G. S. RAKOVSKI NATIONAL DEFENCE ACADEMY
DEFENCE ADVANCED RESEARCH INSTITUTE
IMPROVING ORGANISATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS OF COALITION
HEADQUARTERS
Collection of papers, presented during the
NATO Science and Technology Organization,
Human Factors and Medicine Panel Lecture Series 232
September – October 2013
Yantsislav Yanakiev (Editor)
Sofia, 2014
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© Yantsislav Yanakiev, Frederick M. J. Lichacz, Delphine Resteigne, Ann-Renee Blais
Janet Sutton, Nancy Houston, Plamen Dimitrov, Nikola Stoyanov, Carol Atkinson
Leedjia Svec, Iliya Marinov, Aneliya Mitkova, 2014
© Ivaylo Alexandrov Tasev, Cover, 2014
© St. George Military Publishing House, 2014
ISBN 978-954-9348-47-7
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface / 5
Yantsislav Yanakiev
Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Headquarters:
The Viewpoint of Subject Matter Experts and Theoretical Approach / 8
Frederick M. J. Lichacz
Alignment of Structure and Process with the Operative Goals
of a NATO Headquarter / 21
Frederick M. J. Lichacz
Process Improvement Strategies within an Operational
NATO Headquarter / 33
Delphine Resteigne & Ann-Renee Blais
Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Operational Coalition
Headquarters: The Impact of Cultural Dimensions / 47
Janet Sutton & Nancy Houston
Leader and Team Adaptability in Coalition Teamwork / 66
Ann-Renee Blais & Delphine Resteigne
The Role of the People in the Organisation: Leadership, Training,
and Rotation Practices / 76
Yantsislav Yanakiev
How to Reduce the Challenges of a Multinational Context?
(Implications for Practice) / 92
Plamen Dimitrov
Logistics Support for the Bulgarian Navy in Multinational Operations
by NATO Support Agency – General Services Programme / 104
Nikola Stoyanov
Model of Collaboration between Public Sector Institution Bodies in
Emergency Situations / 115
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Carol Atkinson
U.S. Strategic Defence Priorities: Implications
for Multinational Operations / 129
Leedjia Svec
Cultural Minefields and Coalition Forces / 140
Iliya Marinov & Aneliya Mitkova
Stressful Factors in Modern Military Operations / 153
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PREFACE
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the factors and
issues related to culture, coalitions, and multinational operations. These
include: training, leadership, teamwork, command and control, inter alia.
Consequently, the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO)
Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Panel approved establishment of
Lecture Series (LS) 232 titled “Improving the Organisational Effectiveness
of Coalition Headquarters.” The main goal of this lecture series was to
disseminate the research results of NATO STO HFM Task Group (TG)
163 which examined the factors influencing the effectiveness of coalition
operations among academic and operational communities in NATO and
partner nations. The research findings of STO HFM TG-163 addressed a
variety of issues related to organisational and cultural factors that are critical
to effective cooperation in coalition operations with a particular focus on
organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level headquarters
(HQs).
Three sessions of NATO STO HFM LS were carried out: one at the
Rakovski National Defence Academy, Sofia, Bulgaria; one at the Royal
Military Academy, Brussels, Belgium; and one at the Defense Equal
Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), Patrick Air Force Base,
Florida, U.S.
The sessions were organised by the International Program Committee
with members from Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, and the United States. This
publication is an outcome of the three lecture series sessions and contains
the papers presented during these sessions.
The specific objectives of the NATO STO HFM LS-232 were: (1) to
present and discuss findings on critical factors (barriers and enablers) that
impact effective cooperation in coalition operations; (2) to present and
discuss models and tools for measuring different aspects of organisational
effectiveness of operational headquarters in a multinational context; (3) to
demonstrate multimedia training tools such as GlobeSmart® Commander
and the Cross Cultural Competence Trainer in order to improve cultural
awareness of military leaders participating in coalition operations; (4) to get
feedback regarding the demands of the operational community in NATO
and partner countries for additional research in the field of organisational
effectiveness for the improvement of coalition operations.
The NATO STO HFM LS-232 covered the following basic topics: (1)
viewpoints from Subject Matter Experts on how to improve organisational
5
effectiveness in coalition headquarters; (2) strategies for how to improve
processes within operational NATO HQs with focus on (a) effective and
timely sharing of information, (b) effective and timely decision making,
and (c) shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities; (3) the alignment of
structure and processes with the operational goals of a NATO HQ; (4) the
role of people in organisations to include dimensions such as leadership,
training, and rotation practices; (5) the role of organisational and national
culture and how to improve cultural orientation, openness to diversity, and
trust in coalition settings; (6) the adaptability of leaders and teams to working
within multinational coalitions; and (7) how to reduce the challenges of a
working within a multinational context with implications for practitioners.
In addition, there was a technology demonstration of the GlobeSmart®
Commander Multimedia Training Tool and the Cross-Cultural Competence
Trainer in the program. Finally, several additional papers were presented
during the sessions in Sofia, Bulgaria and DEOMI Patrick AFB, FL, U.S.
in order to broaden the understanding of the challenges of the multinational
context. These papers cover such important topics related to operational
effectiveness as: (1) logistic support in multinational environment; (2)
stress and psychological support in modern military operations; (3) interorganisational collaboration in crisis management; (3) U.S. strategic defence
priorities and the implications for multinational operations; (4) cultural
property protection education and training for multinational operations.
Our project explicitly concentrates on the internal processes in a coalition
headquarter, while the factors external to the organisation and related to the
context of the operation were not examined in this study. For that reason, I
consider this additional input as important enrichment of the original study
results.
I believe that the research results that were presented and discussed
during the Lecture Series will be beneficial for military leaders and nations,
helping them to identify training gaps. These gaps can then be addressed in
the Professional Military Education and future pre-deployment training, and
used to improve the ways that we work in multicultural environments. This
is a direct contribution to one of the basic NATO Long-Term Capability
Requirements, namely Human Performance Improvement in Military
Operations.
In conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to express the
gratitude of the International Program Committee to Commodore (BGR-N)
Dimiter ANGELOV, Commandant of the G. S. Rakovski National Defence
Academy, Major-General Harry VINDEVOGEL, Commandant of Royal
Military Academy and Dr. William T. YATES II, Acting Commandant of the
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) for supporting
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this significant NATO STO activity that has enabled us to meet our goals by
providing an excellent environment for creative work as well as increasing
the level of exchange of new experiences and new ideas among researchers
and operational communities.
Capt. (BGR-N) Prof. D. Sc. Yantsislav Yanakiev,
NATO STO HFM Lecture Series -232 Director
January 6th, 2014
Sofia, Bulgaria
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IMPROVING ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
OF COALITION HEADQUARTERS:
THE VIEWPOINT OF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS
AND THEORETICAL APPROACH1
Capt (BGR-N) Prof. D.Sc. Yantsislav Yanakiev
82 Evlogi & Hristo Georgievi, Blvd., 1504, Sofia, Bulgaria
G. S. Rakovski National Defence Academy
Defence Advanced Research Institute
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
This paper summarises results out of two focus group discussions with Subject
Matter Experts (SMEs). The SMEs responded to a set of pre-defined questions
about their experiences related to: (1) impediments and enablers of organisational
effectiveness in multinational environment; (2) proxy measures of mission
success; (3) characteristics of an effective multinational HQ, and (4) suggestions
for improving organisational effectiveness. The experts identified four groups
of barriers for successful cooperation in multinational operations: (1) Politicalmilitary decision making regarding participation in NATO coalition operations;
(2) Internal process management in the organisation with emphasis on NATO
HQ; (3) People in the defence organisation, and (4) The influence of the cultural
differences on organisational effectiveness. The primary enablers of organisational
effectiveness according to the SMEs are: (1) Introduction of processes improvement
strategies in the coalition HQs; (2) Improvement of strategic decision-making
processes; (3) The organisational structure improvement, and (4) Organisational
culture.
1.0 BACKGROUND
The paper utilises results out of two focus group discussions with
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the NATO School in Oberammergau,
Germany, and the NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in
Norfolk, Virginia, USA, carried out in the framework of NATO Science and
Technology Organization (STO) Task Group “Improving Organisational
1
The paper builds on: Yanakiev, Y., Lichacz, F., & Paris, C. (2012). Chapter 2: Results
of Subject Matter Expert Focus Group Discussions. In Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.),
Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 2-1 – 2-6). RTO-TRHFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.
8
Effectiveness of Coalition Operations”. These events were conducted
correspondingly in 2008 and 2009. During the group discussions the
SMEs responded to a set of pre-defined questions about their experiences
related to: (1) impediments and enablers of organisational effectiveness
in multinational environment; (2) proxy measures of mission success; (3)
characteristics of an effective multinational HQ, and (4) suggestions for
improving organisational effectiveness.
2.0 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
The primary leading criteria for the selection of the SMEs to participate
in the focus group discussions were: (1) commissioned officers from diverse
national background; and (2) officers with extensive experience in NATO
multinational operations. The SMEs group that participated in the discussion
at NATO School in Oberammergau comprised commissioned officers
from the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. who had experience in
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. There were SMEs,
responsible for ISAF missions from Joint Forces Command Brunssum, the
Netherlands that took part in the discussion as well. The group discussion
carried out at the NATO ACT comprised commissioned officers from the
Netherlands, Italy, Spain, the UK and the U.S. (commissioned officers at
level OF-3 to OF-4) who had been selected because of their operational
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan missions.
During the group discussions the SMEs responded to a set of pre-defined
questions about their experiences related to: (1) impediments and enablers
of organisational effectiveness in multinational environment; (2) proxy
measures of mission success; (3) characteristics of an effective multinational
HQ, and (4) suggestions for improving organisational effectiveness.
Two basic terms will be used in this paper: (1) operational effectiveness,
and (2) organisational effectiveness. The operational effectiveness
encompasses environmental factors that are outside of an organisation or in
general all external preconditions for successful performance. An example
is political-military decision making regarding planning and participation
in NATO coalition operations. The term organisational effectiveness is
defined as the degree of fit, or alignment, among various internal factors
of the organisation such as organisational structure, processes, people and
culture towards the achievement of the main organisation’s goal (Porter,
1996).
The main focus of this research project was put on identification
of the factors that influence organisational effectiveness of NATO HQ
implementing Non-article 5 Crisis Response Operations.
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Another dimension of the analysis is related to identification of the factors
in control of the individual and the organisation. Typical approach when
analysing the organisational performance is the Behavioural Engineering
Model (BEM) (Gilbert, 1978) (Gilbert, 1996). According to the BEM model
data, resources, and motivation are identified as “Environmental Supports”.
These factors are perceived to influence the working environment and
are considered external to the individual, so that they are primarily under
the authority, support and control of the organisation. On the other hand,
knowledge, capacity, and motives comprise a “Person’s Repertory” of
behaviour, which is recognised to be under the authority, support, and control
of the individual. Both terms “Environmental Supports” and “Person’s
Repertory” represent elements of the above-defined term organisational
effectiveness.
The existing research in the area of business as well the military
organisations found out that approximately 80 per cent of performance issues
are attributed to environmental factors such as manpower, systems, and
processes. This leads to conclusion that the organisational issues are more
likely to present a barrier to effective human performance than individualfocused issues, such as knowledge and training (Quiram, 2008).
Following the above mentioned, we will test the extent to which this
hypothesis was confirmed by the SMEs data collected in our study.
3.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS
Using the BEM, we can sort out the data from the SMEs assessments
according to general root causes, both under the control of the organisation
or under the control of the individual. Table 1 and Table 2 present the
SMEs input related to: (1) barriers to effective performance; (2) enablers of
effective performance and related recommendations.
3.1 Barriers to Effective Performance in Coalition Operations
Data analysis, in table 1 gives an opportunity to summarise identified
barriers for successful cooperation in multinational operations in four
groups: (1) Political-military decision making regarding participation
in NATO coalition operations; (2) Internal process management in the
organisation with emphasis on NATO HQ; (3) People in the defence
organisation, and (4) The influence of the cultural differences on
organisational effectiveness.
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Table 1: SEMs Evaluations Regarding
Barriers to Effective Performance in Coalition Operations
Political-military
decision making
Differences in
national and
coalition definitions
of operational
effectiveness;
Unclear NATO
doctrine;
Internal process
management
Lack of NATO predeployment training;
Lack of adequate
manning;
Lack of organisational
knowledge because
lessons learned are not
systematically passed on;
Personnel selection
(some individuals
don’t contribute or
are not qualified);
Intended organisational
Different tour lengths; structure is not there in
practice (commanders
National rotations are
change it to how they
not synchronized;
want it);
Nation-centric politics
Lack of resources (time
result in restrictive
and/or money);
caveats;
Lack of communication and
Team leaders have
poor information sharing;
responsibility but no
Lack of social networking
“real” authority;
opportunities;
National symbols
Lack of info sharing
versus one NATO
systems (e.g., interoperable
symbol;
IT systems);
U.S. dominance
Lack of understanding of
in pushing the
team members’ information
“American” way of
needs;
doing business;
Lack of shared
goals among
different institutions,
participating in the
mission (e.g., PRTs
and NGOs may have
different goals).
Lack of standardised
processes;
Different IT systems and
lack of technological
interoperability hampers
information sharing;
People
Rapid turnover
of leadership and
personnel;
Lack of willingness
to make decisions
and take
responsibility;
Leader committed
to nation, not the
mission;
Poor leadership
abilities (e.g.,
micromanagement;
lack of willingness
to make decisions,
leader committed
to nation, not the
mission);
Cultural
differences
Language barriers
in translating
commander’s intent
into action;
National differences
in understanding
the non-kinetic side
of operations;
Culture of fear of
making incorrect
decisions;
Lack of individual,
organisational,
national trust;
National perception
of women in
operations being
less capable than
men;
Different service
and national
cultures.
Different national
work ethics;
Training attendance
is lacking;
War-fighting ethos
where mission is
Personality conflicts; peacekeeping;
People don’t want
to share information
or don’t have the
means to do so (e.g.,
Need national social
communication networks to common IT systems);
accomplish tasks;
The first group contains factors, related to political-military decision
making regarding participation in NATO coalition operations. Among the
most frequently mentioned problems were “unclear and unstable goals,
changing tasks and lack of common understanding of goals and mission end
11
state” among coalition partners. Additionally the SMEs’ indicated that a
“lack of a comprehensive approach to doctrines and concepts” was a major
problem concerning effectiveness of coalition operations.
Next, the SMEs noted that “different national and NATO education and
training systems, along with differing levels of experience in multinational
operations” also hindered their effectiveness. The SMEs agreed that “there
is still a lack of NATO pre-deployment training”. Moreover, a traditional
barrier to the effectiveness of coalition operations were the capabilities
and technological gaps, as well as “lack of adequate resources allocated
to implement the mission” among the coalition partners. Among many
other important challenges the “lack of technological interoperability” in
national systems hampered information sharing and created difficulties for
cooperation among the different troop-contributing nations in the coalition.
Last in this group, the SMEs considered “nation-centric politics, related
to imposing restrictive caveats to employ the troops during the operation”
as a major negative influence on coalition operation’s effectiveness. The
problem was that “the troops are forced to work around these political
barriers, which at times increased the immediate risk to the people on the
ground and undermined the trust among coalition partners”.
The second group of factors is related to process management in the
organisation, with emphasis on NATO HQ. Among the most frequently
discussed factors were “different rotation timeframes among national
positions in the HQ and the lack of synchronisation of national rotations”.
In this regard, the SMEs concurred that “different rotation cycles hurt
organisational effectiveness” because it created difficulties in the adaptation
among the national representatives and development of social networks.
In addition, some of the SMEs identified “rapid turnover of leadership
and personnel” as a hindrance to the learning process. Some of the SMEs
considered “the tour length too short (typically 4-6 months)” noting that
“learning and the development of social networks take a long time to
develop and by the time these things are established the coalition partners
are getting ready to come home”. Conversely, some of the SMEs mentioned
that “most of nations prefer comparatively short periods of rotation because
the high intensity of the operations contributed to high stress levels for the
military personnel”. Obviously, this is a problem which deserves particular
attention and additional study. Another important barrier to organisational
effectiveness according to the SMEs was the “lack of organisational
knowledge because lessons learned are not systematically passed on”.
This was related to the organisation of the process of the handing-over of
positions in the multinational HQ and the willingness of the representatives
from different nations to share information with their successors. From a
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national point of view the SMEs considered this to be problematic that “there
is no debriefing for many personnel returning from a NATO assignment.”
A third and particularly important barrier to effectiveness of coalition HQs
according to the SMEs was related to a “lack of communication and poor
information sharing process”. The problems here are multidimensional,
both from technological and human nature. Some of the typical explanations
were “people not wanting to share information”, “lack of social networking
opportunities”, “lack of info sharing systems” and “lack of understanding
of team members’ information needs”.
The third group of identified factors affecting organisational effectiveness
was related to people in the defence organisation. One of the most important
barriers, according to the SMEs was the “lack of adequate manning”. They
shared the opinion that “frequently, individuals are not qualified for their
assigned role” and that “some nations never contribute, but merely ride out
their time.” This situation generated problems with respect to reasonable
distribution of tasks and responsibilities among coalition partners, as well
as the development of internal social networks in the multinational HQ.
A second factor identified as a hindrance to organisational effectiveness
was the “lack of cultural awareness training” of personnel, participating
in NATO multinational operations and the development of cross-cultural
competences. Directly related to this factor was the problem with “the
quality of English language communication”. The problem was certainly
multifaceted. On the one hand, “non-native English speakers often do not
comprehend the meaning or context of English speech”. On the other hand,
“native English speakers also had difficulties with non-native speakers
and therefore, sometime assumed incompetence on the part of non-native
English speakers. Moreover there was the basic problem with the use of
NATO abbreviations and so-called “NATO slang” which added to linguistic
confusion across the various languages in the NATO HQ.
Finally, the fourth group comprised factors that were related to the
influence of the cultural differences on organisational effectiveness and the
process of formation of unique organisational cultures within the NATO
HQ. The SMEs viewed the organisational culture of a NATO HQ as a
mixture of different national, military and service cultures that affected the
effectiveness of the multinational operations. A particular example of this
was “the different mental models of coping with uncertainty process of
overcoming uncertainty” which was related to culturally based biases in
the need for information to make a decision. This process might affect the
unwillingness to make a decision if the person needed more information or
the fear of making an incorrect decision, both of which could undermine
organisational effectiveness. Another essential factor was “the effect of
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different leadership styles” (for example: direct vs. indirect) which could
lead to misunderstandings or misperceptions of the intention of the leader.
The SMEs were unanimous about the role of the leadership as a factor that
shaped the organisational culture in the HQ and thus influenced effectiveness
of coalition operations. The role of the leader and specific leadership
capabilities in a multinational environment are critical factors regarding the
establishment of shared vision and shared awareness with respect to goals
and tasks. In this regard, the SMEs recommended that “leader be committed
to the mission, not to the nation.” Another factor which deserves attention,
also influenced by different national cultures, is “task orientation vs. the
need to spend time building and maintaining relationships”. A last factor
in this group that the SMEs identified as a potential problem was the “lack
of individual, organisational and national trust”. The issue of trust among
coalition partners deserves particular attention because it is related to
information sharing and the coalition operations’ effectiveness as a whole.
3.2 SMEs’ Evaluations Regarding the Enablers of Organisational
Effectiveness of Coalition Operations
What were the primary enablers of organisational effectiveness
according to the SMEs? Table 2 contains a number of factors focused
on: (1) Introduction of processes improvement strategies in the coalition
HQs; (2) Improvement of strategic decision-making processes; (3) The
organisational structure improvement, and (4) Organisational culture.
The analysis of the data presented in table 2 gives an opportunity to
structure the factors that enable effective collaboration in multinational
coalition operations in four groups.
The first group of factors that the SMEs identified is related to the
introduction of process improvement strategies in the NATO HQs. The
SMEs were unanimous in their view that information sharing was an
enabler of organisational effectiveness within a coalition HQ. In order to
improve information sharing within the HQ, the SMEs indicated the need
for a strategy for changing people’s minds and attitudes of “reluctance to
share information” and to provide full-spectrum technical interoperability
among coalition partners. Another important enabler of the effectiveness
in coalition operations cited by the SMEs was related to the development
of the HQ as a learning organisation. They suggest “introducing Standing
Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the transition of positions in the HQ in
order to avoid gaps of handover” and to transfer lessons learned. In addition,
the SMEs considered the introduction of an “effective mentoring program
to support hand-over procedure so you don’t start from scratch every
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Table 2: Enablers of the Effectiveness of Coalition Operations
Processes improvement
strategies in coalition
HQs
Prioritise conflicting
items;
When communicating/
sharing information,
make every effort to
spare people’s time;
Strategic
decision-making
Leadership issues
NATO provide
standardisation
for education and
training for coalition
operations;
Leader should
provide both formal
and informal
feedback to
subordinates;
Use common
formats /capabilities/
Prepare the staff (clarify standardisation;
roles, expertise, enable
No single nation
them to get to know
one another before they predominantly
arrive in the operational represented on HQ
staff;
theatre);
HQ staff with prior
Develop SOPs for
transition (avoid gaps of experience working
transition and different together as a group;
rotation cycles);
Eliminate national
caveats for mission
Facilitate better
understanding of where execution. Caveats
challenge trust among
information comes
nations;
from;
Create an effective
mentoring program
to include hand-over
procedures, lessons
learned, etc. so that the
same mistakes are not
repeated;
Institute 360 degree
feedback system;
Help individuals
understand how they
contribute to the
goals and mission
of the organisation,
remembering that most
projects are long-term
and that they won’t see
results right away;
Pushing for
development of
NATO identity in the
organisation;
Provide predeployment training
on how to work in
NATO/coalition
environment;
Provide orientation for
the key leaders.
Organisational
culture
Create social
networking
opportunities
(Icebreakers/social
events; Ad hoc
meetings in open
environment in
multicultural settings;
Ability to learn from
mistakes and quickly
adjust to the situation
Create opportunities
(adaptability to
for people to talk
change);
to each other
Ability to take
informally; Officer’s
initiative, to go above club - opportunity or
and beyond assigned environment for social
tasks;
networking Informal
networks (i.e., social)
Ability to make
decisions timely and are key to task
accomplishment;
effectively;
Good leadership
is critical to
organisational
effectiveness: need
of strong leader who
listen to people, who
can make decisions
quickly, and who
can make the best
of a bad situation.
Leader should
have an unreserved
commitment to make
the mission effective.
Help people pick up
the “lingo” (NATO
slang);
Provide cultural
awareness education &
training.
Sensitivity to cultural
diversity is of crucial
importance;
Need to be more
NATO-oriented than
nation-oriented;
Open minded to other
people’ views.
Create processes that
facilitate data fusion and
its action to create some
desired effect.
15
time” and to “learn from mistakes” of the predecessors as an important
way of achieving this goal. Furthermore, the SMEs considered the “process
of social networking” and the development of “informal networks” as a
key factor for successful task accomplishment. In this regard, the SMEs
suggested the organisation of “ad hoc meetings in open environments within
multicultural settings”, as well as to “create the opportunity for people to
talk to each other informally” through ice-breakers/social events or the use
of the officer’s club for social networking.
The second group of factors put forth by the SMEs related to the
improvement of strategic decision-making processes for planning and
implementing a NATO coalition operation. Among the most discussed
factors was the need to introduce “NATO standardisation for education and
training for coalition operations”. The SMEs postulated that the “HQ staff
has to have prior experience working together as a group”. Moreover, they
considered “pre-deployment training on how to work in NATO/coalition
environment as a necessity”. In addition, the SMEs deemed the “elimination
of national political caveats for mission execution” is a priority task because
“such caveats challenge trust among nations”. Last but not least, the experts
focused on to those structural factors that influence coalition operational
effectiveness such as the format of cooperation (lead nation – framework
nation – multinational formation). They gave priority to multinational
cooperation which was characterised by the statement “no single nation has
to be predominantly represented on the HQ staff.”
The third group of factors discussed by the SMEs was related to the leadership
issues in multinational coalitions. They rated among the most important
enablers of coalition operations’ effectiveness “an unreserved commitment
from the senior leadership in the HQ”. In addition, they agreed that “the HQ
will be effective only if the leader was not there to serve his/her nation but
rather to serve the goals of the HQ”. Having in mind the complex character of
current coalition operations, SMEs identified the need to have “leaders who
take timely and effectively decisions to be able to prioritise conflicting items”
In the end, the SMEs suggested that the leaders had to be adaptable to change,
i.e. to learn from the mistakes and quickly adjust to the situation” as well as to
take initiative, and to go above and beyond assigned tasks.
Finally, the fourth group of factors focuses on organisational culture
as a factor for successful coalition cooperation. The SMEs suggestions
were aimed at improvement of cross-cultural education and training, and
building cross-cultural competencies among the NATO HQ staff. As well,
the SMEs considered the development of “NATO HQ culture”, “pushing
for development of NATO identity” and to “be more NATO-oriented than
nation-oriented” as a priority factor for achieving this aim.
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4.0 THEORETICAL APPROACH
The SMEs defined organisational effectiveness as the ability of an
organisation, in our case coalition HQs, to achieve its goals. They described
an effective HQ as an organisation which:
• Facilitates information sharing;
• Is able to make fast and timely decisions;
• Establishes a common understanding of its tasks and responsibilities;
• Is adaptable to change and can adjust quickly to changing situations;
• Is able to go beyond task description and taking initiative;
• Is able to learn from mistakes; and
• Is open to diverse cultures.
In summary, the feedback from the SMEs who volunteered to support
the HFM-163 interviews contributed significantly to our understanding
of NATO HQs organisational effectiveness and toward HFM-163’s
recommendations for improving the organisational effectiveness of NATO’s
culturally diverse teams. The SMEs stated that the main goal of NATO
HQs is to provide effective Command and Control (C2) to its troops on the
ground. In order to achieve this goal, NATO HQs should implement the
following primary operative goals:
• Effective and timely sharing of information;
• Quick and timely decision making; and
• Improved shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities.
Based upon the input of the SMEs and our review of the literature, the
RTG HFM-163 team agreed upon a definition of organisational effectiveness
in NATO HQs as the degree of fit, or alignment, among various dimensions
of organisational effectiveness such as organisational structure, processes,
people and culture towards the achievement of the main goal. In addition,
the input of the SMEs led us to the conclusion that the main (official) goal
of a NATO HQ is to provide effective Command and Control (C2) to its
troops on the ground. Furthermore, we decided to evaluate the organisational
effectiveness of NATO HQs by assessing the following operative goals: (a)
effective and timely sharing of information, (b) effective and timely decision
making, and (c) improved shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities.
5.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL FOR THE ASSESSMENT
OF ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO HQs
The model for the organisational effectiveness of Non-Article 5 crisis
response operations’ HQs should provide:
• An assessment of the internal effectiveness of the organisation;
17
• A distinction between operative and official goals;
• A three-step design with a direct link from the input factors through
the operative goals to the official goal of the organisation;
• The concept of strategic alignment which states that the input factors
must be in optimum balance to result in effective goal achievement;
• A consideration of hard as well as soft, and environmental as well as
individual input factors;
• A simple model, easily applicable in practice.
Effective organisations ensure their operative and official goals are
aligned both in terms of their fit with the external environment and in terms
of their fit with other factors internal to the organisation. In the paragraph
below, we will describe the NATO HQs’ internal factors that we believe
need to be aligned with its operative and official goals, as well as with each
other. We selected these factors from the reviewed models and from the
SMEs’ experience with organisational effectiveness in coalition HQs.
As per our research definition, the official goal of NATO HQs is to
provide effective Command and Control (C2) to its troops on the ground.
Operative goals that support achieving the official goal are: (a) increasing
effective and timely information sharing, (b) increasing effective and
timely decision making, and (c) improving shared awareness of tasks and
responsibilities.
Previous research on organisational effectiveness has revealed that
structure, people, processes, and culture must be aligned towards these
operative goals in order for the main goal to be reached effectively (Porter,
1996). Thus, NATO HQs have to make sure that the decisions made with
respect to the NATO HQs’ structure, processes, people, and culture support
the accomplishment of the operative goals. Figure 1 shows this hypothesised
process. These direct effects from the input factors on the operative goals
form the main focus of the subsequent discussion.
6.0 EMPIRICAL VALIDATION OF THE MODEL FOR THE
ASSESSMENT OF ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF
NATO HQs
The above introduced model of organisational effectiveness of NATO
operational HQ was operationalised and a survey questionnaire, as well as
interview protocols for empirical validation of the model were developed by
HFM-163 research team. In October 2010 data collection team from NATO
HFM RTG-163 carried out the field study in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo.
Data were collected from 103 military members and 33 civilian KFOR HQ
18
Figure 1: Model of Organisational Effectiveness of Non-Article 5
Crisis Response Operations’ HQs
(Bisig, E., T. Hof, S. Valaker, T. Szvircsev Tresch,
S. Seiler, and A. Lise Bjornstad, 2012)
personnel, including 5 government civilians and 28 civilian contractors.
Our analysis focuses on the sub-sample of 103 military personnel from
NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nationalities represented in KFOR
HQ. The respondents were selected based on the following criteria: (1)
representation of diverse nationalities; (2) representation of different
organisational structures within KFOR HQ; (3) representation of different
hierarchical levels and military ranks. As a result, the implemented sample
covers respondents from 24 NATO and PfP nationalities. In addition, fifteen
semi-structured interviews were conducted mainly at the Assistant Chief of
Staff level. Moreover, the survey questionnaire includes several additional
variables related to training and rotation practices in the HQ that were
identified as important factors influencing organisational effectiveness.
The results from the complete study have been recently published in
NATO STO HFM 163- RTG Technical report and were made available for
the academic and operational communities (Yanakiev, Y. & J. S. Horton
(Eds.), 2012). They were presented and discussed in details in the papers,
presented during the NATO STO LS 232 sessions in Sofia, Bulgaria,
Brussels, Belgium and DEOMI, Patrick AFB, Florida, U.S.
7.0 REFERENCES
[1] Bisig, E., Hof, T., Valaker, S., Szvircsev Tresch, T., Seiler, S., &
Bjornstad, A.L. (2012). Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Model. In: Y.
Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of
19
Coalition Operations (pp. 3-1 – 3-17). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.
[2] Gilbert, T. F. (1978). Human competence: Engineering worthy
performance. New York: McGraw-Hill.
[3] Gilbert, T. F. (1996). Human competence: Engineering worthy
performance (Tribute Edition). Washington, DC: International Society for
Performance Improvement.
[4] Porter, M.E. (1996). What is strategy? Harvard Business Review,
74(6), 61-78.
[5] Quiram, T. J. (2008). U.S. Coast Guard Human Performance
Technology Workshop Proceedings.
[6] Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational
Effectiveness of Coalition Operations. RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO, 2012.
20
ALIGNMENT OF STRUCTURE AND PROCESS WITH
THE OPERATIVE GOALS OF A NATO HEADQUARTER
Dr. Frederick M. J. Lichacz
Defence Research and Development Canada – Ottawa
3701 Carling Avenue Ottawa, ON M3M 3B9
CANADA
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the factors and issues
that affect the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level Headquarters
(HQs). For example, researchers have examined the impact culture, language,
multi-national operations, training, leadership, teamwork, and command and
control (C2) have on the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level
HQs. To this end, HFM RTG-163 was established to continue to build upon this
repository of knowledge pertaining to enhancing the organisational effectiveness
of NATO operational level HQs. Broadly, one of the objectives of HFM-163 was to
examine the operative goals of a NATO operational level HQs and how they can
be improved. This paper in particular discusses the responses to a NATO survey by
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from Kosovo Force (KFOR) HQ, Pristine, Kosovo
about how to align NATO HQ structure and process with the operative goals
of a NATO HQ in order to enhance the organisational effectiveness of a NATO
operational level HQ.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The environmental circumstances in which military forces have to
operate are changing and have been changing rapidly for some time now.
Operations are more distributed than before, multinational in composition,
increasingly reliant on complex technologies, and involve non-traditional
foes (Lichacz, 2009). In the face of such changes to military operations,
there has been growing research activity examining the factors and issues
related to improving the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational
level HQs to meet the performance demands of modern operations.
Previous research on organisational effectiveness has revealed that
structure and process must be aligned with the operative goals of the HQ
in order for the main goals of the HQ to be achieved effectively (Porter,
1996). In an effort to build upon these past and continuing research efforts,
HFM RTG-163 was established to explore further those issues related to
21
enhancing the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level HQs.
Broadly, the goal of the group was to develop a definition of organisational
effectiveness, an understanding of the barriers to organisational effectiveness,
an understanding of the enablers of organisational effectiveness, and a
theoretical framework and model of organisational effectiveness within
NATO operational level HQs. To achieve this goal, HFM RTG-163
organised two focus group discussions with Subject-Matter Experts (SMEs)
from the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany (October 2008) and
from the NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk,
Virginia, USA (June 2009). As well, the group developed a questionnaire
and survey to be administered to members of KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo
to examine this group of individuals’ views on the various input (i.e.,
structure, processes, people, and culture) and output (i.e., operative goals)
factors in the theoretical model of organisational effectiveness postulated
by HFM-163 (Yanakiev, & Horton (Eds.), 2012).
This paper presents some of the findings from the NATO questionnaire
and survey presented to the members (henceforth referred to as SMEs) from
KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo regarding their views on aligning HQ structure
and process with the operative goals of a NATO operational HQ in order
to enhance the organisational effectiveness of the HQ. Other findings from
the KFOR HQ questionnaire and survey are presented elsewhere in these
proceedings.
1.1 Structure and Process
Organisational structure is the formal system of task and authority
relationships that control how people coordinate their actions and use
resources to achieve organisational goals (Jones, 2004). It shapes the
behaviour of people and that of the organisation. Organisational processes
refer to the way the organisation implements its objectives in the framework
of the given organisational structure (Peters & Waterman, Jr., 1982). As
such, processes cut across the organisation’s structure; “if structure is
thought of as the anatomy of the organisation, processes are its physiology
or functioning” (Galbraith, 2011).
1.2 Alignment between Structure and Processes
When implementing changes to achieve a more efficient organisation,
ensuring an intra-organisational alignment between structures and processes
may be essential. Organisational changes are at the very heart of NATO’s
current goal of implementing NATO Network Enabled Capabilities (NNEC)
(Bartolomasi et al, 2005). The concept of a network organisation represents
a change from the traditional bureaucratic type of organisation towards
22
flatter, more decentralised and flexible organisations (Alberts & Hayes,
2003; Arnold, Cooper, & Robertson, 1998; Atkinson & Moffat, 2005;
Morgan, 1997; Snow, Miles, & Coleman, 1992). This makes it essential
to understand how alignment, or misalignment, between structures and
processes affects the operative goals of an organisation.
There is a tendency in the organisational literature to view hierarchical
structures and centralised processes, and conversely, flat structures and
decentralised processes, as if they were one and the same thing (Morgan,
1997; Carley & Lin, 1997). Misalignment of structures and processes
is often a problem in organisations and making such generalisations is
problematic. For instance, if the structure changes from hierarchic to flat,
while the decision-making authority is not distributed from the top end of
the hierarchy, but is centralised at the top, the decision-making load on the
top management is likely to become too heavy and render the organisation
inefficient and unable to reach the necessary decisions especially within the
time available in time-sensitive and critical situations (Vego, 2003).
1.3 Alignment of Structure and Processes with the Operative
Goals
The environmental circumstances in which military forces has to
operate are changing. Therefore, it is necessary to implement organisational
changes, such as NATO NNEC. The military needs to transform to an
organisation that supports agility, flexibility, jointness and interoperability.
An organisational design that fits the transformed military organisation
is the network organisation design. A network organisation is an organic
organisational structure. Jones (Jones, 2004) summarises important aspects
of organic structures: Organisations with an organic organisational structure
are decentralised. They have an organisational set up whereby the authority
to make important decisions reside at all levels in the hierarchy. An organic
structure stimulates flexibility, so that employees can innovate and quickly
adapt to changing circumstances, and take responsibility as they make
decisions when necessary. Roles are loosely defined; organisational members
with different functions work together to solve problems and are involved
in each other’s activities. A high level of integration is needed to enable
organisational members to share information quickly and easily. Rules
and norms emerge from the on-going interaction between organisational
members. Interaction between organisational members is horizontal as well
as vertical.
Moreover, flexibility is a central part of the process factor to research
when exploring the organisational antecedents of operational effectiveness.
23
Indeed, both in the military and non-military organisational literature,
authors have often suggested flexibility as the key capability of today’s
organisations in order to successfully meet the new challenges of high
velocity and fast changing environments (Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Atkinson
& Moffat, 2005; Englehardt & Simmons, 2002; Volberda, 1998). This is not
a new idea, for at least three decades researchers have suggested flexibility
as a critical factor for organisational excellence (Snow, Miles & Coleman,
1992; Volberda, 1998; Bahrami, 1992; Krijnen, 1979).
Accordingly, for NATO HQs to be able to attain its operative goals,
they need to properly align the organisational structure and processes and
must tend toward a more organic context. Thus greater the degree to which
the NATO HQ’s organisational structure and processes resemble those of
an organic organisation, the more likely these factors will support attaining
the operative goals.
2.0 METHOD
This section briefly describes the materials, participants, and procedures
used by the NATO HFM-163 TG to collect data via a mixed-methods (i.e.,
quantitative and qualitative) approach (see Blais et al, 2012 for more detail).
2.1 Questionnaire
2.1.1 Materials
The 89-item questionnaire included several background questions
pertaining to the participant’s age, sex, nationality, first language, rank (if
military), etc., and items designed to adequately represent/cover all of the
input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and culture) and output (i.e., operative
goals) factors in the theoretical model previously described (for more
information on the full content of the questionnaire, see Blais et al, 2012).
With respect to the output factors, the participants evaluated the
effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “We seek information
as needed.”) and decision making (e.g., “Organisational decisions are made
in a timely manner.”) within the HQ as well as the shared awareness of tasks
and responsibilities (e.g., “The mission is clear.”) (Blais et al, 2012).
2.1.2 Participants and Procedure
One hundred and three military members (as well as 33 civilian KFOR
HQ personnel, but these results will not be discussed further here), citizens
of 24 NATO and PfP countries, originating from various HQ branches (see
Blais et al, 2012), for more detail regarding the demographic composition
of the sample), completed the questionnaire.
24
Data collection took place in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine,
Kosovo (refer to Blais et al, 2012) for more information on the procedure).
The participants completed the questionnaire in a conference facility in
groups of approximately 25 participants. The chair of NATO HFM RTG163 introduced the multinational research team as well as the goals of the
research. He also informed the participants the survey was completely
anonymous and their participation was entirely voluntary. Each testing
session lasted approximately 30 and 45 minutes.
2.2 Interviews
2.2.1 Materials
In line with the questionnaire, the semi-structured interview protocol
tapped into the theoretical model previously described (see Figure 1). It
included background questions as well as items pertaining to the input and
output factors (for more information on the full content of the protocol, see
Blais et al, 2012).
The interviewers asked the participant to share their perceptions in regards
to the effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “How does
information sharing work in this HQ?”) and decision making (e.g., “How
does decision making work in this HQ?”) within the HQ and the level of
shared awareness (e.g., “To what extent is there a shared awareness of tasks
and responsibilities in this HQ?”) within the HQ. The interviewers probed
for additional information by asking (a) what worked (i.e., in terms of the
output factor) well/did not and why; (b) about the most critical aspect(s)
(i.e., in terms of the input factors) influencing (positively or negatively) the
output factor; and (c) how the output factor could be improved.
2.2.2 Participants and Procedure
As with the questionnaire data, the qualitative data collection took place
in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo (refer to Blais et al, 2012)
for more information on the procedure). Members of the NATO RTO
HFM-163 TG conducted a total of 15 interviews, with the participants being
mainly at the Assistant Chief of Staff level, covering J1-J5, J8, Headquarters
Support Group, different structures of the MCA, and JIC. Thirteen of the
participants were military officers (i.e., Colonel or Lt Colonel), and the
participants were citizen of 10 NATO and PfP nations.
The interviewers worked in pairs: One of them asked the questions, while
the other member recorded the interview and asked additional questions
as needed. Before starting the interview, the interviewers informed the
participant the interview was completely anonymous and their participation
25
was entirely voluntary, and they asked for the participant’s permission to be
audio-recorded. Each interview lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes.
3.0 Results
Utilising the outcomes from the focus groups (Yanakiev, Lichacz &
Paris, 2012) and a review of the literature (Bisig et al, 2012), HFM-163
defined organisational effectiveness in NATO HQs as “...the degree of fit,
or alignment, among various dimensions of organisational effectiveness
such as organisational structure, processes, people, and culture towards
the achievement of a main goal” (Bisig et al, 2012). However, because
official goals are not always readily assessable, HFM-163 defined the
primary operative goals (i.e., goals that management can use to evaluate
organisational effectiveness) of the NATO operational HQs as: (a) the
effective and timely sharing of information, (b) effective and timely decision
making, and (c) an improved shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities
(see Bisig et al, 2012 for more detail). Furthermore, HFM-163 identified
four primary characteristics associated with organisational structure and
process that need to be aligned with the operative goals to enhance the HQ’s
organisational effectiveness: (a) hierarchy, (b) centralisation, (c) flexibility,
and (d) specialization.
3.1 Structure
With regard to the question of how the HQ was organised, specifically
whether or not a J-Structure is used, there were mixed opinions. Some of
the SMEs viewed the HQ as a traditional J-structure, while others saw it as
either a J-structure undergoing change or something other than J-structure
(e.g., ad hoc teams for short term assignments).
Some of the interview results indicated that the deviations from
the traditional J-structure were mainly related to logistics. J1, J4, and Jengineering had recently been merged into a “resource package”. The
transfer of location of support from Skopje to Pristine was also thought to
have resulted in some structural changes.
Another deviation from J-structure mentioned was the MCA division
that was now a separate section, while it was formerly a section within the
J4 branch. The MCA division was regarded by SMEs as separate from the
J-branches.
Formation of ad hoc teams from different J-structure sections was also
mentioned as an example of deviation from traditional structure. These ad
hoc teams were set up for certain focus areas, and targeting was mentioned
as such an area.
26
The general opinion from the SMEs was that the HQs had become
flatter in its organisational structure than before, although it was still
hierarchical. A minority thought that it was hierarchical to a large extent.
One of the SMEs emphasised that structure was influenced by functional
areas rather than the flat hierarchical axis. Those who viewed the structure
to be flatter than before mainly related this to decreased manning due to the
recent personnel reduction of the HQs and to changes in the type of skills
needed to perform the various tasks. Some of those who had this view also
emphasised that a flatter structure was better for a smaller organisation,
in that a shorter chain of command resulted in faster response times and
increased flexibility. One respondent viewed the structure as flat on a dayto-day basis while remaining generally hierarchical overall.
The SMEs indicated that there was a certain amount of hierarchy
associated with the different operative goals of the HQ. However, the SMEs
agreed that too much hierarchy is detrimental to work. According to these
SMEs, greater levels of hierarchy increase the chain of command which
makes it difficult to coordinate efforts between branches and slows down
communications. The goal, according to the SMEs should be to shorten the
chain of command in order to facilitate faster response times and increased
flexibility.
The results from the interview also showed that a flatter structure may
positively impact information sharing by enhancing the cross-flow of
communication between branches in the HQ. A shorter chain of command
is believed to facilitate faster decision-making. Moreover, the more direct
lines of communication associated with a flatter HQ structure should result
in great shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities within the HQ.
3.2 Processes
Some respondents viewed the command processes as too centralised,
while others argued that processes were too decentralised. Centralisation
was thought to be characteristic of how higher echelons of the HQ made
decisions, while in day-to-day business, command processes were viewed as
more decentralised. Those who viewed the HQ as too centralised indicated
that this was causing bottlenecks in information sharing and decision making.
As an example, one SME mentioned that the need to get authorisation for
everything was a problem which is linked to centralisation and ultimately
decreased information sharing and less timely decision-making.
Those who held onto the opposite opinion, that the HQ is too decentralised,
said that the decentralisation could cause problems if the J-heads were not
qualified. That is, less qualified J-heads require more centralised processes
27
to help guide their routine. Moreover, it was noted by the SMEs that more
centralisation was emphasised as important and necessary due to political
sensitivities to ensure that decisions should be made in accordance with
NATO strategy.
Some SMEs noted that centralisation differed between day-to-day
business and long-term decisions. For example, one respondent emphasised
that the HQ was centralised in reporting but decentralised in daily work.
The results from the interviews revealed that the centralisation of
processes can positively impact decision making, because it guarantees that
decisions are made in accordance with NATO strategy. However, it was
postulated by the SMEs the centralisation can negatively impact decision
making, because subordinates need to get authorisation for everything, and
it makes decisions slower. Increased centralisation can impede information
sharing due to increases in information since bottle necks. Flexibility suffers
because the time to react on sudden events is longer. Since decentralisation
is believed to facilitate horizontal coordination within the HQ, increases
in centralisation would likely impede the shared awareness of tasks and
responsibilities within the HQ.
3.3 Flexibility
The work environment was thought of as flexible to some degree by
most of the respondents. Some viewed their own unit as more flexible
than the HQ as a whole and that there was more room for flexibility the
lower one goes in the hierarchy. There were a few respondents who viewed
the environment as quite rigid and gave different examples of what could
enhance or hamper flexibility. When asked what could hamper flexibility,
respondents mentioned personality, bureaucracy and administration, lack of
access to information systems and factors relating to multi-national issues,
such as the lack of language skills and culture awareness. Factors facilitating
flexibility related to personal attributes, common goals, experience, and
information sharing.
Most of the SMEs believe that flexibility is a crucial aspect of an efficient
HQ. One respondent expressed that for short term issues, a lack of flexibility
was not detrimental to organisational effectiveness. However, in long-term
situations where more complex solutions are demanded, flexibility is crucial
to organisational effectiveness. Still, units should not do things completely
on their own. In some units, due to small staff, flexibility was viewed as
necessary for the unit. Conversely, flexibility was not seen as positive in
all contexts. For example, a more rigid process was viewed as important
in order to avoid confusion and maintain focus in some contexts. Some
28
pointed out that the work environment was rigid in appearance but flexible
in practice. Finally, the SMEs suggested that flexibility within an HQ
positively impacts improvement orientation because a flexible organisation
allows improvements and also facilitates information sharing.
3.4 Specialisation
All SMEs viewed the roles in the HQ as specialised rather than
overlapping which was generally described in positive terms. For example,
one SME pointed out that “specialisation demands a person to be focused,
which is good”. A few SMEs expressed a need for more overlap within the
HQ. One of the SMEs expressed the need for more overlap because people
new to the HQ are too specialised and do not recognise what is going on in
other branches within the HQ. Another SME expressed the need for overlap
by saying that “people do not consider others’ work because they are too
focused on their own work. A few of the SMEs also expressed a preference
to have more overlaps since the HQ needs to be more flexible. One of the
officers noted that there are situations where specialists are missing (for
vacancy or on leave) and that this puts more demand on those already in the
HQ. In one of the branches that contained both civil and military personnel,
the civilians, due to longer terms at the HQ, had more specialised roles than
the military personnel due to their shorter terms at the HQ which resulted in
more overlapping roles. This was considered as a good mix by the SMEs.
Views on how the downsizing of the HQ had affected the specialisation
diverged. One SME said that as a result of downsizing, roles had become
more specialised, which reduced the flexibility within the HQ. Another
interviewee noted that roles had become more overlapping due to fewer
people being available to conduct the tasks. It might be that different
branches were affected in different ways by the downsizing of the HQ. The
general impression of the SMEs on specialisation can be summarised in the
quote, “there is specialisation in the structure, but you have to be pragmatic
case-by-case”.
Overlapping roles positively impacts flexible structures and processes
of an HQ, because the system is more redundant when roles overlap.
Information sharing is facilitated because overlapping roles will reduce
stove-piping tendencies. Because overlapping roles also lead to a broader
understanding of others’ tasks and responsibilities, shared awareness
improves. Finally, decision-making improves with overlapping roles. Since
some decisions impact several areas, it is good to have people with interests/
knowledge within/about overlapping areas contributing to these decisions.
29
4.0 SUMMARY
Not surprisingly, the SMEs from KFOR had mixed views with respect
to the degree to which the HQ structure and processes were hierarchical,
centralised, flexible, and specialised. They also differed somewhat on the
degree of how hierarchical, centralised, flexible, and specialised the HQ
should be to ensure optimal organisational effectiveness. One reason for
this diversity may be that the NATO HQ had recently undergone a structural
change which involved personnel reduction and a move from a less active
role in peacekeeping. However, overall, the SMEs did agree that there
needs to be a better balance of hierarchy, centralisation, flexibility, and
specialisation than is the status quo in order to better enhance the operational
effectiveness of the NATO operational HQ.
What is considered to be the most efficient organisational structure,
process, flexibility, and specialization may vary with the degree of task
complexity. Less complex tasks might be in need of a less organic or
networked structure, whereas, more complex tasks might need a more
networked structure (Scott & Davis, 2007). Kosovo might entail less
complex tasks than Afghanistan, for instance, and necessitate lower degrees
of organic structures.
To be sure, determining the best level of hierarchy, centralisation,
flexibility, and specialisation, to enhance the organisational effectiveness
is a non-trivial task to implement. Nonetheless, military and civilian
organisations should heed the views expressed by the SMEs of KFOR
and try to implement the best solutions to achieve optimal organisational
effectiveness for NATO operational HQs.
5.0 REFERENCES
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Confidence within a Multinational Coalition Operation. Military Psychology, 21, 412-426.
[2] Porter, M.E. (1996). What is strategy? Harvard Business Review,
74(6), 61-78.
[3] Yanakiev Y. & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational
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and cases. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education.
30
[5] Peters, T. and Waterman, Jr. (1982). In search of excellence. New
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31
[19] Blais, A. R., Granеnsen, M., Bisig, E., Bjшrnstad, A.L., Hof,
T., Lichacz, F. M. J., Lyons, J. J., Moser-Whittle, E. A., Valaker, S., and
Yanakiev, Y. Chapter 4 – Method. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.),
Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations. RTO-TRHFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO
STO, 2012..
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of Subject-Matter Expert Focus Group
Discussions. In: Y. Yanakiev,
& J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition
Operations. RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-SurSeine, France: NATO STO, 2012.
[21] Bisig, E., Hof, T., Valaker, S., Szvircsev Tresch, T., Seiler, S.,
and Bjшrnstad, A. L. Chapter 3 –Theoretical Framework and Model. In:
Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness
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Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO, 2012.
[22] Scott, R.W. and Davis, G. F. (2007).Organisations and organizing:
Rational, natural, and open systems perspectives. Prentice Hall.
32
PROCESS IMPROVEMENT STRATEGIES WITHIN
AN OPERATIONAL NATO HEADQUARTER
Dr. Frederick M. J. Lichacz
Defence Research and Development Canada – Ottawa
3701 Carling Avenue, Ottawa, ON M3M 3B9
CANADA
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
In recent years, there has been growing interest in the factors and issues that
affect the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level Headquarters
(HQs). For example, researchers have examined the impact culture, language,
multi-national operations, training, leadership, teamwork, and command and
control (C2) have on the organisational effectiveness of these HQs. Broadly,
HFM RTG-163 was established to further explore issues related to enhancing
the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level HQs. To this end, one
of the primary objectives of HFM-163 was to examine the principal operative
goals of NATO operational level HQs are and how they can be improved. This
paper discusses the responses to a NATO survey by Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs) from Kosovo Force (KFOR) HQ, Pristine, Kosovo about what process
improvements these SMEs viewed are needed to facilitate the operative goals of a
NATO operational level HQ.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The environmental circumstances in which military forces have to
operate are changing and have been changing rapidly for some time now.
Operations are more distributed than before, multinational in composition,
increasingly reliant on complex technologies, and involve non-traditional
foes (Lichacz, 2009). In the face of such changes to military operations,
there has been growing research activity examining the factors and issues
related to improving performance in NATO operational level HQs. To
this end, researchers have examined the impact of different national and
organisational cultures, languages, goals, C2 systems, technologies, and
teamwork and leadership skills on a coalition’s effectiveness to achieve
their objectives (Yanakiev & Horton (Eds.), 2012). The results of this work
have been the identification of several specific gaps in current knowledge
and awareness involving cultural and organisational challenges in coalition
operations as well as the need to develop models and tools for understanding,
33
explaining and measuring different aspects of effective adaptation and
cooperation in multi-national coalitions (NATO HFM-138 Final Report,
2008).
In an effort to build upon these past and continuing research efforts,
HFM RTG-163 was established to explore issues related to enhancing the
organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level HQs. Specifically,
the goal of the group was to develop a definition of organisational
effectiveness, an understanding of the barriers to organisational effectiveness,
an understanding of the enablers of organisational effectiveness, and a
theoretical framework and model of organisational effectiveness within
NATO operational level HQs. To achieve this goal, HFM RTG-163
organised two focus group discussions with SMEs from the NATO School
in Oberammergau, Germany (October 2008) and from the NATO Allied
Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia, USA (June 2009).
As well, the group developed a questionnaire and survey to be administered
to members of KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo to examine this group of
individuals’ views on the various input (i.e., structure, processes, people,
and culture) and output (i.e., operative goals) factors in the theoretical
model of organisational effectiveness postulated by HFM-163 (Yanakiev
& Horton (Eds.), 2012).
This paper reports on the findings from the NATO questionnaire and
survey presented to the members (henceforth referred to as SMEs) from
KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo with respect to their views regarding what
process improvements are needed to facilitate the operative goals of a
NATO operational level HQ.
2.0 METHOD
This section briefly describes the materials, participants, and procedures
used by the NATO HFM-163 TG to collect data with regard to the SMEs
views on process improvements for the operative goals of a NATO
operational level HQ (see Blais et al, 2012 for a more detailed discussion
of the entire questionnaire and survey). The context of the data collection
process was on Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO).
2.1 Questionnaire
2.1.1 Materials
The 89-item questionnaire included several background questions
pertaining to the participant’s age, sex, nationality, first language, rank
(if military), etc., and items designed to adequately represent/cover all of
34
the input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and culture) and output (i.e.,
operative goals) factors in the theoretical model postulated in HFM-163
Final Report (Yanakiev & Horton (Eds.), 2012).
With respect to the output factors, the participants evaluated the
effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “We seek
information as needed.”) and decision making (e.g., “Organisational
decisions are made in a timely manner.”) within the HQ as well as the
shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (e.g., “The mission is clear”)
(Blais et al, 2012).
2.1.2 Participants and Procedure
One hundred and three military members (as well as 33 civilian KFOR
HQ personnel, but these results will not be discussed further here), citizens
of 24 NATO and PfP countries, originating from various HQ branches (see
Blais et al, 2012 for more detail regarding the demographic composition of
the sample, completed the questionnaire).
Data collection took place in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine,
Kosovo (refer to Blais et al, 2012 for more information on the procedure).
The participants completed the questionnaire in a conference facility in
groups of approximately 25 participants. The chair of NATO HFM RTG163 introduced the multinational research team as well as the goals of the
research. He also informed the participants the survey was completely
anonymous and their participation was entirely voluntary. Each testing
session lasted approximately 30 and 45 minutes.
2.2 Interviews
2.2.1 Materials
In line with the questionnaire, the semi-structured interview protocol
tapped into the theoretical model postulated in HFM-163 Final Report
(Yanakiev & Horton (Eds.), 2012). It included background questions as well
as items pertaining to the input and output factors (for more information on
the full content of the protocol, see Blais et al, 2012).
The interviewers asked the participant to share their perceptions in regards
to the effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “How does
information sharing work in this HQ?”) and decision making (e.g., “How
does decision making work in this HQ?”) within the HQ and the level of
shared awareness (e.g., “To what extent is there a shared awareness of tasks
and responsibilities in this HQ?”) within the HQ. The interviewers probed
for additional information by asking (a) what worked (i.e., in terms of the
35
output factor) well/did not and why; (b) about the most critical aspect(s)
(i.e., in terms of the input factors) influencing (positively or negatively) the
output factor; and (c) how the output factor could be improved.
2.2.2 Participants and Procedure
As with the questionnaire data, the qualitative data collection took place
in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo (refer to Blais et al, 2012
for more information on the procedure). Members of the NATO RTO
HFM-163 TG conducted a total of 15 interviews, with the participants being
mainly at the Assistant Chief of Staff level, covering J1-J5, J8, Headquarters
Support Group, different structures of the MCA, and JIC. Thirteen of the
participants were military officers (i.e., Colonel or Lt Colonel), and the
participants were citizen of 10 NATO and PfP nations.
The interviewers worked in pairs: One of them asked the questions, while
the other member recorded the interview and asked additional questions
as needed. Before starting the interview, the interviewers informed the
participant the interview was completely anonymous and their participation
was entirely voluntary, and they asked for the participant’s permission to be
audio-recorded. Each interview lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes.
3.0 RESULTS
Utilising the outcomes from the focus groups (Yanakiev, Lichacz &
Paris, 2012) and a review of the literature (Bisig et al, 2012), HFM-163
defined organisational effectiveness in NATO HQs as “...the degree of fit,
or alignment, among various dimensions of organisational effectiveness
such as organisational structure, processes, people, and culture towards
the achievement of a main goal” (Bisig et al, 2012). However, because
official goals are not always readily assessable, HFM-163 defined the
primary operative goals (i.e., goals that management can use to evaluate
organisational effectiveness) of the NATO operational HQs as: (a) the
effective and timely sharing of information, (b) effective and timely decision
making, and (c) an improved shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities
(see Bisig et al, 2012, for more detail).
3.1 Information Sharing
The SMEs in this study were unanimous in their view that effective and
timely information sharing is an important operative goal of organisational
effectiveness within a coalition HQ. Managing information is the HQ’s
way of handling information or knowledge. A HQ’s effectiveness is tied
to its ability to acquire missing information and manage the available
36
information. In current C2 environments, decisions about the planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling of operations is dependent upon
coordinated information processing effort from various human and
technological sources of information (Rovira, McGarry & Parasuramen,
2007; Lichacz, 2008).
Team performance is, in part, the result of team members effectively
performing their interdependent tasks. Information sharing and situation
awareness (SA) are widely recognized to be important factors in achieving
effective team performance outcomes. Effective information sharing has
been linked to improved SA which is a critical cognitive skill required for
maintaining awareness, knowledge, and understanding of events in our
immediate and future environment (Lichacz & Farrell, 2005; Bolstad &
Endsley, 2003). Teams that share task-related information are more likely to
have better SA, make better decisions and have better overall performance
outcomes than teams that do not exchange information (Bolstad & Endsley,
2003; Endsley & Jones, 1997; Salas et al, 1995).
According to the SMEs in this study, a particularly important barrier
to organisational effectiveness in current coalition HQs is a “lack of
communication and poor information sharing process”. The information
sharing problem is certainly multi-dimensional insofar as the solution
to improved information sharing requires both technological and human
involvement. To this end, the SMEs in this study proposed a number of
potential process improvement strategies to enhance information sharing
within a NATO operational level HQs: (a) changing people’s minds about
sharing information; (b) full spectrum technical interoperability; (c) HQs
as learning organisations; (d) social networking; (e) standing operating
procedures; and (f) leaders need to serve the coalition and not their nation.
3.1.1 Changing Peoples’ Minds about Information Sharing
In order to improve information sharing within the HQ, the SMEs
indicated the need for a strategy for changing people’s minds and attitudes
about their “reluctance to share information”. Numerous reasons can exist
for people not wanting to share information. For example, there could
be language and cultural barriers that prevent information sharing. Also,
information is a source of personal power and people might see themselves
as key sources of information if they hold on to information. Regardless
of the reasons, information sharing needs to be more prevalent than is the
current situation.
To this end, leadership might be a key facilitator of better information
sharing. Leadership should be encouraged to create an environment
37
of information sharing by encouraging and rewarding behaviours that
demonstrate open flow of communication, such as meeting face-to-face
and following through when messages are sent via email or phone calls.
Similarly, leadership must discourage the hoarding of information. There
must be adherence to information flow through the chain of command but
it must not be allowed to be used as a mechanism for hoarding knowledge
(Banko, 2011).
3.1.2 Full Spectrum Technical Interoperability
Another important barrier to information sharing that was acknowledged
by the SMEs is a “lack of technological interoperability” across national
systems. Not only does a lack of technological interoperability hamper
information sharing, but it also creates difficulties for cooperation among
the different troop-contributing nations in the coalition. To be sure, full
spectrum technological interoperability is not restricted to technologies for
sharing information from point A to point B. As such, gaps in technological
interoperability can also refer to a lack of proper technologies required for a
proper records management system, for a central repository for information,
and for technological Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for storing
information (Banko, 2011).
3.1.3 HQs as Learning Organisations
The SMEs also indicated that information sharing could be enhanced
through the development of the HQ as a learning organisation. That is,
an organisation that highly values lessons learned process and considers
each coalition members’ cooperation as a contribution to mutual learning.
Ultimately, such a learning organisation could work toward breaking down
barriers that prevent information sharing. To this end, the introduction of an
effective mentoring program could be set up to support handover procedures
so that new members of the HQ do not have to “start from scratch” every
time they arrive at the HQ. This would result in ensuring that new members
of the HQ are equipped with all of the relevant information about the HQ
they require to do their jobs properly and immediately. This program could
also assist members to learn from the information sharing mistakes of their
predecessors to ensure smoother and more complete information exchanges
for future troops.
The SMEs in this study identified differing rotation practices in NATO
HQs as a barrier to information sharing. As a result of discussions with
SMEs, the NATO HFM-163 TG identified rotation practices in NATO
HQs as another potential barrier to organisational effectiveness; the SMEs
mentioned several problematic aspects of these practices including the
38
absence of handover/mentoring programs, transition gaps, and the lack of
synchronization in national rotations (Bisig et al, 2012; Yanakiev, Lichacz
& Paris, 2012). Mentoring programs could be developed to ensure the proper
documenting and sharing of information as well as helping to integrate new
personnel into the existing organisation so that they do not feel isolated and
therefore prone to not share information.
Currently, different national and NATO education and training systems
exist amongst NATO allies which likely include differing information
sharing procedures. Ideally, the ability to harmonize these educational and
training programs would do well to mitigate the potential differences in
information sharing procedures across nations. Alternatively, a mentoring
program could be developed as a more cost effective way to close this
gap in educational and training programs to ensure the members of the
HQ can develop social and organisational skills to ensure the sharing of
information.
The lack of cultural awareness training to facilitate intercultural
competencies for NATO members was cited by the SMEs as another barrier
to information sharing. Members of the military in any NATO country
belong to organisations with related command structures and share some
experiences in common. However, they also tend to behave in ways that
are consistent with cultural norms for their own country. Several decades
of research have led to the identification of dimensions of culture that
shape individual behaviours; these behaviours affect team performance in
both civilian and military settings (NATO HFM-138 Final Report, 2008).
Accordingly, a mentorship program could be developed to help NATO
members to fully leverage the diverse perspectives of their members while
also being able to reach closure and move to action when this is required.
3.1.4 Social Networking
Some of the SMEs consider the tour-of-duty length of most members
in the HQ too short (typically 4 – 6 months) noting that learning and
the development of social networks take a long time to develop and
by the time these networks are established the coalition partners are
getting ready to leave. Conversely, some of the SMEs mentioned that
most participating nations prefer comparatively short periods of rotation
because the high intensity of the operations contributes to high stress
levels for the military personnel. Nonetheless, ultimately, different
rotation cycles hurt organisational effectiveness because it creates
difficulties in the adaptation among the national representatives and
development of social networks.
39
Ad hoc meetings and informal get-togethers in open environments
within multi-cultural settings (e.g., ice-breakers/social events) have been
identified as important ways to bring people together and ultimately
increase information sharing. The social component/cohesion associated
with these get together develops the nature and quality of emotional bonds
of friendships, liking, caring, and closeness among group members. The
social cohesion that can result from these forms of social networking
facilitate commitment to task, task cohesion, and an action component seen
in terms of communication, teamwork, and collective action. Similarly,
social support involves significant others giving tangible support in the
form of material assistance or information, advice, and guidance that helps
the individual function effectively in daily life. Both cohesion and social
support incorporate aspects of a social group. Cohesion facilitates the
productivity of the group member and the group as a whole. In a similar way,
social support enables individual adjustment and effective interpersonal
relationships (Griffiths, 2007). This in turn would likely enhance the sharing
of information within the HQ.
The strength of military unit is the workforce employed within. The
existence of positive internal relationships among co-workers is one of the
most important components of a successful work environment; personality
conflicts are a leading cause of problems in the workplace. Research has
shown the military personnel view “personality issues” as one of the leading
chokepoints of information flow and a major obstacle to getting work done
(Banko, 2011). Within the context of personality issues, individuals can
quickly learn to go around those people to get the information required
to do their work. However, working outside of the established processes
can create obstacles to the smooth flow of information. Accordingly, open
communication, via social networking and informal get-togethers could
work to mitigate “personality issues” by providing venues to develop social
cohesion and thus prevent, manage, or resolve disagreements (Banko,
2011).
3.1.5 Standard Operating Procedures
The SMEs suggested the introduction of Standing Operating Procedures
(SOPs) for the transition of positions in the HQs in order to avoid gaps in
handovers and to transfer lessons learned. SOPs describe in a step-by-step
manner how to perform a particular task to ensure that tasks are performed
consistently and correctly. The assumption underlying any SOP is that it is
the most efficient and effective way of performing a task (Banko, 2011).
Having consistent ways of working is essential to the smooth functioning
of any organisation. However, when changes are required to SOPs, the HQ
40
should develop a standardised template and a process to how to change an
SOP – a meta-SOP. The lack of organisational knowledge because lessons
learned are not systematically passed on represents an important barrier
to information sharing. Moreover, there are often gaps in the processes
for debriefs for many personnel returning from a NATO assignment which
in turn erodes appropriate information sharing that can slow down the
integration of new members into a NATO operational level HQ.
3.1.6 Leaders Need to Serve the Coalition and not their Nation
There was consensus among the SMEs regarding the notion that HQs
will be effective only if the leader is not there to serve his/her nation but
rather to serve the goals of the HQ. Having in mind the complex character
of current NATO operations, SMEs identified the need to have leaders who
make decisions and are able to prioritise conflicting items without national
biases. The SMEs deemed the elimination of national political caveats for
mission execution as a priority task because such caveats challenge trust
among nations and therefore erode information sharing.
The SMEs consider nation-centric politics, related to imposing restrictive
caveats to employ the troops during the operation as a major negative
influence on a coalition’s effectiveness. The problem is that the troops are
forced to work around these political barriers, which at times increases the
immediate risk to the people on the ground. This in turn undermines the trust
among coalition partners which in the end can serve to disrupt information
sharing within the HQ (Banko, 2011).
3.2 Decision-Making
Decision-making in military settings, as in many different settings, is
a dynamic on-going process of identifying or creating multiple options,
choosing among alternatives by integrating the differing perspectives
and opinions of team members, implementing optimal solutions, and
monitoring the consequences of these solutions. Decision-making in the
military is typically directed towards some goal. Ultimately, the extent to
which the HQ’s decision-making is effective lies in the quality, timeliness
and efficiency and the decision-making process itself.
The SMEs noted that political-military decision-making regarding
participation in NATO coalition operations contributes to poor decisionmaking within the NATO operational level HQ. Among the most frequently
mentioned problems within this context are unclear and unstable goals,
changing tasks and lack of common understanding of goals and mission
end state among coalition partners.
41
The second group of factors put forth by the SMEs relates to the
improvement of strategic decision-making processes for planning and
implementing a NATO coalition operation. Among the most discussed
factors was the need to introduce NATO standardisation for education
and training for coalition operations. The SMEs agreed that the HQ staffs
have to have prior experience working together as a group. Moreover, they
considered pre-deployment training on how to work in NATO/coalition
environment as a necessity. Experience through deployments, exchange
and/or international positions were most often cited as the best training
one can have to improve decision-making ability. In the absence of such
experience, formal mentoring programs could be established in the HQ
to improve decision-making abilities (Banko, 2011). Finally, the SMEs
deemed the elimination of national political caveats for mission execution
is a priority task because such caveats challenge trust among nations and
thereby hinders appropriate and relevant decisions-making abilities.
3.3 Shared Awareness of Tasks and Responsibilities
Maintaining shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities operates
to preserve a common picture of the tasks and responsibilities in an HQ.
Unless the HQ can ensure a clear, accurate, and common understanding
of those duties, its organisational effectiveness may be compromised.
Indeed, shared awareness has been identified as an important component of
successful military team performance (Bolstad & Endsley, 2003; Matthews,
et al 2004; Riley, Endsley, & Cuevas, 2006; Salas, Baker, & Shrestha,
1995). In team settings, developing good shared awareness is not an easy
task as this process is dependent upon the communication, exchange, and
coordination of information within and between team members (Lichacz,
2009; Bolstad & Endsley, (2003; Salas, Baker, & Shrestha, 1995; CannonBowers & Salas, 1990; Endsley, 1995).
All SMEs believed that a shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities
was very important for the effectiveness of the KFOR HQ as it saves time,
improves the quality and timeliness of decision making, helps initiative,
enables synchronisation of effort and harmonises work, and facilitates
collaboration. However, the opinions differ as to whether there is an
adequate awareness or not. Some SMEs believed that there was enough
shared awareness. These SMEs noted that they are all informed about tasks,
and if necessary, if they are affected by the task. Other SMEs indicated
that there is no problem with shared awareness. One SME believed that it
was more of an issue for the civilian personnel than for military personnel
because it is a standard and commonly known structure for the military
personnel. Others emphasised that it is a general problem in the HQ. Apart
42
from the general understanding of what one’s branch is doing, some SMEs
felt that there is little shared task awareness. Some SMEs mentioned that
you may only have shared awareness if you are required to work together
with different branches. Most SMEs agreed that improvement is needed but
difficult. As critical aspects for the improvement of shared awareness, the
SMEs proposed (a) standardisation of roles and structures for all NATO
nations; (b) flat hierarchical structure; (c) a structure like in the Naples’ HQ
with a knowledge development centre; (d) horizontal coordination between
the branches; (e) understanding of operational planning system; (f) keyleader/in-theatre/national training; (g) less rotation; (h) military experience;
(i) regular meetings to share information; (j) willingness to bring people
together; (k) establishing (informal) relationships; (l) having a genuine
interest in the job and expectations of others; and (m) shared data base or
shared work place.
4.0 SUMMARY
A quick overview of the SME’s responses, given the volume of
information allocated to the process improvements for each of the operative
goals identified by HFM-163, gives the impression that information sharing
might well be the most important operative goal for facilitating organisational
effectiveness in a NATO operational HQ. While it is true that each operative
goal: (a) the effective and timely sharing of information, (b) effective and
timely decision making, and (c) an improved shared awareness of tasks
and responsibilities are all very important to organisational effectiveness, it
might be the case that it is information sharing that is the bedrock of better
decision-making and shared awareness.
However, at the end of each interview, the SMEs had the opportunity
to respond to what they thought were the most important aspects required
to improve the effectiveness in the KFOR HQ. Their statements are
summarised and listed as follows:
• Give more responsibility and freedom to act for the lower levels in the
chain and command;
• Need to better understand operational planning process;
• Have motivational meetings of the commander with key-leaders/staff
where he/she informs the staff of his/her goals;
• Centralise leadership;
• Fill positions for at least 1 year;
• Spread rotations more evenly during the year;
• Improve training and experience;
43
• Send preparation packages to HQ personnel before starting
deployment;
• Sufficient job experience and background;
• Select effective personnel;
• Improve formal and informal information sharing systems;
• Improve cultural interoperability;
• Need to better understand the environment of KFOR and Kosovo in
general;
• Interact more in the local community to facilitate a better understanding
of the local population and
• Be proactive and make assessments about the future.
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[17] Riley, J. M., Endsley, M. R., Bolstad, C. A., & Cuevas, H. M.,
2006, Collaborative planning and situation awareness in army command
and control. Ergonomics, 49, 1139-1153.
45
[18] Salas, E., Prince, C., Baker, D. P., & Shrestha, L. (1995). Situation
awareness in team performance: Implications for measurement and training.
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[19] Cannon-Bowers, J. A. & Salas, E. (1990, April). Cognitive
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dynamic systems. Human Factors, 37,32-64.
46
IMPROVING ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
OF OPERATIONAL COALITION HEADQUARTERS:
THE IMPACT OF CULTURAL DIMENSIONS
Dr. Delphine Resteigne
Chair of Sociology
Royal Military Academy
Avenue de la Renaissance 30
1000 Brussels
BELGIUM
Dr. Ann-Renee Blais
Defence Research and
Development Canada, Toronto
1133 Sheppard Ave W., P.O. Box 2000
Toronto, ON M3M 3B9
CANADA
[email protected]
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
Multinational cooperation in operations is not new but since it has now
become the norm in operations the aim of this paper is to look at the professional
interactions in those very diverse operational settings. In the framework of the
work done by the NATO HFM 163/ RTG on “Improving the Organisational
Effectiveness of Coalition Operations”, our attention has been focused on the
collaboration of military personnel in NATO headquarters. Based on a mixedmethods approach with questionnaires and semi-structured interviews conducted
at KFOR HQ (Kosovo), we will here discuss the results referring to the influence
of cultural dimensions on the organisational effectiveness of the HQ. Given the
relative static nature of this workplace, as a complementary vision, we have also
included another model which has been developed on the basis of qualitative
researches conducted by Resteigne & Soeters in a riskier environment, that is, at
Kabul airport (HQ KAIA).
1.0 MODEL OF ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND
ITS CULTURAL DIMENSIONS
Effective organisations ensure their operative and official goals are
aligned both in terms of their fit with the external environment and in terms
of their fit with other factors internal to the organisation. To put it simply,
the term organisational effectiveness describes the degree to which an
organisation realizes its goals (Etzioni, 1964). The theoretical model below
hypothesizes that the transformation processes, which include a) information
sharing, b) quick and timely decision making, and c) developing a shared
awareness, influence the effectiveness of a military coalition operation’s
headquarters.
47
The NATO HFM-163 Research Task Group (RTG) defined organisational
effectiveness in NATO HQs as “...the degree of fit, or alignment, among
various dimensions of organisational effectiveness such as organisational
structure, processes, people, and culture towards the achievement of a main
goal” (Bisig et al., 2012, p 6).
Figure 1: Model of Organisational Effectiveness
(Bisig et al., 2012, p. 7)
Broadly said, we can affirm that one of the main official goals of NATO
HQs is to provide effective Command and Control (C2) to its troops on
the ground. Operative goals that support achieving the official goal are (a)
increasing effective and timely information sharing, (b) increasing effective
and timely decision making, and (c) improving shared awareness of tasks
and responsibilities. Previous research on organisational effectiveness has
revealed that structure, people, processes, and culture must be aligned
towards these operative goals in order for the main goal to be reached
effectively (Porter, 1996).
Among these factors that we believe should be internally aligned in order
to support reaching the operative goals, we will here analyse the role played
by the cultural dimensions in more detail. Culture needs indeed to be aligned
with the structure and process factors as well, in order for the organisation to
function properly. For instance, even if structure and processes are aligned
in terms of flat hierarchy and decentralised processes, the operative goals
may not be reached unless there also is a culture of autonomy. Likewise, the
cultural aspect of improvement orientation, together with a flat hierarchy
and decentralised processes, may need to be aligned with flexibility in order
to have a positive effect on the operative goals.
48
2.0 DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE
In those professional settings with a high degree of internal and external
diversity (Manigart & Resteigne, 2013), cultural dimensions refer to
various elements. Culture encompasses both organisational and national
cultures but can also echo other dimensions, such as norms and values of
the different branches of the military (as we will see in the second model
developed in Section 5). Various cultural aspects play an important role in a
multinational HQ, but we have chosen to focus primarily on organisational
culture as this aspect specifically addresses the values and work practices
of a NATO HQ.
2.1 Organisational Culture
Organisational culture is formed by the set of values and norms that
influence its organisational members’ interactions with each other and with
people outside the organisation (Jones, 2004). It refers to dominant values
and norms that have developed over time and become stable elements of
the “routine” of the headquarters. An organisation’s culture can be used
to increase organisational effectiveness (Smircich, 1983), because it
influences the way members make decisions, understand and deal with the
organisation’s environment, what they do with information, and how they
behave (Cook & Yanow, 1993). Organisational culture concerns values
and norms that one holds about actual work practices (Berg & Wilderom,
2006).
So, what are these organisational values and how do they influence
organisational members’ behaviour? Values are criteria that people use
to establish which types of behaviour are desirable or undesirable (Jones,
2004). Two kinds of values can be distinguished (see Figure 2), terminal
and instrumental values. Terminal values represent end-states that people
and the organisation want to achieve, such as excellence, reliability,
innovativeness, stability, and predictability. Instrumental values, on the other
hand, are desirable strictly conditional on their anticipated consequences
(e.g., working hard, being creative and courageous, being conservative and
cautious, taking risks, and maintaining high standards). These values are
preferable mode of behaviour in order to attain the terminal values.
An organisation’s culture consists of the end states that the organisation
wants to accomplish (i.e., its terminal values) and the modes of behaviour
that the organisation supports (i.e., its instrumental values). The NATO
HQ’s mission statement and official goals, that is, supporting the troops
on the ground by agility and flexibility of the processes and stability of the
organisational structure, should be reflected in the terminal values it adopts.
49
Also, for the NATO HQ staff to understand and be able to act in accordance
with the instrumental values, the NATO HQ should develop specific norms,
rules, and standard operating procedures that typify its specific instrumental
values.
We believe that for NATO HQs to be able to attain its operative
goals, its terminal cultural values must reflect flexibility and agility in its
processes, yet stability in the organisational structure, and its instrumental
cultural values should include trusting each other, being open to diversity,
and having an improvement orientation. The larger the degree to which
the NATO HQs has developed these cultural values, the more likely the
operative goals will be attained
In the case of our research conducted in a joint and multinational
Figure 2: Terminal and Instrumental Values
(Bisig et al., 2012, p. 14)
operational setting, NATO HQs’ members show high diversity in national
backgrounds and expertise. On the one hand, high diversity within teams
and organisations can cause integration problems, low cohesion, and
dissatisfaction, which in turn can affect the team’s effectiveness negatively
(Jackson, Brett et al., 1991; Wagner, Peffer et al., 1984). On the other hand,
in such multinational workplaces, an organisational culture that promotes
openness to diversity stimulates team cohesion and allows the innovative
and creative potential of the heterogeneity to be exploited.
In organisations valuing an improvement-oriented culture, members
demonstrate a high level of proactivity in trying to improve work, processes,
and routines. This can lead to improved collaboration between different
departments and an increased emphasise on efficient cooperation among
employees. Specifically in this respect, being open to and able to manage
national cultural differences constructively should be important.
2.2 Leadership Culture
In line with the previous two dimensions of national and organisational
cultures, we could also add the leadership culture, that is, the management
style, as the general attitude and behaviour of a leader in his or her dealings
with subordinates. Although not our main focus, one national cultural
difference, closely related to the leadership style, may be relevant to our
50
hypotheses. The notion of power distance is defined as “the extent to which
the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country
expect and accept power to be distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1991, p.
28). Cultural differences in power distance influences whether or not people
from different countries are used to and prefer to work in more hierarchic
and centralized types of organisations or whether or not they, conversely,
are used to and prefer to work in flatter and more decentralized types of
organisations (Hofstede, 1991, 2001). This suggests that power distance may
moderate the proposed relationships between a flatter structure and greater
decentralization in processes (i.e., the organic organisation variables) and
flexibility and the operative goals variables.
2.3 Level of Trust
When analysing interactions in an operational compound, even if those
interactions happen in an HQ and not in the heat of the battle, the level of
trust between colleagues is also of great importance. Team members who
trust each other are better able to examine and improve team processes,
and self-manage their own performance (Friedlander, 1970; Golembieski
& McConkie, 1975). Moreover, employees report that the absence of trust
interferes with the effective functioning of work teams (LaFasto & Larson,
2001; Costa, 2003) has examined the relation of trust with team performance
and stated that high trust in teams indicates a high perception of task
performance. Therefore, trust is an important condition for the effective
functioning of teams in organisations. As we will also see in Section 5, the
level of trust is particularly at stake in high-risk environments where people
tend to return to what is more familiar to them.
3.0 METHOD
This section briefly describes the materials, participants, and procedures
used by the NATO HFM-163 RTG to collect data via a mixed-methods (i.e.,
quantitative and qualitative) approach (see Blais et al., 2012, for more detail).
3.1 Questionnaire
The 89-item questionnaire included several background questions
pertaining to the participant’s age, sex, nationality, first language, rank
(if military), etc., and items designed to adequately represent/cover all of
the input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and culture) and output (i.e.,
operative goals) factors in the theoretical model previously described.
One hundred and three military members (as well as 33 civilian
KFOR HQ personnel, but these results will not be discussed further here),
51
citizens of 24 NATO and PfP countries, and originating from various HQ
branches (see Blais et al., 2012, for more detail regarding the demographic
composition of the sample), completed the questionnaire.
Data collection took place in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine,
Kosovo. The respondents completed the questionnaire in a conference
facility in groups of approximately 25 participants. The chair of NATO
HFM RTG-163 introduced the multinational research team as well as the
goals of the research. He also informed the participants the survey was
completely anonymous and their participation was entirely voluntary. Each
testing session lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes.
3.2 Interviews
In line with the questionnaire, the semi-structured interview protocol
tapped into the theoretical model previously described (see Figure 1). It
included background questions as well as items pertaining to the input and
output factors (for more information on the full content of the protocol, see
Blais et al., 2012).
As with the questionnaire data, the qualitative data collection took
place also in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo. Members of
the NATO HFM-163 RTG conducted a total of 15 interviews, with the
participants being mainly at the Assistant Chief of Staff level, covering J1J5, J8, Headquarters Support Group, different structures of the MCA, and
JIC. Thirteen of the participants were military officers (i.e., Colonel or Lt
Colonel), and the participants were citizen of 10 NATO and PfP nations.
The interviewers worked in pairs: One of them asked the questions, while
the other member recorded the interview and asked additional questions
as needed. Before starting the interview, the interviewers informed the
participant the interview was completely anonymous and their participation
was entirely voluntary, and they asked for the participant’s permission to be
audio-recorded. Each interview lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes.
4.0 ANTICIPATED HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS
4.1. Quantitative Results1
The set of culture variables (i.e., team trust, improvement orientation,
and openness to diversity), entered third in the hierarchical regression
models, explained between 4% and 11% of the variance in the output
variables above and beyond that explained by the structure and process
1
For a broader analyse of the results, see chapter 5 of the final report (Blais et al.,
2012).
52
and people variables. The models showed that team trust was a significant,
positive, predictor of all of the output factors. Improvement orientation
was also a significant, positive, predictor of shared awareness of tasks and
responsibilities.
With respect to the link between improvement orientation and shared
awareness, it is important to note that, from the perspective of the literature
on organisational culture cited previously, it is emphasised that attitudes,
such as improvement orientation, need to be shared within the HQ in order
to lead to positive outcomes at an organisational level. Ilgen et al. (2005)
suggest that models focusing on how team processes develop overtime
should carefully consider the possibility that an output factor at one point in
time may become an input factor at a later stage in the ongoing processes.
4.2. Qualitative Results2
The qualitative results suggested a similar positive relationship between
team trust and information sharing. However, according to the interviewees,
it is also possible for this relationship to be in the opposite direction, with
more timely and effective information sharing leading to greater team
trust.
Most of the SMEs spoke positively about the multinational component
of the HQ and preferred to talk about “challenges” rather than “negative
aspects” regarding the fact that the HQ was composed of personnel from
30 different countries. A common opinion was that multinationality, in
general, is positive in that it brings different perspectives and solutions
to problems. It is also good for the individual, who becomes more openminded by learning about other nations, cultures, and perspectives.
Still, the SMEs generally believed that a multinational HQ is less effective
than a national HQ. Arguments for this view were based primarily on the
reality that people are on shorter assignments in a multinational HQ, and the
communication problems that arise due to varying English language skills.
Furthermore, national caveats were mentioned as a problem by two of the
SMEs. However, some of the SMEs believed that individual effectiveness
is improved when working in a multinational HQ since you want to make a
good impression of the country that you are representing.
In relation to the model, the SMEs to some extent related multinationality
to the different operative goals and input factors. As shown in Figure 3,
the SMEs mentioned multinationality positively impacts decision making,
2
For a broader analyse of the results, see chapter 6 of the final report (Bisig et al.,
2012).
53
because it brings new perspectives and solutions to problems into the HQ..
On the other hand, SMEs reported that multinationality, if it generates
communication problems and misunderstandings, negatively impacts
information sharing but also shared awareness, because differences in the
national training, methods, and procedures may make reaching a common
understanding of methods and procedures difficult. At a strategic level,
this can also be linked to national interests, as hidden agendas may lead to
different aims.
Figure 3. Relationship between cultural dimensions and the operative goals
(Bisig et al., 2012, p. 8, adapted)
In regards to trust, the SMEs indicated that there was a quite high level
of trust in the KFOR HQ. But, as we can see in the following sentences, the
notion of trust can be understood in different ways.
There were mainly two themes concerning trust, which could relate
either to the personality of the SMEs or to the definition of the term itself.
Some of the SMEs expressed that they trust other members of the HQ by
default, that is, they trust a person until that proven wrong. Two of the
SMEs related this to the military structure: There is a job description and a
rank, and trust is based on the person adhering to their job description and
rank (e.g., “I always trust soldiers until I realise somebody does not deserve
trust.”).The other opinion was that trust has to be established, based on
informal relationships and daily work (i.e., products).
54
Two of the SMEs talked about differences between organisational/official
trust and individual trust (e.g., “Official trust is there from the beginning,
while individual trust has to grow, like in families or friendships.”). Since
the interview question was not specific to a certain type of trust, a reason
for these different opinions might be that some SMEs referred to official
trust (i.e., based on organisation, formal role, job description) and others to
individual trust (i.e., related to a specific individual). These different types
of trust were also reflected in the SMEs’ views on what was considered
critical in order to establish trust, that is, informal information sharing,
face-to-face-meetings, openness and acceptance of differences, compliance
with rules, and delivery of requested products on time.
The way a situation of mistrust was handled within the HQ differed
between the participants. One SME said: “I supervise and give feedback
on how to improve.” Another SME stated: “When I realise I cannot trust
someone, I go to someone else, and there is no time to give a second
chance.” One SME believed that there are cultural differences in how a
situation of mistrust can be handled: “Some people feel uncomfortable by
feedback.”
The third dimension – improvement orientation- refers to the various
initiatives in place in order to improve work, processes, and routines. As
to whether there existed such formal procedures and whether they had
concrete examples in mind, SMES disagreed. Some believed the HQ was
improvement oriented, some believed it was not: “I would say ideas are
accepted and the HQ tries to improve wherever they can and are asked to do
so” said one SME. “No, I think it is about maintaining the status-quo. […]
And it’s probable that it [improvement orientation] doesn’t happen because
people don’t have time in their course of rotation,” stated another SME.
These ambivalent opinions might be caused by different leadership styles
as stated by another SME: “Sometimes yes, sometimes no. It depends on
the persons who have the leadership of this HQ.”
SMEs noted that there definitely was a need for improvement and
innovation to manage all the new and complex tasks. They also mentioned
proactivity was possible and allowed: “Everyone, in his own area of
responsibility, has the authority and also the possibility to prepare something
and to provide his proposals for improvement or whatever.” Crucial for this
proactivity and improvement orientation in general is information sharing.
In terms of the formal procedures required for improvement orientation
to occur, the SMEs specified Lessons Learned (LL), regular revisions of
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), After Action Reviews (AAR), and
monthly Assessment Cycles (AC).
55
But the impact of these procedures was met with doubt: “But I am not sure
if they have much influence on the improvement. It’s more a consequence
of the rotation. When you leave and get your AAR too late, the new crew
has to start again. I don’t think my experience will have an influence on
the persons that come after me.” Some SMEs could not give any examples
of formal improvement procedures, but several people described informal
ways of improving day-to-day work: “We change our working routines
when we see that there are some weaknesses or gaps. Furthermore, we
always try to find a way to make the work easier and better. That’s always
in our minds and we are trying to improve our procedures and make things
run smoother.”
In relation to the model, the SMEs to some extent related improvement
orientation to the different operative goals and input factors (see Figure
3). They mentioned that improvement orientation is positively impacted
by the flexible structures and processes of a HQ, by a leadership that listens
to the opinions and suggestions of its subordinates, by shared awareness,
and by an effective and timely formal and informal information flow. On
the contrary, they also stated that improvement orientation is negatively
impacted by high rotation of staff, because leadership style changes and
organisational memory gets lost.
5.0 COMPLEMENTARY MODEL3
As we have already mentioned when discussing the previous model,
if cooperation can sometimes provide learning opportunities and lead to
greater work satisfaction, it does not always have positive results, and
certainly not if it consists of people and organisations from different
nationalities who have to temporarily work together. Based on their studies
conducted in various operational settings (i.e., NATO, UN & EU missions),
Resteigne and Soeters (2008) have identified eight relevant factors that may
help explain why international collaboration between military personnel
sometimes fails and sometimes flourishes.
In addition to dimensions related to organisational and national
cultures, Resteigne and Soeters’ model also underlines other related factors
which have an impact on professional interactions and, consequently, on
the operative goals describes previously. Focussing on the collaboration
between military personnel in multinational compounds, the following
model is thus more encompassing.
3
For more details on the theoretical model, see Resteigne (2012) and Soeters et al.
(2008).
56
Factors of influence
Professional Interactions
- Cultural distances
- Personnel composition of teams
- Status of units and task cohesion
- Technology
- Organisational set-up of the mission
- Shift in bargaining power
- Danger and threats Factors of influence
- Cultural distances
- Personnel composition of teams
- Status of units and task cohesion
- Technology
- Organisational set-up of the mission
- Shift in bargaining power
- Danger and threats
- Collaboration
- Communication
- Identity
- Level of trust
- Motivation
- Social and cultural
awareness
Figure 4: Cultural and organisational factors of
collaboration in multinational compounds
(Resteigne & Soeters, 2008 & 2012)
5.1 Cultural Distances
International cooperation is intercultural cooperation, bringing together
people with different demeanors, languages, cognitive schemas, and values
(Hambrick, Canney, Snell & Snow, 1998; Adler, 2002). Despite some
elements of shared military culture, cultural differences also exist between
military organisations, even within the ones belonging to NATO (Soeters,
Poponete & Page, 2006). It does not seem too speculative to assume that,
within NATO, an Anglo-Saxon cultural “complex” exists, consisting of the
so-called ABCA-countries (i.e., America, Britain, Canada, and Australia)
who indeed have a common history as well as elaborate forms of joint
defence policies, and practices. Given these cultural disparities, ABCAarmed forces know lesser degrees of civilianization than armed forces from
the West European continent.
But, even among NATO countries, clear cultural differences between
nationalities have existed and continue to do so, notably between soldiers from
“old” and “new” NATO member states. These differences are detrimental
to the development of mutual trust, because the partnering organisations
57
lack non-verbalized sets of congruent expectations and assumptions about
each other’s prerogatives and obligations (Smith & Van de Ven, 1994).
5.2 Personnel Composition of the Teams
The “national demography” of teams and organisations plays a role in
the success of international collaboration (Adler, 2002). Several decades
ago, Kanter (1977) has famously demonstrated that the quantitative
distribution of men and women in organisations plays a major role in
explaining social dynamics in gender-mixed work situations. More recent
studies have revealed a U-shape-relation between national composition and
performance. High and low heterogeneous teams outperform groups that
are moderately heterogeneous (Earley & Mosakowski, 2000; Adler, 2002),
showing the least amount of conflict, the most effective communication
patterns, and the highest level of satisfaction, planning, and cooperation.
Highly heterogeneous teams generally emphasise rules and practices that
are inclusive and tend to be more open to their participants’ ideas and input.
Moderately heterogeneous teams – for instance, teams composed of two
or three more or less equally sized nationalities – on the contrary, tend to
generally display more dysfunctional interactions, accusing one another of
not fully understanding or even being the source of a problem.
5.3 Status of the Unit and Task Cohesion
Military organisations are characterised by a high degree of functional
and structural differentiation, based on the existence of ranks, military
branches, functional groupings, and front versus rear positions. One special
distinction refers to so-called “elite units.” Elite units – such as Special
Forces, air manoeuvre, and airborne troops – are designed and trained to
operate under dangerous conditions, and to use and sustain violence. These
units generally are considered to be high status groups and tend to emphasise
group bonding, disregarding and actually looking down upon others
(Winslow, 1999). In correspondence with their inner directed elite culture,
these units are less likely to accept orders, instructions, and inspections
from people who do not belong to their units. Not surprisingly, the “leaveno-man-behind” ideology is particularly strong among elite’ troops, but it
is noteworthy that this ideology specifically pertains to casualties of the
own unit and not to casualties of other units, not even if they belong to their
own national forces (Wong, 2005). In today’s fuzzy operations, however,
displaying an open mind and developing ties to others in the mission is
of first importance. If such a “bridging” attitude is lacking, units tend to
become isolated and oblivious to negative feedback from other parts of
58
the organisation, while also tending to stick to internal (i.e., within unit)
communication and territorial behaviour (Browne, Lawrence & Robinson,
2005).
5.4 Technology
The cultural impact on air force operations seems to be far less pervasive
than among land forces. Air forces, especially the ones operating in NATO,
are subject to isomorphing, technology-driven impulses (Dimaggio &
Powell, 1991). In the air forces, uniformity in technologies reduces variation
in human behaviour, and, hence, the impact of the cultural factor decreases.
Land operations – especially the ones in non-combat operations – however,
allow for much more variation in procedures and behaviour. These
operations are far less technology-based, but they do require an “elaborate
and well-orchestrated interaction among groups members” (Hambrick,
Canney, Snell & Snow, 1998).
5.5 Organisational Set-up of the Mission
The way tasks in multinational operations are organized and allocated
seems to play a role in the success of international military collaboration.
The work that needs to be done in a collaborative effort of many can
be divided in at least two different ways (Thompson, 1967; Argyle,
1991): Parallel tasking, in which (national) units are assigned their own
geographical area of responsibility where they can act fairly independently,
versus reciprocal tasking, in which each (national) unit, on the one hand,
is providing a discrete, complementary contribution to the whole while,
on the other hand, being supported by the whole and, hence, impregnated
by the other units.
Parallel tasking, that is, the allocation of specific geographical areas
of responsibility to different national units, implies a separation strategy
which will produce positive outcomes, if the work of one unit has no
impact on the work of another and vice versa. In a reciprocal tasking, either
assimilation (i.e., one group submits to the dominating group), or integration
(i.e., the formation of a “third culture”) may follow. As we noticed earlier,
assimilation can be observed in technology-driven operations or when one
nation clearly outperforms the other nations and indeed is deemed to be
superior by these nations. If the other nation’s (claimed) superiority is not
accepted, however, cooperation is likely to be strained. The integration
outcome is more likely to occur if the commander successfully sets superordinate and super-national goals, emphasising goal interdependence and
goal sharing, as well as a strong common code and culture.
59
5.6 Shifts in Bargaining Power
Shifts in the balance of bargaining power between partners may
render inter-organisational arrangements unstable to the extent that these
arrangements can be unexpectedly or prematurely ended (Inkpen & Beamish,
1997). Such shifts in the power balance may occur when one partner
acquires sufficient (local) knowledge, skills, and resources to eliminate a
partner’s dependency and make the inter-organisational arrangement in fact
obsolete.
5.7 Danger and Threats
When people and organisations experience adversity, forms of mental
and organisational rigidity are likely to occur. Under conditions of threat,
information processing is restricted and control is constricted, leading
to increased stereotypical thinking and lesser degrees of individual and
organisational flexibility and even inducing “primitive forms of reaction”
(Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981).
People under such threat conditions focus their frustration on outgroups, cling to values that are essential to their own common identity
and worldview, and tend to reject people who are different (Schimel et al.,
1999). The international military cooperation is quite likely to develop less
smoothly if there are signals indicating that life-threatening situations may
occur in the area of operations.
5.8 Multinational Framework
The type of multinational framework (i.e., NATO, UN or UE) has an
influence on the organisational effectiveness and on the general conduct of
the mission. Even if we have underlined some differences among NATO
countries, military personnel generally have a clear preference for working
in NATO missions. This is not really surprising because, for more than
50 years, the Alliance has tried to encourage SOPs, common training and
exercises, and other shared doctrinal elements.
6.0 DISCUSSION
6.1 Conclusions
The NATO HFM-163 RTG developed and tested a model of
organisational effectiveness in operational NATO Headquarters (HQs).
The model included input factors, the operative goals of the organisation,
and the relationships between the input factors and operative goals.
60
Among the cultural dimensions, team trust was a significant, positive,
predictor of all of the output factors. Improvement orientation was
also a significant, positive, predictor of shared awareness of tasks and
responsibilities.
The qualitative results suggested a similar positive relationship between
team trust and information sharing. However, it is also possible for this
relationship to be in the opposite direction, with more timely and effective
information sharing leading to greater team trust. With respect to the link
between improvement orientation and shared awareness, those attitudes
need to be shared within the HQ in order to lead to positive outcomes at an
organisational level.
With respect to the second model, we expect international military
cooperation to be more difficult, if this multi-organisational arrangement
a) is moderately heterogeneous in composition, b) concerns interactions
between soldiers from the European continent and from ABCA countries,
or from “higher status” versus “lower status” militaries, c) concerns
interactions between so-called “elite” and “non-elite” units, d) is less
technology-driven, e) is based on organisational set-ups in which structural
and cultural elements do not fit, f) has experienced a shift in bargaining
power between the partnering organisations, g) is executed under conditions
that are experienced to be life-threatening, and h) is conducted in a non
NATO-multinational framework.
6.2 Limitations
The greatest strength of this study resides in the fact that the theoretical
model was developed and tested via a multi-method (i.e., qualitative and
quantitative) approach. However, factors external to the organisation and
to the context of the operation were not examined in this study. The model
explicitly concentrates on the internal relationships between the input factors
and operative goals. This might reduce its validity in terms of different
environmental conditions. For example, the same relationships might not
exist under other –external- conditions.
In terms of the empirical scope of this study, we tested our model in
the relatively peaceful Kosovo and the KFOR HQ. To account for other
dynamics, we added findings from the model of Resteigne and Soeters
(2008), developed on the basis of data collected in the context of high
intensity conflicts.
Because we conducted the study at only one point in time, we cannot
infer causality. Future research should thus conduct an empirical test of the
model in a longitudinal manner, where the direction of the relationships
61
amongst the input factors and operative factors could be investigated over
time. Alternative models of causality could also be tested. Finally, the
quantitative results are based upon a single (i.e., self-reporting) method of
data collection, which might reduce their validity.
6.3 Implications for Practice
In order to foster information sharing, Valaker et al. (2012) recommend
developing training programs to enhance teamwork and team trust. Besides
training programs, it might be necessary to encourage more dialogue and
more connections among the various NATO STO Task Groups related to
coalition issues and within the operational community.
When training for operational requirements, personnel should be trained
in a multinational context, and, if possible, the teams that will be working
together in deployment should also train together. The NATO School Key
Leader Training may accommodate this recommendation, which needs to
complement training requirements. In addition, the expectations individuals
have towards the mission and the kind of organisation they prefer needs to
be taken into account. Several points could be used as a starting point to
include individuals in a multinational HQ.
Valaker et al. (2012) recommend integrating cultural adaptability
education and training as a necessary pre-requisite to taking a NATO
assignment. They also suggest establishing strict qualification criteria for
the manning of multinational HQs, including language proficiency, to
improve the contribution of all national individuals. In order to enhance the
collaboration among military personnel but also with (local) civilians, they
recommend developing the cultural awareness training of the personnel,
participating in NATO multinational operations, and fostering intercultural
competences. Facilitating information sharing between people and,
consequently, the various countries operating in those multinational settings
would also enable organisational effectiveness within a coalition HQ.
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65
LEADER AND TEAM ADAPTABILITY
IN COALITION TEAMWORK
Dr. Janet Sutton
U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory
AFMC 711th Human Performance Wing
Human Effectiveness Directorate
Technology and Human
Wright-Patterson AFB OH, USA
2215 1st Street
[email protected]
Dr. Nancy Houston
NATO Allied Command
Transformation (ret)
Human Factors Branch
1200 California Street #15A
San Francisco, CA. 94109
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
Future military operations will be characterised by joint, interagency, and
multinational (JIM) collaboration, and these operations will be business as usual
by 2015 (Objective Force in 2015, White Paper, Final Draft, 2002). No matter
what the type of mission, operational and team diversity will fluctuate. The ability
to appropriately adjust personal interaction strategies (i.e. “adaptability”) based
on the environment is key for successful military transformation and will require
individual and team adaptability. Research has shown a lack of skill in multinational
teamwork to be a significant barrier to adaptability (Klein & Pierce, 2001;
Pierce, 2002). Cultural competence is a critical enabler of effective performance
on planned and ad-hoc multinational teams. Barriers to cultural competence
and cultural adaptability include perceptual, interpretive, and evaluative biases.
Differences in culturally based perceptual patterns can be problematic given that
interpretation and evaluation of behaviour is a critical element of teamwork. A
number of research activities resulted in development of GlobeSmart Commander,
a computer-based instructional program that can be used to develop and enhance
cultural adaptability of military personnel.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Over the years, researchers have attempted to classify behaviours rooted
in cultural values or cultural orientation that could affect social interactions,
including those of multicultural teams. Most agree that there is a tendency
for individuals of the same nationality to have similar behaviour patterns and
that those behaviours vary by degree depending on where an individual’s
values fall along a theoretical continuum.
Questions asked included:
66
• Are there inefficiencies evident in a multinational military environment
that can be attributed to scan inability of individuals to adapt?
• What are the direct and indirect influences of national culture on
military leadership and teamwork?
• How do we train and educate individuals, leaders, and teams (military
and non-military) on how to adapt their behaviour, as necessary, to avoid
frustration, distrust, conflict, etc.?
2.0 CULTURE, VALUES, AND BEHAVIOUR
Culture is the totality of socially transmitted behaviour patterns, arts,
institutions, and all other products of human work and thought typical of a
population or community at any given time. It is the acquired knowledge
used to interpret experience, form values, create attitudes and influence
behaviour. Culture is derived from collective experiences arising from
group´s social, political, and physical surroundings.
Values are basic convictions that people have regarding what is right
and wrong, good and bad, important and unimportant. Values are relatively
stable, not subject to sudden shifts or impulses of the moment, and serve as
a standard for judging the behaviour of others. Our behaviour reflects both
our culture and our values. Our surface or observable behaviour is impacted
by values and assumptions that are not readily observable.
No matter who we are, we receive information through one of the
five senses – capacities that we are born with. However, that information
passes through a series of filters as our brain processes it. The work of
Klein, Pongonis, and Klein provided a “Cultural Lens” model for looking
at performance improvement on culturally diverse teams (Klein, Pongonis,
& Klein, 2000). The work suggests that interactions among members of
multinational teams will improve if team members could see the world
through each other´s eyes.
We all have our own patterns of thinking; feeling; and acting which we
learned throughout our lifetime. Many of these filters been acquired in early
childhood, because that is when we are most susceptible to learning and
assimilating. Once patterns of thinking; feeling and acting have established
themselves; we must unlearn these before we can learn something different;
and unlearning is more difficult than learning for the first time. Research has
identified national group differences in cognitions associated with thinking
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Norenzayan & Nesbett, 2000).
Interpretation and evaluation of communications and events, a problem
inherent in multicultural teamwork, is a barrier to cultural adaptability.
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We are all subject to selective exposure (seeing what we want to see),
selective attention (paying attention to things that are important to us, and
selective retention (remembering what we want to remember). People tend
to categorise their experiences, make assumptions about those experiences,
and then draw conclusions regarding those experiences. For example if you
were asked to “picture a fire” what do you imagine? Some people would
see a camp fire while others might see a fireplace in a home or ski lodge and
still others might see a house burning or a field on fire.
These structured categories help individuals identify the same
phenomenon through time. People categorise so that they may respond
quickly and appropriately when in similar situations (Korzenny, 1984).
Categorised information is framed within one’s own cultural context.
Meaning is assigned to the categories and thinking, then, falls into embedded
patterns. Therefore, assumptions about communications, people, and events
may be inaccurate if the information was categorised incorrectly initially.
Stereotyping is a form of categorisation that inhibits cultural adaptability
when it is maintained in the face of contradictory experience and is used to
evaluate others.
3.0 CULTURE TYPES AND IMPACTS
There are many different types of culture. We often think of culture as
the easily observable traits such as language, dress, and food; however,
the unobservable traits may be the most important ones. Culture is shared
(based on interaction), learned not inherited, evolves over time and consists
of both observable and unobservable characteristics. There is no right or
wrong culture – just cultures that are different from ours. Our cultural
background helps us interpret experience, form values, create attitudes, and
it influences our behaviour.
National culture is the one that is probably the most obvious since it
consists of readily observable traits such as customs and values associated
with where we were born and raised as well as unobservable traits such as
power relationships, attitudes, and expectations. In addition to culture that
emerges from shared national experiences, cultural experiences emerge in
organisations or professions. These cultures are learned, can have many
subgroups and are about “how we do things around here.”
Organisational cultures also have a high impact on our behaviour. People
dress and act differently if they work for a large corporation like Deutsche
Bank or IBM than if they work for Green Peace or McDonalds. Within the
military there are different cultures for the different branches and even for
different jobs in the same branch. Within military subcultures are air, land,
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maritime, special operations, intelligence, etc. NATO has an organisational
culture with subgroups including civilian and military cultures.
So before our brains even get to the information processing stage, the
information received has been filtered through both observable and nonobservable cultural filters. These cultural dimensions impact our reasoning
and judgment thus affecting our situation awareness and our ability to detect
and solve problems. Thus, one of the first problems that we have in sharing
information and establishing shared situational awareness is that none of us
sees the same piece of information in the same way because our “cultural
lens” filters what we see and how we interpret it. We don’t see things as
they are; we see them as we are.
Our behaviour is shaped by history, religion, ethnic identity, language,
and evolves in response to various outside pressures and influences. These
behaviours and cultural biases can either enhance or damage mission execution.
The ability to adapt, as necessary, to differences in cultural influences on
behaviour is a key success factor for effective multinational teams.
We can’t escape our cultural background but we can recognise the role of
culture and develop an appreciation for the cultural backgrounds of others.
Thus, the ability to adapt, as necessary, to differences in cultural influences
on behaviour is a key success factor for effective multinational teamwork.
When team members carry different culturally shaped expectations for
roles and team processes it can make it more difficult to interpret and
match commander’s intent (Granrose & Oskamp, 1997). Leaders and team
members need cultural awareness to have knowledge of an adversary’s or
allies’ motivation, intent, and will. A “culturally competent” person would
attempt to look through another person’s “cultural lens” and understand the
need to adapt their behaviour, as necessary, to ensure mission success. In
fact, a key point here is to note is that people can adapt their own behaviour
rather than expecting the other person to adapt.
The following example, contributed by Meridian Eaton Global, illustrates
three very different perspectives based on both national and organisational
culture.
From a German officer: “In my country, you speak up only if you have
something important to add; silence is okay. In the U.S., however, people
seem to feel it’s bad to be silent, and they will speak up, in a meeting for
example just to let others know that they are there. Many of us interpret this
behaviour of the Americans as either stupidity or arrogance…”
From a British officer: “Why don’t the Americans down the hall just
come and talk to me! They often leave me a voicemail instead of walking
69
10 seconds to my desk or calling to speak to me directly, even when they
know that I’m here…This seems very cold and impersonal to me.”
From an American officer: “I know I’ve been accused by my colleagues
of leaving them too many voicemails, but from my perspective it’s simply a
way of not interrupting them and giving them a message that they can listen
to when they have time to deal with it.”
Nowhere is the cultural diversity inherent in multinational teams more
prevalent than at the operational level. Joint Task Force teams often have the
capacity for more creative approaches to problem solving, but they can also
experience difficulties in coordination, aligning team members to complete
tasks, and error-checking. In these culturally diverse groups, failure to
understand the impact of culture on thoughts and behaviour often results in
distrust, confused priorities, frustration, misunderstanding, even conflicting
goals. Truly culturally adaptive leaders and teams have the ability to think
and adapt faster than the enemy and to enable effective collaboration with
coalition partners, especially in environments of uncertainty and ambiguity,
and unfamiliar cultural circumstances.
Individuals can have significantly different culturally based cognitive
biases that influence their behaviour. In concert with cognitive biases of
others, these behaviours will either enhance or damage team performance.
Leaders and team members who recognise those biases and understand
the implication of culture’s impact on situation assessment, coordination,
assigning of roles and responsibilities, and support behaviour are better
prepared to adapt, as needed, to ensure mission success.
Understanding the relationship between culture, behaviour and teamwork,
and mission performance is critical. “Using one’s own cultural standards to
evaluate the behaviours of other cultural groups occurs more frequently than
misperception or misinterpretation of communications, people, situations,
and events” (Adler, 1986). The link between culture and teamwork is made
when it is understood that culturally based cognitive biases can influence
behaviour that will ultimately enable, or hinder, team performance.
Cultural differences may be seen within a team context. Pierce (2002)
proposed that situation assessment, coordination, roles and responsibilities,
and support behaviour are four fundamental aspects of team performance
that are consistent across teams, multinational or not. Complexity introduced
by culture can affect:
• Information exchange including information about member
resources and constraints, team tasks and goals or mission, environmental
characteristics and constraints, or priority assignment among subtasks;
70
• Coordination of responses with task timing requirements or with
responses of other members, including activity pacing, response sequencing,
and time and position coordination;
• Assigning roles and responsibilities such as the need for role interchange
and the matching of member resources, skills, abilities, prior knowledge,
task information, numbers, etc., to subtask requirements.; and
• Support behaviour that are the processes of monitoring individual
and team activity, identifying problems, and adjusting team and member
activities in response to errors and omissions or the attainment or lack of
attainment of standards of performance.
All of the elements above contribute to effective teamwork and mission
execution. The inability to adapt, as needed, to the influences of culture on
thoughts and behaviour can result in imperfect situational awareness, which
can lead to inaccurate situation assessment, and flawed or delayed decision
making. Understanding other cultural perspectives provides a foundation
for dealing with cultural diversity in multinational teams. What can be
done to help develop cultural adaptability?
4.0 TRAINING CULTURAL ADAPTABILITY
Cultural adaptability refers to the ability to understand one’s own and
others’ cognitive biases and to adapt, as necessary, to ensure successful
team performance. This skill is comprised of three components: cultural
competence, teamwork, and the desire and ability to adapt your behaviour.
The foundation of cultural adaptability is cultural competence.
Cultural competence is the ability to recognise that influences of thoughts
and predisposition to action frequently have deep cultural roots. It is an
understanding of the dominant values and orientations of each culture,
keeping in mind that those values and orientations are not predictive of
behaviour but do provide a guiding model.
The second component of cultural adaptability is teamwork. Whether
multinational or not, there are fundamental aspects of performance that are
consistent across teams.
There are two facets to adaptability, the third component of cultural
adaptability. After recognising culturally based behaviours (i.e., cultural
competence) and understanding the implication of those behaviours (i.e.,
teamwork), truly adaptable individuals (1) have knowledge about how
to adapt their own behaviour when working with others whose culture is
not their own, and (2) make a personal choice to adapt their behaviour, as
needed, to enable effective teamwork.
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The GlobeSmart® Commander is an instructional tool designed to
provide military teams performing command and control functions at the
operational level with the information and skills they need to adapt. This
web-based tool was developed through a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) Concept Development and Experimentation project. The techniques
demonstrated to improve cultural adaptability can be applied across the
broad spectrum of uses including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping
operations, counter-terrorism, and crisis management.
The GlobeSmart Commander provides the flexibility to serve
decentralised, distributed, and highly mobile coalition headquarters as well
as multicultural staff in centralised, co-located, and stationary headquarters.
It facilitates a shortened learning curve for “coming-up-to-speed” when
working in multinational environments and enables assessment of team
effectiveness. Trainees can determine where they lie within each range of
the six cultural dimensions addressed in the training that impact ways of
working and performance. The dimensions reflect culturally-based values
identified in the culture research literature and are:
• Group Orientation (Independent vs. Interdependent) refers to preference
for individual initiative and action or emphasises the interests of the team as
a whole. Independent refers to an orientation to taking individual initiative
and action. Interdependent refers to a more group-oriented approach to task
completion, among other things, emphasising the interests of the team as a
whole over individual needs or interests.
• Power Distance (Egalitarian vs. Status) shapes preference for mutual
consultation in decision making (i.e., an egalitarian relationship orientation)
or for a greater deference to rank and hierarchy (i.e., a hierarchical
relationship orientation).
• Decision Risk Orientation shapes preference for rapid action and risktaking (i.e., risk orientation) or for more cautious, calculated actions based
on ample information (i.e., restraint orientation).
• Task Accomplishment Methodology refers to a preference for
immediate attention to getting the job done with less attention paid to
establishing trusting relationships with others in order to accomplish the
task or for establishing strong, trusting relationships within the team as a
pre-requisite to task accomplishment.
• Communication Style refers to a preference for direct, open and explicit
communication or for more indirect communication with others where careful
attention is paid to context or to implicit meanings in a given message.
• Time Orientation refers to a preference for making choices on a
narrow time-horizon (i.e., short-term time orientation) or for considering
72
the impact that choices will have over a longer span of time (i.e., long-term
time orientation.
The GlobeSmart® Commander computer-based training provides:
• An introductory lesson to raise awareness of the impact of culture
on individual and team performance including examples from the field in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and at subsequent multinational exercises;
• A survey to identify one’s preferred style with regard to the behavioural
dimensions discussed above (developed by Meridian Eaton Global with the
assistance of Dr. David Matsumoto at San Francisco State University)
• Creation of an individual’s profile representing each of the six
dimensions;
• Six behavioural learning modules and one team training module;
• The ability to learn about culturally-based behavioural profiles of
many nations represented in the National Atlantic Treaty Organisation and
Partnership for Peace as well as selected other nations.
Each module begins with a video scene in which it is demonstrated
how cultural differences can have a negative impact on team performance.
A narrator then explains the key differences between the two sides of
the particular cultural dimension represented in the model. For example,
one video presents what can happen when one person has a direct style
of communicating and another has an indirect communication style. The
student is then allowed to look at that situation from both viewpoints
and learn how the difficult situation could have been avoided. A series
of interactive exercises is included in the training to ensure that students
understand and can apply the lessons learned. The training highlights
the importance of developing relationships and the impact that the
perceived lack of trust based on cultural differences has on overall team
performance.
Ultimately, GlobeSmart® Commander teaches students how to
recognise that certain behaviours can be culturally based and not indicative
of personality or other personal characteristics of an individual. Better yet,
the student will learn how to deal effectively with others whose viewpoint
for decision-making or problem-solving is different from their own.
5.0 REFERENCES
[1] Adler, N. J. (1986). International dimensions of organisational
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objective force.army.mil/pages/OFin2015WhitePaper(final).pdf.
[15] Pierce, L. G. (2002). Barriers to adaptability in a multinational
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Annual Meeting, 225-229.
[16] Pierce, L. & Pomranky, R. (2001). The Chameleon Project for
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adaptable commanders and teams. Proceedings of the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society 45th Annual Meeting, 513-517.
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[19] Sutton, J. L., & Gundling, E. (2005). Enabling Cultural Adaptability.
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[20] Sutton, J. L., & Pierce, L. G. (2003). A framework for understanding
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75
THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE ORGANISATION:
LEADERSHIP, TRAINING, AND ROTATION PRACTICES
Dr. Ann-Renee Blais
Defence Research and
Development Canada, Toronto
1133 Sheppard Ave W., P.O. Box 2000
Toronto, ON M3M 3B9
CANADA
[email protected]
Dr. Delphine Resteigne
Chair of Sociology
Royal Military Academy
Avenue de la Renaissance 30
1000 Brussels
BELGIUM
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
Our focus here will be on the people factor within the framework put forward by
the NATO HFM-163 Task Group (i.e., improving the Organisational Effectiveness
of Coalition Operations). After describing the theoretical model, focusing on the
people factor (i.e., leadership, training, and rotation practices) specifically, as
well as summarising the method, we will briefly describe and discuss the results
obtained via a mixed-methods approach (i.e., a questionnaire and semi-structured
interviews) at KFOR HQ (Kosovo). We will conclude with some implications for
practice.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Review of the Theoretical Model
The NATO HFM-163 Task Group (TG), drawing from the input of
subject matter experts (SMEs) (Yanakiev, Lichacz, & Paris, 2012) and a
review of the literature (Bisig, Hof, Valaker, Tresch, Seiler, & Bjornstad,
2012), defined organisational effectiveness in NATO HQs as “...the degree of
fit, or alignment, among various dimensions of organisational effectiveness
such as organisational structure, processes, people, and culture towards
the achievement of a main goal” (Bisig et al., 2012, p. 6). The TG also
identified two official goals of NATO HQs: (a) implementing Non-Article
5 crisis response operations, and (b) providing effective Command and
Control to the troops on the ground (Bisig et al., 2012). Because official
goals are not always readily assessable (Bisig et al., 2012), however, the
TG further defined three operative goals (i.e., goals that management can
use to evaluate organisational effectiveness): (a) the effective and timely
sharing of information, (b) effective and timely decision making, and (c)
an improved shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (see Bisig et al.,
2012 for more detail).
76
Effective organisations ensure their official and operative goals are
aligned both in terms of their fit with the external environment and in
terms of their fit with other factors internal to the organisation (Bisig et al.,
2012). Consequently, the NATO HFM-163 TG identified, from a review of
existing models of organisational effectiveness (Bisig et al., 2012) as well
as from SMEs’ experience with organisational effectiveness in NATO HQs
(Yanakiev et al., 2012), four broad categories of internal factors particularly
relevant to NATO HQs: (a) structure, (b) processes, (c) people, and (d)
culture. Previous research has shown that these factors must be aligned
towards the operative goals in order for the official goals to be reached
effectively (Bisig et al., 2012). Therefore, NATO HQs’ decisions with
respect to their structure, processes, people, and culture ought to be in line
with their operative goals. Figure 1 illustrates this theoretical model.
Figure 1: Model of Organisational Effectiveness
(Bisig et al., 2012, p. 7, adapted)
1.2 The Role of the People in the Organisation
The people factor, fundamental to the effectiveness of an organisation,
and a crucial factor in many effectiveness models (Bisig et al., 2012), is
the focus of this paper. Following upon the feedback of SMEs (Yanakiev
et al., 2012), the NATO HFM-163 TG paid particular attention to the subcategories leadership, training, and rotation practices.
1.2.1 Leadership
In discussion with the NATO HFM-163 TG, SMEs mentioned the
effectiveness of a HQ is, for the most part, a matter of leadership style (Bisig et
al., 2012; Yanakiev et al., 2012). This finding is in line with the work of Bass
and Avolio, and colleagues (e.g., Bass & Avolio, 1994), who have studied the
impact of leadership style on organisational effectiveness extensively.
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Transformational leaders enhance the morals, motivation, and morale
of their followers (vs. transactional leaders, who attend to their followers’
immediate self-interests (Bass, 1999). In fact, transformational leadership
entails moving followers beyond their immediate self-interests through
charisma, inspiration, individualised consideration, or intellectual
stimulation; it strives to elevate followers’ maturity levels, ideals, as well as
their concerns for achievement, self-actualisation, and the wellbeing of others,
the organisation, and society (Bass, 1994). The notions of transformational
and transactional leadership can refer to teams or organisations as a whole;
for example, members of transformational teams inspire each other, care
about each other, and identify with their team’s goals, and organisational
practices and policies can stimulate employee empowerment, esprit de
corps, and creative flexibility (Bass, 1994).
A transformational leadership style has been associated with a long list of
desirable individual- and organisational level outcomes, such as followers’
greater satisfaction with their leader, accrued effort, and increased ratings
of leadership effectiveness (Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996). It
also has been related to follower performance at the individual, group, and
business unit levels (Howell & Avolio, 1993; Judge & Bono, 2000; Pillai
& Meindl, 1998). Moreover, followers of transformational leaders typically
display greater trust in their leaders and greater job satisfaction (Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, & Bommer, 1996), as well as greater commitment to their
organisations (Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 1996).
With no doubt, the multinational aspect of leadership is critical in the
context of NATO HQs. Leaders interacting with subordinates from the same
cultural background tend to agree with their subordinates insofar as authority,
objectives, responsibilities, possible courses of action, etc., are concerned, and
as a result, the interactions normally are mutually satisfying and successful
(Bisig et al., 2012). However, when the leader and subordinates come from
different cultural backgrounds, their notions of leading and following tend to
collide (Kьhlmann, 2005, as cited in Bisig et al., 2012). However, Bisig and
colleagues noted that, within the context of transformation leadership, there is
no need for cultural congruence; for example, Bass (1997; as cited in Bisig et al.,
2012) showed transformational leadership was the (perceived) ideal leadership
style not only in the United States, but also in such diverse countries/cultures
as Canada, India, Japan, the Netherlands, and Singapore, and was consistently
a greater predictor of success than were other leadership styles.
1.2.2 Training
The NATO HFM-163 TG identified training as another crucial factor
in their model of organisational effectiveness (Bisig et al., 2012; Yanakiev
78
et al., 2012). The lack of proper training specific to working in coalition
operations might be an impediment to organisational effectiveness in NATO
HQs; indeed, Bisig et al. noted that, without adequate pre-deployment
training, individuals lack key competencies (e.g., situational and cultural
awareness) and end up working with virtual strangers without first having
been able to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities. The authors
further speculated training is most likely to have a meaningful impact on
the HQ’s operative goals when delivered within a job-specific and skillsfocused context; for example, they argued that an important aspect of NATO
pre-deployment training is the process of team building, because teams in
multinational HQs are typically heterogeneous.
As stated in Bisig et al. (2012), research on team heterogeneity and
diversity has resulted into mixed findings. While some authors have
linked increased diversity to superior performance (perhaps in part because
heterogeneous teams possess greater potential and richer perspectives),
others have argued that increased diversity is associated with a lack of
integration and greater dissatisfaction and hence has a negative impact
on team effectiveness. Thus, heterogeneity appears to be influencing
effectiveness via multiple channels that can be either performance enhancing
(e.g., diversity, creativity) or reducing (e.g., low cohesion; see Bisig et al.,
2012 for a more comprehensive review).
Despite this conflicting evidence, the NATO HFM-163 TG highlighted
the importance of pre-deployment training in promoting team cohesion as a
mechanism to foster the innovative and creative potential of diverse teams.
Bisig et al. (2012) noted that, even though future team members normally
know their hierarchical position and task(s) during deployment, their
integration only begins when they deploy (Ilgen, LePine, & Hollenbeck,
1999, as cited in Bisig et al., 2012). Bisig et al. argued that, without
integration, team members cannot embrace the interpersonal activity that
leads to shared awareness and collective strength, thus their participation
is essential and should be encouraged as early as the pre-deployment
training stage (Barzantny, 2005, as cited in Bisig et al., 2012). Beginning
at that stage, the development of shared perceptions, attitudes, and values
can lead, over time, to shared interpretations and understanding, thereby
reducing potential misunderstandings (Maanen & Schein, 1979, in Bisig
et al., 2012). It is worth noting, however, that this process requires some
time and may only be possible in the long run; thus, it is likely more easily
achievable for nations that have longer deployments/rotations than it is for
those nations that have shorter ones.
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1.2.3 Rotation Practices
As a result of discussions with SMEs, the NATO HFM-163 TG identified
rotation practices in NATO HQs as another potential barrier to organisational
effectiveness; the SMEs mentioned several problematic aspects of these
practices including the absence of handover/mentoring programs, transition
gaps, and the lack of synchronisation in national rotations (Bisig et al., 2012;
Yanakiev et al., 2012).
Studies on personnel rotation have revealed a number of possible causes
for the negative impact of rotation practices on performance, according to
Bisig et al. (2012). Hartman, Stoner, and Arora (1992, as cited in Bisig et
al., 2012), for example, showed that newcomers have to acquire knowledge
and skills concerning structure, processes, and equipment after each rotation.
In addition, new members of the NATO HQ can experience frustration,
isolation, and deprivation of a group identity (Harpaz, 2002, as cited in
Bisig et al., 2012) or difficulties in adopting new social structures and rules
(DeSanctic & Poole, 1994; Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994, as cited in Bisig et al.,
2012) which, as a result, can lead to lower organisational effectiveness.
1.3 Hypotheses
Insofar as the people input factor is concerned, the NATO HFM163 TG hypothesised that, in order for a NATO HQ to have a greater
likelihood of attaining its three operative goals, its leadership must endorse
a transformational style, its staff must actively participate in NATO predeployment training, and its rotation practices must be coordinated (a
comprehensive handover must also be assured (Bisig et al., 2012).
2.0 METHOD
This section briefly describes the materials, participants, and procedures
used by the NATO HFM-163 TG to collect data via a mixed-methods (i.e.,
quantitative and qualitative) approach (see Blais et al., 2012, for more detail).
2.1 Questionnaire
2.1.1 Materials
The 89-item questionnaire included several background questions
pertaining to the participant’s age, sex, nationality, first language, rank
(if military), etc., and items designed to adequately represent/cover all of
the input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and culture) and output (i.e.,
operative goals) factors in the theoretical model previously described (see
Figure 1; for more information on the full content of the questionnaire, see
Blais et al., 2012).
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As described extensively in Blais et al. (2012), with respect to the people
factor, the participants rated the level of transformational leadership (e.g.,
“My superior consistently drives for better outcomes.”) and the efficiency
of the rotation practices (e.g., “The different rotation cycles reduce our
performance.”) within the HQ. Those participants who had taken part in
NATO or national pre-deployment training prior to joining the HQ also
evaluated the effectiveness of their pre-deployment training in preparing
them for their work in the HQ (e.g., “Pre-deployment training helped me
understand the informal social network”, Blais et al., 2012).
With respect to the output factors, the participants evaluated the
effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “We seek
information as needed.”) and decision making (e.g., “Organisational
decisions are made in a timely manner.”) within the HQ, as well as the
shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (e.g., “The mission is clear”,
Blais et al., 2012).
2.1.2 Participants and Procedure
One hundred and three military members (as well as 33 civilian KFOR
HQ personnel, but these results will not be discussed further here), citizens
of 24 NATO and PfP countries, and originating from various HQ branches
completed the questionnaire (see Blais et al., 2012, for more detail regarding
the demographic composition of the sample).
Data collection took place in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine,
Kosovo (refer to Blais et al., 2012, for more information on the procedure).
The participants completed the questionnaire in a conference facility in
groups of approximately 25 participants. The chair of NATO HFM RTG163 introduced the multinational research team as well as the goals of the
research. He also informed the participants the survey was completely
anonymous and their participation was entirely voluntary. Each testing
session lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes.
2.2 Interviews
2.2.1 Materials
In line with the questionnaire, the semi-structured interview protocol
tapped into the theoretical model previously described (see Figure 1). It
included background questions as well as items pertaining to the input and
output factors (for more information on the full content of the protocol, see
Blais et al., 2012).
The interviewers asked the participants to describe the HQ with respect
to each input factor, including leadership (e.g., “How would you describe the
81
leadership in this HQ? By leadership we mean how the leader communicates
and interacts with his subordinates.”), training, (e.g., “What kind of predeployment training did you receive [national, NATO, other, none]?”), and
rotation practices (e.g., “Briefly describe the rotation process in this HQ.”).
In addition, the interviewers inquired about unique aspects of the factor (e.g.,
“Does the leadership style vary [nations, branches, persons, situations]?,”
“What works well/not so well?”, “Could you give some examples?”).
The interviewers asked the participant to share their perceptions in regards
to the effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “How does
information sharing work in this HQ?”) and decision making (e.g., “How
does decision making work in this HQ?”) within the HQ and the level of
shared awareness (e.g., “To what extent is there a shared awareness of tasks
and responsibilities in this HQ?”) within the HQ. The interviewers probed
for additional information by asking: (a) what worked (i.e., in terms of the
output factor) well/did not and why; (b) about the most critical aspect(s)
(i.e., in terms of the input factors) influencing (positively or negatively) the
output factor; and (c) how the output factor could be improved.
2.2.2 Participants and Procedure
As with the questionnaire data, the qualitative data collection took place
over five days in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo (refer to
Blais et al., 2012, for more information on the procedure). Members of
the NATO RTO HFM-163 TG conducted a total of 15 interviews, with the
participants being mainly at the Assistant Chief of Staff level, covering J1J5, J8, Headquarters Support Group, different structures of the MCA, and
JIC. Thirteen of the participants were military officers (i.e., Colonel or Lt
Colonel), and the participants were citizen of 10 NATO and PfP nations.
The interviewers worked in pairs: One of them asked the questions,
while the other researcher recorded the interview and asked additional
questions as needed. Before starting the interview, the interviewers
informed the participant the interview was completely anonymous and their
participation was entirely voluntary, and they asked for the participant’s
permission to be audio-recorded. Each interview lasted approximately 45
to 60 minutes.
3.0 RESULTS
3.1 Questionnaire
As shown in Figure 2, the 103 participants rated the HQ as above
average (i.e., with “average” being about 2.5 out of 5) with respect to
the effectiveness of its rotation practices and its level of transformational
82
leadership (Blais et al., 2012). Of those 103 participants, the 73 participants
who had taken part in some form of pre-deployment training (i.e., NATO or
national) evaluated that training as above average (Blais et al., 2012). As
Figure 3 displays, participants perceived the KFOR HQ as operating with
above average effectiveness and timeliness insofar as information sharing
and decision making were concerned, as well with above average levels of
shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (Blais et al., 2012).
Figure 2: Mean Ratings on the Input Factors
(N = 103; Blais, Lyons, Bjornstad, & Moeser-Whittle, 2012)
Figure 3: Mean Ratings on the Operative Goals (N = 103; Blais et al., 2012)
83
The results associated with the quantitative data modelling showed a
greater level of transformational leadership was predictive of more effective
and timely information sharing and decision making within the NATO
HQ (but there were no relationships between these factors and the level
of shared awareness within the HQ; see Blais et al., 2012, for more detail
regarding the multiple regression analyses. Contrary to the hypotheses,
rotating practices were not related to the operative goals (Blais et al., 2012).
For those participants who had taken part into some form (i.e., NATO or
national) of pre-deployment training prior to joining the HQ, more effective
training was indicative of more effective and timely decision making within
the HQ (but there were no relationships between training effectiveness and
the other operative goals (Blais et al., 2012).
3.2 Interviews
3.2.1 Leadership
According to Bisig, Granasen, Valaker, and Marklund (2012), the
participants (i.e., interviewees) had a very positive view of the leadership
at NATO HQ. They referred to the highest-level leadership in a positive
fashion, describing it as rather formal and typical of a military HQ
with a clearly-defined chain of command and rules (Bisig et al., 2012).
Within the branch, they described the leadership style as less formal as
well as “inclusive,” “respectful,” and “supportive,” among other positive
characteristics, and several participants emphasized their superiors were
approachable and open to suggestions prior to making decisions (Bisig et
al., 2012, p. 7). The interviewees also highlighted that not only did their
superiors encouraged discussion (e.g., open discussion could take place
without rank being a factor within this HQ) but also offered guidance and
enough time to solve tasks (Bisig et al., 2012). On the other end, Bisig et
al. noted that one of the participants felt military members did not easily
accept civilians, leading to communication problems between civilian and
military personnel.
As a further example of effective leadership, Bisig et al. (2012) reported
that some of the participants mentioned the Commander’s daily briefings,
which, according to the interviewees, contributed to a common view of
priorities, a better understanding of the Commander’s intent, and a forum
for information sharing. Several of the participants mentioned the sharing
of information and interactions as crucial aspects of effective leadership.
For example, one of the participants pointed out that information sharing
ought to be better in multinational HQs than in national HQs as a result of
the frequent rotations in multinational HQs (Bising et al., 2012).
84
3.2.2 Training
Because pre-deployment training is a national responsibility, the extent
and quality of the training received obviously differed between participants.
Bisig et al. (2012) reported that some of the participants had taken part
in national training only, while other had received both national and
international training. Prior to being deployed, most of the participants
had completed the two-week KFOR Key Leader Training course located at
the KFOR HQ, according to Bisig et al.; this training was well received, in
that the participants thought it facilitated the early days of deployment, and
many of them stated the course should be mandatory.
The interviewees discussed training in light of personal experience
and of whether or not the position was a staff or field position, with field
positions requiring more training (Bisig et al., 2012). They stressed that
training should be mandatory given the constant changes in the HQ, however
they also recognized that second or third deployments required less training
(Bisig et al., 2012). Insofar as the content of pre-deployment training was
concerned, the participants mentioned cultural training, training regarding
the political situation in Kosovo, training pertaining to the structure and
operations of KFOR as well as to the technical resources available in the
HQ, and time management and language (for non-native English speakers)
training would be highly desirable, according to Bisig et al.
3.2.3 Rotation Practices
Bisig et al. (2012) noted that most of the participants had experienced
a handover/takeover (HOTO) period of one to two weeks: For those
participants who had taken part in a two-week HOTO, they typically took a
“back-seat” role (i.e., mainly observing what their predecessor was doing)
in the first week and switched places with their predecessor in the second
week, doing most of the work under supervision.
However, the time committed to the HOTO, as well as its process,
varied between nations (Bisig et al., 2012). The participants considered
two weeks to be sufficient, and some even mentioned one week might be
enough provided new personnel had previous deployment experience (Bisig
et al., 2012). According to Bisig et al., one of the participants stressed that
administrative in- and out-processing issues were very time consuming, and
that, in the case of a two-week HOTO, half of that time was spent dealing
with such issues.
The interviewees expressed the general opinion that the HOTO process
together with the short rotation cycles reduced the effectiveness of the HQ
by impeding institutional memory, which in turn increased the time required
85
to learn the work (Bisig et al., 2012). The participants in the MCA division
felt this is was particularly true in their case, given their close personal
relationship with the members of the Kosovo Security Forces (Bisig et
al., 2012). According to Bisig et al., they stressed that developing these
relationships was especially challenging in this context, because nations
did not always send personnel with the right competencies, and because the
assignments were simply too short.
On the positive side, one of the participants expressed the opinion that
rotations were positive in that they brought “new eyes and new solutions”
to the HQ (Bisig et al., 2012, p. 9). However, the interviewees’ opinions
diverged with respect to whether or not rotations should be concentrated
to a few times a year or evenly spread out by branch (Bisig et al., 2012).
They mentioned that, in the MCA division, for example, evenly-spread
rotations were necessary due to the need to maintain good relations with
the Kosovo Security Forces; other participants believed that if the rotations
were concentrated to a few times a year, efficiency would be improved in
the HQ (Bisig et al., 2012). Of note, one of the participants stressed the
Chief and Deputy should not rotate at the same time (Bisig et al., 2012).
In closing, Bisig et al. (2012) emphasised the importance of well-trained
personnel matching the demands of their job, deployment experience, and
well-planned and sufficiently long HOTO periods as critical in fostering an
effective HQ, despite its ever-changing personnel.
3.2.4 Relations to Operative Goals
According to Bisig et al. (2012), the participants linked effective
leadership to increased information sharing through the Commander’s
daily briefings (see Figure 4 for a representation of this relationship), to
improved decision making through openness to suggestions/opinions and
sufficient time to solve tasks, as well as to greater shared awareness of
tasks and responsibilities also through the briefings, which the participants
thought helped create a common picture of priorities and understanding of
the Commander’s intent.
As far as pre-deployment training was concerned, the participants in
Bisig et al. (2012) highlighted its positive impact on the rotation practices;
they believed training reduced the loss of effectiveness during the HOLO
period. The participants also stressed training led to a better understanding
of the structure and processes of the HQ thereby increasing shared awareness
of tasks and responsibilities (Bisig et al., 2012).
86
Figure 4. The Relationships between Leadership and the Operative Goals
(Bisig et al., 2012, p. 8)
With respect to rotation practices, the participants brought up their
negative impact on information sharing, due to organisational memory
loss; they also stressed that information sharing ought to be more effective
in multinational (vs. national) HQs because of the frequent rotations in
multinational HQs (Bisig et al., 2012). Even though rotation practices
had a positive impact on decision making trough a regular input of fresh
perspectives, they also resulted into a negative impact on decision making
in the cases where the Chief and Deputy rotated in/out simultaneously
(Bisig et al., 2012). Lastly, according to Bisig et al., the participants stressed
the negative effect of rotation practices on the shared awareness of tasks
and responsibilities, in that they, again, linked rotations to organisational
memory loss.
3.2.5 Suggestions for Improvement
At the end of the interview, each participant had the opportunity to make
suggestions as to how to improve the effectiveness of the HQ. Bisig et al.
(2012) summarised these suggestions which included, with respect to the
people factor: (a) hold motivational meetings of the Commander with key
leaders/staff where the Commander shares his goals and says “thank you;”
(b) fill positions for at least a year; (c) spread rotations more evenly during
the year; (d) improve training; and (e) send preparation packages to HQ
personnel prior to deployment.
87
4.0 DISCUSSION
The NATO HFM-163 TG aimed to develop and test a model of
organisational effectiveness in operational NATO HQs via a multi-methods
approach. The model described input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and
culture) factors, the operative goals of the organisation (i.e., effective and
timely sharing of information and decision making, and shared awareness
of tasks and responsibilities), and the relationships between the input factors
and operative goals. The TG identified the four categories of input factors
and the three operative goals based upon interviews with SMEs (Yanakiev
et al., 2012) and existing general and military models of organisational
effectiveness (Bisig et al., 2012), also emphasising factors of particular
relevance to military HQs (e.g., rotation practices) (Valaker et al., 2012).
With respect to the people factor in particular, the TG hypothesised that,
in order for a NATO HQ to have a greater likelihood of attaining its three
operative goals, its leadership must endorse a transformational style, its
staff must actively participate in NATO pre-deployment training, and its
rotation practices must be coordinated (a comprehensive handover must
also be assured; Bisig et al., 2012).
4.1 Conclusions
In line with the hypotheses, the results associated with the quantitative
data modelling found a greater level of transformational leadership was
predictive of more effective and timely information sharing and decision
making within the NATO HQ (Blais et al., 2012). Blais et al. also reported
that, for those participants who had taken part into some form of predeployment training prior to joining the HQ, more effective training was
indicative of more effective and timely decision making within the HQ.
The qualitative data also reflected the importance of an effective style
of leadership and its ties to the operative goals (Bisig et al., 2012). The
interviewees had a remarkably homogenous view of what they considered
to be effective leadership in the context of a multinational HQ, according to
Bisig et al. In line with the quantitative results, the interviewees believed
effective leadership had a marked positive influence on both information
sharing and decision making (Bisig et al., 2012). This finding resonates
with previous research in that it suggests military leaders are not merely
engaging in planning and analytic thinking (Resteigne and Soeters (2009),
as cited in Valaker et al., 2012), in their study of military leaders at Kabul
Airport, found they often acted based upon their intuition and devoted a lot
of time to building interpersonal relationships.
Another people factor the interviewees particularly focused on was
pre-deployment training as a means to reduce the loss in effectiveness
88
caused by the frequent rotations of personnel (Valaker et al., 2012). They
also emphasized its positive impact on shared awareness of tasks and
responsibilities through its fostering of a common understanding of the
HQ’s structure and processes (Valaker et al., 2012).
4.2 Limitations
The greatest strength of the NATO HFM-163 TG resides without a doubt
in its empirical test of a theoretical model of organisational effectiveness via
a multi-methods approach. Valaker et al. (2012), however, acknowledged
that the work’s focus on the organisational effectiveness of a Coalition’s HQ
implementing Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation and on the internal
processes in this HQ limited the external validity (i.e., generalisability) of
its findings to other contexts. The authors noted that they tested their model
in the relatively peaceful Kosovo and the KFOR HQ, hence high intensity
conflict situation HQs or static HQs may experience very different realities.
Valaker et al. also mentioned causality could not be inferred given the nature
of the data collection; longitudinal data should be collected in the future, with
the relationships between the input and output factors investigated over time.
Furthermore, Valaker et al. stressed the fact that the quantitative analyses
were based upon a single (i.e., self-reporting) method, thereby potentially
reducing the validity of these results, and that the small sample size decreased
the likelihood of finding significant relationships in the data.
4.3 Implications for Practice
Valaker et al. (2012) concluded with practical implications drawn from
the overall work of the NATO HFM-163 TG; for example, they suggested
training in transformational leadership to enhance common attitudes in
NATO HQs. They emphasised the inconsistency in the level of HOLO
information and the difficulty in influencing pre-deployment national
training but noted that expanding key leader training in the HQ to personnel
other than the leaders could help train personnel better (Valaker et al.,
2012). Valaker et al. also suggested the fostering of cohesion and common
understanding through joint, multinational, pre-deployment training for
all personnel and the harmonisation of the rotation cycles among national
positions in the HQ and synchronise the national rotations of troops.
5.0 REFERENCES
[1] Barling, J., Weber, T., & Kelloway, E. K. (1996). Effects of
transformational leadership training on attitudinal and financial outcomes:
A field experiment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81, 827-832.
89
[2] Bass, B. M. (1999). Two decades of research and development in
transformational leadership. European Journal of Work and Organisational
Psychology, 8, 9-32.
[3] Bass, B. M. & Avolio, B. J. (Eds.). (1994). Improving organisational
effectiveness through transformational leadership. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications.
[4] Bisig, E., Granansen, M., Valaker, S., & Marklund, J. (2012).
Chapter 6: Interview Analysis. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.),
Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 6-1 –
6-21). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine,
France: NATO STO.
[5] Bisig, E., Hof, T., Valaker, S., Szvircsev Tresch, T., Seiler, S., &
Bjornstad, A.L. (2012). Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Model. In: Y.
Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of
Coalition Operations (pp. 3-1 – 3-17). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.
[6] Blais, A.-R., Granansen, M., Bisig, E., Bjornstad, A. L., Hof, T.,
Lichacz, F., Lyons, J.J., Moser-Whittle, E. A., Valaker, S., & Yanakiev,
Y. (2012). Chapter 4: Method. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.),
Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 4-1
– 4-6). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine,
France: NATO STO.
[7] Blais, A.-R., Lyons, J.J., Bjornstad, A.L., & Moser-Whittle,
E.A. (2012). Chapter 5: Results. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.),
Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 5-1 –
5-13). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine,
France: NATO STO.
[8] Howell, J. M., & Frost, P.J. (1989). A laboratory study of charismatic
leadership. Organisational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 43,
243-269.
[9] Judge, T. A., & Bono, J. E. (2000). Five-factor model of personality
and transformational leadership. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 751-765.
[10] Lowe, K. B., Kroeck, K. G., & Sivasubramaniam, N. (1996).
Effectiveness correlates of transformational and transactional leadership: A
meta-analytic review of the MLQ literature. Leadership Quarterly, 7, 385-425.
[11] Pillai, R. & Meindl, J. R. (1998). Context and charisma: A “meso”
level examination of the relationship of organic structure, collectivism, and
crisis to charismatic leadership. Journal of Management, 24, 643-664.
90
[12] Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., & Bommer, W. H. (1996).
Transformational leader behaviors and substitutes for leadership as
determinants of employee satisfaction, commitment, trust, and organisational
citizenship behaviours. Journal of Management, 22, 259-298.
[13] Valaker, S., Blais, A.-R., Granansen, M., Bjornstad, A.L., Lichacz,
F., Yanakiev, Y., Cohen, I., Resteigne, D., & Bisig, E. (2012). Chapter 7:
Discussion. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational
Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 7-1 – 7-8). RTO-TR-HFM-163
AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.
[14] Yanakiev, Y., Lichacz, F., & Paris, C. (2012). Chapter 2: Results
of Subject Matter Expert Focus Group Discussions. In: Y. Yanakiev, &
J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition
Operations (pp. 2-1 – 2-6). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476.
Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.
91
HOW TO REDUCE THE CHALLENGES
OF A MULTINATIONAL CONTEXT?
(IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE)
Capt. (BGR-N) Prof. D. Sc. Yantsislav Yanakiev
82 Evlogi & Hristo Georgievi, Blvd., 1504, Sofia, Bulgaria
G. S. Rakovski National Defence Academy
Defence Advanced Research Institute
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
This paper presents and analyses a number of lessons learned and
implications for the practice regarding possible options to reduce the challenges
of a multinational context. They are summarised in the following groups: (1)
Political-military decision-making when multinational operations are planned and
executed; (2) Professional military education and training for the participants in
multinational operations and missions; (3) Processes improvement strategies in a
multinational HQs; (4) Developing a new organisational culture in the post-modern
Armed Forces; (5) Building up and developing of competences for multicultural
communication; (6) Enhancing the leadership training of military for their
participation in multinational military operations; (7) Enhancing the individual,
organisational and national trust among coalition partners; (8) Specialised
English language training; (9) Development of scientific applied researches for
identification of factors influencing the effectiveness of the integration of the
military in a multinational and multicultural environment. The analysis of the
results from NATO STO HFM Task Group HFM-163 “Improving Organisational
Effectiveness of Coalition Operations” is expected to further deepen theory and
expertise on managing multi-nationality in coalition operations to successfully
meet the desired end state of these operations.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
During the post-Cold War era there has been a significant increase in
the number of military operations that involving many nations willing to
contribute forces as part of multinational coalitions. These coalitions have
to execute a variety of operations like peacekeeping, peace enforcement,
anti-terrorist, conflict prevention, restoring stability, search and rescue,
humanitarian aid, etc.
The process of internationalisation of the military, participating in
coalition operations and multinational formations like NATO Rapid
92
Reaction Force is among the most important distinctiveness of the postmodern defence organisations (Moskos, Williams & Segal, 2000).
Researchers and practitioners agree that the political legitimacy of a
given operation, the acceptance by the local population and the costeffectiveness of the mission are among the most important advantages of
these multinational coalitions. At the same time, the effectiveness of the
multinational forces has been a controversial issue over a long period of
time. Recent studies show that the main turbulences that could diminish the
effectiveness of international coalitions are different goals, differences in
logistics, education and training of troops, different doctrines, intelligence
sharing and language barriers as well as leadership skills (Stewart, et al.,
2004; Soeters & Szvircsev Tresch, 2010). In addition, different national and
organisational cultures, concepts of tactics and mission planning, different
disciplinary codes, different command and control systems, equipment and
armament, and payment differences can be viewed as challenges to the
coalitions’ effectiveness (Klein & Haltiner, 2005). Moreover, Sutton and
Pierce identified national cultural behaviours associated with high power
distance and high uncertainty avoidance to clearly impact team performance
in the areas of situation assessment, coordination, assigning roles and
responsibilities, and support behaviour (Sutton & Pierce, 2003; Sutton,
Pierce at all., 2006). The factors described above operate as organisational
and cultural barriers to effective collaboration in multinational settings, and
are related, to a large extent, to the preparation of military leaders and teams
to work in a coalition environment.
To summarise, multinational coalition forces are complex assemblies
of people, both military and civilians, representing diverse national and
organisational cultures, with different education and training, doctrines
and concepts, organisational structures, decision-making procedures, etc.
In such a complex situation the question how to manage multinationality
in order to reduce the challenges of a multinational context turns into one
of the most important components of the improved global cooperation in
current and future military operations.
2.0 BACKGROUND
The conclusions and recommendations in this paper are based on 4-year
research project implemented by a multinational research team of NATO
Science and Technology Organization (STO) Task Group Human factors
and Medicine (HFM) -163 “Improving Organisational Effectiveness of
Coalition Operations”. Researchers from 10 NATO, Partnership for peace
(PfP) and Mediterranean Dialog (MD) countries contributed to the team
93
work (Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK and the U.S.). In addition, NATO ex-officio bodies
were represented in the group (NATO School – member, NATO ACT
and NATO Defence College – observers). The entire technical report was
recently published by NATO Science and technology Organisation (STO)
in 2012 and it is available online for any interested colleague (Yanakiev &
Horton (Eds.), 2012).
The analysis of the results from NATO STO Task Group Human Factors
and Medicine (HFM) -163 is expected to further deepen theory and expertise
on managing multi-nationality in coalition operations to successfully meet
the desired end state of these operations.
We believe that the conclusions and recommendations will help
improving political-military decision-making regarding participation of the
military in international coalition operations. Some of the conclusions might
be useful also for improving professional military education and training to
work in multinational environment. The most important of the practical
implication are summarised in the following rows.
3.0 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
A number of implications for the practice regarding possible options
to reduce the challenges of a multinational context can be summed up
in several groups. They are not ordered strictly in accordance with their
importance. The goal was to identify most important factors that enable or
hinder successful multinational cooperation in current military operations
and to apply a system approach to reduce the challenges of multinationality.
In this sense all of the suggestions are equally important and they must be
viewed as system to be adequate to the complex character of the multinational
coalition operations.
The first group of issues concerns political-military decision-making
when multinational operations are planned and executed. First of all, clear
and stable goals and tasks as well as comprehensive approach to doctrines and
concepts are a must to ensure common understanding of mission end-states
among coalition partners. In addition, the effectiveness of coalition operations
strongly depends on reducing the capability and technology gaps amongst the
coalition partners and enhancing the technological interoperability in national
systems to improve information sharing and cooperation among different
contributing nations in the coalition. Last but not least, the decision-makers
should minimise the restrictive national caveats in the employment of the
troops during the operation. This is an important issue that directly influences
the level of trust among the coalition partners.
94
Second group of issues relates to professional military education and
training for the participants in multinational operations and missions.
Having in mind the nature of current military operations, one can identify
joint, multinational and interagency education of the military leaders as
a key factor for coalition operations effectiveness. In addition, cohesion
and a common understanding can be created by joint, multinational predeployment training when possible for all members of the organisation.
Joint efforts and shared experiences create the power. Besides, it would be
useful for the leaders to receive education in broader scale that develops
their social competencies and builds new skills corresponding to the new
tasks performed in these operations. This includes knowledge and skills
how to interact with civilian agencies; how to work with local population
and local authorities in the host country; how to react in hostage situations;
how to restore public order; how to handle media, etc. It is very important
to promote understanding among the military professionals and to help
them identify many actors (diplomatic, military, NGOs, media, etc.) They
should be prepared to assist the work of the civilian organisations and to
understand the way these organisations work. Apart from this, the issue about
developing and maintaining a national system for deriving lessons-learned
and including them into the training of the participants in multinational
operations and missions deserves particular attention.
The third group of practical implications covers processes improvement
strategies in multinational HQs. One of the most important steps is to
facilitate the information sharing as an enabler of organisational effectiveness
within a coalition HQ. This can enhance mutual trust and confidence
among coalition partners. In addition, the synchronisation of the rotation
timeframes among national positions in the HQ and the national rotations
of troops is also factor that can improve the organisational effectiveness of
the multinational formations. Moreover, it is very important to build HQs
as learning organisations, i.e. to improve the organisational knowledge
trough a streamlined lessons learned process. To achieve this goal it would
be useful to introduce an effective mentoring program to support hand-over
procedures for the key command and staff positions in a multinational HQ.
Last but not least, a special attention must be paid on manning and assigning
the right qualified people on the right positions in order to guarantee
the unproblematic integration of the military and civilian personnel in
multinational setting.
The fourth group of recommendations relates to the necessity of
developing a new organisational culture in the post-modern Armed Forces,
which to be interoperable with those of the NATO allies and other coalition
partners. Focus must be on such identified problems as insufficiently
95
developed culture of sharing information with coalition partners, the
existing culture of a fear of making wrong decisions, lack of skills for
creating and developing informal social networks which is important for
the implementation of the tasks of a multinational coalition, etc. This way
the process of improving the human interoperability in coalition operations
will be supported.
The fifth group of recommendations is especially devoted to building
up and developing of competences for multicultural communication, i.e.
of cultural adaptability and cross-cultural competence when working in a
multinational environment. It is highly necessary to undertake actions for
including a specialised training of the military in the subject of multicultural
communication aiming to an open and receptive approach to the foreign
culture of the local population as well as of the colleagues from other
nationalities. Training and developing of cross-cultural competence is to be
an imminent part of the professional military qualification. Attention must
be drawn to the specifics of national and organisational (military) culture of
the coalition partners, the leadership styles of command, system of values,
ethics and morality, habits and customs. Also, the process has to include
a general knowledge of the region of the mission, history and culture of
the local population. This way the military will perform their tasks better
and the local population will accept them easier. Last but not least, the
military leaders should be provided with sufficient information in order to
understand the culture of the adversary, particularly when participate in
counter-terrorist operations. It would be useful to think of the integration
of the existing knowledge in the sphere of the factors which influence the
effectiveness of the work of military in a multinational environment and
the acquired from the practice experience. They should become subjects
in the training focused on the development of cultural adaptability across
NATO-member states and a Joint Publication be offered in order this
training meant to build up and develop multicultural communication
competences in coalition environment to be standardised. Some training
tools have been already developed to improve the quality of cross-cultural
competence enhancement such as GlobeSmart® Commander and CrossCultural Competence Trainer (See: www.globesmartcommander.com;
www.defenseculture.org). Briefly, the cultural adaptability education and
training should become a necessary pre-requisite to take an international
assignment.
The sixth group of recommendations relates to the need of enhance
the leadership training of military for their participation in multinational
military operations. Our study undoubtedly shows that leadership and the
leadership style are among the most important factors which influence
96
upon effectiveness of coalition operations. Sometimes the diametrically
different leadership styles and the systems for training of leaders in the
coalition deserve a special attention. The good leadership is critical for
operational effectiveness. There is a need of strong leader who listen to
people, who can make decisions quickly, and who can make the best of
a bad situation. The leader in multinational operations must be adaptable
to change, i.e. to develop the ability to learn from mistakes and quickly
adjust to the situation. All these impose the necessity of implying effort for
standardising the leadership training in NATO, developing and adopting
common requirements and approaches to training leaders, especially when
they are prepared for participation in coalition operations.
The seventh group of suggestions is focused on the ways to enhance the
individual, organisational and national trust among coalition partners. One
of the statements used most frequently by the respondents in our study is
that the professionalism and responsibility leads to higher respect on behalf
of the colleagues from the other nations. In addition, they think that it is
important everyone to communicate with respect, regardless of the size of
the national contingent, rank and the previous experience in international
missions. Moreover, honesty and openness in relations with foreign
colleagues contributes to the increasing of mutual trust. Likewise, mutual
understanding and support among the colleagues from different nationalities
will be achieved by stimulating social networking and the development of
informal networks. These are among the key factors for improving teamwork
in multinational setting and successful task accomplishment.
The eighths group of recommendations relates to the specialised
language training. Apparently, the specialised language training of the
military is still a problem which impairs their effective integration in a
multinational environment. It would be better if the will to solving this
problem focuses on both, their general language training (e.g. problems
in understanding English spoken by native speaker, use of idioms,
abbreviations, contractions, etc.), as well as culturally differentiated
attitudes when working in a multinational environment. It is crucial the
language to be accepted as a bearer of a specific culture towards which
we tend to adapt. Apart from this, a special attention is to be paid on
the specialised language training (English for Special Purposes) which
to improve the knowledge and skills in using military terminology,
studying documents, forms, procedures, etc. applied in a NATO staff/
mission. Only after overcoming the above-mentioned shortfalls a common
understanding will be assured, which we believe is fundamental for the
successful integration in multinational teamwork.
97
Last but not least in their importance come the recommendations related
with the development of scientific applied researches for identification of
factors influencing the effectiveness of the integration of the military in a
multinational and multicultural environment. One of the core topics that
needs further development is the one connected with the trust between
coalition partners and the factors which influence the formation of this
attitude. This is of a great importance because current research shows
that trust links with the attitude and readiness to share information among
coalition partners which has an impact on the organisation and effectiveness
of the coalition. Along with this, a priority should be given to the topic
of human performance improvement in current military operations which
applies to NATO Long Term Capability Requirements.
The experience gained in the implementation of joint multinational
projects in the framework of the NATO Science and Technology
Organization will be of a great use in this respect and will support the process
of the management decision making in the training and participation of the
military in multinational coalition operations.
4.0 LESSONS LEARNED1
In this last part of the paper some lessons learned with respect to
improvement of organisational effectiveness of coalition operations are
summarised based on the results from our study.
4.1 Political-military Decision-making
Operations are Planned and Executed
when
Multinational
• Set clear, stable goals and tasks to ensure common understanding of
mission end-states among coalition partners.
• Apply a comprehensive approach to doctrines and concepts to enhance
the organisational effectiveness of coalition operations.
• Harmonise national and NATO education and training systems.
• Increase the level of NATO pre-deployment training.
• Minimise the capability and technology gaps among the coalition
partners, and enhance the “technological interoperability” in national
systems to improve information sharing and cooperation among the different
troop-contributing nations in the coalition.
1
This part of the paper builds upon Valaker, S., Blais, A.-R., Granansen, M., Bjornstad,
A. L., Lichacz, F., Yanakiev, Y., Cohen, I., Resteigne, D., & Bisig, E. (2012). Chapter 7:
Discussion. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness
of Coalition Operations (pp. 7-1 – 7-8). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476.
Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.
98
• Minimise the restrictive national caveats in the employment of the
troops during the operation as a means to enhance the coalition operation’s
effectiveness.
4.2 Professional Military Education and Training for the
Participants in Multinational Operations and Missions
• Create cohesion and a common understanding by joint, multinational,
pre-deployment training when possible for all members of the organisation
to include leadership.
• In addition to traditional military education, provide broader-scale
education for the military leaders that develop their social competencies.
• Promote understanding among the military professionals to help them
identify many actors (diplomatic, military, NGOs, media, etc.) in modern
military operations.
• Maintain a national system for deriving lessons-learned and including
them into the training of the participants in multinational operations.
4.3 Process Improvement Strategies in NATO HQs
• Adopt NATO standards as a must for all daily procedures.
• Harmonise the rotation timeframes among national positions in
the HQ and synchronise the national rotations of troops to improve the
organisational effectiveness of the multinational formations.
• Build HQs as learning organisations, i.e. to improve the organisational
knowledge trough a streamlined lessons learned process.
• Introduce an effective mentoring program to support handover
procedures for the key command and staff positions in multinational HQs.
• Enhance mutual trust and confidence, encourage members of the HQ
to freely express their opinions and beliefs.
• Establish a process of social networking and the development of
informal networks as a key factor for improving organisational effectiveness
and successful task accomplishment.
• Establish a clear and common understanding of HQ tasks and
responsibilities.
• Facilitate the information sharing as an important enabler of
organisational effectiveness within a coalition HQ.
• Focus special attention on manning and assigning the right qualified
people on the right positions in order to guarantee the unproblematic
integration of the military and civilian personnel in multinational setting.
• Establish strict qualification criteria for the manning of multinational
99
HQs, including language proficiency to improve the contribution of all
national individuals.
4.4 Building up and Developing Cultural Adaptability and CrossCultural Competence when working in a Multinational Environment
• Training and developing of cross-cultural competence is to be an
imminent part of the professional military edukation.
• Integrate the cultural adaptability education and training as a necessary
pre-requisite to take a NATO assignment.
• Apply modern training tools that have been already developed to
improve the quality of cross-cultural competence enhancement such as
GLOBESMART® COMMANDER and Cross-Cultural Competence
Trainer.
• Enhance cultural adaptability across NATO-member states via
development of Allied Joint Publication on Cross-Cultural Education and
Training.
4.5 Enhancement of the Leadership Training of the Military for
their Participation in Multinational Operations
• Leadership and the leadership style are among the most important
factors which influence upon effectiveness of coalition operations.
• Diametrically different leadership styles and the systems for training
of leaders in the coalition deserve a special attention.
• Strengthen the role of the leadership in order to ensure, commitment to
the mission, as a factor that shapes the organisational culture in the HQ.
• Harmonise the different leadership styles within the multinational HQ.
• Develop the ability to learn from mistakes and quickly adjust to the
situation.
• Further efforts for standardising the leadership training in NATO are
needed to develop and adopting common requirements and approaches to
training leaders for coalition operations.
• Get training in transformational leadership style.
• Moderate the impact of national caveats by a flexible leadership
style.
4.6 Enhancement of the Individual, Organisational and National
Trust among Coalition Partners
• The professionalism and responsibility leads to higher respect on
behalf of the colleagues from the other nations.
100
• Communicate with the colleagues with respect, regardless of the size
of the national contingent, rank and the previous experience in international
missions.
• Honesty and openness in relations with foreign colleagues contributes
to the increasing of mutual trust.
• Mutual understanding and support among the colleagues from different
nationalities will be achieved by stimulating social networking and the
development of informal networks.
4.7 Enhancement of Specialised English Language Training
• Focus on both, general language training (e.g. problems in understanding
English spoken by native speaker, use of idioms, abbreviations, contractions,
etc.), as well as culturally differentiated attitudes when working in a
multinational environment.
• A special attention is to be paid on the specialised language training
(English for Special Purposes) which to improve the knowledge and skills
in using military terminology, studying documents, forms, procedures, etc.
applied in a NATO staff/mission.
4.8 Further Development of Scientific Applied Researches for
Identification of Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Coalition
Operations
• Human performance improvement in current military operations,
which applies to NATO Long Term Capability Requirements, is the main
avenue for further research activities.
• Trust between coalition partners and the factors which influence the
formation of this attitude should be among the main topics of future research
projects.
• Another important aspect of research is the definitions of perceived
organisational and operational effectiveness among those of the subordinated
HQs and forces, as well as, cooperating with civilian organisations, local
police and military, the local populace and local forces, etc.
• In addition to continuing our research from a longitudinal perspective,
a fruitful avenue of exploration would be to apply or examine the NATO
STO HFM RTG-163 findings within the context of different operational
environments and within different coalition commands. In so doing, we
can begin to identify, propose, and demonstrate solutions to coalition
interoperability inefficiencies due to human factors, technology, personnel,
and procedural characteristics of coalition HQs.
101
• Several factors related to the commander’s role should be taken into
account in further research. For example, the different interpretations of
effectiveness of various commanders, the commander’s role in creating a
suitable organisational structure, the effect of change of commander, trust
as it is developed by different commanders, as well as the commander’s
role in enhancing information could be examined further. In addition,
flexibility in relation to different environments, knowledge of troops as a
precursor to decision making, information sharing across boundaries, and
how rotation processes may or may not impair learning are topics for further
elaboration.
• The operational environment can be included in future research
models along with other tactical forces, civilians, and adversaries. Other
cultural dimensions such as Power Distance, time orientation, and national
culture differences can be included in future refinements of our model and
its empirical testing.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The objective of our research activities was to reinforce and consolidate
the efforts of the social and behavioural scientists from interested NATO,
Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialog nations. We do believe
that our research contributed to identification of critical factors (barriers
and enablers) of effective cooperation in coalition operations. In addition,
we hope that the research findings can help military leaders identify training
gaps that can be addressed in future pre-deployment training and improved
ways of working in a multicultural environment. In this regard, one should
stress the important role of the international collaboration in the framework
of NATO Science and Technology Organization for the development of
adaptive performance in multinational coalitions.
6.0 REFERENCES
[1] Moskos. Ch., J. Williams, D. Segal. R. (Eds.) The Post-modern
Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War. Oxford University Press, New
York, 2000, 2–12.
[2] Stewart. K., et al. (2004) Non-technical interoperability in
multinational forces. Retrieved from: http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2004/
ICCRTS_Denmark/abstracts/130.pdf.
[3] Soeters, J. & Tresch Szvircsev, T. (2010). Towards cultural
integration in multinational peace operations. Defence Studies, 10(1-2),
272-287.
102
[4] Klein P. & Haltiner K. (2005) Multinationality as a challenge for
armed forces. In Giuseppe Caforio and Gerhard Kьmmel (Eds.), Military
Missions and their Applications Reconsidered: the Aftermath of September
11th. Oxford: ELSEVIER Ltd.
[5] Sutton, J. L. & Pierce, L. G. (2003). A framework for understanding
cultural diversity in cognition and teamwork. Proceedings of the 8th
International Command and control Research and Technology Symposium,
Washington, D.C.
[6] Sutton, J. L., Pierce, L. G., C. Shawn Burke, & Salas, E. (2006)
Understanding adaptability: A prerequisite for effective performance within
complex environments. Advances in Human Performance and Cognitive
Engineering Research, 6, 143–173. doi:10.1016/S1479-3601 (05)06005-4.
[7] Valaker, S., Blais, A.-R., Granansen, M., Bjornstad, A.L., Lichacz,
F., Yanakiev, Y., Cohen, I., Resteigne, D., & Bisig, E. (2012). Chapter 7:
Discussion. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational
Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 7-1 – 7-8). RTO-TR-HFM-163
AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO
[8] Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), (2012). Improving Organisational
Effectiveness of Coalition Operations. RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.
[9] www.globesmartcommander.com, www.defenseculture.org.
103
LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR THE BULGARIAN NAVY
IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
BY NATO SUPPORT AGENCY –
GENERAL SERVICES PROGRAMME
(Benefits and Lessons Learned)
Capt. (N) ret. Plamen Dimitrov
G. S. Rakovski National Defence Academy,
82 Evlogi & Hristo Georgievi, Blvd., 1504, Sofia, Bulgaria,
Command & Staff Faculty, Navy Chair
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
This paper examines issues related to improving logistic support for the
Bulgarian naval ships in their participation in multinational operations and
exercises under the auspices of NATO, EU and UN in remote areas from their
permanent naval bases. This publication points out benefits, lessons learned and
recommendations for improving logistic support of the Bulgarian Navy based on
the current participation in operations and exercises abroad and the use of port
services through the NATO Support Agency (NSPA).
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This article was provoked by the recent and expanding participation of the
Bulgarian Navy ships in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea international
operations such as “ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR”, “UNIFIL MAROPS”,
“UNIFIED PROTECTOR”, “NOBLE MIDAS”, “BLACKSEAFOR”, as
well as in different multinational exercises in NATO member countries “NUSRET” in Turkey, “ARIADNE” in Greece and “POSEIDON” in
Romania.
The global trends indicate that in the coming years naval operations
should make a major contribution to the prevention and management of
crisis. For the preparation and planning of their participation in multinational
operations, it is of particularly high importance to provide logistic support
to ships abroad. This function is always responsibility and liability of the
sending country.
The aim of this publication is: (1) to analyse the existing experience
from the Bulgarian naval participation in operations abroad; (2) to draw
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conclusions and to make recommendations for improving of the logistic
support of the Bulgarian warships; (3) to make recommendations for the
adoption of the best practices implemented by other NATO member states.
Besides its interactions within the framework of the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Bulgaria, the Navy interacts also with its coalition and regional
partners. Participation in these international structures is our national
contribution to international security and the fulfilment of our commitments
to the Alliance.
In exchange, for the participation of the Bulgarian Navy in NATO
operations, the Republic of Bulgaria will benefit from collective defence in
the framework of the Euro-Atlantic security system, building regional trust
and prestige, making use of new forms of training, and improving military
cooperation.
2.0 PARTICIPATION OF THE BULGARIAN NAVY
OPERATIONS AND INITIATIVES WITH THE ALLIES
IN
In the future, Bulgaria will most likely be engaged in multinational
military NATO–led operations conducted with allies or coalition partners.
These multinational operations may also be conducted under the auspices of
the United Nations (UN) or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE).
The Navy directly fulfils the commitments of the Republic of Bulgaria
to NATO, EU and UN, and its role to enhance peace and stability in the
Black Sea area will mature with participation in:
1). Operations, missions, permanent groups and exercises with NATO
and EU allies as:
– multiple participation in the operation “ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR”
for the control of shipping in the Mediterranean, under the Article 5 of
Washington Treaty;
– the inclusion of naval forces as a part of NATO Response Force
(NRF) and the forthcoming participation in the Standing NATO Maritime
Groups (SNMG) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Maritime
Groups (SNMCMG).
2). Operation “UNIFIL MAROPS” of the United Nations along the
coast of Lebanon.
3). Different regional initiatives such as Confidence & Security Building
Measures (CSBM) and Black Sea Naval Co-Operation Task Group
“BLACKSEAFOR”.
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4). Inclusion of the naval forces as a part of the battle groups to the
European Rapid Reaction Force.
The certification and maintaining the readiness of the Bulgarian forces
declared to NATO and the EU is a priority for the Navy.
Supporting international peace and security in operations and missions
of NATO and the European Union in response to crises, conflict prevention,
combating terrorism and participation in operations and missions of the UN,
OSCE and other coalition formats, the Bulgarian Navy will be involved
with the declared forces for a period of three to six months per year using its
own resources that are the equivalent to the participation of one frigate.
Bulgaria has declared its commitment to NATO to maintain three ships two frigates and one minesweeper in the state of readiness to participate in
NATO missions. One frigate is declared for participation in the Common
Security and Defence Policy of the EU.
In the new package “Capability Goals-2013”, the number of declared
ships was increased with the addition of a mine hunter and a minesweeper. The
composition of the declared ships for NATO and the EU will be unchanged
after 2014. At present the Navy has prepared and certified at different levels
5 ships: two class E-71 frigates, two class “Sonya” minesweepers and one
class “Flower” mine hunter.
3.0 THE NATO SUPPORT AGENCY (NSPA)
In order to ensure that multinational operations are supported effectively
and efficiently, every NATO participating nation needs to coordinate its
logistic activities and rationalise its use of logistic resources through mutual
support arrangements.
After the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010 and the adoption of the new
Strategic Concept of the Alliance, it was decided to establish a new NATO
Support Agency (NSPA).
3.1 The NATO Agency Reform
The NATO Support Agency (NSPA) is the main NATO’s integrated
logistics and services provider Agency, combining the former NATO
Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), the Central Europe Pipeline
Management Agency (CEPMA) and the NATO Airlift Management
Agency (NAMA). The NSPA is the executive body of the NATO Support
Organisation (NSPO), of which all 28 NATO nations are members. Those
nations are represented in the NSPO Agency Supervisory Board (ASB)
which directs and controls the activities of the NSPA.
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The mission of the NATO Support Agency is to provide responsive,
effective and cost-efficient logistics support services for systems and
operations. This support is provided – in times of peace, crisis and war,
wherever required – to NATO nations, NATO military authorities and
partner nations, both individually and collectively.
The NATO Support Agency plays a critical role in the achievement of
NATO’s objectives, particularly within the Smart Defence Initiative. The
NSPA is a fully customer-funded agency, operating on a “no profit – no
loss” basis. The Agency works actively with the industry of NATO member
nations to accomplish its main tasks.
From the baseline after the Lisbon summit the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) established three primary objectives: (1) increasing effectiveness;
(2) increasing efficiency; and (3) increasing savings. The other important
objective is to preserve capability and service delivery.
3.2 The Naval Logistics Support Partnership Current Users
The Naval Logistics Support Partnership (NLSP) was established
in 2010 (replacing the former Port Services Support Conference) and is
comprised of 11 member NATO navies (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia,
Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Norway, Turkey, Spain and the UK), 4 Trial
navies (Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden, Latvia), and 8 Observers (Canada,
Montenegro, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, NATO Maritime
Command – MARCOM, and EU NAVFOR).
The main mission of NLSP is to meet the needs of the NLSP member
states in terms of military effectiveness by providing contracted solutions
for their navies. This includes providing fuel and services in more than 460
foreign ports worldwide.
Trial member nations are authorised to make a trial use of the services
at an administrative cost of 1000 EUR per logistic request (LOGREQ) in
order to assess the benefits of the project. This trial period is not limited in
time and trial member states may subsequently opt to join the NLSP.
At each nation’s request, NSPA is continuing to expand its services to
cover a growing range of activities, such as the provision of critical spare
parts, freight forwarding to foreign ports, emergency maintenance and repair
of naval equipment and systems (including dry-docking and underwater
repair), as well as providing outline agreements for commonly used naval
systems, and cross servicing agreements.
The NSPA has assured access contracts with main ship agents who
provide the services. These contracts are established through international
competition to ensure their cost-effectiveness.
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The Republic of Bulgaria is a full member of the NATO Support
Organisation (NSPO) since January 1, 2005 and since August, 2007
the country is a trial nation at the Naval Logistics Support Partnership
(NLSP).
The Bulgarian Ministry of Defence (MoD) joined the former Port
Services Support Conference of the NATO Maintenance and Support
Agency by the Decision №559/2007 of the Council of Ministers of the
Republic of Bulgaria. In this regard, there is a signed bilateral “Protocol on
the provision of Port services for the Bulgarian Navy” between NSPA and
the Ministry of Defence which regulates the terms and conditions of logistic
support.
During the participation of our ships in multinational operations in the
Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and in various exercises, the Navy have
committed 77 LOGREQs by NSPA in foreign ports from 2007 to 2013.
This is an average of 12 LOGREQs and approximately 300 KEUR
operational turnovers per year. For a period of 6 years the administrative
expenses paid to NSPA for the logistic support amounted to 40 470 EUR or
an average of 6 744 EUR per year.
Figure 1 Number of LOGREQs
Sourse: Presentation of the 8-th Naval logistic Support Partnership Committee meeting
Refuelling in foreign ports is the most expensive cost not only for our
vessels, but also for vessels from other NATO countries. For that reason, the
NSPA signed contracts at the most competitive price after an international
competition with selected providers of fuel in certain ports in different
regions worldwide. NSPA tries to obtain the lowest possible price through
international competitive bidding.
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In the year 2011 NSPA proposed a change in the cost sharing formula,
to align it to the new reality generated by the fuel business. So, NSPA made
significant number of LOGREQs changes in the contract policy during the
past years, negotiating prompt-payment discounts (aggressive discounts). If
the fuel bill is paid from NSPA within 4 days of receipt of the invoice, the
agency receives a discount of up to 2,5%.
Figure 2
Sourse: Presentation of the 8-th Naval logistic Support Partnership Committee meeting
3.3 Future Administrative Financial Model
The operational turnover of marine fuel has repeatedly increased in
recent years by more than 100% annually. The supply of fuel in 2002 by
NSPA, was of 2,7 MEUR, in 2012 it had already reached 35 MEUR and for
the year 2013 it has reached 23 MEUR as of October, 2013.
From the figure 2 one can see that in 2012 the amount of discounts
received reaches over 700 KEUR. These funds cover administrative costs
and forecasts indicate that in the year 2013, these costs can be covered at
100%.
All this leads to the reduction in the administrative costs for the project.
The challenge NSPA set is to achieve a neutral/negative administrative cost
by 2013 (Fig. 3).
The NLSP has proposed to implement a new administrative model,
starting in 2014.
With the objective to secure the future of the NLSP and to reserve
financial resources NSPA has implemented a fixed annual contribution
for every nation since 2013. Member nations are billed 20 KEUR as “full
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Figure 3
Sourse: Presentation of the 8-th Naval logistic Support Partnership Committee meeting
share” once the number of LOGREQs reaches 50 requests or the value
reaches more than 1 MEUR or they are billed 10 KEUR as “half-share”.
Trial nations are billed 1 KEUR per LOGREQ (except for the first year
0,5 KEUR per LOGREQ) and this amount is an income that reduces the
administrative cost for the member nations.
This contribution model with fixed annual costs has been effective
in 2013 and the surplus generated from the aggressive discounts will be
kept under an approved distribution formula. The idea of this distribution
formula is to divide the surplus into 2 parts – 50% is immediately returned
into the account for the free usage of the Nations and 50% as a Drawdown
fund (Liquidation fund).
The purpose of the NLSP Drawdown fund is to create a savings account,
based on annual contributions of the NLSP member nations, to face eventual
future costs, if a drawdown or liquidation of the partnership occurs.
Because the NLSP Drawdown fund is a savings account, it was established
that the maximum amount of the fund would be the equivalent of the Loss of
Job Indemnity (LOJI) of the technical staff who are mainly dedicated to the
NLSP activity, in the amount of 200 KEUR. The maximum amount of the
fund can be changed with the agreement of all NLSP member nations.
In this connection, the proposal of the NSPA for active membership in
NLSP for all Trial nations and Observers is obvious and not negligible.
4.0 THE BENEFITS FOR THE BULGARIAN NAVY
The use of logistic support by the NSPA for port services ensures timely
and quality supplies and services provided at competitive, low and in many
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cases fixed prices for the fixed current ports from the selected Husbanding
or Fuel agencies.
This greatly facilitates the logistic support of the Bulgarian naval ships
in foreign ports. The crew of the ship does not become involved with the
choice of Husbanding agency during the short time in the ports, does not
make cash payments, the quality and timely delivery are guaranteed and
are in compliance with established procedures. There is daily widespread
support (24hours/7days) provided promptly by Contractor’s personnel,
based on the LOGREQ and confirmed with the supply officers.
In addition, upon the receipt of the requested delivery of goods and
services, the commander/logistics officer of the ship signs the documents
and fills a Quality Assessment Form (QAF) for the quality of delivery
that is later sent to the NSPA. If there is a considerable disagreement with
Husbanding or Fuel agencies there is an opportunity to make and send a
Discrepancy Report (DR).
Through the existing contracts with the selected Husbanding and Fuel
agencies, the fees for the majority of the provided supply/services are
competitive and fixed at certain ports. Of course, these fees vary depending
on the region where the services are used, the ship displacement, the duration
of stay in port and other factors.
Concerning the crew of the ship, they need to precisely prepare a
LOGREQ and send it to the NLSP Contractor (Husbanding or Fuel agency)
up to 5 days before the arrival of the ship in the port. To help the supply
officer the NLSP specialists have provided а price list for those ports that
already have signed contracts.
First, the logistics officer of the ship should specify the prices of the services
from the Husbanding agency before the actual executing of the LOGREQ.
Second, he/she is always free to request full price estimates from contractors
and has to know that additional costs could be invoiced by contractor during
religious/official holidays and regional weekend. The fuel price should be
provided prior to supply by the contractor. Further an increase in the quantity
of supplies leads sometimes to a decrease in the unit price.
The NSPA together with Contractors maintains and promptly updates a
database of fixed and “at cost” prices of the services offered at those ports
where it has contracts (Jackport database). There are more than 460 of those
ports in 105 countries, and they include price data for 41 port services. The
Jackport information is provided to all countries participating in the NLSP
for advance planning of the necessary financial resources and of course
LOGREQs.
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The logistics officer of the ship should know that in some of the Jackport
there are premium prices for the fuel and not all means of fuel delivery
(trucks, barges etc.) have flow meters or adjustable pressure capability. If
the ship is out of the port less than 12 hours for participation in exercises,
there is no extra first day agency fee for a subsequent visit to the port.
Constant contact with representatives of NLSP is recommended on the
phone/email before and after visiting a port.
It is preferable that the logistics officers of the ship be thoroughly prepared
before the exercise. Attention to precision and accurately preparing every
LOGREQ, striving to create only one LOGREQ with a request of fuel (if it
is possible) and planning of the replenishment of fuel in the specific ports,
where NSPA have a Fuel Supply Contract (FSC).
The Husbanding or Fuel agency is required to provide a pro-forma invoice
at the time of delivery with the aim of getting information to the Commander
of the ship regarding prices and documents of origin and quality.
The NSPA makes payments directly to the related Husbanding or Fuel
contractors in the relevant currency for the country and each Customer
nation reimburses it in EURO. In practice there is a deferred payment for
supply/services provided to the Customers. The next overall aim of NLSP
is to provide one fuel contractor for all ports in a given area of operations
and integrated with Husbandry via the LOGREQ procedure.
Naturally, the administrative cost of managing the project is an
additional increase in real costs for port services per every vessel. Payments
for the services and supplies are carried out directly from the Bulgarian
MoD, avoiding cash payments at ports and there is constant monitoring and
control of the invoice process by specialists from NLSP and the finance
department of the MoD.
5.0 LESSONS LEARNED
All actions, procedures and document templates for the crews of the
ships are developed by NLSP and submitted with the document “Operating
Procedure” OP-LG-20 on 10 April, 2013.
It is imperative that the Commanding Officers (CO) and/or Supply
Officers (LO) of the ship and any other person with delegated ordering
authority and of course the planning officers in the Navy, have good
knowledge of OP-LG-20. Having this in mind it could be said that
the plan for supplying fuel with LOGREQ should be accurate and the
amount requested for delivery should be not changed. The Fuel agency
always covers the costs already incurred for delivery at the expense of
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the Customer. Short notice changes will cause problems in fuel deliveries
and may be more expensive.
In specialised ports for logistic support to the Standing NATO Maritime
Groups, the supply of fuel is committed to Defence Energy Support Centre
(DESC) of the Defence Logistics Agency (DLA), USA. There are 3 Defence
Fuel Supply Points (DFSP) – Souda, Crete; Augusta and Sigonella, Italy;
and Rota, Spain. The fuel supply costs are the lowest and therefore these are
the most preferable ports to refuelling.
It is quite clear when there is a need for refuelling in military Ports
and DFSP for the ships of NATO countries, involved in tactical groups
and formations, that all the procedures are in accordance with the ALP-1
and STANAG 1200 “Procedures for Logistic Support between Navies and
Naval Port Information”, ratified by Bulgaria.
When carrying out the logistic support of Bulgarian ships abroad, it
appears that in some cases it is more appropriate for the Commander of the
ship (CO) to have more leeway to spend a part of the funds, according to the
specific conditions of each port.
When visiting military ports, it is necessary to send in advance a
LOGREQ from the ship to the military authorities at the port. After receiving
their offer for logistics support, the CO of the ship should decide whether it
is better or necessary to engage NSPA.
In summary, the services provided by the NSPA Husbanding and Fuel
contractors are correct, timely and good in terms of quality of supplies and
services. This is proven by the Quality Assessment Forms filled out by the
crews of the ships after the completion of each logistic request. So far the
Discrepancy Reports made by the commanders of Bulgarian naval ships
have been very few.
6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The general conclusion from what has been already said is that the
assessment of the participation of the Bulgarian ships in NLSP project of
the NATO Support Agency is positive.
Therefore, I would like to suggest an in-depth study on the participation
of Bulgaria in this project. According to the results of this study, there should
be actions taken in order Bulgaria to become a full member in the NLSP
programme. The Navy experts and the national representative meetings in
NLSP should prepare a detailed analysis of the participation in the NLSP
project.
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Finally, we have to choose between Trial status and Membership as
soon as possible because it will cost us more to remain as a Trial member.
In the future the administrative cost for NLSP is expected to be reduced.
Bulgaria has to expedite the decision-making process in a timely manner
and to maximise the value of the Naval Logistics Support Partnership.
At the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century it can be
concluded that the Bulgarian armed forces have gained extensive experience
in multinational operations under the auspices of the UN, NATO, and EU
and in the composition of an international coalition. The Bulgarian soldiers
perform worthy missions and continue to build the prestige of the Republic
of Bulgaria as a reliable and respected ally.
7.0 REFERENCES:
[1] Naval Operations Doctrine, NP 3.1, MoD.
[2] Protocol on the Provision of Port Services for the Bulgarian Navy,
August, 2007.
[3] Decision №559/2007 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Bulgaria.
[4] Operating Procedure, OP-LG-20, April, 2013.
[5] Presentations and Decision sheets of the 6, 7 and 8-th Naval Logistic
sSupport Partnership Committee meetings.
[6] NSPA Procurement Regulations.
[7] NSPA Quality Assurance Regulation.
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MODEL OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN PUBLIC SECTOR
INSTITUTION BODIES IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
Col. Nikola Stoyanov
82 Evlogi & Hristo Georgievi, Blvd., 1504, Sofia, Bulgaria
G. S. Rakovski National Defence Academy,
Command and Staff Faculty
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a model of collaboration between public sector institution
bodies in emergency situations, focusing on the inter-organisational collaborative
capacity. The main dimensions of this model are: (1) People – individual
collaborative capacity; (2) Purpose and strategy; (3) Structure; (4) Lateral
processes; (5) Incentives and reward system; (6) Organisational culture; (7)
Leadership. There are internal factors as well as several external that are related
to the environment which influencing collaborative capacity between different
institutions in emergency situations. The central idea is the need of alignment of
the operational goals and the official goal of the organisations that can be met
by formations pursuing common results. The analysis of the results from interorganisational collaborative capacity is expected to further deepen theory and
expertise on managing crisis to successfully meet the desired end state of these
activities.
1.0 MODEL DESCRIPTION
In order to achieve synergy and efficiency of the activities of the
institutions responsible to managing emergency situations, they need to
ensure alignment of the operational and the main goals in accordance with
the internal factors of organisation’s effectiveness and those of the external
environment.
The model under consideration (Fig. 1) is an attempt to present the
main internal factors of organisational effectiveness, the alignment of the
operational and the main goal (mission) of the organisations involved in
crisis response operations. The mission or the main goal is to achieve synergy
and to provide effective command and control in emergency situations.
The existing studies of the organisational effectiveness of coalition
operations show that this mission can be met by effective and timely
sharing of information, efficient and timely decision-making and shared
awareness of tasks and responsibilities (Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.),
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Figure 1. Collaborative model of controls in emergency situations
2012). The problem is that most of the current studies focus on the factors
internal for the organisation, while the interrelationship between the internal
and external factors, or those related to operational context is not deeply
examined.
The suggested model for collaboration of military and civilian authorities
in emergency situations allows simultaneous measurement of internal
(organisational) and external factors or the operational context factors.
Organisational factors determine the internal attitude of the members,
culture, leadership practices, structure, objectives and strategy of the
organisation for collaboration. Through them one can assess the ability that
it has to cooperate with other organisations in pursuit of the same objectives.
Collaboration however, is a complex process, which examines also the
influence of external factors in order to fully describe its nature.
External factors can be various, such as historical experience of
collaboration, legal basis, social and economic mechanisms, institutional
and structural factors, financial framework, stakeholders and network
interaction. In the general case, when it is not possible to examine all the
external factors only those who are supposed to have major impact on
collaboration between organisations, such as the social context (environment)
and external communications that largely summarise external variables, can
be analysed in detail.
The Inter-organisational Collaborative Capacity Model (ICC) of Hocevar,
Thomas, & Jansen (2006) is well suited tool for assessing and improving
the capacity for inter-agency cooperation. The ICC model is built on the star
model of Galbraith (Galbraith, 2011). According to ICC model, the design of
an organisation has five areas and these areas define the organisation’s ability
to collaborate with other institutions. Hocevar, Thomas, & Jansen (2006)
use the “star model” to offer “a systematic diagnosis of the organisational
factors that both enhance and hamper collaboration and at the same time
control the actions to improve the capacity for cooperation”. They determine
the ability of collaboration as “the ability of the organisation to enter into,
develop and maintain systems of collaboration between organisations in the
pursuit of collective outcomes” and assume that ability for collaboration
increases the probability of implementing the mission by the inclusion of
scattered resources. Hocevar and colleagues show that the five components
of the “star model”, namely strategy, structure, processes, rewards and
people can be related to collaboration in terms of “success” factors as well
as in terms of factors “barriers”. The model I developed for assessment of
organisations in the public sector, but derived from the model of Galbraith,
it inherits some of its shortcomings, when one needs to measure the
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cooperation between organisations. The model describes the determinants
that affect the organisation’s ability for collaboration, without considering
the impact of external factors of operational environment. Leader influences
the behaviour of employees in five categories by alignment policies through
complex relations that make up the model. At the same time, the leader with
his/her skills and ability to motivate and persuade followers also is a factor
that largely determines the values necessary to develop collaboration. The
ICC model, however, has not a scale that measure leadership styles and
abilities and, therefore it cannot examine the correlation of leadership with
other factors which is another weakness. In the light of the aforementioned,
the question arises about the role of leadership in the process of cooperation,
which requires it to be included in the model as a separate factor.
The topic of the importance of organisational culture for collaboration
remains central. Organisational culture should also be established as a single
factor, because it generates values that form attitudes among members for
or against partnerships with other organisations. It is also the basis for the
creation of the structure of the organisation and in formulating its strategy
and objectives. Hocevar, Thomas, & Jansen model does not measure
the magnitude and direction of the relationships between the areas that
determine it. These areas include the factors that have different effects on
the general policy of the organisation, including collaboration. The central
idea of alignment of policies is difficult, because the shortage of skills in
a particular area can’t be offset by increasing the capacity in another area.
For example, an increase in remuneration or the individual capacity of the
participants in the collaboration will hardly compensate any gaps in the
objectives and the strategy of the organisation. All this requires incoming
factors, determining collaborative capabilities of bodies to align with the
operating factors mentioned above in order to get the model finished.
According to the described ICC model, the organisation’s collaborative
capacity is determined on the basis of the analysis of 12 factors presented
below:
• „Need to collaborate” – used to describe the necessary motivation
and effort to overcome the inertia of the current situation and to generate
changes in structures, processes and behaviour of the organisation.
• „Strategic collaboration”– emphasizes the establishment of long-term
goals of cooperation and considers the interests of other organisations. It
focuses on the role of leadership in taking inter-organisational objectives
and discussions with leaders of other organisations.
• „Resource investment” – a measure of the extent to which respondents
feel that their organisation invests finance, organisational and human
resources for inter-organisational collaboration.
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• „Structural flexibility“ – a measure of the degree to which respondents
perceive the organisation as a flexible, able to change rapidly and modify
policies, processes, procedures in the interest of cooperation
• „Incentives and reward system” – assesses the extent to which perceived
by the respondents influence of collaboration, activities and results on
remuneration, career development and promotion.
• „Metrics for collaboration” – assesses the extent to which the
organisation has established criteria for measuring effort and performance
standards of collaboration.
• „Information sharing” – determines the extent to which the organisation
has established mechanisms for flow and exchange of information between
organisations.
• „Collaborative learning” – assesses the extent to which the organisation
has set aside resources for training, working with other organisations to learn
lessons and develop strong norms for learning from other organisations.
• „Social capital” – assesses the extent to which the organisation's
employees take the initiative to build relationships and know how to interact
with other organisations.
• „Individual collaborative capacity” – includes questions that focus on
the skills and expertise, understanding and knowledge about the work and
vision of other organisations, the desire to participate in decision making
and in seeking collaboration with them.
• „Barriers to collaboration” – a measure of the extent to which
respondents perceive the presence of different factors – the individual's
ability to collaborate, role conflict, policies and procedures in cooperating
organisations and others as barriers to collaboration.
• „Interagency teams” – assesses the ability of the group for further
coordination between the various organisations, face the common problem
area that requires cooperation.
As a result of the analysis of these factors, it becomes clear which ones
promote collaboration and which act as barriers. They can be grouped in five
areas: (1) people; (2) strategy and objectives; (3) structure; (4) processes,
and (5) incentive system. These groups are presented in the figure 1 and will
be discussed in the text below.
1.1 People – Individual Collaborative Capacity
Individual factors are the core of the models that describe and measure
the ability of organisations to collaborate. In the scientific literature it was
found that there are different interpretations for the constructs that determine
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individual factors, but the most suitable for the purpose of the study are
the personal characteristics, employment status, skills and abilities, and
work experience. When we talk about the impact of individual factors on
collaboration between institutions in emergency situations, we cannot miss
the education and functional trail that every member of the organisation has.
Under the functional trace we must understand the specialisation that people
receive as a result of education, training and work experience. Leaders
the graduated management sciences have higher individual capacities for
collaboration in comparison to those who have studied in universities with
other majors. This is because these leaders who have graduated management
sciences are less concerned with the uncertainty and risk associated with
collaboration, because they have learned to manage risk. Following this
perspective, several empirical studies, confirm the relationship between the
functional trace of managers and their strategic decisions (Huxham, Chris
& Siv Vangen, 1996; Snider & Marvin. 2003). The level of education is
also important in the development of collaboration. Leaders with higher
education are more likely to develop cooperation than those with lower
education. It can be assumed that those managers with higher degree have
more abilities that make them confident to manage collaboration with other
organisations. Furthermore, graduates create more personal connections
and relationships with people from different areas, thanks to the many
forums and courses they have attended. Cooperation requires different
skills and abilities than those when working in one organisation. These
are the ability to develop and maintain interpersonal relationships, based
on trust and reciprocity, communication skills, ability to seek consensus
and resolve conflicts, ability to understand the interdependence of the
members of the various organisations. Collaboration would not be possible
without the organisation’s members, particularly those in management
positions, who have developed communication skills. The construction
and maintenance of collaboration entails some risk. To open the borders of
their own organisation, to share ideas, knowledge and experience without
clear guarantees for success is assuming greater responsibility and risk.
Experience of the organisation gained over the years in some form of
relationship with other entities will serve as a catalyst in the development
of collaboration.
1.2 Purpose and Strategy
The aim is explicit formulated intention and desire of the organisation to
its direction of development and pursued results. It is an essential component
of organisational policy and is largely determined by the level of ambition
of its leaders and the resources that the organisation has. When it comes
to cooperation, target is seen as an ideal category that defines the reasons
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why institutions and/or organisations decided to collaborate. Partnership
can happen only at the time when there is a recognised and desirable need,
organisations to build and develop relationships that lead them to a collective
result. The aim of collaboration can hardly be accurately determined when
the partner organisations realise that they exhibit a dual identity. On the one
hand they pursue internal institutional purposes and on the other hand they
make efforts to achieve shared outcomes. In this situation, the objective
occurs simultaneously as a dynamic and frustrating. In the same context some
authors argue that there is a significant discrepancy between the self-interest
of the organisation in the implementation of its organisational mission,
maintaining identity other than the purpose of cooperation and collective
interest in the task of cooperation and maintenance responsibility of the
collaborating partners (Thomson, Perry & Miller, 2007, p. 27). Authorities
for emergency management that intend to form effective collaboration
should discuss their own and collective missions and interests. Their wishes
would later support the previous commitments of a joint project. On the basis
of the agreement for the interests and intentions of the partners there must
be an agreement expressing that they will remain autonomous, but wish to
support the work necessary to solve the general problem. We have to say
that preserving the autonomy of the organisation is often in conflict with the
desire for open borders and sharing of knowledge and resources. Collective
and self-interest must be clearly distinguished and explicitly confirmed, so
that each knows what the other aims to achieve (Huxham & Vangenm 1996,
p. 9). After this change, all parties should have a sense of collective direction
and as a result they must be able to develop an agreement, highlighting how
they plan to achieve the common goals together. Strategy and tasks relate
to how the partners coordinate their actions to achieve the objectives of
collaboration. The strategy represents a wide range of means and methods by
which the partners aim to facilitate the achievement of the collaboration and
the tasks are specific activities that allow cooperation to fulfil its objectives
and to implement the strategy (Bailey & Koney, 2000, p. 30). To improve
the effectiveness, successful collaboration should establish formal structures
(committees and subcommittees) to maintain the identity of the specific
and complex strategy and objectives (Gadja, 2004, p. 71; Banks, 2009,
p. 498). Formal structures such as committees are groups of participants,
representing various organisations in collaboration, attracted to perform
specific tasks. These tasks are delegated according to the specialisation
of the committee and understanding of the purpose of the collaboration.
Attracted by the leaders these groups act as managers. It is important to note
the distinction between leaders and managers. Leaders focus on what to do
and who can do it, while managers focus on when, where and how to be
fulfilled the tasks (Snider, 2003, p. 28). In other words, “ the leader does the
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right things and the manager does things right”. The interpretation of this
simple definition means that the leader sets the direction (strategy), stating
the purpose and set the limits and managers use management approaches in
managing subordinates to achieve the objective by operating in the assigned
frame in the most effective way. Managers can monitor the effectiveness of
cooperation by defining the participating personnel for testing specific areas
of the target areas, specific tasks and joint evaluation of the implemented
strategy, while facilitating the integration of different organisations in the
partnership process. Management strategy and objectives through formal
structures reduce tension between partners. Representatives of various
organisations, especially those who are at the top, become more committed
to collaborative objectives, when appointed to work with members of the
partner organisation. Occurrence of different organisational cultures during
joint actions, promote conceptual belief of participants that positively
contribute to the synergistic capacity of collaboration. To obtain synergy
between partners’ formal structures (committees and subcommittees) should
be set up to support the establishment of specific and complex strategies
and objectives.
1.3 Structure
Organisational structure is a formal system of tasks and relations of
the authorities that govern people by coordinating their actions and utilize
resources to achieve organisational goals. Organisational structure shapes
the behaviour of individuals and the organisation at all. The authors are not
unanimous in its view for the distribution of power. Distribution of power
is a problem which is flattened in the negotiations that accompany every
collaboration project. The historical experience we have when creating
alliances and partnerships, tells us that leading party gets most power in the
union to avoid the “stalemate” situation. The size of the invested resources
and responsibility may be crucial determinants in the distribution of power.
When we pursue common objectives of the controls in emergency situations,
the creation of a common structure for decision-making and management
process is imperative. Participants in this common structure for decisionmaking set the vision and strategy of working together in pursuit of common
outcomes. Hocevar, Thomas & Jansen (2006) consider this structure as an
interagency group. Throughout the history of relations between governments
of Defence, Ministry of Interior and other agencies in emergency situations,
it has never created interdepartmental group or any other coordinating
body. Any of the authorities pursue their organisational goals within the
organisational autonomy, and managerial performance finds its expression
only in coordinating efforts with other institutions to written procedures.
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1.4 Lateral Process
We have to consider the process as the way that the organisation meets
its objectives within the organisational structure. If the structure is the
anatomy of the organisation, the processes are its physiology. Grey (1989)
shows planning and agreement on basic rules as an essential step in ensuring
that the parties take responsibility for the process. The same author argues
that the cooperation will be reinforced if key players create a common
and acceptable regulatory framework for work. During times of crisis and
decision-making is needed to have intermediaries. It is important to know
that because even when there is agreement unexpected conflicts may occur
thereafter. Communication is the key to the process of collaboration and
encompasses all verbal and non-verbal forms which occur in the partnership
process. It shows how communication channels are established within the
organisation, to and from it to other partner organisations, but also to wide
public. Exchange of information between organisations laid the foundation
for the development of collaboration. Transparent communication and
open trusting relationship between the partners suggest confidence.
Communication is important in terms of sharing of cultural values and
knowledge necessary to achieve the intended results. Good communication
between members of the collaborating organisations is one of the prevention
of conflict points that would arise in the process of working together. The
controversies which obligatory accompany the partnership and teamwork
can be resolved in its infancy with only dialogue and mutual respect of
interests. Communication can take various forms, on such technical means
(telephone and internet) to verbal communication, face to face, which is the
essential part of communication and an important condition for the sharing
of information without the “distortion”. As Dale Carnegie said, “ but one
that should be able to talk to you, he would be able to listen”. Listening in
most cases proved more difficult skill of speaking. It is the easiest way to
learn much more about the other or about other organisations, in addition
to demonstrating respect for the subject of collaboration. Communication
is a complex process that depends on many variables – personal values and
expectations, personal differences, hierarchy relations, disruptive behaviour
of some members, culture, generational differences, gender, and differences
in pay, historically accumulated contradictions and others. Many of these
variables can become barriers to effective communication, which lay a
learning process for the study of the characteristics of the organisational
culture of the partner institution at the beginning of the collaboration.
1.5 Incentives and Rewards System
Collaboration is an important activity for any organisation to be left to
chance, the process to develop on its own. For this reason, the organisation’s
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policy is to motivate members, and also to encourage them to build
relationships with members of other organisations, as this is one of her
goals. There are various definitions of incentives’ systems, but the definition
of the Wild best meets the study (Wild, 1973). It examines the system of
incentives “as a deliberately created working condition that activates
specific behaviour” Analysing literature one can conclude that the system
of incentives is a combination of monetary and non-monetary incentives
that encourage collaboration between parties of the partner organisations.
It could be argued that the system of incentives is a tool to achieve these
objectives through the motivation of members. Different institutions have
different organisational structures and different organisational processes
that are influenced by the organisational culture and their history. In this
sense, the incentives and rewards system depend on the organisational
cultures of the participating parties in collaborative project. It follows that
we must study two types of culture that are faced in this process. One type
is the organisational cultures of different parties, and the other is the culture
of the new entity in the form of an interagency group or coordinating body.
The system of rewards and incentives only work if both types of cultures
support its operation. Many factors influence the incentive systems. It is
necessary to know the requirements for the design, implementation and
successful operation of the system of incentives. Incentive systems should
be transparent and open, simple and easy to understand, objective, flexible,
controllable and resistant to tampering. The system of rewards and incentives
shall be constituted so that to meet the expectations of the organisational
members for the recognition they should get on regarding their commitments
to collaboration project. Financial bonuses are one side that motivates them
to be active participants in the partnership, but they are not the only incentive
mechanism. Human nature is arranged so that people have a need to receive
recognition that no material expression. Employees want to see themselves
to be appreciated and feel significant, which corresponds with their desire
for career development and the system should encourage it. Collaboration
occurs only by recognized need for member’s partnership, which reflects
the strategy and purpose of the organisation. Some members have an inner
conviction that collaboration with other institutions enhances the ability to
achieve higher performance and brings greater benefits. These members are
motivated and strive for development collaboration, regardless of whether
they receive rewards and incentives. Rational strategy of the organisation is
to use these employees as ardent propagandists of the idea of partnership.
They can play the role of informal leaders and to carry away employees who
doubt the benefits of collaboration. Leaders are the people most interested
in the success of collaboration as they choose subjects of partnership and
responsibility for it. At the same time, for a certain proportion of staff
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collaboration is an unnecessary activity and they are indifferent. For this
reason, incentives policy should be directed primarily at them.
1.6 Organisational Culture
There are so many definitions of culture as are its actors; everyone has
their own idea of what it is and how it manifests itself. One of the most
commonly cited definitions is those of E. Schein, which deals with the
organisational culture as a set of dominant values and norms of the leading
characteristics of an organisation based on the assumption that enable
you to understand the nature of realism and manifesting itself in internal
unnatural creatures or artefacts of a culture (Schein, 1985). In the literature,
culture is seen as part of an organisational system because it allows the
study of the relationship between cultural patterns of the participants in
an organisation and other subsystems or signs of organisation such as
technology, structural solutions, methods of management, organisational
effectiveness and etc. In terms of collaboration between organisations is
important that organisational culture is the starting point for the formulation
of objective and strategy, but also a model for development, interpretation
and selection of programs for joint action and is a factor that shapes the
behaviour and actions of people, not only the organisation but also in
interpersonal relationships. Moreover, it plays a unifying role that led to
the standardisation of the actions of members of the organisation, as well
as adaptive role in the way people of an organisation are the carriers of
their own values and actions and the existing cultural pattern modify their
former system of values through cultural influence of the environment.
Understanding organisational culture allows members of the co-operating
organisations to know how to operate within an organisational culture.
Speaking the same “organisational language” is vital to the success of
collaborative organisations. By “organisational language” is meant a set
of principles, rules and procedures that are the mechanism through which
partner organisations (institutions) operate. Ways of behaviour in public
organisations, according to their characteristics in a changing social order,
a sense of harmony to achieve common goals becomes essential condition
for organisational success. The view of Adler shows that there is a need of
a change of cultural domination to cultural cooperation, which means the
establishment of a new organisational culture (Adler, 1986). What are the
organisational values on practices and how they affect the behaviour of the
members of the organisation? Values are criteria that people use to determine
what type of behaviour is desirable or undesirable. We can distinguish
two types of values – internal and instrumental. Inner values represent the
results that people and organisations want to achieve, such as excellence,
reliability, innovation, stability and predictability. Instrumental values of
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the other methods are desirable behaviour such as hard work, creativity
and courage, conservative and cautious, risk-taking and maintaining a
high standard. Whatever the classification of organisational culture is, the
existing cultural model undoubtedly determines the strategy and objectives
of the organisation.
1.7 Leadership
Building common ground and increasing trust among members in
organisations requires effective leadership. Leaders define the stages of this
organisational dynamics to enable the organisation to achieve remarkable
results. An important component of leadership is the deployment of shared
values in an organisation. Chrislip and Larson (1994) focus on the most
common principles of the leaders of the collaborative institutions. They
found that these leaders are resolute visionaries, but their vision is focused
on how people can work together constructively, instead of personal vision
or resolution of specific issues. These researchers observed that the leaders
define their roles and practices differently from traditional leaders. They
displayed several principles of leadership for cooperation:
• Inspiring commitment and action.
• Supervises the people as equal resolve.
• Building on the broad-based participation.
• Maintain hope and participation.
• Helpful leadership.
• Leadership as a process.
Collaborative leaders are rarely authoritarian and intrusive, and
leadership is often shared among several people. Their role is to facilitate
constructive interaction in the network is not working for her. Considering
the foregoing, it is clear that leadership and trust are important to improve
collaboration. Without leadership, collaboration probably would not have
the same meaning for the purposes of its manifestation. Leadership as a
pure concept does not automatically improve collaboration. Methodology is
needed for its adequate measurement and determination. By analysing these
five areas, which gives us an idea about the state’s ability to collaborate is
running the first stage of the process model.
In the second stage, are analysed and measured the factors, determining
operational objectives of institution authorities in emergency situations effective and timely sharing information, efficient and timely decisionmaking, shared sense of tasks and responsibilities to a priori given criterion.
Operational objectives are tools (methods) wherewith bodies achieve
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effective collaboration, because of that they are harmonized with internal
factors which influence collaboration.
The third point of the model is learning and training to improve the skills
of collaboration. The actual time required for training and practice depends
entirely on the volume and the pursued objectives. After the implementation
of the third stage it is made a re-measurement and analysis of the achieved
results, and then it is applied the corrective action. It is implemented feedback
whereupon the process is repeated until the objectives are achieved.
2.0 CONCLUSIONS
The objective of my research activities was to reinforce and consolidate
the efforts of public sector institutions in emergency situation. It is believed
that inter-organisational collaborative capacity study will contribute
to identification of critical factors (barriers and enablers) of effective
cooperation in emergency situation. In addition, we hope that the research
findings can help leaders responsible for crisis management to identify
condition and process gaps that can be addressed in future training and
improved ways of working in an inter-institutional environment. In this
regard, one should stress the important role of the collaboration between
various organisations for the effective performance in emergency situations
and crisis management operations.
3.0 REFERENCES:
[1] Adler, N.J., (1986) International Dimensions of Organisational
Behaviour. Boston: Kent Publisher Company, 85–86.
[2] Bailey, Darlyne and Kelly Koney. 2000. Strategic alliances among
health and human services: From affiliations to consolidations. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
[3] Chrislip, D. & Larson, C. (1994). Collaborative leadership, San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
[4] Gadja, Rebecca. 2004. Utilizing collaboration theory to evaluate
strategic alliances. American Journal of Evaluation 25(1): 65-77.
[5] Gray, B. 1989 Collaborating: Finding Common Ground For
Multiparty Problems, San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.
[6] Galbraith, J. R. (2011). The star model. Retrieved from http://www.
jaygalbraith.com/pdfs/Star Model.pdf.
[7] Hocevar, S. P., Thomas, G. F., & Jansen, E. (2006). Building
collaborative capacity: An innovative strategy for homeland security
127
preparedness. In Beyerlein, Beyerlein & Kennedy (Eds.) Advances in
Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams: Innovations through Collaboration,
12, pp. 263-283. Elsevier JAI Press.
[8] Huxham, Chris and Siv Vangen. 1996. Working together: Key themes
in the management of public and non-profit organisations. International
Journal of Public Sector Management 9(7): 5-17.
[9] Snider, Marvin. 2003. Compatibility breeds success. Westport, CT:
Praeger.
[10] Schein, Edgar, 1985. Organizational culture and leadership. San
Francisco : Jossey-Bass Publishers.
[11] Thomson, Ann Marie; James Perry and Theodore K. Miller.
2007. Conceptualizing and measuring collaboration. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 19(1): 23-56.
[12] Wild, J. (1973). „Organisation und Hierarchie“ ZFO, 42(1) 45-54.
[13] Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.) (2012), Improving Organisational
Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 7-1 – 7-8). RTO-TR-HFM-163
AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.
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U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENCE PRIORITIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
Prof. Dr. Carol Atkinson
School of International Relations
University of Southern California
3518 Trousdale Parkway, VKC 330
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0043
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to examine recent U.S. Department of Defense
strategic guidance to U.S. military forces and to discuss the implications of this
guidance for multinational operations. The article begins with a general historical
overview of how the United States has thought about its national security goals
and strategy; it then assesses how this vision has been evolving in recent years. As
the United States has drawn down its deployed combat forces from approximately
200,000 soldiers to fewer than 90,000 (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3.) the U.S. Department
of Defense has begun transitioning to prepare itself more fully for future threats
of the coming decade. The future strategic environment envisioned by U.S.
policymakers will guide this transition process and is described in many venues
and in many documents. This article will discuss four of the most important recent
documents guiding U.S. strategic planning: (1) Joint Vision 2020 published in
2000 by the office of the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); (2) U.S.
President Barack Obama’s National Security Strategy published in 2010, (3) U.S.
President Obama’s Strategic Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense published in January 2012; and
(4) the U.S. CJCS’s Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020
published in September 2012. These documents show the evolution of U.S. strategic
vision during the first decade of the 21st Century. They make clear that partner
nations, particularly in Europe, will be asked to assume more responsibilities and
pay a greater portion of the costs to ensure a stable and secure world.
1.0 OVERVIEW OF U.S. STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN THE 20th
CENTURY
During the 20th Century, U.S. national security strategists and
policymakers were most concerned with threats emanating from powerful
states. The great wars of the century were fought by the United States
against other countries: Germany, Japan, North Korea, North Vietnam, and
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Iraq. In the later half of the century, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact
allies were defined as the primary threat to the United States and its allies
around the world. In this context, U.S. strategic defence planning focused
on deterring and, when necessary, fighting other states whose armed forces
would engage each other on air, land and sea battlefields. U.S. military
theorists and practitioners stressed the use of overwhelming force to achieve
decisive victory as their preferred strategic approach. While the focus was
on the Soviet threat, other types of threats, such as terrorism, were not
ignored. Yet, terrorism was primarily viewed as an overseas phenomenon
affecting other countries not the U.S. homeland. In some cases terrorism
was seen as either state-sponsored or, at the least, state condoned; with the
implication that it was a threat emanating from states for which they could
be held accountable.
The main focus of U.S. defence planning during the 20th Century was
against other states and strategic planners preferred strategies that would
use overwhelming, decisive military force to deter adversaries, and fight
and win when necessary. The U.S. military would conduct operations
with its allies, but would be prepared to fight unilaterally. Some of the
transnational and human security concerns that have engaged policymakers
in the 21st Century, such as the use of strategic communication, “wars of
ideas,” or moral implications of warfare were not absent from strategic
discussions. Certainly in the aftermath of Vietnam there was a great deal of
self-reflection within the United States on how wars should be fought and
the goals for which American soldiers should be asked to fight and die for.
But on the whole, the focus remained on the use of overwhelming force to
achieve decisive victory against the armed forces of other states.
Unfortunately, but perhaps not unsurprisingly, the end of the Cold
War did not usher in an era of peace, as had been hoped for, but exposed
and accelerated various transnational phenomena that challenged the
U.S. military’s strategic culture. The 21st Century is barely underway;
nevertheless, there has been a significant shift in how the United States
plans to deter or counter threats to its security. Attention now focuses more
and more on transnational phenomena and the role of allies and partners.
2.0 U.S. STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN THE EARLY 21st
CENTURY
In the initial years of the 21st Century, U.S. strategic thinking had
evolved little from its conceptual framework coming out of the Cold War.
It was a conceptual framework premised on a vision of the United States as
the triumphant and only remaining super power. The Chairman of the Joint
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Chiefs of Staff’s strategic vision for U.S. military planners and warfighters
that was published in 2000 is a good illustration of this.
2.1 Joint Vision 2020, published in 2000
The U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Henry
Shelton, issued the Joint Staff’s strategic vision in June of 2000. Joint
Vision 2020 described the strategic context for U.S. military forces and
was designed to serve as a guide for the force structure of the U.S. military
up to the year 2020 as the U.S. military “prepare[d] now for an uncertain
future.” (Shelton, 2000, p. 1). The purpose of the document was to describe
the human talent and operational capabilities that would be needed in 2020
in order that the U.S. military would be able to dominate “across the full
spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and
preeminent in any form of combat” (Shelton, 2000, p. 1).
Joint Vision 2020 defined the strategic environment as one in which
the United States would continue to have global interests and would need
to be prepared for adversaries that would have access to the same types of
technology as the United States. These adversaries would seek to adapt
and to counter U.S. capabilities through asymmetric approaches (Shelton,
2000, pp. 4-5). In order to accomplish the objectives that the U.S. national
command authorities might give to it, U.S. military forces would need the
manpower and capabilities for “full spectrum dominance – the ability of
US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and
interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation
across the full range of military operations” (Shelton, 2000, p. 6). This
range of military operations encompassed diverse activities to include:
large-scale combat operations, peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuation
operations, nation assistance, counterinsurgency, humanitarian assistance,
protection of shipping, and support to U.S. civil authorities (Shelton, 2000,
p. 7). There was only a brief discussion in Joint Vision 2020 of the role that
allies and partner nations would play. This discussion centered on issues
of compatibility of technology and interoperability of information systems
(Shelton, 2000, pp. 16-17). In other words, U.S. defence planning focused
on U.S. forces that would have the capability and manpower to act on their
own in a very wide range of operations.
2.2 National Security Strategy, published in 2010
The al-Qaida attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, and
the subsequent difficulties for U.S. military forces operating in Iraq and
Afghanistan highlighted the need for an updated strategic vision. These
events made clear that international security (the security “inter” or between
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states) was becoming less relevant and security in its human, global, and
transnational senses needed to be addressed in more detail. Paradoxically,
the United States had become more threatened by forces unleashed by weak
and failing states rather than by powerful states. Threats to human security
from global phenomena such as climate change, resource scarcity, and
poverty produced transnational security threats that readily flowed across
borders from terrorism to refugee flows to piracy. These phenomena were
facilitated and accelerated by transnational social and political networks
facilitated through cheap and globally available internet connectivity.
Ten years later, in its 2010 National Security Strategy, the Obama
Whitehouse characterised the global security environment as one of
“sweeping change” in which “the success of free nations, open markets,
and social progress in recent decades [had] accelerated globalisation on an
unprecedented scale. This [had] opened the doors of opportunity around the
globe, extended democracy to hundreds of millions of people, and made
peace possible among major powers.” (U.S. Whitehouse, National Security
Strategy, May 2010). Yet, while globalization brought opportunities, it also
“intensified the dangers we face – from international terrorism and the spread
of deadly technologies, to economic upheaval and a changing climate.”
(U.S. Whitehouse, National Security Strategy, May 2010). In the 2010
National Security Strategy, the top national security priority was defined
as weapons of mass destruction in the hands of violent extremists and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to additional states; with the
strategy stating: “there is no greater threat to the American people.” (U.S.
Whitehouse, National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 4). Yet, the strategy
also identified as top priorities: dismantling al-Qaida and its affiliates,
building balanced and sustainable economic growth, promoting respect for
human rights, and addressing climate change (U.S. Whitehouse, National
Security Strategy, May 2010, pp. 4-5).
According to the national security strategy statement, these threats could
not be effectively dealt with solely through the use of military force in the
traditional sense of conducting war and combat operations; nor could they be
handled only by states operating solely within their own geographic borders.
Because the threats were transnational in nature, they would require the
United States to partner with, or at least seek to work with, multiple levels of
government agencies as well as nongovernmental entities from corporations
to influential individuals. The United States would pursue comprehensive
engagement that would include the United States’ traditional allies as well
as “centres of influence” including Russia, China, and India; emerging new
partners; and “peoples not just governments” (U.S. Whitehouse, National
Security Strategy, May 2010, pp. 11-12).
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2.3 U.S. Strategic Defense Guidance, published in 2012
The national security strategy was directed toward the U.S. federal
government as a whole, not just the U.S. Department of Defense. In April
2011, President Obama directed a review of Department of Defense (DOD)
missions and strategies that would be needed to support the new security
strategy and also to identify budgeting priorities in order to meet federal
spending reductions mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011. This act
required the DOD to identify roughly $500 billion in cost reductions over
the next decade (Catherine Dale & Pat Towell, 2012, p. 2). The resulting
strategic defense guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities
for 21st Century Defense, was published in January 2012. The defence
strategy contained in this document will likely serve as the blueprint for
U.S. force planning over the next decade, although the force structure and
DOD spending levels may be revised as a consequence of the spending cuts
triggered by the budget sequestration in 2013 and an increasing U.S. budget
deficit (Catherine Dale and Pat Towell, 2012, p. 2).
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense
is the U.S. President’s latest defence strategy for the United States. The
President and his national security staff developed the guidance in
consultation with civilian and military leaders within the Department of
Defense to include the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military
Services, and the Combatant Commanders (U.S. Department of Defense,
2012). The purpose of the document was to identify U.S. strategic interests
and priorities in order to guide U.S. defence spending. It was shaped within
the context of several significant events that included the conclusion of
U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, fiscal constraints in the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis, and reductions in federal spending mandated by
the Budget Control Act of 2011 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012). This
newest strategic defence guidance is forward looking and seeks to describe
the capabilities that will be needed by the U.S. military (also referred to as
the Joint Force) in 2020.1
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defence is
a follow-on vision to the National Security Strategy, but directed specifisally
at the Department of Defense. The guidance re-emphasised that U.S.
military forces will need to be prepared to engage within a “global security
environment [that] presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and
opportunities” that will require the use of “all elements of U.S. national
power.” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, p. 1) This statement is not
1
The term “the Joint Force” refers to Department of Defense capabilities and usually
means the integrated capabilities and/or units of all services of the U.S. military.
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surprising and follows from the themes presented in previous guidance.
Also unsurprising is the list of the primary missions that the Joint Force will
need to be prepared to accomplish:
• Counter-terrorism and irregular warfare;
• Deter and defeat adversaries;
• Project power despite anti-access and area denial challenges;
• Counter weapons of mass destruction;
• Operate effectively in cyberspace and space;
• Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent;
• Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities;
• Provide a stabilising presence;
• Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations;
• Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2012, pp. 4-6).
These missions flow from the National Security Strategy of 2010 and
other previous defence planning documents; most of the missions are
enduring from past generations.
What is new in the guidance is the refocus of U.S. military strategy to the
Asia-Pacific region and repeated mention of burden sharing with allies and
partners. The United States’ “rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region” (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2012, p. 2) seeks to counter several U.S. national
security concerns: (1) maintaining the free flow of commerce through the
Indian Ocean and the broader Asia-Pacific region; (2) maintaining peace
and stability particularly on the Korean peninsula; and (3) managing the
U.S. relationship with an increasingly powerful China. U.S. allies and
partners in Asia-Pacific are described as “critical to the future stability and
growth of the region.” In order to meet these challenges, the guidance states
that the United States will invest resources in order to develop a “long-term
strategic partnership with India” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, p. 2)
as well as with current Asian allies and emerging partners in order to “to
ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests.”
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, p. 3).
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense
continues the reorientation of the U.S. Department of Defence away from
building forces to fight and win wars on a unilateral basis to building
partnerships that share the burdens of building peace and stability. Not
only are partnerships of key importance in the Asia-Pacific region, but
also globally. The guidance explained that building the capacity of partner
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nations is an important U.S. interest because partners help the United States
to share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. The guidance
goes on to say that across the globe, the United States “will seek to be
the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing
number of nations – including those in Africa and Latin America” (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2012, p. 3).
While the United States seeks to build a global network of allies and
partners, European allies remain very important to U.S. national security.
The guidance is clear that “some of America’s most stalwart allies and
partners” are European and that Europe is the United States’ “principal
partner in seeking global and economic security” and it “will remain so
for the foreseeable future.” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, pp. 23). Europe remains critically important to U.S. national security because
peace and prosperity in Europe as well as a strong and vital NATO is
not only essential to the security of Europe, but to future global security.
The guidance explained: “most European countries are now producers of
security rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown in Iraq
and Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the
U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts
toward a focus on future capabilities” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012,
p. 3).
In sum, the U.S. military forces in the year 2020 will need the
capabilities to act unilaterally to confront and defeat aggression, but partner
nations, particularly in Europe, will be expected to shoulder more of the
responsibilities and burdens. The global community will be expected to
help with many of the tasks necessary to ensure global peace, stability,
and security. As President Obama states in his opening statement, the
United States is “joining with allies and partners around the world to build
their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity. And the
growing capabilities of allies and partners create new opportunities for
burden-sharing” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012).
2.4 Joint Force 2020, published in 2012
Joint Force 2020 is the capstone concept for U.S. joint operations meaning
that it is a strategic vision for how U.S. military forces will operate in the
year 2020. The document directly flows from and provides doctrinal support
for the defence strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Joint Force 2020 was formulated and
published by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as his
guidance to the U.S. military as a framework for conceptualisng future
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security challenges and the operational doctrine that will be needed to meet
those challenges as the United States draws down its military forces in the
Middle East and shifts its attention to Asia-Pacific.
Joint Force 2020 focuses on what is new and different in the strategic
environment and serves as a bridging document between President
Obama’s strategic defence guidance and the CJCS’s directions that will be
given to soldiers. Joint Force 2020 emphasises that the military is only one
instrument of national power and it is clear throughout that the U.S. military
should expect to work with a variety of partners and to expand the number
of partnership opportunities from previous eras. The CJCS explained that
“the nature of conflict in the world is enduring” however, the means to
deal with conflict is not just the job of the military, but also the job of U.S.
government agencies that will need to work together with each other as well
as with nongovernmental organisations, foreign governments, multinational
institutions, industry, allied armed forces, and the like (Dempsey, 2012,
p. 1).
The U.S. military should be given the resources to accomplish the
primary missions identified in the Defense Strategic Guidance (listed above)
to include having the ability to project decisive military force. This is basic
and straightforward support for the President’s national security strategy.
Most of these resources have already been programmed. About 80% of
U.S. military capabilities and force structure for the year 2020 are either
already in existence or currently under development (Dempsey, 2012, p.
3). Thus, the CJCS cautions that only 20% of the force structure could be
significantly changed to address issues that were raised in 2012. Because the
defence acquisition process requires a long time horizon, the most important
advancements, according the CJCS, would “come through innovations in
training, education, personnel management, and leadership development”
(Dempsey, 2012, p. 3). The U.S. Congress is also focused on skills that
military commanders will need to support the strategy. For example, the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (an investigative arm of the U.S.
Congress) identified gaps in the professional military education curricula.
Investigators found that the U.S. military staff and war colleges could play
an important role in support of Joint Force 2020 by providing curricula to
improve the ability of U.S. military officers to anticipate and respond to
uncertainty as well as how to operate on intent through trust, empowerment,
and understanding (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013, p. 14).
According to the CJCS, the security environment in the year 2020 will
be characterised by greater stability in terms of state governance, but this
stability will be increasing threatened by non-state actors, individuals, and
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other adversaries who will have access to highly destructive technologies
from weapons of mass destruction to sophisticated computer codes: “the
diffusion of advanced technology in the global economy means that
middleweight militaries and non-state actors can now muster weaponry
once available to only superpowers. The proliferation of cyber and space
weapons, precision munitions, ballistic missiles, and anti-access and
area denial capabilities will grant more adversaries the ability to inflict
devastating losses” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 2). This evolution in the threat
environment is both a cause and a consequence of transnational dynamics
that allow individuals quicker access to information through social media
and social networks. In addition, advances in communication technologies
such as mobile phones with video cameras are in the process of changing
not only the nature of warfare but also the nature of global politics. Now
information can reach people around the world very quickly and as a
consequence the U.S. military and its operational partners must be prepared
for “intense media scrutiny, a dynamic that potentially invests otherwise
inconsequential actions with strategic importance” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3).
The security paradox, that there is greater stability in terms of inter-state
dynamics but increasing challenges in the global commons, is a situation
that cannot be addressed by the United States alone according to the CJCS,
but will require a “globally integrated approach” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3). The
U.S. military will need to be “globally postured” and capable of combining
quickly with mission partners “across domains, echelons, geographic
boundaries, and organisational affiliations” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 4). Partner
nations and their militaries will play several significant roles as can be
inferred from the list of capabilities that the U.S. military will need in order
to operate as a globally integrated force. These eight key capabilities are:
1. The use of “mission command” that empowers individuals to exercise
their own judgment and emphasises decentralisation of decisions and trust
between individuals.
2. The ability to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in all domains.
3. Global agility to include smarter positioning of forces and greater use
of prepositioned assets.
4. Partnering with U.S. government agencies, partner militaries, and
nongovernmental partners.
5. Flexibility in basing and employing forces across geographic
boundaries and command lines.
6. Cross domain synergy.
7. Increased use of low-signature, small-footprint capabilities such as
cyberspace and special operations.
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8. Increased ability to discriminate targets and minimise unintended
consequences (Dempsey, 2012, pp. 4-8).
Partner nations contribute to key capabilities from participating in
multinational operations to providing bases for U.S. military personnel, U.S.
military equipment, or the prepositioning of supplies. Partner nations may
have special expertise in domains that do not necessarily involve the use
of military force; from banking to energy resources to diplomacy. Partner
nations may provide capabilities that allow small-footprint operations and
they may also provide intelligence that helps to minimise unintended damage
or consequences. As Joint Force 2020 states, these are key contributions.
According to the CJCS, the unwillingness or the inability of partner nations
to work with the United States or the unwillingness or the inability of the
United States to work with partner nations would degrade the ability of
the U.S. military to operate as a globally integrated force and promote
international security and stability (Dempsey, 2012, p. 14).
3.0 SUMMARY
The United States stood at the apex of military power at the end of the Cold
War. It was the sole remaining superpower after decades long competition
for social, political, and military hegemony. The end of the Cold War was
one of the most important geo-political events of the 20th Century; yet at
the same time there was an even more profound technological revolution
underway. This revolution, primarily in information technologies, has
changed the character of how we live our lives. Today, information flows
readily and cheaply across borders. Images and information about events
are produced not only by news agencies, but by each of us as we use our cell
phones and computers. Commerce is conducted through electronic signals
rather than with the exchange of paper currency. In the global commons,
national security (the security of states) can no longer be addressed by any
one state contained within its own borders. Countries, such as North Korea,
that attempt to do so, are still threatened by forces that transcend borders:
climate change that leads to drought, famine, and refugees; information
available on the internet that contradicts state propaganda; international
cyber-surveillance; cyber-attack; or the freezing of bank accounts and
electronic transfers of assets. Even for the most powerful states, geographic
borders serve as less of a barrier as the al-Qaida’s attacks on the United
States demonstrated.
The global strategic environment continues to undergo rapid change.
This article has taken a snapshot view of what this process looks like in the
first decade of the 21st Century by examining four documents that describe
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the strategic environment as it is envisioned by U.S. policymakers. Today
the United States no longer seeks global hegemony, but pursues global
leadership. In a world where threats are global in nature, a global approach
will be the only viable means to ensure security. In the global commons,
security is both a global asset and a global responsibility. From the U.S.
perspective, partner nations as well as partnerships with non-state entities
will play an important, and in some cases vital, role in the national security
strategies of the United States. The military will remain central, yet these
strategies are also evolving to encompass a much more diverse array of
instruments and partners.
4.0 REFERENCES:
[1] Catherine Dale and Pat Towell, “In Brief: Assessing the January
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG),” U.S. Congressional Research
Service, R42146, August 13, 2013.
[2] Dempsey, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020,
2012.
[3] Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Vision 2020, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, June
2000.
[4] Martin E. Dempsey, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Chairman’s Strategic Guidance to the Joint Force, February 6, 2012, p. 3
[5] U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, no page number
(Secretary of Defense’s introductory letter dated 5 January 2013).
[6] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Joint Military Education:
Actions Needed to Implement DOD Recommendations for Enhancing
Leadership Development, Report 14-29, October 2013.
[7] U.S. Whitehouse, National Security Strategy, May 2010.
139
CULTURAL MINEFIELDS AND COALITION FORCES
LCDR Dr. Leedjia Svec
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute,
Directorate of Research Development and Strategic Initiatives,
366 Tuskegee Airmen Drive, Patrick AFB, FL 32925, U.S.
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
Cultural competence is a vital component of many missions in today’s military. Cultural competence enables one to further a mission, save resources, and
save lives. Conversely, a lack of cultural competence may bring about challenges
to mission completion, requirement for more resources, waste of resources, and
destruction of lives. Cultural competence involves many components. One particular component is cultural heritage and protection of cultural property.
Cultural property is comprised of the physical, social, and psychological components that define one’s culture. This may be a representation of a deity, a sacred
space, a social practice such as going to the market, or a belief such as a local
legend. The cultures to which these items belong are the owners; disregarding
this fact may lead to severed connections, poor communication, retaliation, poor
public relations, and even violence.
Cultural property and its protection is a matter of law, heritage, human rights,
and strategy. Few formal studies have been conducted with regard to Cultural
Property Protection (CPP) and the military; training CPP as well as understanding the current state of it in the military remains an important and needed area
for understanding. Such information can be utilised to guide policy, training, and
future directions.
1.0 INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL HERITAGE
Cultural heritage is “a source of identity and cohesion for communities.”
Cultural heritage lays the foundation “for vibrant, innovative and prosperous knowledge societies” (UNESCO, 2008). “In today’s interconnected
world, culture’s power to transform societies is clear. Its diverse manifestations–from our cherished historic monuments and museums to traditional
practices and contemporary art forms–enrich our everyday lives in countless ways” (UNESCO, 2008). Cultural heritage encompasses a wide range
of both tangible and intangible elements.
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Tangible elements include “monuments, buildings and sites with historical, aesthetic, archaeological, scientific, ethnological or anthropological value” and “outstanding physical, biological and geological formations,
habitats of threatened species of animals and plants and areas with scientific,
conservation or aesthetic value” (UNESCO, 2008). Tangible objects may
include clothing, technology, gravesites, buildings, walls, roads, dishes,
and more. Tangible items are typically more visible as well as visual, able
to be seen and held. It is important to recognise that many people will be
familiar with grand or popular places and objects of tangible heritage, such
as the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, Turkey. However, the places or objects
that are less known to the public, the places and objects that do not appear
grand, historic, or pretty–such as rock formations held sacred by Native
Americans in upstate New York, U.S.–are of no less importance.
Intangible aspects of cultural heritage include “traditional festivals, oral
traditions, customs, ways of life, traditional crafts, dance, music, theatre,
cuisine recipes…landscapes, industrial remains, and other various forms
common to humankind” (UNESCO, 2008). Intangible cultural heritage
may include practices, such as going to the market or travelling a particular
route (Rush, 2012). How individuals make decisions, engage in life events
such as weddings, birthdays, and funerals, and conduct their lives all have
the potential to reflect a given cultural custom handed down through the
ages. As with tangible heritage, intangible cultural heritage may not be obvious or elaborate, yet its allowance is paramount. Some people may say
or prefer “happy saint’s day” rather than “happy birthday” on their day of
birth, for example.
Both tangible and intangible cultural heritage may serve as a form of
memory, a connection to the past, or be representative of different aspects
of a given group’s culture (religion, family, etc.). They encompass identity and enrich the diversity of people throughout the world. The practice
of having tea in Bosnia-Herzegovina is one example of both tangible and
intangible cultural heritage. The teapots are tangible, while the practice of
having tea with others and the recipes used are intangible. They are both
important and offer a window into what is significant to the culture this
heritage belongs to.
2.0 IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL HERITAGE
When people think about their home country, they may think of a specific place with pride. They may tell others about it, hoping to convey the
beauty, history, or unique elements it possesses. They most certainly want
to convince others to see or experience it. Many times, people do not need
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to be from a place to experience the pride and emotions that are attached
to it. They understand its significance and worth, even if it does not belong to them. This is the nature of cultural heritage. Heritage is “our legacy
from the past, what we live with today, and what we pass on to future generations. Our cultural and natural heritages are both irreplaceable sources
of life and inspiration” (UNESCO, 2008). An individual heritage may be
unique to a given culture, but all cultures share the common thread of cultural heritage. The importance of cultural heritage cannot be overstated; it is
“a driver and enabler of sustainability … a source of meaning and belonging … a wellspring of creativity and innovation essential for all societies
today” (Bokova, 2013).
The value of cultural heritage does not just lie in psychological concepts, such as pride, or social concepts, such as identity. Cultural heritage
has an influence on economics and international relations as well. In 2009,
for example, U.S. forces expanded their camp in Afghanistan without taking the local culture and landscape into account (Phillips, 2009). As a result,
ancient but still utilised water systems were blocked off or contaminated,
upsetting the local villagers. The U.S. then had to pay reparations and was
not able to work with the locals as intended. Both tangible and intangible
cultural heritage may be threatened by economic instability, outside influence, allies, and enemies (Matsuda, 1998). As the likelihood of working
with and within other cultures increases, it is all the more important to consider cultural heritage.
3.0 CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE MILITARY
There are many news headlines featuring militaries behaving poorly toward others’ cultures, such as the base expansion in Afghanistan. Another
illustration involves the looting of an Iraqi museum after occupation. Additionally, both the U.S. and U.K. had not ratified the Hague Convention,
which caused political issues in allies’ home countries for supporting the
U.S. invasion. This also angered the Italians and negatively impacted their
working relationship with the U.K., which distracted British forces as they
engaged in fixing their political situation, taking away from the mission at
hand. As a result, U.S., British, Italian, and Polish forces faced significant
challenges working together on this issue, as they were not on the same
page of understanding.
The impact of cultural heritage mistakes is significant and harmful;
however there are also examples of military respect for cultural heritage.
The recent coordination of the no-strike list heritage information between
coalition forces enabled the U.S. and the U.K. to demonstrate respect for
the cultural heritage of Italians and Libyans, for example. Heritage preser142
vation is a force multiplier and offers the opportunity to aid in rebuilding
relations within countries. It is a way to show respect to coalition forces and
generate valuable opportunities to partner in positive ways. It also contributes to unified operations, may save lives and dollars, and is an important
part of the new counter insurgency (COIN) strategy. Both the positive and
negative illustrations point to the importance of education and training in
the military.
4.0 PRESENT STUDIES
Both these illustrations raise the question, what is the current state of
understanding and training for military members with regard to cultural
heritage? Literature reviews reveal few actual studies. The extent of cultural heritage knowledge is little known and may be an untapped resource
for allied forces. A series of studies was conducted to assess current understanding of cultural property protection within the U.S. military and to determine the effectiveness of a training aimed at increasing cultural property
protection awareness, knowledge, and comfort within the military setting.
It was hypothesised that participants would vary in their level of awareness,
knowledge, and comfort of cultural property protection, and that all would
show a significant improvement in knowledge scores post-training. Factors
such as deployment experience would be examined for potential correlation
with measures such as awareness.
4.1. Methods
A 14-question pre-read survey was developed to assess participants’
demographics, awareness, knowledge, and efficacy with regard to Cultural
Property Protection (CPP). Demographics included questions on CPP training and cultural property destruction. Awareness included values, laws,
and procedures, while knowledge examined know-how, such as how to
beddown in a protected structure or communicate information about the
structure. Efficacy assessed one’s comfort with engaging in the knowledgebased tasks. After participants completed the pre-survey, they were either
asked to read one of two hard copy manuals on CPP that they were given or
they were given instruction in equal opportunity (EO) subjects.
The CPP manuals were developed by the Combatant Command (COCOM)
Cultural Heritage Action Group. Both manuals connected concepts of cultural property protection with well-established military operations concepts. One manual, “The Cultural Minefield: A Manual on Cultural Property Protection for the Operator Forward”, (Rush, 2012) was 76 pages and
took approximately 2 hours to complete. The other manual, “A manual for
cultural property protection in the deployed environment,” (Rush, 2012)
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was 12 pages and took no more than 45 minutes to complete. After reading
the manual (or receiving general EO knowledge), participants completed a
post-read survey.
A 24-question post-read survey was administered to assess awareness,
knowledge, and comfort, in addition to feedback on the manual itself. The
surveys utilized a 1–5 rating scale with 1 representing no awareness, knowledge, or comfort and 5 representing absolute awareness, knowledge, and
comfort with different aspects of cultural property protection. Participants
were solicited primarily in person. Participants were informed that it was
a volunteer opportunity and that, should they decide to participate, they
would fill out a pre-read survey, read the manual (or not), and complete a
post-read survey.
Participants were divided into “Study One” and “Study Two” to reflect
that they were recruited from different sources and received different manuals.
4.2 Study One Results
Study one utilised the full-length manual and participants primarily from
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute’s (DEOMI) Leadership
Team Awareness Seminar (LTAS). A total of 30 participants engaged in
the study. All participants received the pre-test and post-test, but 18 participants received the manual, while 12 did not receive the manual for control.
Participant demographics are illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1. Study One Demographics
Gender
75% Male and 25% Female
Race
58% White, 33% Black, and 9% Other
Service
53% Army, 13% Navy, 13% Marines, 9% Air Force,
and 12% Civilian
Rank
37% E-7–E-9, 37% O-4–O-6, 10% O-1–O-3, 10% GS11–GS-14, and 6% Other
Occupation
35% HR, 17% Infantry, 17% Science,14% Legal, 10%
Supply, and 7% Aviation
Deployed Status
63% Deployed and 37% Not deployed
Cultural Training
93% No cultural training and 7% Cultural training
Witnessed Destruction
8% Witnessed destruction (pre-), 92% No witness
17% Witnessed destruction (post-) , 83% No witness
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Average pre-read scores indicated that participants had limited awareness for all measures regarding CPP (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Study 1 Average Rating Pre- and Post-
Participants averaged a 2-point increase in all measures on the post-test,
indicating they were more aware, knowledgeable, and comfortable with
CPP after reading the manual. Participants in the control group showed limited awareness for all measures regarding CPP (Figure 2) but did not show
the increase in scores with post-assessment, supporting the idea that the
change in scores coming from the test group was caused by the manual.
Figure 2. Study 1 Average Rating Pre- and Post- (No manual)
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All participants marked that the manual would be helpful for deployments and if they were given the manual they would read it. Participants
rated the manual as extremely useful on average and found the formatting
just right with elements (such as pictures or lists) in place.
4.3 Study Two Results
Study Two utilised the shorter manual and participants from the Equal
Opportunity Advisor Course (EOAC). A total of 79 participants engaged
in the study. In the test group, 27 participants received the pre-test and
post-test and the manual, while 52 participants served as control, engaging in pre-assessment surveys. Participant demographics are illustrated in
Table 2.
Table 2. Study Two Demographics
Gender
58% Male and 42% Female
Race
51% Black, 25% White, 10% Hispanic, 10% Other, and 4%
Asian
Service
58% Army, 22% Air Force, 11% Navy, 3% Marines, 3%
Coast Guard, and 3% National Guard
Rank
67% E-7–E-9, 17% E-4–E-6, 10% O-4–O-6, and 6% O1–O-3
Occupation
42% HR, 14% Supply, 11% Other, 10% Infantry, 8% EO,
6% Medical, 3% Signal, 3% Aviation, and 3% Legal
Deployed Status
87% Deployed and 13% Not deployed
Cultural Training?
78% No cultural training and 22% Cultural training
Witness Destruction?
9% Witnessed destruction (pre-), 91% No witness
12% Witnessed destruction (post-) , 88% No witness
Average pre-read scores indicated that test-group participants had limited awareness for all measures regarding CPP (Figure 3).
Participants averaged a 2-point increase in all measures on the post-test,
indicating they were more aware, knowledgeable, and comfortable with
CPP after reading the manual.
Participants in the control group showed limited awareness for all measures regarding CPP (Figure 4) but did not show the increase in scores with
post-assessment, supporting the idea that the change in scores of the test
group was caused by the manual.
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Figure 3. Study 2 Average Rating Pre- and Post-
Figure 4. Study 2 Average Rating Pre- and Post- (No Manual)
The majority of participants marked that the manual would be helpful
for deployments and that if they were given the manual, they would read it.
Participants rated the manual as useful on average and found the formatting
just right with elements (such as pictures or lists) in place.
5.0 DISCUSSION
Participant demographics were not equal in category representation,
with both studies having a majority of Army, male, human resources (HR),
deployed, and persons from the E7–E9 rank who had not received cul147
tural heritage training nor witnessed cultural heritage destruction. While
comparisons could be made on the bases of job, service, gender, etc., they
would be limited due to the unequal sample size. Additionally, no Clandestine Services were surveyed. Future efforts may benefit from obtaining
their input, particularly Clandestine Services who are frequently in forward
deployed environments.
Pre-test read the majority of participants for both studies had limited
awareness of cultural heritage laws and minimisation of damage. These
findings are interesting in that a significant number of military members
deploy to foreign areas where the awareness of cultural heritage can save
lives and dollars. Additionally, a sizable number of participants remarked
that this was novel and important information. The value of cultural heritage stood out from laws and minimisation as participants had the highest
ratings of this measure pre- and post-test for both groups. It follows that the
value of one’s cultural heritage may be more easily grasped; however, it is
possible that the relevance to the military may need further strengthening
for some participants.
Examination of knowledge scores pre-test read shows that variations
exist within CPP knowledge domains, highlighting certain domains as being less known among the participants tested. The majority of participants
did not know how to recover or how to beddown with cultural property for
both groups, for example. Post-test read these scores had significantly improved but still remained the lowest scores. This finding is important in that
cultural property is purposely utilised by enemy forces and can be a source
of protection from enemy fire. It follows that knowledge about bedding
down with cultural property would be one of the first domains in which to
target training. It is also likely that more interactive training is required for
these domains as opposed to the written format utilised in the manual. On
average, however, participants’ knowledge significantly increased for all
knowledge measures after reading the manual for both groups. It is worth
noting that the groups did not start out with the same scores on average,
with the senior leaders having higher pre-read averages than the non-senior
leaders, which would be expected.
Many studies in other fields, such as HIV prevention, have shown that
knowledge does not equal efficacy or a sense of comfort or belief that one
is capable of changing behaviour despite new knowledge that behaviour
should be changed (Svec&Wand,2003). Comfort with cultural heritage was
assessed to gauge whether participants had the confidence to engage in cultural property protection behaviours. The majority of participants were not
comfortable with performance pre-test read; however, a sizable number of
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participants were comfortable. Comfort with communication was higher,
while comfort with execution was lower. It is encouraging that knowledge
increased efficacy.
One consideration when examining the data is that deployment status
had an influence on levels of CPP awareness, knowledge, and comfort. To
examine whether this was the case, participants’ data were separated into
either having been deployed or never deployed and compared. As would
be expected, those who had deployed rated all measures higher (greater
awareness, knowledge, comfort) than those who had not deployed, pre-test
read, for all measures. The difference, however, was not significant, and
those who deployed on average did not rate measures any higher than a 3,
or “somewhat.” This suggests that just deploying is not enough to teach
matters of CPP.
Assessment of the manuals themselves revealed that participants found
them usable. The lowest rating, that for pictures, was likely due to image
quality as participants remarked that they were hard to decipher. The manual
was printed in black and white; therefore, it is important to ensure colour
printing of the photographs for maximum effectiveness before the manual is
distributed. The manual content was well received. However, the length of
the manual was rated as a little too long, which was expressed in the comments. One of the purposes of the manual is use in the field; therefore, a short
and direct version via app, e-reader, or pocket device may be worth pursuing
in conjunction with publication of this manual for further reference.
Suggestions included checklists at the end of each section, increasing
and clarifying the “so what” factor, and electronic or PowerPoint formats.
Service members may appreciate a version that could be viewed on their
e-readers. A frequent comment included the importance of cultural heritage
knowledge, the novelty of this knowledge to the participants, and the need
for more segments of the military to have this knowledge.
It is worthwhile to pursue versions that may be aimed at different segments of the population, from the senior leader to the newly enlisted, as
well as specific to each service. Cultural heritage is a legal matter as well as
a human rights, EO, and cultural competence matter. The more often troops
are socialised to these concepts, the less often there should be international
incidents of cultural heritage actions gone wrong.
6.0 SUMMARY
Cultural property and its protection is a matter of law, heritage, human
rights, and strategy. Few formal studies have been conducted with regard
149
to CPP and the military; training CPP as well as understanding the current
state of it in the military remains an important and needed area for understanding. Such information can be utilised to guide policy, training, and
future directions. This study sought to assess the current state of cultural
heritage awareness, knowledge, and comfort as well as the effectiveness
and areas for improvement of the cultural heritage training manual.
The results of this study indicate that the current state of cultural heritage awareness and knowledge has room for improvement. Participants
somewhat know the value of cultural heritage and are less than somewhat
aware of laws or protection. This finding is important because service members will still be held accountable to the law, even if they do not know
it. With regard to cultural heritage knowledge, participants are not really
knowledgeable; however, this varied with deployment and service. Participants were somewhat comfortable with cultural heritage, and those with
more knowledge were more comfortable, as one would expect. While further studies would be required, it appears that the knowledge provided was
enough to increase efficacy in engaging cultural heritage for the vast majority of participants. Despite variations between participants’ base knowledge, participants’ average scores clearly increased in all three areas after
reading the training manual.
Cultural property protection value was highest pre- and post-training,
while knowledge regarding recovery of property was rated lowest pre- and
post-training. Differences between those who had deployed or who were in
different services were minimised. This finding is important in that while
not all participants began with the same levels of awareness or knowledge
with cultural heritage, they finished relatively the same. This is encouraging
for maintaining an equal playing field and equitable resources and capacities among service members as they engage in cultural heritage.
Future studies should include objective assessment of awareness and
knowledge rather than, or in addition to, self-rating. Additional questions
should also assess training and experience with cultural heritage. It is
known, for example, that the Army has Fort Drum as a place to engage cultural heritage, and the Marines are trained on CPP via Defense Institute for
International and Legal Studies (DIILS); however, it is not known whether
the Navy or Air Force have such resources. An additional measure would
be a follow up study to ensure retention of knowledge after training, as
well as re-test reliability. Lastly, tracking of incidents and outcomes in the
field may be the key to policy and leadership support and ownership. While
these factors are known, objective measurement and illustration would be a
significant next step.
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With regard to the manual itself, revisions to create a slightly shorter interactive, dynamic, electronic version is recommended. Different educational
levels or purposes could be embedded for different leadership levels within
the military. The recommendation for collateral duty is also worth consideration. Just as participants receive an in-depth training that allows them to help
others vote, be fit, volunteer, keep track of hazardous substances in medical
clinics, and more, commands or units that would benefit from cultural heritage training could employ this as a collateral duty. Training could occur at
Fort Drum as well as online. This would enable a streamlined advocacy and
reach-back capability that service members remarked they needed.
7.0 CONCLUSION
These studies sought to examine the following questions: Do service
members have the necessary skills to protect cultural property as they deploy worldwide? Do service members see the impact of cultural property
protection on matters that range from equal opportunity to national security?
What is the impact of cultural property training? While the current studies
leave room for further refinement and methodological improvement, they
do lend data that is helpful to exploring these questions.
The vast majority of participants had no experience with cultural heritage training, and had some awareness of cultural heritage value but little
cultural heritage knowledge or efficacy. Participants varied in their understanding of the connection between cultural heritage and EO or national
security as evidenced by specific questions and analysis of their comments.
Several participants, for example, believed that cultural heritage did not
apply to them, while after the training, several participants viewed destruction of property in new light. The impact of cultural property training was
measurably significant, with the majority of participants improving on all
measures. The biggest difference between the two manuals, as shown in the
data, was in assessment; 100% of participants found the longer manual useful and would read it, while this was not the case with the shorter manual.
Further studies would be required to determine whether this finding is a
function of group difference or manual difference.
In conclusion, cultural heritage is an important process and outcome.
Cultural heritage relates to issues faced in deployment as well as in times
of peace, in land and on sea. The sheer volume of participants who have
deployed but have not received cultural heritage information is alarming;
however, the effectiveness of training is encouraging. As a final point, cultural heritage is moderately known in the field, has the ability to be successfully taught, and remains an important component of today’s force.
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8.0 REFERENCES
[1] Bokova, I. (2013, October 28). Director General of UNESCO on
the occasion of the inauguration of the exhibition Intangible Cultural Heritage for Sustainable Development. Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco.
org/images/0022/002241/224136m.pdf.
[2] Philips, M. (2009). Learning a hard history lesson in ‘Talibanistan.’
The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124224652409516525.
[3] UNESCO. (2008). Tangible cultural heritage. Retrieved from http://
www.unesco.org/new/en/cairo/culture/tangible-cultural-heritage.
[4] UNESCO. (2008). Intangible cultural heritage” Retrieved from
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/cairo/culture/intangible-cultural-heritage/.
[5] Matsuda, D. (1998). Subsistence Diggers. In K. Gibbons (Ed.) Who
Owns the Past?: Cultural Policy, Cultural Property, and the Law (255265). Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
[6] Rush, L. (2012). Cultural property protection as a force multiplier
in stability operations.Military Review, 36-43. Retrieved fromhttp://usacac.
army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_
20120430_art008.pdf
[7] Rush, L. (2012). The Cultural Minefield: A Manual on Cultural
Property Protection for the Operator Forward. (Manuscript in Review).
COCOM Cultural Heritage Action Group, Fort Drum, NY.
[8] Rush, L (2012).A manual for cultural property protection in the
deployed environment.(Manuscript in Review).COCOM Cultural Heritage
Action Group, Fort Drum, NY.
[9] Svec, L., & Wang, H. (2003). A cross and inter cultural assessment
of AIDS/HIV behaviors, attitudes, knowledge, and methods. Soochow
University, Taiwan & University of Nevada, Reno. American Psychological
Society Annual Meeting.
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STRESSFUL FACTORS
IN MODERN MILITARY OPERATIONS
Col. Dr. Iliya Marinov & 1st Lt. Dr. Aneliya Mitkova
Military Medical Academy, Sofia, Bulgaria
Centre for Mental Health and Prevention
3 St. “Georgi Sofiyski” Str., 1606 Sofia, Bulgaria
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
The present paper refers to the necessity of broadening our understanding
about the factors influencing the emergence of stress reactions as a result of military
deployment. Within the military psychological support system, stress reactions are
considered mainly in terms of Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), while the
post-deployment syndrome perspective is not yet very popular among the mental
health specialists.
By recognizing the role not only of the battle stressors, emergent stress reactions
could be better understood and thus professional mental health specialists would
provide better complex treatment.
Taking into account not only the ground stressors, the authors present the
results of a psychological study (N=380) investigating the degree by which
environmental, cognitive, physiological, emotional and field stressors affect
servicemembers during deployment.
1.0 BACKROUND
Participation in mission deployments and/or battle exposures has been
examined as a situation under extreme conditions which could evoke
a wide spectrum of stress reactions in every human being. Experiencing
threatening events with imminent jeopardy, concerning life and health, for
short or longer periods of time, could lead to traumatic stress reactions in a
period from a couple of days to even weeks after the event. Usually these
reactions weaken with time, but they could last and could lead to various
health conditions. In contrast to many other stress situations, deployment
participation can result in psychological traumas with specific outcomes
in the socio-psychological adaptation of the servicemen/servicewomen.
Eventually these problems become obvious after their return back home.
One of the main obstructions for servicemembers to successful readaptation to everyday life is proved to be the psychological outcome related
to stress resulting from battle experience. With veterans suffering from Post
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Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) the capabilities of integration of the
traumatic experience within personal lifetime is dramatically impaired. The
traumatic memories could be present in one’s memory not as connected in
a coherent storyline, but also as intense emotions with sensory and somatic
symptoms. It is highly possible they be evoked in associatively close to the
traumatic events situations and/or corresponding stimuli. Through the force
of this non-integration of the traumatic stimuli within the cognitive schemes,
and their rigidity in time, the “victims” are “frozen” in the trauma as if it is a
current experience, instead of seasoning it as belonging to the past. Somatic
reactions of individuals with PTSD to specific physical and emotional
stimuli proceed in the same way as if under actual threat condition.
One of the consequences of PTSD represents a generalisation of the
expected danger. The world turns to become an unsecure place: harmless
sounds provoke reactions of anxiety, usual events are perceived as
harbinger of danger, etc. The persevering and relevant activation of „alarm
signals” leads to the fact that physical sensitivity loses its signal purpose
related to emotional conditions, and as a result it can no longer be referred
to as a landmark in any activities. In the continuation of these processes,
normal physiological sensations could be additionally loaded with new
endangering emotional content. As a result, the proper physiological
activity is transformed to source of fear for the person – soldiers suffer
from hypervigilance, overreactions to unexpected stimuli and inability for
relaxation. They have to cope with the fact not to be understood, to be
judged and sanctioned, to deal with problems in human interactions, with
professional self-defining and effective coping, problems in the sphere of
financial budgeting, to engage and preserve their families, and/or close
amiable relationships, etc. As a result, the “victims” of PTSD decrease
and eventually lose their capabilities for flexible response to the changed
environmental requirements that could result in difficulties of assimilation of
new knowledge, abilities and skills, all along new information processing.
The participants in extreme situations, with unexpected traumatic
pattern, perceive the ongoing events as an act of violence, while perceiving
themselves as victims. From a psychological point of view, the violence
damages the most basic beliefs of the personality concerning his/her
independence as an invulnerable and valuable human being, all along with
the impact in direction to negative ideations about the world as a safe and
fairly place. After being a victim of a violent act, one’s own self-perception
and perception of the environment are dramatically altered and can never
be restored as before.
Individuals with PTSD experience perplexity in planning their proper
life in aspect of “forbidding” themselves from dreaming and depicturing in
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their fantasy varieties of valuable outcomes for important situations in their
life. In order to preserve themselves from invasion of traumatic experiences,
memories and associations related to the extreme condition, the “victims”
raise an internal psychological barrier. Hence, for maintaining the strength
of this barrier, they reorganize their life in a way not to feel or to imagine
different probable outcomes leading to emotionally powerful or intense
reactions. Thus, these patterns of built models for cognitive self-restrictions,
having the purpose of not allowing emotional impulses to emerge, have a
substantial contribution for the impulse control of these “victims”.
The reaction to the trauma over again is proved to be one of the main
reasons for violence spreading in a large social context. The persecuting
obsessive memories and thoughts organise servicemembers in a way to
avoid emotions provoking affective invasions. The avoidance mechanisms
could take different appearances – for instance, taking a distance from
events, objects, situations, people, sounds, or whatever stimuli; or drugs
and alcohol abuse for damping the consciousness to be aware/realise the
stress; or using processes of dissociation in order to suppress the hurtful
experience. The aftermath shows impaired relationships and interactions
with other people and adaptive resources decrement.
The presence of PTSD symptoms in one of the family or military unit
members influences the functioning of all the other members as well. By
avoiding situations or doings similar to the main trauma, or that could
symbolise it, could reflect unfavourably on relationships with others, to
lead to family conflicts, divorces or loss of job.
Only part of the soldiers exposed to traumatic experience display PTSD
symptoms and this fact raises the “why” question. One way to answer the
question could be found in the etiological multifactor paradigm. In order
to do that, we have to take into account three groups of factors that in
combination and interplay lead to development of PTSD:
• Factors related to the traumatic event: severity of the trauma, its
uncontrollability and unexpectedness;
• Protective factors: resources for past experience processing,
availability of social support, mechanisms controlling behaviour; these
are imperative for the fact that soldiers having the possibility to talk about
the traumatic event and to abreact their emotional experience show to
reduce the symptoms;
• Risk factors: age and personal maturity at the time of the traumatic
event, negative past experience, psychological issues in the anamnesis,
poorer intellectual resources and socioeconomic status.
Psychological stressors and risk factors in peacekeeping operations
as well as in conventional operations in military areas include sudden
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and unexpected alternations in lifestyle, absence of the family, fatigue,
unfavourable climatic conditions, getting accustomed to new cuisine different
from the national one, cultural traditions, language barriers, insecurity
in deployment duration and processes of demoralisation concerning the
mission results (King et al., 1999; Rosebush, 1998).
Unique stressors in peacekeeping operations include:
1) Sense of hopelessness when faced to loss of people; suffering and
pain, concerning their safety;
2) Boredom, tediousness, and annoyance;
3) Role and functional duty in conflicts;
4) Reproaches and teasing by colleagues and civilians, and
5) Incertitude concerning the rules of engagement in the military area
(Bramsen et al., 2000; Litz et al., 1997).
Additional stressors, unique for the peacekeeping armed forces, include
operations close to the enemy forces. Humanitarian assistance, defence and
deterring attacks must be done under conditions of maximum control and
protection of the local population and the contingents.
On the whole, these stressors concern unique situations after which the
deployed soldiers feel inherently changed and enriched with multiform
experience in a professional and emotional aspect. All this experience
though brings the sensations well known by the scholars from soldiers’
participation in previous wars. An additional stressor, apart from the context
and the core of military operations, is the basic belief that stress experience
cannot be understood by their family members, friends and even by their
colleagues. Research results have shown that subliminal stressors have a
continuous negative psychological influence and can additionally bolster
the PTSD development (King et al., 1999). These phenomena pose the
imperative to discuss and reconsider the view concerning the syndromes
shown to be different to the well-known to date. The Post-deployment
syndrome or the Post-combat syndrome is a chronic syndrome displayed
by veterans from different nationalities, having military experience in
different locations.
During their combat activities, deployed soldiers are very often faced to
traumatic incidents and events typical for the theatre of military operations.
They could witness deaths, feel responsible for civilian’s death(s), or be
involved in serious incidents. Sometimes they are faced with the uncertainty
of the mine fields, friendly fires, or other jeopardizing conditions. They
could also witness different forms of abuse and cruelties to colleagues and/
or civilian population. Bramsen et al. (2000) have shown results that 85%
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of the deployed soldiers have taken part or have witnessed shootings, while
47% have seen death or wounded people.
The nature and the frequency of the traumatic events vary depending on the
location and the specifics of a mission. Peacekeeping operations could range
from operations with mild risk to operations as in Afghanistan of high risk.
2.0 STUDY DESIGNE AND RESULTS
The Centre for Mental Health and Prevention at the Bulgarian Military
Medical Academy conducted a combat stressors’ study. Altogether 380
servicemembers took part in the survey (45 officers, 84 sergeants and
251 soldiers, both men and women), all of them upon their return back in
Bulgaria from an ISAF deployment.
The results show equal tendencies in manifestation of different
stressors during the deployment for all the military units in Kabul and
Kandahar (Fig. 1).
Fig1. Manifestation (in %) of the six stressor categories according to the
respondents after deployment in ISAF (Kabul and Kandahar)
The categorisation of the studied stressors was achieved through expert
judgment from military mental health professionals and has been grouped
in six main categories of deployment stressors as follows:
Physical stressors – including climate (heat, cold weather, humidity, etc.),
environmental (vibrations, noise, etc.) and living conditions (possibilities for
maintaining proper hygiene, personal space, etc.) during the deployment;
Cognitive stressors – sensory overload or sensory deprivation, lack
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of clarity, lack of security, isolation, lack of time, unpredictability,
organisational dynamics, tough choices or lack of choice, etc.;
Physiological stressors – sleep or food deprivation, dehydrogenation, etc.;
Emotional stressors – loss of family members or colleagues, the need
for support by family members and colleagues and active communication
with them, feelings of incertitude;
Terrain stressors include three subscales:
а) Field stressors – direct experience of events related to the military
situation in the area of operation, (e.g.: close calls, blasts in or near the military
base; helping wounded people/colleagues; getting into firings, etc.);
b) Logistic stressors – related to the negative judgment about the
equipment (e.g.: poor condition of the equipment or feelings of uncertainty
concerning the equipment, etc.);
c) Normative stressors – related to the perception about incongruence in
the imperatives of the national military rules and the SOPs;
d) Stressors related to the attitude toward the deployment – they concern
the individual perception for the purpose; meaningfulness of the military
operation and the will of their commanders to conduct those attitudes.
For sergeants and soldiers from the three units the leading tendency is
to the Physical stressors (with a manifestation of 53,39%), followed by the
Cognitive stressors (44,67%), Physiological stressors (42,99%), Emotional
stressors (34,76%), Terrain stressors (32,83%), and the stressors, related
to the attitude toward the deployment (30,8%). Within the subscales
of the Terrain stressors, the most notable manifestation is the one of the
Normative stressors (38,53%), followed by the Field stressors (33,87%),
and the Logistic stressors (20,73%).
The most frequent stress factors during deployment are related to
climatic conditions and features, pollution, unpleasant odours and noises.
The responses obtained from sergeants and soldiers concerning the
Cognitive stressors (with a manifestation of 44,67%), show that besides
the uniformity of the landscape (х=4,14, with a maximum value of 5), the
lack of information of any kind has a high manifestation during an ISAF
deployment, too. Sensory overloading is not typical for the 3 contingents (all
х≈2,33) but has been a matter of discomfort for 18,3% of the respondents.
Concerning the Physiological stressors (with a manifestation of 42,99%),
the results show an unfavourable tendency of the Sleep wake cycle.
The results from sergeants and soldiers regarding the Emotional
stressors (with a manifestation of 34,76%) follow the same trends for the
three contingents. Concerning the sense of safety that one will go back
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home alive, only 3,9% of the respondents (13 servicemembers) have given
the answer “rather disagree” or “strongly disagree”, while other 88,4%
have given positive answers (for the three contingents х≈4,56). The support
from the colleagues is highly evaluated (х≈4,72). The need to be with their
families is rated with medium to high results (all х≈3,47). Low scores hold
worries about serious injuring and/or life endangering (all х≈1,41) and
problems with beloved/family communication/contact (all х≈1,28).
According to the sergeants and soldiers from the three contingents,
Terrain stressors manifest 32,83% of intensity. In this group the highest
intensity is the one of the Normative stressors related to the compatibility of
the national service regulations and the SOPs. According to the respondents
there is a discrepancy between both (national and international) regulations
causing some difficulties.
On the second place, the intensity of the Field stressors proves to
be 33,71%. The most frequent ones are related with information about
wounded/killed colleagues from the same and from different nationality,
and rocket attacks or blasts in or near the military base.
According to the survey results, Logistic stressors occupy the third
place (with 20,8%). Positive ratings come for the pre-deployment training
in equipment usage (for all х≥4,52, with a maximum value of 5).
Stressors related to the attitude toward the deployment seem to show the
lowest intensity – 30,80%, according to sergeants and soldiers. Respondents
from the three contingents give high ratings concerning the estimation of
the efficiency and benefit of the Bulgarian soldiers’ service (all х≈4,72), as
well as the clarity of the assignments (all х≥4,68). They believe that military
presence in the area would really bring local improvements (all х≈4,31) and
highly rate the military presence in Afghanistan (all х≈4,35).
As the respondents rate the intensity of the manifestation of different
stressors according to their personal experience during deployment, we
could see that in locations like Kabul and Kandahar (Kandahar Airfield)
the manifestation of the Field stressors is rated with lower intensity than
the Emotional, Cognitive, Physiological, Physical and Normative stressors.
This result is not related to the area safety, but to the perception coming
from one’s own experience. The main reason for the results on Field
stressors intensity to be the most unstable one is because the situation in
these locations is unpredictable.
3.0 CONCLUSIONS
The above picture presenting the complexity of external factors
continuously influencing a three-month, six-month or longer deployment
uncovers the state of readiness reached in “a natural way” by servicemembers
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on the ground. Under this influence, commanders and mental health
professionplex policy for assistance and suals must intervene periodically
with prevention purposes, not because they can control the external stressors,
but because soldiers’ personal resources have to be bolstered and aimed in
order to prevent the emergence of stress symptoms.
Prevention of Post-deployment syndrome emergence represents a
multilevel intervention. From a psychological point of view, on one hand,
psychological pre-deployment training must be focused on two main topics:
(1) realistic expectations and notions about the peculiarities of the deployment
location; (2) elucidation of the symptoms of stress reactions, coping strategies
and peer-assistance techniques. On the other hand, during the deployment, in
addition to the commanders and peers support, a psychological assistance must
be carried out in terms of individual consultations, psychological discussion
groups, psychological climate survey, etc. in order to maintain personal
resources for coping with external stressors and personal psychological issues.
In the post-deployment stage of the cycle, a following-up program must be
carried out by unit psychologists and medical personnel in order to assure the
most appropriate and timely assistance to the personnel.
This compport of servicemembers during military deployments could
be carried out only with the interaction between medical and mental health
specialists endorsed by the commanders. As a first step in this direction
it is important to acknowledge that the so-called “mild stressors” are not
harmless but as harmful in the long run as the battle stressors.
4.0 REFERENCES:
[1] Bramsen, I., Dirkzwager, A.J.E., Van der Ploeg, H.M.(2000).
Predeployment personality traits and exposure to trauma as predictors of
posttraumatic stress symptoms: A prospective study of former peacekeepers.
American Journal of Psychiatry, 157(7), pp. 1115–1119.
[2] King, D.W., King, L.A., Foy, D.W., Keane, T.M., Fairbank, J.A.
(1999). Posttraumatic stress disorder in a national sample of female and
male Vietnam veterans: Risk factors, war-zone stressors, and resiliencerecovery variables. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108, pp.164–170.
[3] Litz, B.T., King, L.A., King, D.W., Orsillo, S.M., Friedman, M.J.
(1997). Warriors as peacekeepers: Features of the Somalia experience and
PTSD. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 65(6), 1001–1010.
[4] Rosebush, P.A.(1998). Psychological intervention with military
personnel in Rwanda. Military Medicine, 163, pp. 559–563.
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