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Democratic Decay or Democratic Autocracy?Party Primaries and the Challenges of
Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria 1999 - 2013
By
Nkolika E. Obianyo
Department of Political Science,
Nnamdi Azikiwe University
Awka -Nigeria
&
&Ikenna Alumona
Department of Political Science
Anambra State University
Igabariam Campus -Anambra State, Nigeria.
Introduction:
A cardinal principle on which democracy rests is popular mandate. It is the basis of representative
democracy practiced all over the world. Popular mandate presupposes the unrestrained participation
of the relevant community in the affairs of the community especially in the choice of those to carry
out those affairs on behalf of the rest of the community members. The institution of election is one
way, if not the only means of actualizing popular mandate. Similarly, political parties have become
one of the pillars of democracy and a major and important vehicle for actualizing the democratic
principle of popular mandate and responsible representation. If political parties are important
ingredients of democracy, it goes without saying that the organization of political parties and the
modusoperandi of their operations should embody the democratic ideals they fight to enthrone in the
polity. However, it has been observed that while parties rely on democratic principle of popular
mandate to contest and win elections, many of them rarely reflect this principle in their organizational
structures and administration, especially with regards to selection of party leaders and candidates for
elective positions, thus prompting scholars into looking at the issue of intra-party democracy.
Intra party democracy(IPD) has always attracted the attention of scholars of political parties and
party politics (Michels, 1915; Duvuger, 1965; Dahl, 1965; Schapiro, 1972; Sartori, 1976), but the
saliency and urgency of IPD has increased in the modern times given the nascent democratization
wave that took over the world since the collapse of the Communist bloc, what Huntington ( 1991)
referred to as the third wave. `Today the buzz word is not only democracy and democratization but
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transparency and accountability in the administration of the state and institutions of governance. This
has orchestrated changes in the manner in which many political parties choose or select their
leaders/candidates for elective positions, thus moving the pendulum from oligarchic tendencies/
centralization to democratic tendencies / decentralization (though decentralization does not denote
democracy). Intra party democracy has not only gained grounds and currency in modern day politics
and governance but its advocates believe that "parties that practice what they preach, in the sense of
using internally democratic procedures for their deliberation and decisions, strengthen democratic
culture generally" (Scarrow,2005:3) .
Thus, political parties all over the world have devised mechanisms of choosing leaders and
candidates for elective offices, the most democratic of them being the use of party primaries. Party
primaries for the purposes of this discourse shall mean the initial electoral contest amongst
candidates for the purpose of winning the nominations of their parties for the general contest. This
is in tandem with the procedural or minimalist definition of democracy that defines democracy
pragmatically as "the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern".
(Huntington,1991:6). In Schumpeter's view democracy is " that institutional arrangement for
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people's vote"(in Huntington,1991:6). As election has become acceptable
means of choosing leaders or occupants of public office in a democracy, political parties as vehicles
for democratization and democracy should showcase democracy in their internal decision making and
selection of leaders/candidates for election.
In Nigeria, party primaries as an aspect of internal party democracy has become as turbulent and as
problematic as the general elections that succeed them. Though, the Nigerian constitution( 1999) ,the
electoral Act ( 2006, & 2010), and the various constitutions of these political parties stipulate
democratic mechanisms of elections for choosing party leaders and candidates for elective offices,
these statutory provisions have become mere legal frameworks respected more in their breach than
actualization. Many of the political parties especially the dominant ones have jettisoned the written
democratic procedures for candidate and leadership selection in preference for imposition and
manipulated primaries that unleash a plethora of problems ranging from intra party Factionalization,
defections, legal tussles, and violent measures that threaten democratic stability and consolidation in
Nigeria. In Nigeria's nascent democracy the problem has reached the absurd situation where a party
presents more than one candidate for an elective position because each is armed with a court
judgment declaring him or her as the legitimate candidate of for their party, with the attendant
consequence that voters are not only confused but cheated out of an electoral contest in which they
vote for a particular party candidate while another is declared the winner either by the courts or by
the national executive committee of the party. The drift towards anarchy that characterize party
primaries in Nigeria leaves one skeptical about the possibility of intra party democracy(IPD)
promoting democratization process and democratic consolidation in Nigeria. The situation has also
led to excessive multiplication of 'mushroom' parties purposely created to offer platforms to those
who failed to realize their ambition in their party of first choice, resulting to an atomised party
system(Sartori, 2005), The capability of an atomised party system to sustain and consolidate
democracy in the face of patrimonial and clientele politics largely evident in Nigeria remains suspect .
The big question which this paper intends to answer, is why do Nigerian political parties resort to
undemocratic means rather than adhere to the stipulated democratic means(as required by law) in
the selection of leaders and candidates for election? Following from this is another question, can
political parties lacking in democratic ethics mid wife democracy?
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Against this backdrop the paper examines the problem of party primaries(as an aspect of IPD) in
Nigeria since the inception of democratic rule in 1999. In so doing, the paper is divided into four
sections. The first section is a review of literature on the conceptual contestation on the subject of
internal party democracy, party primaries and democratic consolidation. The second section focuses
on the theoretical framework for understanding problem of internal party democracy in Nigeria. The
third section is a background history of party formations and party politics in Nigeria , while the
fourth section focuses on party primaries in Nigeria from 1999 the problems it poses for democratic
consolidation in Nigeria. The fifth section is on recommendations and conclusion.
Intra-Party Democracy, Party Primaries and Democratic Consolidation: Conceptual Issues:
The primary objective of democracy is to give the people the opportunity to participate and make
choices regarding their affairs. Political parties exist to facilitate and make this participation of the
citizenry in governance possible and easier. Political parties as agency of democracy and
democratization, needs to be democratic itself in its organization and procedures. This is the
epistemology of internal Party democracy(IPD) . IPD thus refers to the democratization of a party's
internal decision making structures and processes to provide opportunities for citizens and members
to influence the choices that parties offer to voters(Maiyo, 2008a). Scarrow (2005) has however
pointed out that IPD is very wide term describing a wide range of methods. In fact the concept of
IPD is as nebulous as the concept of democracy meaning different things to different users and
practitioners, thus provoking the raging debate regarding its desirability and practicability. But as
Scarrow (2005:3) observes:
...the ideal of intra-party democracy has gained increasing attention in recent years because of its
apparent potential to promote a "virtuous circle"linking ordinary citizens to government, benefiting
parties that adopt it, and more generally contributing to the stability and legitimacy of the democracies
in which these parties compete for power.
The observation of Scarrow above regarding intra -party democracy (IPD) may be true of political
parties in advanced democracies, but regrettably, cannot be said to be true of political parties in the
nascent democratic governance in most of Africa, and Nigeria to be specific. The experience of
Nigeria lends credence to the argument that IPD may be more of a destabilizing rather than a
stabilizing element of democracy. Our effort in this section is to x-ray the varying arguments against
and in favour of IPD , more especially with regards to an aspect of IPD which is party primaries and
how it affects democratic consolidation.
On the subject of IPD there are two major contestations, which in this paper shall be classified as
critics and supporters and or as Scarrow(2005) describes them, outcome and process protagonists.
Early on the list of critics of IPD are the elite theorist led by Robert Michels who theorized on the
oligarchic character of political parties. According to Michels (1915:401) a political party "is an
organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors... the delegated over
the delegators " and concludes that "who says organization says oligarchy". In his view "every party
organization represents an oligarchical power grounded upon a democratic basis" He further argues
that "the notion of the representation of popular interests...is an illusion engendered by a false
illumination,... an effect of mirage". For this school of thought, the idea of internal democracy in
parties will sound pretentious, because even where laws are put in place to ensure control of the
majority over the minority , it is the laws that ends up being circumscribed(Parry, 1977). Michels
justifies this position by asserting that the modern party is a fighting party, which needs speedy and
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promptness of action to prevail, otherwise it will lose its political elasticity and opportunity for action.
He put it this way:
Democracy is utterly incompatible with strategic promptness, and the forces of democracy do not lend
themselves to the rapid opening of a campaign. This is why political parties even when democratic,
exhibit so much hostility to the referendum and to all other measures for the safe guard of real
democracy; and this is why in their constitutions these parties exhibit, if not unconditional caesarism, at
least extremely strong centralizing and oligarchical tendencies (Michels, 1915:42-43).
Duvuger (1965) also observes the tendency of parties to camouflage their autocratic tendency behind
a democratic mask given the universal reverence paid to democracy and the legitimacy it confers on
those who claim to practice it. He further notes that despite the attraction which democracy holds,
practical efficiency drives parties to the opposite direction, because a party organised on the
democratic premise "is not well armed for the struggle of politics"(Michels, 1915:134).That is to say
that internal democracy makes parties that practice it weaker and incapable of keeping pace with their
opponents To the critics, IPD precludes parties from choosing candidates most likely to appeal to
voters and transfer key political decisions to a small group of party activists at the expense of the
broader membership(Gauja, 2006 in Maiyo, 2008a :4). In fact it has a tendency to lessen party
cohesion while increasing the risk of internal party dissension This in turn impinges on the
efficiency of the party machine as more time and energy is spent on internal competition and conflict
resolutions rather than on the major priorities of the party which is electoral and governmental
success(Maiyo,2008b). A variant of this perspective otherwise referred to as the "responsible party
view" sees political parties essential contribution to democracy as offering clear and distinct choices
so that voters can give their representatives the mandate with which to govern and hold them
accountable if they fail. Thus excessive democratization is considered injurious to the party as it
weakens party discipline and create opening for uncommitted members or strangers to weaken or
hijack and weaken the party(Scarrow,2005). Thus to the critics or what Scarrow (2005) referred to as
the outcome proponents of party role in society, what is important is for a party to win elections, and
the leaders of the party are in a better position to choose those that can deliver the electoral victory.
On the other hand for the supporters of IPD better described as the process or participatory school of
thought, parties are not primarily intermediaries but incubators that nuture citizens' political
competence. To fulfill this role, parties' decision making structures and processes should provide
opportunities for individual citizens to influence the choices that parties offer to voters (Scarrow,
2005). Thus the process or participatory school of thought places a lot of emphasis on the process
rather than the outcome(Maiyo, 2008a). For them democracy is not merely voting, allowing party
members to influence the outcome of party policies gives parties and their policies more legitimacy
and enhances the deliberative aspect of democracy(Todi 2014, Biezen 2004 in Maiyo 2008a). In
addition participation may also be outcome oriented because it gives the party leaders opportunities
to be better informed about their supporters and wider public preferences( Todi 2014).
Scarrow (2005) itemized a number of factors in the organizational structure of political parties that
influence the adoption of IPD by political parties and the form it takes. These are inclusiveness,
centralization and institutionalization.
According to Scarrow (2005:6) inclusiveness denotes an expanded circle of decision makers within a
party. In the most inclusive parties, all party members and even party supporters are given the
opportunity to decide on important issues especially on choice of party leader or candidate selection.
Inclusiveness favors open deliberation in the decision making process of the party . "Centralization
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on the other hand, describes the extent to which decisions are made by a single group or decision
body". However like inclusiveness parties fall on different spots along the centralization spectrum.
Those that fall in the middle of this spectrum, are called "stratarchical" parties because "decisions are
decentralized among geographic layers of the organization,(strata) but tightly controlled by party
elites of these different levels". This system is particularly attractive to political parties in federal
states. Scarrow was quick to point out that decentralization does not necessarily go hand in hand with
democratization. Institutionalization on the other hand denotes "a wide range of features, including a
party's autonomy from other actors, the extent of its internal organizational development, and the
extent to which supporters identify with the party and view it as an important actor" . In addition
institutionalization is measured by the extent of formalization of rules and procedures as well as the
coordination of structures in its target constituency; but like decentralization, institutionalization does
not amount to internal democratization. In fact Mainwaring (1998) observes that extreme
institutionalization may result to a stultified party system which may not augur well for democracy.
However one way the institutionalization element helps democracy is the stability that it infuses into
the system. Mainwaring (1998:10) defined party system institutionalization as "one in which actors
develop expectations and behavior based on the premise that the fundamental contours and rules of
any party competition will prevail in the foreseeable future" . This stable expectation is created with
formalized rules and processes which helps parties minimize internal conflicts or at least "channel
them in predictable ways that facilitates smooth leadership turnovers"(Scarrow 2005:6).
Huntington(1968) had earlier identified
adaptability as one of the important element of
institutionalization which itself is dependent on age. The more adaptable an organization is to
changes and challenges of its environment, the more institutionalized. But adaptability comes with
age. In other words, organizational rules, regulations and procedures that have been in practice for a
long period of time, adapted to changes taking place within its environment, signifies a high level of
institutionalization.
Thus, inclusiveness, centralization and institutionalization according to Scarrow (2005:7) "describe
the organizational differences among parties, as well as characterize changes overtime within
individual political parties." The terms she argues, should not be thought of as "binary labels" but as
terms "describing scales along which parties range, being more or less inclusive, centralized or
institutionalized".
Scarrow(2005:15-19) further identifies five organizational models of parties using the three elements
of inclusiveness, centralization and institutionalization . These are( 1)the "leader -dominated party"
(2.) the "party of notables" or "cadre party"; (3) the party of "individual representation";(4) the
Corporatist party; and (5) the "basis democracy" . Some of the models are not really new though the
criteria for arriving at the characterization, may be new and different. In addition, none of the models
have full claim to IPD. some 'cadre parties' are known to have democratized, while some 'corporatist
parties' or 'basis democracy' type may gravitate towards oligarchy in decision making.
Duvurger(1965) had earlier categorized parties based on organizational and membership structure
and degree of participation and arrived at these categories. Parties can be mass type or cadre type.
Though the mass party type is indicative of openness and citizen involvement and participation than
the cadre type, it is still not indicative of greater IPD than the cadre type.
According to
Duvurger(1965) what the mass party gets through numbers, cadre party gets through quality of
membership. On the basis of participation, Duvurger(1965) identifies three types of participants in
parties. These are the electors, supporters and militants. The three types can be found in all parties.
Parties with more electors than supporters and militants may be indication of restriction or oligarchic
control in decision making, parties with more of supporters may be indicative of inclusiveness , and
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therefore IPD. Parties where militancy is dominant could be indicative of leader dominated type with
strong ideological orientation.
In Africa, a different trajectory of party development took place and has continued to take place given
its colonial background and the level of socio-economic development of the post colonial state. Thus
many political parties in Africa have been classified as either ethnic, clientelistic, programmatic or
personalistic parties(Elischer, 2008) or dominant mass party type(Sartori, 2005) Although efforts
have been made by scholars to describe African parties as different from their western prototypes,
nevertheless many of them are modeled after the western models. That a party's membership is
composed mainly of members of a particular ethnic group does not make it less a cadre, mass or
corporatist party as may be found in the West. However, these categorizations are not suggestive of
the extent of IPD in these parties. The focus of this paper is on an aspect of IPD which deals with
candidate selection otherwise herein referred to as Party Primary election.
According to Scarrow (2005:7) "recruiting and selecting candidates is a crucial task for parties as
parties profile during elections and while in office is largely determined by which candidates are
chosen and where their loyalty lies". This selection process relies on two methods, namely, direct
ballot of eligible supporters, called primary election or nomination by some kind of party
assembly(Scarrow 2005). Primary elections can be defined as "internal party processes that choose a
political party's candidate(s) for the next general election by holding an internal election"(AC
Encyclopaedia,2013:51).The manner in which it is done depends on the legal framework, internal
party rules, and informal practices(ACE Encyclopaedia, 2013, Scarrow, 2005) . Primaries take
different forms. There are closed or congress type(conventions or caucuse), semi closed or
membership type and open systems. In closed primaries only registered members of a political party
are allowed to vote. Semi closed primaries allows registered members and independents who are
expected to identify with a party privately or publicly to vote, while the open primaries(also called
pick -a -party primary) allows a registered voter regardless of party affiliation to vote. The open
system is said to be open to abuse as rival party members may vote in a party's primary to elect their
rivals weakest candidates . Thus parties consider it important to limit participation to party members
in good standing.
Primary election have received both equal shares of support and criticisms. Supporters argue that
primaries enable parties pick popular candidates likely to win the general election. It also promotes
the democratic process and gives candidates a clear mandate and legitimacy in the general election
given the democratic character of the selection. In addition it gives power to the rank and file of the
party and thus helps members uproot entrenched unpopular party elites. Primary elections give
candidates and the party visibility prior to the general election. On the other hand primaries have
been critiqued as undemocratic as only a small fraction of party members do actually vote in primary
elections; it is also considered expensive, since it takes away fund that could have been employed to
fight the general election. It is also said to favor internal party strife that works against the cohesion
necessary to fight opponents. It weakens party structure by diverting attention from the party policies
to individual candidates. More importantly it removes decision making from experienced office
holders to the rank and file of the party who may not understand what is at stake(ACE Encyclopedia
2013) .
Primaries can also be classified as legislated and non legislated primaries. Legislated primaries exist
where primaries are initiated through a country's legal framework (e:g Nigeria) like the constitution
or electoral laws made by the legislature or even the party's constitution or internal rules. It is also
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influenced by other considerations other than the legislations, for instance the party may introduce a
quota system or affirmative action to balance the composition of the candidates list of the party. They
can decide to allot a percentage of the seats to women, or zone particular offices to particular
geographical regions of the state so as to appease national minorities unlikely to win a free and fair
voting process. Some critics criticize the quota system as being undemocratic and blocking the
chances of better candidates to win the election. In all, the political party culture, environment of
contest, the electoral system and the legal frameworks contribute in large measures towards the
specific modality of primary election adopted by a political party (ACE Encyclopedia 2013).
An important question to ask is, how does IPD affect democratic consolidation?
To answer the question demands that we understand what is meant by democratic consolidation.
Democratic consolidation is another term considered nebulous and many times difficult to
conceptualize in practical terms. According to Schedler (2001) the consolidation of democracy has
developed into an "obese" concept thus covers a whole panoply of political problems "third wave
democracies" have been confronting. As a result, the lack of clarity on the meaning of democratic
consolidation has been source of recurrent criticism. He notes that if the empirical context as well as
the normative goals pursued by scholars are taken into consideration, it becomes easy to grasp what is
meant by democratic consolidation. He asserts that "consolidating democracy may involve the
positive tasks of deepening a fully liberal democracy or completing a semi democracy or it may
respond to the "negative" challenges of impeding the erosion of a liberal democracy or else avoiding
the breakdown of whatever minimal kind of democracy we have in place" (Schedler, 2001:67).
Several other definitions have been put forward. O' Donnell
(in Mottiar 2002:1) considers a
democracy consolidated when power is alternated between rivals, support for the system is continued
during times of economic hardship, rebels are defeated and punished , the regime remains stable in
the face of restructuring of the party system , and there exists no significant political anti -system . By
this definition many third wave democracies especially in Africa will fail the qualification tests.
Adam Przeworski(in Mottier, 2002:1) states that "democracy is consolidated when under given
political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town.
When no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions , when all losers want to do is try
again within the same institutions under which they have lost". The most comprehensive definition
comes from Linz & Stepan ( in Mottier, 2002 :1) . They state that democracies can be considered
consolidated democracies when democracy becomes internalized behaviorally, attitudinally and
constitutionally. They further explain that behaviorally a democracy is consolidated when no
significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources
attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or by seceding from the
state. Attitudinally , democracy is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the
midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents , holds the belief that
democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life and
when support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or isolated from pro democratic forces.
Constitutionally democracy is consolidated when governmental and non -governmental forces alike
become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws,
procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.
In this work democratic consolidation shall mean the stabilization of democratic institutions and
practices, as well as the institutionalization or habitual adherence to democratic ethics and values
which includes but not limited to stability of the party system, electoral system, governmental
systems/ institutions, free and fair electoral process, alternation of power between rival parties,
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adherence to the rules and regulations of democratic competition, accountable representation, respect
for the fundamental rights of citizens especially right to dissent from the views of government or to
oppose the government or tolerance of opposition, in fact, "freedom in political action" (Dahl 1965:9)
When IPD or its microcosm party primaries promotes most or some aspects of the elements listed
above, democracy is consolidated, on the other hand when it hampers or obstructs the promotion of
many of these elements so described, democracy is negated and decay or authoritarianism may set in
rather than consolidation.
In Nigeria, party primaries have been conducted in manners that query the democratic credentials of
the parties even when they attach the nomenclature democratic to their names to prove their
democratic character. The fallouts of party primaries negates the democratic ethics and values it set
out to pursue and sometimes impacts negatively on democratic consolidation. One of the objectives
of this paper is find explanation for the incessant breakdown of IPD or breach of rules of the game in
the conduct of party primaries in Nigeria.
Explaining the Absence of IPD in Nigerian Political Parties:The Peripheral Capitalist State
Linkage
Ake (1996:6) wrote:
One of the most remarkable features of democratization in Africa is that it is totally indifferent to the
character of the state. Democratic elections are being held to determine who will exercise the powers of
the state with no questions asked about the character of the state as if it has no implications for
democracy. But its implications are so serious that elections in Africa give the voter only a choice
between oppressors. This is hardly surprising since Africa largely retains the colonial state structure
which is inherently anti democratic, being the repressive apparatus of an occupying power. Uncannily,
this structure has survived, reproduced and rejuvenated by the legacy of military and single party rule.
By all indications, it is also surviving democratization, helped by the reduction of democracy to multiparty elections. So what is happening now by way of democratization is that self appointed military or
civilian dictators are being replaced by elected dictators.
The observation of Ake is not only true of democratic politics in Nigeria but also of IPD in Nigerian
political parties. The import of Ake assertion is that democracy and democratization in Africa or
Nigeria for that matter cannot be divorced from the character of the state. It has to be understood in
the context of the character of the peripheral capitalist state of which Nigeria is one.
A pronounced feature of this kind of state is the underdevelopment of productive forces and
consequentially the dependant nature of the economy of the states in this mode. This dependency
syndrome which stems from its marginalized role in the world economy during colonial rule and
consequently since post independence created a kind of state that is not only instrumentalist but also
ubiquitous in the role it assumed for itself. It was a state that was everywhere and in everything. It
engaged in production and distribution, even if the production were restricted to primary mineral
wealth. This marginalized role also led to the underdevelopment of the indigenous social classes that
emerged from it. The worst hit of these classes is the emergent petty bourgeois or elite classes that
took over the state at independence. Uprooted as they were from production, they came to depend on
the state for sustenance and improvement of their material well being, made worse by adoption of
western taste pattern and consumerist culture. Thus, statism which meant an increase in a range of
economic activities brought under the control of the state using the ideology for development (Ake,
2001). The state thus assumed a larger than life image. It was a state that is everywhere and a state
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that can do anything. This increased the state's instrumentalist role for primitive accumulation. It also
raised the premium on politics and control of state power. The struggle for power became so
absorbing that every other thing was marginalized even economic development. The faction of the
dominant ruling class in power did everything to keep it, those out of it did the impossible to
challenge those in power or at least limit their vulnerability to harassment and abuse by those in
power(Ake 2001). This situation reduced politics to Hobbes' state of nature where what mattered was
the calculus of force. The out of power elite could not "channel their ambitions to economic activity
which was primarily a matter of state patronage"; for those in power already "any sort of
entrepreneurial activity was unnecessary for one could appropriate surplus with less risk and less
trouble by state power". "Political power was everything; it was not only access to wealth but also the
means to security and the only guarantor of general well being"(Ake, 2001:7).
In Nigeria, the primacy of politics and state power created a dependent ruling class that lives off the
state. The problem became accentuated with the advent of oil and oil rent. Oil revenue enhanced the
instrumentalist role of the state and the centralization that followed. Oil revenue alongside military
rule restructured the federation in a manner that enhanced the powers of the centre over the sub units.
This centralization threw up a new class of national bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes with a
centrist ideology that promotes the ascendancy of the centre over the units, with the sole aim of
controlling the immense oil wealth vested in the central government. By virtue of the country's over
dependency on oil revenue, and other forms of external rent for survival, the Nigerian state can also
take the description of a rentier state. .
One of the fallouts of a rentier state is that it is immersed in distribution rather than production .
What luciani (cited in Ibrahim 2000:53) called an 'allocative state" This kind of state according to
Beblawi(in Widdowson 2005,p.9) creates "different layers of beneficiaries of government rent"
which "in their turn give rise to new layers of beneficiaries" . Thus "the whole economy is arranged
as hierarchy of rentiers with the state or government at the top of the pyramid acting as the ultimate
support for all other rentiers in the economy."A rentier economy produces a dominant ruling class
with a rentier mentality whose sole preoccupation is acquisition of state power. The dominance of oil
wealth also led to a centripetal form of federalism and a centripetal class structure that sustain it, and
ipso facto a centripetal democratic system in which control of the central government is the
epicentre of democratic competition. This centralization mentality consequently affected other socio
political institutions in the state including political parties. As a result, the state and its apparatuses
showcase an administrative federal structure that functions with a unitary power structure. There are
sub units but the ultimate power flow from the top, the federal government, or in the case of political
parties the central working committee and the central executive committees. Even the current state's
embrace of market economy which encourage state roll back in the economy through liberalization
and privatization of state owned enterprises, and cut back on state bureaucracy has not reduced the
instrumentalist role of the state, nor its intimidating character. State power is still used to convert
public institutions into private ones (in the name of privatization), while the coercive apparatuses are
still employed to muscle opponents.
In sum the rentier state creates rentier class(es) with rentier mentality and a rentier political culture
that structures the democratization process leading to what in this paper will be called a rentier
democracy. Rentierism permeates the democratic process in various ways: First, the political offices
constitutes rents given the enormous wealth and benefices attached to them. The most important of
them being the presidency with enormous patronage powers.
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Joseph(1991:56-7) describes this phenomenon as "prebendalism" or "prebendal politics". He defines
a prebend as "an office of state,...which an individual procures either through examinations or as a
reward for loyal service to a lord or ruler". He observes that the post colonial state (of Africa) has a
peculiar form of state organization and attitudes in which "constitutional and legal systems" and
"stated impersonal norms" largely serve to camouflage extensive prebendal practices . He further
asserts that while "clientelism defines the nature of individual and group relationships within the
wider socio-political sphere, ...prebendalism is primarily a function of the competition for, and
appropriation of, offices of the state"(Joseph 1991:63). He further notes that electoral politics
"revitalizes and promotes clientelistic networks" because of the extensive prebends associated with
electoral democracy. What Joseph (1999) did not reckon with is the extent control of parties and party
offices have become prebends. In addition Joseph failed to answer a basic question why public
offices in Nigeria or elsewhere become prebends.
Secondly political parties, (as the vehicles for fashioning and sustaining democracy) are sustained by
state rent and this sustenance is strengthened if the party exercises control of the central or many of
the sub unit governments. In fact political parties have become sources of rents as forming and
controlling one or occupying an important party office assures access to state rent and or raises the
negotiating potential of party owners or party office holders in the rent distribution circuit. This
explains the manipulations, conflicts and blatant disregard for rules guiding political competition
even within parties. Rentierism introduced another variant of machine or clientele politics called
"godfatherism". It is a term (in the Nigerian political lexicon) that describes the clientele network or
relationship of a new political class better described as political entrepreneurs or brokers or
godfathers, whose sole preoccupation is primitive accumulation through the instrumentality of state
power. Their influence in the various parties where they operate is dependent on the degree of their
wealth, manipulative or vote rigging skill or better still proximity to or control of state power either
as governor of a state or president of the country (Obianyo2013). While the patron, Joseph(1999)
describes in the clientele network of second republic politics of Nigeria depends on one or few
prebends (political offices) for personal aggrandizement, the godfather -patron of the fourth republic
has unfettered access to the treasury of a state, s/he is the power behind the throne that makes
electoral victory possible. Electoral victory is not usually made possible through a free and fair
process but through what Ibrahim &Ibeanu(2009 in Momoh 2013) called Direct Capture(DC). Direct
capture entails using the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), state intelligence agencies and
coercive apparatuses to undermine the electoral process . It entails "... the transformation of the state
from an instrument and external enabler and implementer of rigging, to a direct party and
implementer of rigging"(Ibrahim and Ibeanu 2009 in Momoh 2013). The outcome of DC is Primitive
Accumulation of Votes(PAV) which translates into Primitive Accumulation of Power(PAC). PAC in
turn results to Primitive Accumulation of Capital (PAC)The simple formular therefore is
DC=PAV+PAP=PAC. Thus, control of the party machinery is important for successful use of DC.
Parties where one person has overwhelming influence as the party boss or godfather, IPD is not only
unnecessary but is skewed to meet the wishes and intents of the godfather. However where there are
two or more godfathers with commensurate political and electoral influence, leadership/ candidate
selection whether through primary election or caucus selection, results to intra- party conflicts that
may yield factions or serious opposition to the hegemonic faction controlling the party. In such
parties we encounter situations where various factions hold primaries, each claiming (sometimes
with court judgment) to be the legitimate faction of the party. The centralization and personalization
of decision making apparatuses of Nigerian political parties despite the decentralization that
characterize its structural arrangement negates and obstructs the internal democratic mechanisms of
11
these parties. and further reinforce hegemonic control of one man or a few men of influence and
wealth who abrogate democratic processes for selfish ends. In the event how each party's decision
making structures work is dependent not just on the statutory provisions but also on the character of
leadership and structure of the clientele network that permeates it.
Political Parties in Nigeria: Background History
Political parties in Nigeria started as part of the social and political struggle against obnoxious
colonial policies and quest for independence. Thus, the first political party in Nigeria was the
Nigerian National Democratic party (NNDP) founded in 1922 led by a foremost nationalist also
called father of Nigerian nationalism, Herbert Macaulay. NNDP's initial focus was articulation and
aggregation of the grievances of the local communities and interest groups against colonial rule and
so fought for abrogation of obnoxious laws that violate the rights of the local populace as well as
greater participation of the indigenous communities in the colonial administration. Although this
party had a large mass following given that it was the first organized political movement through
which the local populace could express their grievances, it was personalistic and elitist in the sense
that its activities were controlled by few educated elites and local chieftains led by Herbert
Macaulay. Its politics was concentrated in Lagos and environs(Sklar 1983).NNDP was later followed
by the Nigerian Youth Movement(NYM) another elitist but national political organization composed
of mainly graduates of one of Nigeria's foremost College, the King College Lagos and forerunners of
Nigerian nationalism like Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe(Sklar 1983). The crisis in NYM crystallized into the
ethnicization of politics that was later to define party formation and party politics in Nigeria. Thus the
major parties of the colonial and post independence era could be described as ethnic mass parties.
They can also be described as personalistic and programmatic, in the sense that they are formed
around the personality of a charismatic leader from the major ethnic groups, but also harnesses
programs/policies that target the welfare of particular ethnic members(Obianyo,2001).
These parties were, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens(NCNC) which started with a
nationalistic appeal before it got marginalized into an Igbo political party; the Action Group(AG)
started as yoruba cultural group known as "Egbe omo Oduduwa", it never pretended to want one
Nigeria; the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) a derivative of a cultural society known as Jam'yyar
Mutanen Arewa with a pan northern philosophy of "One North One People". The Northern Elements
Progressive Union(NEPU) - a radical mass party formed by Mallam Aminu Kano to protect the
interests of the underprivileged known in Hausa Language as the Talakawas, and the United Middle
Belt Congress(UMBC) a party representing the interests of the northern minorities of the Southerly
provinces of the Northern region. The National Independent Party (NIP) a splinter group from
NCNC representing the interests of the minorities of the Niger Delta. The United Peoples Party(UPP)
a splinter group from the AG which later became the Nigerian National Democratic Party(NNDP) in
opposition to AG in western Nigeria. The ethnic politics that characterized party politics saw to the
demise of the first republic and the military incursion into governance.IPD was not visible in all these
parties as the dominance of the various personalities that drive the parties determines what they do or
left undone. Whoever disagrees with these personalities had only once choice to leave the party.
In 1979 Nigeria was returned to civil democratic rule. Party formation of the second republic
mirrored the pattern of the first republic. Many of the parties toed ethnic line even though statutory
provisions were made to avoid ethnic orientation to party formation(Obianyo 2001). The major
12
parties of the second republic also had as their leaders and presidential candidates some of the
dramatis personae of the first republic. The major parties were the National Party of Nigeria(NPN)
Nigerian Peoples Party(NPP) Great Nigerian Peoples Party(GNPP), Unity Party of Nigeria(UPN)
and the Peoples Redemption Party(PRP) With the exception of GNPP which was splinter group from
NPP, the rest were like the resurrection of the parties of the first republic. NPN had as presidential
flagbearer and consequently as leader of the party, Alhaji Shehu Shagari a descendant of the first
premier of Northern Nigeria late Sir Ahmadu Bello who was the leader of NPC, NPP's
leader/presidential flagbearer was late Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who was also the leader of NCNC, UPN
was led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who also led AG in the first republic while PRP had Mallam
Aminu Kano of NEPU. Obviously nothing changed in the internal dynamics of these parties,
candidates for elective positions must receive the blessings of these leaders to contest in their
respective parties. The malfeasance that characterized politics and election in the second republic
also brought back the military in December 1983.After long years of military rule, party politics
partially resumed with the protracted military transition programs in 1989. To run away from the
events of the previous democratic systems that crashed from repeating themselves, the Gen.
Babangida regime went to the extent of involving the government in the formation of political
parties. This was to rid parties of the ownership syndrome that exclude many and put parties under
the control of a few wealthy and influential individuals from the various ethnic groups. Two parties
were formed to accommodate the ideological orientation of the would be joiners, the Social
Democratic Party(SDP) with a leftist or welfarist orientation and the National Republican
Convention(NRC) with a capitalist orientation. The parties were structured to restore power to the
grassroots starting from the ward level. The demise of the transition program of that era caused by the
cancellation of the June 12 1993 election brought back the military and several military aided
transition that failed until 1999 when the Abubakar led military government transferred Power to a
democratically elected government.
Party formation in the fourth republic also followed the dynamics that has come to define military
transition politics in Nigeria. As a result of failed transition programs that sometimes lead to banning
and unbanning of some classes of politicians, the political class learnt to form political groups or
meetings that later transform into political parties. There is also the popular notion that only political
parties that receive the blessings of the military government eventually scale through the complex
statutory stipulations that guide party formation and registration in Nigeria. In addition, the military
government also stipulate the number of parties that will participate. All these factors impact on the
nature, membership and the manner of IPD in the parties. Many of the parties are therefore
associations of strange bedfellows whose only reason for joining the association is that they have the
inclination that the association is the favorite of the Military regime managing the transition process.
1999 thus saw the birth of three parties, namely, the Peoples Democratic Party(PDP) All Peoples
Party(APP) and the Alliance for Democracy(AD). These parties registered and recognized by the
Independent National Electoral Commission(INEC) the umbrella body that oversees election in
Nigeria, contested the 1999 election. Since 1999, the political space has been relaxed leading to
registration of more political parties. The number of parties increased from 3 in 1999 to 28,50,and 67
in 2003,2007 and 2011 respectively. The number has recently been pruned down to 26 by INEC in
accordance with the section 78(7ii) of the Electoral Act(2010) that authorizes deregistration of
parties that failed to win one seat in national or state elections.
Party Primaries in Nigeria- A case of Democratic Decay or Democratic autocracy?
13
That political parties are the major building blocks of democracy is no longer contestable, that parties
nurture and sustain democracy is a fact of modern democratic systems, what remains contestable is
whether parties lacking in democratic ideals and principles in their internal mechanisms can enthrone
and sustain democracy in the wider polity.
According to Norris(2004 ) a key issue in intra-party democracy is the nomination process, as it
serves as a prism in understanding the power distribution among different organs and factions in a
party. According to Schattschneider (in Norris 2004, p.26)"the nominating process has become a
crucial process of the party. He who can make the nominations is the owner of the party"
Schattschneider may have made the stated assertion based on experiences of parties in advanced
democracies, but his observation very aptly fits what appears to be the fundamental reason or basis
for party formation in Nigeria-serving as vehicles for capturing state power. This is more true of
parties in the current democratic dispensation in Nigeria, a flaw emanating from the socio-economic
and political environment that threw them up. The primacy of state capture thorough DC as the
epistemological foundation of party formation and organization in Nigeria has contributed in no small
measure to the deterioration or near absence of internal democracy in these parties despite several
rules and regulations both by the state and the party constitution stipulating such. In fact,
Omoruyi(2000) observes that parties in Nigeria cannot be easily classified as parties except in name
since their origin, structure, organization and functions defy standards by which parties are identified
in classical or scholarly writings. The Justice Uwais committee on electoral reform in Nigeria had
this to say about political parties in 2008:
One of the most crucial and yet least developed democratic institutions in the country is the political
party system. There are currently 50 registered political parties in the country, most of which are an
assemblage of people who share the same level of determination to use the party platform to get to
power. As such, it is usually difficult to identify any party programmes or ideologies. The structure of
the political parties is such that internal democracy is virtually absent. The political parties are weak and
unable to effectively carry out political mobilization, political education and discipline (Uwais et al,
2008 :4 in Jega, 2014:2).
One of the fallouts of military transition to democracy, is the character of political parties it throws
up . This is because the parties start out as structural edifices immersed in meeting the cumbersome
registration guidelines stipulated for their existence, such as "pan -Nigerian membership, functional
offices in two-thirds of the states of the federation, electing officers that meet the federal character
criterion, etc"; that they fail the basic condition of party formation which is an organic linkage of the
wishes and interests of those that came together as members(Fawole, 2005,p.159). Consequently the
post military transition parties are usually lacking in membership coherence, ideologically vacuous,
and void of democratic attitudes and values that can bring about democratic consolidation. Diamond
(1994 in Fawole 2005, p.165) notes that "adherence to laid down rules and procedures, makes
acceptance of electoral outcomes less problematic even when it fails to favor one", a factor "that is
more crucial to democratic consolidation than the actual outcomes of elections". It is just this very
factor, non adherence to rules and regulations of the game, that has become the bane of party politics
in Nigeria. Nigeria is obviously not lacking in rules stipulating democratic elections as the only way
of choosing leaders and candidates in both intra and inter party competition, the problem is that the
political class prefer the rule of the jungle to the rule of law.
IPD in Nigerian Political Parties- The Legal Frameworks:
According to section 222(1) states that "The constitution and rules of a political party shall
14
(a) provide for the periodical election on a democratic basis of the principal officers and members of
the executive committee or other governing body of the political party; and
(b) ensure that the members of the executive committee or other governing body of the party reflect
the federal character of Nigeria.
(2) For the purposes of this section (a) the election of the officers or members of the executive
committee of a political party shall be deemed to be periodical if it is made at regular intervals not
exceeding four years; and (b) the members of the executive committee or other governing body of the
political party shall be deemed to reflect the federal character of Nigeria only if the members thereof
belong to different states not being less in number than two-thirds of all the States of the Federation
and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The Electoral Act(2006) stipulates in Section 85 (1) that
Every registered political party shall give the commission (Independent National
Electoral Commission-INEC) at least 21 days notice of any convention, congress
conference or meeting convened for the purpose of electing members of its executive
committees, other governing bodies or nominating candidates for any of the elective
offices specified under the Act.
Subsection (2) states: The Commission may with or without prior notice to the political party monitor
and attend any convention, congress conference or meeting which is convened by a political party for
the purposes of (a)electing members of its executive committees or other governing
bodies;(b)nominating candidates for an election at any level.
The Act was silent on the manner of selecting candidates for elective positions. This lacunae was
corrected in the amended version of the electoral Act 2010. Section 87(1) states that, "a political
party seeking to nominate candidates for elections under this Act shall hold primaries for aspirants to
all elective positions".(2) "The procedures for the nomination of candidates by political parties for the
various elective posts shall be by direct or indirect primaries". (3)"A political party that adopts the
direct primaries procedure shall ensure that all aspirants are given equal opportunity of being voted
for by members of the party".(Electoral Act 2010) Sections 87(4) to (11) stipulates the methods of
organizing the primaries in the case of parties that choose the indirect form of primaries for all the
elective positions, namely, President, Governor, Senate, House of Representative, States Houses of
Assembly, Chairmanship and councilors of local government area councils. For instance indirect
primaries for the nomination of a presidential candidate will involve the party holding special
conventions in each of the 36 states of the federation and Federal Capital territory, where delegates
shall vote for each of the aspirant at designated centers in each state Capital on specified dates. The
candidate with the highest number of votes shall be declared in a special convention to be held by the
party in each of the 36 states and federal Capital Territory and the name of the nominee forwarded to
INEC as the candidate of the party after ratification by the convention. Similar provisions were also
made for other elective positions as afore stated.
This elaborated provisions comes at the wake of many problems associated with candidate selection
in all the parties and the many legal battles that tend to thwart or derail the democratic process. The
15
various parties also made provisions for party primaries for the selection of candidates. This is
provided chapter VIII, section 50 of the PDP constitution(2012 as amended); Article 20 of the All
Progressive Congress(APC) ( new party recently formed by merger of three political parties to fight
the dominance of PDP in Nigerian politics). The APC, however introduced a new dimension, a yes or
no vote for candidates that emerged by consensus so as to forestall discontent that may arise from
perceived feeling of imposition. The All Progressive Grand Alliance(APGA) also made similar
provisions in article 24 of the party. However, APGA constitution gave the National Executive
Committee(NEC)) the powers to identify and choose a credible and nationally acceptable person
who shall be presented to the national conventions for ratification with respect to presidential
candidates. Selection of vice presidential candidates is the preserve of the national officers of in
consultation with the presidential candidate, grand patrons and Board of trustees chairman. Similar
powers to select 'credible' candidates was also given to state executive committees, local government
and ward executive committees with approval from NEC. A study of the various parties' constitution
show that party organization in Nigeria follow the centralized format not minding the decentralized
structure. The national executive committee and the Board of trustees enjoy unequalled powers that
cannot be challenged by other levels of party authorities.
We need to reiterate that these legal provisions are breached very often leading to internal strife,
defections and litigations associated with primaries in Nigeria. When political parties as lubricants of
democracy engage in acts that derail democracy or violate the principles upon which democracy is
based, that is democratic decay and when democratic processes are employed in undemocratic ways
by a hegemonic group to foist decisions on others, or mask the undemocratic practices in order to
present them as legitimate, that becomes for lack of a better term democratic autocracy.
Few instances of the troublesome party primaries in Nigeria shall be used to buttress this anomaly
Primaries in Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
PDP has remained the dominant party in Nigeria given that it has been winning the presidency,
majority seats in the National Assembly and majority of many gubernatorial contests and state
legislative seats since the inception of democratic rule in 1999. It is also a party that can boast of
cutting across ethnic divide in Nigeria asit has successfully established presence and dominance in
the politics of all the geo political zones in Nigeria. This it successfully did as result of it zoning
formular. The politics of zoning is a type of consociational arrangement devised by the Nigerian
political class to address the divisive politics of ethnicity ad primordialism that scuttled the
democratic dispensation in the first republic. It arose also out of the constitutional stipulation of
federal character principle which demands equitable sharing of political posts by members of all the
states in Nigeria. Nigeria has been unofficially divided into geo graphical zones which correspond
with ethnic divides of the country, because many of ethnic groups could be located in one
geographical zone. These zones are North-East(6 states), North-West(7 states), North Central(6
states), South East(5 states), South West(6 states) and South -South(6states).Party positions and very
important elected positions are shared by the zones in a manner that no zone is left without an
important position. This position rotates periodically. In 1999 PDP zoned the presidency to the South
west. This was not unconnected with the crisis generated by the June 12 1993 election adjudged the
16
freest and fairest election ever conducted in Nigeria in which a yoruba man in the person of Chief
M.K.O Abiola was known to have won. The virulent agitation against military rule waged by the
South led by the yoruba was part of what ended military rule. PDP is a party seen to be favoured by
the military cabal in control of the country and who took control of the party from the civilian
oligarchy that formed it known as G34(a group of eminent politicians and professionals opposed to
Gen. Sani Abacha military regime) were instrumental to the emergence of a yoruba from the south
west, in the person of Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (who at the time was serving a prison sentence) as
the presidential flag bearer of the party. The party held a convention in Jos where the presidential
primaries took place. In fact the idea of zoning positions in the party was upheld by a voice vote in
the Jos convention of the party, explaining why there were presidential aspirants from the south East
geopolitical zone. The real contest was between Gen. Obasanjo and ex Vice President, Dr. Alex
Ekwueme one of the founding fathers as a member of the G34. He hails from the South East. To an
observer who just watched what is either televised on television, or without getting really involved,
the primaries looked free and fair. However delegates and party activist at the convention notes that
money played a big role in deciding the winner as many delegates were bought over with large sums
of money by sponsors of the various candidates. Gen. Obasanjo who had the backing of persons like
former military head of state Gen. Ibrahim Babangida and other very rich sponsors of the northern
oligarchy, outspent the Dr.Alex Ekwueme group and won the election. In fact the voting process was
cancelled twice when it was observed that many of the votes favoring Obasanjo was being voided
by the secretary of the convention comittee Dr. Nnia Nwodo, the chairman of the convention in the
person of Chief Sunday Awoniyi cancelled the exercise and started afresh. In the event, Obasanjo
emerged the winner of the process. Similar money politics played role in several state congresses for
election of gubernatorial candidates of the party. A celebrated case was PDP primaries in Anambra
state, in which the winner of the primaries Dr. ABC Nwosu was dropped and another candidate
banked by some business monguls in the party imposed their chosen candidate in the person of Dr
Chinwoke Mbadinuju was selected as the gubernatorial candidate. This was effected by sacking the
party chairman in the state (whom it was alleged had a pact with the 'supposed winner of the process
to the effect that he will be getting N500million naira from the state coffers if the candidate wins the
gubernatorial election. The effect of the imposition or hijacking of the party by political entrepreneurs
known as godfathers was not far fetched. The rigged process associated with the scam called
primaries are usually perfected at the wider election leading to success of candidates of these
godfathers at the polls. Thus Dr Mbadinuju won the election but was refused excerise of his powers
by the godfather that saw to his success, in the person of chief Emeka Ofor who saw him as mere
surrogate. He was disallowed from picking the members of his cabinet. Even the state House of
Assembly in Anambra state was not spared as the house was split between supporters of the governor
and supporters of Chief Offor. In the drama that played out, the election of speaker of the House
elected by the legislators sympathetic to the governor was nullified by the Chief Ofor group
supported by the national executive of the party. A compromise was later reached, which enabled
the godfather-patron to handpick candidates of the key political appointments in the state. In the
struggle for hegemony that ensued the governor Dr Mbadinuju embacked on massive exploitation of
the state coffers to consolidate his position while chief Ofor formed another faction of the party
known as Anambra peoples forum (APF) to destabilize and block the governors policies. While this
drama played out, the people suffered, as workers salaries were unpaid leading to protracted strike
actions, schools were locked for months , the water taps went dry, roads became death traps, in fact
social infrastructures degenerated, youth unemployment and
armed robbery increased, while
insecurity became the order of the day, but the political warriors remain unperturbed. Anti riot
policemen were used to disperse demonstrators, while some civil society activists were murdered
17
using the instrumentality of state power for leading strike actions against the underperforming
government (Obianyo 2008a).
This scenario did not end with the 1999 election year, it also repeated itself in the subsequent election
years . Anambra state seems to present the worse case scenario when it comes to manipulated PDP
primaries. While the PDP presidential primaries favoured the incumbent president who employed
the full force of the state machinery to emerge victorious. What transpired at the state levels were
impositions. One mechanism of manipulating primaries in PDP or any other party is to use the party
executive to pick delegates that will be supportive of the preferred candidate of the hegemonic group
that controls the party. So the process starts with election of party executives that will favor the
preferred candidates or that are ready to do business and be paid off to manipulate the primaries to
favor particular candidate. So what determines the winner is dependent on who controls the party
machine and where the sympathy of the party machine especially the national executive lies. This
played out well in the choice of PDP candidates for the 2003 election in Anambra state where chief
Chris Uba single handedly handpicked the candidates starting from the governor. The malfeasance
reached a crescendo when candidates presented for the National Assembly were dropped and their
names substituted with another set of candidates picked by Chief Chris Uba, whose power in the
party stems from the fact that his elder brother was the personal assistant of the president on
domestic affairs. It took court actions to reverse the travesty and return the candidates that actually
stood for election(Obianyo 2003). Similarly the governor that emerged from the rigged electoral
process in the person of Dr Chris Ngige, was later abducted by Chris Uba(his godfather) and forced
to write a resignation letter because he refused Chief Uba unfettered access to state funds. It took the
spirited action of some prominent Nigerian to save the governor. Even the police that should be
custodian of law and order were used to perpetrate the is act. In the ensuing struggle for the soul of
the state between the governor and chief Uba, properties of the state government were burnt down
and destroyed by Uba thugs while the police looked on. The removal of Dr Ngige as governor by the
election tribunal for failing to win the 2003 gubernatorial election ended that debacle. The PDP
chieftain Chris Uba openly confessed to the president that he rigged the election to put Dr Nigige and
other into office( Obianyo 2003, 0bianyo 2008a).
Candidate imposition in PDP came to a climax level in 2007. President Obasnjo had earlier declared
that election will be a do or die affair. This death struggle approach started in the PDP primaries both
at the presidential and state levels. The celebrated cases were primaries associated with the
presidential candidate nomination and the PDP gubernatorial primary in Imo state. Before the
convention the president embarked a gradual dismantling of the political machine of estranged Vice
president, who had a formidable party machine in PDP known as Peoples' Democratic
Movement(PDM).This machine has always been utilized effectively in bringing about the victory or
failure of candidates in the PDP primaries. It was however alleged that the Vice president Alhaji
Abubakar Atiku and his PDM were behind the scuttling of the third term ambition of the president.
In the event, President Obasanjo decided to oust Alhaji Atiku's supporters from the party through reregistration process. This was also geared towards obstructing the emergence of Vice president Atiku
as PDP presidential candidate in 2007. This was successfully done, because Alhaji Atiku was forced
to leave the PDP, to join another party Action Congress later (AC) later renamed Action Congress of
f Nigeria(ACN)to actualize his presidential ambition. But other contestants for the PDP presidential
nominations(many of whom were drawn from the class of ex governors whohave served out their
second term in office) were harassed with the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
with allegations of corruption at the venue of the convention. Many of them left the arena without any
18
notice to their supporters(Obianyo, 2008b). Consequently, Alhaji Umaru Yaradua emerged the
winner of the manipulated and highly controversial presidential primary that had all the serious
candidates withdrawn. In the case of the PDP gubernatorial primaries in Imo state, the winner, Chief
Ifeanyi Ararume was dropped and replaced by Mr. Charles Ugwu a favorite of president Obasanjo.
Later Chief Ararume went to court and secured a judgment that returned him as the PDP's
gubernatorial candidate. Angered by Chief Araume's stubbornness to stick to his mandate, president
Obasanjo announced openly in a rally that PDP has no candidate for the gubernatorial election in
Imo state(Obianyo 2013). Similar controversy trailed the party's primaries in many of the states. In
Ogun state where PDP made inroads in 2003 after the massive structural rigging that characterized
the 2003 election, the PDP also suffered internal crisis arising from the face off between the
governor Gbenga Daniel and president Obasanjo who sponsored him to power. The rift was such that
the two factions held primaries nominating candidates for the 2007 election. INEC initially accepted
the list of candidates from the Governor Gbenga Daniel's faction but later dropped it when President
Obasanjo led faction got a federal High court injunction restraining INEC from accepting any list
from the Governor Gbenga faction. The rift in the party became the gain of the opposition parties
especially ACN which recorded a slide victory in the Ogun state elections in
2007(Akinsanmi,G(2013) Similar cases of imposition characterized the PDP primaries in Anambra
state in 2007, 2010 and 2011 respectively and recently 2013 gubernatorial election in Anambra state.
It is either the delegates receive so much money and vote for the highest bidder or the executive
manipulate the primaries to favour particular chosen candidate, or the National Working Committee
of the Party chooses a candidate for the elective position, an action that many times lead to defections
and court actions against the party by other disenfranchised aspirants.
Party Primaries in All Progressive Grand Alliance(APGA) .
APGA came into existence in June 2002 as a party duly recognized by INEC to contest elections in
Nigeria. APGA ever since its formation has been perceived by Igbos and other Nigerians as a party
for the Igbo. This is against the backdrop that Alliance for Democracy (AD) is yoruba party and
controlled governance in the South west before the PDP onslaught in 2003 under the presidency of
Obasanjo. The Igbo believe that to raise their negotiating power in the scheme of things , they need
party that will be under the hegemony of the Igbo political elite. Though the party claims to have
national spread , a quality it must present to gain registration by INEC. Its electoral strengtha does not
go beyond the shores of South East geopolitical zone dominated by the Igbo and where it struggles
for ascendancy with PDP. APGA beginning was also crisis laden, as result of the imbroglio
associated with its first primaries to nominate gubernatorial candidate for Anambra state. APGA held
a party primaries in which a winner in the person of Mr Okey Nwosu emerged as the winner, but in a
turn of events Mr. Peter Obi who scored the least of the votes cast turned the situation around by
deploying his cash machine to work. The party later dropped Mr Nwosu and gave Mr. Peter Obi the
ticket of the party to become the gubernatorial candidate. That incident also became the harbinger of
the crisis that took over the party leading to two factions, Mr. Chekwas Okorie led faction and Chief
Victor Umeh led faction(Okafor &Uzodinma 2013). As for the presidential candidate, the ticket was a
special preserve of the leader of the party Gen. Odumegwu Ojukwu erstwhile leader of the Biafran
secessionist movement, who later became a symbol of Igbo unity after the death of Dr. Nnamdi
Azikiwe. Despite his poor performance in various presidential elections, he continued to be fielded
as the presidential flag bearer of APGA(except in 2011) to serve as a rallying point for other
candidates of the party under APGA .In the Anambra state gubernatorial election that took place in
2010, Mr. Peter Obi used his incumbency position and with the backing of Gen Ojukwu to secure a
19
second term bid against the wishes of other aspirants, having succeeded as the governor of Anambra
state in 2006 when the courts handed him victory against estranged PDP candidate Dr. Ngige,
initially declared winner. The democratic restriction in the partyforced some of the aggrieved
members to leave the party for other parties (Okafor&Uzodinma 2013). The imposition approach
also attended the nomination of candidates for the 2011 National Assembly and State Assemblies
election. Many of nominees were chosen governor Obi in collusion with the APGA chairman Mr.
Victor Umeh. In addition, many of the nominees were drawn mostly from those that decamped from
PDP for failing to clinch the PDP nomination . They are politicians who by virtue of their wealth and
influence can buy up the position from the oligarchic group in control of APGA. The nominees
include late Prof Dora Akunyili(ex Minister , Chief Chuma Nzeribe(ex House of Representative
member, and Mrs Joy Emodi(ex senator) for APGA senatorial seats while Mrs Uche Ekwunife,
Chris Azubogu, Francis Idigo,Edozie Aroh,Cyril Egwuatu,Umeoji Chukwuma Victor Ogene Simon
Okpalaeke and Chinedu Eluemunoh for House of Representative seats. In fact since after the first
primary election which got truncated in APGA with the undemocratic emergence of Mr. Peter Obi as
the gubernatorial candidates in 2003, all APGA candidates had always been handpicked by the
hegemonic group in the party. This may explain the limited electoral victory of the party in Nigeria
and even in Anambra state where the party presidential flag bearer comes from. Thus the
Factionalization and fractionalization that has become a permanent feature of APGA is not
unconnected to the absence of internal democracy in the party. The factions have been out doing each
other with court judgments that the members can hardly state at any point in time which of the
factions will be the legitimate party to present candidates for election. The APGA constitution that
permits this imposition from the party hierarchy has been used to justify the absence of IPD.
Primaries in All Progressive Congress(APC) :
A new party recently formed in July 2013 to challenge the dominance of PDP in Nigerian electoral
contest. APC is an amalgam of about 3 and a half parties namely All Nigerian Peoples' Party
(ANPP), Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) Congress of Democratic Change (CPC) and faction of
APGA led by the governor of Imo state chief Rochas Okorocha. Prior to this merger the various
parties that formed APC all had problems of internal democracy trailing their choice of party
nominees for election. ANPP was as old as PDP being one three parties registered to contest the 1999
election. It was then known as All Peoples' Party (APP) . It was later renamed ANPP and had as its
'unchallenged' consensus presidential candidate as Gen Muhammad Buhari. The Party relies on the
Party hierarchy to decide nominees of the party for elective positions. Even where primaries are
conducted, it is only to legitimate the choices of the party oligarchy. However disagreements arising
from the manner of prosecution of the electoral dispute of the highly controversial 2007 election led
to further split of the party with Gen Buhari leaving the party to float another party called CPC. The
fact that before the formation of CPC Gen Buhari had always been the presidential flag bearer of the
party without any challenge or contest but under the principle of consensus candidate speaks little of
internal democracy in the party ANPP. The crisis generated by absence of credible primary and IPD
in Bauchi state CPC is even more instructive. The CPC party in Bauchi state divided into four
factions each headed a gubernatorial aspirant. The four aspirants, namely Sadiq Mahmud, Nuhu
Gidado, Mohammed Dewu and Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, all of them claimed to be the legitimate
candidate of the party. Dewu and Gidado had earlier obtained court ruling giving them the mandate
which was over ruled by another court ruling got by Tuggar. The party chairman in the state
attributed the confusion to PDP efforts to destabilize the party in the state(The New Nigerian Voice
News April 26 2011). ACN on the other hand was formed at the wake of the 2007 election, and
20
went ahead to replace the AD and PDP hegemony in the south west politics. It also suffers the set
back of internal democracy as policies and candidate selection are privileges that belong to a select
few if not one man in the party. The towering influence of Bola Tinubu, (the former governor of
Lagos state) in the party leaves very little room for any form of internal democracy. But then ACN
never pretended to organize party primaries, their method is for the party hierarchy to choose from
among the members (mostly drawn from the friends, relations, and political godsons) nominees for
various elective positions. This is done under the mask of consensus candidate. The consensus is all
about agreements amongst the chieftains of the party. They argue that primaries may open up the
party to enemies from the opposition PDP who may join the contest to eventually sell them out at
the general election(Interview with APC members June, 25, 2014). Momoh(2013) also high degree of
personalization of party structures and decision making processes in ACN which has resulted to the
towering influence of Bola Tinubu in the affairs of the party. In fact the emergence of the current
Lagos State governor Babatunde Raji Fasola as both AC nominee and governor of Laos state is
attributable to the political prowess of Bola Tinubu as the erstwhile governor of Lagos State under
the AD. Raji Fasola was the chief of staff to Governor Tinubu from 1999-2007 when he took over
from him. Many of the other contestants who harbored the gubernatorial ambition in AC defected to
other parties. These parties came together to form APC. It is still very fresh to determine the extent
of IPD in APC although the party fielded candidate for the gubernatorial election in Anambra state
held in 2013. The nomination process that brought out the gubernatorial candidate in the person of Dr
Chris Nwabueze Ngige is not without incidence. The party hierarchy had already decided that Dr
Ngige will fly the party flag for the post, but then there were contestants who opposed the imposition,
which led to a primary election between Dr Ngige and Mr Ezimo, and in which that Dr Ngige won
sealing him as the flag bearer of the party. The process appears credible to an unbiased observer, but
in actual fact the election is manipulated in a manner that enables the chosen nominee of the party
oligarchy to win. This is done by making sure that delegates to the congress are drawn mainly from
supporters of the favored candidate. The same consensus approach was employed in the party
convention recently held in Abuja in June for the election of party executives. The nominees of the
different positions have already been selected and their opponents just come to the election and
decline the contest, wherein a yes or no votes are cast by the delegates to legitimate the exercise in
the eyes of INEC officials observing the process(Interview with APC delegate, June 30, 2014).
Conclusion / Recommendations.
IPD in Nigerian Political Parties: The Way Forward:
Political Parties invariably reflect the of the environment in which they operate. Nigerian political
parties therefore cannot automatically become democratic in their internal affairs when the state that
constitutes them remains largely undemocratic and pervasive and consequently mandates a politics
of extremism rather than moderation. As a result the average "Nigerian politician is uniquely
absorbed with the quest for absolute and eternal power. The result is war without end because amidst
the defeats and victories of particular battles the underlying social dynamics remains the same."
Namely,"...the over projection of state power, unilateralism in decision -making, and the use of
public resources for personal advancement"(Nnoli 2008:23) The state is built on a hierarchy of
patron -client, and in which political support is traded for material gains. The general mass of the
people are submissive to those who have power as they also are oppressive of those who are weaker.
"One is either a servant or a master, nothing in between" (Nnoli 2008). Consequently, political
parties unofficially, are so constituted, thus making any statutory provision for internal democracy
a waste of time. Since State capture translates to primitive accumulation of capital, parties have also
21
become instruments of primitive accumulation. This raises the stake on who controls the party
machinery, and like the struggle for state control , it also mandates a politics of expediency where
every method legal and illegal are used to muscle fellow competitors and win victory at all cost. No
form of democratic mechanism can emanate from such a system.
The inability of the political class to imbibe and exhibit democratic attitudes have serious negative
impact on the electoral process and democratic consolidation in several ways. First, there is voter
apathy arising from lack of confidence in the process that produced the candidates for election.
Secondly, the electorates imbibes the culture of votes for money, thereby selling their votes to
whomever pays highest at the pooling units since that may be the only reward that may come from
the system once the election is over and winners are declared. Democracy which largely amounts to
participation is exchanged for cash and other forms of material inducement. Thirdly, Intra -party
crisis generated by absence of IPD complicates the already busy process of election conduct, as
parties quarrel over the composition of party list even on the eve of election. Sometimes INEC is
stopped from fulfilling its duty with court injunctions. Fourthly, Intra Party Factionalization breeds
political violence in the quest for supremacy. Many politicians have been killed in Nigeria as a
result.
What then is the Way forward?
Nigeria obviously is not lacking in legal formulations to guide the activities of political parties, the
problem is in the enforcement of the rules. The electoral management body should be strengthened
with necessary provisions to sanction parties that violate the processes as stipulated in the electoral
act. That means that INEC should be made more proactive and be given powers to cancel a party's
congress that do not follow due process rather the current docile observer status the law provides.
But this will be dependent on the independence of the election body , hence we advocate that the
Chairman of the Commission and other commissioners should be appointed by the Judicial service
Commission with the approval of the Senate to remove the commission from unnecessary
interference of the president who at all times remains a partisan politician who will do everything to
ensure the success of his party at the polls as we witnessed in Nigeria in the 2003 and 2007 elections.
Similar independence should also guarantee the State Electoral Commissions.
The Judiciary should also step up and review the current grant of reckless injunctions and court
rulings that derail the electoral process. The possibility of courts of equal jurisdiction granting
judgments and injunctions on matters that is already instituted in another court of competent
jurisdiction is to say the least reckless and capable of derailing democracy. This may not be
unconnected with the primitive accumulation of capital associated with being in government in
Nigeria. But the Judiciary as the custodian of the law must rise above this arbitrariness to restore
order.
Urgent importance must be placed on political education of the people in so as to create awareness
that enable them check abuse of office by the elected leader. This should translate into development
of a vibrant civil society.
None of these factors can work until the state is reconstituted to reduce poverty, reward hard work,
reduce privileges attached to political offices, promote production rather than consumption and
ensure transparency and accountability in all public institutions.
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