MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS
Manage. Decis. Econ. (2012)
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/mde.2577
Governance of Franchising Networks,
Cooperatives, and Alliances:
An Introduction
Thomas Ehrmanna, Gérard Cliquetb, George Hendriksec and Josef Windspergerd,*
a
Institute of Strategic Management, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Münster, Germany
b
IGR-IAE, School of Business Administration, Université de Rennes 1, Rennes, France
c
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
d
Center for Business Studies, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
There are many types of networks, such as franchise and retail chains, cooperatives, strategic alliances, joint ventures,
and cluster relationships, that govern interorganizational
transactions (Gulati, 2007; Cliquet et al., 2007; Hendrikse
et al., 2008; Tuunanen et al., 2011; Hendrikse and Feng,
2012; Ménard, 2005, 2012; Grandori, 2010; Windsperger,
2012). This raises the issue of efficiency of governance of
networks. This Special Issue is dedicated to developments
in economics and management of networks, especially
franchises, cooperatives, and strategic alliances.
A special feature of networks is that multiple independent firms have a stake in the development and outcome
of the network. The multiplicity of independent entrepreneurs in a network results in incentive, control, coordination and knowledge creation problems that deserve
special attention. The emphasis in the articles of this
Special Issue is in line with this focus. The authors apply
different theoretical perspectives on networks, such as
transaction cost (TC) theory (Williamson, 1991, 2002;
Marcher and Richman 2008), agency theory (Lafontaine
and Slade, 2001; Blair and Lafontaine, 2005), property
rights theory (Hart and Moore, 1990; Hendrikse, 2003;
Baker et al., 2008), resource-based and knowledge*Correspondence to: Center for Business Studies, University of
Vienna, Brunner Strasse 72, A-1210 Vienna, Austria. E-mail:
[email protected]
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
based theory (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993; Nonaka
et al., 2000; Barney and Clark, 2007), organizational
capability theory (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al.,
1997), real options theory (Reuer and Tong, 2005;
Leiblein, 2003; Tong and Reuer, 2007), and the relational governance perspective (Gulati, 2007; Dyer and
Singh, 1998; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). The Special Issue is structured into two parts:
Part I: Governance of Franchising Networks
The five articles dedicated to franchising advance
and discuss new explanations for the plural form,
the determinants of multi-unit franchising, the
allocation of decision rights, the impact of intangible
resources and explicit call options on the chain
performance, and the degree of network integration.
Part II: Governance of Cooperatives and Alliances
The six articles regarding cooperatives show that
cooperatives use their degrees of freedom in terms
of ownership, decision, and income rights to tailor
their organization to specific circumstances. This
is shown empirically as well as theoretically. The
five articles dedicated to alliances advance and
discuss new explanations for the tendency to networks, the evolution of control and coordination
T. EHRMANN ET AL.
functions in interorganizational relationships, the allocation of formal and real authority in joint ventures,
the moderating role of leverage potential and relational
polygamy for the value creation of relational investments in inter-firm alliances, and the impact of alliance
portfolio management design on alliance performance.
FRANCHISING NETWORKS
Franchising is a contractual arrangement in which an
upstream parent corporation, the franchisor, sells the
right to market a product and/or service to downstream
firms, the franchisees, usually in exchange for an
upfront fee as well as ongoing royalties. In franchised
chains, the individual outlets are run either by company
managers or by franchisees who own and manage the
outlet. The simultaneous use of company-owned and
franchised units by a franchisor is labeled as ‘plural
form’ in the franchising literature (Bradach and Eccles,
1989; Ehrmann and Spranger, 2004; Windsperger
et al., 2004; Baker and Dant, 2008). Franchising firms
differ considerably as regard the degree to which they
rely on company ownership versus franchising—some
chains are entirely franchised, whereas others have a
large proportion of outlets owned and controlled by
the company. Because franchising firms have to deal
with both franchisees and managers, they have to use
different incentives and monitoring mechanisms for
actors with more or less equivalent jobs. The costs and
benefits of different mixes of ownership and governance
forms are at the core of franchising research.
In ‘Plural Forms—A Williamsonian Approach’,
Menard studies why actors often choose to address
and combine alternative modes of organizations—
company-owned outlets and franchises. Building on
older articles by Williamson, he extends the TC model
by illustrating how the transaction at stake and the
comparative benefits derived from alternative ways of
coordinating assets necessitate different types of
contracts. He identifies three determinants driving the
use of the plural form in franchise firms: (i) ambiguity
in the advantages expected from varying degrees of
coordination/control over key assets; (ii) complexity
making more difficult the governance of assets involved
in the transaction; and (iii) strategic behavior with respect to modalities of coordinating the use of assets in
relation to partners that can also be competitors.
Despite the obvious importance of chain composition, empirical research on synergies in the plural form
is largely absent, and insights on performance implications of the plural form are equally scarce. In ‘The
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Prevalence and Performance Impact of Synergies in
the Plural Form’, Meiseberg provides the first in-depth
examination of the prevalence and performance effects
of synergies. Detailed data from 122 chains document
to what extent franchisors actually achieve synergies
by using the plural form, and what types of synergies
are most relevant in practice. The empirical analysis
demonstrates that the synergies that franchisors seek
and can actually realize are central determinants of the
chosen extent of the plural form. Her empirical
results also show that the relative importance of each
respective synergy for coping with the four franchising
imperatives—system growth, chain uniformity, local responsiveness, and system-wide adaptation—outweighs
any generic explanations for chain composition as studied in previous literature. In particular, synergies that are
provided by franchised outlets (rather than company
units) are highly relevant for decisions on chain composition. The strongest impact on the extent of plural form
stems from synergies realized by franchised outlets with
regard to local responsiveness, uniformity, and systemwide adaptation. The article implies for the management
of chains that not only developing cooperative norms in
the chain is essential but also that franchisees should be
selected such that they can provide relevant externalities
to the chain.
Hussain, Perrigot, El Akremi, and Herrbach investigate the ‘Determinants of Multi-Unit Franchising’.
Building on an organizational economics framework,
the authors give an explanation for the percentage of
multi-unit franchisees within franchise chains. Using
TC theory, property rights view, and agency theory, they
develop research hypotheses. They stipulate that franchisees’ transaction-specific investments have a positive
influence on franchisors’ use of multi-unit franchising
and that especially under a strong brand name, the
franchisor relies on a higher percentage of multi-unit
franchisees to reduce the free-riding risk. Their hypotheses are tested in the French franchising context by
using a sample of 138 franchisors. The empirical results
support their hypotheses. The combined application of
different theoretical perspectives helps them to improve
the explanation of the franchisor’s use of multi-unit
franchising in the franchising literature.
Mumdziev and Windsperger in their article ‘An
Extended Transaction Cost Model of Decision Rights
Allocation in Franchising’ include trust in transaction
cost economics (TCE). This inclusion enables them to
develop and test an extended TC model to explain the
structure of decision rights in franchising. The empirical
results show that the inclusion of trust in the TC model
supplements the TC explanation of the allocation of
Manage. Decis. Econ. (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
GOVERNANCE OF FRANCHISING NETWORKS, COOPERATIVES, AND ALLIANCES
decision rights in franchising. On the basis of data from
the German franchise sector, they find that environmental uncertainty has a negative effect on the allocation of
decision rights to franchisees. Another finding is the
positive effect that behavioral uncertainty has on the
allocation of decision rights to franchisees. This result
contradicts the traditional TC view. It implies that
franchisors are more likely to delegate decision rights
to franchisees when they encounter difficulties in
measuring franchisees’ performance and controlling
their behavior. Finally they show that trust has a moderating effect on the relationship between TC variables
and franchisor’s propensity to delegate decision rights
to franchisees. The study extends the franchise literature
by developing a TC model of decision rights allocation
and investigates the role of trust for decision rights
allocation in franchising.
In ‘Real Options, Intangible Resources and Performance of Franchise Networks’, Gorovaia and Windsperger analyze the performance of franchise networks
building on both resource-based and real options theory.
They argue that the intangible resources of the franchisor and the intangible outlet-specific resources of the
franchisees improve the performance of the franchise
system. Adding a real options perspective, they argue
that the franchisor’s use of an explicit call option in
the franchise contract—that is, a clause stipulating the
right to acquire franchise units—has a positive impact
on both the franchisor’s managerial flexibility and the
incentives for intangible investments, which should lead
to improved performance of the franchise chain. The
hypotheses, which are tested with data from the franchise
sector in Germany, are partly supported. The novelty of
the study is the common testing of resource-based and
real options models of network performance in franchising. Specifically, this study contributes to the franchise
literature as no prior study has applied the real options
perspective to franchising.
Chaudey, Fadairo, and Solard use evidence from
French distribution networks to investigate the ‘Network Integration through Franchised and Companyowned Chains’. Their sample consists of recent data
from 949 French networks, which are active in a wide
range of retail and services sectors. They examine the
degree of vertical integration that increases from franchised chains to company-owned chains. Building on
resource scarcity (signaling) theory, they hypothesize
that the integration level of the network is positively
(negatively) related to its maturity. Using agency
theory, they conjecture that the integration level of
the network is negatively related to the monitoring
costs of the upstream firm and positively related to
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
the brand name value. The empirical results of the
article illustrate that the three explanatory variables,
maturity, monitoring costs, and brand value, have a
significant influence on the degree of network integration. In particular, it is shown that a firm’s choice of a
company-owned or a franchising chain is negatively
related to its resource constraints and monitoring
costs, and positively related to the brand value of the
networks. The result concerning maturity is in contrast
to the prediction of the signaling theory.
COOPERATIVES
An agricultural cooperative is an enterprise collectively
owned by many farmers (Feng and Hendrikse 2008;
Hendrikse and Feng, 2012). Its main purpose is to serve
the membership. They exist worldwide, in various
sectors, and often coexist with investor-owned firms.
Bijman, Hendrikse, and Van Oijen show in their article
‘Accommodating Two Worlds in One Organization:
Changing Board Models in Agricultural Cooperatives’
that the 33 largest cooperatives in the Netherlands
structure their decision rights in different ways. The
ownership rights in cooperatives are formally allocated
to members, but they may decide to allocate the decision
rights informally to another party. The article distinguishes three allocations of decision rights between the
board of directors (representing the members) and
professional, outside managers: traditional model,
management model, and corporation model. The latter
model provides the professional management with
relatively most autonomy. Cooperatives with the traditional board model are least diversified in their product
portfolio, whereas cooperatives with the management
model are most diversified. Traditional cooperatives
outperform financially the other models, but sales
growth of these cooperatives is lowest.
Cook and Burress investigate ‘The Impact of CEO
Tenure on Cooperative Governance’. They establish
in a sample of 461 cooperatives in the USA that
long-tenured CEOs experience less board monitoring.
This is primarily due to formal committees and procedural aspects of governance, such as boards of longtenured CEOs meeting less often, engaging less in
board training, having fewer executive sessions, and
are less likely to include formal audit and member
relations committees as part of their structure. The
structure and the organization of the decision rights
in cooperatives in the USA seem therefore to be
related to the tenure of the CEO.
Manage. Decis. Econ. (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
T. EHRMANN ET AL.
The article ‘Quality in Cooperatives versus Investor
Owned Firms: Evidence from Broiler Production
in Paraná, Brazil’ by Cechin, Bijman, Pascucci,
Zylberstaijn, and Omta investigates which governance
structure provides higher quality. Quality is measured
in terms of the incidence of chicken feet callus.
Cooperative farmers turn out to deliver higher-quality
products than the suppliers to investor-owned firms,
despite that they invest less. A number of seller–buyer
relationship characteristics between cooperatives and
their members may be responsible for this result, such
as higher dependence, lower buyer uncertainty, more
market risk reduction, and more technical support than
in the relationships between sellers and investorowned firms. Cooperative management of the animal
welfare problems associated with foot callus may
therefore be more important for the level quality than
the level of investment.
It is common in cooperatives in the Western world
that members have (almost) equal voting rights and
that the CEO is an outside professional. Liang and
Hendrikse show in their article ‘Core and Common
Members in the Genesis of Farmer Cooperatives in
China’ that these features are different in cooperatives
in China. The genesis of Chinese cooperatives is
recent and massive, almost like a revolution. The number of cooperatives has increased from less than
100,000 to more than 500,000 in less than a decade.
The genesis of cooperatives in China turns out not to
be a bottom-up, collective action process of many
small farmers like in many other countries. Entrepreneurial farmers and the government are crucial in the
genesis of cooperatives. There are usually three or five
core members in Chinese cooperatives, where one of
these core members is the CEO. The core members
dominate in these cooperative and have a substantial
share of the ownership rights in the cooperatives.
Dietl, Duschl, Grossmann, and Lang develop a theoretical model in ‘Explaining Cooperative Enterprises
through Knowledge Acquisition Outcomes’. The
production costs are determined by level of generalizable as well as non-generalizable knowledge. A cooperative is a processor owned collectively by two suppliers.
The suppliers differ in terms of marginal cost. The lowcost member receives a higher percentage of the
cooperative’s profit than the high-cost member. The
investor-owned firm is a monopsony processor dealing
with the two suppliers separately. The cooperative is
efficient compared with the investor-owned firm when
the effect of generalizable knowledge on production
costs is large and the distribution of income is skewed,
but not too much, to the low-cost member. This is due
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
to the cooperative’s ability to collectively acquire generalizable knowledge.
Huang, Fu, Liang, Song, and Xu determine empirically ‘The Efficiency of Agricultural Marketing
Cooperatives in China’s Zhejiang Province’. The focus
is on technical efficiency, which is decomposed into
scale and pure technical efficiency. The empirical
results show that there are substantial scale inefficiencies due to the small size of the cooperatives. Pure
technical inefficiencies are even more important, that
is, the same level of output can be generated by a much
lower level of input. Local economic development,
entrepreneurship of managers, and the human capital
of members have a positive impact on the efficiency of
cooperatives, whereas the financial leverage and the
number of board members have a negative impact.
ALLIANCES
In ‘Tendency to Networks of SMEs—Combining
Organizational Economics and Resource-based
Perspectives’, Meiseberg and Ehrmann examine the
impact of organizational economics and resource-based
variables on the tendency to networks in small and
medium enterprises (SMEs). Data from 348 German
SMEs reveal that predictions from both theories play
an important role for the tendencies of SMEs to
network, yet organizational capabilities in terms of
coordination and communication in alliances are more
relevant for cooperation decisions than relationshipspecific assets and monitoring costs. Specifically, their
findings document the importance of SMEs developing
coordination and communication capabilities to establish a culture of cooperation in network relationships.
Consequently, this study takes a step forward to
develop a more comprehensive analysis of factors
influencing the tendency to networks in SMEs by
combining organizational economics and organizational capabilities explanations.
In ‘Evolving Functions of Interorganizational
Governance Mechanisms’, Sanchez, Velez, and
Alvarez-Dardet investigate the evolution of control
and coordination function, as an interorganizational
relationship evolves. Whereas control tends to mitigate agency costs, coordination serves the effective
actual management of the interorganizational relationship, thereby facilitating value creation. Adopting a
dynamic perspective by carrying out a longitudinal
case study in a marketing channel, they explore the association over time between the gradual introduction
of interorganizational formal governance, the evolution
Manage. Decis. Econ. (2012)
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GOVERNANCE OF FRANCHISING NETWORKS, COOPERATIVES, AND ALLIANCES
of both functions, and the evolution of the relationship.
This study offers a significant contribution toward
understanding the evolution of coordination and control
functions in interorganizational relationships.
In ‘Formal and Real Authority in Interorganizational
Networks: The Case of Joint Ventures’, Hippmann and
Windsperger study the allocation of formal and real
authority in international joint ventures by applying
the view of Aghion and Tirole (1997). A partner has real
authority when he has effective control over decisions,
and a partner has formal authority when he has the right
to decide. They show that intangibility of knowledge
and uncertainty, because of environmental uncertainty
and cultural distance, impact the allocation of formal
and real authority between the joint venture partners.
In addition, they provide some evidence that formal
and real authority function as complements in joint
venture relationships. Overall, this study contributes
to the literature by presenting—to the best of our
knowledge—the first empirical test of the Aghion–
Tirole view on formal and real authority applied to interorganizational networks.
In ‘Value Enhancement through Value-Creating
Relational Investments in Inter-firm Relationships—
The Moderating Role of Leverage Potential and Relational Polygamy’, Yaqub integrates insights from
TCE, value-exchange theory, and dependence perspectives to investigate the efficacy of value-creating
relational investments in affecting certain revenueenhancing behaviors in different context of supplier–
buyer relationships. Specifically, this study extends the
literature by examining the moderating role of leverage
potential and relational polygamy on the value creation
of relational investments. On the basis of 284 supplier–
buyer relationships from Pakistan, the study shows that
relational investments made by the focal suppliers in
their intermediate buyers enhance relationship quality,
which ultimately translates into an enhancement of
revenues of the focal supplier firm. In addition, tests of
moderating effects reveal that efficacy of the valuecreating relational investments varies across different
levels of leverage potential and/or the extent of relational polygamy. Consequently, this study explains the
conditions under which value-creating relational investments have the greatest impact on the revenue enhancement in inter-firm alliances.
Neyens and Feams investigate in ‘Exploring the
Impact of Alliance Portfolio Management Design on
Alliance Portfolio Performance’ the design of the alliance
portfolio management (APM) and its performance
implications. They contribute to the alliance literature
by identifying four first-order APM dimensions
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
(formalization, hierarchy, specialization, and participation) and two second-order dimensions (mechanistic
and organic APM) that explain how firms design the
management of their alliance portfolios. In addition,
they find that adopting an organic approach toward
designing APM significantly increases alliance portfolio
performance, suggesting that particular APM designs
might contribute to building alliance management capabilities. In general, the study suggests that, with respect
to the management of technology alliance portfolios,
firms might benefit more from adopting a bottom-up
approach, which emphasizes the integration of knowledge, autonomy, and participation than a top-down
approach, which focuses on the institutionalization of
knowledge, formalization, and specialization.
In conclusion, the articles featured in this Special Issue provide substantial insights into central governance
issues of franchise chains, cooperatives, and alliances,
and therefore are an essential contribution to the
economics and management of network literature.
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