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Insecurity/Security Community in South Asia: US Security Practices
Vandana Asthana
Government Department
Eastern Washington University, Cheney, WA.
[email protected]
President Obama’s proclamation in Turkey on April 6, 2009 that ‘US is not at war with Islam’
created optimistic feelings in the Muslim World about reversing the deleterious effects of the
past actions and building relationships with the countries and people of the region on a basis of
mutual respect and mutual interests. Yet the recent administrations framing and language on the
war on Terror reaffirms that the position of the United States remains unchanged and may
generate another era of failed policy in the region. The trust deficit currently burdens the United
States and a wave of Anti Americanism is widespread in the region. There is deep skepticism
and concern amongst intellectuals as well as the people of the region about US intentions and
commitment to security of the state and its societies. This paper examines role of the United
States as an external actor in providing “strategic altruism” in a region beset with complex
“wicked problems” through the lens of its economic and security policies towards the countries
in the region.
From a public policy perspective, “wicked problems” are one that are multi causal and
have a system effect. They require contemplation that is capable of grasping the larger context as
well as understanding the interrelationships among the full range of causal factors underlying
them. They often require long-term, holistic, collaborative and innovative approaches. The
complexity and dynamics are such that a lack of understanding of the situation may result in the
occasional failure or need for policy change or adjustment. From a South Asian perspective the
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region has a history of conflict, poverty, underdevelopment, contentious border and territorial
problems, terrorism and nuclearization, all of which operate at operate at different scales and
that there are no quick fixes and simple solutions. These issues have a multicausal and a system
effect. In such an environment, the relationship is even more complicated by a core – periphery
model (Cambri and Speigel 1969), given India’s size and economic and technological
development. This has always led to actors of the region inviting an external actor to balance
their regional aspirations vis- a-vis India. Such an actor can play an important role in promoting
sustained interactions across a broad range of issues with a strong measure of consistency. This
actor should exhibit a kind of a strategic altruism in their relations, which indicates the
recognition that long-term interests mitigate against seeking maximal outcomes in each shortterm interactions. Any attempt of intervention by any external actor thus needs to recognize this
complexity and blow back effects of any policy implemented in the region. The United States
involvement in the region is well documented in history and my paper surveys the literature on
the cold war and the post cold war strategic and economic policies and evaluates the role of the
United States during the period. The analysis suggests that the United States practices lacked the
‘strategic –altruism’ as a mechanism of security governance in its relations with the region and in
a regional context pursued an inconsistent, short-term policy1. This has ingrained
disillusionment; a trust deficit and anti American sentiment in the region, in what could have
been a potentially ongoing security relationship where the relationship becomes more important
than any relative loss or gain in any single transactions.
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Pervasive sense of insecurity cannot be attributed to just US policy but issue of governance,
weak and uneven development etc. This is beyond the scope of my paper.
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This paper is divided into four sections. The first section sets the region in context. The
second section elaborates on the United States policy towards the region in a historical context
during the cold war and post cold war period. It analyzes some practices of US policy in relation
to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the period beginning 1979, the post 9/11 scenario, and its
blowback effects. The third section elaborates on development practices humanitarian aid and
neoliberal economic structures in international organizations and aid workers. The fourth section
evaluates the civilization role and its impact on the region. The last section summarizes the
observations made in the literature reviewed and the impact of such policies towards security in
the region.
Understanding Security Community:
The security community framework arose as a systemic – level argument that not all states
believe in the international order of self- help, war and anarchy in international relations but
there exist other ordering principles amongst them. At the heart of Deutsch (1957) approach is
the assumption that communication processes and transaction flows between peoples are the
cement of social groups, political communities and international cooperation between states.
Through transactions such as trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges a
social fabric is built not only among elites but also the masses of different states, which in the
long run translates into greater levels of mutual trust, security cooperation and the emergence of
a sense of community. According to Deutsch, transactions contribute to a shared understanding
of security leading to a security community. The habit of transactions is no longer zero sum but
takes into consideration long term view of costs and benefits and allow them to make holistic
calculations. Deutsch argued for a non-war community. Adler and Barnett advanced on Deutsch
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defined a security community as a ‘transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose
people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’ where peaceful change means
‘neither the expectation of war nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle
interstate dispute’. They mentioned three essential elements for a security community. These
included1) Shared identities, meanings and values; 2) many sided and direct relations among
members; and 3) a reciprocity among members that recognize that value of long-term interest
and perhaps strategic altruism. Based on the above indicators, the dependable expectations of
peaceful change in South Asia are understood to be a long way away in the establishment of a
security community2.
The evolution of South Asian states as most postcolonial societies emerged in conflict
formation. India and Pakistan were formed out of history of conflict and bloodshed where
political rivalry based itself on secular and Islamic nationalism of both states. The rivalry has
seen three major wars and a major contention on claims to Kashmir territory. Pakistan sees
Kashmir as an incomplete project of the establishment of a Muslim state while India sees an
integrated Kashmir as a success of its secular multicultural, multireligious and ethnic society.
The tension between the two has cultivated threat perceptions and grounds for securitization of
national identities on both sides of the border. On the other hand, with Afghanistan rests an
unrecognized border that fuels insecurity in Pakistan for fear of secessionist opportunities for an
independent Pashtunistan, and an autonomous Baluchistan supported by Iran. While economic
relations were not securitized completely but economic interdependence was much too limited to
constrain the region’s military political problems. The South Asia Association for Regional Co-
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In spite of the pessimistic picture that emerges in the context of a security community in south Asia, I do not
discount the evolution of a community over time with indicators other than the purist notions of International
relations theory.
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operation that began with much fanfare in 1985, never amounted to much and has not affected
the security politics of the region. Politically the region South Asia is characterized as one where
realism and zero sum games are still the norm.
However, the constructivist theory of regional security communities requires the realist
notion that the most powerful actor takes the lead. Adler (1998) and Wendt (1999) do not deny
the need for this to happen and explicitly state that this is necessary. Adler and Barnett (1998:52)
state “the existence of powerful states that are able to project a sense of purpose, offer an idea of
progress, and provide leadership around core issues can facilitate and stabilize this (nascent)3
phase. Walt (1998:43) states that ‘some constructivists admit that ideas will have a greater
impact when backed by powerful states and reinforced by enduring material forces”. They thus
believe that the development of security communities is ‘not antagonistic’ to the language of
power; indeed, it is dependent on it (Jones 2008:188). Jones uses this idea in the regional
context by examining the role of India and its ‘strategic altruism’ as a step towards this imagined
community. In this paper, I take this argument further to evaluate it in the context of an external
actor – the United States that most states of the region turn to given the core periphery
relationship that they have with India and the historical complexity of the region. Has the United
States met the expectations of an actor that has exercised strategic altruism in the region, which
according to Adler and Barnett can create a sense of security backed by normative power and
with material forces? The following section looks at United States practices during the cold war
period.
United States Policy during the cold war:
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The author talks about to phases: Nascent and Mature.
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The United States processes of security governance during this period included a classical realist
perspective that focused on power, hegemony, empire or some combinations. Specific examples
and practices that undergird balance of power as a security mechanism include military planning
and deterrence. In the initial period of the cold war, South Asia stood low in the priorities of the
US policy makers. South Asia for most policy makers seemed a source of Oriental exoticism
than a region of geopolitical or economic value (McMahan 2006: 132). Since the India
subcontinent was peripheral to the major struggle with the Soviet Union, Truman administration
denied it any importance in the foreign policy agenda.
The onset of the cold war to Asia brought United States to the region in search of new
allies to extend its influence in the international community and counter a global threat. The loss
of China as well as Soviet Union’s consolidation of power in Eastern Europe was complete. The
outbreak of the Korean War, and China’s military support in the Korean conflict in 1950 resulted
in a transformation of US attitudes and policy towards the Indian subcontinent. US policy was
framed around these objectives focusing on winning friends for its anti soviet and anticommunist
campaign as well as preventing the development of any regional power which could not be made
an American satellite. Altered threat perceptions brought about a newfound admiration for both
India and Pakistan as strategic cold war assets.
India’s determination to remain nonaligned resulted according to a CIA report “in a
tendency to appease world communism and in a failure to support the West in its program of
combating world communist aggression” (CIA 1951). US directed its overtures towards India’s
traditional rival Pakistan whose ruling elite seemed to keen and eager to take advantage of the
inherent opportunities in the cold war atmosphere and build its own military/political power
versus India. Strategically, Pakistan had a perceived relevance to another troubled region – the
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Middle East and the participation of Pakistani troops in the Middle East plan would help
alleviate the US concerns of Soviet influence and expansion in that critical area. By convincing
the American officials of cooperation in an American sponsored defense arrangement for the
Middle east and later in South East Asia Pakistan became the beneficiary of formal security
arrangement with military assistance in May 1954. Keeping in view the containment policy
United States started to woo Pakistan by providing military, economic and grant programs from
1954-1965. The US policy became one of offering military aid and other inducements to
Pakistan in exchange of furthering US policies of encircling the Soviet Union with military
bases. With the United States and Pakistan, entering a long-term security relationship in South
Asia, the objectives of the emergence of a regional threat to the United States, and protection of
its Middle East interests was secured. This security practice of wooing an ally derives from “the
concept of balance of power, conceived as state capabilities and resources, which should be
compared and weighted against the material resources of other states” (Adler and Greve 2009:
63). While this practice was conceived as a containment of an external threat of – Communism,
the massive influx of arms in the region embittered the already sullen relationship between two
suspicious neighbors. The India contention remained that Pakistan did not perceive any threat
from communist powers and India was the main factor for joining the SEATO and CENTO. The
assumption was also that United States wanted a strengthened Pakistan to curb India’s regional
hegemony within the region.
The US aid to Pakistan in 1954 led India to lean towards Moscow. The Soviet Union also
seized this opportunity to counter a US Pakistan alliance by establishing close ties with India and
offered long-term help for developmental and industrial projects. The close involvement of the
Soviet Union in India worried the Eisenhower administration, as losing India to the Soviet bloc
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would represent a victory of the Communism model of development. Thus, despite US India
foreign policy differences, the United had a vested interest in maintaining a neutral and non
aligned India free of the Soviet influence as a successful example of
an alternative to
communism in an Asian context”(NSC 1957). With a shift in policy India became a recipient of
economic and military assistance in the form of a $225 million and food grains under the Public
Law 480 program.
The U.S. policy shift in South Asia was born of equal parts fear and opportunism
(McMahan
2006:141 The fear of close Indo Soviet ties and a warming
Indi Chinese
relationship that followed the signing of a mutual security agreement between United States and
Pakistan. The opportunism was based in the conviction that India’s economic needs provided the
United States with a critical instrument of influence. The Kennedy administration followed on
Eisenhower’s policies of winning India over in it’s the race for economic development with
China. As United States Ambassador wrote in a cable to the state department: We stand on the
edge of great opportunity here – reconciliation between India and Pakistan, security for the
whole subcontinent, a decisive reverse for communism in its area of its greatest opportunity”
(Galbraith 1962:142). United States began a massive economic development aid program with
India while downplaying relations with Pakistan to the great annoyance of the Pakistani leaders.
To appease the opposition of Pakistan the administration tried to broker negotiations on Kashmir
and mollify the Pakistani’s that India would adopt a more moderate position on Kashmir. The
failure of these initiatives and the apparent US tilt to India jeopardized the alliance and drove
Pakistan straight into the arms of the Chinese. The liberal aid transfers by the Eisenhower and
Kennedy administration failed to convert India into a cold war asset or promote India Pakistan
amity by helping to resolve Kashmir. The alliance became dormant only to be revived with US
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support to Pakistan in the 1971 war when it sent the seventh fleet into the Bay of Bengal to
intimidate India. During the early phase of the cold war, the US policy in South Asia remained
one of containing any potential adversaries in the region. Containment of communism was the
only objective pursued with a measure of consistency in the cold war period occurring at the
expense of supporting military regimes and sidelining democratic goals and human security. The
discourse on containment became a means of connection and intervention with countries around
the world. Another goal under this policy was to constrain the capabilities of rival states to
interfere with the American foreign policy agenda and to limit India’s power in the region. The
long-term consequences of such a policy that entailed huge military assistance under a balance of
power mechanism of security governance and its potential ramifications did not figure in the
American policy agenda for this region at that time. The policies adopted in the region were
connected with crisis management and containment of external threats. Thus, the US
involvement in South Asia remained in a state of flux, sometimes weakened, often to re emerge
in the context of India’s evolving relations with Soviet Union and China. Neglect, interest and
intervention appeared and disappeared as per American priorities. The development of Pakistan’s
nuclear program, and subsequent sanctions imposed by the Carter administration generated a lot
of opposition for America in Pakistan. “When difficult decisions had to be made, the first
interest – sustaining Pakistan’s cooperation in the war against Soviet Union - trumped all others.
Washington was mild in its language regarding democratization… it managed to avert its eyes
from the Pakistani nuclear program (Cohen 2004:302-3).
A key example of U. S. security practice under a balance of power mechanism was the
adoption of Pakistan as a key ally in the containment discourse. The Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan began an era of US and Saudi funneling of arms to the anti Soviet guerillas through
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Pakistan’s Inter – Services Intelligence agency. Pakistan became a frontline state for the US and
therefore became high in US priorities. The US sophisticated weaponry was pumped into
Pakistan that had little to do with its declared objective. Large portions of the multibillion dollar
military aid given to anti Soviet rebels by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was
siphoned off by the conduit – the ISI – to ignite the insurgency in Kashmir after Pakistan failed
in its efforts to trigger a separatist was in Punjab in the early 1980s (Chellaney 2001). By
funneling billions of dollars worth of arms – including sophisticated surface – to air-missiles,
tanks, and howitzer guns – through conduit sales and their agencies the United states allowed
these actors to bring into play their own interests and rivalries. Pakistan for example used its
participation in the US led covert operation to strengthen its position against India and to favor
Afghan groups based in Peshawar (for example Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami) rather
than assist groups engaged
in combat inside Afghanistan. Pakistan could push its agenda
because United Sates had accepted the ISI condition of controlling the weapons flow and arm
recipient (Chellaney 2001). The inability to forecast the consequences of such a reactionary
policy and its blowback effects led to a civil war in Afghanistan. The containment policy failed
to recognize the impact of a power vacuum left by the United States and Soviet Union. With an
unprecedented policy success in hand, policy makers chose to turn their backs on the Afghan
people who were so critical in carrying out US policy in the region. The Reagan administration
was uninterested in the consequences of supporting extremist Islamic fighters as these had fought
the Soviet war and their religious fervor appealed to some American officers and politicians
(Cohen 2004: 303). In addition, the Clinton administration solely focused on nuclear issues and
later on the Taliban – Osama nexus in Afghanistan. The sanctions on Pakistan and the short term
alliance supports the argument that in a traditional balance of power mechanism interstate
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alliances are traditionally understood as formal though inherently unstable agreements between
states for mutual support (Maurseth 1964).
The 1990s were important for Pakistan as a country experienced major political
turbulence with ephemeral civilian regimes whose key focus was political survival. The rising
level of violence in Afghanistan, interference of General Babur- Bhutto’s interior minister
facilitated the rise of a new actor in Afghan politics; the Taliban as a way to promote a pro
Islamabad government in Kabul. Oliver Roy (1996:38 -39) suggests that Americans and Saudis
were happy to see the change as the Mujahedeen groups were becoming increasingly hostile
towards the United States. This policy of military resources and planning as security practices
produced an arms race in South Asia as a byproduct of the Cold war battle in Afghanistan. The
rise of a nuclear Pakistan was deliberately ignored by the United States in pursuance of its own
objectives of the overthrow of the Communist regime in Afghanistan.
President Carter’s National Security adviser statement that he would like to make
Afghanistan the Vietnam of the Soviet Union reflects the U.S. policy based on a strong balance
of power mechanism. In many American perceptions, the rise of Mujahedeen and US support to
them, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and its collapse represents one of the most
successful covert military operations and action in US history. However, the spiraling violence,
instability in India and Pakistan is the “blow backs” of decades of a failed US foreign policy of
covert action, military aid and military intervention as a practice of security governance. In this
legacy of the history of conflict, India and Pakistan were mere pawns in great power politics.
Afghanistan became another forgotten conflict as the United States entered a strict neutrality
mode. In a region beset with wicked problems the United States policy since 1979 was reactive
to events and stuck in operational and tactical issues with no political and realistic goal in mind.
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The abandonment of Afghanistan as it did not figure in the strategic interests of US policy
makers, and the neglect of Pakistan created a backlash that ultimately culminated in the
September 11, 2001.
Post Cold war Policies:
In the case of Pakistan these attacks led to a third alliance as the Bush administered lifted
sanction on Pakistan imposed under the Pressler amendment and guaranteed aid in exchange for
Pakistan’s cooperation in the Global War on Terror. U.S. policy discourse shifted from
containment to the ‘War on Terror’ where the threat was not only external but internal as well.
As a continuity of its policy of converting tactical relationships with dictators into ideological,
strategic alliances, the Bush administration continued President Carters a policy of aid and
assistance to President Musharraf’s regime in Pakistan.
A policy of unaccountable aid began flowing into Pakistan that was directly under the
control of the Pakistani military. Washington wrote off a $1 billion debt of Pakistan in 2001-02
and offered $3.2billion in a five-year package in economic and military assistance to be
distributed by the military. Coalition support funds, Budget support, security assistance and
developmental aid are the four types of funds allocated to Pakistan (Jones 2008). The most
detailed study of aid finds that this $10 billion is matched if not exceeded by classified funds that
have gone towards intelligence and covert military action. The programs under this stream cover
funding the ISI, training Pakistani officers in nuclear safety, cash payments to rival leaders hired
to find Al-Qaida (Miller 2007). The aid since 9/11 has is closer to $20 billion (Cohen 2007). The
coalition support funds reimburses Pakistan for operational and logistic costs incurred in COIN
operations. The United States has implicitly paid for the conflict in Waziristan, Swat. The
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Coalition Support Funds equal more than a quarter of Pakistan’s total military expenditure.
Security assistance pays for capital military expenditure (Jones 2008). Money has been spent on
cobra attack helicopters, patrol aircraft, night vision equipment and roads. Budget assistance is
to allow Pakistan to pay off its debt, and free up money to be spent on social security. The
relatively free hand that Pakistan has in disbursing these funds meant that it all ended up in
military expenditure. The remaining money 0.9 billion is earmarked for social spending. Of the
total aid that goes to Pakistan, only 30 percent is spent on social projects (Jones 2008).
In Afghanistan, the United States followed a policy of military tactics of preeminence of
intrusive sweep operations, emphasis on so-called kill/capture mission and indiscriminate use of
airpower in inhabited areas. The outcome of which has been extremely damaging for culturallynationalistic groups with a zero tolerance for insult and collateral damage. Increased
militarization leading to a large number of troops has created more insecurity than security (
Sebestyen. 2009). Thus, the failure of a sustained US policy whose actions/inactions have led the
Afghans to perceive the
U.S. as an occupying force supporting a corrupt and decadent
government in power. Astri Suhrke (2008: 214 -236) writes, “US soldiers were considered
infidels in a countryside that was mostly tribal in social structure, culturally conservative, and
closed to the uninvited. The Americans behaved on all accounts like an occupation force”.
While there is recognition of the complexity of the security situation and the danger to
these states from terrorism by the current administration the framing of the United Policy of
“defeat disrupt and dismantle the Al-Qaida” is generally a narrow paradigm of military
intervention. This war on terror categorized as a war of US with the –Other is based on the US
narrative that is constructed as a discourse having the ultimate effect of normalizing counterterrorism policy, empowering political elites, marginalizing public dissent and enforcing national
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unity. This discourse that normalizes killings and drone attacks in the name of national security
increases radicalization in the region with many negative consequences. The policy of ‘American
exceptionalism’ and uniqueness has created several predicaments in the past but there is a failure
to recognize that the interests of the American people are inseparable from the interests of the
people of south Asia. If people elsewhere are injured by this policy, the American people are
more susceptible to injury. The United States policies have failed to provide security to the
region.
Humanitarian aid, developmental practices and social programs as security practices:
Another examination of US policies can be understood from a liberal functionalist perspective
under David Mitrany’s post world war II argument that international organizations working in
specific functional areas would be a more practical answer to solving political problems. By
solving day-to-day problems of water, food, health and infrastructure, these agencies can
marginalize political considerations that states emphasize. A good example of United States
international aid to Pakistan as developmental assistance for education: The American
government’s foreign aid agency USAID “paid the University of Nebraska U.S. $51 million
from 1984 to 1994 to develop and design these textbooks, which were mostly printed in
Pakistan. Over 13 million were distributed at Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madrasas
[religious schools] ‘where students learnt basic math by counting dead Russians and Kalashnikov
rifles.’... The following example shows a math textbook for 4th grade children that asks the
following question:
“‘The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. If a Russian
is at a distance of 3,200 meters from a mujahid, and that mujahid aims at
the Russian’s head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet
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to strike the Russian in the forehead.’” (Mario Novelli and Susan
Robertson, 2008)
While in the post 9/11 aid package programs have addressed migration, drugs smuggling etc
but have not touched on wider social objectives. While aid to Pakistan is an important security
practice in pursuing the goal on winning the war on terror in Pakistan and there is evidence of
channelization of aid to social programs in theory, there is no visibility of that aid in the real life
of the Pakistani people. The protest against the Kerry - Luger Bill is evident to the point4. While
the Congress passed this bill for Pakistani civil assistance programs the people in Pakistan
protested and demanded cancellation of that aid as they believe that aid is a transactional
relationship between the Pakistani military and the political elite. It does not benefit the people.
It is also an example of the deep trust deficit that is growing in US Pakistan relations. The
current partnership therefore is best described as one of uncertain duration, implying joint
objective of rounding up insurgents, without legal and strategic implications of an alliance.
In the case of Afghanistan, the United States had a long and successful aid program in
Afghanistan. It dispensed some 500$ million from 1950 to 1979. U.S. funding underwrote
construction of the ring road around the country as well as dams, power plants and other
infrastructure. The peace corps was there right from its inception in 1950s to the Soviet invasion
and worked in health vaccination and other social programs. During the Afghan Jihad, the United
States offered an ambitious program to stop the outflow of refugees. The cross border aid
program supported schools, and medical clinics provided food and other supplies and underwrote
private agencies that sent in American volunteers. From the initial seed money the funding rose
from $ 6 million in 1985 to 90million $ in 1990 the program turned into an indispensable second
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The bill provides non-military assistance to Pakistan of $1.5 dollars for five years annually. While the bill is
opposed for conditionalities imposed by the Congress, many do not support the bill for reasons mentioned above.
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front in the CIA covert war (Gutnam 2008). USAID funding and assistance was given out to
Mujahideen leaders in Peshawar and Quetta for winning good will and helping the US develop
personal relations at a time when CIA under Pakistani restrictions had few mujahidden contacts.
Bush and Baker made the initial decision to cut the aid but the Clinton and secretary of
state warren Christopher completed the process. US development and grant assistance dropped
by two thirds, from $60 million in 1992 to 20 million in 1993; it was cut by another 90 percent in
Clinton’s first year to just under 2 million. Even food donations were zeroed out. Foreign aid was
unpopular at home. USAID closed 27 offices around the world. After dispensing the final 2
million dollar aid to Afghanistan for the year beginning September 1 1993, Clinton
administration closed the program (Gutnam 2008). The cold war was over we don’t have to be in
some countries where in the previous era we thought that foreign aid was a way of fighting
communism” thus in 1994 foreign aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan ceased altogether (Atwood).
What people in Washington heard from the field did not carry a lot of weight in the context of
the larger consideration. No one felt the aid more than Masood who said emphasized the need for
US engagement in the region. He requested the United States not to forget Afghanistan because
the Soviet empire is gone. His appeal called for a moral responsibility towards Afghanistan
because of the sacrifices the state made as they fought side by side with them. The goal was to
get people some work as soldiers were paid less than $20 month (Gutnam 2008). Investment in
small factories would help thousands. While the start up of the cross border program in 1985 had
changed the environment by raising the American flag and identifying with the American cause
as Afghan cause cutting of aid had exactly the opposite impact. Absence of US Aid presence had
a lot to do with the rise of Taliban. With no influence, the real advantage belonged to Pak ISI
with fundamentalist funding sources and eventually in 1997-8 with al-Qaida. Despite rising
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costs U.S. has annually doubled its official defense costs in respects to Afghanistan, moving
from under US $ 21 billion in 2002, to a projected US $180 billion in 2009 -2010 ( Belasco
2009).
A shift in the United Sates approach led to adoption of Provisional Reconstruction Teams
where civil and military personnel would help expand legitimacy of Kabul government. PRTS
would enhance security and facilitate reconstruction process. PRTs failed work force, equipment
shortage, conflict between m military and civilian, failure to appreciate local conditions and
effectiveness became a contested issue The level of non security related aid is shockingly low,
less than 5$ a day per Pashtu per year (Johnson and Mason 2008).
U.S.-led international (post)war aid and development supports the postmodern
understanding of the spaces of privilege and power associated with political influence, insecurity,
and economic and spatial inequities that dominate the processes in the developmental aid policy
in Afghanistan. Rather than “developing Afghanistan,” this situation results in an extension and
reproduction of hierarchical wealth and uneven development (Juri 2009). Kabul, the capital city
of Afghanistan, is a key site for the U.S.-led international system of neoliberal economics and
militarized violence5. The flows of global capitalism in Kabul see the rise of temporally limited
economies that include various business opportunities, such as logistics organizations, private
security companies, service sector jobs, brothels, restaurants, malls, and shops. In developmental
projects, Afghan salaries vary widely by the nature of work and are very low. In addition,
working for an international nongovernmental organization (NGO), government, or private5
Conversely, ,the author mentions that Afghans interviewed also recognize the immediate need for social programs,
state-sponsored health care and education, a strong central government, and increases in Afghan government
funding and oversight. This understanding, however, remains outside current neoliberal economic, geopolitical, and
militarized systems for aid and development in Afghanistan ( Juri 2009)..
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sector group yields a much higher salary than that of their Afghan counterparts (Dittman 2007).
Some quotes from a study by Jennifer Juri( 2009) on “Foreign Passports Only”: Geographies of
(Post)Conflict Work in Kabul, Afghanistan:
“If the priority is local reconstruction and capacity building why do they pay a local such
low rates, $50-100 per month when an international comes in to do the same job and is
paid $200 per hour” (Sally 2006).
“People are separated and segregated. People ride in their own prime white SUV. In a perfect
world, I wish internationals thought about what they could learn from Afghans”. (Kathy 2006)
“Internationals are rude and obnoxious”. (Jim 2006)
“People come here for six months or one-year contracts, to build their careers in
the UN and NGO world. It is a kind of resume building … if you come [here] it
looks like you are serious and hard working. There are many people working
their way up for that cushy job in Geneva or New York”. (Giles 2006)
While aid flows in, most Afghans living in Kabul have limited access to clean drinking
water, electricity, Internet, and mobile phone usage due to the costs of these amenities and
services. The international donor workers experience technological efficiency and comfortable
lifestyles, whereas city-generated electricity and water accessibility remain minimal or
compromised for local Afghans. Most contracts are assigned to international companies, which
then subcontract them to local or neighboring contractors and most invested businesses and
economies are temporary at best that are part of a war reconstruction and conflict management
project.
The processes of aid and international workers practices do not provide affect the daily
lives of people and the struggle for survival continue. Their experiences with United States and
Western aid agencies and the spaces of “free markets” exist within a formal system of regulation
marred by extensive corruption, inconsistency, and insecurity ( Rubin 2006; Rashid 2008). The
perceptions in the Afghan’s collective consciousness are a U.S. led system of neoliberal
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economic under a corrupt central government. The questions that need to be asked are is: ‘Whose
development’ and ‘who benefits’ in this post war conflict ridden state that is experiencing
modernity and transformation through processes of aid and development.
What does this narrative tell us about US practices of security governance in South Asia?
An analysis of US policy in the region has been episodic, discontinuous driven by America’s
own strategic calculations of balancing power during the cold war and by the need for military
allies in the war against terrorism. This policy can be characterized as one of ‘strategic
inattentiveness’ in Afghanistan a ‘strategic permissiveness’ in Pakistan (Kapila 2008) rather than
‘strategic altruism’. In cases, military planning and the policy of aid and its logistics was
determined by America’s strategic goals in the region. Adopting a counterterrorist frame of
action by putting US policy in the hands of counterterrorism experts who advocated and drafted
the US and UN sanctions in 1999 and 2000 led to the articulation of Muslim grievances in a
regime for extremist global vision, calling for war through terror tactics. These circumstances
and situation specific alignments that became a call against America did not emerge out of thin
air but from a domestic political context, or from civil war or regional war and the destabilizing
role of an external actor. Before 9/11 all three administrations - George Bush, Clinton and
George W.Bush started from the premise that after the collapse of Soviet Union, The United
States could withdraw from parts of the world where it had no material or strategic interests.
The failure of the Afghan policy is a result of miscalculation of consequences, limited
rationality that satisfies absolute minimal requirements and repackaged decision rather than case
specific solutions. From winning the global war on terror, to promoting democracy and
development, the realist, civilizational and liberal functionalist security practices of the United
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States have failed to achieve its desired goals of creating stability and security in the region.
Discounting the internal dynamics and complexities of the states and following an entrenched
policy of military and economic aid and intervention as a source of security, is too narrow a
dimension of a complex problem and resonates strongly as ‘US imperialism’ and occupation of
Afghanistan and war against Pakistan.
Measures for changing behavior:
The United States approaches the region as a set of wicked problems that can be tamed. A tame
problem was a term designed by Herbert Simon who argued that problems could be tamed
through rational choices. A traditional linear process is sufficient to produce a workable solution
to a tame problem in an acceptable period time. To quote Rittel and Webber (1973): “The
classical systems approach … is based on the assumption that a … project can be organized into
distinct phases: ‘understand the problems’, ‘gather information,’ ‘synthesize information…,’
‘work out solutions’ and the like. For wicked problems, however, this type of scheme does not
work. One cannot understand the problem without knowing about its context; one cannot
meaningfully search for information without the orientation of a solution concept, one cannot
first understand, then solve.”
United States practices are not located outside of the discourse of US foreign policy that
focused from containment of communism, to the global war on terror and promotion of
democracy around the world. Practices of the administration are endowed with meanings. These
practices of state investment in counterterrorism initiatives, military technology and planning are
endowed with meanings for the foreign policy goals and the role of the military. These practices
objectify meaning and discourse. The measure for changing these practices may vary from the
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spectrum from temporarily balancing power to embracing normative power.
However, the
preferred tools of American foreign policy – weapons, covert tactic and surgical military strike
are only a temporary fix. All administrations from Clinton to Obama developed counterterrorism
tactics but not a political strategy embedded in a long-term foreign policy. It viewed Afghanistan
in the context of Osama bin Laden instead of seeing Bin Laden in the Afghan context. Great
effort went into intelligence gathering but in the form of actionable intelligence that would guide
a surgical strike to assassinate Bin laden rather than in the form of political cues that would
provide the key to his power and resilience. Grievances that allowed Bin Laden to rally martyrs
from around the world need to be examined seriously and addressed. A strategy of normative
power practices to change the worldview of America and the ‘Other’ – who are stigmatized as
either terrorists or objects of development could be the first step in the merging of alternative
modernities and changing the war of narratives.
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