Sources
Source 1
Timeline
1939
September
1940
January
1941
December
January
April
May
October
December
1942
February
March
May
June
July
August
October
19431944
September
WW2 begins. Australia declares war on Germany in a response
to British declaration of war. The Second Australian Imperial
Force (AIF) formed
Australian troops sailed to the Middle East to support the British
war effort
Australian troops fighting in North Africa against the Italians
Australian and British troops capture the port of Tobruk
German troops, lead by Rommel (the “Desert Fox’), advance in
North Africa. They surround and lay siege to Tobruk and
Australian troops (“Rats of Tobruk”). The siege ends in November
with allied reinforcements, but Rommel forces a retreat in
January 1942
Australian and British troops defeated by Germany in Greece and
Crete
John Curtin becomes Prime Minister of Australia
Japan attack on Pearl Harbour. Germany declares war on USA.
Australia declares war on Japan. Curtin makes his speech about
change in foreign policy. Transfers some troops from Burma back
to Australia, against UK/Winston Churchill’s wishes.
Japan takes Singapore. Most Australian and British troops
(130,000) taken prisoner. Darwin bombed by Japan, as are many
other northern Australian cities.
Japan takes Indonesia from the Dutch, and move onto Papua
New Guinea. American General Douglas MacArthur flees the fall
of the Philippines and is ordered to set up base in Australia,
where he is welcomed by John Curtin.
Japan attempts to cut off Australia from Papua New Guinea and
America. Battle of the Coral Sea. Australia wins, and this is the
first halt to Japanese advances in the south of Asia. Three
Japanese midget submarines attack in Sydney harbour.
Battle of Midway (Japan vs USA). Major loss for Japan, and end
of its expansion east in the Pacific.
Beginning of Australian-Japanese conflict in PNG, Kokoda trail
Australia fights Japan at the battle of Milne Bay in PNG. Australia
victorious, stops Japanese advance around PNG towards Port
Moresby, forcing them to try the overland route via Kokoda track.
Major American victory against Japan in Guadalcanal, ending
Japanese advance and forcing them to retreat in South-East
Asia. Also forces Japanese troops into retreat at Kokoda to
protect more northerly bases.
Battle of El Alamein in North Africa (Allies versus Rommel).
Germany defeated, and Australian troops return home in January
1943
John Curtin is re-elected Prime Minister, finally with a majority in
both houses (unity and security of his government). Allows
himself the opportunity to travel to American and Britain (1944) in
order to assert Australia’s rights and wishes to both FDR and
Churchill, especially at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers
Conference in London, May 1944.
Sources
Source 2
Responding to John Curtin's charge in October 1938 that 'the Government
had no policy on foreign affairs', Attorney General Robert Menzies decisively
stated there was no possibility for such a development:
Let me say something…about this matter of an Australian foreign
policy…Does that mean that we as a dominion government ought to formulate
our foreign policy independently of what may be the foreign policy of Great
Britain…and that having formulated it, we should then announce it to the world,
caring nothing…as to whether it happens to be in line with the policy of Great
Britain…? I say that to adopt such a line of conduct would be suicidal… I say
without any hesitation that I should regard such a thing as folly… [CPD vol.
157 p.429 ]
According to Kim E Beazley, Fremantle MP (1945-1978) when Curtin came to
power three years later, 'It would be fair to say that Curtin revolutionised the
foreign policy, defence policy, financial and banking policy of Australia…'
[Beazley, Kim E, John Curtin - an atypical Australian Labor leader, ANU John
Curtin Memorial Lecture, 13 September 1971]
Under Curtin's skilled and pragmatic leadership, Australia's refusal to see itself
as a colonial outpost serving only British interests created the possibility of a
new direction in foreign policy. Curtin believed that 'the best service which
Australia can render to the British Empire is to attend to its own business, to
make certain that we manage Australia effectively…' [CPD vol. 157 p.395]
http://john.curtin.edu.au/artofthepossible/index.html
Sources
Source 3
John Curtin was an avid believer in the right of Australians to determine their own
future. As early as the 1920s he was writing editorials about the subject. In March
1923 he wrote:
Australia's status in international politics and diplomacy is a matter which should interest all
who have the well-being of this country at heart. Like a plant, Australia is rapidly reaching
maturity. Soon it will achieve the dignity of nationhood. Its foreign policy will then be decided
by its own Federal Parliament and its ambassadors will be established in the world's capitals.
Direct and unrestricted marketing of its goods as a matter of course will follow. National
sentiment will be aroused, and pride of country generated. To be an Australian in future will
be to declare one's equality in a truly national and international sense.
While Curtin believed strongly in maintaining links with Britain, he did not think
Australia needed to be constrained by these ties where it was not in Australia's best
interests. In this same editorial of March 1923, he expressed admiration for the
'breakaway progress' South Africa and Canada had made as separate and
independent Dominions and abhored the way the United Kingdom exerted economic
control over Australia: 'Great Britain has Australia in its financial clutches and the rest
of the world is told "hands off".'
http://john.curtin.edu.au/aspirations/foreign.html
Source 4
The United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the Pacific
fighting plan…I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America free of any pangs (feelings
of regret or guilt) as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom (Britain). We
know the problems the UK faces. We know the constant threat of invasion (by Nazi
Germany)…but we know too that Australia can go (be defeated/invaded), and Britain can still
hold on…We are therefore determined that Australia shall not go (be defeated) and we shall
exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the US as its keystone (most
important element), which will give our country confidence of being able to hold out until the
tide of battle swings against the enemy.”
Prime Minister John Curtin, The Herald, 27 December, 1941
Sources
Source 5
'AUSTRALIA LOOKS TO AMERICA'
'Without any inhibitions of any kind I make it quite clear that Australia looks to
America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United
Kingdom.`
John Curtin's dramatic appeal in a Melbourne Herald article of 26 December 1941
caused controversy across the world. For some it meant a disloyal rejection of
Britain; for others a bold recognition of Australia's desperate position. Curtin's striking
statement was plucked from an otherwise routine article in which he appealed to
Australians to support the war effort.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill claimed that the statement would `cause
resentment throughout the Empire'. US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt said it
`tasted of panic and disloyalty'. Yet newspapers across the country supported
Curtin's declaration.
The United States did come to Australia's aid, but it is unlikely that Curtin's statement
had a major impact on US military strategy. A close alliance between the two
countries was probably inevitable, as they both shared the same goal - to defeat the
Japanese.
http://john.curtin.edu.au/manofpeace/crisis.html
.
Sources
Source 6
Curtin: 'No offence, mum, but I'm shifting to these here apron strings - at least
for twenty-four hours' cartoon by John Frith.
The Bulletin 31 December 1941.
http://john.curtin.edu.au/artofthepossible/touringex/graphics/apronstringscartoon.jpg
Note: “Apron strings” refers to the habit of children holding onto their mother’s apron in order
to be lead, feel safe and secure, and is a symbol of childishness and dependency.
Sources
Source 7
Curtin and MacArthur at a formal reception
for the US general, c 1942.
Note the round table and Allied flags in the background.
By permission Australian War Memorial: Negative No. 077686
Sources
Source 8
However, the central point at issue derives from the assertion, in the words of military
historian Gavin Long, that during the Curtin-MacArthur era, the Australian Government 'had
made a notable surrender of sovereignty' when 'no Australian government would have so
completely surrendered control of its forces in its own territory to a British commander and
staff'.
In Long's view, a 'strange aspect of this alliance of an Australian government and an
American commander' was how far apart were 'their views on international and local politics'.
So complete was the surrender of sovereignty that MacArthur from the outset appointed
Americans to lead every branch of his staff even though there were several highly qualified
Australian Army specialists who had the additional advantage of 'recent and varied active
service'.
Similarly, at the 'higher political, military and administrative levels' the relatively few points of
contact were testimony to 'the thorough way in which strategical control had been
surrendered to the American Joint Chiefs of staff and their local subordinate, General
MacArthur' with the latter dealing only with Curtin and Blamey and his chief of staff. As a
consequence, Long argued, the Australian government had virtually no share in the
making of key strategical decisions even though for the first twelve months at least it
contributed 'the greater part' of the forces under the South-West Pacific Command.
Peter Edwards suggests that in Long's view the surrender of control was 'politically
distasteful and strategically futile.
http://john.curtin.edu.au/macarthur/assessment1.html
Source 9
'The key to understanding Curtin and his place in Australian history is that he
was a politician gifted with insight into the significance of events, that he came
to power just as Australia's relationship to the rest of the world and its internal
structure were ready to change, and that he grasped the authority to move the
country in the direction he wanted to go. He understood that the
circumstances of war offered him a chance to change the way Australia
worked…His enduring achievement was not saving Australia from Japan but
in creating modern post-war Australia.' (Edwards, John, John Curtin's Gift,
Allen & Unwin, 2005)
http://john.curtin.edu.au/artofthepossible/leaders.html
Sources
Source 10
Letter from MacArthur to Curtin, 16 November 1943.
'... I believe that the basis of the extraordinary success that we have attained against the
enemy has been the complete co-operation, goodwill and understanding which from the very
beginning has existed between us. Nothing should be allowed to disturb this harmony...'
Courtesy National Archives of Australia: A5954, 2386/20
Sources
Source 11
Personal Portrait as a gift to John Curtin
Writing on the photo:
'To the Prime Minister who saved Australia in her hour of deadly peril. With the
admiration and affection of Douglas MacArthur.'
Records of the Curtin Family. General Douglas MacArthur, c1944.
Sources
Source 12
This is a black-and-white photograph of Commonwealth leaders at the Dominion Prime
Ministers' Conference in London, May 1944, during the Second World War. Standing, left to
right, are General Smuts (South Africa) and Peter Fraser (New Zealand). Seated, left to
right, are Mackenzie King (Canada), Winston Churchill (Britain) and John Curtin (Australia).
Curtin's trip in April, May and June 1944, first to Washington and then to Britain before
returning to Australia via Canada, had two central objectives; he secured his first objective,
obtaining Anglo-American agreement to the view that the Australian contribution to the war
effort would increasingly be in the provision of food and other supplies rather than military
personnel; however he was unable to attract any support for his second objective,
concerning the establishment of post-War collaborative machinery in the form of a
secretariat based in London which would have seen more equality for members of the
Commonwealth in relation to Britain.
http://john.curtin.edu.au/education/tlf/R3689/00376077/index.html
Sources
Source 13
ANZAC Agreement
It was the impact of war in the Pacific arena and the threat of Japanese aggression
which first made it apparent to many Australians that although Australia was close
culturally to Britain, geographically it was positioned in the midst of Asia. While Curtin
advocated some form of permanent organisation for the British Commonwealth after
the war, Australia's dependence on the United States for security and its wish for
America to take a more permanent interest in this part of the world were becoming
increasingly apparent. Even within the British Commonwealth, Curtin and Evatt
argued that Australia must take responsibility for its own geographical region.
In early 1944 Australia and New Zealand signed a treaty, known as the ANZAC
Agreement, asserting that 'a regional zone of defence comprising the South-West
and South Pacific areas, and based on Australia and New Zealand, should be
established' and that 'the two Governments agree to act together in matters of
common concern in the South West and South Pacific areas.'
The agreement covered a number of areas including security and defence, civil
aviation, migration, dependencies and territories. The ANZAC Agreement was
Australia's first international treaty signed independently of Britain and was an
attempt by Australia and New Zealand to assert autonomy in their own region.
http://john.curtin.edu.au/aspirations/foreign.html
Source 14
After Curtin’s death, MacArthur said of him that "the preservation of
Australia from invasion will be his immemorial (everlasting) monument".
(1945)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Curtin#Death
Sources
Source 15
How are we then to assess the true significance of the relationship between the General and
the Prime Minister? The substantial differences in personality and political perceptions could
be bridged because each provided the other with what was considered indispensable
support and backing; because each needed what the other could bring to the relationship;
and because in the end neither posed any real threat to the other but rather a potential
source of assistance in securing their overall objectives.
Neither in fact was able to deliver all that the other wanted and needed and it is probably fair
to say that Curtin was able to do more for MacArthur in removing potential obstacles to his
freedom of action than MacArthur was able to do for Curtin in terms of influencing the Allied
war strategy and the availability of military resources.
On balance, Curtin had definitely to give the most ground and in the process several
informed commentators believe he ceded far more Australian sovereignty than was
desirable or even necessary.
http://john.curtin.edu.au/macarthur/assessment2.html
Source 16
General Election ALP policy statement by John Curtin, 26 July 1943.
http://espace.library.curtin.edu.au/R?func=dbin_jump_full&object_id=94551&local_base=era
01jcpml
Sources
Source 17
John Curtin, 1943 Election, Labor Party Policy Speech
http://espace.library.curtin.edu.au/R?func=dbin_jump_full&object_id=94551&local_base=era
01jcpml
Sources
Source 18
A cartoon from the Daily Telegraph, 1942
(Churchill gives his assurances to Curtin that Australia is safe from Japan and that it can
trust and rely upon Britain)
Source 19
A message from Curtin to Churchill about the British proposal to evacuate Singapore, thus
leaving Australia defenceless and without the promised protection of Britain
Sources
Source 20
Prime Minister Robert Menzies (PM 1939-41, 1949-66) (United Australia Party, created out
of the National Party, and developed into the Liberal Party) giving the official declaration of
war against Germany to the Australian people
Sources
Source 21
Curtin and Churchill argument
over where to send the 7th AIF
division: Burma or Australia?