Trouble in paradise:
The reconfiguration of the political party system in Costa Rica?
Fransje Molenaar
PhD Candidate
Institute of Political Science
Leiden University
[email protected]
+(31) 71 527 1957
Although high levels of voter turnout and electoral stability historically characterized
the Costa Rican two-party-system, voter abstention, high volatility levels, and the
proliferation of political parties have been on the rise the 1998 elections onwards.
These dynamics have mainly been ascribed to voter discontent with a rigid party
system that had held on for too long to a strong neoliberal policy line in the face of
strong public disapproval. It is unclear, however, how these dynamics relate precisely
to the rise of new parties and to what extent these demands for change translated into
a new configuration of the party system. This paper addresses these questions through
a longitudinal analysis of political party organization and change in order to gauge
how the rise of new parties created party system change. In the process it unpacks the
concept of supply-side party system change and contributes to the measurement of
party system dynamics by taking into account party competition and intraorganizational factors of political party development.
1
Introduction
Over the course of the 20th century, the stable Costa Rican party system formed an
exception amidst the democratic breakdown and civil wars that plagued the rest of the
Central American region. This picture started to change from 1998 onwards, when
political parties were confronted by voter abstention, high volatility levels and the first
presidential run-off elections in 50-years-time. Explanations of these changing party
system dynamics have mainly focused on the demand-side of party system
reconfiguration, namely discontent with the neo-liberal reforms that characterized
politics in the 1990s and the social rejection of political parties that were seen as
undistinguishable in terms of policy achievements and unresponsive in terms of
vertical accountability (Lehoucq 2005, Rosales Valladares 2008). It is unclear,
however, to what extent this actually led to changes in the party system.
This paper asks how these electoral dynamics relate to changes in party
competition and party organization. Clearly, the changes in political behavior of Costa
Rican voters over the last 15 years are a sign that society at large demanded a
different form of representation. This is most visible in the rising levels of voter
abstention, which can be regarded as the complete rejection of the political options
available on the electoral menu. At the same time, however, it is unclear how these
dynamics relate precisely to the rise of new parties and to what extent these demands
for change translated into a new configuration of the party system. In order to
investigate these questions, this paper undertakes a historical analysis of party system
development from 1953 – the year that marked Costa Rica’s transition to democracy –
to the present day. Through its focus on the dynamics of party participation in
legislative elections, it shows how electoral discontent created incentives for new
parties to enter the national political arena. The subsequent investigation of the
changes this introduced at both the party-system and the organizational level shows
that in the case of Costa Rica it is better to speak of a partial – rather than the
complete – reconfiguration of the party system.
As such, this study is a descriptive one with conceptual implications, as it
discusses party system change as a multi-level concept. The aim of the paper is
therefore threefold, namely to unpack the concept of supply-side party system change;
to contribute to the measurement of party system dynamics by taking into account
both party competition and intra-organizational factors as measures of party system
stability and change; and to explore how the changing party dynamics which appeared
2
from the 1998 elections onwards contributed to the reconfiguration of the party
system in Costa Rica. Given Costa Rica’s stable democratic records, this study
extends research on supply-side party system change beyond nascent democratic
systems.
Electoral volatility and party system change
Studies of party system instability and institutionalization often focus on aggregate
volatility scores (e.g. Coppedge 1998, Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, Mainwaring
1998). This measure represents the minimum probability of a vote shift between two
consecutive elections (Pedersen 1979), and as such, it has been applauded for its
elegant simplicity and its potential to provide insights into long-term electoral
dynamics (Rattinger 1997: 88). One problem that the reliance on aggregate volatility
scores has for the study of party system change is that volatility scores combine the
demand for political change in the form of voters that switch their party allegiance
with the supply of political change in the form of new parties (Rattinger 1997: 88-9,
Tavits 2008: 538, Kitschelt, et al. 1999). This means that it is difficult to tease out the
extent to which party system change follows from an increase in the supply of
political parties – thereby allowing for the diversification of representation. Indeed,
the literature on electoral volatility identifies causal mechanisms that run both from a
disgruntled or dealigned electorate (measured as an increase in electoral volatility) to
an increase in the supply of new parties by political elites that act strategically on
these demands for alternative representative bodies (Mair 1997, Birch 2003) and from
unstable political elites to an increase in party supply at election time – hence leading
to higher volatility scores (Pedersen 1979, Tavits 2008). The goal of this study is to
contribute empirically to this causal puzzle by tearing the concept of party system
change apart to look at the supply-side dimensions of party system change.
A second problem related to the mere reliance on electoral volatility as a
measure of party system change is that an exclusive focus on (the lack of) electoral
volatility may obscure other developments that point to shifting levels of party system
institutionalization (Luna and Altman 2011: 3). With regard to the Costa Rican case,
this means that it is unclear to what extent the increase of electoral volatility that
started in 1998 was preceded or accompanied by party system change on other
dimensions such as party organization (cf. Mainwaring and Scully 1995). I argue that
it is important to approach party system change as a multi-level concept to identify
3
whether increasing levels of electoral volatility reflect broader changes in the party
system or whether they are mere ‘cosmetic’ changes in light of (short-lived) electoral
discontent, and as such, actually obscure political continuity.
Studying these phenomena in the context of Costa Rica has the advantage that
it provides insights into why and how party system change occurs in democratically
established regimes. Although empirical studies have already pointed out that the
instability of political elites plays a significant role in the creation of an unstable
electoral offer and subsequently leads to an increase in volatility levels in emerging
democratic states (Tavits 2008, Toole 2000), it is unclear to what extent these
dynamics play a role in countries that have historically portrayed stable patterns of
party competition. Is it similar supply-side phenomena that drive party system change
in such a context or are additional demand-side dynamics, such as changing social
cleavages (cf. Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Bartolini and Mair 1990), at hand as well? By
teasing out the demand-side and supply-side components of party system change, the
Costa Rican case is a useful one to investigate the assumptions that underlie common
approaches to party system change and to provide some tentative answers to these
questions.
Measuring party system change
An important component part of supply-side party system change consists of the rise
of new political parties. Although it has been argued that electoral volatility scores
capture increases in party system fragmentation (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007: 161-2),
it is important to focus more in depth on the rise of new parties as these may
constitute novel dynamics. An important step in analyzing supply-side party system
change therefore consists precisely of an effort to identify the dynamics that underlay
changes in aggregate volatility due to the rise of new parties. In order to determine
what supply-side party system change looks like in Costa Rica, this study compares
data on the number of parties that registered, participated in legislative elections1, and
that won legislative representation in Costa Rica from 1953 to the present. In addition,
the participation and legislative success of provincial parties is also taken into
account, as these may provide insights in the relationship between political
participation in the national and provincial political arena.
1
Legislative elections likely provide for les strategic voter behavior than presidential elections and will
likely form an easier race for parties to participate in.
4
The rise of new parties need not necessarily constitute actual party system
change. As noted by Mair (1997), party system change can be read as changes in the
interaction among party elites as well. In the Eastern European countries, for example,
Sikk (2005) finds that many new parties arise but only few manage to break through
successfully and challenge the domination of the political system by the incumbent
parties. This means that although electoral volatility scores rise, this does not
necessarily translate into a different structure of political competition and
representation. Alternatively, the creation of successful new parties can be seen as
supply-side creation of party system change, as new parties manage to fill a gap in the
representative capacity of the existing political parties by introducing new issues in
politics. In order to measure whether party system change at the party-system-level, or
horizontal party system change, takes place, this paper looks at the dominant issues in
party politics, at whether new parties were seen as actual presidential contenders or
not, and at the size of legislative factions.
At the same time, party system change may also result from developments
within established political parties, such as organizational changes and shifts in party
ideology. As noted by Coppedge (1998: 549) “it is important to revive the systematic
analysis of the substance of party politics, not to supplant our knowledge of parties as
institutions, but so supplement it. A purely institutional focus limits us to a dissection
of party systems that have been drained, gutted and picked clean of the flesh and
blood of politics – ideology, personalities, interests, ideas, platforms, slogans, images,
issues – in short, the substance of political competition.” The argument advanced in
this paper is that vertical changes within party organizations themselves lay at the
heart of party system change because they have the potential to instigate both
demand-side and supply-side party system change. On the one hand, changing forms
of party organization and party rootedness in society may create an electorate that is
more open to political alternatives. On the other hand, intra-party developments may
advance splits and mergers – thereby contributing to the increase or diminution of the
number of the political parties on offer. In order to study these vertical changes, this
paper looks at changes in the process of candidate selection, leadership style, and
party rootedness in society. This qualitative dimension has the advantage that it allows
not only for the distinction between old and new parties, but also for the identification
of seemingly new parties that are taken over by traditional politicians that have fled
5
their party in light of disputes over power or ideology, or new parties that function
according to traditional forms of party organization.2
Electoral discontent and the changing number of parties
Discussions of party system change in Costa Rica generally focus on the changes in
two electoral measures, namely the number of voters that abstain from participation in
elections and the level of electoral volatility. Explanations for changes in these
measures are ascribed to demands for political change. As such, various studies
unpack the dynamics of voter abstention (cf. Raventós Vorst and Ramírez Moreira
2006), identify shifting party linkages as a cause of party system change (Rojas
Bolaños 2008, Sánchez Campos 2007), and describe the effects that changes in
electoral volatility have on representation and democratic governance (Rojas Bolaños
2008, Hernández Naranjo 2009b).
Figure 1: Development electoral volatility and abstention over time
40
35
30
25
Electoral volatility
20
Abstention
15
10
5
0
1953 1958 1962 1966
1970 1974 1978
1982 1986 1990 1994
1998 2002 2006 2010
Source: Electoral volatility legislative elections (Alcántara Sáez 2012). Abstention legislative
elections based on data from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
(http://www.tse.go.cr/datos_historicos.htm, accessed December 3rd, 2012)
Figure 1 provides an overview of the longitudinal changes in voter abstention and
electoral volatility and illustrates that both have indeed been prone to change from
1998 onwards. Given that the sudden rise in voter abstention levels was preceded by a
30-year-period of steady and high turnout levels, the shock that this development
2
Towards this end, semi-structured interviews with political scientists and party officials were
conducted in Costa Rica in Nov-Dec 2012. See appendix 1 for an overview of these interviews.
6
caused in the literature and among political practitioners is well taken. It is not until
the 2010 elections that abstention levels drop somewhat – although abstention still
does not come close to its pre-1998 level. Electoral volatility levels more or less
follow the same pattern as voter abstention – with a sharp increase taking place in the
2002 elections and a decrease occurring from the 2006 elections onwards. This means
that the system appears to normalize somewhat in the 2010 elections, as both electoral
volatility and abstention levels fall again.
From the pattern visible in figure 1, an explanation of electoral volatility
change in terms of demand-side factors can easily be deduced. Given the electorate’s
deception with party politics in the 1998 elections – as can be read in the rising levels
of abstention – voters turned away from all existing political parties; thereby spurring
the rise of new parties. The increased offer of parties in the subsequent 2002 elections
thereby led many voters to shift their votes from established to new parties – hence
giving rise to increased levels of electoral volatility. This is underwritten by the
literature on shifting party linkages, which identifies voter dealignment and shifts
between – rather than within – party blocks (Estado de la Nación 2002: 257)
Additional evidence of this dynamic of demand-side change comes up in the
study of voter abstention. Whereas Costa Rican abstention levels were generally
related to structural factors such as socio-economic exclusion (Hernández Naranjo
2009a: 37), in the 1998 elections the level of abstention increased in all districts of the
countries and on all socio-economic and educational levels (Raventós Vorst and
Ramírez Moreira 2006: 14). This meant that abstention was strongly related to voter
de-alignment and general discontent with the political system. Voter turnout in the
2002 elections showed a somewhat different pattern. Although general discontent
with parties affected electoral behavior, these elections allowed for multiple strategies
to express this discontent. This time, voter abstention rose under voters with a lower
level of education, whereas the higher educated shifted their votes to newly emerging
parties (Raventós Vorst and Ramírez Moreira 2006). As a result, both the level of
abstention and the level of electoral volatility increased.
From these observations the hypothesis follows that both rising levels of
abstention and electoral volatility followed from rising discontent in the electorate
with the existing political status quo. As a result, a vacuum of representation opened
up and new parties organized to fill this empty space. Figure 2, however, depicts the
number of parties that participated in legislative elections and that obtained seats in
7
the Legislative Assembly and shows that this relationship is not as straightforward as
it seems.
Figure 2: Changes in the number of parties over time
40
35
30
Electoral volatility
25
Abstention
20
Number of parties in legislative elections
15
Number of parties in Legislative
Assembly
10
5
0
1953 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Number of parties in legislative elections is author’s own elaboration based on the Atlas Electoral
(http://www.atlas.iis.ucr.ac.cr/, accessed December 19th, 2012). Number of parties in legislative
assembly is based on data of the Parliamentary Archives (obtainable from the author).
In both the 1998 and 2006 elections, the sharp increase in electoral volatility was
indeed coupled by an increase in the number of parties that participated in legislative
elections as well as by an increase in the number of parties that managed to obtain
seats in the legislative assembly. At the same time, the sharp increase in electoral
volatility in the 2002 elections was matched by a decrease in the number of parties
that participated in these elections and by a decrease in the number of parties that
actually obtained legislative representation. Furthermore, the increase in the number
of parties that participated in legislative elections had already been on the rise from
1966 onwards. Perhaps the increase in number of parties from 1998 onwards was
nothing more than a continuation of this previous trend.
Is the increase in the number of political parties that participated in legislative
elections, then, nothing more than a continuous trend? In order to investigate this
hypothesis, figure 3 explores the relationship between the number of registered parties
and the number of parties that participated in legislative elections at the national level.
It shows that the number of registered parties started to rise from the 1966 elections
onwards as well. This development translated into both an increase in the number of
parties that participated in national legislative elections and in the number of parties
8
that obtained legislative representation. All three trends reached a peak in the 1974
elections – which concurred to a period in which the electoral system was
characterized by both a high degree of ideological pluralism and by splits within the
traditional parties (Hernández Naranjo 2006). After these elections a gap appeared
between the number of registered parties on the one hand and the number of parties
that participated in elections on the other. This is best explained through the start of
the period of institutionalized two-party competition in the traditional National
Liberation Party (PLN) and Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC)3 (Hernández
Naranjo 2007), which likely provided little incentives for participation in legislative
elections. Figure 3 thus underlines that party politics in the 1982-1998 period was
characterized by the stabilization of competition in a two-party framework.
Figure 3: Changes in number of national parties4over time
25
20
15
Registered national parties
National parties in legislative elections
National parties in Legislative Assembly
10
5
0
1953 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Number of registered parties is based on data of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (obtainable
from the author).
Whereas before 1998 a great deal more parties were registered than that participated
in legislative elections, the 1994-1998 period interestingly enough undoes this gap.
Indeed, in the 1998 and 2002 elections almost all registered parties participated in
national elections. This raises the suggestion that participation in these elections
promised parties something to gain. A gap once again appeared between registration
and participation in the 2006 elections, but in 2010 all registered parties once again
participated in elections. Given that the formal rules of party registration remained
3
4
Partido Liberación Nacional and Partido Unidad Social Cristiana
Parties that formed an electoral coalition were counted as a single registered party as well
9
rather stable over time and that these rules hardly pose any obstacles to party
formation (Molenaar, forthcoming), the trends in figure 3 should hence be read as a
reflection of the fact that the Costa Rican party system not necessarily provides
incentives for participation of parties in legislative elections. This means that it is not
the formal rules of the game that explain the increase of legislative participation of
parties from 1998 onwards. Instead, registered parties appear to have had more
incentives for electoral participation than before.
Given that the Costa Rican electoral systems allows provincial parties to
participate in national legislative elections as well, it may well be that the rise of the
number of parties that participated in legislative elections followed from an increase
in provincial parties that were able to capitalize on public discontent and thereby
increased their participation in national politics. Indeed, Beers (2006: 13-4) notes that
between 1983 and 1998 – a period characterized by stable two-party competition –
permanent parties at the provincial and cantonal level appeared that offered a critique
to the traditional two-party model and promoted a ‘new way of doing politics.’ If the
provincial parties explain the expanded offer of parties that managed to electorally
structure public discontent from the 2002 elections onwards, it should be these that
obtained an increased legislative share from 2002 onwards.
Figure 4: Changes in provincial parties
16
14
12
National parties in legislative elections
10
National parties in Legislative Assembly
8
Provincial parties in legislative elections
6
Provincial parties in Legislative
Assembly
4
2
0
1953 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Number of provincial parties in legislative elections is author’s own elaboration based on the
Atlas Electoral (http://www.atlas.iis.ucr.ac.cr/, accessed December 19th, 2012). Number of
provincial parties in legislative assembly is based on data of the Parliamentary Archives
(obtainable from the author).
10
In order to investigate the merits of this hypothesis, figure 4 provides and
overview of the participation of provincial parties in national legislative elections, as
well as their ability to enter the national Legislative Assembly. It shows that the
number of provincial parties that participated in elections started to increase from the
1978 elections onwards. It reached its peak in the 1998 elections, decreased
substantially in the 2002 elections, only to rise and fall again in the 2006 and 2010
elections respectively. This fluctuation of provincial parties in national legislative
elections is best explained through the dynamic of party system change that occurred
on the national level – rather than that it functions as its cause. The success of new
national parties in the 2002 elections partly came at the expense of provincial parties.
As noted by Beers (2006: 16; translation FM), the electoral success of these new
parties “had a negative effect on the development of provincial and cantonal groups,
which in some cases lost or saw their quota of municipal representation diminish, and
which disappeared from the Congress of the Republic”. The fluctuation of provincial
party participation in the 2006 and 2010 legislative elections is best explained due to
the rise of two new parties with national aspirations (Party for Access Without
Exclusion – PASE and the Broad Front – FA)5 but a limited following, which
therefore limited their political participation in the 2006 elections to the provincial
kind and participated in the 2010 elections as national parties. All this goes to support
the argument that party system change from 1998 onwards reflected the opening up of
the national system to political alternatives that before 1998 had been constrained to
the provincial level.
This overview of party system change in the case of Costa Rica has shown
how the dynamic of party system change in Costa Rica was not only demand-driven,
but also contained an important supply-side component part. Secondly, this supplyside dimension did not result from an increase in the formation of more parties or the
transformation of strong provincial parties into national political players. Instead,
strong incentives appeared for registered parties to actually participate in elections and
the national system opened up to political alternatives that before 1998 had been
constrained to the provincial level. The following sections describe how these changes
affected the party system in terms of party competition and party organization.
5
Partido Accesibilidad sin Exlcusión and Frente Amplio
11
Horizontal party system change
As noted above, a first indicator of horizontal party system change – or change taking
place at the level of party competition – consists of change in the shape of ideological
competition. In order to illustrate changes in this dimension, figure 5 provides an
overview of the changes in the seat share of the two traditional parties – PLN and
PUSC. Although this measure does not capture ideological changes taking place
within the traditional parties themselves, it provides an important indicator to the role
of other parties in party competition. The underlying assumption is that the increase of
vote share for new parties will reflect the contestation of traditional party competition.
From figure 5 it follows that party competition changed radically in the 2002
elections.
Figure 5: Seat share traditional parties
35
30
25
20
PLN
PUSC
Others
15
10
5
0
1953
1958
1962
1966
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1994
1998
2002
2006
2010
Source: author’s own elaboration based on TSE data and Atlas electoral
(http://www.tse.go.cr/datos_historicos.htm, accessed December 3rd, 2012;
http://www.atlas.iis.ucr.ac.cr/, accessed December 19th, 2012)
A more qualitative overview of electoral competition confirms this finding. Up to the
1990s, party politics was characterized by a high degree of ideological congruence.
This manifested itself in similar neoliberal government policies applied by both
traditional parties and in the cooperation of the PLN and PUSC in bringing about
important policy reforms. One example of this is the 1995 pact between the sons of
the PLN’s and PUSC’s historical leaders – Figueres and Calderón – who agreed to
introduce a package of neoliberal reforms. Several of the reforms of this ‘FigueresCalderon pact’ met with social opposition and strikes, and as a consequence, the
12
parties gained the common nickname PLUSC to signal their ideological
indistinctiveness (Hernández Naranjo 2009a: 30-1). Up to 1998, party politics in
Costa Rica was hence not characterized by ideological conflict.
Rojas Bolaños (2003: 4) notes that as a result of these developments, as well
as several corruption scandals, the PLN and PUSC saw their sympathy scores drop.
The two traditional parties therefore entered the 1998 elections – which would mark
the end of an era of political stability – from a position of diminished electoral appeal.
Nevertheless, they managed to maintain their dominant position in the political
system and the PUSC candidate won the elections with 47% of the vote. Under the
1998-2002 administration, the PUSC and PLN once again cooperated in an unpopular
decision – this time to privatize the national electricity institute (Hernández Naranjo
2009a: 31). As a result of this development, the 2002 presidential elections presented
a severe shake up of the party system and resulted in the first second-round election in
decades.6 In the end, the PUSC won the presidential election, but both traditional
parties saw their seat share in the Legislative Assembly decrease to the advantage of
the newly formed Citizen’s Action Party (PAC)7. The 2002 elections hence marked
the beginning of a new era of party competition that rejected the ideological
indistinctiveness and political style (i.e. corrupt) of the traditional parties.8
On April 4, 2003, the Constitutional Chamber ruled that the ban on
presidential reelection (stemming from a 1969 political reform) was unconstitutional;
thereby allowing the PLN to present ex-President Arias as its candidate in the next
elections. The party resorted to this measure as the only way forward to guarantee
political stability and effective governance. Society was not convinced, however, as
can be seen from public opinion polls before the elections that continuously indicated
rising levels of intended abstention (cf. Rojas Bolaños 2008: this was also due to the
eruption of corruption scandals in 2004). It was not until the elections turned into a
referendum on the proposed signature of the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA) that part of the electorate was activated to vote. In the end, 80.7% of the
emitted votes were distributed among the main proponent (PLN) and opponent (PAC)
of this treaty. From the rejection of the political status quo, the main point of
6
Such a run-off only takes place when no candidate reaches 40% of the popular vote.
Partido Acción Ciudadana
8
This development was even reflected in the PUSC’s victory in the presidential elections, as its
candidate Pacheco won on a projected image of his being an outsider to the political system.
7
13
contention hence turned into contestation of the neoliberal course that politics had
embarked upon in the 1980s and 1990s.
The 2006-2010 government of Oscar Arias mainly focused on the signature
and implementation of CAFTA. After a referendum on the treaty (where the yes-camp
reached a narrow victory) and the subsequent adoption of the legal reforms needed to
implement CAFTA, the subject disappeared from the political agenda. As a result, the
2010 elections did not revolve around important ideological or economic issues.
Instead, the campaigns focused on the rising levels of insecurity in the country. The
Libertarian Movement (ML)9 was able to take advantage of this issue by advocating
the mano dura (literally ‘firm hand’ – tough on crime) policies popular throughout the
Central American region. As a result, the ML saw its vote share increase in both the
presidential and legislative elections. It was PLN presidential candidate Laura
Chinchilla, however, who won the elections through her ability to capitalize on the
popularity of the Arias’ government (Urcuyo Fournier 2010). After removal of the
main ideological and economic points of contention from the electoral agenda, the
non-traditional parties thus had to resort to new topics to establish their difference
from the traditional parties. The rise of the PASE in the 2010 elections is interesting
in this regard as well, as this party campaigned on a platform of improving the life of
the disabled Costa Ricans.
Figure 6 underlines these changes in party competition by illustrating vote
splitting in the 2002, 2006, and 2010 elections. Vote splitting in the presidential and
legislative vote is a good indicator of the difference in voter appreciation of the
various political parties. The underlying assumption is that voters will vote
strategically for the party that best fits their interests and has the possibility to win
elections in presidential elections, whereas their legislative vote captures their actual
party preference in terms of political ideology and policy agenda. This means that
only when a party gains more presidential than legislative votes, it comes to be seen
as a credible presidential contender.
9
Movimiento Libertario
14
Figure 6: National parties in 2002 elections
2002 legislative elections
45
40
35
30
25
Presidential
Legislative
Mayor
20
15
10
5
0
PLN
PUSC
ML
PAC
2006 legislative elections
45
40
35
30
25
Presidential
Legislative
Mayor
20
15
10
5
0
PLN
PUSC
ML
PAC
2010 legislative elections
60
50
40
Presidential
30
Legislative
Mayor
20
10
0
PLN
PUSC
ML
PAC
Source: author’s own elaboration based on Atlas electoral (http://www.atlas.iis.ucr.ac.cr/,
accessed December 19th, 2012) and TSE data (http://www.tse.go.cr/datos_historicos.htm)
15
Figure 6 shows that the PLN and PAC maintained a similar appreciation in the eyes of
the electorate over time – meaning that they received a higher vote share in
presidential elections than in legislative elections. The PUSC lost its appeal from the
2006 elections onwards, when it became an unlikely contender for the presidency.
The ML moved in the opposite direction and became a popular option for the
presidential vote in the 2010 elections. Clearly, part of these dynamic is best
explained by the political context. This is particularly the case for the electoral
downfall of the PUSC from the 2006 elections onwards. In the period between 2004
and 2006 the country was shaken by corruption scandals. These scandals involved
three ex-presidents – two of which belonged to the PUSC – that had accepted
consultancy fees from international companies contending for government contracts.
Given social discontent with the neoliberal privatizations of state companies, these
scandals increased the general rejection of the political status quo (Lehoucq 2005:
141-2, Isbester 2011: 200). At the same time, the 2006 elections turned into an
unofficial referendum on the signature of the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA); thereby pitting the PLN (in favor) and the PAC (opposed) against one
another (Rojas Bolaños 2008). The PUSC was thereby put outside of the most
important policy debate determining these presidential elections.
At the same time, the parties themselves also had some doing in establishing
the profile of a viable presidential contender. This is best visible in the ML, which
initially organized as a single-issue party focusing on the rejection of the role of the
state in the private domain. Indeed, an analysis of the policy proposals put forward by
the ML in the 1998-2002 legislature shows that these generally related to the abolition
of taxes and the closure of public institutions (Estado de la Nación 2004: 346). In
2005, however, the party leadership entered into a period of conflict. Whereas party
president Otto Guevara wanted to create a less radical party with a broader agenda to
move to the center of the party spectrum, the party’s secretary general advocated to
hold on to a strict libertarian agenda. In the end, the Guevara prevailed – leading both
to the separation of the more radical party faction10 and the attraction of disgruntled
PUSC leaders to the party.11 Figure 6 shows this move to have succeeded in attracting
more votes in the presidential election – thereby turning the ML into a contender to
the PAC for the anti-PLN vote in the 2006 and particularly in the 2010 elections.
10
11
Interview, Guevara 2012
Interview, Hernández Naranja 2012
16
Next to an ideological dimension, party competition also contains a dimension
of relative legislative strength of parties vis-à-vis other parties. This dimension relates
to the need of governments to rely on a legislative majority and the extent to which
governing parties need to cooperate with other parties. Table 1 provides an overview
of the changes in the distribution of legislative seats between 1994 and 2010 to show
how the relative weight of parties in the Legislative Assembly changed over time. As
such, it shows that the increase in voter abstention and electoral volatility from 1998
and 2002 onwards resulted in an increased number of national parties with legislative
representation.
Table 1: Seat share national parties12
Partido Liberación Nacional
Partido Unidad Social Cristiana
Movimiento Libertario
Partido Acción Ciudadana
Renovación Costarricense
Partido Acceso sin Exlcusión
Frente Amplio
Fuerza Democrática
Partido Integración Nacional
Partido Unión Nacional
1994
28
25
1998
23
27
1
1
2002
17
19
6
14
1
2006
25
5
6
17
1
1
2
2010
24
6
9
11
1
4
1
3
1
1
Number of parties in legislative assembly is based on data of the Parliamentary Archives
(obtainable from the author).
Table 1 also shows that the distribution of seats among parties took on a new pattern
in terms of relative legislative strength of the traditional versus the new parties.
Whereas the 1998 elections are perhaps best seen as a try-out period where many new
parties entered the Legislative Assembly, the legislative dominance of the two
traditional parties did not change. It was not until the 2002 elections that the number
of seats held by both old and new parties changed – with both the PLN and PUSC
losing a substantial amount of seats at the advantage of the newly risen PAC. The
PLN managed to recuperate its seat share in the 2006 and 2010 elections, but the
PUSC was almost completely wiped out of the Assembly. At the same time, both the
PAC and ML solidified their legislative presence, whereas the Costa Rican
Renovation party,13 PASE, and FA also obtained a handful of seats.
From the above discussion it follows that the Costa Rican party system
changed both in terms of the ideological competition that took place, in terms of the
12
13
Scores of the PASE and FA in 2006 reflect the number of seats they obtained as provincial parties.
Renovación Costarricense
17
parties that were seen as viable presidential contenders, and in the relative weight of
the political parties vis-à-vis other parties in the Legislative Assembly. In 2010, the
rejection of the traditional parties combined with the rise of many new parties that all
sought to take on the role of opposition party ironically enough appeared to have
consolidated the position of the traditional PLN as governing party while
simultaneously fragmenting the multi-faceted opposition.
Vertical party system change
Next to changing party politics at the party-system-level, the rise of new political
parties may also have led to changes in the way in which Costa Rican parties
organize. In order to investigate this hypothesis, the following section traces the
development of Costa Rican parties in terms of their candidate selection, leadership
style, and rootedness in society over the course of the last decade.14 In terms of
candidate selection, the PLN was the first party to introduce primaries for the
selection of presidential candidates. It did so in the late 1970s to channel intra-party
conflict over candidate selection (Sánchez Campos 2007). In the 1990s, both the PLN
and PUSC resorted to primaries to select their presidential candidates. Candidates for
the Legislative Assembly were selected in the national party assemblies, with party
statutes explicitly allowing the presidential candidate to select the top candidates on
the party list (Taylor-Robinson 2001: 7-8). As such, party leaders maintained a
substantial degree of control over the party’s legislative candidates.
This ‘traditional system’ of candidate selection underwent three changes in the
2000s. Firstly, the PLN and PUSC both experimented with the use of internal
elections to select their candidate lists for the Legislative Assembly. This attempt to
introduce more intra-party participation backfired as parties were suddenly confronted
by an increase in both intra-party conflicts and legislative indiscipline (also cf.:
Freidenberg 2006: 118). Given these negative consequences, no change is currently to
underway in this area of candidate selection.15 Secondly, given that the parties’
legislative factions grew smaller due to the increase in legislative fragmentation, the
common practice of presidential candidates electing the top candidates on the party
lists has become a contested one. This is the case because smaller factions actually
14
Due to space constraints, the focus is limited to the two traditional parties and the two most
successful new parties: PAC and ML.
15
Interviews Ballestero and Vásquez, 2012
18
increase the relative weight of these hand-picked candidates. In response, all four
parties are currently debating changes to these statutory rules.16 Lastly, party system
change actually did away with the use of primaries for candidate selection in the 2006
elections. This was the case because the PUSC was in internal disarray due to the
corruption scandals that had hit it in 2004, because the PLN had already decided that
Oscar Arias was the only way forward to save the party, and because the new parties
did not feel comfortable resorting to the use of primaries for candidate selection just
yet17 (also cf. Hernández Naranjo 2009b). This changed again in 2010 when the PLN,
PUSC, and PAC returned to the use of party primaries for presidential candidate
selection. Only the ML maintained that up to this point the party lacked the “political
maturity” to use democratic candidate selection methods.18 All in all, the rise of new
parties on the political scenery has thus had limited consequences for the candidate
selection process.
In terms of leadership style, party politics in Costa Rica historically took on a
personalistic character. This was the case for the PLN, which up to the 1980s was led
by its four principal founders: José Figueres Ferrer (don Pepe), Francisco Orlich (don
Chico), Daniel Oduber and Luis Alberto Monge. These leaders maintained internal
party cohesion and had a decisive voice in the selection of candidates for elections
(Sánchez, 2007). Similarly, the PUSC was traditionally characterized by
calderonsimo. This is a personalistic form of Christian democracy derived from the
legendary Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, who played an important in introducing
social reforms in the 1940s and in the ensuing civil war (March 12 – April 24, 1948).
Given that the changes in party competition that started to appear in 1998 initially
focused on a new way of doing politics, a change in political leadership style may
well have been brought about. The following sections trace developments in the way
in which intra-party conflicts played out in order to investigate whether this was
indeed the case.
An overview of the intra-party conflicts that occurred over the last decade
shows that no party has been spared this problem. The PLN has historically known its
fair share of party splits; the most notable of which were the split of the Independent
16
Interviews Ballestero, Bolaños, Guevara, Vásquez, 2012.
Interviews Solís and Guevara, 2012
18
Interview Guevara, 2012. Guevara adds that he expects that his party will organize its first primaries
for the 2018 elections.
17
19
Party19 in 1958 and of the Democratic Renovation Party20 in 1974. These splits
resulted from internal conflicts and both led to historically low vote shares for the
PLN (Hernández Naranjo 2009a: 10-1, Sánchez Campos 2007). Similar developments
took place in 2000s. This was firstly the case when a faction headed by Ottón Solís
Fallas split from the PLN to form the PAC in 2002. The faction rejected the PLN’s
neoliberal policy agenda and desired the restoration of social democracy.21 Another
notable split took place over the course of 2005 and 2006, when a significant number
of high-level leaders left the party out of dissatisfaction with the leadership’s
decisions to continue negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement with the United States
and other Central American States (CAFTA) (Hernández Naranjo 2009a: 11) and to
allow ex-president Oscar Arias a second electoral bid.22 Examples of these splits are
Luis Guillermo Solís – who joined the PAC23 – and Antonio Álvarez Desanti – who
went on to create the Union for Change party24 that participated in the 2006 election
with the support of PLN mastodon Luis Alberto Monge.25 For the PLN, party
organizational stability was hence characterized by the traditional patterns of conflicts
between personalistic leaderships and ideology.
The PUSC suffered a severe electoral defeat in the 2006 elections. This was
due to the corruption scandals involving Miguel Ángel Rodríguez and Rafael Ángel
Calderón Fournier – two of the parties’ ex-presidents – and public disapproval of
PUSC president Pacheco’s government (2002-2006). Although the PUSC had less of
a history of internal upheaval than the PLN, these developments had consequences for
party stability as well. The corruption scandals created frictions within the party, as
opinions were divided on the best course of action to deal with the matter at hand.
Although the party leadership advanced the line of thought that the best way forward
was for both ex-presidents to renounce their party membership, only Rodríguez
decided to so. Many leaders left the party out of dissatisfaction with the continuing
presence of Calderón. A second crisis took place in the 2009 when the party had to
19
Partido Independiente
Partido Renovación Democrática
21
Interview, Hernández Naranjo 2012
22
Interview, Hernández Naranjo 2012
23
Interview, Solís 2012
24
Unión Para el Cambio
25
In 2008, Desanti decided to return to the PLN and announced his aspiration to run for presidential
candidate in the 2010 elections. See: La Nación (27/01/2008) “Personaje del Día: Antonio Álvarez
Desanti”
20
20
decide upon its candidate for the 2010 elections. Although Calderón was still awaiting
judgment in his corruption case, he decided to run for president once more. When he
was subsequently declared guilty – and had to give up his candidacy as a result – he
put forward his wife as the first candidate for the Legislative Assembly. According to
former PUSC’ president Lorena Vásquez Badilla, these events led to an overall
departure of leading party figures – including herself – as they felt that this meant the
continuation of traditional Calderón dominance over the party.26
A substantial
number of departing party officials joined the PLN – with which they had created a
good working relationship on the number of laws that had to be adopted to implement
CAFTA. For the PUSC, events over the course of the 2000s thus turned a stable party
into both an electoral and an organizational wreak.
For the PAC, its first term in office proved a trial in maintaining party
discipline in a party that had arisen as a bolt of lightening. This was particularly the
case in the Legislative Assembly. Table 2 provides an overview of the legislative
secessions in all the legislatures between 1982 and 2012. It shows that this practice
first appeared in the 2002-2006 legislature and that 8 of the PAC’s 14 delegates left to
form other blocks or to become independent legislators.27
Table 2: Secessions in the Legislative Assembly
PAC28
Secessions
1982-1986
1986-1990
1990-1994
1994-1998
1998-2002
2002-2006
2006-2010
2010-2014
0
0
0
0
0
10
2
1
PLN
8
1
ML
1
PASE
1
1
1
Number of parties in legislative assembly is based on data of the Parliamentary Archives
(obtainable from the author).
Similar developments took place in other new parties, such as the ML and PASE. The
latter party, which increased its seat share from one to four seats in the 2010 elections,
has since been plagued by internal conflict and a party split due to clashes between the
central party leadership and its delegates.29 The rise of new parties in the Legislative
26
Interview Vásquez, 2012 – translation FM, as are all other references to interviews
The law prohibits against legislators joining other parties
28
Either split of as independent legislators, Bloque Patriótico, or Patria Primero
29
Interview Hernández Naranjo, 2012. Also see: La Nación (05/11/2012) “Óscar López retoma el
control del PASE”
27
21
Assembly was hence accompanied by an increase in intra-party instability – at least in
terms of the stability in terms of legislative factions. This has introduced a new
dynamic to the Costa Rican party politics.
In addition, the new parties demonstrated difficulties in establishing a party –
rather than a personal – profile. In the case of the PAC, this is visible in the discussion
over the party’s 2014 presidential candidate. After running for president in three
consecutive elections, Ottón Solís decided to step down as the party’s presidential
candidate, as he believed that “the most important thing is that the foundational ideas
of the parties come to power and it is not necessarily one person that can bring them
there.”30 In response, a core group of party members organized to convince Solís to
take on a fourth term. Their main argument was that the people recognized Solís
rather than the party name and that “although the other candidates are excellent
persons with the same capacity, the party has already invested in the image of don
Ottón.”31 Given that Solís was not a newcomer to the political process – but a PLN
veteran who had previously served as a minister and a member of the legislative
assembly for this party – the PAC hence showed some signs of continuing the Costa
Rican tradition of personalized leadership. At the same time, his willingness to step
down from power after three presidential bids may prove a turning point in the party’s
way of doing politics.
In a similar vein, the ML has been plagued by intra-party splits on various
occasions. As noted above, a struggle over the party’s ideology led to the departure of
its secretary general and a faction of radical libertarians in 2005. Another split took
place in 2010 when former presidential candidate Federico Malavassi left the ML to
start a new party32 – arguably after a conflict over the candidate selection process and
a dispute over power with party founder and president Otto Guevara. The pattern of
personalistic leadership and conflicts over access to power repeats itself in this new
party as well. According to Guevara, this is the reason that the party is currently
developing its organization on the ground in order to “create a more permanent
existence in the long term, because party sympathy scores are still very low. Otto
Guevara, as a presidential candidate, is 3 or 4 times bigger than the party and that is
30
La Nación (09/12/2012) “Un grupo se embarca en la dura tarea de persuadir a Ottón Solís”
La Nación (09/12/2012) “Un grupo se embarca en la dura tarea de persuadir a Ottón Solís”. Also
see: La Nación (13/02/2013) “Había un vacío en el PAC, afirma Campbell”
32
La Nación (13/10/2011) “El Libertario ‘no es un partido, eso es una empresa personal’”
31
22
not convenient for the party.”33 Both the PAC and the ML hence show how the need
for stabilizing measures and problematic identity formation in a newly formed party
may actually reinforce the personalistic leadership style so characteristic for Costa
Rican politics.
In order to investigate party rootedness in society, figure 7 compares the
national parties’ vote share in three municipal elections (2002, 2006, and 2010).. The
assumption is that these municipal vote shares reflect the organizational capacity of
parties on the ground. Given that these municipal elections did not take place
concurrently with the national elections (thereby diminishing the coattail effect of the
presidential elections) and that turnout figures for municipal election are very low
(even compared with municipal elections in other countries – Estado de la Nación
2003: 292), it seems a fair assumption that the development of an organizational
structure on the ground will determine electoral success in municipal elections.
Figure 7: Vote share in municipal elections34
Source: author’s own elaboration based on Atlas electoral (http://www.atlas.iis.ucr.ac.cr/,
accessed December 19th, 2012)
Figure 7 shows two interesting developments. Firstly, the PLN and ML are the only
parties that consistently manage to increase their vote share at the municipal level.
Secondly, although the PUSC sees its vote share decrease, this stands in small contrast
to its losses in the national political arena. Both the continued growth of the PLN and
the continued territorial presence of the PUSC are likely explained on the basis of
their traditional organizational network throughout the country – combined with the
fact that the PLN can count on the state apparatus to support its political development.
33
Interview Guevara Guth, 2012
34 In 1998, the Municipal Code was reformed to allow for the separate local elections (Beers, ¿?). Only
the last three municipal elections are therefore taken into account in this figure
23
The steady increase of newcomer ML is less self-evident. According to the party’s
president, this is mainly due to its efforts to elect the members of its party assemblies
from the bottom up. This means that the party uses its assemblies at the cantonal level
in order to elect members of the provincial assemblies and provincial assemblies for
the election of members of the national assembly. In his opinion, this enforces
members to build a local support base in order to promote their careers within the
party.35
The PAC initially showed some growth between the 2002 and 2006 elections,
but lost its momentum in the 2010 elections. According to presidential pre-candidate
Solís, this was due to the mistaken idea that top-down management of local party
organizations was an ‘old way of doing politics’ and that the PAC would be able to
count on a more organically organized membership basis. In his words, this meant
that “the people had to organize themselves, that they had to function as a very
flexible and decentralized structure, and that they had to do things for themselves.” He
goes on to note that “it was a very nice idea, because it transferred the logistic
responsibility of the party to the community itself,”36 but that this was a mistake
because after the enthusiasm of the parties’ first electoral victory waned, no structure
was in place to reactivate or continue the work set into motion by the communities
themselves. PAC secretary general Bolaños confirms that one of the problems of the
PAC is that “the party doesn’t organize. There are still a lot of PAC people left, but
they are more like a movement than like a party”.37 She adds that the strategy of the
party is therefore to focus more on the creation of regional networks, although the
rigid division of the country into seven provinces that do not necessarily overlap with
regional identities makes this strategy a suboptimal one.
Conclusion
This paper underlines the usefulness of taking an inclusive approach to party system
change. Through its use of a wide array of quantitative and qualitative data that
measures not only change at the party-system-level but within the parties themselves
as well, it shows how the demands for political change that appeared in 1998 only led
to a partial change in party politics. The increased incentives for competition of
35
Interview Guevara, 2012
Interview Solís, 2012
37
Interview Bolaños, 2012
36
24
political parties in the national political arena created horizontal party system change.
This is visible in the fact that party competition suddenly revolved around new issues
and that governing parties were forced to look for legislative coalitions for their
policies due to their decreased seat share in the Legislative Assembly. In terms of
party profile, more parties presented themselves as presidential contenders. This
allowed the PLN to maintain its traditional hold over power, while simultaneously
fragmenting the opposition among multiple parties. In terms of horizontal party
system change, electoral demands for change put into motion several process of
change at the party system level as new parties appeared to serve this disgruntled
electorate.
That being said, party politics at the vertical level remained more of the same.
In response to electoral discontent, the traditional parties initially introduced
participatory mechanisms in the candidate selection process of their party lists for the
Legislative Assembly. As this backfired, parties resorted to the traditional practice of
selecting legislative candidates in the national party assemblies. In addition, the
traditional parties abolished their traditional use of party primaries for presidential
candidate selection in the tumultuous 2006 elections. The new parties remained rather
ambiguous about the use of primaries to select their candidates – which can mainly be
ascribed to their fear that this will create internal conflicts in their nascent parties. As
such, the demands for a different way of doing politics did not necessarily translate
into more inclusive parties in terms of candidate selection. Similar developments were
visible in party leadership style, where new parties struggled to break with the
tradition of personalistic leaders, and in party rootedness in society, where only the
PLN was able to substantially increase its organizational structure on the ground.
Given that over the last years, the legitimacy of the political system has been rapidly
falling, it may very well be the how of politics rather than the why that holds the key
to improvement of the party system.
25
Appendix 1 – Interviews
Supreme Electoral Tribunal
- Luis Antonio Sobrado. Interview San José, November 16th, 2012. President of
the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
- Hugo Picado Leon. Interview San José, November 30th, 2012. Director of the
Institute for Democratic Formation and Studies (IFED) of the TSE and
assessor of the Tribunal to the 2006-2009 Special Committee on Electoral
Reform and Political Parties (CEREPP)
- Héctor Fernández Masís. Interview San José, December 11th, 2012. Director of
the General Direction of the Political Parties’ Electoral Register and Finances
(DGREFPP) of the TSE
- Ronald Chacón Badilla. Interview San José, November 27th, 2012. Director of
Political Parties’ Finances of the TSE
- Martha Castillo Víquez. Interview San José, November 27th, 2012. Director of
the Political Parties’ Electoral Register of the TSE
Political parties
- Maureen Ballestero Vargas. Interview San José, November 29th, 2012.
President of the National Liberation Party (PLN) legislative fraction 20072009.
- Lorena Vásquez Badilla. Interview San José, December 12th, 2012. President
of the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) 2002-2006.
- Sergio Alfaro Salas. Interview San José, November 14th, 2012. Member of the
Legislative Assembly 2006-2010 for the Citizen’s Action Party (PAC).
- José Rosales Obando. Interview December 4th, 2012. Member of the
Legislative Assembly 2006-2010 for the Citizen’s Action Party (PAC).
- Otto Guevara Guth. Interview December 4th, 2012. President of the Libertarian
Movement (ML) and presidential candidate in 2002, 2006, and 2010.
- Margarita Bolaños. Interview December 3rd, 2012. Secretary General of the
Citizen’s Action Party (PAC)
- Luis Guillermo Solís. Interview December 4th, 2012. Pre-presidential
candidate of the Citizen’s Action Party (PAC).
Experts
- Joseph Thompson. Interview San José, December 12th, 2012. Director of the
Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL) of the InterAmerican Institute of Human Rights.
- Gerardo Hernández Naranjo. Interview San José, November 14th, 2012.
Political scientist at the University of Costa Rica (UCR).
- Rotsay Rosales Valladares. Interview San José, December 6th, 2012. Political
scientist at the University of Costa Rica (UCR).
26
Appendix 2 – Newspaper articles
La Nación (13/02/2013) “Había un vacío en el PAC, afirma Campbell” Available at:
http://www.nacion.com/2013-02-13/ElPais/-Habia-un-vacio-en-el-PAC---afirmaCampbell.aspx
La Nación (09/12/2012) “Un grupo se embarca en la dura tarea de persuadir a Ottón
Solís” Available at: http://www.nacion.com/2012-12-09/ElPais/un-grupo-seembarca-en-la-dura-tarea-de-persuadir-a-otton-solis.aspx
La Nación (27/01/2008) “Personaje del Día: Antonio Álvarez Desanti” Available at:
http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/2008/enero/27/pais1400107.html
La Nación (13/10/2011) “El Libertario ‘no es un partido, eso es una empresa
personal’” Available at: http://www.nacion.com/2011-10-13/ElPais/el-libertario--lsquo-no-es-un-partido--eso-es-una-empresa-personal-rsquo-.aspx
La Nación (05/11/2012) “Óscar López retoma el control del PASE” Available at:
http://www.nacion.com/2012-11-05/ElPais/Oscar-lopez--retoma-el-control-del-pase.aspx
27
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