The Pathway to Regionalism:
A Historical Sociological Analysis of ASEAN
Economic Community*
Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar
Graduate Student, MSc Politics with Research Methods,
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield
Elmfield, Northumberland Road, Western Bank, Sheffield,
England S10 2TU
[email protected]
**This Paper is prepared for the International Studies Association
(ISA) Asia-Pacific Conference, City Univesity of Hong Kong, 25-27
June 2016. Please do not cite without explicit permission from the
author**
*
The author acknowledges financial support from the Indonesian Endowment Fund for
Education (LPDP). The author is also grateful to Dr Simon Rushton for constructive
comments over this draft.
Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
“The most important revolutionary force at work in the Third World today is
not communism or socialism but capitalism…”
Richard Robison
Introduction
The beginning of 2016 has marked a new phase for the regional integration
project in Southeast Asia: the coming of ‘ASEAN Community’ era. By this
date, all member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has agreed to transform the region into a more complex form of
cooperation under one regional community. The development dates back to
the aftermath 1998-1999 financial crisis, when ten ASEAN member states
have agreed to give more power for its regional organisation. Since the 2 nd
ASEAN Summit in Bali, 2003, ASEAN member states have agreed to
establish ASEAN Community by 2015, which comprises three pillar of
cooperation, including political security, economic, and social cultural. The
ASEAN Summit in 2015 has extended this area of cooperation into a deeper
multi-sectoral basis until 2025.
The development of latest political and economic integration in Southeast
Asia has embraced a debate on the nature of regional integration: what
makes the regionalism project in Southeast Asia possible? Early regionalism
theorists basically argue that it is economic cooperation that enables the
growing ‘resurgence’ of regionalism in world politics (Haas, 1958; see Hurrell,
1995; Hettne, 2005). The economic cooperation is arguably possible due to
growing interdependency in world politics, particularly after the 1970s (Nye,
1970). This argument has been further developed by liberal-institutionalist
approach, who believes on the institutionalisation of cooperation beyond
state boundaries (Aris, 2009). On the other side of this debate was the critical
theory, who contends that the ‘regional turn’ was in fact enabled by the
changing discourse of capitalism in the region, which put the state at the
sidelines of emerging regulatory capitalist regime in the region (see
Jayasuriya, 2009; Jayasuriya and Hameiri, 2011).
This paper aims to offer both theoretical and analytical critique of those
perspectives in order to explain the origin of regionalism in Southeast Asia. In
so doing, it would be important to further understand the origin of capitalism
in Southeast Asia before moving forward to analyse regionalism in Southeast
Asia. Capitalist regional project, however, is not new for the region. Recent
studies has demonstrated that Dutch and British regional project in Southeast
Asia has been established during their mercantilist expansion in Southeast
Asia, and contribute to the formation of ‘modern’ political economy(see
Lawson and Buzan, 2015; Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). However, even
though their rules are formative to the capitalist system at that age, there has
been also the role of local ruler who maintain feudal economy at the region in
the capitalist system (van Klaveren, 1953). Their strong role was evident, for
example, in maintaining culturrstelsel in Dutch Indies or performing local rule
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
through British indirect rule in Malaya (see Frankema and Buelens, 2013; van
Klaveren, 1953; Hamid, 2007). These ‘local’ origins also contributes to the
formation of capitalism in the region. With the decolonisation in 1950s, which
leads to the formation of ‘developmental states’ in the 1960s, these historical
trajectories characterise the unique characteristics of ‘ersatz capitalism,
which put strong state control alongside the capitalist economic development
(Kunio, 1987).
How could we explain the rise of such that phenomenon? The ‘colonial’ origin
of capitalism in Southeast Asia, which takes its root in the mercantilist
political economy during the colonial era and its relations with local ruler the
region, has led this paper to consider the framework of uneven and combined
development –as developed by Trotsky (1930), and elaborated by
Rosenberg (2009, 2010)— to comprehend the origin of economic regionalism
in Southeast Asia. Drawing upon such framework, which is based on a
broader Historical Sociological perspective, this paper argues that the
construction of regionalism is neither driven by economic interdependence in
the global economy nor the emergence of neoliberal form of ‘global
governance’, but constructed historically ‘from within’ the social contestation
in the region. Instead of tracing the origin of regionalism from the existing
global order, as Hurrell (2007) suggest, this paper argues that it is the
transformation of capitalism in the region, which is characterised by an
uneven and combined nature of historical development in the region, that
enables the ASEAN Economic Community. This paper will build that
argument on the longue duree analysis of capitalism in Southeast Asia until
the formation of ASEAN Economic Community.
To do so, this paper will be divided into four parts. The first part will discuss
the theoretical approach to understand the origin of regionalism in Southeast
Asia. More specifically, this research will outline the framework of ‘Uneven
and Combined Development’ (UCD), as developed by Trotsky (1930) and
several proponents of Historical Sociology in International Relations as the
main theoretical approach (see Rosenberg, 2009; 2010; Anievas and
Nisancioglu, 2015). The second part will trace the historical trajectory of
regionalism during the colonial era, which is arguably formative to capitalism
in the region. This part will also trace the uneven and combined historical
development that enables colonial mercantilist project and set birth to
‘Southeast Asia’ as a region.
The third part will elaborate the rise of ‘third world nationalism’ and
‘developmental state’ as post-colonial project in the region, which was slowly
emerged in Southeast Asia after the World War. The moment of
decolonisation was enabled by several factors, including the rise of
nationalism, Japanese expansion, and the post-war crisis that gave
momentum for declaration of independence in some countries. The fourth
part will understand the formation of capital-based regionalism in ASEAN,
which was began by the establishment of ASEAN, and moved forward to its
transformation into a more complex form of regionalism under SEAN
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
Community. This paper argues that the transformation is related to the
changing discourse of capitalism in both domestic and global level. This part
will bring about the framework of uneven and combined development to
capture the recent trajectory of regional integration in Southeast Asia.
Theorising Southeast Asian Regionalism: The Framework of
Uneven and Combined Development
Contending Perspectives on Southeast Asian Regionalism
There have been many attempts to theorise the recent regionalism in
Southeast Asia from a wide range of perspectives, from ‘realism’ to ‘critical
theory’ (see, for example, Narine 2002; Acharya and Stubbs, 2006; Kim,
2011; Quayle, 2013; Plummer, 1997; Gerard, 2014; Ikenberry and
Mastanduno, 2005; Jayasuriya, 2004; 2008; Hameiri and Jayasuriya, 2009;
Jones, 2011). This theoretical development enabled by some developments
in the integration project in the region, which is arguably important in locating
Southeast Asia in the changing context of world politics. Acharya and Stubbs
(2006) argues that the rising theoretisation in Southeast Asian relations
reflects the changing discourse of international politics that turns to ‘nonWestern’ world, particularly after the financial crisis and growing crisis in
world politics.
This bourgeoning literature has built up two competing views about
integration and regionalism in Southeast Asia. The first view sees
regionalism and regional integration in Southeast Asia as merely ‘state-led’
project. This view is shared by realist, constructivist, and to some extent
‘English-School’ approach that posits ‘state’ as the main actor in Southeast
Asian relations. Realists, of course, believes that state is the only actor in
Southeast Asian relations and is quite skeptical with the regional integration
project, having emphasise security and stability as the centre of international
relations of the region (Emmers, 2012). Constructivist, even though more
‘critical’, in terms of placing the importance of ‘structure’ over the agential
status of the state, also believes that the state is remain central in the region
(Haacke, 2003; Easton and Stubbs, 2006; also Acharya, 2003). This
standpoint has also been acknowledged by the ‘English School’, who
believes on the hierarchical nature of regional politics rather than ‘anarchy’
(see Narine, 2006; Quayle, 2013).
The second view, on the contrary, argues that regionalism and regional
integration in Southeast Asia are also involving some non-state actors.
Liberal-institutionalist and Critical Theory develops this anti-statist theoretical
approach, albeit with different theoretical standpoint. On the one hand liberalinstitutionalist argues that Southeast Asian regionalism has been marked by
the growing interdependence in the world politics, that enables the non-state
actor to be involved at the regional processes (see Nye and Keohane, 1971;
Hurrell, 1995). More specifically, in Southeast Asia, liberal-institutionalist
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
approach believes that the financial crisis in 1997-1998 has led the
Southeast Asian countries to acknowledge the ‘region’ as the most important
factor in delivering state policies, particularly in trade and development (Kim,
2011; Hettne, 2005).
On the other hand, critical theorist --particularly those linked with ‘Murdoch
School’ of Asian studies-- argues that it is the liberal governmentality project,
rather than interdependence in world politics, that gives birth to Southeast
Asian regional integration. This approach sees regionalism as merely an
extension of state regulatory model to the ‘region’ in order to enlarge market
base for growing capitalist class in the region (Hameiri and Jayasuriya, 2011).
Nevertheless, this regulatory project has also enabled the rising advocacy of
civil society and social movement in the region, which is organised under
some banners such as ASEAN People’s Forum or ASEAN People’s
Assembly (see Chandra, 2009; Gerard, 2014).
This competing perspectives, to some extent, reflects the ‘state debate’ in
International Relations theory, which has emerged since early theoretical
debate in the discipline (see Hobson, 2000). According to Hobson (2000),
the state debate in International Relations theory has been marked by
several ‘agential state power’, such as domestic, international, ‘statist’, and
‘internationalist’ (see Hobson, 2000).The ‘state debate’ in Southeast Asian
regionalism theory has reflected the degree to which state has agential
power, which is ‘high’ (represented by realist), ‘moderate’ (represented by
constructivist and ‘English School’) and low (represented by liberalinstitutionalist and critical theory). However, as Hobson suggested, this ‘state
debate’ has also neglected the social source of ‘state power’, which is
constructed historically within the state boundaries (see Hobson, 2000: 226).
This lacuna in regionalism theories, particularly those emerged to explain
Southeat Asian regionalism. has made International Relations theory unable
to catch-up broader trends in international politics before the state was
institutionally established in IR (for example, before the 19th century) and thus
failed to understand the dynamics of states in post-colonial societies
(Hobson, 2000; see also Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). To resolve such
this problem, this paper attempts to re-conceptualise Southeast Asian
regionalism through the framework of ‘uneven and combined development’.
Double Reading Trotsky: The Framework of Uneven and Combined
Development
It is therefore important to move beyond the ‘state debate’ to understand
regionalism and regional integration in Southeast Asia. This paper aims to
offer the framework of ‘Uneven and Combined Development’ to investigate
the social origin of regionalism in Southeat Asia. This framework was
originally proposed by Leon Trotsky in his lengthy book, The History of
Russian Revolution (1930) and recently elaborated by several International
Relations theorist, most notably Justin Rosenberg (2009, 2010) and
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu (2015). Trotsky originally
proposed the uneven and combined development as a law that govern the
historical development of human society. Taking the case of Russian
revolution, Trotsky argues that the revolution has in fact contained
pecularities because its origin lies not in the domestic level, but in the
intersection between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ level (Trotsky, 1930).
Trotsky argues that Russian revolution has been enabled by ‘the privilege of
backwardness’ of Russian society, which aims to loop forward to catch-up
the industrial development in Western European states (that is, England and
Germany). This ‘historical backwardness’, according to Trotsky, marks the
uneven characteristic of international society during that period. However,
this historical backwardness has also created a privilege for Russian society
to catch the industrialisation through inter-societal relations, for example
trade and modernisation, which was started during the the Tsarism of Peter
(1870). The Western Europe, suggest Trostky, serves as ‘the whip of
external necessity that enable the progress of historical development and
marks another feature of historical development, namely ‘the combined’
characteristic of historical development. Trotsky then argues that the Russian
revolution was enabled by this uneven and combined characteristic, which
enabled the crisis in Russia’s bourgeois society in the 1910s and led to the
Bolshevik revolution in 1917 (Trotsky, 1930; cf. Anievas and Nisancioglu,
2015).This ‘uneven and combined development was later proposed as law
that govern human society and made possible the idea of ‘permanent
revolution’, since it is not possible for only having a revolution in only one
country (Trotsky, 1930; see also Lowy, 1981).
Trotsky’s framework of uneven and combined development has been
criticised, primarily because of two reasons. First, in its original form, it
contains a very clear Eurocentric tendency (see also Hobson, 2011;
Bhambra, 2011; Shilliam, 2009). By putting the framework of uneven and
combined development as a ‘law’, he tends to generalise all historical
development into a single model of ‘progress’, that he believes should follow
to capitalist development in Western Europe and then socialist revolution in
Russia (Trotsky, 1930). By doing so, Trotsky has failed to understand the
historical development in non-European world, which at that time has
undergone the process of colonialism (Hobson, 2011). Second, with this
Trotsky’s framework of uneven and combined development has also
entrapped to the danger of stagism, which is also central in the capitalist idea
of ‘stage of development’ (Bhambra, 2011; see also Rostow, 1959). It
therefore reproduces not only a Eurocentric narrative of historical
development, but will also mislead social theorist to a very ‘statist’
perspective of social science.
This ‘eurocentric’ trap has, however, been also a problem for Marxist theories
(see Said, 1978; Mollaer, 2015). In order to getting rid of this spectre,
Rosenberg (2009, 2010), Anievas and Nisancioglu (2015), Anievas (2014),
Matin (2013), and Allinson (2016) re-elaborated this ‘law’ into a theoretical
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
framework to understand not only Russian revolution, but also the entire
characteristic of ‘the international’. Drawing upon Trotsky’s concept of
uneven and combined development, Rosenberg (2006) argues that the
framework of ‘uneven’ and ‘combined’ development should not only
understood in terms of Russian revolution, but also the characteristics of ‘the
international’ itself. Rosenberg proposes a view that the ‘uneven’ character of
the international marked the multiple form of societies, which is originally
drawn from their interactions with the nature (Rosenberg, 2006; see also
Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015).
Therefore, rather than arguing that all societies need to undergo a ‘stage of
development’ in order to loop into capitalist society, one should understand
the very social nature of society based on their mode of production. The idea
of ‘multiplicity of society’ has, however, characterised with the combined
character of historical development, which is enabled by the inter-societal
relations in the international world (Rosenberg, 2006). It leads to the
possibility to acknowledge ‘pre-modern’/’pre-Westphalian globalisation, which
is in fact occurs with some inter-civilisational dialogues between ‘the West’
and other part of the world (see Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015; Hobson,
2004; Hobson, 2011; Nisancioglu, 2014).
It is within this framework Anievas and Nisancioglu (2015) proposes the
geopolitical approach to understand the origin of capitalism. According to
Anievas and Nisancioglu, capitalism was not reproduced automatically in
Europe, through the so-called ‘industrial revolution’, but was also enabled by
the slave market in the Atlantic, labor market and mercantilist economic
project in Southeast Asia, and the counterhegemonic strategy to prevent
Ottoman’s invasion in Eastern Europe (Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015).
Moreover, Anievas and Nisancioglu argues that it was the inter-societal
interactions (some with peaceful way through trade, some with violent ways
with slavery and invasion) that enables the birth of capitalism as a hegemonic
social forces in the 19th century. In the similar vein, Lawson and Buzan (2015)
also argues that the modernisation project in the 20th century, that is arguably
central in the birth of ‘modern’ International Relations, was enabled by the
uneven and combined historical development in the 19th century (Lawson
and Buzan, 2015).
This re-conceptualisation of ‘Uneven and Combined Development’ has thus
given some promises for non-Eurocentric account of Historical Materialist
approach to world politics (see Mollaer, 2015; Tansel, 2015). To understand
the historical development of a particular society, according to this framework,
one needs to acknowledge the multiplicity of society and the intercivilisational/inter-societal interactions that reproduce the mode of production
in a society. Methodologically, it would also involve the longue-duree
historical analysis to understand the continuity of change in world politics
since colonial era (see Nisancioglu, 2012). It furthermore requires
International Relations to free itself from the ‘prison of political science’ and
acknowledges a more interdisciplinary approach to International Relations.
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
The uses of uneven and combined development as a theoretical framework
thus reject the English School assumption that ‘International Society’ was
originally constructed from the European states and subsequently expanded
to the ‘rest’ of the world (see, for example, Bull and Watson, 1984). This
paper also in a different position with the theory of ‘norm localisation’, as
demonstrated by Acharya (2004) in understanding Southeast Asian
regionalism. Acharya, following constructivist theories, argues that the idea of
‘regionalism’ has had its origin in ‘external’ form of knowledge that was
localised through the interaction between states in the region (see Acharya,
2004). This assumption has, as critically demonstrated by Hobson (2012),
contained a degree of Eurocentric conception of world/regional politics, and
therefore neglects the ‘non-Western’ subjectivity in theorising the
world/regional politics.
Beyond State Debate: Southeast Asian Regionalism in a Longue Duree
Historical Perspective
This theoretical approach has therefore led us to move beyond ‘state debate’
in theorising Southeast Asian regionalism. As discussed above, contending
perspectives on Southeast Asian regionalism has been entrapped by a statecentric approach (although with various degree of ‘state agential status’) and
therefore neglects the historicity of the state and the region itself. Rather, this
paper argues that both state and non-state actors’ agential status should be
historically and sociologically traced since the pre-colonial era. Therefore, it is
important for us to re-assess the origin of Southeast Asia as a region, which
was built since the pre-colonial era and, through the law of uneven and
combined development, continue until the colonial era.
This paper will conceptualise regionalism in terms of what Rosenberg (2010)
termed as ‘multiplicity of society’ and ‘inter-societal interaction’. Firstly,
regionalism needs to be theoretically understood as the formation of ‘order’
within a particular geopolitical spectrum. The geographical and geopolitical
proximity constitutes the most important aspect of regionalism. However, it is
the multiple societies within the geographical spectrum, who interacts each
other, that gives birth to the regionalism. The formation of regionalism,
therefore requires the ‘inter-societal interactions’, which then forms the notion
‘regional’ as the interaction goes beyond the political boundaries.
Therefore, our conceptual understanding of regionalism should be brought
beyond the present-day conception of ‘state’. Regarding that, this paper
proposes an argument that regionalism was built through a series of
historical events in a long-term basis, built upon the interaction of many forms
of societies throughtout the time. The idea of ‘Southeast Asia’ as a region
has, as several Historians argues (see, for example, Reid, 1988, 1990; 1993,
Laffan, 2003), been constructed since the age of Kingdoms. Preserved by
‘Mandala System of Anarchy’, Southeast Asia was historically evolved until
the coming of Colonial Forces, who introduced mercantilist political economy
and later the concept of ‘modern state’. The idea of Regionalism was then
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
evolved until the State-System was fixated after the decolonisation processes.
However, the decolonisation process did not necessarily followed by the
establishment of ‘regionalism’. It was amidst the Cold War that the idea of
regionalism was established in the form of ‘regional organisation’.
Therefore, neither ‘state-centric’ or ‘anti-statist’ approach will be taken in this
paper to conceptualise ‘regionalism. Through the concept of uneven and
combined development, this paper will understand region as a historicallyevolved concept. The establishment of ASEAN, from this viewpoint, is only a
‘phase’ in the historical development of regionalism in Southeast Asia.
Therefore, this paper will go beyond ‘state debate’ by tracing the origin of
Southeast Asia region historically to the pre-colonial period. The ‘multiplicity
of society’ will be important to assess the construction of ‘region’ in Southeast
Asia. In contrast to ‘state-centric’ approach in Southeast Asian regionalism
debate, this paper argues that ‘regionalism’ should be traced historically to
the formation of ‘pre-colonial society’ in Southeast Asia, that is not limited
only to the form of ‘state’ and is not exclusive on the form of ‘regional
organisation’. Rather it was involved, for example, Kingdoms in the region
(Melacca, Majapahit, Srivijaya, Demak) as well as its encounter with ‘external
forces’ such as Islamic Caliphate, Muslim Merchants, or Chinese Qing
dynasty.
Given this theoretical framework, this paper will move forward to identify the
construction of economic regionalism in Southeast Asia. Through the
passage of colonialism, this paper will show how the multiplicity of society in
Southeast Asia embace the ‘age of commerce’ and ‘age of mercantilism’ as a
continual form of colonial ‘economic regionalism’. The transformation will be
critically discussed in the following section. Furthermore, the fixation of
‘colonial state’ in the 19th century gave birth to the ‘state-system’ and paved
way to the foundation of ‘state-centric regionalism’ after decolonisation
processes. It then preserved during the Cold War until the wake of Asian
crisis in the region. Through the concept of uneven and combined
development, this paper will put these series of events as a continuum of
historical development of Southeast Asian regionalism.
The Uneven and Combined Origin of Southeast Asian
Regionalism: A Longue Duree Trajectory
Mandala System and the Pre-Colonial Regional Order in Southeast Asia
Pre-colonial Southeast Asia has been marked by two important features: (1)
the tributary system under the so-called ‘Mandala system of anarchy’ and (2)
the ‘age of commerce’ that was enabled by the coming of traders from India,
Middle East, and subsequently followed by European explorers (see
Manggala, 2013; Shu, 2012; Reid, 1988; 1993). The ‘Mandala System of
Anarchy’ marks the uneven characteristic of pre-colonial Southeat Asia, while
the ‘age of commerce’ marks the combined characteristic of the region.
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
According to Shu (2012, 2013), pre-colonial Southeast Asia has been
marked by the ‘Mandala System of Anarchy’, which arguably put the region
as an unstable system with no single hegemonic rule. Rather, there were
competing hegemonic international order at that time. Under the Mandala
System, several Empires and Kingdoms have competed to establish political
presence through various strategies, but was (Shu, 2012; see also Manggala,
2013; Kang, 2010). Even though there are several ‘strong’ Empires who aim
to establish hegemonic rule through tributary, trade, and maritime power, no
powerful force was able to unite the region into a stable, hegemonic rule. For
example, Chinese Sung Dynasty and Mongol’s Kubilai Khan was attempted
to expand their power to Southeast Asia by invading Vietnam and
Kampuchea and goes south to Malay and Indonesian archipelago. However,
even though they gained some successes in the Indochina region, their
imperial expansion was constrained by the emerging Javanese Majapahit
Empire, who also built a strong maritime rule over the archipelago (Kang,
2013), It leads to the ‘anarchy within hierarchy’ in the pre-colonial Southeast
Asian society, which forms a hierarchical international system but without
hegemonic stability within the system (Shu, 2012, 2013).
Mandala System has its root in the anciet Indian conception of ‘statehood’. It
was then adopted by the emerging Majapahit empire to set relations with
other political forces in the region, most importantly the Qing Dynasty,
Mongol, and Ayutthaya (Manggala, 2013). However, it was not the ‘anarchic’
character of Mandala System, as argued by Shu (2012, 2013), that made
Southeadt Asia as emerging site of contentions within social forces in Asia.
By practicing Mandala System, no strong political forces that was able to set
an ‘united’ empire in the region. Even though, to some extent, Majapahit has
been successful to maintain hegemonic maritime forces in the region (Lapian,
1996), its existence has also been depended upon the tributary system in the
region. Therefore, this paper argues that ‘Mandala System’ was best
explained in terms of political order, which sees the unstable region in the
tributary political environment.
The ‘Mandala System’ precisely represents an ‘uneven’ character of
Southeast Asian historical development. This ‘uneven’ character was
preserved until the 14th century, which was marked by the coming of traders
and explorers from Middle East, India, and Europe. The growing interaction
in 13th-15th century, as suggested by Reid (1988; 1993) enables the intersocietal interactions in the region and subsequently leads to a slow wave of
colonialism in the following centuries (see Reid, 1988; 1993; see also
Manggala, 2013). Most importantly, the ‘new’ forces introduces some
technological and social innovation that slowly weaken feudal tributary
system in the region. For example, Muslim traders has brought a new
religious order of trade and cooperation, which attracts people in the coastal
society of Malay and Indonesian archipelago. The colonial forces also
introduce some technological innovation in Europe, and put it in the
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
international market in exchange with herbs and spices (Willis, 1994; Reid,
1988, 1993).
This era constitute, according to Anthony Reid, ‘the age of commerce’. This
era was impactful to the regional political order. During this age, the strong
Majapahit rule was subsequently replaced by the Muslim Demak Kingdom,
who inherits Majapahit’s maritime forces, and the Sultanate in Melacca was
overthrown by Portuguese navy, who set to build a new colony in Southeast
Asia after ‘the age of discovery’ (see Toer, 1995). Chinese rule, although still
maintained in Vietnam and Campuchea, was slowly weakened after the
domestic turbulences (Kang, 2013).
The globalised features indicates the ‘combined’ characteristic of pre-colonial
Southeast Asia. This feature, however, is central to the formation of colonial
order in the region. Through the uneven and combined character of
Southeast Asian historical development, five main colonial forces was able to
set institutional rule in the region: Portuguese, Spanish, British, Dutch, and
French. In 17th century, the Dutch was able to get rid of Spanish and
Portuguese rule in Eastern Indonesia, therefore set a hegemonic rule over
the Indonesian archipelago and ended the Portuguese-Spanish expansionist
strategy (Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). The Portuguese rule was
remained limited in Eastern Timor, and Spanish was flee to the Mindanao
and Luzon archipelago to establish the present-day Phillippines.
From ‘the Age of Commerce’ to ‘the Age of Mercantilism’
Mercantilism has been central to the early colonial rule. During early colonial
rule, there are two competing discourses of colonialism in Southeast Asia:
First, the ‘statist’ redisitributive approach, held by Portuguese (and to some
extent Spanish) that relies upon taxation and tribute from colonies. Second,
the ‘liberal’ mercantilist approach that relies upon trade and joint-stock
companies, although also accompanied by strong military force. This
approach was taken by Dutch, and later followed by the British. The late 17 th
century showed that the Dutch and British mercantilist projects have been
established in Batavia (Dutch) and Singapore (British), while the Portuguese
and Spanish has been driven out from the region (except in some small parts
of East Timor and the Phillippines). It was arguably marks the early success
of British and Dutch colonial rule in the region (see Anievas and Nisancioglu,
2015: 231-232).
British and Dutch mercantilism, in this era, was characterised by the
involvement of big business enterprise, protected by military forces, to
expand economic and political rule in the colony. The early 17th century
witnessed the establishment of Dutch Vereniigde Oost-Indische Compagnie
(VOC) and British East Indian Company (EIC), two joint-stock companies
which set forth the mercantilist economic hegemony in the region. Both VOC
and EIC played central rule in maintaining mercantilism in the region.
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
The mercantilist project, however, did not only act as the ‘economic’ or
‘business’ tool for the colonial force, but also pivotal in re-establishing
economic order in the region. As this paper will demonstrate, VOC and EIC
institutional rule was originally based upon the nexus of political expansion
and economic/businesss colonial necessity. Established in the early 17th
century, VOC was granted monopoly by Dutch Kingdom to operate business
in the East Indies, therefore acts as a pivot for Dutch capitalists hub in the
region (Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015; see also Abdullah, 1994; Irwin, 1991).
VOC was actually a ‘joint-stock’ company –originally operated to trade in
Southeast Asia company and ship the goods to Europe— with a strong state
support in operating their business venture. The British East India Company
(EIC) also operates in the similar vein. It was granted monopoly to trade in
East, South, and Southeast Asia by Queen Elizabeth I and subsequently acts
an ‘agent’ of British imperialism in the region, acting behalf of British Empire
(see Irwin, 1991; Tarling, 1999).
However, it was then evident that VOC and EIC did not necessarily operate
merely as ‘business’ company. Rather, given the uneven condition in
Southeast Asia, it was also accompanied by political forces in order to secure
their position in the region and, furthermore, to make possible the early
capitalist accumulation (see Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015; Abdullah, 1994;
Sidel, 2015). It is in this case these companies did the ‘primitive’
accumulation process. Another strategy used by the Dutch and British to
establish their colonial order was a form of ‘indirect rule’ by making some
negotiations with local rulers and therefore give way to the practice of
mercantilism in the region. (Kian, 2008).
The other picture of ‘mercantilist capitalist’ project was the Marxist conception
of ‘primitive accumulation’ in Southeast Asia. This paper argues that it was
during the age of mercantilism that the primitive accumulation process takes
place for the first time in Southeast Asia. In Dutch East Indies, it began with
the establishment of Batavia, the Capital of Dutch colony, by GovernorGeneral Jan Pieterszoon-Coen after razed the Sunda Kelapa –a city ruled by
Prince Jayakarta—to the ground and rebuild a new colonial city (van Goor,
2004). However, during the early 17th and 18th century, the main arena for
‘primitive accumulation’ was not Java, but the Ambon, Ternate, and several
other part of ‘Eastern Indonesia’. It was due to the massive spice extraction
that the ‘colonial force’ expands its power –first by the Portuguese and later
by Dutch. It also involves some popular resistance of people in Ambon and
Ternate, who fought against orang kaya in Molucca and subsequently
oppressed by the Dutch through a violent military acts (Anievas and
Nisancioglu, 2015). It then, as suggested by Sidel (2015), constitute the socalled ‘capitalist accumulation’ in the Dutch Indies.
Meanwhile, the different process of capitalist accumulation takes place in
Malaysia and the Singapore. While British has put only a little interest in
‘territorial’ aspect of its colonial rule in the 17th and 18th century, their
activities were primarily based on trade. There had been a similar route of
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
British capitalism, which also used joint-stock company (EIC) as a
representative body of colonial force in the region. Unlike the Dutch, the
British rule was originally settled from India, where the EIC was based, and
indirectly rule several parts through business office. British presence has not
been territorially-motivated until the 19th century, when the EIC’s business
power has weakened and the ‘statist’ capitalist economy was embraced. It
therefore, as would discussed in the latter part of this paper, enabled the
‘governmentalisation’ of British colonialialism in the region (Lewis, 2009;
Bassett, 1999; Shani, 2006).
The above explanation of British and Dutch early colonial rule in the 17th and
18th century has characterised mercantilism as the main discourse in
Southeast Asian relations. It was characterised by an international economic
strategy with the formation of economic institution to stabilise such strategy
(see Jayasuriya, 2003). At that age, the international relations was
institutionalised through diplomatic treaties and the introduction of
‘transnational business companies’ which were backed by their states (VOC
and EIC). It also constitute the coalitions between ‘domestic political forces’
and ‘transnational companies, either to discipline local resistance or to rule
the trade (see Lewis, 2009; Bassett, 1999; Jayasuriya, 2003). This
mercantilist project also characterises the multiplicity of society in the region,
which also characterised the uneven and combined feature of colonial
development in the region.
Through such mercantilist project, the colonial forces was able to challenge
the more traditional Kingdoms in Indonesia, such as Mataram (which was
established to continue the old ‘Demak’ Kingdom after Senopati move the
capital to Central Javanese highland), Banjar, or Maluku. It then paved the
way to the formation of centralised authority under the new ‘Colonial State’
after the VOC and the EIC was dissolved in the 18th and 19th century.
The Birth of Colonial State: Southeast Asia in the 19th Century
However, the late 18th century also witnessed a crisis in regional economy.
The late 18th century witnessed the slow economic growth in the Dutch,
following the Anglo-Dutch War that takes much resources out from both the
Dutch and British. The economic crisis following the war was also reinforced
by the corruption and infeffective trade in the VOC. It was then resulting to
the increase of Dutch state debt and brought the VOC to its end (see Adams,
1996; de Vries, 1997). The British, however, survived for more than 50 years
until the EIC was dissolved due to internal problems (Adams, 1996).
The dissolution of VOC and EIC brought a new era for Dutch and British
colonialism. With the dissolution of both companies, the state then took
control of the colonial economy. In the Dutch Indies, the Dutch State sent
appointed a Governor General, with direct hierarchical coordination with
Amsterdam, to rule Batavia. It was started with Johannes Siberg in 1801 and
subsequently followed by other Governor-Generals. Since Siberg, Dutch
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
colonial government takeover VOC’s power to rule East Indies. On the other
hand, the British also set up a more ‘statist’ colonial government in Malaysia
and the Singapore after the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, which was signed in 1824 to
divide British and English territories, therefore ended the Fourth Anglo-Dutch
War. Before that, the Spanish has already established a captaincy in the
Phillippines since the early colonial age.
This paper argues that there are four main features of ‘colonial state’ in the
region. The first feature was the abolition of traditional rule over their
sovereign territories, which was conducted either through direct or indirect
rule. It leads to the Second and Third feature, namely the establishment of
fixed territorial boundaries of colonial state, which was legitimised by treaties
with local ruler or other colonial forces, and the formation of a centralised
governmental and bureaucratic bodies to rule the state. The fourth feature
was the integration of the ‘colonised’ society into a colonial rule through
economic and social governmental techniques, which was in the making led
into a modernisation process in the colonial society.
The abolition of traditional rule was the first task of colonial rule to vanquish
the ‘domestic’ threat. Soon after the Anglo-Dutch Treaty in 1824, which
releases British rule over Indonesia to the Dutch, several uprisings emerged
in Java and other Islands (such as South Kalimantan and Minang). The
establishment of Dutch colonial governmental bodies, which was originated
since the Governorship of Siberg and Daendels in early 19 th century,
responded to this challenge by military acts. While the local uprisings was
oppressed (the final revolt was the War in Aceh), the Dutch was
subsequently able to politically administer rule in the present day Indonesia
(see Carey, 2008)..
The abolition of traditional rule then paved way to the emergence of more
complex of governance in Southeast Asia. It included at least two important
variables: the establishment of ‘fixed’ territorial boundaries and the formation
of colonial governmental bodies. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty (also known as
Treaty of London) had fixated the territorial basis for both the British and the
Dutch in Southeast Asia. Domestically, the Dutch has also been able to
challenge the ‘traditional’ rule in the East Indies with several military
expansion and war after subsequently finalise its territorial rule after their
winning in Aceh in 1912 (see Ricklefs, 1991). The British, on the contrary,
maintained local Sultanate as a political and legal entity under their territories,
resulted in ‘indirect rule’ over their territories in the Malay Peninsula and the
Singapore (Hamid, 2007). At the northern part of the region, the French
consolidated their power by slowly defeating the local rulers –Annam Tomkin,
Cochinchina, Cambodia, and subsequently Laos— and established a French
protectorate in the Indochina (Brocheux and Hemery, 2009; Goscha, 2009).
Spanish has, since 17th century, established its territorial rule over the Islands
of Luzon and Mindanao, which subsequently formed the Phillippines.
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
It was then followed by the establishment of governmental bureaucratic
entities within those colonial territories. There are two model of colonial
governmental rule during this age. First, the ‘direct rule’ that involves the
formation of ‘new’ legal, administrative, and political organisation to rule the
colony. Second, the ‘indirect rule’ that maintained the legal rule of existing
local Kingdom, while economically (and politically) extend the colonial
authority through taxes or reports (see Iyer, 2010). Both direct and indirect
rule leads to the integration of society to a new state structure. It thus led to
what Foucault termed as ‘governmentalisation of state’ (see Foucault, 1991;
see also Lemke, 2007). Through the establishment of colonial law and
political rule, the Dutch government was able to expand its rule to society.). It
was resulted in the massive capitalist accumulation, which then paved way to
the exploitation of agriculture sector in Indonesia and brought huge amount
of income to the Dutch (Maddison, 1989; see also Sidel, 2015).
This longue-duree reading of Southeast Asian political history has then
embraced three important understandings of political development in the
region, which characterises the ‘uneven’ and ‘combined’ origin of modern
Southeast Asia. First, the ‘nation-state’ in the region has neither took origin
from only pre-colonial and colonial state, but in fact a continuation between
the two processes. Second, Southeast Asia, as a region, has a ‘globalised’ –
or ‘combined’— origin since the very beginning. Third, given the ‘globalised’
nature of region, it is also evident that there has been multiple societies in
Southeast Asia, which drives their interest through various mode of
interactions.
The “Privileges of Colonial
Modernity and Regional Order
Backwardness”:
Colonial
Prelude to Decolonisation: Modernisation and Colonialism in the 20th Century
The previous part of this paper has argued that the regionalism in Southeast
Asia had its origin in the colonialism processes. The concept of ‘state’ was
relatively unknown before the colonial forces introduced a modern ‘statesystem’ through the fixation of territorial boundaries and the establishment of
governmental bureaucratic structures. Furthermore, The pre-colonial and
colonial era has marked the multiplicity of society and the high degree of
inter-societal interaction in the region. It was through this mulitiplicity of
societies in the region that the capitalism emerged in Southeast Asia, firstly
as a ‘mercantilist project’ and subsequently, after the dissolution of VOC and
EIC, as a state-led project to sustain the free trade. These characteristics
gives the foundation to the formation of post-colonial state after the World
War II.
The World War II marked the end of colonialism in the region and was
followed by a wave of decolonisation. Nevertheless, decolonisation in
Southeast Asia did not take place at once. It also underwent a long process
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
and has particular historical roots. The roots and process can be traced back
to the modernisation process and the rise of nationalist movement in the 20th
century.
As discussed in the previous part,. the formation of ‘colonial state’ therefore
marked a new phase of colonial history. It is within this age were the ‘proto’
state-system introduced in Southeast Asia. With fixed territorial boundaries
and organised governmental bodies, the colonial states were transformed as
an actor in Southeast Asian relations after the 19th century. At the beginning
of 20th century, the four colonial forces (Spanish, French, British, and Dutch)
had been able to fully took control of Southeast Asia, with the exception of
Thailand, who remained sovereign and became the ‘border’ between British
and French colonies over Southeast Asia. It then paved way to the
constitution of ‘state-centric’ regionalism after the decoloniation took effect in
the 20th century.
The modernisation process in colonial state, however, has been started since
early 19th century. The modernisation process has embraced three vital
characteristics, namely (1) the emergence of local middle class, who gained
benefit from their inclusion into new colonial system of education, which in
turn sowed the seed for nationalist movement; (2) industrialisation and the
massive recruitment of workers, which led into the formation of ‘dual
economic structure (with both agrarian and industrialising society developed
in their own path); and (3) the racialised social structure, which was enabled
by colonial approach to re-categorise society as a part of their development
project.
In Dutch East Indies, the modernisation process began after the
Diponegoro/Java War, with the formation of colonial bureaucratic
organisations and the implementation of ‘cultivation system’ in Java. It also
marked the primitive accumulation of capital, which then paved way to
‘plantation era’ (see Lawson and Buzan, 2015; Knight, 1992). The similar
pattern also occurs in the colonial Malaya, firstly emerged through plantation
industry. Those processes were then followed by the modernisation of
colonial education system, which gives opportunity to pribumi/bumiputera
(native people in Southeast Asia) to access education. The purpose of
modernisation in education system were, at that time, simply to fulfill the
needs of human resource in plantation industry, and more broadly colonial
governmental system. The expansion of colonial bureaucratic offices
required, to some extent, local officer to maintain administrative daily
actitivities. It was within this purpose the educational system was reformed,
primary in Indonesia and Malaysia.
However, the modernisation processes also brought about the new economic
configuration in the colonial states. The reconfiguration of colonial economy
was visible in Indonesia, with the emergence of ‘dual economy’ as the
industrialisation process began in the late 19th century. The plantation
industry was since then developed into manufacturing industry, which in
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
process also created the working-class and the middle-class merchants.
However, as economist JH Boeke noted, the agrarian economy was also
developed in rural villages, thus constitutes ‘dual economy’ in Java (see also
White, 1976). It then led to the formation of workers in big cities in Java (most
notably Semarang, Surakarta, Surabaya and Batavia) and also the middle
class in other cities (such as Yogyakarta, Banjarmasin, or Makassar. The
processes also took place in Spanish Philippines, with the formation of
emerging middle class and professional workers in big cities such as Manila.
Another important result of the state colonialism in the early 20 th century was
the origin of ‘racialised’ social structure in the region. As noted by
Hirschmann (1987) and Shamsul (2001), the colonial political structure has
embraced a racialized political structure in the modern Malaysia, which was
enabled by the migration of people and the categorisation of people into
racial/ethnic categories in colonial census (Hirschmann, 1987). It was within
this era that the Tamil-Malayan society emerged as a political subject in the
country, having been employed by British government as a part of their
colonial project (see Baxstrom, 2000). The same pattern also occurred in
colonial Indonesia, which placed race as a basis for the categorisation of
society in colonial administrative structure. It then led into a racialized social
and political structure in the 20th century.
The formation of modern economy in the colonial states, as well as the
formation of executive and bureaucratic colonial bodies and the ‘racialisation
of society’ thus paved way to the rise of political movement of pribumi people
in Indonesia. The newly-educated people in Southeast Asia, who studied in
big colonial cities or in the Europe, started to embrace the idea of nationalism
through various ideological source. Among of them was Soekarno and Hatta
(Indonesia), Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), or Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore). Most of
them were originally influenced by socialism, which has been the dominant
anti-imperialist ideology in the Europe in the early 20th century (Anderson,
1998).
The Rise of Nationalism
The most important achievement of 20th century for the decolonisation was,
indeed, the rise of nationalism. Nationalist ideology sowed the seed for
decolonisation in the region. However, the nationalists’ articulations varied in
each countries. In Dutch East Indies, the nationalists in major cities
(Surabaya, Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Batavia) were responded with both
security (through the creation of intelligence secret services) and
accommodative (through the inclusion of nationalist leader in Volksraad)
approach (see Akbar, 2013; Elson, 2008). In Vietnam, the communists
emerged as the main domestic opposition to resist the French Union. Jose
Rizal firstly lead the nationalist movement in the Phillippines, but was turned
down as the United States come in 1898. Meanwhile, in Singapore and
Malaysia, the nationalists used a relatively cooperative approach with British
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
colonialism, led into a slow arrival of decolonisation in these countries (see
Hamid, 2007).
The different strategies and features of resistance in each Southeast Asian
colonial states brought different results in the decolonisation processes. In
Indonesia, and Vietnam, the strong and ‘long’ nature of resistance leads into
the quick declaration of independence soon after the Japanese was repelled
from the country. Burmese resistance was then followed by its independence
by British in 1947. Meanwhile, the accommodative nature of nationalists in
Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei made the decolonisation processes took
place in the late 1950s and 1960s. The Phillippines obtained their
independence from the United States soon after they won the World War II in
1945.
It is clear that, from these facts, that the modernisation processes and the
emergence of ‘nationalist movement’ was also characterised by ‘uneven’ and
‘combined’ nature of historical development in the region. The formation of
solid ‘colonial state’ in the 19th century has given some boundaries for the
birth of nationalism, which since then identified themselves with the people
within the colonial territorial boundaries. The formation of ‘Indonesia’ is an
interesting case, where the nationalists began to define the modern country
through the fixated ‘Dutch East Indies’ territorial boundaries. Even though
they did not deny the existence of pre-colonial entities (such as Mataram or
Majapahit), the political articulation of modern Indonesians were based on
the people who live within the national boundaries of Dutch rule.
It is within this political sphere Benedict Anderson famously argued that the
nationalism was in fact a manifestation of ‘imagined communities’, where
they define the ‘nation’ not to the similarity of race, but to the similarity of
national consciousness – which is, for example, bound by the resistance
against Dutch colonialism— and the emergence of modern political identity
among colonised people (Anderson, 1987). The notion ‘imagined community’
as argued by Anderson, opens up a new understanding to nationalism as
political identity in Southeast Asia. However, one would ask, what made the
‘imagined community’ possible in Southeast Asia? This paper argues that it is
the Trotsky’s concept of ‘the whip of external necessity that leads to such
formation of imagined community (Trotsky, 1930; Allinson and Anievas,
2009). The emergence of colonial modernisation, that opens up spaces for
people in colonial state to obtain access to education and employment in
Europe, served as the external necessity for the colonised people. Their
interaction with Europe enabled the dissemination of new ideas, which were
developed in Europe, to the people in colony.
The result of this interaction was the spread of nationalism. It was made
possible from, for example, the movement of ‘Islamic reformation’ ideas from
Saudi Arabia and Egypt to Malaysia and Indonesia, educational activities in
Netherlands, Britain, and France, as well as participation in several antiImperialism conferences in 1930s (see Laffan, 2003; Utama, 2015).
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
Nationalism, from this viewpoint, was a result of the uneven and combined
character of historical development and was enabled by the unique
combination between ‘modernity’, which was produced by colonialism, and
‘exchange of ideas’ between Southeast Asia, Middle East, and the Europe.
The ‘Japanese Factor’
However, it was not only nationalism that led into the decolonisation. The
decolonisation process was also made possible by the crisis in the AsiaPacific during the World War II. The ‘colonial state’, which was established in
the 16th century (in the case of Spanish rule in Phillippines), and the 19 th
century (in cases of Dutch, British, and French), has since established a solid
political base for colonial rule until the World War II, which oversaw the rise of
Japan in Asia-Pacific. After the fall of Pearl Harbour, Japanese began to
spread war to challenge colonial forces in the Pacific, subsequently ended
the European colonial rule.
Japanese factor’ has also influential in sowing the seed of decolonisation in
Southeast Asia. The coming of Japanese in the region has not only repelled
some countries –Dutch and French— but also brought momentum to
nationalist resistance in the former colonies of those countries. Even though
Japanese did not gave any momentum for the resistance in Indonesia and
French Indochina countries, the idea of independence remain vibrant within
this era. It was the Japanese surrender to the Alliance that gave momentum
for the declaration of independence, began by Soekarno and Hatta’s
declaration of independent in Indonesia (August 1945) and subsequently
followed by Ho Chi Min’s declaration in Vietnam (September 1945). The
Phillippines, through a different route, obtained independence from the
United States via the Treaty of Manila in July 1946.
If the ‘European Colonialism’ can be understood as the ‘whip of external
necessity’ for the emergence of nationalist ideas and movement, ‘Japanese
expansion’ then provides the condition for the articulation of nationalist ideas
to build ‘nation-state’. Japanese establishment of local army, under PETA
(Pembela Tanah Air) and mobilisations of local people in Indonesia and
Indochina gave birth to the modern army in Southeast Asian states who were
controlled by Japan. As Harry J Benda aptly noted (1956), Japanese
occupation also repelled Europeans from Indonesian society, therefore
construct the sense of ‘European as other’ after the War. Besides that,
Japanese occupation also sowed seed for the political embrio of
independence movement, who began to prepare the new state if the Japan
loss the war (which was in fact happened in 1945) (see Benda, 1956; McCoy,
1980).
However, it is also important to consider that the Japanese occupation was
occurred under the World War situation. Japanese occupation, therefore,
took a different stance from that of European Colonialism. While European
colonialism was primarily motivated by economic concern, such as
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
maintaining capitalist rule over its colony, Japanese occupation was instead
motivated primarily with military objective to expand its influence against the
United States and British control in Asia Pacific. Therefore, even though the
control was authoritarian, Japanese was yet to do any long-term
development in the colony. Besides that, their control limited to several areas,
for example Indochina and Indonesia. In severa areas, such as Phillippines,
the United States hold a front to combat Japanese influence. British, however,
remained strong in the Malaya.
This situation, once again, characterises the uneven nature of colonialism in
the region during the World War II. The uneven character was led to the
continuation of colonialism, in some parts, after the World War II. The British
forces, for example, retained control over Malaya and the Singapore until the
declaration of Malaysian state in 1957. However, the French was failed to
regained their control over Vietnam (which led to the 1st Indochina War) and
the Dutch has to leave its position in Indonesia after revolutionary war in
1945-49, except in small parts in West Papua. This region then integrated
with Indonesia in the 1960s.
The uneven characteristic of Japanese occupation then brought some effects
to the ‘uneven’ process of decolonisation in the region. In fact, several states
obtained independence soon after the colonialization ended before 1950,
while several other countries gained independence after 1950s and even
three decades afterwards. Indonesia and Vietnam was the first to gained
independence (1945), followed by Phillippines (1946), Burma (1948), Laos
and Cambodia (1953), Malaysia (1957), Singapore (1963), and, after two
decades, Brunei (1984). Another country, Timor Leste (formerly administered
by Portuguese before occupied by Indonesia in 1976), gained independence
in 1999. This uneven feature was then ‘combined’ with the formation of
regionalism and regional organisation by the newly independent states.
The Uneven and Combined Pathway to Regionalism
Decolonisation, Development, and Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia
The decolonisation processes after the World War II did not took place at
once. It was conducted in a wave, until the 1960s, where most of the state
has been decolonised (except Brunei, who gained independence from the
British in 1984 and Timor Leste, whose independence was obtained in 2001).
It then marked the ‘uneven’ characteristic of regional politics after
decolonisation. The multiple routes to decolonisation in the region also led to
the multiple regional organisations after the decolonisation. At that time, there
were two existing regional organisations, which represent two distinct feature
of ‘political cooperation’ in the region. First, the ‘Bandung’ model, which
aimed to gather all newly-independent countries into a spirit of ‘third world
nationalism’ and ‘anti-colonialism. Second, the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organisation (SEATO), a security treaty initiated by the United States in
Southeast Asia and includes Phillippines and Thailand. This organisation
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
served as the basis for security and economic cooperation in the region.
These forms of regionalism were then dissolved after the establishment of
ASEAN in 1967.
Why did the regionalism process were different at that time? There were
several important factors behind this feature. The first factor was the different
nature of decolonisation in the region. The second factor was the ‘uneven’
political economy of development in post-colonial states, which was caused
by the different nature of decolonisation in the region. The third factor was
the involvement of several ‘Great Powers’ who began to put Southeast Asia
as the important ideological battlefield in the wake of Cold War. These factors
has prevented the establishment of a solid regional organisation, particularly
during 1950s.
The first factor was the divergent nature of decolonisation in Southeat Asia.
As has been discussed in previous parts, the nature of decolonisation in the
region was uneven due to different route to seek independence. Several
states such as Indonesia, Vietnam, or Burma gained their independence
through independence wars and military aggressions. The Dutch, after the
World War II, attempted to regain control over its territories in Indonesia.
However, the independence leaders declared resistance to Dutch military
attempts. It was then resulted in the series of revolutionary battles until a
roundtable conference in 1949. The similar pathway was also held by
Vietnamese, whose declaration of independence ignited the first Indochina
War against French campaign until the Geneva Conference in 1954.
However, the Malaysian (and Singaporean) achieved their independence
from British through a relatively peaceful means. The Malaysians obtained
independence from British in 1957, following by the declaration of Singapore
after some political unrest in early 1960s. Both of those states were included
in ‘the Commonwealth’ soon after their independences. With a different route,
Phillippines were peacefully obtained independence by the United States,
having been the base for US military campaign during the World War II.
This factor then leads into the second factor behind the ‘regionalism’, namely
the ‘uneven’ politics of development in each post-colonial states.
Development was the biggest concern of post-colonial state, particularly in
Southeast Asia (Weinstein, 1971). For states who obtained independence
peacefully from their former colonisers, and still maintain linkages (such as
Malaysia and Singapore), development was not a big deal. However, the
problem were faced by states who obtained their independence by force,
such as Indonesia or Vietnam. It was to resolve such this problem that
Soekarno (Indonesia) and U Nu (Burma) came to their initiative to organise
Bandung Conference in 1955.
This conference was originally aimed to ‘discuss problems of common
interest and concern to countries of Asia and Africa’ and ‘discussed ways
and means by which their people could achieve fuller economic, cultural and
political co-operation’ (Joint Communique, 1955). Therefore, the Bandung
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
Conference was proposed to resolve the ‘uneven’ politics of development
among post-colonial states through economic cooperation (see Nesadurai,
2008). However, ‘Bandung Conference’ was not set as merely a ‘statist’
project. It was also sided by several events (although not organised in
Bandung) held by several non-state organisations, such as student, journalist,
or literary community (see Wright, 1956; Nesadurai, 2008). It is important,
therefore, to see Bandung Conference beyond ‘state project’. Rather,
Bandung was set as a forum to facilitate various actors within a Asia-Africa
cooperation project.
Nevertheless, this idea was not peacefully accepted by some other countries
(such as Thailand and Phillippines), who used their established relations with
the United States and the British to organise Southeast Asian Treaty
Organisations (SEATO) as the basis of cooperation, rather than joining the
‘Third World’ counterparts in Bandung Conference. SEATO was, originally, a
US-led initiative to counter the Communism in the region (Jorgensen-Dahl,
1982). The establishment was also enabled by ‘close’ relations between
Phillippines and the United States, which was also joined by Thailand, whose
conflict in Vietnam and its concern with regional instability led to the closer
relations with the United States (see Nuechterlein, 1964).
It then marks the third factor, namely the involvement of United States and
Soviet Union, who became two ‘great powers’ after the World War II, in the
regional politics. The uneven politics of development paved way for the rearrival of ‘Great Powers’, some of them were former colonisers, in the region.
Soon after the World War II, Southeast Asia has been put as a potential
arena for the expansion of both United States and Soviet Union’s power. The
battlefield was visible in Vietnam, where Vietnamese campaign against
French has led into the the contestation of Chinese-Soviet powers, who
supported the pro-communists in Northern Vietnam, against the rival United
States, who supported the Republican in Southern Vietnam. The conflict in
1950s were escalated into the Vietnam War until the lost of United States in
the 1970s. The tension was also heated during early 1960s, where Indonesia
began the politics of confrontation to reject Malaysia’s appointment at the UN
Security Council, which was also followed by the establishment of JakartaPeking Accord in the following year.
ASEAN and the Rise of ‘Regional Capitalism’
This ‘uneven’ nature of post-colonial politics in Southeast Asia was then
resolved by ‘the politics of combination’ in the 1960s through the
establishment of ASEAN. The politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s
showed the heated tension, not only between the ‘intra-regional’ actors (such
as Indonesia and Malaysia, Malaysia and Singapore), but also involved
external actors (such as crisis in Indochina). It was then resolved in the mid
1960s, after five Southeast Asian leaders met in Bangkok to discuss the
possibility of a new regional organisation. The result of the meeting was the
formation of ASEAN through Bangkok Declaration. In the declaration,
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Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
Southeast Asian leaders were aimed to “establish a firm foundation for
common action to promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia” and
“determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in
any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities” (see
Bangkok Declaration, 1967).
Firstly initiated restore stability in the region, amidst the heated tension in
Indochina, ASEAN was then emerged as the main regional instititution in the
region. ASEAN’s emergence was arguably enabled by the dissolution of
SEATO in 1971 and the decline of ‘Bandung Spirit’ after some political
changes in Asian and African states, including Indonesia and Burma. SEATO
was dissolved due to internal dynamics within the regional organisation, , as
well as the establishment of more complex security cooperation (see
Jorgensenn-Dahl, 2016). The dissolution of SEATO made ASEAN as the
only platform for security cooperation in the region, while the rise of New
International Economic Order in 1971 successfully changed the ‘Third World’
nationalist discourse into cooperation and development.
The original form of ASEAN was marked by two distinct features: ‘statecentric’ approach to political security cooperation and market-based
approach to economy. This feature has been inherently embedded within
ASEAN and preserved after the Asian crisis in 1997. It is therefore important
to explain ASEAN in relations to the political economy of development,
industrialisation, and trade in the region. As Lee Jones aptly noted (2010),
the formation of ASEAN needs to be understood as the reconfiguration of
capital in Southeast Asia, which was made possible through the
‘domestification’ of capitalism within Keynesian Import-Substitution
Industrialisation discourse. The reconfiguration of capital was also preserved
by the making of ‘non-intervention’ consensus to preserve ‘sovereignty’ of
each states and therefore provide some ‘security vanguard’ to protect the
capitalist accumulation process internally (Jones, 2010; 2011 see also
Shimizu, 2004).
ASEAN, therefore, marked the discourse of ‘state-centric’ regionalism in
Southeast Asia. The formulation of several ASEAN norms in the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (TAC), formulated in Bali, 1976 exemplifies the case.
The treaty consists of 20 articles, which was divided into 3 chapters: amity,
cooperation, and pacific settlement of disputes. In the treaty, ASEAN
member states (originally consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, and Phillippines) agreed to, for example, “promote active
cooperation in the economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative
fields” (Article 4), which is guided by the principle of “(1) mutual respect for
the independence and sovereignty; (2)The right of every State to lead its
national existence free from external interference; (3) Non-interference in the
internal affairs; (4) Settlement of disputes by peaceful means; (5)
Renunciation of use of force; and (6) Effective cooperation” (Article 2).
23
Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
This treaty, which was followed by some agreements to build joint industrial
projects, clearly show two discourses of ASEAN Regionalism, namely
‘economic development’ and ‘political stability’. Since 1976, ASEAN has been
developed mean to enable the Keynesian industrialisation and development
projects to be implemented in domestic level. On the one hand, ASEAN was
projected as a ‘regional stronghold’, in order to build a suitable environment
for trade and investment in the region. Some industrial initiatives, however,
has not been successful due to lack of state commitment to fund joint
industrial project (see Yoshimatsu, 2002). On the other hand, ASEAN was
also projected to maintain regional stability in the region, by putting the
principle of ‘non-interference’ and ‘respect to national sovereignty’ as the
main rule of the game for regionalism. The main aim of this ‘security’
discourse, as aptly showed by Jones (2010), was to protect the capitalist
accumulation processes from both external and internal threat. State, within
the discourse, has been used as a ‘bodyguard’ of the capitalist development
project in the region.
All of these regional capitalist project was enrooted in state-led
developmentalist project, which has been initiated in Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Singapore since 1960s. Malaysia seem to adopt a developmentalist
approach through ‘New Economic Policy’ project (1971-1990), which was
continued by National Development Policy (1990-2000), thus leading to a
strong state involvement in economy (see Gomez and Jomo, 1999).
Singapore, with its strategic geopolitical position as the ‘financial’ and ‘trade’
hub in the region, adopted a relatively pragmatic developmentalist approach
and enjoyed a continued growth and economic development (Pareira, 2008).
Indonesia also began to adopt developmentalist policy since the rise of
General Soeharto amidst political turbulence in 1965-66. While maintaining
state dominance in economy, Soeharto introduced planned developmentalist
economy through Pelita (Five-Years Development Programs) that sought to
implant market economy with development processes (see Robison, 1986).
These development, as portrayed by Kunio (1987), was followed by the
emergence of ‘ersatz capitalism’, which combined the strong state control
over capitalist economy.
The rise of ASEAN has arguably replaced the discourse of ‘Third Worldism’,
which was initiated by Soekarno and U Nu through the Bandung Conference.
Since Soekarno’s Asian and African Cooperation project was heavily based
on state dominance, it was subject to political changes within domestic
politics. As both Soekarno and U Nu was deposed through military coup
d’etat in the 1960s, their international project has been constrained. In
Southeast Asian context, the rise of General Soeharto in 1960s paved way to
the changing discourse of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards a more
‘regional-based’ politics and, subsequently, a more American-friendly
economic development (see Weinstein, 1971; Anwar, 1994). It is important,
therefore, to see ASEAN as not only a project whose initiative comes from
within the region, but also influenced by the Cold War politics. Even though
24
Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
the United States and its allies did not directly participate at ASEAN (unlike
SEATO), the establishment of ASEAN has made some preconditions for the
‘pacification’ of Southeast Asian states and ‘domesticate’ Third World
resistance, as previously initiated by Soekarno and U NU through Bandung
Conference (see also Gerard, 2014).
Therefore, this paper argues that the early foundation of ASEAN was
motivated by three important discourse. First, ASEAN was set as a mean to
regionalising capitalism through cooperation and industrialisations; Second,
ASEAN was also served as a tool to provide stable and secure political
environment, which is a prerequisite for the stable economic development.
Third, and the most important, ASEAN was also set as a mean to
‘domesticate’ some anti-capitalist tendency by putting the resistance under
strong state control
‘Neoliberal Turn’:
Community
Post-Crisis
Arrangement
and
ASEAN
Economic
However, the state-centric discourse of regionalism has also been subject to
internal constraint. In 1997-1998, ASEAN has to face the financial crisis in
the region. The crisis started in Thailand, who witnessed the radical
devaluation of the Thai baht in the financial market. Supported by the large
foreign debt from Thai government, the crisis has made the Thai economy
unstable and collapse (see Yamazawa, 1998; Wade and Veneroso, 1998).
This crisis was then spread to several states: Indonesia and Malaysia was
among the most notable country that was severely hit by the crisis.
Indonesian Rupiah and Malaysian Ringgit was severaly devaluated, brought
the worst economic uncertainty since 1965-66. Several small countries such
as Brunei and Phillippines were also affected, even though in a less impact
compared to Indonesia and Malaysia.
The Asian crisis in 1997-1998 has brought about the crisis of state-centric
regionalism project, proven with ASEAN’s inability to deal with financial crisis
in the region. It then led ASEAN member states to reconfigure the regional
architecture after the crisis. The result was the establishment of ASEAN
Economic Community in 2003, along with two other pillars of ASEAN
Community –ASEAN Political Security Community and ASEAN Social
Cultural Community—which was aimed to create a more ‘open’ economy
through trade liberalisation and more complex regional arrangement (see Bali
Concord II, 2003).
This development thus marked the ‘neoliberal turn’ in Southeast Asian
economic regionalism. The Blueprint of ASEAN Economic Community (2009)
mentioned four important elements: (a) a single market and production base,
(b) a highly competitive economic region, (c) a region of equitable economic
development, and (d) a region fully integrated into the global economy.
These core elements are then institutionalised into a more complex of
25
Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
cooperation in state level, with the primary aim to facilitate business and
market development in the region.
The establishment of ASEAN Community has also been followed by further
institutionalisation of the regional integration process. Since 2003, ASEAN
leaders have agreed to meet annually in the ASEAN Summit to discuss the
progress of regional integration. In the Ministry level, ASEAN was also
institutionalised, first by reorganising ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as the main
locus of decision-making within the regional institution, and afterwards by
putting cooperation agenda within each ministries or sectoral bodies.
Through this arrangement, ASEAN Economic Community has been projected
the main agenda for all ASEAN member states in order to facilitate the
regional market development.
This form of regionalism clearly showed that ASEAN has moved to the ‘statecentric’ form of economic cooperation. Within this discourse, the ‘state-based’
discourse of regional cooperation was abandoned, replaced by free trade
and institutionalisation of cooperation in all level of ministries, as well as the
strengthened function of ASEAN Secretariat. As aptly showed by Jayasuriya
and Hameiri (2011), this form has produced the discourse of ‘regulatory
regionalism’., which aims to preserve the interest of particular social class
(namely big businessmen) under the regulatory framework of state policies.
This also reproduced what Kanishka Jayasuriya termed as ‘embedded
mercantilism’, which is characterised by four core elements: (1) a set of
international economic strategies; (2) 2. a set of governance structures in
accordance with regional economic governance; (3) a set of normative
constructs for interactions with other states or other entities; and (4) a
coalition between domestic and regional political-economy structures across
the region, enabled by trade liberalisation and regional economic cooperation
(see Jayasuriya, 2003).
This form of cooperation, however, was not a unique idea. It was during this
era the discourse of inter-regionalism emerged, particularly between ASEAN
and the European Union (EU) to strengthen financial and trade cooperation
between the two regional institutions (see Borzel and Risse, 2009). European
Union, in this case, became a ‘mirror’ for ASEAN economic integration
project. The establishment of ‘single market’ and more specifically ‘single
labor market’ (established under Mutual Recognition Act) exemplifies this
case, mirroring what the EU has done in 1990s. The emergence of the socalled inter-regionalism project through, for example, ASEM (Asia-Europe
Meeting), has also enabled the adoption of European integration trajectory to
ASEAN integration project. The Asia Europe Meeting provides a learning site
for ASEAN to learn about regionalism, therefore establishes a ‘mirror’ for the
institutionalisation processes within the region (see Gilson, 2002). The
European Union, therefore, serves as ‘the whip of external necessity’ that
enables the combined characteristic of ASEAN regionalism project.
26
Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
Therefore, it can be concluded that the formation of ASEAN represents the
institutionalisation of ‘capital’ in the region. The process has, however, had its
roots in the colonial modernisation projects in the late 19th century, where
colonial states in Southeast Asia opened industrialisation as a mean to
consolidate capitalism in the colony through trad and development. The
decolonisation process transformed the industrialisation and trade into a new
form of inter-state relations, which was marked by two discourses of
regionalism (Bandung Conference and SEATO). The establishment of
ASEAN institutionalised the ‘capital’ to the regional level, particularly after the
Asian crisis in 1997-1998. Regionalism, since this era, has been linked to the
consolidation of capitalism in the region.
Most importantly, the establishment of ASEAN has to be understood as an
attempt to preserve capitalism, which has been established in the region
since colonial era. Even though there have been different features of
regionalism in the region, the aim was still to the same, that is to preserve
capitalist accumulation in the region. The establishment of ASEAN is only an
attempt to re-locate the accumulation process in accordance with the rising
globalisation in world politics, which was enabled by industrial, technological,
and digital revolution in Southeast Asia. The law of uneven and combined
development enabled the transformation of capitalism in the regional context.
Conclusion: Rethinking the Origin of Southeast Asian
Regionalism
In the History of Russian Revolution, Leon Trotsky (1930) said that, “the
fundamental and most stable feature of Russian history is the slow tempo of
her development, with the economic backwardness, primitiveness of social
forms, and low level of culture resulting from it”. It seems that the feature of
Southeast Asian history, from a critical viewpoint, follows the similar path.
This paper attempts to trace the origin of regionalism in Southeast Asia
through a longue-duree historical perspective. Through a Historical
Sociological inquiry, this paper has demonstrated that the uneven and
combined development was the very nature of historical development in
Southeast Asia and the characterises the development of regionalism since
the pre-colonial era.
Regionalism in Southeat Asia has been constructed since the pre-colonial
era, dates back to the 12th and 13th century. This paper argues that the precolonial era was marked by ‘the Mandala System’ as the main feature of
regionalism. The regional order, at that time, was marked by the absence of
a single hegemonic force in the regional politics. However, as the mobility of
trade was massively exploded in the 15th century, the uneven feature of
Mandala System was combined with its interaction with external societies,
leads to the ‘age of commerce’. Early colonial period introduced ‘the
mercantilist economy’, which was then replaced by the ‘modern’ formation of
regionalism in the 19th century, based upon the colonial state,
27
Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
industrialisation, and the migration of workers. It then led to the emergence of
‘primitive capitalist accumulation’ and thus sowed seed to modern capitalism
in the next century.
The decolonisation processes in the 20th century transferred all power to the
new independent states. However, it was also evident that the post-colonial
states was, to some extent, reproduced the discourse of colonial
statebuilding and political economy. The feature of regionalism after colonial
era has been heavily linked to preserve state capitalism in the region, which
was invented during the modernisation processes in late 19th century. The
latter development of ASEAN Economic Community was projected to
reconfigure capitalism to deal with such financial crisis in the region,
therefore move the locus of capitalist accumulation in a broader level.
Given such a historical trajectory, this paper offers two insights for the origin
of regionalism in Southeast Asia. First, regionalism has its origin in the
continuum of colonial development in Southeast Asia, which was most
notably enabled by the ‘politics of combination’ during the age of commerce
in the 15th century. Second, the objective of colonial development, since its
early formation, has been served to cultivate capitalist economy in the region.
The history of economic regionalism in Southeast Asia, therefore, is the
history of capitalist development. The uneven and combined characteristic of
the region enabled the transformation and evolution of capitalism in their new
forms.
Therefore, this paper makes case for the importance of ‘historical origin’ of
regionalism. It is clear that the pre-colonial and early colonial rule did not see
‘state’ as the main actor. Rather, mercantilist business actors (such as VOC
and EIC) or Islamic merchants and travelers also played role in creating
regionalism in Southeast Asia. The post-independence regionalism, such as
Bandung Conference, also reflected the involvement of non-state actors in
the region. It was the establishment of ASEAN that put ‘state’ as the central
actor in regionalism.
Therefore, this paper suggest that regionalism should be understood through
the notion of ‘multiplicity of society’ in the region rather than simply put it as
merely put it into the ‘state debate’. Through this approach, regionalism will
be understood as a historically-evolved political project, which consists not
only political units within the region, but also units outside the region. The law
of uneven and combined development enables the inter-societal interactions
within a particular geopolitical boundaries, therefore defined (also historically)
such a concept named ‘region’. This framework therefore enable the
identification of form of regionalisms beyond ASEAN. It is thus the task of
Historical Sociology to unpack, and furthermore re-understand Southeast
Asian regionalism as a site of contentions between particular social forces
throughout the time.
28
Umar | The Pathway to Regionalism
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