The Quarry of
Consciousness
Our analysandum?
Or, our analysanda?
Two Styles of Accounts
❖
Extensionally Adequate:
❖
Simply co-extensive
❖
x is cordate iff x is renate.
❖
❖
Necessarily co-extensive:
❖
❖
Of course, possibly there is some x such that x is cordate but
not renate.
Necessarily, x is triangular iff x is trilateral
Intensionally Adequate
❖
x =df . . .
Some Desiderata
❖
We’d like our intensionally adequate account to be:
❖
non-circular
❖
non-disjunctive
❖
univocal
❖
essence-specifying
A Successful Paradigm
❖
❖
❖
water =df H2O
So, rather than:
❖
S is conscious iff . . .
❖
Necessarily, S is conscious iff. . .
We would like:
❖
consciousness =df . . .
Some Possible Pitfalls
❖
Perhaps all we can muster is an ostensive definition:
❖
❖
Consciousness is, well, like that (point to your favourite
example)
Perhaps there is no non-circular account of consciousness:
❖
“By consciousness I simply mean those subjective states of
awareness or sentience that begin when one wakes in the
morning and continue throughout the period that one is
awake until one falls into a dreamless sleep, into a coma, or
dies or is otherwise, as they say, unconscious.” —Searle (1990)
A Mongrel Concept?
❖
Block: Searle’s circular account is problematic in another
way.
❖
It is not only ostensive and circular: it points to too
many things.
❖
In our lingo: it’s non-univocal.
Creature vs. State Consciousness
❖
There is an Aristotelian technique for uncovering non-univocity: a test of opposites.
❖
Consider an obvious case for illustration:
❖
Freni’s singing was rather sharp.
❖
❖
The kitchen knife was nice and sharp.
❖
❖
❖
Fern's singing was rather flat.
The kitchen knife was dull.
Since being dull is not the same as being flat, sharp in the original predications is non-univocal.
Now consider a non-obvious case:
❖
Human beings are conscious.
❖
Hector was irate the second he became conscious.
❖
Univocal or non-univocal?
Non-univocal
❖
Humans are conscious; rocks are not.
❖
❖
Rocks are non-conscious (or simply not conscious).
Humans are sometimes conscious, sometimes not.
❖
Hector lay unconscious.
❖
Since being non-conscious is not the same as being
unconscious, conscious in the original predications is
non-univocal.
First Distinction
❖
Being conscious (as opposed to nonconscious) is simply being
an instance of a kind which can have experiences.
❖
❖
Being conscious (as opposed to unconscious) is simply being
awake and a subject of experiences.
❖
❖
Call this K-consciousness.
Call this E-consciousness.
One plausible thought: S is E-conscious only if it has Kconsciousness, but possibly at t1 S is K-conscious but not Econscious.
What is E-consciousness?
❖
❖
A further, more tendentious distinction: Some E-conscious states
have focus or attention; others do not.
❖
So, e.g., S1 is listening to the orchestra, experiencing the whole
ensemble, but focussing on the violas, sitting next to S2, who is
listening to the orchestra, experiencing the whole ensemble, but
focussing on the tympani.
❖
If there is an experiential difference here, perhaps one should
further distinguish between focal and (mere) E-consciousness.
One plausible thought: S is focally conscious only if S is E-conscious,
but possibly at t1 S is E-conscious but not focally conscious.
Pulling Back Slightly
❖
Block wishes to point to of phenomenal consciousness, but cautions that we
must point carefully:
❖
‘Phenomenal consciousness is experience; what makes a state
phenomenally conscious is that there is something “it is like” (Nagel,
1974) to be in that state.’ ❖
Let me acknowledge at the outset that I cannot define Pconsciousness in any remotely non-circular way. I don't consider
this an embarrassment. . . . the best one can do for P-consciousness
is in some respects worse than for many other things because really
all one can do is point to the phenomenon (cf. Goldman, 1993a). ❖
Nonetheless, it is important to point properly.’
Pointing by Synonymy and Example
❖
‘So how should we point to P-consciousness? ❖
Well, one way is via rough synonyms. As I said, P-consciousness
is experience. P-conscious properties are experiential properties. P-conscious states are experiential states; that is, a state is Pconscious just in case it has experiential properties. The totality of
the experiential properties of a state are “what it is like" to have it. ❖
Moving from synonyms to examples, we have P-conscious states
when we see, hear, smell, taste and have pains. P-conscious
properties include the experiential properties of sensations,
feelings and perceptions, but I would also include thoughts, wants
and emotions.’
The Mystery of P-Consciousness
❖
‘By way of homing in on P-consciousness, it is useful to
appeal to what may be a contingent property of it,
namely the famous "explanatory gap". ❖
To quote T.H. Huxley (1866), "How it is that anything so
remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a
result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin
rubbed his lamp.”'
More Prosaically
❖
Can we divide and conquer?
❖
That is, can we offer even an essence-specifying
account where our analysandum is P-consciounsess?
❖
That is, can we complete the schema:
❖
P-consciousness =df . . .
❖
So far, alas, it seems not.
Still, some progress. . .
❖
Still, one can contrast P-Consciousness with another form of consciousness,
A-Consciousness, and at least avoid conflating them.
❖
A-Consciousness:
❖
‘A-consciousness is access-consciousness. ❖
A representation is A-conscious if it is broadcast for free use in
reasoning and for direct “rational” control of action (including
reporting). An A-state is one that consists in having an Arepresentation. ❖
I see A-consciousness as a cluster concept in which reportability is the
element of the cluster that has the smallest weight even though it is
often the best practical guide to A-consciousness.’ —Block (PM, 208)
P- and A-Consciousness Contrasted
❖
P-C is phenomenal; A-C is representational.
❖
It is crucial to note here that A-C is contentful, that it can play a role in
reasoning, both theoretical and practical.
❖
❖
A-C is always transitive: A-C is always consciousness of something.
❖
❖
P-C might or might not be consciousness of anything
A-C is a functional notion; hence, A-C is system relative.
❖
❖
Here we must take care, however, since it may be the case that every A-C
state is also a P-C state, without its being the case that A-C is P-C.
P-C, by contrast, is non-functional and given, so to speak, from the inside out.
P-C is, as conscious, typed: every pain, e.g. has a certain feeling; A-C, by contrast,
may out of commission at any given moment.
The Difference, in Brief
❖
The paradigm instance of P-C is sensation.
❖
The paradigm A-C is a propositional attitude.
The Point of the Difference, in Brief
❖
One might have A-C w/o P-C:
❖
Zombies on the march; blind-sight; super blind-sight.
❖
❖
(Does this show, as Searle contends, that therefore A-C is precisely
not consciousness at all?)
One might have P-C w/o A-C:
❖
One might have P-C of a loud pneumatic drill pounding outside
one’s window w/o coming to think that there is a loud pneumatic
drill pounding outside my window just now.
❖
This is why the phrase ‘conscious awareness’ is more than a mere
pleonasm.
The Final Upshot
❖
If we’re looking for our essence-specifying account of consciousness, we’d
better pause first to determine what it is that we’ve in view: what, precisely, is
our quarry?
❖
One more fertile question: if consciousness is not a cluster concept (is it not?),
must ‘consciousness' be ambiguous?
❖
If Block is right, should one simply give up on the impulse to offer an essencespecifying account of consciousness?
❖
Here there remain two queries:
❖
Might we not yet provide essence-specifying accounts of the
disambiguated notions (cf. average velocity vs. instant velocity)?
❖
Might we not yet offer a core-dependent essence specifying account?