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Strategic Studies Institute
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U.S. Army War College Press
THE RESURGENCE OF AL-QAEDA IN SYRIA
AND IRAQ
Azeem Ibrahim
May 2014
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iv
FOREWORD
By 2010, it was possible to see al-Qaeda as an organization in decline. It had lost militarily in Iraq and
seemed politically irrelevant to the popular revolts
during the Arab Spring. However, the Syrian civil war
has allowed it to rebuild and, in the form of the local
Al Nusrah Front, use a revised political and military
strategy. This important monograph considers if these
apparent gains can be sustained or whether al-Qaeda’s
ideology will again alienate other salafist groups and
the wider Sunni population.
Dr. Azeem Ibrahim bases his report on available
evidence, interviews, and visits to Syria. At the moment, the Assad government seems to be making
some gains, and the rebel forces are split into three
broad groups of the Free Syrian Army, the Islamic
Front (backed by the Gulf States), and two al-Qaeda
groups (Al Nusrah and the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria [ISIS]). ISIS has alienated all the other factions
and is likely to retreat to Iraq, but the Al Nusrah Front
is operating in a loose alliance with the Islamic Front.
What is not clear is if Al Nusrah’s approach of seeking
to cooperate with other Islamist groups and of trying
to build popular support will allow it to make the substantial territorial gains that al-Qaeda has been seeking since it fled Afghanistan.
Dr. Ibrahim argues that this attempt is likely to fail.
Even though Al Nusrah has shown a willingness to
cooperate with the Islamic Front, the latter is likely to
have to reject any long-term alliance with Al Nusrah
if it wishes to retain funding from the Saudis and the
Gulf States. In itself, ensuring that al-Qaeda remains
marginalized will do little to help Syrians suffering
the 4th year of civil war, nor will it eliminate the risk
v
of radicalized foreign fighters returning to their home
countries. However, it does suggest that al-Qaeda’s
relative resurgence since 2010 will be limited, and the
organization as a whole will be no closer to its desire
to reestablish territorial control over a large region
where it can operate with relative safety.
The Strategic Studies Institute offers this monograph for consideration in the ongoing discussion
regarding al-Qaeda and the organizations affiliated
with it.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
vi
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
AZEEM IBRAHIM served as a Research Fellow at
the International Security Program of the Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard, a World Fellow at
Yale, Fellow and Member of the Board of Directors
at the Institute for Social Policy Understanding, and
an Adjunct Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He has met and
advised a number of world leaders and governments
on a diverse range of issues ranging from financial investment, to geopolitics, to countering extremism. He
served as a reservist in the United Kingdom’s 4th Battalion Parachute Regiment. Dr. Ibrahim holds a Ph.D.
from the University of Cambridge.
vii
SUMMARY
The Syrian civil war has allowed al-Qaeda to recover from its setbacks up to 2010. Its main affiliate in
the region seems to be testing a new strategy of collaboration with other salafist-jihadist groups and a
less brutal implementation of Sharia law in areas its
controls. In combination, this might allow the Al Nusrah Front to carve out the sort of territorial control of
a region (or state) that al-Qaeda has sought ever since
its eviction from Afghanistan.
On the other hand, Syria has also seen a civil war
between two al-Qaeda inspired factions (Al Nusrah
and the Iraq-based Islamic State in Iraq and Syria)
and there are indications of limits to al-Qaeda’s ability
to cooperate with other anti-Assad factions and gain
popular appeal.
The extent that the Syrian civil war offers the
means for al-Qaeda to recover from its earlier defeats
will determine whether the organization has a future,
or if it will become simply an ideology and label adopted by various Islamist movements fighting their
own separate struggles.
ix
THE RESURGENCE OF AL-QAEDA
IN SYRIA AND IRAQ
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this monograph is to review the
current resurgence of al-Qaeda (AQ) in Iraq and Syria.
Al-Qaeda affiliates now occupy more territory in the
Arab world than at any time in its history. However,
this resurgence may be a temporary phenomenon,
with al-Qaeda taking advantage of the chaos in Syria,
the weak government response in Iraq, and the simmering discontent in other Muslim countries that has
followed the Arab Spring. Their recent gains are substantial, but there are reasons to doubt if al-Qaeda’s
power and appeal within the wider salafi-jihadist
movement, especially in Syria, can be sustained. Here,
different coalitions have recently disavowed al-Qaeda
and, in some cases, are in open conflict with its militias.
There is a case to argue that al-Qaeda has managed to
exploit an opportunity but lacks the ability to broaden
its appeal sufficiently to make long-term gains.
This report is based on an extensive analysis of
current national security reports and interviews with
global experts; the author recently traveled to Turkey and Syria to interview individuals knowledgeable about al-Qaeda. A definitive assessment of the
significance of al-Qaeda’s resurgence in 2013 remains
inconclusive, as 2014 brings further turmoil, conflicting information, and shifts and changes with new alliances, leaders being killed or replaced, and territory
won and lost.
One conclusion that is emerging, however, is that
the imposition on civilian communities of extreme
fundamentalist Sharia law is not welcome or accept-
1
able anywhere, especially if al-Qaeda continues with
its violent and brutal suppression of other political
currents within radical Islam. While their goals may
be similar, the so-called “moderate” salafi-jihadists
seem to have a better appreciation of how to win over
the wider population than al-Qaeda.
Despite the attention paid to the resurgence of alQaeda, the bigger problem dominating the Middle
East scene is the escalation of the Sunni-Shia divide.
This split is reflected in the civil wars in Syria and Iraq
and, in turn, has an international aspect as Shia Iran
and Sunni Saudi Arabia are fighting a proxy Muslim
civil war, particularly in Syria.
It may turn out that al-Qaeda is just one of the many
pawns in this tragic and explosive situation, and that
its resurgence will last only as long as the money and
power behind the conflict continues in a war where
it increasingly seems that no one can win. However,
the clear warning from Syria is that al-Qaeda has the
capacity to exploit any unrest to its own ends, even if
it fails to then take control of the situation.
BACKGROUND
A common narrative from the U.S. administration
has been to proclaim the final demise of al-Qaeda. In
reality, it is still not clear if “we are winning or losing
the war on terror.”1 Despite the United States spending an estimated $5 trillion2 on the war on terrorism,
(including veterans’ costs and interest on borrowing
the funds), al-Qaeda has managed to reconsolidate itself very quickly in Iraq and Syria. This may be due
partly to the failure of U.S. policy in dealing with the
crisis in Syria. However, it indicates that al-Qaeda
has the capacity to exploit new opportunities. It has
2
learned from experience and is more organized, better
funded, more media and public relations aware, and
more dangerous than ever before. The failures of Western intervention in Afghanistan, where, in spite of all that has been attempted,
the situation is fragile, and Iraq, increasingly racked
by sectarian violence, provides one way in which alQaeda can recover. Add to this, the relative failure of
the democratic opportunities offered by the events of
the Arab Spring after 20103 in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia means all those states are now facing domestic terrorism and sectarian violence. In addition, the gradual
shift in Syria from popular revolt to outright civil war
has created the scope for al-Qaeda to extend its reach
from northern Iraq and threaten to dominate the opposition to the Assad regime.
One interpretation is that al-Qaeda has recovered
from its losses in the period up to 2010 and has managed to emerge as a dominant force and ideology
across the Islamic world, taking advantage of political upheaval and Western failures. However, while
al-Qaeda, in its most recent manifestation in Iraq and
Syria, appears to be alive and well, what is not clear is
how much of the current structure is the old pre-September 11, 2001 (9/11) al-Qaeda, and how much is a
new organization using the label of al-Qaeda. This has
led to genuine confusion about exactly what al-Qaeda
is today, and if it is still a hierarchical organization
with a leader or a more amorphous ideology which
people freely adopt and interpret as a brand name and
set up “franchises” relevant to their national situation.
If the apparent resurgence is to be understood, then
paying careful attention to what is, sometimes lazily,
labeled al-Qaeda is important.
3
Political, economic, or religious differences in
Muslim countries have created violent opposition to
the existing dictatorships, whether Western-backed or
not, and they all tend to be called “al-Qaeda” when
they should really be seen as either the various regional affiliates of official al-Qaeda or the more pervasive form of salafi-jihadism. Every religious terrorist
is not necessarily a member of al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda
does not represent all groups within the global salafijihadist movement. These differences are becoming
increasingly apparent in Syria as the civil war rages
on and fluid alliances are continually being made and
broken within the opposition to the Assad regime. Jihadism in Syria is revealing the fault lines between
al-Qaeda and other Sunni freedom fighters and may
give us a better indication of whether al-Qaeda is surviving, transforming, or slowly dying.
To survive, al-Qaeda needs leadership, funding,
and territory in which to operate. This territory needs
to be within the chaos of failing or transitional states,
where al-Qaeda can operate outside the law of the
land, thriving in a civil vacuum. At the moment, Syria
is the obvious temporary home for al-Qaeda, where
it can operate with impunity. However, its inability
to co-opt all the other jihadi factions in the country
indicates that there are significant limits to its power
and influence.
In the Syrian war setting, al-Qaeda followers are
primarily fighters rather than ideologues, and their
loyalties are to their immediate brothers in arms
and leaders in the field. However, these leaders in
turn swear an oath of fealty or “bayat” to Ayman alZawahiri, who, since the death of Osama bin Laden,
has been in hiding, probably in Pakistan’s Northwest
Frontier, the birthplace and the stronghold of not only
4
al-Qaeda, but the global militant-Islamist movement
and the Taliban. The same can be said for al-Zawahiri
that was said about Osama bin Laden:
how to respond to an enemy who is a man and not
a state; who has no structured organization, no headquarters, and no fixed address; and whose followers
live in different countries and feel a loyalty not so
much to that man as to the ideology of militant Islam.4
The war in Syria is becoming “a quagmire of sectarian violence”5 as the revolutionary opposition has
been splintered by rival militias turning on each other
instead of uniting against the Assad regime.
The leading al-Qaeda faction, the Al Nusrah Front,
is losing credibility among fellow Muslims who do not
agree with their mission and have refused allegiance
to al-Qaeda leaders. The other former al-Qaeda militia (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]) has already
been discredited and rejected by other rebel coalitions. News from Syria in November 2013 blames the
recent advances by Assad forces on rebel in-fighting,
according to the British-based Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights. This in-fighting is partly a struggle for
control over arms and resources but also reflects a rejection of the hard line approach to social issues of the
two al-Qaeda factions in the country. It is also a matter
of ideology and a struggle for funding from the Gulf
States among the Islamist and salafi-jihadist militias.
In the short term, the remaining al-Qaeda contingents in Syria are more concerned with establishing an
Islamic state than defeating Assad’s forces. Equally,
the newly formed Islamic Front is seen as a move to
attract funding from the Gulf, to the further exclusion
of al-Qaeda factions, including the Al Nusrah Front.
Some more enlightened Al Nusrah leaders have re5
sponded to this threat by trying to moderate their
policies to win hearts and minds, and their success or
failure will indicate the ability of al-Qaeda to endure
or whether its hard-line fundamentalism finally renders it irrelevant, unable to appeal to a wide enough
strata of society to allow it to take real control over a
state or region.
AL-QAEDA SINCE 9/11
In his July 18, 2013, testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Thomas Joscelyn
defined al-Qaeda as:
a global international terrorist network, with a general
command in Afghanistan and Pakistan and affiliates
in several countries. Together, they form a robust
network that, despite setbacks, contests for territory
abroad and still poses a threat to U.S. interests both
overseas and at home.6
This is hardly a description of a dying organization.
On the other hand, according to White House
transcripts, President Barack Obama has described alQaeda as having been “decimated,” “on the path to
defeat,” or some other variation of these phrases, at
least 32 times since the September 11, 2012, attack on
the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya.7 He has since
had to limit his statement to the Taliban in Pakistan
and al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, whose leadership
has been decimated by drone attacks. Variously dismissed as “a bunch of guys in caves”8 or “a ragtag
group of jihadists,”9 some commentators seek to dismiss al-Qaeda members today as thugs or criminals, a
localized but containable problem like the Mafia in the
1940s or the Assassins of the 12th century.
6
Other counterterrorism analysts suggested that the
killing of Osama bin Laden had defeated al-Qaeda,
along with the impact of the successful drone strikes
in Pakistan’s tribal regions, which have killed 38 alQaeda and Taliban leaders.10 Some claim that al-Qaeda was already on the decline before 9/11, and that
that one grand atrocity was its last major accomplishment. An alternative to this is that, as Jacob Shapiro
suggests, the 9/11 attacks were only possible because
al-Qaeda had the secure space in Afghanistan to operate, organize, and create a hierarchical system to train
and motivate terrorist operatives.
When terrorist groups have a great deal of operative
space and can build large, relatively formalized organizations, they can indeed be quite deadly. Terrorist
groups, of course, can no longer operate in that manner without attracting a great deal of lethal attention
from various governments and it is hard to imagine
such permissiveness will be allowed any time in the
near future.11
In effect, there is a strong argument that either alQaeda managed one spectacular strike due to luck, or
to the extent to which it was embedded in secure bases
in Afghanistan. Since then, it has lost its secure base,
most of its original leadership, and has been in strategic retreat over the past decade. However, just 1 year
after the Benghazi attack in 2012, al-Qaeda has been
described as transformed, reconstituted, or rebuilt,
and Syria has become key to this resurgence. In effect,
it is no longer “on the run” but has managed significant gains and, for the first time since it was evicted
from Afghanistan, has a substantial region under its
direct control. We are thus faced with a confusing interpretation of the relative strength of al-Qaeda and its
capacity for future actions.
7
One argument is that the mostly successful counterterrorism actions since 9/11 have meant that alQaeda has never since been able to carry out a similar
crime with the same impact and terrible loss of life.
Seventeen Americans have lost their lives to terrorism
since 9/11, and some consider this as defeat for alQaeda. For example, Thomas Lynch in a New America Foundation debate on October 17, 2012,12 argued
that al-Qaeda has been defeated, reasoning that apart
from the death of its charismatic leader, Osama Bin
Laden, it has failed to achieve its stated objectives, it
has achieved nothing since 2006, and importantly, it
has failed to co-opt salafi-jihadists to its ranks. Conversely, other analysts cite the proliferation of terrorist
attacks all over the world as evidence that al-Qaeda is
still functional in that it has successfully inspired other
jihadi movements. They argue that although Osama
Bin Laden is dead, the al-Qaeda movement lives on
as “a network, not a hierarchy,” and its resilience and
adaptability allow it to flourish as localized affiliates
in many countries around the world.
For example, Bruce Reidel, director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution, wrote on
September 27, 2013:
The horrible attack on a shopping mall in Kenya this
week, the attack on a natural gas plant in Algeria
earlier this year and the ongoing growth of al-Qaeda
franchises in Syria all underscore the remarkable ability of al-Qaeda and associated movements to attract
volunteers from across the Islamic world to its ranks.
Al-Qaeda has achieved a long-sought goal of Islamist
politics: the creation of a pan-Islamist militancy that
operates across national borders and national politics.
This transnational quality is one of the keys to alQaeda’s remarkable regenerative capacity, its ability
8
to survive massive counterterrorism campaigns and
rebuild operational capability quickly.13
This points to a major problem in understanding
al-Qaeda. As one writer put it, “Al Qaeda is a lot of
things. It’s partly an ideology, it’s partly a politicalcultural force, and it is also a state of mind.”14 This
has led to a degree of fragmentation, especially since
Ayman al-Zawahiri took over, following the death
of Osama bin Laden in 2011. The al-Qaeda inspired
groups that have become established in many parts
of the world do not necessarily take orders from
al-Zawahiri, nor are they funded directly by him.
This implies there are a substantial number of
salafi-jihadists groups that are not part of al-Qaeda,
and there are many degrees of influence, inspiration,
and affiliation. Thus, only those groups which have
sworn allegiance to al-Zawahiri should legitimately
be called al-Qaeda. Beyond these few groups, there is
simply a more amorphous network of al-Qaeda sympathizers, subscribing to the al-Qaeda mythology and
using the name when it is to their advantage.
One way to understand this nexus of groups is to
see al-Qaeda as:
far from being a fly-by-night, fragmented terror organization, Al Qaeda is attempting to behave like a
multinational corporation, with what amounts to a
company-wide financial policy across its different
chapters.15
Thomas Joscelyn’s testimony to a Congressional
committee in July 2013 described al-Qaeda as a strong
organization:
9
The backbone of today’s al Qaeda consists of its ‘general command’ in Afghanistan and Pakistan (others
refer to this as the ‘AQ Core’) and its formal affiliates.
The established al Qaeda affiliates include: Al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI) and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Shabaab in Somalia. All of the affiliates have publicly sworn bayat (an
oath of fealty) to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. Jabhat
al Nusra in Syria should also be included in this list
as well, because the group has openly proclaimed its
allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri.16
This distinction is made by other commentators,
such as former National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael V. Hayden,
during an appearance on CBS on December 29, 2013,
who stated that the al-Qaeda movement is divided
into three layers: “al-Qaeda prime, formally affiliated
and like-minded.” General Hayden told The Washington Times on December 30, 2013, that there are still uncertainties about who precisely executed and ordered
the attack on Benghazi, but that he could say with
confidence that the perpetrators were “al Qaeda affiliated if al Qaeda is viewed as a movement, a cause,
a concept.”
This is giving the organization a very bureaucratic
aspect. “They have to have bookkeeping techniques
because of the nature of the business they are in,” said
Brookings Institution fellow William McCants, a former adviser to the U.S. State Department’s Office of
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. “They have so
few ways to keep control of their operatives, to rein
them in, and make them do what they are supposed to
do. They have to run it like a business.”
10
The picture that emerges is of a rigid bureaucracy,
with a chief executive, a board of directors and departments such as human resources and public relations.
Experts say that each branch of the terror group replicates the same corporate structure, and that this strict
blueprint has helped al-Qaida not just to endure but
also to spread.17
At the same time, many of the franchises are operating independently, and it is difficult to establish
which of the jihadist groups are still loyal to the “old”
al-Qaeda and which have broken away to pursue their
own actions, independent of funding or even direction
from al-Qaeda leadership. Joscelyn describes them as
being outside the formal affiliates but describes them
as “ideological kinsmen”:
We often cannot see the operational ties between these
groups because al Qaeda still maintains a substantial
clandestine apparatus that is tasked with hiding such
relationships. For some of these organizations, there
may very well be no concrete ties and their relationship al-Qaeda’s jihad is purely rhetorical.18
The controversy about those responsible for the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi in 2012 is one
example of the confusion surrounding the name of
al-Qaeda. At the time it was often described as an “alQaeda” attack, but The New York Times published an
article on December 29, 2013,19 stating that, according
to their extensive interviews with Libyan militants,
the perpetrators of the attack were not al-Qaeda.
Guy Taylor of the Washington Times had a somewhat
different analysis:
Counterterrorism analysts and former high-level officials indicated during interviews with The Washington
11
Times last summer said that the FBI [Federal Bureau
of Investigation], which was tasked by the Obama
administration with carrying out an investigation
into the attack, had settled on a broad conclusion: The
attack was carried out by a combination of militants
with varying degrees of connection to three Islamist
groups: Ansar al-Sharia, the uhammad Jamal network,
and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.20
This pattern is also emerging in Syria. Here, there
are different factions of salafi-jihadist fighting forces,
and the divide between the mainstream Syrian opposition and the extremist jihadi groups is creating
a war on several fronts with a very volatile situation
of allegiances that are constantly shifting and changing. With the hard-line al-Qaeda faction (ISIS) now
denounced by several alliances of jihadist militias,
al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Syria has suffered a definite
setback, with implications yet to be revealed. Al-Qaeda’s remaining “official” militia in Syria is now the
Al Nusrah Front. In combination with the return of
al-Qaeda in Iraq in the Anbar province, recent events
in Syria indicate that gaining territorial control is an
important goal, but that al-Qaeda is having problems
imposing its will on other salafi-jihadist groups.
One issue is that al-Zawahiri, like Osama bin
Laden, lacks combat experience but does not have the
charisma or authority of al-Qaeda’s former leader. He
remains in hiding and in early September 2008, the
Pakistan Army claimed that they had “almost” captured him after getting information that he and his
wife were in northwest Pakistan. Currently, the U.S.
Department of State is offering a reward of U.S.$25 million for information about his location.
Al-Zawahiri to date has been unable to match the
organization and funding achieved by Bin Laden, and
12
his contact with his followers is constrained by his existence as a fugitive. In the videos released at intervals
to rally his followers, he shows he is aware of the need
for a better public image. Bin Laden himself in some of
his later writings acknowledged that al-Qaeda (“base”
in Arabic) was no longer a good brand name as he was
failing to attract funding and followers due to general revulsion against his violent and self-defeating
agenda.21
However, al-Zawahiri is still totally committed to
his vision of a global caliphate as he explained in his
2001 autobiography, Knights Under the Banner of the
Prophet, that the most important strategic goal of alQaeda was to seize control of a state, or part of a state,
somewhere in the Muslim world, explaining that,
“without achieving this goal, our actions will mean
nothing.” In this sense, the struggle to control large
areas of Syria and northern Iraq are clearly critical to
al-Qaeda being able to carry out its overall goals.
In October 2013, Ayman al-Zawahiri delivered a
recorded audio speech on the occasion of the 9/11 attacks, revealing according to Al Arabiya, that he “has
begun to suffer from frustration and incapability of
activating al-Qaeda’s strengths.” The most important
point of the speech was that America will remain “the
first target of al-Qaeda members’ operations” as per
the strategy of individual jihad—which is the only
means left for the organization.22
Al-Zawahiri, from his refuge in Pakistan, has belatedly realized that the militants’ increasing ferocity and
widespread practice of takfir (declaring other Muslims
infidels) is not winning over the Muslim world.23 His
authority has obviously been undermined by events
in Syria and the defection of ISIS. This may mean his
attention seems to have shifted instead to Pakistan
13
rather than Syria. As reported in the Pakistan newspaper, Dawn, on September 19, 2013, he urged fighters
to “create a safe haven for Mujahideen in Pakistan” so
that it can become a base for “establishing an Islamic
system.”24 As William McCants says, “Zawahiri’s inability to manage al-Qaeda’s sprawling organization
offers a preview of the infighting to come after his
inevitable death.”25
THE WIDER DYNAMICS OF
JIHADI TERRORISM
Jihadi terrorism has been in existence for a long
time, with attacks preceding the formation of al-Qaeda, and not all the resurgent salafi-jihadis in Syria
choose to call themselves part of al-Qaeda nor wish
to swear allegiance to al-Zawahiri. Despite its claims,
al-Qaeda is not aiming to unite all Muslims, as it is
strictly Sunni and violently anti-Shia. In addition, it
is not able to gain the loyalty of either all Sunni traditions or even of all Sunni militant groups.
In effect, to understand some of the dynamics in
Syria means understanding the logic and goals of the
various groups opposed to the Assad regime. This is
difficult, as “there is a natural tendency to shy away
from treating terrorists as rational actors.”26 In particular, there are some differences of opinion as to the
main motivating force of the salafi-jiahdists, with some
analysts suggesting that funding, food, and guns are
more powerful than ideology. “Size, money, and momentum are the things to look for in Syrian insurgent
politics—ideology comes fourth, if even that.”27
However, others such as Professor Joshua Landis,
believe that ideology rules.28 The public statements by
the various militia leaders are an indication of their
14
commitment to the cause of first defeating the Assad
regime, and then establishing an Islamic state. In this
respect, it is now possible to discern two major strands.
One is of groups aligned with al-Qaeda, such as the Al
Nusrah Front and ISIS, and the other are the newly
formed Islamic Alliance, which is a further consolidation of the merger of two major ideological streams
within the Syrian rebels—the moderate Islamists and
the salafists.
The Alliance rejects secularism, which it defines as
dividing religion from life and society, and is developing its own political bureaus and platforms in an
effort to challenge those of the Syrian National Coalition. While civilian populations have demonstrated
their opposition to ultra-radical influences, they are
becoming more supportive of groups that advocate
the implementation of some form of Sharia law in the
country.29
The Islamic Alliance stated on Nov. 26 that it wants
to replace Syria’s regime with an Islamic state, but
insisted it would protect minorities and not create an
‘oppressive, authoritarian system’. However, they did
not provide a clear vision of a post-Assad Syria, perhaps fearing that going into details would splinter the
alliance of seven key Islamist groups which hopes to
unify the fractured opposition.
The Islamic Front says representative government
‘is based on the notion that the people have the right
through institutions to (determine) legislation, whereas in Islam God is the sovereign’. But it adds: ‘This
does not mean that we want an oppressive, authoritarian system’, saying Syria should be ruled through a
Shura, or Islamic consultative council. The new coalition includes a Kurdish Islamic faction, and also says
it rejects ‘any project to partition’ Syria.30
15
Syriacomment.com provides up-to-the-minute information about the fluid nature of the insurgency,
noting that “powerful leaders are emerging and
smaller militias are lining up with the larger sharks.”31
The opposition remains extremely fragmented and
volatile, but salafi-leaning insurgents are the single
most dominant force in liberated areas. These groups
may not represent even half of the insurgency but are
major actors in their areas.
While ISIS and the Al Nusrah Front attract media
attention because of their al-Qaeda affiliation, past or
still existing, the other fighting factions in Syria deserve attention regarding their ideology and makeup
as “moderate” forces, possible counterweights to alQaeda. The Syrian Islamic Front is the biggest alliance
of salafi-jihadis, and, while many would like to see
them as “moderate,” they are committed first to defeating Assad’s troops and then to creating an Islamic
state, as opposed to al-Qaeda which is committed first
and foremost to global jihad.
Aron Lund’s recent comprehensive reporting for
Syria in Crisis32 notes that the Islamic Front wants “to
establish an independent state where God’s merciful
law is sovereign and where the individuals of this
state enjoy justice and a dignified life.” It spurns the
term “civil state” (dawla madaniya) as misleading and
rejects democracy and parliamentary rule. They appear to be envisioning “a republican theocracy supervised by religious scholars where there is some degree
of political competition within sharia-compliant but
otherwise modern institutions and where the role of
politicians is to administer a strict application of sharia rather than to make laws of their own.”
The militias who make up the Islamic Front now
outnumber the Free Syrian Army (FSA). As the new
16
coalition excludes the two al-Qaeda groups, the Al
Nusrah Front and ISIS, some would like to see it as
a more moderate coalition that is marginalizing the
truly radical factions.33 The jihadi culture has adapted
with the times, and the fiercely independent Islamic
Front is now seen to have three main objectives: to further isolate ISIS now that it has created its own downfall; to encourage the Al Nusrah Front to become more
mainstream; and to create a viable rebel army with
clear command and control.34
In contrast, an insight into al-Qaeda’s motives and
strength in Syria was provided by the analyst Cole
Bunzel in his February 2013 translation of a document
posted on Shumukh al-Islam, al-Qaeda’s premier online forum. Purporting to be a “comprehensive strategy” for the Al Nusrah Front in the ongoing Syrian
jihad representing the forum membership’s thinking
as a whole, the document is particularly revealing in
two respects:
First, contrary to the triumphalist tone of much Syrian
jihadi media, the Shumukh members are not upbeat
in their description of ongoing and anticipated events.
For the present, there is hope mixed with desperation and fear; for the future, a strong sense that the
jihadis will suffer strangulation from all sides. In their
worldview, some form of Western intervention to stymie jihadi success is all but assured; the West, with its
Israeli and Iranian allies, will seal Syria’s borders and
proceed to eliminate the jihadi threat, carving up Syria
and elevating the ‘Islamists’ to power.
Second, Shumukh’s recommendations presuppose a
very long war in Syria. These include such things as
rapidly increasing the number of recruits before the
borders are sealed, making sure to take control of the
regime’s heavy and unconventional weapons, estab-
17
lishing a unified media organization for more effective
propaganda, and refraining, at all costs, from allying
with ‘Islamists’ such as the Muslim Brotherhood, no
matter how attractive this might seem.35
The Al Nusrah Front (Jahbat al-Nusrah) is directly
subordinate to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The rival ISIS, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, despite
its resurgence in Iraq, is being run as a renegade operation since al-Baghdadi defied al-Zawahiri’s leadership. These two al-Qaeda branches have an estimated
6,000-7,000 operatives,36 and new recruits are continuing to arrive in large numbers. The other salafist rebel
groups in Syria total about 100,000;37 thus the proportion of fighters with formal al-Qaeda loyalty is comparatively small. There are many groups who are on
record as disavowing al-Qaeda, but that adhere to the
salafi-jihadi objectives, adding to the complexity of
predicting the strength of al-Qaeda as a distinct ideology, network, and organization.
This would support the view that al-Qaeda is divided effectively from other jihadist groups in Syria.
Thus, not only is it at war with the regime and those
who follow the Shia traditions, but is also at variance
to other radical Sunni groups. In addition, even those
who directly share its ideology are split into two factions. This may indicate that there are limits to its ability to influence events. However, in combination with
its resurgence in Iraq, it is clear that al-Qaeda is again
a major force.
AL-QAEDA’S RESURGENCE IN IRAQ
Al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Syria was preceded by
its recovery in Iraq, where it was “dead on its feet” in
2010 and has rebounded strongly since then. A suc18
cessful relaunch of the movement in April 2011 led to
a significant recovery of territory within Iraq’s Sunni
communities, notably in the Anbar province, making
the country less stable and cohesive, and effectively
merging its struggle in Iraq with the Syrian civil war.
The Syrian crisis is strengthening Al Qaeda in Iraq and
Iraqi militants are in turn, complicating Syria’s future
path. Operating as the Islamic State of Iraq and alShams (ISIS) Al Qaeda in Iraq has ambitions to dominate the Salafi terrorist scene in Syria.38
Since 2011, the Shia dominated government in
Baghdad has alienated Iraqi Sunnis by discrimination
and repression, with the result that many Sunnis have
moved to the Anbar province, making it an al-Qaeda
stronghold on the border with Syria.
The Institute for the Study of War, in an October 9,
2013, report, assessed that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has
reconstituted as a military force:
Al-Qaeda in Iraq is resurgent. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
reached its apex of territorial control and destructive
capability in late 2006 and early 2007, before the Surge
and the Awakening removed the organization from
its safe havens in and around Baghdad. Subsequent
operations pursued AQI northward through Diyala,
Salah ad-Din, and Mosul, degrading the organization
over the course of 2007-2008 such that only a fraction
of its leaders, functional cells, and terroristic capabilities remained and were concentrated in Mosul. As of
August 2013, AQI has regrouped, regained capabilities, and expanded into areas from which it was expelled during the Surge.39
Control of terrain is important to AQI, as it thrives in
a chaotic environment from which it may emerge as
the most well-organized contender. AQI seeks to cre19
ate this disorderly condition as it pursues control of
urban terrain presently secured by the forces of the
Iraqi State.40
The AQI stated aim is to gain control of Mosul to
destroy popular confidence in the Iraq administration;
to isolate Mosul’s population and government from
the state; to exploit the ethnic and social fractures
within Mosul’s diverse community; to intimidate the
population into tolerance of AQI’s presence; and then
later to compete with local and provincial governance
structures for control. However, the brutality of AQI
is appalling, with civilian casualties of more than 5,500
since April, 2013, according to United Nations (UN)
figures. As of August 2013, AQI has increased the frequency and volume of bombing attacks and has also
carried out attacks upon critical infrastructure, such as
the Um Qasr port at Basra.
The United States has reacted by reaffirming the $10
million bounty placed on Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the
leader of AQI, whom officials said was based in Syria
in August 2013. Targeting AQI’s leader, however, will
not be effective in halting the organization’s growth.
AQI is no longer a small cadre based around a single
leader, but rather an effective reconstituted military
organization operating in Iraq and Syria.41
Much of the renewed violence has been attributed
to foreign jihadists who come into Iraq from Syria, creating one large conflict zone, which has also spilled
over into the Lebanon.42 The situation in Iraq at the
beginning of 2014 has become increasingly violent.
Al-Qaeda Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
militias seized Fallujah on January 2, 2014, and have
attacked Ramadi, seeking to consolidate their hold on
the Anbar province on the border with Syria. The Iraqi
20
Army and the local tribes are fighting back. Ahmed
Abu Risha, head of the Awakening National Council—a coalition of tribesmen in Anbar—said “there
is an open war against ISIL,” with the tribes forming
a bloc against the al-Qaeda group with the help of
local police.
However, the extent of this counterstroke by the
government is in doubt. A report in Al Arabiya on
January 3, 2014, reiterates that:
Baghdad’s failure to recruit the awakening movement’s fighters into the formal army and the exacerbation of the conflict in Syria have encouraged
al-Qaeda to reemerge in the strategically important
Anbar province that connects Iraq to Syria, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia.43
Michael Knight’s December report to Congress states
that, although al-Qaeda in Iraq has been a fairly insular terrorist group for many years:
Al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Iraq is undeniably damaging to US interests in Iraq, in the broader regions and
potentially in the homeland security environments in
Europe and the United States.44
AQI has been self-funding since 2010 through organized crime such as kidnap for ransom; protection
payments from large Iraqi companies; plus trucking,
smuggling, and real estate portfolios. However, the
organization may be in danger of overreaching, as
Sunni Arabs and tribesmen become resentful of alQaeda as it becomes more powerful. This is culminating in the recent escalation of conflict in Fallujah and
Ramadi where tribal forces and the Iraqi Army were
under attack by al-Qaeda militants.
21
ISIS has now gained a territorial chain of control
stretching from Ramadi, 100 kilometers (km) west
of Baghdad, to Al-Raqqah in northern Syria, 160-km
from Aleppo. Commander Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
vows to establish an Islamist caliphate, presenting a
direct threat to Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. Despite these successes, ISIS has been disowned
by al-Zawahiri and the formal al-Qaeda leadership.
In effect, particularly in Syria, there are two groups
that share al-Qaeda’s ideology but are at war with
each other.
AL-QAEDA IN SYRIA—ISIS AND
THE AL NUSRAH FRONT
While the civil war is still being waged in Syria and
it becomes increasingly dangerous for journalists, it is
difficult to get reliable, detailed information about the
al-Qaeda organizations operating alongside the rebel
opposition.
The rival sides (the supporters and opponents of the
regime) customarily issue biased and manipulative
reports whose sole purpose is to further their own interests. Each side claims to be winning and each side
slanders the other. Another difficulty is the nature of
the Al Nusrah Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and
Greater Syria (ISIS). They are both closed decentralized organizations with many rivals and which are
careful to preserve their secrecy, and do not reveal,
even to their own operatives, information about their
leaders or about how they operate.45
To understand the situation, it is necessary to consider ISIS and Al Nusrah as separate organizations,
even if they essentially share the same ideology.
22
ISIS.
In April 2013, AQI declared itself the ISIS, expanding its historical identity to include Syria. Its leader,
Al-Baghdadi, had played a key role in establishing the
Al Nusrah Front and considered Abu Mohammed alGolani, Al Nusrah’s leader, to be his subordinate with
a duty to obey him.
Baghdadi attempted to integrate Jabhat al-Nusrah
(the Al Nusrah Front) into ISIS, with the new organization being called the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham,
ISIS. ISIS took control of wide areas without much resistance, benefitting from the Jabhat al-Nusrah fighters who defected to ISIS.46 Al-Baghdadi claims descent
from the Prophet Muhammad and has been described
as a “philosopher jihadi,” something quite different
from other al-Qaeda leaders.47 His leadership ambitions and his brutal methods of enforcing Sharia law
have alienated ISIS from the populace and the Syrian
Islamic Front.
ISIS is estimated to have about 8,000 soldiers in both
Syria and Iraq, who were recruited without checking
the quality of the new members. ISIS started paying
$200 a month for each fighter, and thousands of men
in ISIS’s area of control joined the group. Al-Baghdadi
continues to be openly defiant of al-Zawahiri’s directives and, according to a jihadist source quoted by the
Iranian news source Alalam:
Baghdadi believes in the necessity of declaring the
emirate, or Islamic state, immediately and declaring
its emir as its leader who alone [makes decisions], and
for the mujahedeen to swear allegiance to that Islamic
state in the territories [it controls], be they Syrian or
non-Syrian, and by not recognizing the Sharia com-
23
mittee judges who come from other Islamic factions.
There should be no law but ISIS’s law. Also, all Islamic factions should swear allegiance to the ISIS emir
or be considered outside of God’s authority. Military
cooperation happens only with the battalions that declare exclusive allegiance [to ISIS]. And ISIS preachers
(mosque preachers) have the right to replace the local
preachers in all mosques. Moreover, all the spoils and
financial resources belong to the ISIS’s treasury. The
other factions, whether or not they are Islamic, have
no right to that money.48
ISIS has been criticized for attacking fellow rebels
and establishing its own fiefdom. It fought against the
FSA, for example, in Azaz, north of Aleppo, so that it
could take control of the border crossing with Turkey
to capture revenue and control goods moving to Aleppo. Turkey closed the border crossing in response.49
ISIS also sought to establish a foothold in the northeast section of Syria that borders Iraq. However, this
is being contested not only by Assad’s forces, but by
Syrian Kurds who are taking advantage of the unrest
by planning to form a transitional administration. Iranian Fars News reports on November 27, 2013, that
Syrian Kurdish fighters have intensified their attacks
against ISIS and recently seized the sole border post at
Yarubiya held since March by al-Qaeda-linked groups
on their border with Iraq.50
By adding the Kurds to their list of enemies, ISIS
would seem to have too many enemies to be able to
survive for long. Instead of concentrating on defeating the Syrian Army, it has taken over two towns
from the FSA forces and seems to be intent on establishing a foothold for an Islamic state, creating in
Syria’s north a series of fiefdoms run by rival warlords. This self-serving aggressiveness, along with
24
its brutality, has led, among others, to American alQaeda spokesman Adam Gadhan recommending that
al-Qaeda publicly sever its ties with the Islamic State
of Iraq because its sectarian violence tarnished AQ’s
reputation.51
Al-Zawahiri, in a broadcast on Al Jazeera TV on
November 9, 2013, declared that Golani’s Al Nusrah
Front would continue to function as “an independent
branch of Al Qaeda that reports to the general command.” He said that al-Baghdadi had “made a mistake by establishing the [ISIS] without asking for our
permission.” “The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
is to be abolished while the Islamic State of Iraq remains functioning,” al-Zawahiri said.52 Subsequently,
al-Qaeda has stressed that it:
has no connection with the group called the ISIS, as
it was not informed or consulted about its establishment. It was not pleased with it and thus ordered its
suspension. Therefore, it is not affiliated with al-Qaeda and has no organisational relationship with it. . . .
Al-Qaeda is not responsible for ISIS’s actions.53
On October 5, 2013, Cole Bunzel of jihadica.com
noted that ISIS persisted “in a state of outright disobedience to its supposed seniors in Al Qaeda Central
(AQC), Zawahiri among them.”54 Brookings Institution’s William McCants said, “In the 25 year history of
Al Qaeda, no affiliate has ever publicly disagreed with
the boss so brazenly.”55
Since the defection of ISIS, both al-Qaeda branches
have entrenched themselves as independent organizations in the Syrian theater of operations. The split
has been widely covered on jihadi forums and social
networking websites, with some supporting the ISIS,
some the Al Nusrah Front, and others both groups
equally, for they each are waging jihad against the en25
emy. On the ground, however, the Al Nusrah Front
is attempting to maintain its popular support among
the Syrian people, whereas ISIS has initiated attacks
on fellow Muslim rebels and has instituted draconian
Islamic law in towns it controls. ISIS does not seem to
have learned from experience in Iraq where al-Qaeda’s
brutal campaigns have alienated many Sunnis and led
to its isolation. Since its takeover of the eastern city of
Raqqa in May 2013, ISIS has focused on solidifying its
rule through intimidation, creating an economy of dependence, and seeking to integrate eastern Syria with
its strongholds in Iraq. Minorities have been hounded
out of the city and foreign journalists and aid workers
are no longer welcome; dozens are presently in ISIS
captivity.56
According to Chris Looney, writing for Syria
Comment:
Its hostility towards minority groups, draconian legal
system, and brutal repression of dissidents has generated a significant backlash, severely undermining the
group’s credibility and keeping it from being seen as a
legitimate part of the opposition. Because of this, ISIS’
current governance strategy is likely unsustainable.
Still, ISIS thrives on instability, and as the Syrian
war reaches its 1,000th day with no end in sight, the
group is likely to be able to maintain its hold in Raqqa.
Whether it can learn from its mistakes remains to be
seen, but absent a dramatic shift in the trajectory of the
conflict, ISIS is here to stay.57
That dramatic shift has now taken place, with ISIS rejected not only by the al-Qaeda leadership, but also
the Al Nusrah Front and almost all the other rebel
factions because of its uncompromising ideology and
imposition of strict Sharia law on the areas it holds.
26
The Al Nusrah Front.
The Al Nusrah Front was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in May
2013. According to a Quilliam Foundation report,58
al-Qaeda sent operatives from Afghanistan to Syria
as early as 2000 to train them for the fighting in Iraq.
In March 2011 when the Syrian uprising began, AQI
sent trained Syrian and Iraqi guerilla fighters back
into Syria, where they later defined themselves as
an autonomous organization and strengthened their
direct links with al-Qaeda, formally becoming an alQaeda branch called Jahbat al-Nusrah (JN), or the
Al Nusrah Front.
Many cadres of the Al Nusrah Front come from
the jihadist network of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which
was built during the 2000s and centered in Baghdad
in 2002, following Al-Zarqawi’s arrival from Afghanistan via Iran. Syrians who had been with AlZarqawi in Herat, Afghanistan, in 2000 were sent to
build branches of his network in Syria and Lebanon,
with Al-Zarqawi exercising control from Iraq. These
jihadists established “guesthouses” in Syria to channel would-be fighters to Iraq and the infrastructure
flourished. During this period, Syria acted as the main
channel for funding for the network, with Saudi and
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) jihadists in the Levant securing financial support from sympathisers in
their home countries.
On January 24, 2012, the Al Nusrah Front was formally announced with the objective of establishing an
Islamist state in Syria and a caliphate in Greater Syria,
by its leader Muhammad al Golani (also spelled Al
Julani). His name reflects the fact that he is probably
from the Golan Heights, and is thought to have close
27
ties to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and AQI. A secretive
figure, he has several times been pronounced killed
in battle,59 yet he appeared recently on Al Jazeera
TV, his back to the camera, and his face covered by a
black scarf.
Al-Golani has renounced the FSA, saying it was a
crime to accept the aid of Western countries in the war
to topple the Assad regime. He also announced his opposition to Turkey as a U.S. ally and opposes both the
Arab League and Iran. By refusing to cooperate with
the pro-democracy opposition, the Al Nusrah Front
has fragmented the anti-Assad forces, a counterproductive stance as it is also alienating the international
community.
The Al Nusrah Front is very selective about initiating new members, requiring tezkiyya, or personal
assurance, from two commanders on the front line,
stating that the recruit has the necessary skills, religious commitment, and attitude to join the group.60
Recruits are tested in the field for courage and loyalty
to the Front’s ideology. According to the Quilliam
Foundation report:
This is part of the reason JN [the Al Nusrah Front] has
been so successful—other rebel groups such as the
Free Syrian Army (FSA) have a policy of mass recruitment which makes them appear strong, but actually
leaves them chaotic and disunited.
Another Al Nusrah Front leader, Al-Amir Gazi
al-Haj, said his group is effective because it has extremely high standards. “We only accept the best of
the best,” he is quoted in an interview.
We have pure intentions. We fight only for Allah. We
do not accept even small deviations [from God’s law],
28
like smoking. We walk a straight line, and you can see
the results.
Al Nusrah Front’s new recruits take an oath of allegiance or al-Bay’ah. The religious nature of this oath,
swearing before God to follow the jihadist leadership,
makes it a stronger, more personal contract than a
simple civil oath would be. Breaking this oath carries significant danger, with jihadists in Algeria killed
for refusing to follow the leaders to whom they had
pledged allegiance. The religious basis of this oath
means that recruits have no legal recourse should they
wish to leave the group, as they have made a vow to
submit to jihadist leaders entirely, unless their instructions go against the will of God.61
The exact number of foreigners is not known, but
approximately 7-11 percent of the volunteers come
from West European countries (mainly the United
Kingdom [UK] and France) and Muslim countries in
Central Asia (mainly Chechnya).62 Their motivation
and ideology differ—some are motivated by sectarian
considerations, some by a hatred of the Assad regime,
and some volunteer because of a sense of adventure
and the heroic image of the rebels.
Many come to Syria to join the FSA but then transfer to the Al Nusrah Front because of better salaries
and equipment, organization, and resources. Many
adopt the salafi-jihadi ideology only after staying in
Syria, where they undergo an accelerated process of
radicalization. Concern exists in their home countries
that when the operatives return, having undergone
military training and radicalization, they will potentially engage in radical activity and terrorism. But as
volunteering to fight Assad is not a crime in the volunteers’ countries of origin, authorities have no effective
way of dealing with the phenomenon.
29
While Syrians continue to suffer, sandwiched between a brutal dictatorship and extremist groups,
Arab and European jihadists are being indoctrinated
and trained in the world’s most active battle zone—
experience they may someday bring home.63 The brigades are made up of thousands of volunteers from
the Arab Muslim world, such as Libya, Tunisia, Saudi
Arabia, and Egypt who now make up the majority of
its members. The process of jihadist operatives joining
the ranks of the Al Nusrah Front is still going on.64
While admitting to receiving help from the Iraq
branch since the early days of the insurgency, Golani
said that the Al Nusrah Front would continue operating under its own banner, with loyalty to al-Zawahiri.
“The banner of the Front will remain the same, nothing will change about it even though we are proud
of the banner of the (Islamic) State and of those who
carry it,” he said.65
The Al Nusrah Front leadership is aware of the
negative publicity that is created by indiscriminate
attacks killing civilians but are outspoken through
their own media network, al-Manara al-Bayda, about
the sectarian nature of their mission; revenge against
al-Nusayrin (Alawites) for their mistreatment of ahl
al-Sunna (Sunnis).
Once the Ba’athist regime falls, JN’s opponents will
become many and varied. Moderates who support
the group’s strong stance against Assad may grow to
be repulsed at the continuing violence and increasingly extreme rhetoric which could follow the fall of
the regime.66
This has proved to be the case with the excesses
of ISIS and, while Al Nusrah may be more pragmatic
in its statements, it clearly represents a mortal threat
30
to anyone from different confessional groups or who
hope for a democratic, secular Syria. It remains to be
seen whether the Al Nusrah Front has learned from
the ISIS mistakes and will temper its rhetoric and actions in the field. The ability to make the transition
from being a combat organization to gaining popular
acceptance will be crucial in determining the limits to
the current al-Qaeda resurgence.
AL-QAEDA AND POPULAR GOVERNANCE
Al-Qaeda’s efforts at building community trust
and respect among beleaguered citizens in war-torn
Syria is an indication of whether it will be a movement
that prevails, or whether it is simply a wartime phenomenon. Its record of nation-building internationally
has been negligible, and recent events are proving that
“significant grassroots hostility is building in liberated
parts of Syria against foreign-funded extremists and al
Qaeda affiliates.”67
It would seem vital to al-Qaeda’s survival to have
the support of the local populace in whatever country
it seeks to become established, otherwise it simply remains an organization that attracts deracinated young
men, adventurers, malcontents, and religious zealots
with a taste for violent adventure. Al-Qaeda has always been associated with violence and destruction,
unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, which historically attempted to create community loyalty through public
service. This is important, as Syria has a tradition of
relative pluralism and tolerance:
Syria has been a pluralistic secular society for decades.
The majority of its Sunni Muslim population are conservative and have coexisted peacefully alongside the
31
many other religions and ethnic minorities that make
up Syria’s diverse society, history, and culture. The
people of Syria do not aspire to a Saudi sponsored
Salafi/Wahhabi leadership or doctrine of law.68
The Syrian people would appear to be reluctant
participants in the attempt to establish an Islamic
state. The actions of ISIS and the Al Nusrah Front in
the areas they now control will be an indication of
their future staying power based on their governance
of the civilian populations. At present, the establishment of Sharia law and tribunals is the one unifying
factor of the different rebel factions, and their imposition of Sharia law on civilians seems to be tolerated as
long as it is not punitive and that public services are
restored as well.69
Throughout Syria since the very beginning of the
democratic uprising, communities have attempted
with more or less success to establish civilian governance and prevent anarchy. The Local Coordination
Committees (LCC) realized the importance of remaining committed to the original goals of the revolution—freedom, justice and equality for Syrians of all
backgrounds. A network of 70 coordination groups
(tansiqiyat) operated by media and street activists connected to the grassroots revolt inside Syria, played a
key role in organizing anti-regime demonstrations,
and disseminating information about the revolution.70
Activists in coordination committees across the
country deplored the actions of warlords who are
benefiting from the current conflict at the expense of
the Syrian people. “They are no different from the corrupt regime,” and have “sold the revolution for their
personal gain,” the grassroots organization said in a
recent statement.71 However, the dwindling secular
32
opposition in Syria, whose activists have, in many
cases, lost hope and fled the country, has given way to
the uncertain control of the rebels in areas where civil
services have broken down completely.
Unlike ISIS, the Al Nusrah Front seems to have
a strong appreciation of the need to win hearts and
minds to justify their presence in towns and villages
under their control. They claim to control parts of at
least a dozen Syrian towns, including sections of the
ancient city of Aleppo in the northwest. The group’s
social wing, Qism al-Ighatha (Relief Department),
provides food and warm clothing to civilians where
possible, as well as seizing wheat by force to distribute among the hungry in Aleppo. The group has also
released videos on jihadist websites claiming that it
is providing services to the people of several towns
in the governorate of Idlib, which borders the Aleppo
Governorate to the west. Al Nusrah claims that it is a
quasi-government and service provider in the towns
of Binnish, Taum, and Saraqib.72
Aaron Zelin at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy says that Al Nusrah’s ability to provide security and basic needs such as bread and fuel to Syrian
civilians, as well as to reopen shops and restart bus
services, has won gratitude from people who would
not usually adhere to its strict ideology.
This seems to demonstrate that we are witnessing the
building of JN security structures across the country,
showing that the group are adapting to the changing
conflict, and making preparations for a post-Assad future by taking steps towards separate security service
and army structures. JN’s sharia courts are also open
to Syrian civilians, and non-members have come to
ask the court’s advice on personal matters. The Free
Syrian Army (FSA) recently adopted a similar legal
33
structure, with an FSA member explaining the benefits of establishing a court as a way of maintaining
law and order.73
The Front’s behavior in Deraa, demonstrated by its
insistence on collaboration and lack of conflict with
other rebel groups, indicates that the group is responsive to local conditions and able to “play by the rules”
in a given battle space.74 This gains it some credibility
with the exiled opposition leadership who disagree
with the U.S. designation of the Al Nusrah Front as a
terrorist organization.75
By contrast, the other al-Qaeda affiliate, ISIS, is despised by many Syrians, as its goal seems to be not to
defeat Assad but to consolidate its own power in rebel-held areas. This has led to its recent denunciation
by rebel groups and the demand that it disband and
leave the country. Syria represented al-Qaeda’s best
chance of proving its continuing relevance by establishing a new base in the Middle East. ISIS has ruined
this opportunity by its hesitancy in taking on Assad’s
forces and by moving in to already liberated areas and
proving to be more barbaric than the Assad regime.76
In this respect, at least within basically Arab and
Sunni communities, it may appear that al-Qaeda has
learned its lessons from Iraq. It has taken from the
long-established Muslim Brotherhood and groups
like Hamas and Hizbollah an appreciation of the importance of acting as a source of security and food, as
well as being a combat force. The problem, of course,
is that on religious grounds, it can make no appeal to
Shia, Christian, or secular communities and seems to
have lost any chance of alliance with the Kurdish communities of northern Syria.
34
SYRIA TODAY
The extent that al-Qaeda can manage this balance
between gaining at least the tolerance of the wider
population, and its own core ideology is perhaps the
key to understanding the true strength of its recent
resurgence. In early-2013, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) commissioned a workshop of
experts to assess the future of al-Qaeda. CSIS found:
“How AQ [al-Qaeda] adapts to the challenges and opportunities that will shape its next decade is a source
of spirited debate amongst government officials,
academic experts, think-tank analysts and private
consultants.”77
The “spirited debate” will persist as the conflict
in Syria continues to reveal the intransigence and
the growing isolation of the now discredited and ostracized al-Qaeda faction, ISIS. ISIS retains control
of various areas in Syria and, according to analyst
Aron Lund, will probably resist pressure to abandon
them.78 How the other al-Qaeda faction, the Al Nusrah Front, reacts to this development will be an indication of al-Qaeda’s remaining strength and influence
in Syria. The Al Nusrah Front is showing more flexibility and cooperation with the other salafi-jihadi alliances as, after all, they share the same ideology. But
their allegiance to al-Zawahiri sets them apart from
the other alliances’ command structures. Until they
embrace the authority of the Sharia tribunals being established, they run the risk of being isolated like ISIS.79
Most Syrians see this as a struggle against the Assad
regime, not as part of a wider al-Qaeda goal to re-establish territorial control of a significant portion of the
Muslim world.
In the meantime, the resurgence of AQI is causing great disquiet. A December 2013 report by Dr.
35
Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy stresses the necessity of defeating the alQaeda narrative in Iraq and “splitting the reconcilable
Sunnis from irreconcilable militants.”80
This is happening in Syria with the now overt battle
of the jihadist militias against the “irreconcilable militants” of the rebel al-Qaeda affiliate, ISIS. A statement
from the Front of Syrian Revolutionaries shows its antagonism towards ISIS, which is referred to as Daash,
the acronym in Arabic for ISIS.81 Jaysh al-Mujahideen
is a coalition of seven Islamist factions that announced
its formation on January 2, 2014. Their statement also
makes it clear that they consider ISIS the enemy:
We, the army of Mujahideen announce that in defense
of ourselves, our honor, our money and our land, we
declare war on ISIS so long as it refuses to obey God’s
law until which time it dissolves and its members join
other military groups or they leave their weapons and
quit Syria.82
A January 4, 2014, report out of Beirut by Agence
Presse added that the Alliance reproached ISIS for:
spreading strife and insecurity . . . in liberated [rebel]
areas, spilling the blood of fighters and wrongly accusing them of heresy, and expelling them and their
families from areas they have paid heavily to free from
Assad’s forces.
The report went on to say that “At least 36 members
and supporters of ISIS have been killed since Friday in
Idlib, and more than 100 have been captured by rebels” in Idlib and Aleppo, the Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights said.83
Hassan Aboud, political head of the Islamic Front,
explained the tensions in a recent Al Jazeera interview.
36
We would like these [ISIS] brothers to join their brethren in the Syrian revolution. We see them as nothing
but another group. They see themselves as a State.
They need to drop this illusion that they have come to
believe as an established fact. It causes them to treat allies as opponents. Nusra doesn’t differ in ideology and
authority from ISIS, but they have been able to work
hand in glove with the other militias because they
have followed the rule that no objective has a higher
priority than pushing back the enemy. So we call on
ISIS to follow Nusra’s lead.84
The Islamic Front makes it quite clear that the common goal should be of establishing an Islamic state
and deciding its leadership and governance comes after the defeat of Assad’s forces. The Emir of ISIS, Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, obviously has been premature and
arbitrary in designating himself the Caliph85 and demanding that others give him allegiance.
It now remains to be seen how the Al Nusrah Front
fills the vacuum created by the loss of credibility and
likely demise of ISIS. However, the problems of ISIS
are not necessarily a blow to al-Qaeda, an affront to its
leader al-Zawahiri, and a public relations disaster for
its objective of establishing a global caliphate. Al Nusrah is formally aligned to al-Qaeda and presumably
sees the principle gain from victory in Syria the establishment of a safe region that has been al-Qaeda’s goal
since it was evicted from Afghanistan. It is being more
tactically astute than ISIS in short-term cooperation
with the wider jihadist alliances in Syria but presumably retains very separate long-term goals.
The other groups may have some awareness of this,
as the Islamic Alliance has since it was superseded by
a new Islamic Front, as announced in November 2013.
37
Seven rebel groups came together in a new configuration that excludes the al-Qaeda affiliated Al Nusrah
Front. It includes the Tawheed Brigade and the salafist Ahrar al Sham and thus potentially brings together
tens of thousands of fighters. The leader of the new Alliance is Abu Eissa al-Sheikh, who described the new
coalition on Al Jazeera as an “independent political,
military and social formation . . . to topple the Assad
regime . . . and to build an Islamic state.”86
Since the announcement of the new Islamic Front,
two new coalitions have been announced in January
2014, called Jaysh al-Mujahideen and the Front of
Syrian Revolutionaries, the new configurations being
formed as a backlash against ISIS. The Syrian Opposition Coalition has also spoken out against ISIS, calling it “a regime inspired organization, designed to
undermine the revolution and pervert the meaning of
Islam.”87
The Coalition stands in full solidarity with all Syrians
rising up against al-Qaeda’s extremism and calls upon
the international community to recognize the importance of supporting revolutionary forces as partners
in the fight against al-Qaeda’s extremism and Assad’s
sponsorship and encouragement of extremist forces.88
Opposed by all other forces in Syria, ISIS seems
to have backed itself into an ideological corner, leaving the Al Nusrah Front as the remaining al-Qaeda
standard bearer.
38
CONCLUSION
The war in Syria has become a complex network of
conflicts. The regime has brought in fighters from Hizbollah, threatening to spread the war to Lebanon. The
anti-Assad opposition is split between secular groups
such as the FSA, Islamists such as the Islamist Front,
and the two competing al-Qaeda factions of ISIS and
the Al Nusrah Front. Division between the FSA, the
al-Qaeda elements, and the salafi-jihadists has created a tenuous situation, with rival Islamist factions
intent on establishing their own territorial spheres of
influence, thus enabling Assad’s forces to regroup and
fight back. The new alliance against ISIS should help
to rally support from overseas and to raise morale.
However, it is not just a domestic dispute but has
become a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran,
with involvement also of Qatar, Turkey, and Iraq.89
Until all these nations stop funding and arming the
opposing groups, the war will continue indefinitely
since it is clear the Assad regime has the capacity to
resist but lacks the ability to re-establish complete
control. While the war continues, Syria is an incubator of salafi-jihadist extremism that is threatening the
internal stability of Muslim countries with Sunni and
Shia populations. According to Aron Lund, editor of
the Syria in Crisis website run by the Carnegie Endowment, “the two conflicts in Iraq and Syria are melting
into one. The more conflicts you pull into the Syria
war the harder it will be to stop it.”90 But peace should
be an imperative, not an option.
As the winter advances and the rebel forces gains
are countered by Assad forces retaking positions to
cut rebel supply lines, the war seems to have reached a
stalemate. The resilience of the Assad regime is dispir-
39
iting the activists who created the revolution nearly 3
years ago. Disillusioned by the lack of support from
the West, the corruption of rebel commanders, the disarray and division on their side, and the rising power
of the Islamist rebels, many are exhausted by the conflict, which has no end in sight.
The battle now is one of survival rather than a fight
for democracy and civil rights. As many young motivated people are leaving the country, it becomes even
harder for those who remain. Stories of betrayal and
disappointment are common, and the only hope for
Syria today is for negotiations to bring about a ceasefire, while the weakened Assad regime still maintains
the remnants of statehood and thus represents a body
with which to negotiate. The revolution has failed, but
equally so, the Assad regime has failed to win mass
support.91 The protracted civil war has created a rapidly failing state, a tragic refugee problem, and it is
estimated that by the end of 2014, more than half the
population of Syria will be living as refugees, a situation that can only be resolved by the powers who are
enabling it to continue.92
The United States has provided substantial
amounts of nonlethal as well as military aid, especially to the FSA. However, this was suspended when the
FSA lost control of key stocks to the Islamist groups
and subsequently nonlethal aid was restarted. However, the United States has found another avenue to
send weapons by sending 15,000 anti-tank missiles to
Saudi Arabia, at a cost of over $1 billion. The expectation is that Saudi will retain these to modernize its
forces and will send its older stockpiles to the Syrian
rebels.93 The Islamic coalitions will welcome the arms
to continue the war of attrition against Assad’s artillery and air power, with the recent barrel bomb at-
40
tacks in Aleppo suggesting that Assad is running out
of sophisticated weaponry. However, the insurgents
are still facing a bleak winter, with erratic supplies
and with the added complication of ISIS no longer as
an ally and, in some cases, as the enemy. However,
this suggests that enough arms will reach Syria to allow the various factions to continue to fight, even if
there is no longer a realistic hope that the war will end
by military victory.
Al-Qaeda’s future is tied up with these dynamics.
The attempt by ISIS to create an Islamic state of Greater Syria has been discredited, and its fighters will
probably eventually retreat across the border to Iraq
to join the al-Qaeda led insurgency there. The question remains of how long the al-Qaeda resurgence will
last and whether it has the staying power to remain
in areas where it now has armed control. Equally,
although the Al Nusrah Front is formally aligned to
al-Qaeda’s central leadership, at the moment it is operating in relatively close cooperation with the salafist Islamic Front and is seeking to balance its military
goals with building a social system in areas it controls.
If al-Qaeda is to be denied a foothold, it will be essential for the new Islamic Front to hold together and
continue to occupy the moral high ground, so that it
may increasingly be seen as separate and distinct from
al-Qaeda, represented now only by the Al Nusrah
Front. The banishing of ISIS has presumably had the
effect of weakening the al-Qaeda presence and prestige in Syria and reinforces the ascendancy of coalitions, with or without the Al Nusrah Front. The statement announcing the Islamic Front described it as “an
independent political, military, and social formation
that seeks to completely topple the Assad regime in
Syria and build an orthodox Islamic state.”94 Most of
41
the participating groups have cooperated in battle in
the past, and, while one spokesman denied that the
alliance had been formed to challenge ISIS, it has been
perceived as a show of force by mainline rebel factions
against the al-Qaeda extremists. Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Stephen
Ford established contact with the new Islamic Front
leaders in November, and the Obama administration
has committed itself to ”an expanded Syrian insurgency that includes the recently-formed Islamic Front.”95
This can be interpreted as a pragmatic decision to ensure that the Al Nusrah Front is marginalized from
the wider Islamist opposition. However, this suggests
that the U.S. administration simply does not know
what to do, or who to support, and that every option
looks like a bad one.
“The conflict has become an existential struggle
for all concerned and not even the fall of Assad will
bring an end to the violence.”96 Local militias are operating beyond any rules of engagement and have not
yet come together to make the transition from guerilla
fighters to a force capable of defeating Assad’s army
on the ground. Fighting continues with uncoordinated autonomous formations attaining tactical victories
but unable to alter the situation strategically.
U.S. policy will have to change as nonintervention
has made the situation worse.97 It is a supreme irony
that the United States, after spending so much time,
treasure, and so many lives to defeat terrorism, may
now have to ally itself with salafi-jihadis to topple
Assad and end the carnage in Syria. As the Islamic
Front has not been designated a terrorist organization like the Al Nusrah Front, the United States can
create closer relationships with secular and moderate
rebels in the Islamic Front, avoiding any hint of sup-
42
port for Assad and developing an understanding of
what the grassroots Syrian population has been trying
to achieve. In the process, it could continue to weaken
al-Qaeda until it is a marginalized branch of a much
bigger enterprise of concern—the growing salafi-jihadi movement. In the meantime:
The longer the Syrians fight, the more sectarian the
conflict becomes, the more savage the fighting, the
more sectarian cleansing will occur, the greater the accumulation of reasons for revenge, the less likely there
is to be a political situation.98
This leaves open the future of al-Qaeda and its desire to establish an Islamic state in Iraq and Syria. ISIS
has failed to impose its will in Syria but remains the
dominant power in northern Iraq. In turn, the Al Nusrah Front is the dominant al-Qaeda faction in Syria
but has no influence in Iraq. The traditional al-Qaeda
approach, typified by ISIS, has little chance of gaining popular support beyond those fully committed.
Its brutality and sectarianism preclude even tactical
alliances, and its ideological straightjacket means its
version of Sharia law loses it any support in regions
it controls. In this respect, the Al Nusrah Front may
be a more formidable foe. It seems to have learned the
importance of building a social support network and
close cooperation with those who share much of its
ideology. Equally, it seems to have accepted the Islamic Front’s logic: essentially win the war first, and then
work out the nature of the state. On the other hand,
ISIS stressed its differences with any other ideological
or religious current even while the war with Assad’s
regime was ongoing.
The U.S. administration’s decision to not proscribe
the Islamic Front, as well as the Islamic Front’s need
43
to retain its Gulf backers, may mean the current loose
alliance with Al Nusrah is doomed. Faced with the
risk to its funding and arms supplies if it continues to
operate in tandem, the Islamic Front may well turn on
its al-Qaeda ally. Equally, the Islamic Front is essentially fighting a domestic struggle in Syria, while Al
Nusrah, given its allegiance to the core al-Qaeda leadership, presumably sees Syria as simply a means to an
end—the re-establishment of a safe zone the organization has lacked since it was evicted from Afghanistan.
Even if the alliance is maintained, Al Nusrah will
struggle to balance its military and social roles. Jacob Shapiro, in his book The Terrorists Dilemma, discusses the problem that terrorist organizations face to
maintain organizational discipline and management,
“given the secretive nature and the challenges and
constraints of communication without detection.”99
Also when commanders in the field become too independent, it is difficult for the leadership to control
them except by cutting off funds, which further alienates the commanders who then tend to resort to kidnapping, smuggling, or the drug trade to finance their
operations. This brings the name of salafi-jihadism
and al-Qaeda further into disrepute among moderate
peace-loving Muslims.
Shapiro refers to the mundane side of terrorism,
such as the bookkeeping, the disciplinary procedures,
and recruiting processes that make them similar to ordinary organizations, yet they are unique in that they
operate at a tremendous disadvantage.
The difficult task is achieving the controlled use of violence as a means of achieving a specified political end.
Using too much violence, or hitting the wrong targets,
can be just as damaging to the cause as employing
too little.100
44
The problems of becoming detached from the field
because of having to maintain security have led to a
lack of confidence in leadership, resulting in internal
conflicts and schisms, clearly evident in Syria right
now. Problems of trust and control have been issues
plaguing al-Qaeda for many years, according to captured documents in the U.S. Department of Defense’s
Harmony Database. Based on these documents,
Shapiro says:
At the end of the day, these examples will highlight
that terrorists are, for the most part, not nearly as successful or committed as the most successful of their
kind might make one think. As a result, their organizations are nothing close to the threat that many in the
policy community once claimed them to be.101
However, even if Al Nusrah is isolated and collapses under the tensions of its contradictions, this assumes that the war continues. One fear now is of fighters from Syria returning to their original countries.
All those countries whose nationals are at present
fighting in Syria under various insurgents’ banners
have a vested interest in not wanting them to return
home with their dangerous expertise and experience.
On January 1, 2014, The Meir Amit Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center published a definitive
report on the numbers of foreign jihadis at present in
Syria and their nationalities, and stressed the potential
danger to the Western world.102
According to Peter Bergen, CNN’s national security analyst, the widening reach of al-Qaeda in the
Middle East does not necessarily translate into an immediate threat for the United States as “only a handful
of Americans have fought in the Syrian conflict along45
side al-Qaeda’s affiliates.” However, his January 8,
2014, report says that hundreds of European citizens
have been fighting in Syria, and there is a valid concern that the returning veterans of the Syrian conflict
might launch terrorist attacks in Europe.103 The United
States and its allies should therefore make a careful
effort to track the foreign fighters who have joined jihadist groups fighting in Syria.
Given the consequences of the war continuing,
urgent consideration must be given to negotiating a
ceasefire and supporting peace talks. However, the
rather tenuous statements from the U.S. administration reveal nothing but cautious optimism about the
current peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland. Apart
from the Syrian National Council, most factions have
refused to attend the self-declared “government in
exile” opposing the regime of President Bashar alAssad. Secretary of State John Kerry called recent negotiations “a big step forward and a significant one,”104
but did not immediately address how the conflicting
demands would be resolved. At the same time, the
United States continues to supply weapons indirectly
to the conflict , as do the Sunni Gulf states and Iran.
One key issue is what the Syrian conflict tells us
about the trajectory and influence of al-Qaeda. It is
clear the organization has the capacity to embed itself
into any conflict, and its trained, motivated fighters
give it influence beyond its small numbers. There are
some signs that the Al Nusrah Front has tried to learn
from the sectarianism that has limited its appeal in
Iraq where a combination of indiscriminate attacks
and a harsh interpretation of Sharia law means few
give the group real support. On the other hand, there is
ample evidence that the central al-Qaeda leadership is
struggling to maintain control, and the loss of ISIS is a
46
warning that local affiliates can become self-sufficient.
That does not end the appeal of the ideology but does
indicate that al-Qaeda is now struggling to maintain
control over its various regional movements. In Syria,
it is likely that the Islamist Front will turn on its allies,
not the least as this may be the price paid to maintain
access to U.S. and Gulf State funds and weapons.
However, even in this case, it is more likely that
most Al Nusrah fighters and local commanders will
be co-opted into the Islamic Front rather than driven
from Syria. Al-Qaeda, as an organization, may well
find that the Syrian civil war points to the limits of its
influence. What the Syrian civil war will not do is to
end the appeal of the wider salafist-jihadist ideology.
47
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The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and
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The International Crisis Group, Brussels, Belgium.
Jenkins, Brian Michael. The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War,
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Available from www.
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE115/RAND_
PE115.pdf.
Jihadica. Available from www.jihadica.com/.
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The Long War Journal. Available from www.longwarjournal.org/.
Lund, Aron. Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syrian
Islamic Front. Available from www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.pdf.
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center, Gelilot, Israel.
The Middle East Media Research Institute, Washington, DC.
The Quilliam Foundation, London, UK.
“The Resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq,” Joint Subcommittee Hearing, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and
Trade, Washington, DC, December 12, 2013.
48
Shumukh al-Islam, al-Qaeda’s semi-official online forum.
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49
ENDNOTES
1. Donald Rumsfeld, 2103, quoted in usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm.
2. See nation.time.com/2011/06/29/the-5-trillion-war-on-terror/#
comments.
3. See www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/12/timelinearab-spring-20131217114018534352.html.
4. Mary Anne Weaver, in a profile of Osama bin Laden, The
New Yorker, January 24, 2000.
5. Gaith Abdul-Ahad, “Syria is not a revolution anymore—
this is civil war,” The Guardian, November 18, 2013.
6. Thomas Joscelyn “Global al Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives,
and Future Challenges,” The Long War Journal, July 18, 2013.
7. See cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-touts-al-qaeda-s-demise32-times-benghazi-attack-0.
8. Barry Rubin, “Why the CIA is wrong, Rethinking Al
Qaeda,” RubinReports, February 22, 2013.
9. Peter Bergen, “Should we still fear Al Qaeda?” CNN,
February 6, 2013.
10. See www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlubL-dIJ0s.
11. Jacob Shapiro, The Terrorists Dilemma, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013, p. 15.
12. See www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlubL-dIJ0s.
13. Bruce Reidel, “Kenya Terror Strike Was Part of Al-Qaeda’s
Latest Global Jihad,” New Age Islam, October 2, 2013.
14. Mary Anne Weaver, in a profile of Osama bin Laden, The
New Yorker, January 24, 2000.
50
15. The Associated Press, “Al Qaeda records even the most
minute expenses including 60 cents for cake,” Daily News, March
17, 2014. Also see www.nydailynews.com/news/world/al-qaeda-documents-show-real-company-infrastructure-article-1.1560804#ixzz2wF7DJ4Pk.
16. Joscelyn.
17. William McCants, as quoted in Ibid.
18. Joscelyn.
19. David Kirkpatrick, “A Deadly Mix in Benghazi,” The New
York Times, December 28, 2013.
20. Guy Taylor, “Intel community: NY Times wrong, al Qaeda links in Benghazi are clear,” The Washington Times, December
30, 2013. 21. There is a substantial archive of translated material at the
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, NY. One relevant report is available from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/self-inflicted-wounds.
22. Abdel Moneim Al Moshawah, “Zawahiri speech, though
confused, shows U.S. is still main al-Qaeda target,” Dubai, United
Arab Emirates: Al Arabiya Institute, October 8, 2013.
23. See www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2.
24. “The Doctor’s advice: Zawahiri issues ‘jihad guidelines’,”
The Dawn, September 19, 2013.
25. William McCants, “How Zawahiri Lost al Qaeda: Global
Jihad Turns on Itself,” Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2013.
26. Jacob Shapiro, p. 18.
27. See www.joshualandis.com/blog/#_ftn12.
28. Dr. Joshua M. Landis, Director of the Center of Middle
Eastern Studies, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, telephone
interview, January 3, 2014.
51
29. Daniel Nisman, “A New Islamist Alliance Among Syria’s
Rebels. The creation of the Islamic Alliance has the potential to
make anti-Assad moderates extinct,” The Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2013.
30. Agence-France, “New rebel alliance wants Syria as ‘Islamic state’,” Hurriyet, March 18, 2014.
31. Joshua Landis, Syriacomment.com, October 1, 2013.
32. See carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54233.
33. Hassan Hassan, “The Army of Islam is Winning in Syria,”
Foreign Policy, October 2, 2013.
34. Interview by the author with Michael Weiss, January
15, 2014.
35. Cole Bunzel, “Al-Qaeda Advises the Syrian Revolution:
Shumukh al-Islam’s ‘Comprehensive Strategy’ for Syria,” Jihadica,
February, 25, 2013.
36. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center, September 23, 2013.
37. Elizabeth O’Baqy, “Jihad in Syria,” Security Report No. 6,
September 2012, p. 23.
38. Michael Knights, “The Resurgence of Al Qaeda in Iraq,”
Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, December 12, 2013.
39. Isabel Nassief, “The Campaign for Homs and Aleppo,”
Washington, DC: Institute for Study of War, January 28, 2014.
40. “Iraq city seizures illustrate Qaeda group’s resurgence,”
Space War, January 5, 2014, available from www.spacewar.com/
reports/Iraq_city_seizures_illustrate_Qaeda_groups_resurgence_
999.html.
41. Jessica D. Lewis, “Al Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent,” Washington, DC: Institute for Study of War, September 2013.
52
42. While most foreign attention has been on the Shia Hizbollah, there has been a long-standing problem with al-Qaeda related groups, especially in the northern port city of Tripoli. The
potential for this division to form the basis of outright conflict in
Lebanon is substantial.
43. “Fighting in Iraq’s Anbar kills at least 32,” Al Arabiya
News, January 3, 2014.
44. See foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/joint-subcommittee-hearing-resurgence-al-qaeda-iraq.
45. Ibid.
46. See en.alalam.ir/news/1532838#sthash.PxCzHG1F.dpuf.
47. Joas Wagemakers, “Al Qaida advises the Arab Spring: The
Case for al-Baghdadi,” Jihidica, September 21, 2013.
48. Suhaib Anjarini, “The evolution of al-Qaeda; From Iraq to
Syria,” Alalam, November 9, 2013.
49. Landis, Syriacomment.com.
50. “Syrian Kurds Regain Control of Strategic Regions in Hasaka Province,” Fars News Agency, November 27, 2013.
51. Cole Bunzel, “The Islamic State of Disobedience: al-Baghdadi Triumphant,” Jihadica, October 5, 2013.
52. See rt.com/news/al-qaeda-syria-disbanded-480/.
53. BBC, “Al-Qaeda disavows ISIS militants in Syria,” BBC,
February 3, 2014.
54. Bunzel.
55. William McCants, “How Zawahiri Lost Al Qaeda,” Washington, DC: Brookings Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2013, p. 30,
available from www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/19how-zawahri-lost-al-qaeda-mccantsw.
53
56. See www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/dec/27/how-alqaeda-changed-syrian-war/.
57. See www.joshualandis.com/blog/al-qaedas-governance-strategy-raqqa-chris-looney/.
58. Norman Benotman and Roisin Blake, Jabat al-Nusra, London, UK: Quilliam Foundation, September 25, 2012.
59. David Trifunov, “Abu Mohammad al-Golani, leader of
Jabhat al-Nusra, killed in Syria, state TV claims,” Global Post,
October 25, 2013.
60. Benotman and Blake.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., p. 85.
63. See www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/dec/27/how-alqaeda-changed-syrian-war/?insrc=wbll.
64. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center, Gelilot, Israel.
65. Marian Karouny, “Syria’s Nusra rebels say support Qaeda’s Zawahri,” Reuters, April 10, 2013.
66. Benotman and Blake.
67. Ibid.
68. Phil Greaves, “Syria: ‘The Army of Islam’; Saudi Arabia’s
Greatest Export,” Global Research, October 3, 2013.
69. Interview by the author with Aron Lund, January 6, 2013.
70. See
lang=en.
carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=Coalitions&
71. See www.lccsyria.org/category/news.
54
72. See www.cnn.com/2014/01/07/opinion/bergen-al-qaeda-terrority-gains/index.html.
73. Benotman and Blake.
74. Nassief.
75. See www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/dec/27/how-alqaeda-changed-syrian-war/?insrc=wbll.
76. Interview by the author with Michael Weiss, January
15, 2014.
77. Joscelyn.
78. Interview by the author with Aron Lund, January 6, 2013.
79. Ibid.
80. See foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/joint-subcommittee-hearing-resurgence-al-qaeda-iraq.
81. Joshua Landis, “The Battle between ISIS and Syria’s Rebel
Militias,” Syria Comment, January 4, 2014.
82. Ibid.
83. Al Arabiya News, January 4, 2014.
84. Landis, “The Battle between ISIS and Syria’s Rebel
Militias.”
85. R. Green, “The Rift in the Global Jihad Movement,” The
Counter Jihad Report, February 21, 2014. Note that al-Baghdadi is
described as having “designated himself as a global leader of the
jihad fighters in particular and of Muslims in general, and as a
herald of the Caliphate.”
86. Loveday Morris, “Seven Syrian Islamist Groups form new
Islamic Front,” The Washington Post, November 22, 2013.
87. Landis, “The Battle between ISIS and Syria’s Rebel
Militias.”
55
88. See english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/01/04/
New-Syria-rebel-alliance-declares-war-on-al-Qaeda.html.
89. Jeremy Shapiro and Samual Sharap, Theguardian.com, November 26, 2013.
90. Interview by the author with Aron Lund, January 6, 2013.
91. Joseph Halliday, “The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War,” Middle East Journal, March 2013.
92. Brian Michael Jenkins, The Dynamics of Syria's Civil War,
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Perspective, November 2013.
93. Tony Cartalucci, Syria’s War: The Next Phase, available
from www.informationclearinghouse.info/article37121.htm.
94. Abu Eissa al-Sheikh, leader of the new entity, as he announced the group’s creation on Al Jazeera. 95. Michel Chossudovsky, “Washington’s New Islamic Front:
Expanded U.S. Support to Al Qaeda Rebels in Syria,” Global
Research, January 28, 2014.
96. Jenkins.
97. Interview by the author with Michael Weiss, January
15, 2014.
98. Ibid.
99. Jacob Shapiro.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid., p. 10.
102. See www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20607.
103. See www.cnn.com/2014/01/07/opinion/bergen-al-qaedaterrority-gains/index.html.
104. See live.aljazeera.com/Event/Syria_Live_Blog?Page=14.
56
APPENDIX
AL-QAEDA IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD
A detailed report by Thomas Joscelyn was presented to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
November 21, 2013, regarding al-Qaeda’s network in
Africa and the threat it poses to the United States.
AL-QAEDA IN THE MAGREB (AQIM)
AQIM, in his opinion, is still a very viable organization and, like Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
in Syria, is restless under al-Zawahiri’s control. The
leader of one of the AQIM brigades, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, refused to work with other AQIM leaders in
North Africa and pledged allegiance directly to al-Zawahiri. In August 2012, Belmokhtar announced that
his group, the al-Mulathameen Brigade, had merged
with the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
(MUJAO).
The AQIM network includes groups that are frequently identified as ‘local’ jihadist organizations. It is widely believed that groups such as Ansar al-Dine and the
Ansar al Sharia chapters are not really a part of the al
Qaeda network in North and West Africa.1
However, despite disagreements between the leaders of these various al-Qaeda-linked groups, according to Joscelyn, they are all openly loyal to al-Qaeda’s
senior leadership, and they have all continued to work
closely together in Mali and elsewhere. In addition,
Boko Haram, which was also recently designated a
terrorist organization, has joined this coalition and is
“linked” to AQIM.2
57
Ansar al Sharia in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia
Two prominent chapters of Ansar al Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law) have risen in North Africa, one
in Libya and the other in neighboring Tunisia. Some
have argued that, while these Ansar al Sharia chapters
cooperate with al-Qaeda, they have fundamentally
different goals. Ansar al Sharia is said to be focused
on purely “local” matters, while al-Qaeda is only interested in the global jihad. But this is simply not true.
Al-Qaeda’s most senior leaders, including Ayman alZawahiri, have repeatedly said that one of his organization’s chief priorities is to implement Sharia law as
the foundation for an Islamic state. This is precisely
Ansar al Sharia’s goal. In addition, there are credible
reports that the Ansar al Sharia chapters in both Libya
and Tunisia have provided recruits for al-Qaeda’s affiliates and other jihadist organizations in Syria, the
new epicenter for the global jihad.
The weight of the evidence makes it far more likely
than not that the Ansar al Sharia chapters in Egypt,
Libya and Tunisia are part of al Qaeda’s network in
North Africa. This has important policy ramifications
because both groups have been involved in violence,
with Ansar al Sharia Libya taking part in the Benghazi
terrorist attack and Ansar al Sharia Tunisia sacking
the U.S. Embassy in Tunis 3 days later. The Tunisian
government has also blamed Ansar al Sharia for a
failed suicide attack, the first inside Tunisia in years.
While both chapters have been involved in violence,
they have also been working hard to earn new recruits
for their organizations and al Qaeda’s ideology. The
Arab uprisings created a unique opportunity for them
to proselytize.3
58
This assessment by Joscelyn has been confirmed by
the Pentagon‘s own terrorism research agency, which
concluded in August 2012 that “al-Qaeda senior leadership” based in Pakistan was “likely seeking to build
a clandestine network in Libya as it pursues its strategy of reinforcing its presence in North Africa.” The
report predicted that AQIM was “likely to join hands
with the al Qaeda clandestine network.”4
A report by the Council on Foreign Relations, updated on January 8, 2014, notes that “though AQIM
and its offshoots pose the primary transnational terror threat in North and West Africa, they are unlikely
to strike US or Western interests beyond the region.”5
Spain and France are its foremost “far enemies” because of colonial history. The report also says that the
merger with al-Qaeda may have discredited AQIM
because of its association with the brutal tactics of alQaeda. in Iraq.
Egypt
Ansar al Sharia in Egypt has existed for some time,
run mainly by former members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), a terrorist organization headed by
Ayman al-Zawahiri that merged with al-Qaeda. In
July 2013, the formation of a new front was announced
in the wake of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s
ouster, according to the Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE) Intelligence Group. The front is
also called, “Ansar al Sharia in Egypt” and may be “a
new front with the same name. Or, perhaps it is a new
brand for an effort that was already in the works.”6
59
Somalia
The al-Shabaab organization in Somalia merged
with al-Qaeda in early-2012. Bin Laden had cautioned
against this before his death, noting that al-Shabaab’s
harsh implementation of Sharia law was alienating the
Somali population. After Bin Laden’s death, however,
al-Zawahiri went ahead and accepted a pledge of loyalty from al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane.
Al-Shabaab today is fractured into multiple rival
factions, some based along clan lines and others ideological. An Agence France-Presse (AFP) report in June
2013 stated that al-Shabaab extremists had killed two
of its own co-founders. In spite of the perception that
al-Shabaab has been severely weakened inside Somalia, where it has lost territory over the past 2 years,
Godane has strengthened his control over the group
with his ruthless treatment of rivals and his new hardline, international agenda. Al-Shabaab has said it carried out the deadly assault on a shopping center in
Nairobi on September 21, 2013, in which at least 68
people were killed.
Brookings Institute analyst Daniel Byman has detailed the extent to which al-Qaeda, through offshoots
like al-Shabaab, remains alive in Africa and, in his
opinion, has even prospered. In a paper last year titled
Breaking the Bonds Between Al-Qa’ida and Its Affiliate
Organizations, he stated:
. . . Shebaab pledged support for Zawahiri after bin
Laden’s death and then in 2012 more formally joining
al-Qa’ida by declaring Shebaab members ‘will march
with you as loyal soldiers’. Some fighters who had
trained in al-Qa’ida camps in Afghanistan moved to
Somalia to train members of the Shebaab, and the two
groups currently cooperate closely on everything from
60
indoctrination and basic infantry skills to advanced
training in explosives and assassination.7
Yemen
On January 14, 2010, Yemen declared open war on
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yemen
is currently contending with a Shia insurgency in the
north and militant separatists in the south, with ensuing waves of violence. In May 2013, Yemen’s main
oil pipeline was blown up by militants claiming to be
Ansar al Sharia, or a re-branding of AQAP. The U.S.
drone strikes in Yemen have caused great controversy, as the successful targeting and killing of militant leaders has also killed an estimated 100-200 civilians, plus 36 children. The outrage against the United
States is mirrored by outrage against al-Qaeda’s offshoot, Ansar al Sharia, which claimed responsibility
for killing an estimated 52 people in an attack on a
military hospital in Sanaa. The United States has improved its drone technology recently, and hopefully
the rate of civilian casualties will drop in Yemen as it
has in Pakistan where the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
also carry out controversial and lethal drone strikes.
United States
The presence of al-Qaeda in the U.S. homeland has
been thoroughly documented by the Henry Jackson
Society in its report, Al-Qaeda in the United States, published in 2013 and acknowledged by General Michael
Hayden as “a remarkable work.” It details how the
terrorist threat within the United States has developed, by profiling all al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda inspired
61
terrorists who were convicted in U.S. courts (federal
and military) or who participated in suicide attacks
against the U.S. homeland between 1997 and 2011.
Al-Qaeda in the United States profiles 171 individuals
who were convicted for al-Qaeda related offenses or
committed suicide attacks between 1997 and 2011. It
provides statistical analysis on their background (such
as age, nationality, occupation, education and whether
they were a religious convert); data relating to types
of offenses, type of charge and their subsequent sentence; outlines individual connections to other known
terrorists or designated terrorist organizations; and
studies whether these individuals had received terrorist training or had combat experience.8
While the total of 171 individuals convicted may
appear like a “resurgence” in al-Qaeda activity , it also
represents a reassuring resurgence in successful antiterrorism detection in the United States.
It is conceivable that al-Qaeda activity in Syria and
Iraq is emboldening al-Qaeda affiliates and sympathizers in Africa, Yemen, and across the Muslim world
wherever they exist as the increased use of global
media channels enables more communication and
publicity. At the same time, increased pushback from
anti-terrorism forces and increased negative publicity about their reckless brutality and civilian deaths,
is also bringing al-Qaeda into disrepute. The focus in
2014, however, will be on Syria, where al-Qaeda has
been hurt, and its progress has been checked for now.
But it is far from destroyed. 62
THE NON AL-QAEDA INSURGENTS:
SYRIA’S SALAFI-JIHADIS
Aron Lund documents in detail the rise of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) in his March 2013 report for
the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Also in
his four-part series for the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, he examines in detail the politics
of the Islamic Front and its emerging strength as the
most powerful coalition in Syria.
On December 21, 2012, the SIF announced its creation through a video, bringing together 11 factions,
the most influential being the Ahrar al-Sham network.
It shares salafi-jihadi ideology but it is clearly focused
on Syria:
. . . it also tries to highlight a streak of pragmatism and
moderation, intended to reassure both Syrians and
foreign policymakers. In this way, it sets itself apart as
an Islamist ‘third way’, different from both the most
radical fringe of the uprising, and from its Westernbacked Islamist mainstream.9
Hassan Abboud, the general head of Ahrar al-Sham, spearheaded the joint position of the new Islamic
Alliance announced in November 2013, rejecting the
Syrian National Council (SNC) and U.S. backed exile
groups, as well as the two al-Qaeda affiliates. However, Abboud pulled out of the council shortly after the
merger, criticizing “the hegemony of certain factions
and the exclusion of [other] effective ones,” referring
to the exclusion of al-Qaeda’s Al Nusrah Front. His
statements since are seen to be an attempt to include
the Al Nusrah Front and moderate it, rather than
alienate it like ISIS.10
63
The success of any alliance or coalition attempting
to be the “third way” between the Free Syrian Army
(FSA) and more extremist militias like the Al Nusrah
Front will depend on its ability to acquire a sufficient
level of funding to sustain its ambitious bid for salafi
leadership. Otherwise, it is likely to fragment with
time, like so many Syrian rebel alliances before it.11
The Islamic Front brought together ideologically
disparate groups: Ahrar al-Shaam (jihadi-salafi inclination), Suqur al-Shaam and Liwa’ al-Tawhid (Muslim Brotherhood), Jaish al-Islam (salafi and former
Muslim Brotherhood members with Saudi connections), and Liwa’ al-Haqq,12 to name a few.
Liwa al-Islam, the Army of Islam, is a coalition of
about 50 insurgent groups operating around Damascus, which merged into Jaysh al–Islam, (Army of Islam). General Commander of Jaysh al-Islam, Zahran
Alloush, is the son of a Saudi-based religious scholar,
and his Army of Islam flies the black flag and not the
Syrian flag. He speaks of resurrecting the Omayyad
Empire and has little faith in democracy, seeking to
establish an Islamic state ruled by a committee of Islamic scholars. He is suspicious of the FSA because of
its links with Western countries. Saudi Arabia seems
to be central to the new coalition. Liwa al-Islam was
backed by Riyadh and is the central player in the
Army of Islam.
According to Hassan Hassan in a Foreign Policy
article:
Although Liwa al-Islam had been part of the Saudibacked FSA, the spokesman of the new grouping
told an Arabic television channel that the Army of
Islam is not part of the FSA. This is likely because
the FSA has lost the trust of many rebel groups, and
adopting a religious language will be more effective
64
in countering the appeal of radical groups—which is
what happened after the announcement of the merger,
as various Islamists and moderate groups welcomed
the move.13
Contrary to the popular narrative emerging in
Western and Gulf media that this new force will represent a “moderate Islamist” coalition capable of taking
on al-Qaeda, the majority of Syrians will be repelled
by the sectarian language and ideologies of Zohran
Alloush, his group’s overt affiliations, their pandering
to al-Qaeda ideologues, and his “Army of Islam.”14
Another group in Syria is the Abdullah Azzam
Brigades, which is not recognized as a formal al-Qaeda affiliate, but it is openly loyal to al-Qaeda, and
its leaders have long operated as part of the al-Qaeda
network.15 Majid bin Muhammad al-Majid, the Azzam
Brigades’ leader, in August 2013 called for Sunnis in
Lebanon and Syria to unite against Hizbollah, which
he calls the “party of Iran.” The Azzam Brigades took
responsibility for firing rockets at Israel and recently
for the attack on the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, on November 19, 2013. Another example of the
volatility of the situation is that it was announced on
December 31, 2013, that Lebanese Armed Forces had
recently captured Majid bin Muhammad al-Majid.
A new leader will doubtless be announced for the
Abdullah Azzam Brigades.
Some other leaders with broader appeal in the
Arab and Islamist mainstream, in contrast with the alQaeda leaders, are:16
•Ahmad `Aisa al-Shaykh, or Abu Aissa, commander of Suqour al-Sham Brigade, Falcons of
Syria Brigade, based in Idlib.
65
•Abdul Qader Al-Saleh was the high Commander of Liwa al-Tawhid (Unity Brigade) based
in Aleppo and is a large, umbrella movement
formed out of regional militias numbering
about 15,000 men. Killed in action in November
2013, Abdul Qader most likely will be succeeded by Abdelaziz Salame, who was wounded in
the same attack. In a dispatch for Syria Comment
on November 17, 2013, Aron Lund reported
that:
Leadership succession might not be an easy
thing for such a group. It could suffer internal
divisions and even violent strife, at the loss of a
central and unifying leader. At a time when the
Syrian regime is advancing on Aleppo, Saleh’s
death therefore is very bad news for the opposition. Even if the front holds, Tawhid could
be drained of cohesion, and end up losing subunits and fighters to other groups.17
•Bashar Al-Zoubi, the Commander of Liwa alYarmouk in the south of Syria around Deraa.
The Supreme Military Command (the U.S.backed leadership of the FSA) has named him
the commander of the Southern Front. He is the
only member of these groups who has not expressed a wish to see an Islamist Syria.
ENDNOTES - APPENDIX
1. Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda and the threat in North Africa,”
The Long War Journal, November 21, 2013, www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2013/11/al_qaeda_and_the_thr_1.php#ixzz2lPh2AfWc.
2. Ibid.
66
3. Ibid.
4. See www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/30/intel-com
munity-still-insists-on-al-qaeda-ties-in-/#ixzz2pAozowT5.
5. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM),” New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, available www.cfr.org/terroristorganizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717.
6. See www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/07/a
_new_ansar_al_sharia_in_the_s.php.
7. See www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2013/09/alshabaab-somalia-terrorist-nairobi-mall-attack#.
8. See henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
Al-Qaeda-in-the-USAbridged-version-LOWRES-Final.pdf.
9. See www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.pdf.
10. Interview with Joshua Landis.
11. See www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.pdf.
12. See www.reasonedcomments.org/2014/01/010901-syria-war.
html#.Utw9FtLn-9I.
13. Ibid.
14. See www.globalresearch.ca/syria-the-army-of-islam-saudiarabias-greatest-export/5352638.
15. See www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/11/abdullah_
azzam_briga_1.php#ixzz2lDdwGiZn.
16. See
leaders-syria/.
www.joshualandis.com/blog/biggest-powerful-militia-
17. See www.joshualandis.com/blog/.
67
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III
Commandant
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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
and
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Steven K. Metz
Author
Lieutenant Colonel Clarence J. Bouchat, USAF
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Editor for Production
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