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Politics of
NATURAL
DISASTERS
William L. Waugh
Georgia State University
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company
Boston
New York
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CONTENTS
3
Natural Hazards in the United States .............................................................
5
Earthquakes ...........................................................................................
7
Tsunamis ................................................................................................
9
Hurricanes .............................................................................................
10
Tornadoes ..............................................................................................
12
Wildfire ..................................................................................................
13
Other Hazards .......................................................................................
14
Natural Disaster Policy ..................................................................................
15
The Evolution of Emergency Management ..................................................
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The Future of Emergency Management and Disaster Policy ........................
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Discussion Questions .....................................................................................
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Introduction....................................................................................................
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OVERVIEW
1.
2.
What determines the hazards that officials focus on most?
•
Recent catastrophic disasters, from the 2004 “Christmas” tsunami in the Indian Ocean
to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, are encouraging a focus on natural disasters in the
United States.
•
Federal officials have focused primarily on terrorism since the 9/11 attacks and have
been inattentive to the threats of natural disasters.
•
Federal resources, including funding, have primarily been directed to programs dealing
with the threat of terrorism.
•
Local officials tend to focus on the hazards that pose the greatest risk to their
communities, but they also focus on the policies and programs that the federal
government funds.
What hazards pose significant risk to American lives and property?
•
There is a wide range of natural hazards in the United States, including earthquakes,
volcanoes, wildfire, hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis, floods, droughts, heat waves,
landslides, snow and ice storms, and sinkholes.
•
States with significant seismic hazards have strengthened building codes and land-use
regulations to reduce vulnerabilities to earthquakes.
•
States with significant tsunami hazards are developing warning systems and
evacuation plans to reduce the risks to life and are considering restrictions on
development in areas that might be flooded by tsunamis.
•
The United States has had a few major tsunamis, including the 1946 Hilo and 1964
Alaskan tsunamis, but there is evidence that much larger tsunamis have struck the
West Coast in the past.
•
The hurricane risk along the United States coastline is increasing as more people move
to the coast and the strength of storms increases.
•
Hurricane losses can be reduced by moving development out of areas subject to storm
surge and other flooding and by elevating structures so that flood waters can pass
below them.
•
It is difficult to evacuate coastal areas when hurricanes threaten, because it is not easy to
predict where the storms will come ashore, and evacuees may be caught on highways
or in low-lying areas if not evacuated early enough.
•
Regulating land-use is extremely difficult, often politically unpopular, and frequently
challenged successfully in court, unless regulations are adopted well before disaster
strikes.
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Politics of Natural Disasters
Though the science of tornado prediction is improving, it still provides little warning
of the storms.
•
The public needs to understand the meanings of tornado warnings and watches.
•
Community preparedness for storms can reduce the vulnerability of residents.
•
The risk of wildfire is increasing as development intrudes on the Wildland/Urban
Interface (WUI).
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•
3.
How has disaster policy developed in the United States?
•
Seldom a concern beforehand, natural disasters become a political issue after a major
disaster occurs.
•
National and international disasters can draw public attention to the threat from natural
hazards.
•
There is a brief window of opportunity to address natural hazards after a major
disaster.
•
Disaster policy is problematic for the following reasons:
•
There are so many hazards.
•
Few are concerned about the hazards until a disaster occurs.
•
There is little support for regulation.
•
There is little support for planning efforts.
•
The political constituency for strong policies has little influence.
•
The administrative constituency for strong policies also has little influence.
•
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of policies and programs (except
after a disaster).
•
The American political system is fragmented vertically and horizontally.
•
State and local capacities are very uneven.
•
The emphasis after Hurricane Katrina is on self-reliance and a reduced federal role in
disaster responses.
•
Emergency management evolved from the volunteer fire brigades of colonial America
and still relies heavily on volunteers.
•
The first national hazard programs were for floods and civil defense.
•
In the 1970s, following major natural disasters, the National Governors’ Association
asked President Carter to consolidate federal disaster programs. In 1979, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created.
•
FEMA became a “dumping ground for political cronies” in the 1980s, and Congress
considered dismantling the agency in 1992 after poor responses to Hurricanes Hugo,
Andrew, and Iniki.
•
FEMA was reinvented in 1993, when President Clinton appointed James Lee Witt as
director of the agency.
Politics of Natural Disasters
Some communities have state-of-the-art, professional emergency management
programs, and some still rely on part-time volunteers without staff or budget.
•
The 9/11 attacks changed emergency management by focusing on terrorism and
moving resources and personnel away from natural hazards programs.
•
FEMA director Michael Brown resigned after the poor federal response to Hurricane
Katrina.
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•
3
4.
What is the future of emergency management and natural disaster policy?
•
The United States still needs to address serious natural hazards.
•
The poor response to Katrina pointed out serious flaws in the national emergency
management system.
•
Congress is debating whether FEMA should remain within the Department of
Homeland Security or be removed and restored as an independent agency reporting to
the President.
•
The politics of natural disasters are much like the politics of other policy areas.
•
Disaster policy reveals a lot about community values, particularly in how the needs of
those least able to help themselves, such as the elderly and disabled, are addressed.
Key terms: disaster policy, emergency management, Hurricane Katrina, earthquakes, volcanoes,
floods, land-use regulation, building codes, disaster insurance
Introduction
Recent catastrophic natural disasters across the world have drawn attention to the need for nations
and communities to prepare for known hazards, and to be adaptable when new hazards become
known. Real life disasters have also encouraged examination of the potential for mega-disasters,
ranging from giant tsunamis to asteroid strikes to solar storms. At the same time, scientists are
urging action in anticipation of the disastrous effects of global warming. In short, natural and
unnatural disasters are getting much more attention than they have in decades.
National policymakers, however, are focused on the threats of pandemic influenza,
terrorism, and, after Katrina, hurricanes. These are the threats judged most in need of government
action. At the state and local levels, emergency managers tend to focus on the threats that pose
the greatest risk to their communities, but they are forced to pay attention to the threats that public
officials and their constituents consider most serious. The funding of disaster programs is more
often based upon perceived threats than assessed risk. For example, federal funds are still targeted
largely at the risk of terrorism, but state and local officials have been arguing that they should
spend more on the kinds of disasters that they are more likely to face. For officials in California,
it is more certain that there will be major earthquakes in the near future than a major terrorist
attack. Too, for officials in Florida and along the Gulf Coast, powerful hurricanes are more an
immediate concern than terrorism. That does not mean that terrorism is not a serious threat;
rather, it means that terrorism is less probable and its effects likely less catastrophic than the
natural disasters that have caused devastation in the past.
It is said that all disasters are local. The impact is local, and the response, at least initially,
is local. The first responders, such as firefighters, police officers, or emergency services
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personnel, are almost always local. Local first responders may have to deal with the disaster
for days before help arrives from state or federal agencies. That is a major dilemma in disaster
policymaking and emergency management. The government with the most resources is usually
far from the disaster. The federal government cannot be a first responder, because it may take
days or even weeks to mobilize personnel and transport supplies to the disaster area. By the same
token, although local emergency response organizations are experienced in dealing with fire,
flood, and other natural disasters, their capabilities may be overwhelmed by a major disaster. As a
result, policymakers have focused on how to bring national resources to bear in major disasters
and how to build local capacities to deal with disasters until help can arrive. While national policy
seems to be changing since the poor response to Hurricane Katrina, the foundation of the national
emergency management system rests on local capabilities to deal with disaster.
While there are communities that do not have emergency management offices or agencies,
or have only part-time, unpaid volunteer emergency coordinators, the trend is toward more
professional emergency managers and more funding of essential disaster planning and
preparation. The increasing professionalization of the field is due to several factors. First, local
officials may be held legally liable for failure to prepare reasonably. Second, they may be held
politically liable for failing to protect people and property effectively. Third, their communities
may suffer economically when there are large losses. Fourth and last, local officials also have an
ethical obligation to protect residents and their homes and businesses, as well as the environment.
Governments were originally organized to help communities deal with common threats. How
well they deal with disaster is the measure of their effectiveness.
The assumption in emergency management is that state officials provide assistance when
local resources are overwhelmed and local officials are struggling to deal with a disaster. In turn,
federal officials provide assistance when state and local resources are overwhelmed. In reality,
however, agencies from all levels of government and a multitude of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) may be involved in disaster response and recovery operations. Historically,
Americans have relied heavily upon volunteers during emergencies of all kinds. For example,
volunteer fire brigades were organized in colonial communities, and most fire departments in the
United States are still volunteer, although the number of mixed (volunteer and paid firefighters)
and paid fire departments is increasing. Communities also rely heavily on organizations like the
American Red Cross and the Salvation Army to provide assistance to the victims of fire, flood,
and other disasters. Networks of governmental and nongovernmental organizations may also be
involved in efforts to prevent disasters or reduce their effects and to prepare for the disasters that
do occur. The National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD), for example, is a
coordinating body for national volunteer activities. Its members are voluntary organizations (see
Table 1).
Emergency or disaster management has become all the more important because of the
increasing vulnerability of communities. There can be serious political repercussions when
disasters are not handled reasonably well. Effective emergency management has become a
major issue in the last two decades because of the increasing vulnerability of people and
property and the heightened severity of catastrophic disasters. Increasing numbers of
Americans have moved to coastal communities vulnerable to hurricanes, to California and the
Pacific Northwest, which are vulnerable to earthquakes, and to homes in or near woodlands
prone to wildfire. Society itself has become increasingly vulnerable because of its
dependency on fragile technologies, from transit systems and cruise ships to computer
systems and power grids. Technological failures caused by mechanical malfunctions or
human error can have devastating effects in terms of human casualties and property losses.
There is also a growing social vulnerability due to the aging population, increasing poverty,
and increases in chronic diseases and conditions (e.g., diabetes, high blood pressure, and
heart disease). All three of these social conditions contributed to the problems evacuating and
sheltering victims of Hurricane Katrina.
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Table 1
National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD)
Agency
Lutheran Disaster Response
Mennonite Disaster Service
Mercy Medical/Angel Flight America
National Emergency Response Teams (NERT)
National Organization for Victim Assistance
Nazarene Disaster Response
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Agency
Adventist Community Services
America’s Second Harvest
American Baptist Men
American Radio Relay League
American Red Cross
AMURT (Ananda Marga University Relief
Team)
Catholic Charities USA
Center for International Disaster Information
Christian Disaster Response International
Christian Reformed World Relief Committee
Church of the Brethren—Emergency
Response/Service Ministries
Church World Service
Convoy of Hope
Disaster Psychiatry Outreach
Episcopal Relief and Development
Friends Disaster Service, Inc.
The Humane Society of the United States
International Aid
International Critical Incident Stress Foundation
International Relief Friendship Foundation
Northwest Medical Teams International
The Points of Light Foundation
Presbyterian Church (USA)
REACT International, Inc.
The Salvation Army
Society of St. Vincent de Paul
Southern Baptist Convention—North American
Mission Board
United Jewish Communities
United Church of Christ—Wider Church
Ministries
United Methodist Committee on Relief
United Way of America
Volunteers of America
World Vision
Source: NVOAD web site: http://www.nvoad.org.
Natural Hazards in the United States
When Hurricane Katrina devastated Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama coastal communities in
2005, it was judged the worst natural disaster in American history. However, the nation has
experienced catastrophic disasters that rival the losses of life and property caused by Hurricane
Katrina. Large areas of New York City burned in 1835, and much of Chicago burned in 1871;
Galveston (Texas) was leveled by a hurricane in 1900, with 6,000 to 8,000 people losing their
lives; San Francisco was largely destroyed by earthquake and fire in 1906; and the Mississippi
River flooded in 1927, damaging communities from Illinois to Louisiana and killing 246 people.
That flood destroyed 41,487 buildings and covered an area of over 26,000 square miles in seven
states. It caused an estimated $100 million in damage (approximately $1.12 billion in 2005
dollars). 1 Lesser catastrophes have also cost hundreds of lives and billions of dollars in damage. 2
1
Kevin R. Kosar, “Disaster Response and Appointment of a Recovery Czar: The Executive Branch’s Response
to the Flood of 1927,” CRS Report to Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 25, 2005, p. 3.
2
See the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s listing of “Billion Dollar U.S. Weather Disasters”
at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html.
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Hurricane Katrina making landfall on August 29, 2005.
Source: NOAA.
Hurricane Hugo cut a swath through South and North Carolina in 1989, Hurricane Andrew
flattened communities in south Florida in 1992 before making landfall a second time in
Mississippi, four hurricanes in quick succession devastated the state of Florida in 2004, and
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the Gulf Coast in 2005. Nonetheless, Hurricane Katrina
killed over 1,300 people and has caused an estimated $25 billion in damage (the economic costs
of the disaster may not be known for years). By way of comparison, the terrorist attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001, resulted in almost 3,000 deaths in the aircrafts and in and
around the World Trade Center towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC.
Natural hazards in the United States include earthquakes, floods, heat waves, droughts,
hurricanes, landslides, thunderstorms, tornadoes, tsunamis, volcanoes, wildfires, and winter
storms. One might also add public health emergencies, such as epidemics, that result from natural
(non-man-made) causes. Current concerns over the potential that avian influenza might be passed
from human to human and cause an international pandemic have certainly focused attention on
public health preparedness efforts. The natural hazard list might also be expanded to include solar
storms, asteroid strikes, and other extraterrestrial phenomena.
The foci of disaster policy and emergency management professionals have generally been
on those hazards that pose the greatest risk, i.e., those that occur frequently and cause significant
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damage. For most communities, the greatest risks are from structural fires and floods. For
communities along the East and Gulf Coasts, the greatest major hazards are generally hurricanes.
In California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska, the greatest risk comes from earthquakes,
although hazards such as wildfires, volcanoes, and tsunamis are certainly significant threats to life
and property. Clearly, some communities face more hazards than others. The degree of risk varies.
The long history of earthquakes in California, including the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 and
Northridge earthquake in 1994, has focused the attention of state officials on that hazard.
Additionally, the levee breaches that caused the flooding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina
have encouraged a serious assessment of the levees on the American and Sacramento Rivers
around the California state capital, Sacramento. Given that risk is often measured in terms of
threats to people and property, the more populated states are often judged to be at the greatest risk.
In terms of disasters that result in Presidential disaster declarations and the deployment of federal,
as well as state and local, emergency response agencies, California, Florida, and Texas are at the
top of the list.
Americans have been lucky for the most part. While there are natural hazards on the
North American continent and around the world that pose dangers, the nation has experienced
remarkably few catastrophic disasters. The risk, however, may be greater than generally assumed.
Native American communities were decimated by earthquakes, tsunamis, and other natural
disasters in the centuries prior to the arrival of Europeans. Legend and myth provide evidence of
the impacts of natural disasters on communities. The continent was only sparsely populated then,
and it is far more densely populated now.
Fortunately, the United States has not suffered a disaster like the “Christmas” tsunami of
2004 that killed over a quarter of a million people in Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India,
Somalia, and other nations surrounding the Indian Ocean. It has not suffered a major earthquake
like the one that killed over 80,000 Pakistanis in 2005 and left millions more to spend the winter
months in make-shift homes in the Himalayan Mountains. However, catastrophic disaster is
certainly possible in the United States. Seismic faults underlie the city of Los Angeles and have
been found in other large metropolitan areas. A new cycle of powerful hurricanes has been
predicted. The vulnerability of cities like New York City, Miami, Galveston, Houston,
Wilmington (North Carolina), Tampa-St. Petersburg, and New Orleans is well documented. The
hazards are being identified and analyzed, the risks are being assessed, and the design and
implementation policies and programs to mitigate the hazards are being put into motion.
Earthquakes
The largest earthquakes in U.S. history are listed in Table 2. The worst earthquakes, however,
have not necessarily been the strongest. In terms of loss of life and property, the worst were the
Prince William Sound “Great Alaska Earthquake” of 1964 and the “Great San Francisco
Earthquake” of 1906. The Alaskan quake severely damaged Anchorage and Seward, caused a
devastating tsunami that inundated coastal communities, and caused fires, landslides, and other
secondary disasters. The San Francisco earthquake of 1906 and the fire that followed devastated
the city. The water system failed, and the fire department was helpless in the face of a growing
firestorm. Estimates of the number of deaths in the San Francisco earthquake range from the 664
counted by the U.S. Army in its relief operations to 3,000 documented by later researchers. 3
3
Jeanne B. Perkins, Arrietta Chakos, Robert A. Olson, L. Thomas Tobin, and Fred Turner, “The 1906
Earthquake and Public Policy,” Natural Hazards Observer.
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Table 2
Largest Earthquakes in the United States
Magnitude
9.2
~9
8.7
8.6
8.2
8.1
8.1
8.0
~8
7.9
7.9
7.9
7.9
7.9
7.9
7.8
7.8
7.8
7.8
7.8
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Rank, Location, and Date
1. Prince William Sound, Alaska, March 28, 1964
2. Cascadia Subduction Zone, January 26, 1700
3. Rat Islands, Alaska, February 4, 1965
4. Andreanof Islands, Alaska, March 9, 1957
5. East of Shumagin Islands, Alaska, November 10, 1938
6. Unimak Islands, Alaska, April 1, 1946
7. New Madrid, Missouri, December 16, 1811
8. Yakutat Bay, Alaska, September 10, 1899
9. New Madrid, Missouri, February 7, 1812
10. Denali Fault, Alaska, November 3, 2002
11. Gulf of Alaska, Alaska, November 30, 1987
12. Andreanof Islands, Alaska, May 7, 1986
13. Near Cape Yakataga, Alaska, September 4, 1899
14. Ka’u District, Island of Hawaii, April 3, 1868
15. Fort Tejon, California, January 9, 1857
16. Rat Islands, Alaska, November 17, 2003
17. Andreanof Islands, Alaska, June 10, 1996
18. San Francisco, California, April 18, 1906
19. Imperial Valley, California, February 24, 1892
20. New Madrid, Missouri, January 23, 1812
Source: U.S. Geological Survey.
Those earthquakes were the worst because they struck more populated areas. The Cascadia
Subduction Zone earthquake in 1700 certainly devastated Native American communities along
the coast, but there are few records to document the destruction. The New Madrid earthquakes in
1811 and 1812 similarly destroyed small communities in Missouri and surrounding states, but
documentation is limited. Nonetheless, the risk of earthquakes and tsunamis posed by the
Cascadia Subduction Zone 4 has been determined to be higher than assumed in the past, as
evidence of past earthquakes and tsunamis is being uncovered along the coastline. Similarly, the
risk of another major earthquake in the central United States is considered very serious because of
the devastation it poses to the cities of Memphis and St. Louis, as well as the hundreds of smaller
communities in the region.
The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) agencies are the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the United States Geological Survey
(USGS). NIST is the lead agency. The goals of the program are to:
4
•
Develop effective practices and policies for earthquake loss reduction and accelerate
their implementation.
•
Improve techniques to reduce seismic vulnerability of facilities and systems.
The Cascadia subduction zone is where the Juan de Fuca plate slides under the North American plate off the
coast of Oregon and Washington. Slippage along the plates can cause earthquakes and tsunamis. See the U.S.
Geological Survey web page on the Cascadia Subduction Zone
http://www.pnsn.org/HAZARDS/CASCADIA/cascadia_zone.html.
Politics of Natural Disasters
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Improve seismic hazards identification and risk-assessment methods and their use.
•
Improve the understanding of earthquakes and their effects.
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The program is expected to educate the public and public officials about the hazard, to advise
on how to reduce the risk of losses of life and property, and to encourage communities to adopt
effective loss reduction practices and policies. Selling risk reduction measures, such as stronger
building codes and better land-use regulation, is difficult in a region that has not experienced a
catastrophic earthquake in almost two hundred years. Despite the increased risk of a major
earthquake in the region, public officials are skeptical, and many are unwilling to strengthen
building codes to mitigate the risk of earthquake damage. Californians, on the other hand, have
had major earthquakes in recent memory and are frequently reminded of the risk by smaller
quakes. However, while lessons have been learned from recent quakes and building codes have
been strengthened, older structures are still vulnerable, and the cost of retrofitting them is often
too high for property owners.
Tsunamis
Tsunamis may result from undersea earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, asteroid strikes,
and other upheavals. Major tsunamis are infrequent occurrences in the United States, although
frequent occurrences like earthquakes may cause them. In the 1990s, floods associated with the El
Niño phenomenon uncovered evidence of very large tsunamis along the Pacific coastline near the
Cascadia subduction zone. The evidence, along with legends and myths among the Native
American groups in the region, has increased scientific and public interest and concern about the
potential for damaging tsunamis. The region is now heavily populated, and millions of residents
are at risk. Portland, Oregon; Seattle and Tacoma, Washington; Vancouver and Victoria, British
Columbia; and smaller communities from California to Alaska are at risk. Table 3 lists the
historical tsunamis that have occurred along the U.S. Pacific Coast from 1788 through 2006.
Table 3
Historical Tsunamis along the U.S. Pacific Coast (1788–2006)
Location
Southern California
Nondamaging/Damaging Tsunamis (Years)
6 / 4 (1806, 1812, 1927, 1930)
Northern California
9/0
Oregon
1/0
Washington
1 / 1 (1949)
British Columbia, Canada
3 / 1 (1946)
Southeastern Alaska
5 / 5 (1854, 1905, 1936, 1958, 1994)
South Central Alaska
5 / 4 (1899, 1899, 1925, 1964)
Kodiak Island and Alaskan Peninsula
3 / 3 (1788, 1788, 1883)
Eastern Aleutians
7 / 2 (1946, 1957)
Western Aleutians
2 / 1 (1965)
Source: National Geophysical Data Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
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The lesson of the Christmas tsunami in Indonesia, which struck coastal communities like
Banda Aceh within minutes of the earthquake, has encouraged the development of tsunami
warning and evacuation programs along the west coast of North America. Scientists are
identifying hazard zones, determining inundation zones that are likely to be flooded by tsunamis,
and helping policymakers develop warning systems that can effectively alert residents and
tourists to the danger and evacuation plans to guide those at risk to high ground. Communities
that adopt the recommended procedures can apply to be recognized as “TsunamiReady”
communities. 5
The 1964 tsunami that struck south central Alaska was caused by the Prince William
Sound earthquake that devastated Anchorage, Seward, and other communities. The most
remembered tsunami in the United States is the one that hit Hilo, Hawaii, on April 1, 1946. The
tsunami seriously damaged communities in Hawaii and Alaska’s Aleutian Islands and killed 165
people. The Pacific Tsunami Warning System was established as a result of the tragedy, and
warnings are now issued for all 7.5 or greater earthquakes in the Aleutian Islands. 6 The West
Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center was created in 1965, right after the 1964 Alaskan
earthquake and tsunami. The International Tsunami Information Centre had 28 member nations in
2005. 7 The Sunda Trench earthquake was picked up by scientists at the Pacific Tsunami Warning
Center, but there was no procedure for contacting officials in the Indian Ocean region and no
system in place to communicate warnings to coastal communities. As a result, a new warning
system is being implemented in the region with American help. The United States is also
implementing a warning system in the Atlantic Ocean because surveys have identified undersea
features that might cause landslides, which, in turn, can cause tsunamis.
While communities at risk largely recognize the threat of tsunamis and the need to reduce
the vulnerability of their residents, developing and maintaining effective alert and warning
systems require an investment of public funds they often do not have. Ensuring that visitors are
aware of the hazard and understand warnings does raise concerns that the information may
frighten them and, thereby, reduce tax revenues. Much of the tax revenue of coastal communities
comes from vacationers. Whether the risk is great enough to warrant limitations on coastal
development or retrofitting buildings, bridges, and other infrastructure to withstand large waves is
another concern. At what point should communities restrict development on the beaches that
residents and visitors alike find so desirable?
Hurricanes
Many of the same issues arise with the hurricane hazard. Should development be limited on
beaches and in other low-lying areas that might be subject to storm surge and other flooding?
Who should pay for sea walls to protect beach homes and coastal towns? Who should repair
roads and bridges damaged by storms? Who should pay for beach replenishment when storms
cause beach erosion? A great deal is known about hurricane impacts and the nature of the hazard.
It is still difficult to pinpoint landfall early enough to ensure evacuation in the paths of the storms.
But the science is getting much better both in predicting the number and size of the storms that
can be expected and, via satellite imaging, in following their development. Table 4 lists the top
ten most expensive hurricanes in the 20th century.
5
The TsunamiReady Program is operated by the National Weather Service. See the National Weather Service
web page: http://www.tsunamiready.noaa.gov/.
6
See William L. Waugh, Jr., Living with Hazards, Dealing with Disasters (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe
Publishers, 2000), pp. 67–68.
7
See the International Tsunami Information Centre web page: http://www.tsunamiwave.info/
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Table 4
Top Ten Most Expensive Hurricanes in the 20th Century
Cost
$26.5 billion
$7.0 billion
$4.5 billion
$3.2 billion
$3.0 billion
$2.31 billion
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Year — Hurricane — Area Most Affected
1992 — Hurricane Andrew — South Florida
1989 — Hurricane Hugo — Charleston, South Carolina
1999 — Hurricane Floyd — Mid-Atlantic states and Northeast
1996 — Hurricane Fran — North Carolina
1995 — Hurricane Opal — Pensacola, Florida
1998 — Hurricane Georges — Florida Keys, Mississippi, and
Alabama
1979 — Hurricane Frederic — Mississippi, Alabama
1972 — Hurricane Agnes — Florida, Eastern Seaboard
1983 — Hurricane Alicia — Texas
1991 — Hurricane Bob — Northeast
$2.3 billion
$2.1 billion
$2.0 billion
$1.5 billion
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
The biggest issues in hurricane hazard mitigation are moving development out of areas
that may be subject to storm surge, adopting and enforcing building codes to reduce wind and
water damage, providing warnings early enough so that people can evacuate, and developing
alternative evacuation plans to accommodate those who cannot evacuate in time. In many coastal
communities, for example, it may be easier to evacuate residents to well-built, multi-story hotels
and office buildings within the community than to transport them far enough inland to get
away from the storm surge. Using local facilities, too, reduces the likelihood that evacuees will be
trapped on highways during the storm. “Vertical evacuation” is particularly appealing to those
who want to stay close to their homes.
Regulating land-use along the coast is another strategy, but the courts have become less
receptive to the idea of regulation when it reduces the value of property. Restricting beach access,
for example, can have a tremendous impact on the value of beachfront property. As many
communities along the Mississippi and Louisiana coastlines are finding after the Hurricane
Katrina disaster, low-lying areas are vulnerable to storm surge and redevelopment may require
relocating whole communities or elevating structures to permit storm surge to pass underneath
them. Recent challenges to community efforts to restrict development have been successful. The
“takings” issue is a problem for local governments trying to restrain beachfront development. The
easiest course would be for local governments to purchase property in hazardous areas and use it
for purposes that do not encourage the building of homes or businesses. This is commonly done
in flood-prone areas and has been the practice during the most recent major floods. Whole
communities were relocated out of the floodplain following the 1993 Mississippi floods. Recent
court cases, however, have required authorities to compensate property owners for the reduced
value of their property. When local officials adopt the regulations well before disaster strikes and
before property owners begin developing close to the water, the courts are more sympathetic. If,
however, the regulations follow the disaster, as they frequently do, property owners can more
easily make the case that they have lost value and that they are due compensation. 8 Even though
the property owner may assume the risk to his or her own property, development in flood-prone
areas can often increase the risk to neighboring property owners and cause environmental
damage.
8
Waugh, 2000, p. 175.
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12
Hurricane Katrina Damage in Pass Christian, Mississippi. Source: FEMA.
Tornadoes
“Tornado Alley” extends from Texas to the Dakotas or, depending on the map, to the upper
Midwest. There are “mini-tornado alleys” elsewhere in the nation, including areas of eastern
Mississippi, northwest Alabama, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. These area prone to
tornadoes tend to be where warm air collides with cold, where weather is more turbulent. See
Table 5 for where major tornado outbreaks have occurred.
The Super Outbreak of 1974 saw 148 tornadoes touch down over a 16-hour period. An
estimated 118 of the tornadoes cut paths of one mile or more, with the total length of the paths of
destruction being over 2,500 miles. The storms killed 330 people and injured 5,484 more.
Tornadoes were tracked in Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Six of the
tornadoes were F5, the highest category on the Fujita scale. Large hail and straight-line winds
contributed to the damage. The outbreak gave impetus to efforts to predict tornadic activity and to
develop effective warning systems. Modern meteorology has increased the average lead time to
11 minutes, 9 which is sufficient time for most to take shelter, but warning systems are still a
problem. Sirens, for example, may not be heard in areas that are heavily wooded or have tall
buildings that block the sound. Many residents may not understand the warnings even if they hear
the sirens.
9
See “The Worst in U.S. History: 1974 Tornado Outbreak,” http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/storms/, accessed
on May 12, 2006.
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Table 5
Selected Major Tornado Outbreaks
Location and Date
Tri-State Outbreak in Missouri, Illinois, and Indiana, March 18, 1925
746
317
255
216
203
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Natchez, Mississippi, May 6, 1840
St. Louis, Missouri, May 27, 1896
Tupelo, Mississippi, April 5, 1936
Gainesville, Florida, April 6, 1936
Super Outbreak, 13 states, including Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio,
April 3-4, 1974
Palm Sunday Outbreak, Upper Midwest, including Indiana, Ohio, and
Michigan, April 11, 1965
Fatalities
330
256
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Community preparedness includes development of an effective warning system so that
residents hear, understand, believe, internalize (i.e., believe that they are at risk), and react
appropriately to the warning. The National Weather Service issues “tornado watches” when the
conditions are right for the development of tornadoes and “tornado warnings” when a tornado has
been spotted or identified on radar. Communities often deploy trained “storm watchers” to look
for wall clouds and other signs of tornadic activity and to initiate warnings. Preparedness also
includes providing information to the public on the nature of the hazard and appropriate
protective actions. A strong effort is being made by the National Weather Service, for example, to
dissuade individuals from seeking safety under highway overpasses because they do not afford
enough protection. Videos of individuals hiding under overpasses during a Kansas tornado have
misled people into thinking that it is a good idea. FEMA is encouraging property owners who do
not have basements or cellars in which to take cover to build “safe rooms” that can withstand
tornado winds. At present, no structures, except for “safe rooms,” are considered safe during
tornadoes. Communities that adopt the recommended mitigation measures can apply for
recognition as “StormReady” communities.
Wildfire
Just as coastal communities vulnerable to hurricanes are growing, development is increasing in
the Wildland/Urban Interface (WUI). In the western United States, 38 percent of new homes are
being built next to or within the WUI. 10 The development is putting more and more property, as
well as property owners, at risk of wildfire. Many scientists and fire officials believe that
wildland fires are essential to remove dead trees, undergrowth, and other material that might fuel
large fires. Fire officials are also concerned because dealing with wildfire is very different from
dealing with structural fires. The equipment and training are different. Not all urban fire
departments are trained to deal with wildfire. However, property owners want fires suppressed to
avoid damage to their property. Building in the WUI also increases the potential for accidental
fires.
In 1991, fire broke out in the East Bay Hills in Oakland, California. Local fire
departments were unable to contain the fire as it jumped large freeways. When the fire was finally
10
“Fires in the Wildland/Urban Interface,” Topical Fire Research Service, U.S. Fire Administration, Vol. 2, Issue
16 (March 2002), pp. 1–3.
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stopped, 25 people were dead and over 3,000 structures had been destroyed. The lesson was that
heavily wooded residential areas are vulnerable to wildfire. Such fires had been known in urban
America before, but expanded development in the WUI has greatly increased the risk to many
communities. At a minimum, it has been suggested that property owners use fire-resistant
building materials, build homes where they are more easily protected from fire spread, keep
flammable vegetation away from structures, install smoke alarms, and have and practice
evacuation plans. An alternative is to restrict development in the WUI and/or to require that
property owners who choose to locate in the WUI pay a special fee for fire protection. Table 6
mentions some historically significant wildland fires that have occurred since the late 1800s.
Table 6
Selected Historically Significant Wildland Fires
Date, Name, Location
Damage/Significance
October 1871, Peshtigo, Wisconsin/Michigan
3,780,000 acres burned/1,500 fatalities in
Wisconsin
September 1894, Hinckley, Minnesota
Undetermined acreage burned/418 fatalities
September 1894, Wisconsin, Wisconsin
Several million acres burned/some fatalities
August 1910, Great Idaho, Idaho/Montana
3 million acres burned/85 fatalities
1949, Mann Gulch, Montana
4,339 acres burned/13 smokejumpers killed
September 1970, Laguna, California
175,425 acres burned/383 structures destroyed
1987, Siege of ’87, California
640,000 acres burned/timber lost in Klamath
and Stanislaus National Forests
1988, Yellowstone, Montana/Idaho
1,585,000 acres burned/damage to Yellowstone
National Park
October 1991, Oakland Hills, California
1,500 acres burned/25 fatalities and 2,900
structures destroyed
July 1994, South Canyon, Colorado
1,856 acres burned/24 firefighters killed
1998, Volusia Complex, Florida
111,130 acres burned/thousands evacuated
1998, Flagler/St. John, Florida
94,656 acres burned/thousands evacuated
May 2000, Cerro Grande, New Mexico
47,650 acres burned/originally a prescribed fire;
235 structures destroyed; damaged Los Alamos
National Laboratory
Source: National Interagency Fire Center.
Other Hazards
Certainly, there are other kinds of natural disasters that affect communities in the United States.
Flooding is the second most common disaster after fires. Regulating land use on floodplains is a
politically charged task. The National Flood Insurance Program offers discounts on flood
insurance to communities that implement mitigation measures to reduce the risk of flood damage
and preparedness measures to warn the community about the hazard. Points are given for each
measure adopted, and those points translate into discounts. Tulsa, Oklahoma, has been the most
proactive community in the nation in addressing the risk of flooding. Thousands of communities,
however, do only the minimum to qualify residents for flood insurance. Flood insurance is
underwritten by the federal government because the scale of floods is often so great that private
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insurance companies could not afford to issue policies because too many claims might be made
from one flood.
Communities distribute fans and/or provide air-conditioned shelters to the elderly during
heat waves, distribute warm clothing and blankets during cold spells, provide warm shelters
during winter storms, and provide other assistance when lives and property are at risk from other
hazards. Snowstorms can paralyze cities. Ice storms can bring down power lines and cause
outages for days and even weeks. “All-hazards” emergency management programs are designed
to be flexible so that officials can adapt plans to unanticipated circumstances. Adaptation,
innovation, and improvisation are necessary capacities to ensure that agencies can respond to
threats to life and property.
Natural Disaster Policy
Disasters have not always been a major political issue in the United States. Flooding was the first
major hazard to be addressed, and systems of dams and levees were created to reduce the hazard
to residents. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built levees and dams along many of the rivers
that historically flooded. The extensive levee system built along the Sacramento and American
Rivers in central California is similar to the system on the lower Mississippi River. Consequently,
there are concerns that massive flooding could occur in and around Sacramento just as it did in
New Orleans.
Disaster policy tends to become an issue only after a major disaster and tends to focus on
that particular disaster rather than the next one. Policies and programs to reduce earthquake risk
were implemented after the Northridge earthquake in 1994, for example. International disasters
also can have significant effects. The disasters are focusing events, as Thomas Birkland has called
them. 11 They focus attention on the hazard and the potential for more disasters. The 2004 Sunda
Trench or “Christmas” earthquake and tsunami off the coast of Sumatra in the Indian Ocean, for
example, drew attention to the risk of tsunamis along North American coastlines and encouraged
more investment in tsunami warning systems in Hawaii, Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and
California. It also called attention to the risk along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. It spurred on the
development of a warning system in the Indian Ocean so that there will be more warning than
there was in December 2004. Similarly, earthquake programs were expanded after the 1989 Loma
Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes in California. Lessons are learned with each major
disaster, and building codes and land-use regulations are adjusted accordingly to reduce the risk
to people and property. Since the Northridge earthquake, for example, property owners are
encouraged to strap water heaters, refrigerators, and other large appliances to walls so that they
will not fall on residents during earthquakes. Big-screen televisions, bookcases, and lights can
topple and seriously injure children and adults.
Designing effective policies and programs is not an easy task. There are major obstacles
to overcome. 12 These are discussed in the following sections.
The diversity of hazards makes it difficult for officials to focus their efforts. While the adoption of
the “all-hazards” model means that officials develop more general plans and programs that can be
adapted to circumstances when needed, known hazards should be identified and assessed.
11
Thomas A. Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 1997).
12
William L. Waugh, Jr., “Emergency Management and State and Local Capacity,” in Cities and Disaster: North
American Studies in Emergency Management, eds. Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr., (Springfield, IL:
Charles C Thomas Publishers), pp. 221–237.
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Disaster policy generally has low issue salience for officials and the public. Unless there has been
a disaster recently, officials have little inclination to invest in programs to address hazards, and
the public has little inclination to pay for such programs. There is a relatively brief window of
opportunity in which officials and the public are concerned enough to act. In many respects, it is
helpful when a disaster with minimal damage and minimal injury occurs, so that scientists and
emergency managers can get officials to do something about the risk. The focus on bioterrorism
caused by the anthrax attacks in 2001 and 2002 created an opportunity for public health officials
to draw attention to the risk of pandemic influenza, which they consider more dangerous than
potential terrorists’ use of biological agents.
A critical element in hazard mitigation is regulation of building codes, land use, and behaviors
that put people and property at risk. The easiest way to reduce the likelihood of death, injury, or
property loss is to make people move away from hazards. Lives and property may be saved by
preventing development on floodplains, along coastlines where storm surge may pose a threat, in
woodlands prone to wildfire, near seismic fault lines, in landslide areas, in mountain valleys
prone to flash flooding, and in other hazardous areas. However, people want to live near rivers,
on beaches, in the woods, on hillsides, in the mountains, and near other hazards, and developers
want to build where people want to buy homes. Finding a balance between reasonable
development and preventing catastrophic losses is not easy for public officials. Developers often
win the political battle. Similarly, strong building codes to make structures less vulnerable to
earthquakes, wildfires, floods, and other hazards raise the cost of building, and there is strong
political pressure to avoid regulations that increase costs. In California, for instance, there was
tremendous opposition to the development of stronger building codes after the 1906 San
Francisco earthquake because it might adversely affect land values and building costs and even
scare potential buyers.
Some Americans oppose virtually any regulation of the use of private property, and state
legislatures, county commissions, and city councils are reluctant to support regulations even if
they might save lives and property. The courts have increasingly sided with property owners
against regulations that might reduce the value of their property even when the development
increases the risk of fire or flood or some other calamity to the community.
The development of strong policies and programs has been limited by the lack of a strong
political constituency. Public attention focuses on disasters for a few months or a few years,
depending upon the size of the disaster, but that attention wanes rather quickly. There are political
interest groups, such as environmental groups, that lobby state legislatures to reduce specific
risks, but they are generally less influential than those that oppose regulatory actions, such as the
building industry and developers. Moreover, people do want to buy homes on the beach, in the
mountains, along river banks, and in other hazardous areas and are not supportive of policies that
restrict those kinds of development. They support the principles behind hazard reduction but often
do not support the policies necessary to advance those principles.
Disaster policies and programs do have administrative constituencies, but they tend not to be
politically influential. Scientists from the U.S. Geological Survey and universities monitor
earthquake hazards and make recommendations concerning action to reduce the vulnerability of
communities to disaster, for example, but they have relatively little influence in the policymaking
process. Indeed, in recent years, some congressional leaders and Administration officials have
tried to prevent scientists from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and universities from providing
evidence of global warming and its likely effects.
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Measuring the effectiveness of disaster policies and programs has been difficult. It is possible to
measure the cost effectiveness of policies and programs, but it is more difficult to measure their
effectiveness in the long term. How much preparation is enough? Should taxpayers be asked to
support more effort than is warranted by the level of risk, even though the community will be
better prepared for catastrophic events? It is easier to determine how satisfied victims are with the
assistance they receive or how fast a community recovers from disaster. The guiding principle in
the 1990s, the “golden age” of FEMA, was that investments in mitigation paid off in reduced
recovery costs. Efforts to determine the cost effectiveness of mitigation programs produced some
evidence that every dollar spent to prevent or reduce the impact of disaster saved as much as four
dollars in recovery. In recent years, FEMA and its parent organization, the Department of
Homeland Security, have reduced investments in mitigation, even eliminating some mitigation
programs, in favor of prevention alone. Grants are awarded competitively, which gives advantage
to larger jurisdictions or those with more professional staff support, rather than awarded based
upon risk. Federal officials encourage communities to invest in their own mitigation programs
with minimal to no federal support.
The vertical fragmentation of the American political system greatly complicates emergency
management and disaster policymaking. During the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005, federal,
state, and local officials were unsure of their responsibilities. In some cases, federal officials
assumed that they had more authority than they legally had. The new National Response Plan is
based on assumptions about federal authority that would be accurate in a terrorist event but not in
a natural disaster in which state and local authorities are the lead and federal authorities have to
be invited to participate.
The horizontal fragmentation of the American political system greatly complicates emergency
management and disaster policymaking. At the local level, communities have their own fire and
police departments and are legally responsible for responding to disasters of all sorts. Mutual
assistance agreements and memoranda of understanding can facilitate interaction. Officials can
agree on responsibilities and borrow resources, including personnel, from other jurisdictions. But,
those agreements have to be in place prior to the disaster in order for them to work effectively.
Similarly, states can development cooperative relationships. The Emergency Management
Assistance Compact is an agreement that states can borrow personnel and resources, including
National Guard troops, from one another. 13
State and local capacities are very uneven. Some state emergency management agencies have
sufficient funding to support a professional staff and to assist local governments in developing
and maintaining effective policies and programs. Some state emergency management agencies
are focused on the threat of terrorism and pay little attention to the threats from natural and
technological hazards. Because federal funding has been funneled to Homeland Security
programs, it is understandable that state and local officials might be focused on the threat of
terrorism. Similarly, some communities have very professional staffs with trained emergency
planners and trainers, and many have little or no staff. Some smaller communities are without a
trained emergency manager and rely instead on volunteers or part-time coordinators drawn from
other agencies. Often the emergency management coordinator is a fire official who has other
responsibilities and little or no training in emergency management. Some small communities may
employ itinerate emergency managers who move from one community to another assisting
officials with their emergency plans, training, and disaster responses.
13
See the Emergency Management Assistance Compact web page: http://www.emacweb.org/.
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The emergency management function in the United States evolved out of community volunteer
efforts. Fire brigades were organized, neighbors helped neighbors respond to threats ranging from
flood to wild animals, and communities supported those who lost their homes and farms to
disaster. Most fire departments in the United States are still volunteer organizations. 14
Communities still rely primarily upon the local chapter of the American Red Cross and a variety
of nongovernmental organizations, including the Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, Islamic
Relief USA, United Way, Lutheran Disaster Response, Mennonite Disaster Response, Southern
Baptist Convention, United Jewish Communities, United Methodist Communities on Relief, and
other faith-based and secular organizations. Community groups ranging from Veterans of Foreign
War chapters to university fraternities and sororities respond to disasters. The nongovernmental
organizations, or NGOs, range from professional organizations that provide administrative services
to small groups who distribute water and make sandwiches. Private firms from Home Depot to
WalMart also provide essential services as well as bring in essential supplies for recovery. While
state and local emergency management and Homeland Security agencies may have more capacity
than most of the NGOs, the NGOs and private firms do contribute critical resources and support
the government effort. The national system is built upon volunteers, and those volunteers need
to be utilized. Using NGO and community resources increases their capacity to deal with future
disasters. They also provide assistance to the victims who do not qualify for government
assistance, i.e., those who fall through the proverbial cracks.
The first federal emergency management programs in the United States dealt with floods
and civil defense. The focus was broadened with the passage of the Disaster Relief Act of 1950,
which authorized the president to issue disaster declarations and to mobilize federal agencies to
help. The nation’s capacity to deal with major disasters was very limited during the 1950s and
1960s. It was only after a series of major natural disasters in the late 1960s and 1970s that the
National Governors’ Association encouraged President Jimmy Carter to consolidate federal
disaster resources into a single agency. In 1979, President Carter brought together programs from
the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and Housing and Urban Development and from the
General Services Administration and the Executive Office of the President to form the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA struggled during the 1980s. Its early directors
had little or no emergency management experience, and civil defense programs tended to
dominate in the agency’s internal politics.
In the mid-1980s, scandal rocked the agency, and the director and several of his
subordinates were forced to resign. The agency became known as a “dumping ground for political
cronies” who had worked on presidential campaigns. FEMA’s reputation was extremely poor;
fortunately, it had few major disasters to handle. Part of the internal turmoil was the result of how
the agency had been formed. FEMA was the product of the consolidation of disparate programs,
not unlike the consolidation that created the Department of Homeland Security. The agency had
many subcultures with different orientations toward the public, different technical languages, and
different political constituencies. There was little commonality among the Civil Defense planners,
insurance and flood mitigation personnel from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), fire
services people from the National Fire Administration, course developers and trainers from the
Emergency Management Institute, and the growing number of contractors.
14
A listing of fire departments by category is available at the following web site:
http://fe.pennnet.com/about/links.cfm.
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Politics of Natural Disasters
American Red Cross Disaster Relief vehicle in Biloxi, Mississippi, after Hurricane Katrina.
Source: FEMA.
At the state and local levels, emergency management capabilities were and still are
uneven. Some states and communities have state-of-the-art programs with professional staff and
strong relationships with the other public, private, and not-for-profit organizations responsible for
dealing with natural and man-made hazards and disasters. Others do not. Some communities have
no emergency managers, relying instead upon officials with other responsibilities. Some
communities have part-time emergency managers. Some have unpaid volunteers with small or no
budgets and no staff support. The consequence is that some communities have little capacity to
deal with hazards or disasters, while others have tremendous capacity. For state officials, that
means that some communities will need a lot of help during disasters and some will need very
little. In fact, local programs may well be better staffed and trained than state programs.
Political leaders may or may not have the resources to spend on programs that may
not be needed, and they choose to gamble on strong emergency management capabilities not
being needed. It is a political choice. It may also be a legal gamble, because local officials
may be held legally liable for failing to exercise their discretion reasonably. Federal and state
officials are protected by sovereign immunity as agents of federal or state law. Local officials
are protected when they are exercising authority given by the state and enforcing state laws,
but they may be held personally liable if they do not act reasonably to prepare their
community for disaster or mitigate a known hazard.
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20
Emergency Operations Center in Biloxi, Mississippi, during Hurricane Katrina disaster.
Source: FEMA.
FEMA failed to respond effectively to Hurricane Hugo in Charleston, South Carolina,
in 1989. The agency waited for the governor to request aid instead of proactively working
with the South Carolina governor’s office to estimate damage and request essential aid.
FEMA equipment and supplies were not moved close to the disaster area to facilitate the
response, and the response was slow. FEMA officials again failed to respond as quickly as
they might have to the Hurricane Andrew disaster in south Florida in 1992. The FEMA
director was removed as head of the federal response effort by President H. W. Bush and
replaced by the secretary of Transportation, Andrew Card. A slow response followed in
Hawaii when Hurricane Iniki made landfall later in the year. Because of the poor
performance of FEMA during these and other disasters, Congress considered dismantling the
agency when it came up for reauthorization. The National Academy of Public Administration
and the U.S. General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) studied
FEMA’s organization and performance and issued reports outlining the major problems.
However, when President Clinton took office in 1993, he appointed James Lee Witt as
director of FEMA. Witt, unlike his predecessors, had emergency management experience and
began reorganizing the agency to overcome internal conflicts. The agency structure was
realigned from a program focus to a functional focus. The central functions were mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery. The focus of the agency was on mitigation, i.e.,
preventing or reducing the effects of disaster. Project Impact was created to encourage the
development of “disaster-resistant” communities. FEMA worked with citizen groups, NGOs,
state and local agencies, and other federal agencies to encourage hazard reduction. The
programs were not without political, administrative, and/or technical problems. Local elected
officials were sometimes unhappy about FEMA working through citizens’ groups rather than
city or county offices, but there were advantages in engaging the public in community
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programs. Project Impact, in fact, enjoyed some success in reducing hazards, and as a result,
Seattle and surrounding communities suffered remarkably little damage during the Nisqually
earthquake in February 2001.
The national emergency management system includes public agencies ranging from
FEMA to state and local emergency management agencies and from the U.S. Geological Survey
to the National Weather Service. The National Response Plan (NRP) provides a structure to
coordinate federal disaster efforts. NRP outlines Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) that
identify lead federal agencies for specific functions (see Table 7). The plan identifies the
coordinating or lead agency, primary agencies, and supporting agencies. The American Red
Cross is a federally chartered organization and has a special role in national disaster operations.
Table 7
Emergency Support Functions in the National Response Plan
ESF
Transportation
Communications
Public Works and Engineering
Firefighting
Emergency Management
Mass Care, Housing and Human Services
Resource Support
Public Health and Medical Services
Urban Search and Rescue
Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
Agriculture and Natural Resources
Energy
Public Safety and Security
Long-Term Community Recovery and
Mitigation
External Affairs
ESF Coordinator/Primary Agencies
U.S. Department of Transportation
U.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMA
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Agriculture/Forest Service
U.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMA
U.S. Department of Homeland
Security/FEMA/American Red Cross
U.S. General Services Administration
U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services
U.S. Department of Homeland Security/
Emergency Preparedness and
Response/FEMA
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency/
Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Coast
Guard
U.S. Department of Agriculture/Department of
the Interior
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Homeland Security/
Emergency Preparedness and Response/
FEMA/U.S. Department of Justice
U.S. Department of Homeland Security/
Emergency Preparedness and Response/
FEMA/U.S. Department of the Treasury/Small
Business Administration
U.S. Department of Homeland Security/
Emergency Preparedness and
Response/FEMA
Source: National Response Plan.
The events of September 11, 2001, radically changed emergency management and how
the nation viewed disasters. The focus of federal programs changed to the threat of terrorism,
federal funding was redirected to anti- and counter-terrorism programs, and “weapons of mass
destruction” became the watchword. What this meant for natural disasters was a lack of public
attention, cuts in funding, cuts in personnel, and a change in culture from the open culture of
emergency management to the closed culture of Homeland Security. When the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2003, FEMA became a very small part of that
organization. What happened to FEMA has been described in the after-action reports and
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investigations done after the poor response to the Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita
disasters. 15 There were problems with the responses to the four hurricanes (Charley, Frances,
Ivan, and Jeanne) that struck Florida in late summer and early fall of 2004, and recovery efforts
were still underway in Florida when Hurricane Wilma struck the state in September 2005. Roofs
covered with blue tarps and lots covered with FEMA trailers became all too familiar sights.
FEMA became the symbol of failure in disaster response even though other federal,
state, and local agencies also failed to respond effectively. Michael Brown, FEMA director,
resigned and criticized his superiors for failing to heed warnings about the levees in New Orleans
and the limited capacity of FEMA to respond. The scale of the disaster certainly made it difficult
for FEMA and other agencies to get access to the disaster area. Federal, state, and local officials
often did not understand their roles in the disaster response. Analyses of the response have
generally concluded that FEMA capabilities to deal with natural disasters declined when it was
transferred to DHS, the agency lacked essential technical capabilities (such as information and
communications technologies), communication systems failed and coordination of emergency
response efforts was extremely poor, and it lacked the manpower to deal with a major disaster.
There is less consensus on how to correct the problems. Currently, the debate within Congress is
over whether FEMA should remain in DHS as an essential element if there is a catastrophic
terrorist attack or should be removed and returned to its independent status reporting directly to
the president. Some assets of the agency have already been lost. Many long-time FEMA
employees have retired, transferred to other agencies, or chosen to work for consulting firms that
value their hazard expertise. This is not a new problem for federal agencies, or for state and local
agencies for that matter, but it is a problem that is causing a lot of concern. The “brain drain”
means that much of the institutional memory and expertise has been lost. 16 One indication of the
challenge that fixing FEMA (or a new agency with emergency management responsibilities)
entails is that President Bush offered the FEMA directorship to seven or eight people, all
nationally prominent emergency management professionals, before nominating the acting director
to the position.
The Future of Emergency Management and Disaster Policy
The United States has to address serious hazards, from the Yellowstone super-volcano to
pandemic influenza, and indications are that responsibility will increasingly reside with state and
local officials and with individuals and families. All-hazards emergency management and
comprehensive emergency management are still the foci of state and local emergency
management agencies, even though DHS has deemphasized mitigation and added awareness and
prevention to the list. Federal programs are still overwhelmingly focused on the threat of
terrorism, rather than natural disasters. More and more state and local officials are finding their
own priorities based upon the hazards in their own communities. State policies regarding hazards
may well conflict with federal policies. State and local officials, for example, are looking at the
effects of global warming, including drought, flood, sea level rise, and more severe weather, on
their constituents.
State and local officials are also continuing to emphasize “dual use” when they invest in
equipment, training, and other capabilities. “Dual use” means that equipment, personnel, etc., can
be used in more common disaster responses as well as in response to terrorist attacks. For
example, decontamination equipment can be used in hazardous materials responses, such as
15
See William L. Waugh, Jr. “The Political Costs of Failure in the Katrina and Rita Disasters,” The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 604, Special Issue on “Sheltering from the Storm:
Repairing the National Emergency Management System after Katrina, ed. W. L. Waugh, Jr., March 2006.
16
Ibid.
Politics of Natural Disasters
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chemical spills, as well as incidences involving WMD. 17 Officials are trying to find a middle
ground between federal pressure to prepare for terrorist attacks and their communities’ needs to
prepare for the natural disasters that are certain to happen.
State and local officials are also finding some guidance in the development of programs
in National Fire Protection Association Standard 1600 (NFPA 1600) and EMAP (the Emergency
Management Accreditation Program). NFPA 1600 and EMAP have been recognized by Congress
as the standards by which emergency management programs should be designed. The standards
cover the components of comprehensive programs from the types of emergency plans to the
administration and financing of the programs. They provide benchmarks for officials to assess
the quality of their programs and ensure that the essential elements are present, documented,
and functional. EMAP conducts assessments and accredits state and local programs that meet
its standards.
Katrina pointed out some serious shortcomings in the national system for dealing with
hazards and disasters. Corrections are being made in how equipment and supplies are deployed to
disaster areas, how personnel are recruited for disaster operations, how evacuation plans address
the needs of special populations like the elderly and disabled, how communities designate sites
for temporary housing, how national medical resources are deployed and what kinds of resources
are deployed, how warnings are issued to residents, how care facilities (e.g., nursing homes and
hospitals) determine when and how to evacuate, and so on. The lessons learned from Katrina and
Rita are forcing a reevaluation of the national emergency management system.
Since Katrina, federal officials have urged communities and individuals to prepare for the
next disaster and not to expect federal support to arrive immediately. Greater self-reliance,
including greater reliance upon individual and family preparedness and private insurance, is the
focus. The likely reasoning behind the change in policy is that reducing expectations concerning
federal responsibilities might increase state and local preparedness efforts and encourage
individuals, families, and communities to create their own “72-hour kits” 18 so that they can
survive on their own until help arrives. It is uncertain, however, whether Americans watching
events unfold on television will understand or agree with the policy if the victims of the next
large disaster are seen struggling to survive and the “cavalry,” federal assistance, is not on the
way to help. The poor may not have the resources to store sufficient food and water to survive on
their own. Many of those trapped in the flood waters in New Orleans lacked the resources to
evacuate and the resources to survive in their homes for more than a short period of time.
In most respects, the politics of disaster are much like politics in other policy areas.
Issues do not get on the public agenda unless there is a catastrophic disaster, and media coverage
greatly influences how the disaster is perceived. The public attention span is relatively short.
There are differing views of the hazards, different views of risk, and a multitude of other motives
that influence political positions and policy choices. Many support the notion of self-reliance,
encouraging residents to take care of themselves and their families, and many support the notion
that the government is the “cavalry,” the responder responsible for ensuring public health and
safety. There are political costs for failing to prepare adequately and/or to respond effectively, but
blame is difficult to assign. The system is complex, and many people and many organizations
have responsibility for ensuring success. Disaster victims and communities are very resilient.
Disaster policy reveals a lot about community values, particularly in how policy addresses the
needs of those who cannot take care of themselves.
17
CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive material) or B-NICE (biological, nuclear,
incendiary, chemical, and explosive) are the new terms for WMD.
18
There is a debate within the emergency management community concerning the adequacy of three days’
supply of food, water, and other essentials. Some argue that everyone should have supplies for two weeks, and
largely because of the avian influenza threat, supplies to last one to several months may be in order.
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Politics of Natural Disasters
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Should state and local officials focus their efforts on the hazards that pose the most risk to
their communities, or should they follow the federal lead and focus on the threat of
terrorism?
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2. How can officials convince the public and public officials to invest in policies and
programs to reduce the risks from natural hazards when there are other policy problems
to address?
3. Should communities be permitted to prevent development in hazardous areas if the only
risk is to the property owner who wishes to develop the area?
4. Is it a problem that the national emergency management system is so reliant upon
volunteers and volunteer organizations?
5. What should be the federal role in natural disasters when legal responsibility and
authority rests with state and local officials?
6. When should the federal government not provide assistance to communities in disasters?
7. FEMA’s recent problems with the Hurricane Katrina response were at least partly due to
the fact that its leaders were political appointees with little or no emergency management
experience. Should presidents be required to appoint qualified administrators, and what
qualifications should they have?
8. The tsunami hazard on the East Coast of the United States is less certain than the hazard
on the West Coast. How might restrictions on development along the coastlines differ
because of the differences in risk?
9. Should local officials be held legally liable when they do not prepare their communities
reasonably for disasters?
10.
Should communities have a special tax for property owners who build in the
Wildland/Urban Interface (WUI) and require more fire protection than others in the
community?
11.
Should communities charge hikers, skiers, snowboarders, snow mobilers, and others for
rescue operations when they have disregarded hazards like severe weather?
12.
Should communities choose not to mount rescue operations when to do so would put
rescuers at risk?
13.
Should disaster assistance agencies refuse to aid victims when they put themselves at risk
by choosing not to evacuate or to live in a hazardous area?
14.
Should FEMA be an independent agency reporting directly to the president, or should it
remain part of the Department of Homeland Security?
15.
How can federal, state, and local officials encourage self-reliance, including individual
and family preparedness, so that people will be able to survive on their own in a major
disaster like Katrina?
16.
Do you have a disaster plan and a “72-hour kit,” so that you and your family can survive
for at least three days without outside help?