of a terror structure that has aligned with and provided
sanctuary to al Qaeda and its affiliates.
The conflict in Swat Valley—where Pakistan conceded to Taliban
demands for the imposition of Shariah law—was used by militants to expand
their power base to adjacent areas. Faced with a growing Islamist threat only
100 miles from the capital, Pakistan was forced to move against the Taliban.
The military offensive against the Taliban in the Swat Valley (more comprehensive than past efforts) speaks volumes about the futility of negotiating with
the Taliban.
Afghan Pashtuns can also not be lured into an alliance by a common
external enemy. The Sons of Iraq Movement, ironically, was forged by a fear of
the Shia dominated central government, and by U.S. efforts, to create a Sunni
military force as a counter weight to Iranian influence in Baghdad. This unity of
interests is currently lacking in Afghanistan.
Today U.S. forces confront numerous obstacles and are constrained by
limited strategic options. For instance, although the coalition could forge a
patchwork of anti-Pashtun tribes similar to the anti-Syrian Sunni and Christian
militias in Lebanon, who find themselves opposing Pro Syrian Christian and
Shi’ite groups (Cell B), such an anti-Pashtun alliance would complicate
Washington’s relationship with Islamabad, and threaten to intensify the
Taliban insurgency on both sides of the border.
Similarly, it is not a viable option to allow for economic development
to take hold to weaken tribal loyalty and increase secular attitudes (Cell C). The
lack of security in Afghanistan undercuts the modernizing effect of prosperity,
which has weakened tribal loyalties in South Africa. Unless the insurgency is
defeated, insecurity will militate against economic development as the basis
for national reconciliation.
Faced with a diverse and recalcitrant Taliban, coalition negotiation
efforts are likely to have limited success. One possible fruitful option would be
to pursue a divide and conquer strategy among the Pashtuns. The sheer
20
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Rashid, Descent Into Chaos.
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diversity of Pashtun tribal confederations (some of whom are opposed to the
Taliban) may give the coalition an opening.
The Pakistani experience, oddly enough, provides evidence of some
Pashtun hostility toward the Taliban. Various tribes have risen against the
Taliban in the North West Frontier. Some Pakistani tribal warlords are chafing
at the Islamic militancy of the Taliban and their attacks against tribal hierarchies
and commercial activities.
The evolving civil war in the Pashtun community could allow for
coalition inroads among anti-Taliban Pashtun. This is especially important in
areas like Waziristan, where al Qaeda’s logistical and military structure took
root after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Military support to friendly local forces
would facilitate the hunt for al Qaeda leaders such as Bin Laden and Zawahiri
who so far have evaded U.S. forces.
Such a development, moreover, would reduce Washington’s dependence on Islamabad whose fight against extremist forces has been half
hearted. The Pakistani military and intelligence apparatus has never cut its
ties to the Taliban and its strategic interest in countering Indian influence in
Afghanistan and Kashmir make such a severing unlikely. The Taliban-al Qaeda
network in Northwest Waziristan continues unabated by Pakistani efforts.
Given both the intractability of the Taliban and the weak Pakistani efforts to
counter extremism, what then should be our Af-Pak policy?
Conclusion: Designing a Realist Counterinsurgency Policy in
Afghanistan
President Obama’s Af-Pak strategy is unlikely to reverse the region’s
deteriorating security. The success of the policy in Iraq depended on a
homogeneous tribal system characterized by loyalty to sheiks and chiefdoms,
which has no counterpart in Afghanistan where the Pashtun are split into five
different confederations. The Pashtun confederations, moreover, are characterized by intense infighting, leadership volatility and historic rivalries.
The dominance of fundamentalists groups within the Taliban
(especially Mullah Omar’s faction based in Quetta and the Haqqani Host
network operating along the border) militates against insurgent cooption. Much
of the current fascination with flipping the insurgency to our side is based on an
illusive quest for ‘‘moderate’’ Taliban and criminal elements amenable to
negotiation.21 This quest for moderate Taliban has proven illusive, as illustrated
by the Pakistani experience in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, where
truces have been repeatedly violated. The Obama Administration’s projected
‘‘conditions based’’ withdrawal starting in 2011 similarly demonstrates a lack of
21
Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, ‘‘Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan’’ in
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009, pp. 34-45.
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resolve that is likely to embolden the Taliban’s efforts to resist national reconciliation talks.
Flipping much of the insurgency to our side is not a realistic option.
The Administration’s dependence on Pakistani cooperation in the fight against
Islamic militants is equally problematic. Pakistan’s fight against the Taliban has
been marred by pro-Islamist forces in the army and the ISI, and the religious
militancy of Pakistan’s pro Taliban Pashtun allies. Obama’s strategy of continued support for Pakistan (albeit with more stringent conditions) compounds past mistakes.
The plan’s focus on counter narcotics is also counterproductive. Since
the 2001 invasion, opium production has skyrocketed and poppy cultivation in
Helmand province has enriched the financial coffers of the Taliban. The
criminal smuggling network along the border has been a key component
in the Taliban resurgence.
Past efforts to break the nexus between drugs and terrorist finance
has led to crop eradication programs that alienated rural farmers leading them
to support the Taliban. The recent decision to abandon this strategy is an
improvement, but the alternative offered is potentially dangerous.
Obama’s current strategy plans to use military force to destroy laboratories, drug convoys and distribution networks. Some 50 major drug traffickers
are to be targeted by U.S. and Afghan security forces to be either captured or
killed. Given the role of prominent warlords in poppy cultivation and heroin
production, such a strategy threatens to enlarge the insurgency. Such an antidrug strategy risks even alienating anti-Pashtun war lords with substantial ties
to the central government.
Expanding crop substitution programs is also unlikely to reverse the
vast expansion in opium. There are no crops capable of luring Afghan farmers
away from poppy cultivation. The financial remuneration associated with
wheat, vegetables and fruits are insufficient to compensate farmers for lost
income.
Washington needs to rethink its strategy on drug cultivation in Afghanistan. Commercializing opium production into medicines has viable antecedents. In the 1970s, Turkey and the United States converted poppy
cultivation into codeine.22 The surplus crop not used for medical purposes
was purchased by the Turkish government, underwritten by Washington, and
subsequently destroyed.
This arrangement has endured for over thirty years with the U.S.
foreign aid assisting Turkish conversion of opium into medicines. Turkey’s
poppy licensing system has reduced the power of criminal gangs and helped
22
Jerrit Kamminga, ‘‘The Political History of Turkey’s Opium Licensing System for the
Production of Medicines’’ Sencis Council: Development and Security Group (May 2006) at
http://wwwpoppyformedicine.net/doc/Political_History_Poppy_Licensing_Turkey_May-2006.
html.
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farmers preserve income. Commercializing the opium market in Afghanistan
could make a substantial contribution to abating the insurgency and assisting
Anti-Taliban forces, while denying the Islamists a valuable source of income.
Licenses to cultivate poppies would create a coalition of farmers,
merchants and warlords tied to Kabul and potentially wean farmers away
from the Taliban. Such a policy mimics America’s utilization of government
patronage in Anbar where loyal tribal sheiks were granted government
contracts, preserving traditional lines of authority and patronage. This is
especially critical in Helmand Province, a Taliban stronghold that accounts
for most of Afghanistan’s poppy crop. The predominance of the Taliban
among Ghilizi Pashtuns means that other Pashtun federations could be
targeted for economic assistance. Commercializing the poppy trade, distributing commercial licenses and funneling government contracts through antiTaliban tribal leaders combined with enhanced force projection could facilitate security and economic development.
The expansion of U.S. and British forces in Helmand and Kandahar
Provinces in order to clear this area of insurgent activity is necessary to prevent
Taliban intimidation of the civilian population. Increased force projection and
sustained local economic development based on poppy trade have some
potential to reverse the recent gains of the Taliban. Without a sustained
commercial economy, the Administration’s military strategy of securing road
and trade networks linking Kandahar with key towns in Helmand and
eventually to the Pakistani border is likely to fail.
By dividing the Pashtun and isolating the fundamentalist Ghilizi
confederation, coalition forces could mount more targeted raids to capture
and kill extremists. Such measures, however, will flounder unless Washington
begins to rethink its strategic relationship with Islamabad.
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban along the border is consistent with its
strategic aim of weakening Indian influence in Afghanistan. FATA provides a
critical support network for the Taliban insurgency. No amount of money or
coaxing from Washington is likely to change this situation. The continued
fixation with altering Pakistani behavior is as fanciful as luring ‘‘moderate’’
Taliban into national reconciliation talks.
Greater cooperation with India, Russia, Central Asian Republics, and
Iran is critical.
Sunni Islamic militants threaten security in these countries, the strategic
interests of which lie in cooperating with United States. Alliances with these
countries give us greater access to alternative supply routes, bases, valuable
intelligence and less dependence on Islamabad.
U.S. forces should support anti-Taliban groups operating in Pakistan.
Taliban attacks against tribal hierarchies are encountering resistance across
Pakistan. Military and financial support for these groups offers us the best hope
of killing or capturing Bin Laden, Mullah Omar and Zawahiri and effectively
diminishes our reliance on an untrustworthy ISI and Pakistani military.
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Friendly forces along the frontier will allow for better coordination of
air strikes from unmanned Predator drones that have exacted a substantial toll
on al Qaeda and Taliban militants in the last two years. This is especially critical
given the current strategy’s redeployment of U.S. and international forces away
from frontier outposts and toward major population centers. Unless Washington changes its Pakistan alliance and drug cultivation stance and begins arming
anti-Taliban Pashtuns, and other local militias, it is unlikely to
achieve its strategic objectives of destroying the Taliban insurgency
and promoting national reconciliation.
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