Representation of People’s
Foreign Policy Orientations
in the Public Communication
of Ukrainian Power Elites
Oleh Ivanov
National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
Abstract:
The article presents the preconditions and empirical limitations
for implementation of ideal-type deliberative democratic decision making in foreign relations
sphere which exist in Ukraine. Communicative representation theory explains the stability of the
Ukrainian public system in the foreign policy dimension (Ukraine-Russia relations case) through
the functionality of foreign policy determined by elites, social tension and conflict of orientations
in the transformation period. Politicians’ communication is generalized through media-strategies:
the hidden (nomenclatura-styled), ambivalent, and confrontational. A computer algorithm for
structural and morphological analysis of large amounts of text data (Ukrainian and Russian messages on official web-sites) created. Text corpuses are transformed into the semantic network of
an issue, combined with all of the attributes which an analyst may be interested in (time, place,
author, potential audience, etc.). For the analysis of large number (hundreds) of surveys with
different sample size and different wording of questions the technique of thematic clustering of
questions with the use of content analysis applied.
Keywords:
representation, communication, power elite, international relations, Ukraine, Russia,
political orientations.
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
Introduction
Ukraine is one of the central powers in the
post-Soviet area due to many reasons, which
can be combined under general conception of “transboundary” or “cleft” country
(Huntington, 1993). West-East communication
in a broad sense is going through Ukrainian
territory. Main energy corridors – gas and oil
pipes, airways, as well as informational and
cultural exchange are among examples of this
communication.
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and
the start of the military conflict in Donbas
region, the transboundary role of Ukraine
transformed into the frontier of European
security zone (Blockmans, 2015). Therefore,
the strengthening of Ukraine is not the sole
interest of its people, but also among key preconditions of European Union even existence
(Snyder, 2015).
“Strengthening” for transition state means
not only the development of the military, but
also the acceleration of modern European
democratic structures formation and consolidation of the socio-political system of Ukraine.
Studying of democracy in Ukraine and social
mechanisms of its functioning requires the
development of indicators of implementation of citizens will by the power elites, i.e the
level of publics-elites consolidation. Without
conceptual and especially methodological
tools for studying of representative democracy
in Ukraine, we have to rely on expert estimates
and statements of political leaders about the
quality of people’s representation. Modern
representative democracy crisis (Piattoni,
2013; Poguntke, Roßteutscher, Schmitt-Beck, &
Zmerli, 2015) requires theoretical and empirical reconsideration of political representation
itself.
Among the key obstacle of society consolidation towards democratic reforming is
the inefficiency of public communications
(Журба & Андрусів, 2015) which leads to the
impossibility of making consensus decisions
involving power elites, experts, and the public.
For instance, Kyiv International Institute of
Sociology study shows that publics tend to
exaggerate the scale of corruption mainly
due to its representation in media, but not
due to their own experience (КМІС, 2016, pp.
27–63). The scholar and analytical problem in
this area is the lack of knowledge about the
mechanisms of representation in the public
discourse of politics, lack of reliable tools for
measuring the level of representation and integrated operating model of communication
links between the subjects of social and political processes in the framework of representative democracy.
The sharpest and the most manipulative is
socio-political discourse around issues which
divide society into groups which are comparable in size but opposite in views. Since 1994
presidential elections in Ukraine foreign policy
vector became such an issue. Leading candidates started to manipulate through pro-/antiRussian sentiments (Birch, 1995). This political
technology has been used in each campaign
for more than a decade already (Frye, 2015;
Хмелько, 2006).
Taking all these arguments altogether, we
think that studying of the representation of citizens’ foreign policy orientations by Ukrainian
power elites is timely and relevant for government communication policy development.
Our study based on tools developed and data
gathered during our Ph.D. thesis study (Іванов,
2012) as well as new data collected for the
period after the Euromaidan revolution.
The main goal of our study is to explore the
peculiarities and dynamics of representation
of foreign policy preferences of the general
public and particular electoral groups in public
communication of power elites in Ukraine.
We will reach that goal through the following steps:
15
1. show the explanatory power of social representation theories for the study of political representation in transitional society;
2. consider political communication as
a unifying mechanism of social systems of
modern societies and exemine the suitability of communication paradigm of
representation for the study of democratic
development;
3.propose the conceptual model of communicative representation in foreign policy
domain;
4. propose a quantitative method of comparative analysis of aggregated Ukrainian
survey data and public communication
of power elites data coded via computeraided content analysis tools;
5.compare Yushchenko’s presidency period
and after Euromaidan period using methodology developed by the author.
Theoretical background and
conceptual model of representation
via communication
The topic of political representation is quite
broad and connected with several spheres of
social research (see the diagram below).
Scheme 1. Theoretical prerequisites for studying political representation
Source: Ivanov (2011)
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
First of all, if we talk about representation
we have to address the general theory of
social representation. The study of the various
types of representations at the highest level –
in culture and society – traditionally associated with Durkheim’s concept of “collective
representations” (Дюркгейм, 1996, pp. 6–74)
. The largest contribution to the study of this
phenomenon has made by the French School
of Sociology and one its leading representatives Serge Moscovici. It was he who used the
term “social representation ” for the first time
in 1961 to study the perception and use of
ideas of psychoanalysis in France in sense of
collective “processing ” of social object by the
community in order to improve behavior and
communication (Moscovici, 1963). Moscovici
defined social representations as system of
values, ideas, and practices with a twofold function; first, to establish an order which will enable
individuals to orient themselves in their material
and social world and to master it; and secondly
to enable communication to take place among
the members of a community by providing them
with a code for social exchange and a code for
naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual
and group history (Moscovici, 1973, pp. ix-xiv).
Moskovici, unlike Durkheim, understood
representation as an active process, not just as
the display and reproduction of some external
reality. There is a symbolic space of development and coordination of the various versions
of representations because all people have the
opportunity to creatively change the way of
representation so that every person is a social
agent in this process. He recognizes the possible coexistence of competing, sometimes
entirely mutually exclusive versions of the
perception of reality as part of the same community and culture (Howarth, Foster, & Dorrer,
2004). His follower Sandra Jovchelovitch
proposes to consider social representation as
a space that connects individuals and society,
as well as object and subject of the action
into the one system, and as rooted in areas of
origin (Jovchelovitch, 1996).
Martin Bauer and George Gaskell (1999)
offered to formalize social representations
in a model consisting of three components:
subjects – bearers of social representations
(for instance, experts, journalists, politicians
or other people’s representatives); objects,
actions or ideas that are represented (for instance, government policy attitudes); projectimage of the social group for which social
representation matters (for instance, groups of
interest, electoral groups, etc.). This conceptualization is called “Toblerone model” of social
representations – from the name of Swiss
chocolate “Toblerone”, which has an elongated
triangular-pyramidal shape. Let us keep these
three components in mind as we will use them
in our model of communicative representation.
Political representations are of doubly
complex nature, as they are related to issues of
power, democracy, elites. Studying representation in political sphere presumes following
the framework of delegation and functioning
of citizens’ representatives. As a sacred legal
concept (Гадамер, 1988) representation is
authorized representation. In the analysis of
representations in political sphere, two general approaches could be distinguished: delegative and representative. Within delegative
approach the main carrier of power is a social
group which delegates their representatives,
therefore, the actions of the latter should
always be guided by the position of those
who nominated them. The elected persons
cannot develop their own policy, but should
only meet the desires of the electorate. Such
an approach is closer to the American political
tradition in which the greatest possible control
over the public authorities is the part of liberal
rights and freedoms guarantees (Hamilton,
Madison, Jay, & Goldman, 2008). A representative approach presumes that voters give all
17
the power to those who represent them.
Politicians decide what actions they can do for
the benefits of the represented social groups.
This approach is typical for European political
tradition in which the effectiveness and the
power of the ruling elite take precedence over
the individualistic vision of human freedom.
Within those two general approaches, Pitkin
(1967) proposed to classify four types of political representations theories:
▶▶ formalistic (or institutional) – the key mechanism is the rotation of representatives;
▶▶ symbolic (representative, as a symbolic
embodiment represented);
▶▶ descriptive theories consider the degree of
objective similarity between a representative and represented: similar social background, physical appearance etc.;
▶▶ substantive theories are about actions of
representatives and how they meet the
interests of the represented.
Still all formal-legal approaches do not
consider the ability of politicians to respond
to public opinion fluctuations. This problem
was initially approached in theories of politics
as a vocation. Max Weber (1919) distinguishes
political (focused on electoral preferences) and
bureaucratic (linked to standards and development of tactical solutions) types of governing. This theory was empirically verified in
a study by Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, Bert
Rockman (1981), in which it was found that hybrid forms of government exist, and “creative
dialogue ” between elites of various types are
presented as a condition for good governance.
In this context, specific areas of policy (e.g.
international relations) and transitional societies were not studied. In electoral democracies,
which are characterized by the compliance
with the minimum standards of government
representatives’ elections, political communication is of special importance. Therefore,
the theory of political representation in the
context of the Ukrainian political system can
be meaningfully verified only in a study of
specific areas of policy, communication and
interaction between the publics and elites.
How do we assess political communication
potential for the democracy development
and political system consolidation? In terms
of the theory of communicative action and
deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1987)
communication is a factor of social solidarity and democratic decision-making, if it is
rational, and if there is a culture of pluralism in
society, as well as some common interests (implemented through the “invisible hand of the
market”). Ideal-type representation presumes
(Dahl, 1989, p. 307) the following:
a)the presence of socially important issues in
public discourse;
b)their unequivocal formulation and evaluation by stakeholders;
c) the availability of basic values that enable
communication;
d)communication between power elites and
the public which is two-sided and leads to
unambiguous regulatory decisions;
e)the process is continuous, the rules
are changed according to the new
circumstances.
The first conceptual model within the
communicative approach to foreign policy
domain has been applied in studies of international conflicts and integration at the Stanford
University (Holsti, North, & Brody, 1969). Its
effectiveness for the analysis of negotiation in
crisis environment has been proven, thus, as
a first approximation, we can use it to explore the interstate communication between
Ukraine and Russia. However, a significant
drawback of this model is its disregard of
internal processes in each country involved in
this communicative system. Potential interactions between non-state (or, more precisely,
out-of-power, non-elite) actors (publics) in
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
the communications space are ignored too. In
addition, media are absent as independent actors that can influence if not the content of the
communication, then, at least, the placement
of accents (“agenda setting”) in international
relations at the public level. This lack is postulated a priori: any media within this model is
only a tool of power elites, through which they
carry out communication with the publics.
A wider view of the problem is suggested by
Matthew Baum and Philip Potter (2008). Their
conceptual model partially overcomes the
disadvantages of the simplified two-tile “behavioral” Stanford school model. The authors
conclude that today almost all parts of the interaction at the international level are studied.
However, there are no empirical studies that
have combined within a single conceptual and
methodological approach all of the data about
interactions in a specific period and for specific
actors. Also, we must note that this model represents the interaction in terms of one country.
We understand that the authors had in mind
the possibility of mirroring elements of models
for 2 or more actors. Furthermore, we assume
the possibility of links between elements of
two “mirror” models (see. Scheme 2).
19
Note that Baum and Potter do not take
into account the impact of foreign actors on
the domestic media of the studied countries.
Media systems of Russia and Ukraine through
the last 25 years were rather related, so assuming such complete independence would
be incorrect. Therefore, the existence of such
influence we also show in Scheme 2. In the
same way, we do not neglect the influence of
foreign media upon the country’s ruling elite.
So the relationship here is two-sided.
Scheme 2. The theoretical model of interaction between media, public opinion and foreign policy: the interstate context
Scheme 3. A conceptual scheme.
Source: Ivanov (2011)
Source: Ivanov (2011)
The main object of our attention is the
representation of foreign policy orientations of
Ukraine’s population by power elites Ukraine,
so we do not intend to operationalize the
whole conceptual scheme outlined above. Our
conceptual scheme shows the relationship
between public opinion and the ruling elite in
the most detailed way. However, we consider
all the elements of the theoretical model,
which directly affect the present communication (see Scheme 3).
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
Thus, this conceptual model is useful to
study the level of representation of foreign
policy orientations of Ukraine’s population
(1) by power elites (2). Foreign policy orientations of the population can be studied using quantitative opinion polls (3), which is
also the channel of communication through
which thoughts and orientations of the
population can be perceived by power elites.
Representation of popular orientations by
elites can be studied through content analysis
of their public communication. There is also
a difference from the original model: we do
not consider the media as the sole actor. Baum
and Potter noted (p. 40) that modern researchers consider the media from the two opposite
positions: either as an independent actor
that shapes public opinion on foreign policy
and often modifies the initial communication
intentions of the publics’ representatives; or as
a “transmission mechanism” that transmits the
position of the elite to the public. We argue
that the media can be both.
Independent media communicates with the
public, interpreting statements of politicians
in its own manner, and selecting the most
important (according to journalists) expressions, thus creating “agenda”. Here we will
consider the independence of journalism in
Ukraine and Russia, as a topic for a separate
study. Just take into account that media can
be independent, and partly is. However, there
is a special type of media, which in any state,
regardless of its level of democracy, is meant
to represent the official views of politicians in
full, with accents that are important for politicians, with a minimum of additional interpretation. These are information outlets of political
forces and their leaders: official pages of
politicians and political parties on the Internet,
newspapers, video and audio recorded by the
public relations assistants of politicians. These
media directly reflect the intentions of politicians and, which is important, select a media
presentation of specific policy positions, which
the latter considers the most “right”.
If we want to study representation by power
elites, but not its interpretation by media, the
best of the available options is the content
analysis of official media, totally controlled by
political leaders (4). We propose to analyze the
official websites of politicians. On the one hand,
this is the most dynamic type of media that
will quickly respond to changing situations
and promptly submit politician’s statement
on a particular issue, and on the other – the
Internet is an integral media that combines
text, video, audio and still images. The official
websites of politicians are practically ready
databases of politicians’ expressions, both exclusive – placed only on these sites, and copied
materials from the other media – newspapers,
radio, television, Internet resources. Clearly, the
official website will not copy materials, which,
according to politician and his or her team,
distort their position. And if they are, these
materials go only with “appropriate” comments.
Political leaders, expressing a position on
foreign policy have to take into account the
potential position of the leaders of the opponent countries. Thus, there is communication
between them, including public communication (5). It is an external factor that affects the
way the elite represent the orientations of the
population. Here we also offer to analyze official websites of political leaders in both countries. But as this is a two-way communication,
then we use a two-sided “stimulus-response”
model described above. In order to follow
trends of reciprocal influence between political leaders, opposing each other, this interaction should be arranged across the timeline.
This will allow, on a certain level of reliability,
to conduct the causal analysis of communication acts of politicians.
Finally, we consider public opinion in Russia
as an external factor affecting the content of
communication between political leaders of
21
both countries and the opinion of Ukraine’s
population through social relations between
the two nations. The overall analysis of the representation and the environment that affects it
should take place inseparable from the sociopolitical and historical context of international
relations, i.e. the events taking place in the
international sphere (6).
In sum, the proposed conception of analysis
covers four relationships (or 6 if bilateral ties
count as 2) in the model of international relations, including the media, public opinion, the
ruling elite and the historical context of the
events:
1. the relationship between the foreign policy
publics’ orientations and the content of
public communication of elites (elite’s
representation of voters); analyzed through
quantitative analysis of public opinion surveys, quantitative content analysis of public
statements by politicians and multivariate
time series analysis (analysis of survey data
and speech coding within a dynamic statistical model);
2.the interaction between the positions of
power elites of Ukraine and Russia in the
framework of public communication on
the international level; analyzed through
quantitative content analysis of public
statements by politicians and multivariate
time series analysis;
3.the potential impact of the public opinion
in the opponent countries;
4.the potential effects of context (events).
In this article, we will only verify the first
type of relationship. The others are considered in our dissertation for the Yushchenko
presidency period (Іванов, 2012) and can be
applied in further research.
Method
In this section we present basic terms, the
period of our analysis, sample of actors and
messages, technique of automated contentanalytical coding, statistical apparatus for the
representations assessment.
We use the terms in the following meaning:
A message is a publicly expressed opinion
statement, which contains an attitude to certain issues, and is limited by clear time frame
and / or place.
Communication strategy is a potentially realizable way to achieve certain goals through
communicative acts. It is characterized by
a specific manipulation with ideas and judgments available in public discourse, for example, their opposing, association, suppression.
The expected purpose of a communicative
action in our study’s context is the support of
politician by communication recipients.
Target electorates are the voters who are
most likely to support a particular politician or
political party, and on which they rely, wanting
to keep or gain the power.
Attitudes are a support (direct or indirect),
a denial (direct or indirect) or assertions of
neutrality regarding certain issues.
▶▶ Direct support – expressed statements that
directly reflect the specific orientation of
the public.
▶▶ Indirect support – expressed statements
that deny the content of the statement that
is not supported by the public.
Foreign policy orientations of the population – the general attitude to foreign policy
vector. It includes consent with a need or
unacceptability of convergence between
states or unification of certain countries,
international communities and other actors
in intergovernmental politics. It also covers
attitudes to actions of subjects of international
politics and their representatives, credibility to
foreign countries representatives. In this study,
an external entity of international politics is
Russia and organizations to which it belongs
or which are led by it.
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
Power elites are persons who control the
highest authorities in the country or are in parliamentary opposition and exercise the greatest impact on the particular state institutions.
We compare two periods of modern
Ukrainian history: Yushchenko’s presidency
and the period after the Euromaidan. Both
periods characterized by the presence of proWestern state leaders (Kuzio, 2015; Tudoroiu,
2007). However, during Yushchenko’s
presidency “orange”1 politicians failed to
consolidate Ukrainian population around
Western foreign policy vector (Геополітичні
орієнтації населення і безпека України,
2009, p. 47). After the Euromaidan, for the
first time, the supporters of European integration overwhelm the supporters of the union
with Russia (Sakhno, 2015). Obviously, there
was no Russian military aggression during
Yushchenko’s presidency, which is a considerable factor of influence upon Russia image in
Ukraine. Still, we should compare power elites
communication in both periods to see if there
any arguments which are different from “external enemy” rhetoric which is not enough for
sustainable European society development.
Our data originate from two specific time
spans: from August 1, 2005 till August 31,
2008 (3 years) and from February 22, 2014 till
February 29, 2016 (more than 2 years). The
reason for the first time span is that we have
week-by-week public opinion polls of the
Ukrainian adult population for this period. As
a rule, these polls contained questions about
respondents’ geopolitical orientations. This
time span represents Yushchenko’s presidency
at the height of his power. The reason for the
second time span is that on 22 of February
2014 Ukrainian parliament removed president Yanukovych from the office. The same
day Turchynov became new acting president,
1 The supporters of Yushchenko during 2004 Ukrainian
presidential elections.
thus, new western-oriented authorities came
to power in Ukraine. This period of modern
Ukrainian history continues till now. On 29 of
February 2016 we finished data collection for
this research (both opinion polls and communication data).
Polls were conducted with structured
individual interviews by Kyiv International
Institute of Sociology (KIIS), the Razumkov
Center, and Fund “Democratic initiatives ” in
90–132 settlements in all regions of Ukraine
and Crimea2. The sample is representative for
Ukraine, for 24 regions and Crimea. The number of respondents varies from 1019 to 2040.
With the method of personal (face-to-face)
interviews were surveyed respondents who
were at least 18 years old at the time of interview. The error margin excluding the effect
of design with a probability of 95% does not
exceed 2,3–3,5% (depending on the sample).
For the analysis we selected answers to
questions that are connected with Russia, its
representatives, organizations to which it
belongs or which are led by it, foreign and
domestic issues in Ukraine for which its representatives have expressed their views. Some
of them repeated from study to study, others
were unique for a particular poll. To measure
the foreign policy orientations, we used 34
variables (including responses to multiple
choice questions). Examples of the statements
assessed by the respondents are the following:
▶▶The threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine
from Russia is one of the three major
threats to Ukraine in the coming year.
▶▶ Would you support the completion of
Ukraine’s participation in the activities of
2 After the annexation of Crimea and starting of the
hostilities in Donbas region the data from these
regions are not strictly representative. After 18 March
2014 there were no reliable data from Ukrainian
sociological organizations based in Crimea. And the
data from Donbas is representative enough only for
territories under Ukrainian Army control.
23
Eurasian Economic Union on the principles
of multi-level and multi-speed integration?
▶▶ Do you expect the establishment of friendly and mutually beneficial relations with
Russia from the Ukrainian government?
▶▶ Whom do you support in the GeorgianRussian conflict?
▶▶ Integration with Russia and the
Commonwealth of Independent States
should be the central area of Ukrainian
foreign policy.
A full list of questions’ wordings in the
Ukrainian language can be found in the supplement of our Ph.D. thesis (Іванов, 2012, pp.
317–326).
Typically, during the first period a survey
was conducted every week, but not always.
Also, not all questionnaires included all
relevant issues. Therefore, in the comparative
analysis of surveys and messages only 86 data
sets were involved (in total for both periods),
and the comparison with the results of statements of politicians coding was conducted
monthly with accumulated frequencies.
For the second period we calculated index
variable which consists of three components:
▶▶ exclusive support of joining the European
Union;
▶▶ exclusive support of joining the non-military union with Russia;
▶▶ other positions.
By “other positions” we mean “joining both”,
“joining neither”, “hard to say” or “refuse to
answer”.
This index was calculated from the following questions:
▶▶ How would you vote on the referendum
about Ukraine membership in EU? – “For”,
“Against”, “Would not take part in referendum”, “Hard to say”.
▶▶ If there was a referendum about which
union should Ukraine join, how you would
you vote? – “Join the EU”, “Join the Customs
Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan”,
“Join neither, but maintain good relations
with both”, “Hard to say”.
To identify target electorates we used the
question “How would you vote if the presidential elections took place in Ukraine next
Sunday?”. It was repeated in all polls we used
for our analysis.
In accordance with our conceptual model
and operational definition of power elites, we
selected the following politicians whose messages should be collected. For the first period:
President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko (in office from 23.01.2005 till 25.03.2010); leader of
one of the two most powerful political forces
at the time – Yulia Tymoshenko; the leader of
the most powerful opposition political forces
at the time – Viktor Yanukovych. The particular
reasons are the following:
▶▶The President of Ukraine is the head of
Ukrainian state and according to its legal
framework is the most influential official.
The President represents Ukraine at the
highest level in foreign relations and directs
the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
▶▶Yulia Tymoshenko was the Prime Minister
of Ukraine twice over the period and for
the longest time of all premiers of this
period: from 04.02.2005 till 08.09.2005 and
from 18.12.2007 till 11.03.2010, i.e. 55% of
the time of this period. The Prime Minister
of Ukraine has a key influence on the economic content of foreign relations. Under
the Constitution that was in force during
the study period, the Prime Minister could
be appointed only by a parliamentary coalition, thus was independent enough from
the President. In addition, Tymoshenko was
a BYuT, the second largest parliamentary
faction, leader.
▶▶ Viktor Yanukovych was the leader of the
largest opposition faction in Parliament at
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
the time of Yushchenko’s presidency – the
Party of Regions. He was the Prime Minister
of Ukraine from 04.08.2006 till 18.12.2007
(27% of the time). Russia expected his
victory in the presidential election in
2004: Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin
congratulated Viktor Yanukovych on his victory before election results were officially
announced3. Therefore, the role of this
politician can be considered special.
parliament, and from 23.02.2014 till
07.06.2014 was acting president of Ukraine.
▶▶ Petro Poroshenko – from 07.06.2014 till
now is the President of Ukraine.
▶▶The reasons to include the messages of
these two are the same as for Yushchenko.
▶▶Arseniy Yatsenyuk – from 27.02.2014
till 14.04.2014 was the Prime Minister of
Ukraine. The reason to include his messages is the same as for Tymoshenko when
she was a prime minister.
▶▶Yulia Tymoshenko – the leader of the most
popular (КМІС, 2016) pro-Western opposition (Zawada, 2016) faction.
▶▶Yuriy Boiko – the leader of the largest opposition faction “Opposition block”, which
mainly consists of the former Party of
Regions members. We also include all messages of other representatives of this block
which appears on its official web-site.
For the second period we also choose to
analyze messages of politicians who, on the
one hand, are the most influential and, on the
other, have alternative views on foreign relations. They are:
▶▶ Olexander Turchynov – from 22.04.2014
till 29.07.2014 was Head of the Ukrainian
3http://ekmair.ukma.edu.ua/bitstream/
handle/123456789/1216/hubenko,%20paper.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
25
In total we collected 27 818 messages. The
sources were the following:
Table 1. Sources of messages data collection.
Firstly we used lemmatized word form
“Russ*” (the word covers Russia, the Russian
Federation, Russian and others in all possible
grammatical forms). In this way were selected
1106 messages by Yushchenko, 446 – by
Tymoshenko and 478 – by Yanukovych. Next
were selected messages related to issues
present in questionnaires. The whole list of
keywords used in this procedure is given in
Appendix E.3 of our Ph.D. thesis (Іванов, 2012,
pp. 328–329). We used both Ukrainian and
Russian counterparts.
Selected messages were analyzed using the
algorithm of structural-morphological analysis developed by us. First, we used a specially
structured common lexical dictionary (for
Ukrainian and Russian language) instead of
a predefined analytical dictionary. The dictionary is based on POS-tagging projects (Nguyen,
2015; Rysin, 2016) and structured as a matrix,
Table 2. Analytical dictionary structuration
A
B
C
D1..k
Word index
Lemma
Original form
Form of a particular Code of
time, gender,
grammatical form
number, etc.
Lemma+xx|0
Lemma +xx
G
J
I
Antonyms
Contextual
synonims, defined
by the user
Contextual
antonyms,
defined by the
user
Politician
URL
Date of copy
Total messages
saved
1…n
Yuschenko
http://www.president.gov.ua/
27.01.2010
10 084
E
Tymoshenko (first
period)
http://archive.tymoshenko.com.ua/
29.01.2010
6 285
Code of morphological Synonyms
characteristics
Yanukovych
http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/
19.10.2010
969
Turchynov
http://www.turchynov.com/
20.05.2016
326
Poroshenko
http://www.president.gov.ua/
20.05.2016
5424
Yatsenyuk
https://yatsenyuk.org.ua/
https://www.facebook.com/yatsenyuk.arseniy/
20.05.2016
3937
Tymoshenko
(second period)
https://www.tymoshenko.ua/
20.05.2016
757
Boiko and other
“Opposition block ”
representatives
http://opposition.org.ua/uk/
20.05.2016
36
which serves as a grid, within which the program is “reading ” the analyzed text.
Matrix is conceptually shown in Table 2.
The rows correspond to all the words, which
are different in meaning and morphological
characteristics (as in any ordinary lexical dictionary). Column A contains a numeric code of
each word, which serves as an internal reference to a word within the dictionary. Column
B contains the lemma of the word, i.e. the
unchangeable part of it. Column C contains
the original form of the word, i.e. the form that
the program uses for presenting the results of
calculation.
Columns D1… Dk and D'1 … D'j contain
pairs of words and their grammatical identifiers, such as gender, number, etc. In this case (1
… k) and (1 … j) is the complete paradigm of
each token. Each form ID consists of a unique
combination of numbers for each row.
F
D'1..j
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
The last variable allows to check the possible impact of addressee type on a message
content. We define 5 types of recipients:
a)Southeast region. It is the addressee of
public statements in the Dnipropetrovsk,
Odessa, Mykolayiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhya,
Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and
Crimea.
b)Central West region. It is the addressee
of public statements in Volyn, Rivne, Lviv,
Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky,
Transcarpathian, Chernivtsi, Zhytomyr,
Vinnitsa, Kirovograd, Cherkasy, Poltava,
Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv oblasts and Kyiv.
c)The entire population of Ukraine. It is the
addressee of any media messages in nationwide scale.
d)The West. It is the addressee of public
statements in Western and Central Europe,
Eastern Europe members of the European
Union, North America, Georgia.
e)East and Russia. It is the addressee of public
expression in the countries of CSTO4.
These types defined by the electoral characteristics of these regions and geopolitical
division (Ivanov, 2016).
The last but not least is transforming surveys and content analysis results to a common
measuring scale. The respective algorithm is
conceptually presented in table 3.
4 The Collective Security Treaty Organization led by
Russia.
Table 3. Messages vs public opinions comparison algorithm
Statement Х
Electoral group
connected to other words, if they occur in
the same sentence?”. Method of determining
the direct connection involves two consecutive steps: (1) identifying the position of each
significant word around keyword (word under
analysis) within a sentence by fixing the
relative position of spaces and continuous
sequences of letters and parallel reconciliation
with matrix vocabulary; (2) comparing morphological code of a keyword with meaningful
words near it. The rule of meaningful connection is the following: if a keyword and one of
the nearest meaningful words have similar
codes and there are no other words with the
same code between them, these words relate
grammatically and meaningfully. The similarity
of values means that no value starting from 1,
cannot be compared with zero, which means
the unsuitability of certain characteristics for
a given word.
Identified relations were manually coded as
positive or negative statements on selected
issues (values from polls). Then a triangulation
was performed on a subsample of 100 messages: it was recorded by two other coders.
The procedure was repeated until the reliability of coding reached the required level
(Kripendorf’s α = 0.77).
As a result of the coding we received data
matrix with the following variables:
a)the date of the message;
b)a variable which relates to the message,
c) modus of the message in regard to a variable (favorable or negational)
d)the recipient of the message.
+
=>
–
=>
+
n(+)>n(–)^p
0,05^«0 ”<50%
–
n(+)<n(–)^p
+– || “0 ”>50%
0,05^«0 ”<50%
|| “0 ”
Power elite
representative
For the standardization of internal dictionary links, each form identifier is presented as
an n-digit number, where n – the number of all
possible forms of all parts of the language. This
code consists of numbers starting with 1 representing the value of each grammatical characteristic, and 0 – to indicate the unsuitability of
a characteristic for a particular part of speech.
Column E contains morphological identifiers of each word, which is a part of speech tag.
Here we use the same coding principle, but
with different values. This allows the analyst
to present frequency analysis results in the
form of significant categories of words. In
any European language nouns denote some
concepts or phenomena, adjectives denote
characteristics of these concepts or phenomena, verbs denote the action of certain
subject-nouns, etc. So, during the first stage of
text data processing, we can figure out which
concepts (nouns) are in the text and what are
their frequency.
Columns F and J refer to lexical synonyms
and antonyms in the form of their index in
the matrix. Thus, the “value clusters”, i.e. words
with all their synonymous, can be calculated
and summarized. The last two columns – J and
I are user-defined contextual synonyms to be
automatically transcoded into the corresponding index words. In order to identify these contextual synonyms, we can count the frequency
of meaningful words and deduce that some of
them are synonymous. In this case, of course,
there are no strict rules of synonymization.
However, if, say, we have in one text the word
“president ” and his name, we can say that the
word “president ” and this name are contextually synonymous.
Besides the sole functionality of each
column, we can benefit from their combined
use. Using the comparison of indexes and
positional analysis at the level of sentences we
tried to solve one of the problems of automated content analysis: “Is a word directly
27
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
If the number of people who approve
certain statements (choosing a certain answer
to the question) is greater than the number
of people who deny certain statements (or
choose the opposite answer), and the difference is significant at p≤0.05, while the number
of those who chose the answer “do not know”
or refused to answer is less than half of valid
sample set (ignoring missing values), then this
statement is considered to be supported. It
can be equated to the favorable statement of
a politician. Similarly were determined negative statements that are equated to the negative statements of politicians.
If the number of people who approve
certain statements (choosing a certain answer
to the question) does not differ on a statistically significant level, the number of people
who deny the specific statement (choose the
opposite answer) and / or the number of those
who chose option “do not know” or refused
to answer more than half of valid sample set
(ignoring missing values), the attitude to this
statement is considered ambivalent. Such
statements are equated to the absence of
favorable or negative statements (“silence”)
for the comparable period (we used 1-month
frame) or to the equity of favorable and negative statements (“communicative ambiguity”)
for the comparable period.
Approval, denial or ambivalence we define
for each variable, for all Ukraine’s population
and for the target electorate of each politician.
To determine the key statements that unite
the electorate of each politician (the factor of
orientations) and the population as a whole,
we have combined all the data sets by the key
variable of electoral preferences and conducted a factor analysis on the variables that
determine the foreign policy orientation. The
electorate was divided into supporters of proWestern politicians (Yushchenko, Tymoshenko,
Yatsenyuk, Turchynov, Poroshenko) and supporters of pro-Russia politicians (Yanukovych
and “Opposition block”). Thus was obtained
a solution that explained 43% of the variance.
We also determined statements that unite
the majority of Ukraine’s population, and the
approval of which continued over time. These
variables were used in the further comparative
analysis to identify whether politicians represent the two largest electoral groups and the
population as a whole.
As we analyzed time series of data, we faced
the challenge of the small data “saturation” in
each of the comparable periods. To overcome
the problem we applied the following algorithm to compare the preferences of voters
(citizens) and statements of politicians in the
time dimension:
a)after each relevant survey it is assumed that
target electorate’s orientations remained
unchanged until the next survey detected
the change;
b)target electorate’s orientations compared
with the statements of politicians on
a daily basis using the Granger causality test
(Granger, 1969), which allows us to estimate
the likelihood of policy of orientation expression at different delay of reaction (lags)
between the point when public opinion
on a particular issue became known and
representation (or denial) of this opinion by
a politician;
c) comparisons are grouped by the factor of
orientations;
d)within each group we leave only the most
probable causal relation for each point on
the scale of lags.
Results
First period
Western and all-Ukraine publics were the most
popular addresses among Ukrainian politicians
during the first period (see table 4). Among
Tymoshenko’s messages about foreign policy
29
the highest percentage of publications were in
the Western media. In the Russian media there
were mostly articles in liberal and opposition
press. Others were in national newspapers and
regional media of the central-western region.
Yushchenko’s statement mainly focused on the
population of Ukraine and the West. Among
the recipients of Yanukovych’s statements
there was a significant percentage of the
Russian publics, which he tried to convince in
his commitment to Russia.
Table 4. Addressees of the messages
Addressee
Coded statements
Tymoshenko
Central-Western
36
Ukraine in general
36
West
71
Russia-East
18
Eastern-Southern
Eastern-Southern
25
Yushchenko
15
Central-Western
37
Ukraine in general
226
West
165
Russia-East
30
Yanukovych
Ukraine in general
53
West
46
Eastern-Southern
0
Russia-East
20
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
Unexpectedly Yanukovych’s messages to his
target voters – residents of the southeastern
region – are missing on the official site of the
Party of regions5. Although he could use rather
tough statements in concordance with the
preferences of the target audiences, after the
2004 elections Yanukovych’s team began to filter out material that could give rise of criticism
of his position from the general publics.
The factor of “Blue-white ” (Yanukovych’s
electorate) orientations included the following
statements:
Russian should be state language;
▶▶The problem of the language is real;
▶▶ Ukraine should join with Russia in economic union (ЕЭП);
▶▶ Good relations with Russia are among the
top priorities for state authorities;
▶▶ In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be
supported;
▶▶ Integration with Russia and CIS should be
among priorities;
▶▶ For cheaper gas national interests can be
partly sacrificed;
▶▶ We can trust president of Russia;
▶▶ Ukraine should join the geopolitical union
of Russia and Belarus.
The factor of “Orange ” (Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko electorates) orientations included only two statements:
▶▶ Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo
activity;
▶▶ Russia intervene Ukrainian internal affairs.
All-Ukraine orientations are the following:
▶▶ Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after
top-level visits interchange;
▶▶ With his visit to Ukraine Putin support
Yanukovych.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means stabilization of gas price.
5 Remember that we analyzed 2010 version of this site.
Firstly, let us compare the aggregated data
of population, two electoral groups, and politicians’ positions on every issue. The surveys
were aggregated by the number of approvals
/ objections for the entire study period. For
the statements the most frequent modus is
presented. In both cases equal number or
frequency is presented as ambivalence. To
illustrate representations of foreign policy
statements by politicians we use the coloring
scheme: green-colored text means approval of
a statement, red color – its disapproval, black
color – missing of a position or ambivalence.
Thus, Yanukovych’s representation was the
following:
▶▶There is a threat to the sovereignty of
Ukraine from Russia.
▶▶The Russian language should be state
language.
▶▶The problem of language is real.
▶▶ Ukraine should join with Russia in the economic union (ЕЭП).
▶▶ Good relations with Russia are among the
top priorities for state authorities.
▶▶ Improvement of relations with Russia will
make gas cheaper.
▶▶ NATO membership will reduce Ukraine’s
dependence on Russia.
▶▶ NATO membership will worsen relations
with Russia.
▶▶ Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo
activity.
▶▶ In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be
supported.
▶▶ Integration with Russia and CIS should be
among priorities.
▶▶ For cheaper gas national interests can be
partly sacrificed.
▶▶ Current gas price indicates good relations
with Russia.
▶▶ Recognition Holodomor as genocide will
worsen relations with Russia.
▶▶ We can trust the president of Russia.
31
▶▶ Russia worsens relations between
countries.
▶▶ Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after
top-level visits interchange.
▶▶ With his visit to Ukraine Putin support
Yanukovych.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means stabilization of gas price.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means no borders check.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means equal conditions for work in Russia.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means new projects in business, science
and culture.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means protection of Russian language in
Ukraine.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means protection of Ukrainian language in
Russia.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means simultaneous entrance to WTO.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means no trade restrictions from Russia.
▶▶ Russia will raise price of gas for Ukraine.
▶▶ Ukraine should join the geopolitical union
of Russia and Belarus.
▶▶ Ukrainian Orthodox church should be
under Moscow patriarchy.
▶▶ Ukraine should give its gas transporting
system under Russia control for cheaper
gas.
Yushchenko represented foreign policy in
the following manner:
▶▶There is a threat to the sovereignty of
Ukraine from Russia.
▶▶The Russian language should be state
language.
▶▶The problem of language is real.
▶▶ Good relations with Russia are among the
top priorities for state authorities.
▶▶ NATO membership will reduce Ukraine’s
dependence on Russia.
▶▶ NATO membership will worsen relations
with Russia.
▶▶ Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo
activity.
▶▶ In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be
supported.
▶▶ Integration with Russia and CIS should be
among priorities.
▶▶ Current gas price indicates good relations
with Russia.
▶▶ We can trust the president of Russia.
▶▶ Russia worsens relations between
countries.
▶▶ Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after
top-level visits interchange.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means stabilization of gas price.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means no borders check.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means equal conditions for work in Russia.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means new projects in business, science
and culture.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means protection of Ukrainian language in
Russia.
▶▶ Russia will raise the price of gas for Ukraine.
▶▶ Ukraine should join the geopolitical union
of Russia and Belarus.
▶▶ Ukrainian Orthodox church should be
under Moscow patriarchy.
The other statements were suppressed or
presented ambivalently.
Tymoshenko clearly represented the following statements:
▶▶There is a threat to the sovereignty of
Ukraine from Russia.
▶▶The Russian language should be state
language.
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
▶▶ Good relations with Russia are among the
top priorities for state authorities.
▶▶ NATO membership will reduce Ukraine’s
dependence on Russia.
▶▶ NATO membership will worsen relations
with Russia.
▶▶ Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo
activity.
▶▶ In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be
supported.
▶▶ Integration with Russia and CIS should be
among priorities.
▶▶ For cheaper gas national interests can be
partly sacrificed.
▶▶ Current gas price indicate good relations
with Russia.
▶▶ Russia worsens relations between
countries.
▶▶ Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after
top-level visits interchange.
▶▶ With his visit to Ukraine Putin support
Yanukovych.
▶▶ Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations
means stabilization of gas price.
▶▶ Russia will rise price of gas for Ukraine.
▶▶ Ukraine should join the geopolitical union
of Russia and Belarus.
▶▶ Ukraine should give its gas transporting
system to Russia for cheaper gas.
We can see that Yanukovych represented
his target electorate in 7 of 9 statements,
Yushchenko – only in the statement about
intervention in Ukrainian internal affairs,
Tymoshenko represented all “orange” electorate orientations.
To analyze representation in time dimension
we applied Granger causality test to standardized survey and coded communication data
(see Method section). The results are illustrated
in the following figures 1–3. The red line
represents the probability that publics’ orientations influence the content of the messages
(p-value). The blue line represents lag, i.e. time
span in days between survey and communicative reaction. The green line stands for Fisher
statistic values.
33
Figure 3. Tymoshenko: “all-Ukraine ” orientations
factor
Figure 5. Yushchenko: “orange ” orientations factor
Figure 1. Tymoshenko: “blue-white ” orientations
factor
Figure 6. Yushchenko: “all-Ukraine ” orientations
factor
Figure 2. Tymoshenko: “orange ” orientations factor
The analysis of time series indicates that
Tymoshenko used “contrasted” communication
strategy, i.e. systematic denial of the “bluewhite” factor. At the same time, high levels of
representation of the whole population caused
primarily by sequential repeating of the thesis
about the need to stabilize gas prices as a sign
of improving relations with Russia.
Figure 4. Yushchenko: “blue-white ” orientations
factor
Yushchenko better represented the “Orange”
factor of orientations. He quickly responded
to changes in public opinion of his electorate
and the society as a whole.
As for Yanukovych, time series analysis
found no causality at any level of probability
for any delay in response for all factors. This
means that Yanukovych in public communications presented on the Party of regions
official website, did not try to systematically
respond to changes in the orientations of the
population.
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
Second period
The distinctive feature of the second period
is the presentation of Russia as an aggressor
by most public speakers in Ukraine. Moreover,
Russia was officially recognized as the aggressor by the Ukrainian parliament (Верховна_
Рада_України, 2015). This was a strong factor
of influence on both public orientations and
public communication of power elites. ProRussian sentiments and messages became
stigmatized as “separatists’” and socially
undesirable. Still, there were differences in
foreign orientations of the publics and their
representations by the politicians.
First of all, it is notable that Opposition
block tried to conceal foreign relations topic
and focus itself on domestic issues: only 36 relevant messages were collected for the entire
period (see Table 1 above). The differences in
aggregated counts for pro-Russian, ambivalent
and pro-European messages for all communicators are presented in table 5.
35
We must note that “pro-Russian” messages in
no case meant support of Russian actions in
Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, or the will to join
the union with Russia. They include statements
like the following: “With peaceful Russia that
treats us with respect, you need to trade and
cooperate.” Ambivalent statements include
positive assessment of the talks with Vladimir
Figure 7. Changes in geopolitical orientations of Ukrainian adult population
Table 5. Representation of foreign policy orientations during after the Euromaidan
Orientation
Communicator
Total
pro-Russian
ambivalent
pro-European
Opposition block
2,8%
38,9%
58,3%
Poroshenko
0,2%
6,8%
93,0%
Tymoshenko
0,1%
5,4%
94,4%
Turchynov
0,3%
5,2%
94,4%
Yatsenyuk
0,3%
6,4%
93,3%
0,3%
6,6%
93,2%
Putin while condemning the aggression of the
Russian Federation.
Yet the population of Ukraine is much less
united than the elite. While the majority of
publics supports joining the European Union
after February 2014, this percentage is only
above 50% and is not stable (see the diagram
below).
Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
Target electorate
This means that the elites did not fully
represent publics’ orientations, especially in
electoral groups dimension (see table 6).
p-value
1
0,57395
1
0,57395
0,4909
Turchynov
Table 6. Representation of foreign policy orientations in time dimension
Lag (in months)
37
0,4909
Target electorate
F-statistics
–
Yatsenyuk
Opposition block
General population
General population
1
2,9793
0,09135
2
0,051864
0,9495
3
0,31337
0,8156
Target electorate
4
0,125
0,9721
Poroshenko
1
0,058577
0,8101
2
0,26301
0,7704
1
0,011703
0,0846
2
3,0914
0,8988
3
10,57
0,91234
Target electorate
–6
General population
1
6,36
0,01577
2
1,10
0,3439
3
1,08
0,3753
4
2,93
0,04411
5
2,58
0,06801
6
1,68
0,2228
7
1,24
0,4402
Target electorate
1
5,52
0,02443
2
2,21
0,1276
3
1,01
0,4039
4
0,32
0,8629
Tymoshenko
General population
1
1,3445
0,2535
2
4,9896
0,013
3
3,0519
0,04625
4
2,0086
0,132
5
1,7109
0,1968
6
3,1714
0,06733
7
0,94774
0,6024
6 No causality at any level of probability for any delay in response.
3
0,8572
0,4756
4
0,38521
0,8166
5
0,52356
0,7547
6
0,22331
0,9579
7
0,041766
0,9993
We can see that Opposition block,
Tymoshenko, and Turchynov better represented the general population of Ukraine,
then their target electorates. Poroshenko and
Yatsenyuk, on the contrary, were more ideologically oriented in their public messages. Still,
Tymoshenko reacted more quickly to changes
in orientations of her electorate, then other
politicians.
The communication strategy used by
Yanukovych and Opposition block we call
“nomenclature strategy”, the strategy of
Tymoshenko during the first period is a “radical-sensitive”, and the strategy of Yatsenyuk
and Poroshenko during the second period is
a “compromise”. Neither of them is ideal for the
rapid change of society.
Conclusion
Comparing two periods of modern Ukrainian
history – after the Orange revolution and after
Euromaidan – we can say that after February
2014 the changes in both publics’ foreign
policy orientations and their representation by
power elites are significant.
The publics became much more unite in
their European aspirations and this was consistently represented by power elites. However,
several features remain common for both
periods. These features may transform into
threats for sustainable European development
of Ukrainian society.
The position of the Ukrainian government
in relations with Russia independent of foreign
influences make impossible the complete
representation of constantly changing foreign policy orientations of different electoral
groups. However, ignoring the latter in times
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian…
of crisis and a sharp abandoning of isolationism can lead to a confrontation within the
country. During the first period politicians
represented mainly their electoral groups,
while during the last two years they move to
representation of the general public.
Ukrainian politicians differ in terms of
the level of representation and sensitivity
to changes in public opinion. For the first
period the rating in descending order was
the following: Tymoshenko, Yushchenko,
Viktor Yanukovych. For the second period,
Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk became more representative. Tymoshenko was more radically
focused on the electorate, which changed
during the second period. Yushchenko less
represented the population in general, with
a level of representation decreased from the
beginning of his presidency to the dissolution
of Parliament, when his target electorate orientation has become more rigid. Most sensitive to the circumstances of communication in
the first period was Yanukovych, who changed
the content of communication according
to the audience, used neutral statements or
suppressed disputable messages. We can see
that Opposition block uses the same strategy,
which could be the hidden threat in case of
the aggravation of economic and military
crisis.
Social tensions and conflicts of the orientations in the transformation are functional,
while the formation of foreign policy is essentially elitist. The contradictions that exist
regarding the foreign policy direction, on
the one hand, contribute to the structuring
the political forces, on the other – to creating
a stable balance in which disproportionate
strengthening of one of the groups is compensated by mobilizing their opponents. Such
interaction has both positive and negative effects on social development. On the one hand,
it hinders the development of any vector of
foreign policy, but on the other – potentially
improves the quality of the implementation
of this vector by the rotation of elites. As
a result, it is possible to develop a model of
foreign relations, which somehow satisfy all
groups.
Oleh Ivanov, PhD. is a Senior Lecturer at the
Department of Sociology, the National University
of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”, and analyst at the
Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Ukraine.
In 2012, defended “summa cum laude” PhD
thesis “Representation of People’s Foreign Policy
Orientations in the Public Communication of
Power Elites.” Scholar interests cover political sociology, sociology of mass communication, military
sociology, and content-analytical methodology.
Since 2014 is a member of the Editorial Board
of the international peer-reviewed journal “Social,
Health, and Communication Studies Journal”
which is published collaboratively by MacEwan
University (Canada), and the National University
of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” (Ukraine). Since 2016 is
a deputy head of the Young Scholars Association
at the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla
Academy”.
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, National University of “KyivMohyla Academy”.
E-mail: [email protected]
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ARCHIVE/cherez_scho_politikam_vdaetsya_
rozkolyuvati_ukrayinu.html
Społeczne reprezentacje
orientacji zagranicznych
Ukraińców w dyskursie
publicznym ukraińskich elit
politycznych
Streszczenie:
Artykuł przedstawia warunki konieczne
(a także empiryczne ograniczenia), które
pozostają niezbędne do wdrożenia w sferze
ukraińskiej polityki zagranicznej demokratycznego i deliberatywnego procesu decyzyjnego. Teoria reprezentacji wyjaśnia stabilność
ukraińskiego systemu społecznego w tym
wymiarze (np. w odniesieniu do relacji między Ukrainą a Rosją) poprzez to, jak polityka
ta była kształtowana w okresie transformacji
ustrojowej przez elity, napięcia społeczne oraz
konflikty dotyczące kierunku rozwoju państwa.
Komunikacja polityczna upowszechniana jest
poprzez określone strategie dyskursywne:
ukryte (formułowane w stylu właściwym dla
nomenklatury), ambiwalentne oraz konfrontacyjne. Dla strukturalnej i morfologicznej
analizy tych strategii utworzono określony
algorytm komputerowy, obejmujący znaczną
ilość danych (wiadomości obecnych na ukraińskich i rosyjskich stronach rządowych). Korpusy
badanych tekstów zostały przekształcone w semantyczną sieć dotyczącą danego zagadnienia,
połączoną z tymi wszystkimi cechami, które
stanowiły przedmiot zainteresowania samego
badacza (np. czas, miejsce, autor, potencjalna
liczba odbiorców itd.). Z kolei do badania dużej
liczby sondaży przeprowadzonych na różnych
próbach i z użyciem odmiennych pytań zastosowano technikę tematycznego skupiania
pytań za pomocą analizy zawartości.
Słowa kluczowe:
reprezentacja, komunikacja, elity władzy,
stosunki międzynarodowe, Ukraina, Rosja,
orientacje polityczne.