STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
November 29, 2016
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 328097
Shiawassee Circuit Court
LC No. 14-006595-FH
MONICA MARIE STEVENS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and O’CONNELL and GLEICHER, JJ.
GLEICHER, J.
A jury convicted Monica Stevens of third-offense operating while intoxicated, MCL
257.625. The trial court departed upward from the guidelines and sentenced Stevens to 22 to 90
months’ imprisonment. The court also ordered defendant to pay a total of $1,472, including
$774 in court costs. We now remand for proportionality review as required by People v
Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 46-49; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), and for the trial court to articulate a
factual basis for its imposition of costs.
I. BACKGROUND
On the evening of September 20, 2014, a passerby found Stevens behind the driver’s seat
of her vehicle, which was in a ditch alongside a roadway. Stevens admitted that she had been
drinking for approximately nine hours. The Good Samaritan testified that Stevens smelled
strongly of alcohol, was slurring her speech, and stumbled her way out of the vehicle. A
responding officer reported that Stevens failed several field sobriety tests, and a breathalyzer test
indicated that her blood alcohol level was .25. Stevens denied that she drove that evening. She
testified that she fell asleep at her ex-husband’s house and awoke in her car with no memory of
how she got there. She claimed that her ex-husband drove her to the scene and then placed her in
the driver’s seat. The jury rejected this explanation and convicted Stevens as charged.
Before sentencing, the Department of Corrections scored all applicable offense and prior
record variables and determined that Stevens’ then-mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines
range was 0 to 13 months. The trial court departed upward from the guidelines, sentencing
Stevens to 22 to 90 months’ imprisonment. In doing so, the court explained:
Miss Stevens, I spent a lot of time on your case, and the Court staff will
tell you that I took great care into fashioning a Sentence for you that I think is
-1-
appropriate, and I don’t think zero to 13 adequately handles this matter. I think
that your matter presents substantial and compelling reasons to depart upwards
from the recommended guideline range. Your prior record variables are scored at
15 points based on two prior misdemeanor convictions and two prior low severity
convictions. The guidelines in your case . . . don’t adequately account for the
following factors that the Court relies on in performing an upward departure.
You’ve had two previous convictions of OUIL Third. This is your third,
third. You’ve had extensive histories of alcohol related crimes, Miss Stevens.
You’ve had a total of five OUILs, with a sixth that was dismissed in September of
the year 2000. As I already mentioned, your blood alcohol level was [.]29.[1] The
legal limit in the State of Michigan is [.]08, you were over three times the legal
limit.
* * *
What’s important is that this is your third felony for drunk driving, that’s what’s
important.
Your previous and persistent failure to rehabilitate is important. Five
previous courses of substance abuse counseling, four of which says you
completed and were successful, yet you returned to drinking. Your prospects for
rehabilitation are further lowered based on the fact that you’ve undergone
community service for OUIL, work release, tether, and jail time. These previous
sanctions along with the treatment that we’ve already talked about, has little
positive effect on you, Miss Stevens.
You admit no responsibility in your description of this offense. In fact,
you’ve argued that you’re framed. I’m not basing your Sentence on this, not at
all. I’m just pointing it out so this record reflects that, well, it further supports
that rehabilitation is not a likely outcome. You’re unlikely to rehabilitate, because
you don’t believe that you’ve done anything wrong. That suggests the need to
emphasize punishment, and to protect society as primary goals for this Sentence.
And Miss Stevens, any one of these factors that this court just placed on
the record would keenly and irresistibly grab this Court’s attention to the extent
that the Court would be compelled to depart upward.
1
It is unclear from the record where the trial court gleaned this number; the evidence at trial
supported a .25 blood alcohol level.
-2-
* * *
The Sentence I’m imposing is more proportional to this offense, because it
accurately reflects the aggravating factors I’ve already discussed, and the need to
impose a more severe sanction than those you’ve already faced.
Stevens now appeals her sentence.
II. DEPARTURE SENTENCE
July 29, 2015 marked a sea change in Michigan’s sentencing jurisprudence. On that day,
the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the mandatory minimum sentence ranges of the
legislative sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional as they required sentencing based on
judicially found facts. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 364; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). To
remedy this deficit, the Court severed the mandatory sentencing provisions and rendered the
guidelines advisory only. Id.
In relation to departure sentences, Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392, instructed that appellate
courts must conduct a reasonableness review. As noted by the dissent, the Supreme Court stated
in Lockridge, 498 Mich at 394, that a defendant cannot establish plain error supporting relief
where the court imposed an upwardly departing sentence and explained its reasons on the record.
However, in Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 46-49, this Court held that when a trial court imposed
a departure sentence before the resolution of Lockridge, we must remand for proportionality
review pursuant to People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), utilizing the
procedure set forth in United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103, 117-118 (CA 2, 2005).
In People v Masroor, 313 Mich App 358, 373; 880 NW2d 812 (2015), a panel of judges
requested the convention of a conflict panel to resolve a difference of opinion with Steanhouse.
The vote fell short, however, and Steanhouse remains binding precedent. See People v Masroor,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 18, 2015 (Docket Nos. 322280,
322281, 322282). Accordingly, even if this Court believes a defendant’s pre-Lockridge
departure sentence is reasonable and adequately supported by the trial court’s record statements,
we must remand to allow the defendant an opportunity to reiterate his or her request for
resentencing and then for continued proceedings consistent with Crosby. We are not permitted
to presume that the lower court would have embarked on the same reasoning had it been aware
that its judgment was controlled by Milbourn’s reasonableness analysis. Nor are we permitted to
disregard the binding precedent of this Court.
Although the trial court in this case went to great lengths to support its sentencing
decision, it did so on the assumption that the guidelines were mandatory and any departure had
to be based on substantial and compelling reasons that keenly and irresistibly grabbed the court’s
attention. The court did not specifically consider, as required by Steanhouse’s readoption of the
Milbourn standard, whether the sentence imposed was “proportionate to the seriousness of the
circumstances of the offense and the offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636. We are bound to
remand this case to the trial court pursuant to Steanhouse.
-3-
III. COSTS
Stevens also contends that the trial court improperly ordered her to pay $774 in
unspecified court costs, in violation of MCL 769.1k. MCL 769.1k(b)(iii), as amended by 2014
PA 352, allows trial courts to impose state costs against a criminal defendant “if reasonably
related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court. . . .” Under this statute, trial courts must
“establish a factual basis” from which this Court can “determine whether the costs imposed were
reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court.” People v Konopka (On
Remand), 309 Mich App 345, 359-360; 869 NW2d 651 (2015). The prosecution agrees that the
trial court did not establish this factual basis in this case and that remand is necessary.
Accordingly, we remand for further sentencing proceedings consistent with Lockridge,
Crosby, and Steanhouse, and for the trial court to articulate a factual basis for its imposition of
costs. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
-4-
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
November 29, 2016
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 328097
Shiawassee Circuit Court
LC No. 14-006595-FH
MONICA MARIE STEVENS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and O’CONNELL and GLEICHER, JJ.
O’CONNELL, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I write simply to state that regarding departure sentences, People v
Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 48; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), is in conflict with People v Lockridge,
498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). As such, this Court is required to follow the strictures as
set forth in the Supreme Court’s Lockridge opinion. By following the strictures as set forth in
the Lockridge opinion, the defendant is not entitled to a remand for a Crosby hearing, United
States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005). I would affirm the well-reasoned decision of the
learned trial court.
This case involves a departure sentence. It does not involve an Alleyne1 challenge, nor
does it involve a challenge to the mis-scoring of the guidelines. In such instances, Lockridge
compels us to review the defendant’s sentence for plain error. If no error occurs, no remand is
necessary. In the present case, no error has occurred. In my opinion, it defies logic to remand a
case for resentencing when the offense variables (OVs) are not mis-scored, when no valid
Alleyne challenge exists, and when the trial court stated valid reasons for why its chosen sentence
was more proportionate to both the offense and the offender.
This Court reviews the trial court’s decision to depart upward from the sentencing
guidelines for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. People v Masroor, 313
Mich App 358, 373; 880 NW2d 812 (2015). The trial court abuses its discretion when its
sentence is not proportional under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), and
its progeny. Id. at 373-374.
1
Alleyne v United States, 570 US ___; 133 S Ct 2151; 186 L Ed 2d 314 (2013).
-1-
In imposing a departure sentence that exceeded the guideline range by nine months, the
trial court stated that the recommended sentence did not “adequately handle[] this matter” and
that it would fashion an “appropriate” sentence. The trial court explained that the guidelines did
not adequately account for defendant’s extensive history of alcohol-related crimes, including five
prior convictions of operating while intoxicated, that defendant’s blood alcohol content was three
times over the legal limit, or that defendant had “previous and persistent failure to
rehabilitate . . . .” Stevens had participated in five previous courses of alcohol abuse counseling
but continued to drink. Finally, the trial court noted that Stevens did not admit responsibility for
the crime and was not likely to be rehabilitated. The trial court specifically stated that its
sentence “is more proportionate to this offense, because it accurately reflects the aggravating
factors I’ve already discussed, and the need to impose a more severe sanction than those you’ve
already faced.”
The recommended guidelines range for Stevens’s sentence was 0 to 13 months’
imprisonment. The trial court exceeded the guideline range by nine months and sentenced
Stevens to a term of 22 to 90 months’ imprisonment. In my opinion, this was a reasonable and
well-deserved sentence.
The Lockridge question at issue in this case is whether Stevens, a fifth-time multiple
drunk driving offender, is entitled to be resentenced or at least entitled to a remand for a Crosby
hearing. The answer to this question depends on whether Stevens can show plain error in her
sentencing process. On appeal, Stevens does not contest the scoring of her guidelines, nor can
she establish plain error. I therefore conclude that Lockridge addresses this issue perfectly:
Stevens is not entitled to be resentenced.
In this case, I would adopt the identical reasons to apply as stated in my dissent in People
v Shank, 313 Mich App 221; 881 NW2d 135 (2015) (O’CONNELL, J., dissenting), as follows:
If a defendant does not challenge the scoring of his or her offense variables
(OVs) at sentencing on Alleyne grounds, our review is for plain error affecting
that defendant’s substantial rights. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392. In this case,
Shank did not challenge the scoring of his OV scores on Alleyne grounds. Our
review is for plain error.
To be entitled to relief under plain-error review, a defendant must
show that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Id.
at 393. The Lockridge court aptly stated the application of the plain error
doctrine in cases—like Shank’s—in which the defendant did not preserve an
Alleyne challenge below and the trial court departed upward:
Because [the defendant] received an upward departure sentence
that did not rely on the minimum sentence range from the
improperly scored guidelines (and indeed, the trial court
necessarily had to state on the record its reasons for departing
from that range), the defendant cannot show prejudice from any
error in scoring the OVs in violation of Alleyne. [Id. at 394
(emphasis altered).]
-2-
If a defendant’s minimum sentence involved an upward departure, that
defendant “necessarily cannot show plain error . . . .” Id. at 395 n 31. “It
defies logic that the court in those circumstances would impose a lesser sentence
had it been aware that the guidelines were merely advisory.” Id.
In this regard, the Steanhouse court’s decision to remand in that case was
contrary to the precepts of stare decisis. As in Lockridge, the trial court in
Steanhouse departed upward from the recommended sentencing range.
Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 42. The defendant in Steanhouse, like the
defendant in Lockridge, did not challenge the scoring of his OVs on Alleyne
grounds. Id. The Court of Appeals in Steanhouse recognized that the
defendant could not establish a plain error under Lockridge. However, the
Court proceeded to review the defendant’s sentence and remand for
resentencing anyway, directly contrary to the language of Lockridge providing
that the Lockridge defendant was not entitled to resentencing under the exact
same circumstances.
I would follow Lockridge without declaring a conflict panel. The reason
is simple—this Court need not convene a conflict panel to follow a rule
articulated by the Supreme Court, even if a decision of this Court conflicts with
the Supreme Court’s decision. Charles A Murray Trust v Futrell, 303 Mich
App 28, 49; 840 NW2d 775 (2013). Until the Supreme Court’s decision is
overruled by the Supreme Court itself, the rules of stare decisis require this
Court to follow the Supreme Court’s decision. Paige v Sterling Heights, 476
Mich 495, 524; 720 NW2d 219 (2006). This Court simply “does not have the
authority to recant the Supreme Court’s positions.” Murray Trust, 303 Mich
App at 49. Under the rule of stare decisis, this Court must follow a decision
of the Supreme Court even if another panel of this Court decided the same
issue in a contrary fashion. Id. Because Steanhouse ignored the clear directives
of the Michigan Supreme Court, it is against the rules of stare decisis to follow
the procedures in that case. I cannot in good conscience violate the rules
articulated in Lockridge.
A remand under United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005), is
used to determine whether prejudice resulted from an error. People v Stokes,
312 Mich App 181, 200-201; 877 NW2d 752 (2015). The Lockridge court
stated that no prejudice could result from the type of “error” involved in this
case. Shank cannot show plain error; therefore, he is not entitled to relief. I
conclude that a Crosby remand is not appropriate or necessary in this case. [Id. at
228-230 (footnote omitted).]
I would affirm the trial court’s well-reasoned decision in this matter. The sentence is
proportionate both to the crime and the offender. No OVs have been mis-scored in violation of
-3-
the Alleyne decision. No plain error has occurred. It is clearly a waste of judicial resources to
remand this case to the trial court.2
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
2
This Court’s recent opinion in People v Ambrose, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___
(2016), slip op at 6, further supports my position:
Further, even if we were to assume that the trial court erred in scoring OV 9, we
would conclude that resentencing is not required. Under People v Lockridge, 498
Mich 358, 364-365; 870 NW2d 502 (2015), a trial court’s departure from a
defendant’s recommended sentencing guidelines range is reviewed by this Court
for reasonableness. Defendant has not challenged the trial court’s departure from
the guidelines as unreasonable. In light of the facts of this case, the trial court’s
lengthy articulation of its reasons for departing from the guidelines, and the minor
extent of the departure, we hold that the departure was reasonable. Although in
People v Biddles, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d___ (2016) (Docket No.
326140); slip op at 4, we recently clarified the distinction between [People v
Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 92; 711 NW2d 44 (2006)] errors and Lockridge errors,
Biddles did not deal with an upward departure, and we do not read Biddles as
requiring remand for a Francisco error when we have determined (as here) that a
sentencing departure is reasonable under Lockridge and the sentence “did not rely
on the minimum sentence range from the improperly scored guidelines” at issue.
Lockridge, 498 Mich at 394; see also People v Mutchie, 468 Mich 50, 52; 658
NW2d 154 (2003) (holding that it was unnecessary to determine if a scoring error
in OV 11 existed and required resentencing when the sentences imposed were
departures “above the recommended range in any event, and the court expressly
stated” the reasons for the departure).
-4-