Catharsis and Phantasia in the Mind Incomplete Draft Lenhardt Stevens (2015) Introduction The mind (​
Ψυχῆ)​
in Aristotelian psychology is the locus of many functions that are directed towards the animals survivability. Its functions are organized in order of how fundamental they are to the life of the organism. The hierarchy begins with nutritive functions, and moves upward to the rational portion of the mind. While all life possesses the basic functions (nutrition, reproduction), humans are uniquely rational animals. Each of these portions of the psyche, depending on who possesses them, constitute the psychological makeup of each species, starting from plants and moving towards humans. No where, however, in ​
De Anima​
, is there any mention of where catharsis (κάθαρσις) exists on this chain of psychology features. The task for philosophers is now to place catharsis somewhere on the scheme of the soul’s capabilities. In this paper, I will survey some options for the peripatetic philosopher who is attempting to locate catharsis somewhere within the psychological framework put forth by Aristotle. The provisional position of this paper is that phantasia is what enables catharsis to take place, and that emotions belong to a being who has perceptions and not one who is disembodied or entirely rational, i.e. the heavenly bodies. Furthermore, the rational capacity of human beings is what keeps the fictionality of the story away from the spectator interacting inappropriately with the story world, thereby making catharsis a necessary consequence of combining phantasia with the rational component of the human mind. The Role of Phantasia in the Psyche For one, we know that phantasia is the desiring component of the animal. This desiring is brought about when the animal creates an image of some experience, e.g. the taste of honey, and subsequently may witness other examples of honey and therefore desire it because the organism remembers it being sweet and enjoyable. Aristotle claims that we cannot have phantasia in a disembodied being. In other words, gods and immobile organisms cannot possess phantasia, because they lack the basic functions of life that phantasia is in service of. Insofar as the being can have sensory experiences, these experiences and their impressed images are what phantasia later uses to generate longings and displeasures to various stimuli. Phantasia anticipates experiences possessing reward or dissatisfaction, thus acting as the conjunction between memory and action planning. Hindering the placement of phantasia in Aristotle’s psychological framework are questions about its imaginative aspect. We know that phantasia is a truth­apt cognitive function. In other words, phantasia can be right or wrong about a perceived circumstance in the world. The feelings it generates, however, are not. Let me give an example of this. If you were to see a shadow that resembled a chocolate cake, you would be in error of identifying an object as a cake, but the thought of its chocolate taste might still make you salivate contemplating its flavor. The thought about the shadow as a chocolate cake is in error, but the phantasia of desiring chocolate cake was not; it was simply an anticipation that did not come to fruition. The images dealt with by phantasia are not the same as those directly under the attention of sense­perceptions. Were this the case, hallucination would be a frequent experience. Catharsis as psychological event Ars Poetica ​
is a text that is almost page for page concerned with narrative structures and how to develop the most effective dramatic (or tragic) narrative. It is within this book Aristotle first uses his term catharsis, and no other text picks up where the ​
Poetica ​
leaves off. Catharsis, mentioned only once in ​
Ars Poetica​
, occurs when there is a comprehension of a tragic scenario, which is one that ου μονον τελειασ εστι πραξεως η μιμησις αλλα και φοβερων και ελεεινων (1452 a1­3) which Bywater translates “...an imitation not only of complete action, but also of incidents arousing pity or fear.” Notice that Aristotle draws no distinction between fictitious and real situations that may merit the attribution of tragic to a given situation. This begs certain questions about the relationship between catharsis and the real world. That is, is it possible that catharsis could be experienced during a situation deemed tragic by the subject directed towards the real world? The question has to be tabled for now, as the essay is strictly concerned with the catharsis as a reaction to fictitious stories and phantasia’s normal use directed towards situations aimed at the real world. We will be operating within the understanding that Aristotle meant for catharsis to be something that body performs in virtue of activity of the psyche. That is, the psyche entertains a series of propositions, such as: ɑ
: Odysseus is trying to return home. β : Charibdis is inhibiting Odysseus from returning home. δ : The reader’s interest in Odysseus’ return is one that desires his wellbeing and safety. On pains of condition δ, the reader will experience a negative evaluation, or disappointment, if anything were to happen to Odysseus on his journey back home. So while statements ɑ
and β are concerning an understanding about the narrative and the stakes contained therein, statement δ requires an additional piece of analysis by the subject. Ways in which Phantasia may interact with Catharsis With the two terms of phantasia and catharsis placed somewhat more understandably within the psychology, we are now in a position to attempt to discover the relationship between these two terms. Our first question should be; why does phantasia and catharsis need have a relationship at all? Somewhat unsurprisingly, mental phenomena all require some relationship to each other, even if they are explanatorily needed for disparate activities. P1. Phantasia is unrelated to catharsis. Catharsis, being a wholly intellectual activity, happens in beings who have emotions but those emotions are not necessarily restricted to beings who possess phantasia. P2. The relationship to phantasia and catharsis is in how they use imagination. That faculty, however, of thinking about possible worlds, is over and above phantasia and catharsis, therefore imagination, in some sense, is what not only allows for catharsis, but also is tied up with the more demanding usages of phantasia. P3a. Phantasia is what enables catharsis. That is to say, catharsis would not be possible without phantasia, because emotional purging is linked with the sensory desires of the organism. ­Why would it be the case that phantasia is somehow more basic than catharsis? P3b. Phantasia is what enables catharsis. That is to say, catharsis would not be possible without phantasia, because emotional purging is tied to the education of the organism, which requires the faculty of memory in order to develop understanding. The essay will address these four possibilities, all while acknowledging that emotions, properly called, may be possible only within subjects who possess a body that can experience the varying temperatures of blood. Phantasia Being Removed From Catharsis Consider this. Homeric epics are a recurring example for Aristotle in how he discusses catharsis. A being who can comprehend the story of Odysseus and his fellow warriors can do so in virtue of their advanced cognitive abilities. The arc of Odysseus’ return home from the Trojan war doesn’t merely mean that organism knows the difference between past and present events, something that possession of catharsis assumes, but that they also can understand fictionality, family, and the hardships of war. This complex web of emotional life looks very little like the pleasure/pain distinction in an organism that knows when it’s hungry or when its life is threatened. It could come from this that catharsis, understood as the emotional judgment connected to rational functions, does not Martha Nussbaum insists that when we render a translation of ​
κάθαρσις​
we should keep in mind a purely cognitive understanding of its use. That is, catharsis is an activity of the mind, which, according to a disembodied reading of Aristotle’s rational soul, does not supervene on activities in somatic regions. “Thinking loving, and hating are affections not of thought, but of that which has thought, so far as it has it. That is why, when this vehicle decays, memory and love cease..” 1 De Anima 408b25 The argument of catharsis being part of phantasia turns on two key issues. 1) If the representationality of the events instigating the cathartic moment is the prerequisite understanding necessary for it to occur, then it follows from that that abstract understanding is bound up in catharsis, making it fulfill the requirement for rational mental activity. 2) If phantasia is motivated by images that are non­representational, or do not service under conceptual recognition, then phantasia can occur from non­intellectual activities, and, perhaps, emotions also do not require advanced levels of cognition. II. Catharsis and Phantasia as Rational Activities Regarding the rationality of the two psychological phenomena of catharsis and phantasia, some problems arise immediately. Foremost of them, if rationality is what connects them, then how is it that phantasia can sometimes be misguided whereas catharsis, unless an event is improperly identified, can only be the purgation of emotions? Secondly, if catharsis is a purgation of emotions, these cannot be part of rationality if rationality is something that cannot be eliminated in the creature. Comprehending the beginning, the middle, and the end of a play requires a high level of structural understanding by the viewer. Once the knowledge of the fate of the protagonist is revealed and the cathartic moment is released…. Phantasia Granting Catharsis It is the position of this paper that the most fruitful route in future scholarship on how the concepts of phantasia and catharsis are related is in the sublimation of catharsis under phantasia’s capacities. There are two readings one could adopt in order to come away with this understanding, and it is linked somewhat to the previous section. In section II. we explored the possibility that catharsis and phantasia are made possible through the psyche, and that neither of them were dependent on the embodiment of the subject, which is to say they did not rely upon their outcomes in order to be instantiated. This seemed to contradict a few of Aristotle’s assertions in De Anima as well as Ars Poetica. Phantasia is often rendered as the imagination1. It is the cognitive process that allows for future planning and anticipating outcomes. Closing Remarks In this essay, I sketched out some possible ways of viewing catharsis in its relationship to phantasia. The position of the paper, which will hold on pains of further interpretative work, is that phantasia is prior to (​
hepesthai​
)​
and thus grants cathartic experience. The overarching difference between animals that possess phantasia and human beings is our rational ability to cognize our own experiences. That is, because human beings are rational animals, catharsis is a fallout of using phantasia to contemplate fictitious stories. The “purge” and “educate” translative decision for catharsis does not impinge on this understanding of catharsis. It could be either case in terms of considering 1