Carnival in Salvador, Brazil:
A Case Study of Inter-organizational Collaboration
by
Sandro Cabral
Assistant Professor of Operations and Strategy and CNPq Researcher
School of Management
Federal U. Bahia (UFBA)
[email protected]
Dale Krane
Frederick W. Kayser Chair Professor
School of Public Administration
University of Nebraska at Omaha
[email protected]
Fagner Dantas
Graduate Student, NPGA/UFBA
Urban Planning Analyst - City of Salvador, Brazil
[email protected]
Paper prepared for delivery at the 2011 JCPA/ICPA-Forum
Comparative Research Symposium on Public Policy in Brazil and Latin America.
Fundação Getulio Vargas, Sao Paulo, Brasil, November 18-19, 2011.
**No Quotation or Reproduction of the Paper without Permission of the Authors**
Carnival in Salvador, Brasil: A Case Study of Inter-organizational Collaboration
1
Sandro Cabral, Dale Krane, and Fagner Dantas
Carnival in Salvador, Brazil offers an unusual example of collaboration among public and
private entities that normally engage in non-cooperation and conflict. Reputedly the largest
popular festival in the world, Salvador’s historic cultural event depends on a high degree of
cooperation among and between municipal and state governments, private firms, and voluntary
associations. Policy-making in Salvador is characterized typically by frequent outbreaks of “turf
wars” that prevent public action in a timely fashion. Yet surprisingly, the normal condition of
non-cooperation does not disrupt Carnival activities. So why is the usual conflict over public
policies restrained for decisions and activities related to Carnival?
Public policies that require inter-organizational collaboration must overcome several
institutional barriers: fiscal, legal, organizational, technical, and political. Among factors
hypothesized to influence the possibility of collaboration are (1) initial conditions and context
such as agency autonomy, policy problem characteristics, and institutional constraints, (2) formal
arrangements such as budgets and finances, membership of decision-making bodies, and
structural configurations, (3) operational processes such as administrative coordination, shared
communication, and style of decision-making, and (4) social capital such as mutual recognition,
shared understanding, and trust. Variation in these factors significantly affects whether
collaboration occurs, whether “turf wars” are suppressed and transcended, and whether public
purposes are achieved. Most of the models that attempt to explain collaboration rely on examples
from the United States and Europe. These models also focus on a rather narrow set of policy
areas, primarily environmental protection, emergency management, human service networks, and
regional planning. Little attention has been given to the conduct of large-scale civic events.
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Salvador’s Carnival provides a laboratory in which the current conceptualization of collaboration
can be tested in a distinctly unique policy area as well as in a cultural and political setting
different from the usual studies.
Models of Collaborative Governance
Scholars increasingly argue public administration is “repositioning itself” around “models
built on the assumptions of institution building, cooperation, productivity, structure, and
leadership” (Frederickson 1999, 710), and consequently public managers now function in “an age
of collaboration” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, 20). Some such as Jan-Erik Lane (1993: 1) assert
traditional hierarchically structured public administration has been abandoned. The movement
away from Weberian public bureaux has been driven by two key determinants (1) many problems
affecting citizens transcend existing jurisdictional boundaries (Kettl 2006), and (2) societal
problems increasingly require solutions that surpass the capacity and scope of any one public
agency. Instead of a single responsible agency, collaborative forms of policy design and
implementation are supplementing and even supplanting “top-down” forms (Bryson &
Einsweiler, 1991; Alter & Hage, 1993; Wright & Krane, 1998).
As public officials expanded government activities in response to citizen demands, policy
design and implementation became complicated by the challenge of functioning across horizontal
and vertical tiers of government. This intra-governmental complexity has been compounded
further by a growing reliance on non-governmental entities in the production and delivery of
goods and services. These changes not only blur the distinction between public and private
sectors, but also decentralize and devolve public policy away from traditional administrative and
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political structures. Bryson and Einsweiler (1991, 10) state “the plain fact of the matter is that the
most important public issues of the day typically arise in settings in which no one is in charge,
and in which organizations or institutions must share power in order to address these issues
effectively.” If public officials must operate a world of “shared power,” then they face the
challenge of joint action by multiple organizations. A key theoretical and practical question then
is: “why should firms or agencies cooperate?” (Alter & Hage, 1993:12).
The line of research addressing this question began over four decades ago with work by
Aiken et al. (1975) and Pfeffer and Salanick (1978), and moved forward by others such as Rogers
and Whitten (1982), Gray (1989), Mandell (1990), Agranoff (1991), Bryson & Einsweller (1991),
Alter & Hage (1993), Ring & Van de Ven (1994), McCaffrey, Faerman, & Hart (1995), Bardach
(1998) until today one finds an expanding list of articles and books on collaborative governance
and public management (see for example, Bingham & O’Leary, 2008; O’Leary & Bingham,
2009). Despite this considerable corpus of work on collaboration, no one generally accepted
theory exists; instead one finds specific authors arguing for one (or more) of several possible
theoretical foundations. The lack of theoretical unity can be traced in part to the disciplines the
authors represent and on which the authors ground their research. But an equally important
reason underlying the lack of theoretical agreement is the lack of consensus on a generally
accepted definition of collaboration. Krane and Lu (2010) identified a minimum of five different
and competing definitions (1) a process, (2) a purposive relationship, (3) a feature of an
inter-organizational network, (4) an outcome or result of an interactive process or relationship,
and (5) both a process and an institutional arrangement. These alternative conceptualizations
have not stood in the way of the rapid expansion of collaboration studies. It should also be noted
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that scholars studying collaboration have not yet explicitly clarified collaboration from
cooperation and coordination. Krane and Lu (2010, 10) observe “Distinguishing among these
three concepts has been something of a Gordian knot in the study of inter-organizational
relationships not just for scholars, but also for professionals working in public and nonprofit
organizations.”
Contrasted with the diversity of collaboration definitions and theoretical roots, the
development of models of collaboration are converging around a set of similar elements and
relationships (see e.g., Thomson & Perry, 2006; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Ansell & Gash,
2008; de Leon & Varda, 2009). Early efforts sought to sketch the antecedents of collaboration,
and then attention turned to outcomes. More recent models incorporate antecedents, processes,
outcomes, and add institutional design, leadership, number and variety of groups, issues and
incentives, structure and governance, and contingencies and constraints. Different models may
label a given factor differently from another model, but the factors in the various models are
increasingly similar.
Ansell and Gash Model of Collaborative Governance
Johnston et al. (2011: 701) assert “the ‘contingency model’ of collaborative
governance recently proposed by Ansell and Gash is, perhaps, the most sophisticated account of
the complex conditions necessary to initiate and sustain collaboration to date.” Ansell and Gash
(2008: 548) conducted an extensive literature review of collaboration studies drawing
internationally cases published in English. Most of their 137 cases described and analyzed
attempts “to implement collaborative governance in a particular sector,” especially where the
situation entailed the management of contentious disputes. Using this inventory, they proceeded
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to create a model of collaborative governance (see Figure 1). Among factors hypothesized to
influence collaborations are (1) Starting Conditions composed of “power-resource-knowledge
asymmetries, incentives and constraints on participation, and prehistory of cooperation or
conflict; (2) Collaborative Process consisting of face-to-face dialogue, trust-building,
commitment to process, shared understanding, intermediate outcomes; (3) Institutional Design
based on participatory inclusiveness, forum exclusiveness, clear ground rules, process
transparency; (4) Leadership including empowerment; and (5) Outcomes, which are seen as
process based.
_______________________
Insert Figure 1 about here
________________________
The heart of the model developed by Ansell and Gash is the collaboration process itself
and the dynamics they hypothesize are necessary for collaboration to succeed. They conceive of
the process as cyclical or iterative, rather than linear. Dialogue depends on “good faith”
negotiations to overcome a lack of trust which often prevents joint action. The dialogue “is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for collaboration”...because ...”it is possible for
face-to-face dialogue to reinforce stereotypes or status differences or to increase antagonism and
mutual disrespect” [italics in original] (p. 558). Ansell and Gash view the level of commitment to
the process as the critical variable in explaining success or failure because negotiations and
trust-building are time-consuming activities and impose costs on those seeking to create
collaboration (p. 559). As a dialogue proceeds, one would expect a shift in the locus of decision
making from individual agencies and organizations to the parties committed to the collaborative
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process such that the stakeholders “own” the decision-making. “Ownership” by stakeholders
‘implies shared responsibility’ which for the process to succeed needs to develop into a “shared
understanding of what they can collectively achieve together” (p.560). Ansell and Gash suggest a
“shared understanding” takes the form of a common problem definition, a clear mission [for joint
action], and the identification of common values. Intermediate outcomes, or “small wins,”
reinforce the collaborative process and increase the chances of successfully achieving desired
outcomes.
Starting a collaborative process is a function of contextual preconditions and the degree to
which these preconditions facilitate or hinder cooperation. The challenges here are substantial
since power and resource imbalances may have to be altered through capacity building,
knowledge sharing, or empowerment. Given the obvious costs of joint activity, stakeholders are
more likely to participate if they anticipate collaboration will yield meaningful results.
“Incentives to participate,” Ansell and Gash claim, “are low when stakeholders can achieve their
goals unilaterally or through alternative means” (p.552). One condition that increases incentives
to participate is the existence of an exclusive forum for decision making. Another important
factor affecting incentives to participate are perceptions of interdependence among the parties –
do the parties see each other as partners or rivals, indispensable or nonessential? Political and
policy contexts with their histories of conflict or cooperation (or both) among stakeholders also
affect the likelihood of starting a collaborative dialogue. Grid locks and inaction may actually
raise costs to individuals and organizations so much that they begin to view anticipated benefits
of collaboration as exceeding its costs.
An important role in initiating the collaborative process is the guidance of a facilitative
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leader who shepherds the parties along the path toward trust and shared understanding.
Leadership can be singular or multiple; what counts is the ability of leaders to manage the
dialogue through arbitration, facilitation, and mediation. Especially where power imbalances
and/or antagonistic perceptions exist, facilitators are vital to bringing parties together and guiding
the negotiations through tense situations. It should be noted that Ansell and Gash locate
facilitative leadership outside the collaborative process as do Faerman, McCaffrey and Van Slyke
(2001), but unlike Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) who place leaders inside the process.
Also located outside the collaborative process and shaping its operation are various
institutional design features. Ansell and Gash adopt an [apparent] institutional economics
approach and define design as “the basic protocols and ground rules for collaboration” (p.555).
They go on to specify several design features which undergird collaborative processes (1) broad,
inclusive participation, (2) exclusivity of the decision forum [“it is the only game in town”], (3)
clear ground rules, (4) process transparency [no back door deals], (5) “fair hearings,” (6)
agreed-on decision rules [e.g., consensus, super majority, or majority rule], (7) formalization of
governance structures, and (8) use of deadlines. The degree to which various studies have
confirmed the importance of one or the other of these design features varies, as Ansell and Gash
note. They emphasize design features in the form of protocols and rules that need to be
established so as to imbue the process with procedural legitimacy and foster trust-building.
Although Ansell and Gash highlight the value of an exclusive forum for collaborative decisions,
their description of the forum is unclear as to whether it is an existing venue or one created
specifically by the stakeholders as a product of negotiations.
Challenges to Models of Collaborative Governance
8
Collaborative governance and models of collaborative processes face the long-standing
pathologies caused by hierarchical bureaucracies, fragmented strategies to societal problems,
mismatches between problem scope and jurisdictional boundaries, increased complexity of tasks
and solutions, and lack of citizen input to public decisions – to name a few. The enthusiasm for
collaborative forms of organization comes close to treating collaboration as the next “silver
bullet” or panacea for public sector shortcomings. This enthusiasm can also be seen in the rapid
increase in the number of research articles published on the subject. However, this bandwagon of
advocacy and interest in collaboration needs to be tempered by a realization that significant
stumbling blocks to collaboration exist and they must be acknowledged in model-building as well
as in the application of collaborative processes to public problems.
The impediments to cooperation and collaboration, as discussed by Jennings and Krane
(1994), pose several large categories of barriers, including organizational, legal/technical, and
political. Organizational obstacles are rooted in mission differences, professional norms, standard
operating procedures, and structural arrangements. Agency actions and public programs are
constrained by laws and regulations as well as by the level and types of technologies employed.
Political jockeying among an agency’s units and between politically appointed managers and
career civil servants can easily block movement toward collaboration. Similarly, the pursuit of
interests by constituency groups and by public officials can stop attempts at collaboration. The
equally well-understood issues associated with budgets and finances also erect high walls to
collaborative efforts. Advocates of collaboration and those who study collaboration cannot easily
deny the presence of these pervasive impairments. Studies of collaboration need to avoid the
temptation to focus solely on the factors and processes associated with “successful”
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collaboration. Studies also need to incorporate the considerable work on barriers to
organizational change and how they can be overcome.
Although theorists have hypothesized that certain factors shape collaboration, only some
elements are under the control of public officials or are amenable to their actions. Yet, these
officials are held responsible for results. For example, in policy areas that employ private sector
entities, the establishment of a public-private partnership will depend as much on the actions of
executives of for-profit enterprises and/or nonprofit organizations as on those by public officials.
Consequently, a particularly crucial focus of research is the identification of those factors public
officials utilize in their efforts to overcome inter-organizational conflict and build collaboration
among the agencies, jurisdictions, and organizations that populate a public program’s
implementation structure.
Not only are the actions taken important, but so is the sequence. It is often believed that
cooperative behavior is a product of formal arrangements such as contracts and joint planning,
but evidence drawn from studies in the United States suggest that informal processes that build
interpersonal relationships among members of the organizations within a functional policy area
are a necessary first step (Jennings & Krane, 1994; Bardach, 1998). Put another way, without
first establishing a level of confidence and trust, formal arrangements are not likely to emerge. A
related feature of collaboration is the type of inter-organizational network created – not all
networks are alike in their purposes, operations, or structures. Collaborations can be rather
simple affairs existing for cooperative purposes such as information exchange, other networks
take additional steps to educate members and build member capacity, some networks initiate new
programming by members, and other collaborations adopt formal arrangements designed to
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achieve joint goals (Agranoff, 2007). Variation in these factors significantly affects whether
collaboration occurs, whether “turf wars” are transcended, and whether public purposes are
achieved.
Carnival and the City of Salvador, Brazil
Located a little more than 1000 miles north of Rio de Janeiro, Salvador is the capital of
the State of Bahia, and with a population of almost three million is Brazil’s third largest
municipality. The city functioned as Brazil’s capital from 1549 until the 1808 arrival of the
Portuguese court in Rio. During the colonial period Salvador was the principal port serving the
plantation economy based on sugar cane. This lucrative crop which depended on the extensive
use of African slave labor produced such profit that Bahia became one of the wealthiest regions
in the Americas and allowed the city’s residents to build opulent churches, homes, and public
facilities. After the capital moved and sugar no longer yielded riches, Salvador languished as
other cities advanced. The Afro-descendent population, comprising nearly 80% of the city’s
inhabitants, created a distinctive local culture and a form of Carnival different from the style in
Rio. The numbers of the Salvador Carnival´s are impressive. Miguez and Loiola (2011), estimate
that the 668,000 revelers per day are in the city streets enjoying the party, including local people
and tourists (15% of the total). Organizing this annual cultural event occurring over six days
requires enormous exertion by public agencies, private enterprises, and voluntary associations,
and the work must be completed on-time. The process by which the numerous organizations
create the yearly festival provides an exceptional opportunity to understand the dynamics of
collaborative governance.
Carnival in Salvador
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The pre-Lenten festival in Salvador contrasts dramatically with the elaborate floats and
choreography of the samba schools in Rio. Originally, families who lived in the city’s historic
core [Pelourinho] marched around the “upper city.” These street parades were supplemented in
the 1950s by trios elétricos (wagons with a small group of musicians). Groups of friends (blocos)
developed to sponsor a trio and participate in its annual procession. Over the years the festival
grew in numbers of trios and two routes around the city were established to accommodate the
crowds which followed. The trios became increasingly more elaborate and by the 1990s the
wagons were replaced by huge cargo trucks modified with stages carrying one or more celebrity
singers, bands, dancers, sound systems, lights, and advertising (Jacobina, 2011). Today’s trio is
composed of several components: the trio, a large truck with a celebrity performer and
accompanying musicians and technicians. The crew of each trio creates a large cordoned space
around the vehicle and people purchase a special costume (abadá) to accompany the trio in close
proximity which separates them from the throngs in the street or standing along the route.
Accompanying the trio within the cordoned area is a support truck (carro de apoio) which
provides sanitary facilities, food and drink, and medical assistance for those who paid to be in the
restricted area close to the trio. The typical paid audience moving with the trio numbers about
3000 each night, and the number of employees (performers and support staff) often exceed 1,000.
Ticket revenues, advertising, and sponsorships cover the trio’s costs (can be as high as R$2.5
million). In one sense, those who buy abadás partially subsidize the non-paying masses that
dance and sing in the streets to the music of the trios.
Enterprising individuals and organizations construct bleachers and acquire spaces in
buildings which are turned into fee-based locations (camarotes) from which to observe the
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parade of trios. These camarotes cater primarily to middle and upper class persons who can
afford the entry fee (US$100 to US$600) to observe the street throngs and trios from a
comfortable perch. Some of these private spots offer the VIPs a bundle of services including
drinks, food, disco bands, massage, coiffure, clean toilets, and security guards.
Carnival creates large numbers of customers for hotels, restaurants, and other tourist
related industries as well information technology, mass media, health care, private security, and
transport. Not only does Salvador’s festival attract many Brazilians, it increasingly draws more
and more foreign participants. The week-long event is an important opportunity for low and
middle income persons to sell all manner of items to the crowds. The city designates certain
streets which annually become populated with kiosks and vendors. Miguez and Loiola (2009)
estimated that Carnival generates 110,000 temporary jobs.
The past three decades have been characterized by the professionalization of the trios and
of the festival itself. Windson Silva, an impresario with Grupo Cheiro (a bloco) observes
“Everything used to be very playful, we did not have a preoccupation with profit nor a
commercial vision. But with the growth of Carnival we have been pushed toward
professionalization...We evolved from a group of friends to a business. Because of this, we have
to invest in the excellence of the service we offer.” Grupo Cheiro now attracts on average 2.7
thousand associates who pay R$600 to join its trio for three days (Jacobina, 2011: 22-23). The
event’s growth prompted the city to establish two new organizations: the Special Commission for
Carnival and the Casa do Carnaval (House of Carnival). Both entities, composed of public and
private stakeholders, have become important for fostering inter-organizational cooperation to
assure the festival’s success.
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The Municipality of Salvador
The municipality of Salvador is responsible for the organization of the Carnival. Given
the importance of the festivity for both economic impact and political image, the Mayor assumes
the role of main coordinator for Carnival. It is up to the municipality to synchronize the efforts of
the several public, private and civilian organizations involved and to exert the administrative
control over issues related to the festival. Indeed, Carnival in Salvador generates a non-negligible
amount of money. As of 2007 Carnival, official records estimate that annually Carnival
accounted for between US$ 200 million and US$ 250 million volume of business (Infocultura,
2007), and unsurprisingly such amount of money attracts the attention not only from private
entrepreneurs but also from public officials and citizen groups.
In the past three decades several agencies were created to administer Carnival. Among
them are the Gregorio de Matos Foundation, the Special Commission for Carnival (Comissão
Especial do Carnaval), the House of Carnival (Casa do Carnaval), the Municipal Tourism Office
(EMTURSA, now SALTUR), and the Municipal Council of Carnival (COMCAR). Although
the prominence of each organization in the preparation for Carnival has varied over the years,
there has been considerable interaction among these organizations. According to the city’s laws,
COMCAR is the lead agency responsible for planning Carnival. COMCAR is composed of 25
public and private stakeholders (Table 1) and is constructed to assure Carnival is managed in a
democratic and participative fashion. However, there are claims that COMCAR’s decisions are
biased toward the tangled interests of municipal politicians and business leaders (Miguez, 2011).
_______________________
Insert Table 1 about here
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________________________
Carnival´s organization requires several support services such as public security, health,
city transit, mass transportation, and sanitation control. Municipal authorities have to collaborate
with state-level agencies to assure the provision of some services. In this matter, collaboration of
public security forces (military police, civil police, fire department, and forensic police) and
health services (hospitals, on-site physicians and paramedics) are crucial for a successful event.
Public opinion tends to judge state-level authorities, especially the State Governor, accountable
for success or failure of the Carnival. This aspect demands the involvement of state-level
agencies in Carnival planning and operation in order to preserve and/or boost the reputation of
state government authorities.
Naturally, such interaction is not conflict free, and political and technical tensions may
arise. Actually, struggles and lack of collaboration between different public agencies are a
hallmark in the context of both state and local levels. For instance, the different police forces of
Bahia state hardly ever operate in a team-work basis. Despite existing complementarities,
non-cooperation characterizes their daily activities (Barbosa & Souza, 1997). In the same vein,
the relationship between municipal and state health systems present frictions that hamper the
attainment of public demands (Jose, 2011). The conflicts are even more evident when
municipality and state government are run by different coalitions giving rise to “turf wars”
between rival political groups at the expense of efficiency in the delivery of public services
(Hupsel Filho, 2011).
Nevertheless, the regular state of non-cooperation does not hinder the delivery of the
“Carnival product”. On the contrary, different organizations involved with Carnival operation
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engage in a level of collaboration that is not usual outside of the festival´s period. For example,
police forces work together to control violent individuals, local and state health systems share
information and resources, and parades proceed. Considering that almost 700,000 persons are in
the Salvador´s streets celebrating Carnival and that the consumption of alcoholic beverages is not
restricted, homicide rates are surprisingly low; actually being inferior to a regular weekend
(Sotero, 2011). In this sense, one may argue: why is the usual level of conflict over public
policies restrained for decisions and activities related to Carnival? Which factors explain the
collaboration process? Why does such cooperative behavior not spill over to other public
services? In the next section, we tackle these questions by investigating the planning and
operation of Salvador’s Carnival.
A Brief Note on Methodology
To examine the influence of inter-organizational collaborative practices in Carnival
design and implementation, we use a qualitative approach. We interviewed a number of the most
relevant actors who participated in the planning and implementation of the Salvador’s Carnival in
the past 25 years. These key informants are persons in city and state government offices
responsible for the administration of Carnival and for public security (list available from
authors). The interviews were conducted between May and October 2011. The in-depth
interviews took between 60 and 75 minutes, totaling more than 9 hours of dialogue. Some
interviews were recorded and latter transcribed. In some cases, we took notes during interviews
and one of us after each meeting composed full records that were content analyzed and
commented on by the other two authors. We also analyzed ancillary documents related to
Carnival such as internal reports, meeting notes, and official communications. As usual in
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qualitative research, coinciding and conflicting perceptions on the phenomena under
investigation arose from the different sources of information. To increase the reliability of our
findings we triangulated all data, as suggested by Myers (2009).
Carnival and Collaboration
Numerous studies of collaborative success have examined conflicts in policy areas such
as disaster response, environmental protection, social service delivery, and watershed
management. Policy issues vary with the number (few to many) and type of participants (solely
public; public and private). Issues also vary with the nature of the policy problem. Some issues
are characterized by a single discrete conflict between two parties, which when resolved results
in a stable agreement governing future joint activity (e.g., a dispute between a government agency
and a polluting industry). Other issues are characterized by multiple parties and multiple points of
conflict which are negotiated over a lengthy period in which progress requires the sequential
resolution of each conflict until all issues are settled (e.g., negotiation over water management
among multiple types of users, public and private). Another situation is one where the disputes
occur on a regular basis (e.g., annually) and must be settled before joint action can proceed
successfully, but with each new period, previous agreements may be re-opened and re-negotiated.
Carnival in Salvador fits this last situation in that multiple participants, both public and private,
annually (re)negotiate the conditions of their joint activity that is required to produce the event.
Models of collaboration purport to identify the crucial elements and relationships necessary to
explain the success of the collaborative process. We use the Ansell and Gash model to explore
the collaborative process in Salvador’s Carnival planning and operation.
Starting Conditions
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“Conditions present at the outset of collaboration can either facilitate or discourage
cooperation among stakeholders and between agencies and stakeholders” (Ansell & Gash, 2008:
550). Power and resource imbalances between stakeholders are a commonly noted obstacle to
collaboration. Planning and execution of Carnival, as mentioned previously, depends on city and
state government administration and resources as well as private sources. The interviews suggest
a strong interdependence exists among city and state government, and between the public
agencies and private entrepreneurs. For example, the city and the impresarios who produce the
trios rely on the state Military Police for security. At the same time, private firms and state
government agencies (e.g., tourism) depend on the organizational capability of the municipality
which is the responsible for carnival. An equally important initial imbalance is the knowledge
held by the artistic associations and the resources of commercial entrepreneurs. Without the
cooperation of associations of musicians and other artists the event cannot function. Similarly,
the festival increasingly requires financing from commercial enterprises as well as the provision
of their products and services. As one interview respondent declared, the collection of private
businesses and artistic groups involved “is fundamental [because] they create the structures,
produce the content, and sponsor the festival.” Simply put, no one possesses sufficient power,
resources, and knowledge to carry out Carnival singlehandedly.
Incentives are held to be an important causal factor in the explanation of behavior, and
incentives related to collaboration are often influenced by the imbalances in power, resources,
and knowledge among the stakeholders. Incentives can be direct and tangible; a good example
can be found in regard to festival sponsorships. During Lidice da Mata’s term as mayor in the
early 1990s, sponsorship arrangements changed so that “major national brands began to pay for
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the realization of the festival with their profits.” In return, the companies were permitted to
participate more directly in Carnival planning and operation. Incentives may also be tangible but
more indirect. Also during the da Mata mayorship, “a new vision emerged seeing Carnival as a
unique economic opportunity for the city, including the point of view of the distribution of
income from the highest impresario to the most humble street vendor, all would have a great
chance at profit.” While tangible economic returns prompt individuals and groups to participate
cooperatively, a more basic motivation is the weight of public opinion due to the general
expectation that carnival will be a well-orchestrated and enjoyable event. Because everyone in
the city (and the media) is watching, it is impossible to sweep under the rug any shortcomings.
Consequently, this public expectation creates a palpable and powerful non-monetary incentive to
participate collaboratively.
A prehistory of cooperation or conflict strongly shapes the emergence of collaboration.
Policy deadlocks or an “us versus them” mind set can prevent collaboration. The post-1985
history of Salvador’s Carnival includes periods of cooperation and conflict. Important conflicts
have occurred over whether the city or state government would be the primary administrator,
between different agencies as to how one agency’s actions will affect another agency’s plans, and
between the mayor and the city council. Other conflicts have occurred between public agencies
and private firms over the amount of fees that can be charged, the taxes to be paid, the location of
privately operated facilities, the routes taken by trios and blocos, the type of media coverage
groups receive, the type of subsidy a group will be given, and the designation of a specific
company as a sponsor. Conflicts have also been ignited between various artists, blocos, and trios
over the routes and schedules of the procession, and between blocos and neighborhood
19
associations over the hours and noise levels of the processions. Although conflicts happen
frequently among various stakeholders, cooperation proceeds because “the entities who
participate have a perception that if Carnival fails, it would also cause their own collapse.” No
one wants to be the party who caused the event to fail, no one wants to be left out of a successful
event. “It is better to participate and try to interfere on the procedures than to be the last one to be
informed on others’ decisions,” one of our respondents stated. Because rewards and punishments
are at stake, the diverse agencies, groups, and organizations are motivated to take a “hands-on”
approach, different from more normal behavior in other policy areas where non-action and
non-cooperation are typical.
Institutional Design
Ansell and Gash view institutional design as “the basic protocols and ground rules for
collaboration which are critical to the procedural legitimacy of the collaborative process...Access
to the collaborative process itself is perhaps the most fundamental design issue” (p.555).
Salvador’s Carnival is preeminently a popular festival, embracing the whole population.
Consequently, decision-making arrangements have evolved to be broadly inclusive in Salvador,
and our respondents confirm this expectation. Formal entities have been established over time to
serve as forums for planning, operating, and assessing event activities, including the previously
mentioned House of Carnival and the Municipal Council for Carnival (COMCAR). The House of
Carnival was specifically created “to foster cooperation among the different organs involved,
concentrating their command in a single headquarters.” COMCAR, with members representing a
broad spectrum of associations and organizations vital to the event, is described as “the principal
channel of communication.” The “role of the Council is to carry the opinions of its members to
20
the discussions with state and city government,” in particular, the four principal public agencies
which administer the festival: Bahia Department of Culture, Bahia Department of Tourism,
Bahia Department of Communication, and City of Salvador Department of Tourism. COMCAR
serves as the sole space where small entities, the blocos and camarotes operators, have direct
contact with the security forces managed by the state Military Police. COMCAR also is an
important vehicle for carrying its members’ views to the mayor and city council as well as the
state governor. Other important forum of cooperation are the Office for Integrated Management,
which is an office crafted to take decisions during the week of Carnival and the Center for
Carnival Information, which records public security issues during the festival.
Ansell and Gash’s conception of institutional design also incorporates “clear ground rules
and process transparency” which are necessary for “procedural legitimacy and trust-building”
(p.556-557). Laws and formal agreements have been enacted to govern Carnival, including the
Ordinance of Popular Festivals, the Terms of Settlement of Conduct, and the Terms of
Commitment. Records of meetings are kept and published as well as any changes in rules
governing the event. Regulatory documents include the Regulation of Carnival Entities (e.g.,
blocos and trios), a Code of Ethics, and a Decree on the Flow of Blocos. These various
agreements “prescribe the responsibilities of each entity, so that the actions of Carnival will be
decided together and not by an individual.” Some topics are not deliberated in official forums.
The large blocos and the celebrity trios have direct access to key decision makers (e.g., the
mayor; the Military Police). Therefore, in some situations, the rules are not completely
transparent and enforcement mechanisms are not effective. A typical example is a trio moves
slowly and takes much more time to complete its route in the assigned time is never punished.
21
It should be pointed out that Ansell and Gash’s conceptualization of institutional design
closely follows that used by Douglas North (1990) and by Elinor Ostrom (2007), who define
institutions in terms of “rules of the game” and “rules-in-use,” both formal and informal (i.e.,
norms). Other conceptions of institutions such as Scott’s (1995) and Pierson’s (2004) include
structure and symbolic aspects. While clear rules insuring broad access and procedures
guaranteeing transparency are important, a solely rule-based definition ignores the influence
structures exert not just on their members, but also on the interaction with other structures.
March and Olson’s (1989) argument that institutions matter is grounded in the thesis that
institutions possess and pursue interests, just as individuals do. In Salvador the history of
Carnival’s operation is rife with examples of different institutions pursuing their own interest,
thus provoking conflicts; our respondents more than once mentioned the jockeying between city
and state government officials and agencies. Rules are an important element of institutional
design, but equally important are the structures necessary to plan and operate the event.
The Collaborative Process
The meta-analysis conducted by Ansell and Gash found that the most common
description of collaboration was a linear process “developing in stages” (p.557). However, they
reject this view and argue “...the collaborative process is cyclical rather than linear.
“Collaboration often seemed to depend on achieving a virtuous cycle between communication,
trust, commitment, understanding, and outcomes” (p.558). That is, the process is iterative [italics
in original], and “...it calls attention to the way in which feedbacks from early collaboration can
positively or negatively influence further collaboration” (p.558). The collaboration crucial to
Carnival in Salvador confirms this iterative perspective.
22
A necessary but not sufficient condition for collaboration, according to Ansell and Gash,
is face-to-face dialogue and good faith negotiation which “...is at the heart of a process of
building trust, mutual respect, shared understanding, and commitment to the process” (p.558).
Carnival is a cultural event that “...takes place on public streets but a major part of its content [is
provided] by private entities,” then “it is necessary to dialogue. And where there is dialogue,
there is participation.” One particularly apt description of Carnival negotiations we were given is:
Each inside the collaborative process tries to convince the other that his idea is better.
What is most important is that, everyone can discuss as much as they like inside the
group, but, once an item is decided, everyone ought to commit to the decision taken...
And (also) very important is that no one going into this process would want to impose
their own authority [on others]. It is fundamental to listen to all the participants,
principally when they are dealing with a very technical issue, listen to the specialists
and not assert a political desire.
These dialogues are held within and across multiple organizations, those specifically
established to administer Carnival as well as general purpose institutions such as the city council.
Ansell and Gash emphasize face-to-face dialogue and negotiation provide the means by which
stereotypes held by stakeholders can be broken down as well as other barriers to communication
that prevent the exploration of mutual gains. The result should be, according to them, the
emergence of trust among the participants. Interestingly, not one of our respondents mentioned
trust (confiança). Mutual respect, commitment to the process, and shared understanding were
mentioned by our respondents, but not trust. Further investigation is necessary to determine
whether the idea of trust is believed to be necessary to the development of collaboration. Perhaps
it is a cultural-linguistic matter in Brazil or perhaps it is a function of the content of the dialogue
related to Carnival activities. On the latter possibility, more than one respondent emphasized the
relevance of technical data and information as crucial to negotiation and decision-making. Since
23
much of the planning and operation revolves around logistics, technical experts from public
agencies are likely to exercise significant influence on the decisions of councils composed of
many non-technical participants. Similarly, where items to be decided are about artistic matters,
persons from the artistic community are likely to be more influential, and when commercial
interests are stake, the interests of relevant actors tend to be preserved. These types of mutual
adjustment suggests that there is more to dialogue than its face-to-face feature – who
communicates and what is communicated also influence whether collaboration occurs.
Ansell and Gash tell us that stakeholders’ level of commitment to collaboration is a
critical variable in explaining success or failure. They also point out “collaborative governance
shifts ‘ownership’ of decision making from the agency to the stakeholders acting collectively”
(p.559), and “ownership implies shared responsibility for the process” (p.560). Carnival’s
stakeholders “...work each time for a greater articulation among the different entities so that
carnival will be a product of joint action and not the [result] of dispersed forces.” According to
one of our respondents, “It is fundamental that personal vanity does not supersede the collective
vanity.” By this the person means “...in an activity with many participants, it is normal that vanity
exists and there is a dispute over who will be the ‘father of the child’ (pai da criança), not just at
the moment of suggestion, but [also] in the hour of implementation...in the end, it is important
that Carnival will be the fruit of the combined efforts of these diverse partners.” Describing the
commitment to collaboration among government agencies, artist associations, and private firms, a
respondent said: “on this point, the discussion is ruled by the importance that all of them (the
public officials) understand that to have Carnival without the blocos and without the camarotes,
the quality of Carnival falls. On the other hand, they (artists and entrepreneurs) need to
24
understand that without the state government and without city hall Carnival will not happen.”
Similarly, another respondent explained: “Until today, this underlying collective consciousness,
where all who are involved recognize the importance to act so as to produce a correct Carnival so
that each one of them will have their respective benefits in their area of performance, is still an
important factor for explaining the inter-organizational cooperation present during Carnival.”
Commitment to the process fosters a shared understanding of what can collectively be
achieved, Ansell and Gash explain, and suggest the shared understanding appears in common
missions, purposes, visions (p.560). A respondent explains: “Evidently all of the persons [in the
planning processes] think that they will lose power and that they will not gain money because it
is complicated. We have to demonstrate that this is not the case. What we want is to enlarge [the
festival] so that all benefit and until they benefit more.” Another respondent suggested there is
more to the shared understanding among the stakeholders than a common desire for material
gain: “The social aspect of today’s Carnival is greatly associated with Bahian culture and the
image of Bahia and Salvador, since it is one of the unique marks of Salvador’s success, at one
time we did not have industrialists or traders of national importance. Therefore the success of
Carnival is not only directly linked to the festival, but to everyone interested in Salvador...[for
someone] to cause a sensational failure (and not just the immediate problems that always occur)
would be a ‘political death’.”
The final element associated with the establishing and sustaining a virtuous cycle of
collaboration is, according to Ansell and Gash, a series of “small wins” that are relatively
concrete (p.561). The growth of Salvador’s Carnival from an amateur event put on by friends and
neighbors for their own enjoyment to a city-wide spectacle of 217 Carnival entities managed by
25
public and private professionals who engage in year around planning and operation demonstrates
an iterative process of collaboration has been developed and produces successful outcomes. Not
only are more and more individuals from other parts of Brazil and from around the world
attending the event, but more and more local groups continue to form and seek to be included in
the festival’s schedule of events. The demand by local associations to participate is so great that
one respondent noted “we are having discussions to expand the space ...because the two [main]
routes are overloaded...this does not necessarily mean a fourth route ...we may have to remove
obstacles on the public streets [or] perhaps we have too many operational posts.”
Ansell and Gash state that “joint fact finding is a type of intermediate outcome...[that can
demonstrate] the overall value of collaboration” (p.562). Public agencies such as the Salvador
Department of Tourism conduct annual evaluations of Carnival which include public opinion
surveys, an economic analysis, and an analysis of media coverage. These reports are produced
within forty-five days after the end of the festival, and the reports become the basis for planning
next year’s event. The collaborative governance of Carnival also results in learning which can be
applied to other aspects of city functioning. The state Military Police gain valuable experience in
tactics and strategies used to manage performances and revelers which “can be adapted and
applied to day-to-day policing...It is possible to say that Carnival is to daily policing what
Formula 1 is to the automobile industry...many innovations arise in these different contexts
and...migrate, with appropriate adaptations to the day-to-day [life] of common persons,”
explained one of our interviewees. As noted earlier, the economic impact of the festival is crucial
not just to the state’s economy, but also to the treasuries of city and state government. In 2007 the
event generated R$5.8 million in direct municipal receipts and R$171.1 million considering only
26
private formal revenues (Miguez & Loiola, 2011, 290).
Facilitative Leadership
The numerous studies reviewed by Ansell and Gash indicate “leadership is widely seen as
a critical ingredient bringing parties to the table and for steering them through the rough patches
of the collaborative process” (p.554). Leaders can facilitate negotiations, mediate them, or
arbitrate differences. Effective leadership is based on “adequate management of the collaborative
process, maintaining technical credibility, and ensuring that the collaborative is empowered to
‘make credible and convincing decisions that are acceptable to all’”(p.554). The
inter-organizational cooperation found in Salvador can be attributed in part to the actions of
public and private persons who took the lead in creating and sustaining collaborative mechanisms
and processes. Previously, we noted the efforts of the city’s mayor in the early 1990s who was
instrumental in encouraging the professionalization of city government’s role in the festival,
especially her advocacy of Carnival as a strategic element in the city’s economy. A good example
of facilitative leadership is provided by the president of SALTUR who invited a coalition of 15
different organizations to participate in a series of regular meetings to discuss questions they had
about Carnival, to search for better solutions, and to assist in organizing upcoming carnivals. He
describes the role of leadership by saying “although it is essentially a collective process, there are
always persons who emphasize in whatever process that involves many people directions toward
a common goal.”
To say that parties to a dispute are led to cooperate by a leader who facilitates dialogue
leaves unclear how it is the facilitator convinced the various parties to cooperate. For example,
respondents explained the Military Police and the city tourist agency base their presentations
27
related to the festival’s organization on technical data. A respondent notes “...there is a respect
[for the police] based on experience accumulated over many years...on the operational level that
exists...whatever decision that could be taken only by an established authority, they still listen to
the experience of the technical [police] experts.” SALTUR’s use of annual evaluations to guide
planning for the next year’s event is another example of how technical data are used not just to
make decisions, but also to foster cooperation. Whatever the different positions staked out by the
different participants in the decision process, ultimately as several of the respondents emphasized
leaders are those who direct others toward a common objective, possess competence and
technical skills, control the decision process without hurting sensitivities [of others], think
through everything not just from an isolated point of view, have a vision of the future and a
capacity to communicate, and have a capacity to adjust to change. This list could come straight
out of leadership texts.
Some Final Thoughts
After a review of 137 studies of collaborative governance, Ansell and Gash extracted a
set of contingent conditions that previous researchers had identified as factors facilitating or
hindering successful collaboration. Their model “offers a framework for organizing a series of
contingent propositions and cause-and-effect relationships...[and]…provides the basis for further
empirical testing and theory elaboration” (p.562). Our exploration of the planning and
administration of Carnival in Salvador, Brazil, is a preliminary attempt to test the utility of their
model. Our investigation offers considerable evidence that collaborative processes for the
operation of Carnival have developed and have been institutionalized in Salvador. We can
reasonably assert that evidence also confirms that several of the contingent conditions included in
28
the Ansell and Gash model of collaborative governance contribute to the collaborative processes
found in Carnival planning and management.
This case has also uncovered other factors that influence the collaborative governance of
Carnival which Ansell and Gash treated only as secondary or did not include in their model.
First is the nature of the conflict or problem. Carnival is an annual event necessitating the
establishment and maintenance of an on-going governance process that insures all stakeholders
will continue to participate cooperatively and is characterized by constant negotiation and
renegotiation among highly interdependent partners. This situation contrasts with the type of
collaborative process associated with the resolution of a specific, one-time dispute. Second, since
collaboration usually results in the creation of a network, the purpose of the network established
will shape the collaborative process (Agranoff, 2007), and further, collaborative networks
develop an organizational culture and specific methods of operation which affect their
continuation (O’Leary & Bingham 2009, 263). Third, the contingency model of collaboration
focuses squarely on features of the collaborative process, but does not address the basis on which
decisions are taken. How decisions are justified (technical data, political leverage, or shared
community values) can affect not just whether a decision to cooperate occurs, but the
justification also affects its acceptance and legitimacy by multiple stakeholders. Fourth,
institutional design is more than a contingent influence on the process of collaboration; it is also
a product of collaboration. Other studies have shown continued collaboration depends on the
establishment of one or more new structures designed specifically to administer the collaborative
activities to attain joint goals (Krane & Lu, 2010).
Finally, our concern in examining Salvador’s Carnival arose from an observation that the
29
planning and operation of this mega-event exhibited many features of collaboration. This
working together by the stakeholders – public and private – contrasted strikingly with the
common occurrence of non-cooperation in other areas of community decision making. From our
investigation of the festival, we believe the critical incentives in accounting for the development
and maintenance of collaboration encompass more than the obvious instrumental benefits to be
gained from a successful celebration (i.e., profits and revenues). Equally important are symbolic
incentives linked to the meaning Carnival has for the whole community. For example, although
the Military Police receive considerable respect from other stakeholders, some of their
recommendations are not followed due to “political arguments” by the municipality, yet this
powerful state agency does not stall the collaborative process. We noted in the discussion of
Starting Conditions that “no one wants to be the party who caused the event to fail.” Because
Carnival is a public spectacle embedded deeply in the local culture and vital to the shared sense
of community identification, there is enormous pressure from the general public on all
stakeholders to insure the event’s success. To avoid a sensational failure, a respondent pointed
out that “even if there are divergent interests and feuds, the stakeholders involved have to engolir
sapo (“swallow the toad”) and do what is necessary to make the festival happen, including
working together.” That the whole community is watching the stakeholders is a powerful force
encouraging cooperation. Trust, a factor commonly argued as necessary to collaborative action,
may be less critical than the simple fact the community expects the festival to be a success, and
the penalty for non-cooperation is, as respondents stated “collapse of the organization” and
“political death.”
Note
30
The research for this paper was supported in by the Council for International Exchange of Scholars
which provided the U.S. author with a Fulbright grant (Dale Krane), by CNPq which provided the
Scholarship in Produtividade em Pesquisa (Sandro Cabral), and by the Research Fund of the Center for
Graduate Studies of the Federal University of Bahia, NPGA-UFBA (Sandro Cabral and Fagner Dantas).
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TABLE I – ENTITIES REPRESENTED AT CARNIVAL MUNICIPAL COUNCIL*
PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS
ARTISTIC ASSOCIATIONS (ASSOCIAÇÕES ARTÍSTICAS)
Association of Popular Carnival Groups from Salvador (Assoc. dos Blocos de Salvador – ABS)
Association of Music Carnival Groups (Associação dos Blocos de Trios – ABT)
Association of Modern Plastic Artists from Bahia / actual Association of Plastic Artist from Bahia (Assoc.
dos Artistas Plásticos Modernos da Bahia / atual Assoc. dos Artistas Plásticos da Bahia)
33
Independent Music Groups / actual Association of Independent Music Groups from Bahia (Trios Elétricos
Independentes / atual Associação Baiana de Trios Independentes – ABTI)
Popular Groups of Indian Culture (Blocos de Índios)
Popular Groups of African Culture (Blocos Afros)
Popular Groups of Percussionists (Blocos de Percussão)
Popular Groups of African Religious Culture (Blocos de Afoxés)
UNIONS AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION
Association of Street Bars from Popular Parties (Assoc. dos Barraqueiros de Festas Populares)
Musician Syndicate (Sindicato dos Músicos)
Association of Carnival Writers (Associação de Cronistas Carnavalescos)
Syndicate of Fair and Street Salesmen from Salvador (Sindicato dos Vendedores Ambulantes e Feirantes
de Salvador)
Association of Sound Equipment Owners / actual Association of Sound and Light Enterprises (Associação
dos Proprietários de Equipamentos de Som / atual Associação de Empresas de Sonorização e Iluminação Abesi)
OTHERS (OUTROS)
Federation of Social Clubs from Bahia (Federação dos Clubes Sociais da Bahia)
Federation of Carnival Clubs from Bahia / actual Federation of Carnival and Cultural Entities from Bahia
(Federação dos Clubes Carnavalescos da Bahia / atual Federação das Entidades Carnavalescas e Culturais
da Bahia)
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (INSTITUIÇÕES PÚBLICAS)
STATE GOVERNMENT (GOVERNO ESTADUAL)
Bahia Tourism S.A (Bahia Turismo S.A.– BAHIATURSA)
Investigation Police (Polícia Civil)
Military Police (Polícia Militar)
Secretary of Health from Bahia (Secretaria de Saúde do Estado da Bahia)
Judge for Children / actual Judge for Childhood and Youth (Juizado de Menores / atual Juizado da Infância e
Juventude)
Tourism State Council (Conselho Baiano de Turismo – CBTUR)
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
Municipal Tourism Office / actual Salvador Tourism S.A. (Empresa de Turismo de Salvador S.A – EMTURSA /
atual Salvador Turismo S.A. – SALTUR)
Secretary of Health from Salvador (Secretaria Municipal de Saúde)
House of Local Representatives (Poder Legislativo Municipal)
Local Government (Poder Executivo Municipal)
* As defined in article n. 261 from Major Law of Municipality (Art. 261 da Lei Orgânica do
Município – LOM).
34