Intifada for Dummies: Why a
Popular Uprising is Yet to
Take off?
By Ramzy Baroud
The nature of the current uprising in the West Bank and East
Jerusalem is a testament to that claim. Previous uprisings
were massive in their mobilization, clear in their message and
decisive in their delivery. Their success or failure is not
the point of this discussion, but the fact is that they were
willed by the people and, within days, they imprinted
themselves on the collective consciousness of Palestinians
everywhere.
The current uprising is different; so different, in fact, that
many are still hesitating to call it an ‘intifada’; as if
intifadas are the outcome of some clear-cut science, an exact
formula of blood and popular participation that must be fully
satisfied before a eureka moment is announced by some
political commentator.
It is different, nonetheless, for there is yet to be a clear
sense of direction, a leadership, a political platform,
demands, expectations and short and long term strategies. At
least that is how the 1987-93 Intifada played out and, to a
lesser extent, the 2000-05 al-Aqsa Intifada as well. But is it
not possible that the outcomes of these previous intifadas is
what is making the current uprising different?
The first Intifada metamorphosed into a worthless peace
process which eventually led to the signing of the Oslo
Accords in 1993. A year later, the Palestinian leadership of
the PLO was reproduced into the emasculated form of the
Palestinian Authority (PA). Since then, the latter has served
largely as a conduit for the Israeli Occupation.
The second Intifada had less success than the first. It
quickly turned into an armed rebellion, thus marginalizing the
popular component of the revolt which is required to cement
the collective identity of Palestinians, forcing them to
overcome their division and unify behind a single flag and a
distinct chant.
This Intifada was crushed by a brutal Israeli army; hundreds
were assassinated and thousands were killed in protests and
clashes with Israeli soldiers. It was a watershed moment in
the relationship between the Israeli government and the
Palestinian leadership in Ramallah, and between the
Palestinian factions themselves.
The late PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, was held hostage by the
Israeli army in his Ramallah headquarters. The soldiers
taunted him in his office, while blocking his movement for
years. Finally, he was slowly poisoned and died in 2004.
Israel then went through the painstaking effort of revamping
the PA leadership, flushing out the nonconformists – through
murder and imprisonment – and allowing the so-called moderates
to operate but, even then, under very strict conditions.
Mahmoud Abbas was elected President of the PA in 2005. His
greatest achievements include the cracking down on civil
society organizations, ensuring total loyalty towards him:
personally, and towards his branch within the Fatah faction.
Under Abbas, there has been no revolutionary model for change,
no ‘national project’; in fact, no clear definition of
nationhood, to begin with.
The Palestinian nation became whatever Abbas wanted it to be.
It consisted, largely, of West Bank Palestinians, living
mostly in Area A, loyal to Fatah and hungry for international
handouts. The more the Abbas nation agreed to play along, the
more money they were allowed to rake in.
In 2006, this fragmentation became absolute. Many will recall
that period of discord when Hamas was allocated majority of
the seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC); but
the conflict, which resulted in the violent summer of 2007,
had little to do with democracy. The paradigm – of endless
‘peace talks’, generous donors’ money, growing illegal Jewish
settlements, etc. – suited both Abbas and the Israelis very
well. No one, Hamas especially, were to be allowed to impose a
paradigm shift.
Israel immediately besieged Gaza, launched successive wars,
and committed numerous war crimes with little criticism
emanating from Gaza’s brethren in Ramallah. Bolivia and
Venezuela seemed more furious by Israel’s war crimes in Gaza
than Mahmoud Abbas’ West Bank clique.
Until October of last year, when the current uprising slowly
began building momentum, the situation on the ground seemed at
a standstill. In the West Bank, Occupation was slowly
normalized in accordance to the formula: occupation and
illegal settlements in exchange for money and silence.
Gaza, on the other hand, stood as a model for barbarity,
regularly meted out by Israel as a reminder to those in the
West Bank that the price of revolt is besiegement, hunger,
destruction and death.
It is against this backdrop of misery, humiliation, fear,
oppression and corruption that Palestinians arose. They were
mostly young people born after Oslo, became politically
conscious after the Fatah-Hamas clash, raised in the
conflicting worlds of their own leadership co-existing with
the Occupation, on one hand, and clashing with other
Palestinians on the other.
These youth, however, never perceived Occupation to be normal;
never came to terms with the fact that the earth beneath their
feet kept shrinking while illegal, massive Jewish cities kept
on being erected upon their land; true, they learned to
navigate their way across the checkpoints, but never assented
to the superiority of their occupier. They abhorred disunity;
rejected identity politics and factionalism; never understood
why Gaza was being disowned and slowly slaughtered.
This is a generation that is the most educated, yet; most
politically savvy and, thanks to the huge leaps in digital
media technology, is the most connected and informed of the
world around it. The ambitions of these youth are huge, but
their opportunities are so limited; their earth has shrunk to
the size of a single-file queue before an Israeli military
checkpoint, where they are corralled on their way to school,
to work and back home. And, like the Israelis who shot at
anyone who dared to protest, Abbas imprisons those who
attempted to do so.
It is a generation that simply cannot breathe.
The current Intifada is an expression of that dichotomy, of a
generation that is so eager to break free, to define itself,
to liberate its land, yet resisted by an Old Guard
unremittingly holding on so tight to the few perks and dollars
they receive in the form of allotments every month.
History must remain in constant motion, and the last six
months have been the attempt of an entire generation to move
the wheels of history forward, despite a hundred obstacles and
a thousand checkpoints.
This might be the most difficult Intifada yet; for never
before did Palestinians find themselves so leaderless, yet so
ready to break free. The outcome of this tension, will not
only define this whole generation, as it defined my generation
of the 1987 Intifada, but it will define the future of
Palestine altogether.
– Dr. Ramzy Baroud has been writing about the Middle East for
over 20 years. He is an internationally-syndicated columnist,
a media consultant, an author of several books and the founder
of PalestineChronicle.com. His books include “Searching
Jenin”, “The Second Palestinian Intifada” and his latest “My
Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story”. His
website is www.ramzybaroud.net.