India’s Neighbourhood Policy in the First Year of the Modi
Government
Text of Talk at IISS-U.S., Washington DC, 14 April 2015
Rahul Roy-Chaudhury
Senior Fellow for South Asia
IISS, London
INTRODUCTION
I will be speaking on ‘India’s Neighbourhood Policy in the First
Year of the Modi Government’. Let me begin with two caveats.
First, it has not yet been one full year, but ten-and-a-half
months, since Narendra Modi, the leader of the centre-right
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was sworn in as prime minister
of India on 26 May last year; and,
Second, I will be focusing on what I consider to be the Modi
government’s top three priorities in India’s “immediate” and
“extended” neighbourhood – the Pakistan-Afghanistan
region; China; and the Indian Ocean.
Far more than any other previous government, Modi’s
government is acutely aware of the direct, deep and enduring
linkages between its domestic agenda priorities and its
foreign policy enablers. Modi’s objective is the economic
development and the political transformation of India,
encompassing high economic growth and the boosting of
foreign investment. This essentially requires a stable, secure
and peaceful neighbourhood.
Modi therefore issued an unprecedented invitation to SAARC
(the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation) heads of
government, as well as Mauritius, for his swearing-in ceremony
1
in Delhi on 26 May last year. His first foreign visit was to
Bhutan, followed shortly afterwards by a visit to Nepal,
surprisingly, the first bilateral visit by an Indian prime minister
in nearly two decades! Last month, Modi undertook a five-day
visit to three Indian Ocean island states, Seychelles, Mauritius
and Sri Lanka. Shockingly, the Sri Lanka visit was the first
bilateral visit by an Indian prime minister in 28 years!
Yet, India’s attempts at regional stability will be difficult, with
relationships with its ‘immediate’ neighbours traditionally
dominated by mistrust, disputes and tensions amidst a
precariously
evolving
regional
security
environment.
Nonetheless, Modi’s premiership provides a unique
opportunity for attempts to significantly change India’s
neighbourhood policy and help stabilise the region. And, I
say this for three reasons:
First, this is the first time in 30 years that India has a prime
minister who actually wanted to become prime minister!
This is primarily a Narendra Modi government, not essentially a
BJP one, and therefore it will be Modi’s personality and
character that will define India’s neighbourhood and foreign
policy in the next four and a bit years. This is clear in Modi’s
strong ‘top-down’ style of functioning and leadership.
Second, Modi won a decisive electorate mandate in the lower
house of parliament, the Lok Sabha; this is the first time that
any single party enjoys a majority in this House in 30
years. This not only ensures political stability in the central
government for a full five-year term, but the absence of
dependence on parliamentary allies for political survival,
also make for a stronger and bolder foreign policy for
India.
Third, with his strong nationalist credentials, it will be difficult
for any conservative right-wing organisation or group to attempt
to scuttle any diplomatic compromise Modi may agree to.
2
Now, to the neighbourhood:
I.First, the Pakistan-Afghanistan region is Modi’s top
security challenge.
It is often forgotten that on his premiership Modi inherited,
rather than forged, the current tensions in relations with
Pakistan. This is marked by the absence of any official IndiaPakistan dialogue for the last two years, as a result of the rise
in firing and violence across the Line of Control (LoC) dividing
Kashmir.
Yet, Modi’s meeting with Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif
at his swearing-in ceremony in New Delhi led to the setting up
of a meeting between their Foreign Secretary’s in an attempt to
resume this stalled dialogue. Last month, India’s Foreign
Secretary visited Islamabad on a SAARC journey, marking
India’s first official diplomatic outreach to Pakistan in over
two years. The BJP has also recently entered into a coalition
government in Kashmir whose common minimum programme
seeks normalisation of relations with Pakistan. Modi’s
greetings to Nawaz Sharif on Pakistan's National Day last
month made the point that “all outstanding issues” between the
two could be resolved through bilateral dialogue in an
atmosphere free from terror and violence". And, last week
Modi thanked Sharif for the evacuation of 11 Indian nationals in
Yemen and their return to India.
But, the reality is that India-Pakistan relations are currently
dominated by deep tensions and mutual mistrust. The
official bilateral dialogue has not resumed, trade relations
suffer, and there was a distinct chill between Modi and Sharif at
the SAARC Summit in Kathmandu last November. Indeed, the
Modi government’s position towards Pakistan has
hardened in three significant ways, with mixed impact.
3
First, India last August formally protested against the meeting
between the Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi and the
separatist Kashmiri Hurriyat group leadership, and abruptly
cancelled the scheduled Foreign Secretary talks. Yet, Pakistan
continues to deal with the Hurriyat leadership.
Second, India has deliberately intensified and reacted
forcefully to firing and violence across the LoC and the
international border in response to Pakistan. India’s Defence
Minister has warned Pakistan that it will make the “cost of this
adventurism unaffordable”. Troops and civilians have been
killed on both sides, with both sides blaming each other for
ceasefire violations. Although the firing has recently reduced
the borders have not stabilised, with Pakistan-based militants
continuing to infiltrate into India and carrying out terror
attacks in Kashmir.
Third, the Modi government has rhetorically expressed “zero
tolerance” towards terrorism, and last month India’s Home
Minister publicly criticised Pakistan for supporting terrorism in
India. Yet, India has not been successful in pressurising
Pakistan on critical issues in response to the brutal
Mumbai terror attack in November 2008 carried out by the
Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), with
links to Pakistan’s security establishment. This attack
killed 166 people including six U.S. nationals.
The most visible of these is the attempt to bring to justice the
perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks. This faced a huge
setback last week with the grant of bail from a Pakistani prison
after six years of the alleged mastermind of the attacks, LeT
operations chief Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi.
It is notable that three days before Modi’s swearing-in
ceremony there was a failed terror attack by the LeT on the
Indian consulate in Herat in Afghanistan. This would have had
serious implications for regional security had it succeeded.
4
Notwithstanding the brutal terror attack on a school in Pakistan
last December killing 132 children and 15 others, and
Pakistan’s vow to counter terrorism, this is unlikely to include
anti-India militants such as the LeT or the Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM) as they have so far not taken up arms against the
Pakistan state.
Therefore, in the absence of any effective disruption of
Pakistan-based anti-India militant groups, India’s primary
concern vis-à-vis Pakistan is the possibility of another Mumbaitype terror attack on India.
How will Modi’s government then respond to such a terror
attack? Will it be restrained as the Manmohan Singh
government was after the 2008 Mumbai terror attack or will it
threaten or respond with military force? Would this be in the
form of the Indian military’s ‘pro-active’ response? Could this
then lead to Pakistan’s ‘first use’ of battlefield nuclear
weapons deployed on the ‘front line’ despite the absence of
an existential threat to Pakistan? This has raised
international concern over the prospect of the first use of
nuclear weapons in 70 years.
Will this, in turn, bring about an Indian ‘massive retaliation’ with
nuclear weapons against Pakistan as required by India’s
nuclear doctrine, despite the possibility of a Pakistani use of
nuclear weapons on its own territory?
These dangers are exacerbated by the prospective
misperceptions, misunderstanding and lack of communication
that tend to exist between the two sides at a time of crisis.
Nonetheless, after over a decade, an Indian prime ministerial
visit to Pakistan is scheduled for late next year, when Modi
travels to Pakistan for the next SAARC Summit. This could
provide an opportunity for Modi to attempt a significant change
5
in relations with Pakistan somewhat in the manner of his BJP
prime ministerial predecessor Atal Behari Vajpayee, during the
SAARC summit in Islamabad in January 2004.
But, this will fundamentally require the Pakistan government to
crack down on anti-India militant groups. It will also require, I
believe, India to seek to informally influence the most powerful
institution in Pakistan, the Pakistan army, which it has
pervasively refuses to engage with because of its
prevalent anti-India stance.
This brings us, briefly, to Afghanistan, as a key dimension
and theatre of India-Pakistan tensions.
Both countries have had a history of competing for influence in
Afghanistan, which they accuse the other of but deny
themselves. India has blamed Pakistan’s intelligence agency,
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), for involvement in the two
terror attacks on its embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009, which
the Pakistan government has denied. Meanwhile, the Pakistan
government has alleged India’s involvement through
Afghanistan in the support of militant groups in the tribal areas
bordering Afghanistan and Baluchistan, which India has denied.
Over the past near decade and a half, India had intensified its
relations with the then Karzai government of Afghanistan –
providing $2 billion in aid, training Afghan security forces in
India, and provisionally seeking to provide defence supplies.
But, new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has made it clear his
top priority is an outreach to Pakistan to seek its influence in
bringing the Afghan Taliban to the table for peace talks and
seeking ultimately to end its support of the Afghan Taliban,
thereby providing stability to Afghanistan. This has led to
somewhat strained relations with India, with Ghani expected to
visit India for the first time at the end of the month – after being
in office for seven months - and Afghanistan deliberately
publicising the suspension of its arms request to India.
6
While the Modi government is clearly concerned over these
developments, fearing the re-emergence of dominant Pakistani
influence over Afghanistan to the detriment of India, yet, it
appears quietly confident that peace talks with the Afghan
Taliban will not succeed and the Afghan Taliban will not become
part of a new coalition government in Kabul. Currently,
therefore, the Modi government appears to be playing a
‘waiting game’ in Afghanistan, not seeking to push the Ghani
government in any way, nor attempting to disrupt in any way
the prospect of talks or the reconciliation process.
But, the key concern for the Modi government will be the
possibility of greater Pakistani influence in Afghanistan through
the Afghan Taliban, detrimental to India’s interests, which could
result in increased terrorism in India. If so, what would or could
the Modi government do?
II. Let’s now shift focus to China, Modi’s top foreign policy
challenge.
China is India’s largest and most powerful neighbour, with an
economy four-and-a-half times larger and a defence budget
estimated to be nearly three times bigger. India fought – and
lost – a border conflict with China 50 years ago, and this
remains a highly emotive issue in India today.
China’s assertiveness towards the border dispute and the
expansion of Chinese influence in India’s neighbourhood
are India’s top two concerns vis-à-vis China.
The two most populous countries in the world share a long
disputed land border, called the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
But, they disagree even on its length, which India places as
about 4,000 kms and China half that! The reason is that
whereas China sees the border dispute confined to some 2,000
kms mostly comprising India’s province of Arunachal Pradesh
7
which it claims as part of southern Tibet, India perceives the
dispute to also cover the Aksai Chin area annexed by China in
the 1962 war.
Five border cooperation agreements have been signed since
1993, the most recent in October 2013. 18 rounds of Special
Representative talks have also taken place between the two
since 2003. Although both sides rhetorically maintain
confidence in resolving the boundary dispute and maintaining
peace and tranquility on the border areas, there has been no
tangible progress on the resolution of the dispute. Notably, in
2005 a ‘Guiding Principles and Political Parameters’ agreement
was signed between the two countries. This was to be the first
of a three-step process to be followed by a ‘Framework
Agreement’ and the demarcation of the border on the ground
and its delineation on mutually agreed maps. A decade later,
not only have neither of the two follow-on steps taken place, but
the Chinese also appear to have re-interpreted a key
component of the 2005 agreement on not affecting the
transfer of areas with ‘settled populations’.
In his electoral campaign, Modi talked tough on China,
criticising its “mind-set of expansion”. In an unprecedented
manner, Tibet’s Prime Minister-in-exile found himself in the
official photograph at Modi’s swearing-in ceremony, along
with the SAARC leaders. Perhaps, this took place at the best
of the influential right-wing Hindu organisation, the Rashtriya
Swamyavalk Sangh (RSS), tough on territorial issues vis-à-vis
China in view of the presence of Hindu religious sites in Tibet.
China has also officially protested Modi’s recent visit to the
Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh, which it claims as
Chinese territory.
Although the last fatal casualty on the Sino-Indian border took
place 40 years ago, major border intrusions have taken place
twice in the last two years. On both these occasions, unlike the
past, Chinese troops entrenched themselves for several days in
8
sizeable numbers on the Indian side of the Line of Actual
Control. But, the response from the Indian government was
very different.
The then Congress-led government initially attempted to
dismiss the nature and extent of the Chinese intrusion in the
Depsang Plains in 2013. It was only after several media reports
that its importance was understood and a tough position taken
till the departure of the troops.
In contrast, the Chinese intrusion at Chumar in Ladakh last
September, surprisingly taking place during the visit of
Chinese President Xi Jinping to India, was handled in a
robust manner by the Modi government, with Modi himself
raising it with President Xi. Modi’s first visit to Beijing is
expected to take place next month.
Although the likelihood of a conflict between the two
countries is extremely low, the possibility of local
transgressions or major intrusions exists. In the absence
of effective communication mechanisms and the
prevalence of misperception and miscalculation between
the two, these could escalate to border ‘stand offs’,
thereby raising bilateral tensions.
At the same time, the issues of Tibet and Tibetans will rise in
profile, exacerbated by the dispute over the reincarnation of the
present 14th Dalai Lama nominated by the Chinese government
or the Tibetans themselves, or indeed the end of the tradition of
the Dalai Lama.
Moreover, India remains concerned over the expansion of
China’s trade and defence relations in its “immediate
neighbourhood” including Pakistan, Myanmar, Nepal and the
island states of the Indian Ocean, which it fears as
‘encirclement’ by China.
9
III. This brings me, finally, to Modi’s third neighbourhood
priority, the Indian Ocean, as a major test of India’s
leadership.
Unlike the rhetoric of the past, the Modi government truly
perceives the Indian Ocean as India’s “immediate and
extended neighbourhood”, vital for its security and for which
India must assume a degree of responsibility in shaping its
future. Modi’s four-pronged vision for the region was unveiled
during his visit to Mauritius last month. This focuses on
defending India’s maritime territory and interests; deepening
economic and security cooperation with maritime neighbours
and island states; promoting collective action for peace and
security; and seeking a more integrated and cooperative future
for sustainable development. This policy appears to be driven
by three factors:
First, to counter China’s expanding influence in the Indian
Ocean. This was most vividly seen by the presence of Chinese
submarines off Sri Lanka last year. China has also proposed a
‘maritime silk road’ plan, intended to revive a trade route
running from China through Southeast Asia and the Indian
Ocean to Europe. A key contract for the expansion of Male
international airport in the Maldives was granted to a Chinese
company after the controversial cancellation of its Indian
contract three years ago.
To counter China’s ‘maritime silk road’ plan, the Modi
government has recently launched ‘Project Mausam’, a
transnational initiative to revive India’s ancient maritime routes
and cultural linkages with countries in the region. And, the new
Sri Lankan government has suspended the contract given
to a Chinese company on the Colombo Port City project,
reportedly at India’s behest.
Second, to build and expand India’s security links with
island states to ensure its role as a ‘net security provider’
in the Indian Ocean. Modi’s visit to the Seychelles, Mauritius
10
and Sri Lanka last month demonstrated this. This included the
gifting of a second Dornier maritime aircraft and the launching
of a coastal surveillance radar project in Seychelles, and the
provision of an offshore patrol vessel to Mauritius. Alongside,
India agreed, for the first time, to develop Assumption island
in Mauritius and the Agalega island in the Seychelles, both of
which could be used for surveillance purposes. India also
agreed to the politically significant development of the oil tank
farm near Trincomalee in eastern Sri Lanka.
Third. To maintain maritime dominance over the Indian
Ocean. India is currently bolstering its naval profile with the
acquisition of aircraft carriers and nuclear-armed ballistic
missile submarines. The government recently unveiled an $8
billion naval building plan. The first of six French-designed
diesel-electric Scorpene submarines has just begun sea trials
in an attempt to stabilise the navy’s dwindling submarine
numbers. Plans are being made to accelerate the construction
of India’s second indigenously-built aircraft carrier after the first
one is expected to enter service in four years.
Yet, none of these three objectives can be met without a
clear demonstration of Indian leadership as well as the
build-up of national requisite resources and capacities.
Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean is considerable, and
China has ‘deep pockets’. India has only recently begun to
build security relationships with island states. The Indian navy’s
force levels and reach are still not sufficient for a dominant role
in the Indian Ocean.
Indian leadership requires a demonstration of commitment and
sustenance of a ‘responsible’ role in the safety, security and
stability of the Indian Ocean. A stronger regional grouping for
the Indian Ocean is required, in which India could play a key
role. This also requires extensive and durable cooperation with
friendly regional and extra-regional navies in the Indian Ocean.
But, could India once again take part in a quadrilateral naval
exercise, along with the U.S., Japan and Australia, as it did
11
eight years ago, only to have ended this after facing a stiff
demarche from China? Could the India-origin Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium (IONS) and the 16-nation ‘Milan’ series of
naval exercises also be strengthened?
Significantly, during President Obama’s visit to India three
months ago, both sides unveiled an eleven-paragraph US-India
Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. A
key paragraph affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime
security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight
throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.
This reference to the South China Sea, perceived to refer
indirectly to China, is widely interpreted as an emerging IndiaU.S. consensus on countering an assertive China. While one
should not exaggerate its impact, it does indicate a long
overdue recognition of the complementary nature of India’s new
‘Act East’ policy and the U.S. ‘rebalance’ towards the AsiaPacific. This also provides opportunities for expanding the
Malabar-series of India-U.S. bilateral naval exercises by
regularising the participation of Japan, and elevating the
trilateral dialogue with Japan to a ministerial level.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, a clear single priority for Modi’s government is its
‘immediate’ neighbourhood. Modi has the political stature and
power to attempt to dramatically change India’s neighbourhood
relationships, based on what I call a sense of “ruthless
pragmatism”.
12