The Society for Japanese Studies
The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Volume 1, between War and
Peace, 1697-1985; Volume 2, Neither War Nor Peace, 1985-1998 by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
Review by: Stephen Kotkin
Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter, 2000), pp. 270-274
Published by: The Society for Japanese Studies
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TheNorthernTerritoriesDispute and Russo-JapaneseRelations:Volume1,
Between Warand Peace, 1697-1985; Volume2, NeitherWarnor Peace,
1985-1998. By Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Internationaland Area Studies,
Universityof California,Berkeley, 1998. Vol. 1: xiii, 216 pages; Vol. 2:
483 pages. $38.50, paper.
Reviewedby
STEPHENKOTKIN
PrincetonUniversity
Although "the world has entered the post-cold-warperiod," writes Tsuyoshi Hasegawa,professorof history at the Universityof California,Santa
Barbara,"Russia and Japanhave stood still, unable to put behind [them]
not only the legacies of the cold war, but also the legacies of the war they
fought fifty long years ago" (p. 2). To understandand perhapsovercome
this enduringstalemate,Hasegawahas writtena detailedhistory of RussoJapaneserelations, focused on Japaneseirredentism.His handling of the
historiographyon the islands is wonderfully nuanced. He brings out the
subtlestdifferences(refiningthe overview by GilbertRozman)and tries to
set himself off fromthe dominantfigureson the Japaneseleft (WadaHaruki)
and right (KimuraHiroshi),thoughhe ends up closer to Wada.
Territorialquestions,Hasegawaconcedes, "shouldnot consumethe entirety of Russo-Japaneserelations" (p. 512). But that is precisely how he
frames his enormously eruditetwo-volume work, beginning with the first
contacts in 1697 and extending up to 1998. He states that "a commonly
acceptedview of Russo-Japaneserelationsis thatthey have been antagonistic from the very beginning" (p. 13), and he, too, more or less adopts such
a view. But GeorgeLensen,the leading authorityon the full scope of RussoJapaneserelations,demonstratedthe opposite in his still unsurpassedstudy
(cited by Hasegawa).John Stephan,anothermajorscholar(also cited), has
spent much of his careerconfirmingLensen'santi-common-sense,factually
based assessmentthathistoricallyRusso-Japaneserelationswere relatively
friendly,even in the aftermathof the Russo-JapaneseWar.It is almost as if
Hasegawa,like the Russian and Japanesegovernments,has become a captive of the postwarterritorialconflict simply by trying to settle the matter.
The four islands, called by the Russiansthe southernKurils and by the
Japanesethe NorthernTerritories,are Kunashiri,Etorofu,Shikotan,andthe
Habomai group. Hasegawa chooses to call them the NorthernTerritories,
though he claims that in choosing the Japaneseterminologyhe does "not
necessarilyendorsethe definitiongiven by the Japanesegovernment"(p. 6).
He presentsa scrupulouslyfair narrativeof the historicalbackgroundof the
dispute, which like the choice of terminologyhas the effect of confirming
the Japaneseposition that there is a dispute. At the same time, he demonstratesthatappealsto historycannotestablishrightfulor legal ownership.If
ReviewSection
271
anyonehas a "legal" or "historical"claim to the islands, it is of course the
Ainu (p. 527). Hasegawa'saim, however,is not to advocatea returnto Ainu
sovereignty.It is to reconcile Japanand Russia. He is not the firstanalystto
make such an attempt, but his effort is distinguished by substantialnew
researchin Japanese,American,and recently declassified Russian sources.
Of particularinterest are new documents from Soviet-era archiveson
the maneuveringsin 1945. Hasegawaagrees with Japanesenationaliststhat
when PresidentHarryTrumanlearned-contrary to his worst fears-that
Stalin would not advance from northerninto southern Korea, Trumanin
effect ceded the southernKurils to the Soviet Union. But Hasegawa emphasizes that TrumansteadfastlyrejectedStalin'sproposalto occupy Hokkaido from the north. In turn, Stalin refused a last-minuteU.S. requestfor
landingrights in the southernKurils-a decision thatthe United Statesdid
not protest,knowing that failing to protestmeant accepting Soviet control.
This is how the United States "conceded" the Kurils. The key point, however, is that the Japanesecould not have stoppedthe Soviet army from taking Hokkaido.Analysts who blame the United States for giving away Japanese territoryby not taking a firmerstand on the southernKurils will now
have to contendwith the fact thatin mid-August1945, not only were Soviet
troops in place for a Hokkaidoinvasion, but, as Hasegawashows, the order
to invade had already been given. Following Truman'srefusal to sanction
the invasion, however,Stalin unexpectedlyrescindedhis invasion order.
Hasegawaexpertly narratesthis complicatedepisode. With carefulpresentation of the evidence he demonstratesfurtherthat unlike the case of
Hokkaido, "the Soviet operation against the southern Kurils was not
planned.... Ratherit grew, almost accidentally,out of the contingencies
arising from Japan'simminent surrenderand the discontinuationof the
planned attackon Hokkaido.The 87thRifle Corps, which was supposedto
be used for the attack on Hokkaido, suddenly became available" (p. 67).
Opportunistically,Stalin hastened,before the Americans moved in, to add
the southernKurilsto his conquests of the northernand centralKurils.But
that is as far as he got. Subsequently,the United States would exclude the
Soviet Union from a promised role in the occupation of Japan.Thus, as a
result of Stalin'scancellationof the Hokkaidoinvasion and of the U.S. decision to cede the Kurils while attemptingto draw the line on Hokkaido,
Japan,unlike Korea,was not divided. Surely the successful exclusion of the
Soviets from the occupationand the nondivisionof Japanare of far greater
historical and strategic significance than the Soviet annexation of the
"NorthernTerritories."Imagine the postwar world with a Soviet-backed
Japanese communist governmentand a demilitarizedline in the south of
Hokkaidoor the northof Honshu.
But the Japanesehave chosen not to see mattersin this Realpolitiklight.
For one thing, Stalin'shalt to the Hokkaidoinvasion had disastrousconsequences for capturedJapanesesoldiers. As Hasegawanicely explains,given
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the plan to invade Hokkaido,the Soviet Union decided to repatriateJapanese POWs. Once he was without the huge labor contingent anticipated
from a Hokkaidoinvasion,however,Stalinordered640,000 JapanesePOWs
deportedto the Soviet Union. In blatantviolationof the GenevaConvention,
the Japanesesoldiers were sent to labor camps. Repatriationonly began in
1947, and some POWs were not able to returnhome for anotherdecade. At
least 60,000 died before they could returnat all; theirremainsarestill being
sought and, when found, carriedback to Japan.Complicatingmatters,the
Soviet Union lied aboutthe numberof POWstaken,theirlocation, andtheir
ultimatedisposition.The Soviet mistreatmentof the POWs,combinedwith
brutalitiescommittedby Soviet soldiers against civilian Japanesein Manchuriaand Korea,remainpalpablegrievancesin the Japanesememory.
Acknowledging the suffering, Hasegawa does not allow the POWs'
treatmentto obscurethe largercomplex of issues. Instead,he calls the Japanese attentionto the Soviet violation of the NeutralityPact an "obsession,"
and quotes John Stephan,who soberly explains that "despitepious protestations, neither side felt bound to honor the NeutralityPact one moment
longerthatit served strategicinterests"(p. 42). Moreover,Hasegawashows
that if the Japanesegovernmenthad acceptedthe PotsdamDeclarationimmediately,on July 26, there would have been no Soviet-JapaneseWar,and
no Hiroshimaor Nagasaki (p. 72). "Ironically,"he concludes, "it was Japan'sbelated acceptanceof the PotsdamDeclarationthatpromptedStalin"
to launchoperationsagainstthe northernKurils(p. 62), beginningthe process by which the Japaneselost the southernKurils,too.
Hasegawais equally superbon the double game played by JohnFoster
Dulles at the 1951 San Francisco Treaty negotiations. To foment longlasting enmity between the Soviet Union and Japan,Dulles kept the geographicaldefinitionof the Kurilsambiguous(he deliberatelydid not include
what the Japaneseregardedas the "northernterritories"in the definitionof
the Kurils). In that sense, Hasegawawrites, "the northernterritoriesquestion was a creationof the United States" (p. 105). Nonetheless,the Soviets
could have shocked Dulles and signed the proposed treaty,resolving the
Kurilsmatteronce and for all, and turningJapaneseirredentismagainstthe
United States (over Okinawa).Instead,the Soviets refused to sign, falling
into Dulles's trap, and "the 'northernterritoriesquestion' thus became for
the U.S. governmentthe best guaranteeagainstSoviet-Japaneserapprochement" (p. 121).
After 1956, the diplomacyis less exciting. In 200 pages, Hasegawacovers the six years from 1985 to 1991, and in another 150 pages the seven
years 1991-98. As the text makesclear,absolutelynothingresultedfromthe
wranglingof those 13 years. Japaneseprime ministerscome and go; titanic
struggles take place over brief, inconsequentialcommuniques.We learn
who wrote what, who said what, whose tone slightly sharpened,whose tone
subtly softened. It is like watching polar ice melt a few centimeters,then
ReviewSection
273
hardenagain, then melt again. In the 1980s and 1990s, there is the sudden
injection of public opinion (surveys of islanders) and visits by Hokkaido
journalists,which accordingto Hasegawacrackedthe Gaimushomonopoly
over informationon the issue. For the Japanesepublic, this may have rendered the dispute more immediate and personal,but any movement in the
Japanese or Russian governmentpositions remains invisible, even under
Hasegawa'spowerfulmicroscope.
If anything, television images and direct reportinghave made the dispute less comprehensible.Hasegawa suggests that the islands encompass
one of the richest fishing areas in the world (even if that view is exaggerated, Japan'sterritorialwaters have been so depleted that any neighboring
fishing grounds assume inordinateimportancefor Japan).He also argues
thatthe islands carrystrategicnavalimportance,thoughhe notes thatGeoffrey Jukesof Australiahas refutedmost Russiansecurityargumentsandthat
the Russian Pacific Fleet is downsizing anyway. Whatevertheir supposed
significance,the islands togetheramountto less than 2,000 squaremiles of
land surface. That is more than Okinawa, but less than Chiba Prefecture
(and about the same as Delaware). In 1945, before the Soviet Union invaded, the Japanesepopulationon the islands was about 18,000, many of
whom, afterrelocatingto Japan,are now dead. Almost half a centurylater,
in 1992, the Russian populationwas a mere 25,000. In 1994, following a
majorearthquake,the islands' populationsankto around13,000. Even more
thanthe rest of Russia, the Kurilsare in decline.
Generously, Hasegawa calls Soviet policy toward Japan "puzzling"
(p. 313). But the bigger puzzle is why Japan,a world economic colossus,
has made four largely uninhabitedrocks in the sea the central, indeed the
only, issue in its relationswith one of its large neighbors.Hasegawawrites
that "it is difficultfor the Japaneseto acceptthatthe Soviet Union ... joined
the war against Japan at the request of the Allies, and that the SovietJapaneseWarhad a decisive impacton the terminationof the war."In other
words, the Japanesecontinue to treat the Soviet-JapaneseWar as entirely
separatefrom the Pacific War. "To many Japanese,"he notes, "the SovietJapaneseWar[has] served as a psychological means by which the Japanese
[have] acquireda sense of victimization,which [has] served as a majorexcuse to avoid atonementfor the Pacific War" (p. 71). Here we come to the
crux of the matter.
Mikhail Gorbachev, who shook the world with breakthroughagreements, visited Japanin 1989. "It gives one an eerie, surrealisticfeeling to
realize," writes Hasegawa, "thatthreedays of protractednegotiationswere
almost totally devoted to the northernterritoriesissue" (p. 403). When the
August 1991 putschtook place in Moscow, threateningto reversethe largely
benign foreign policies of a major nuclear power, commentatorsin Japan
fixated on the coup's implications for a returnof the northernterritories.
Gorbachev'ssuccessor, the erratic Russian President Boris Yeltsin, infa-
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mously cancelled a plannedtrip to Tokyo, but even if the last-minutecancellation was inept and insulting, Hasegawashows that it is difficultto see
why Yeltsin should have gone. Hasegawa also takes the Russians to task,
for they "haveallowed greaterconcessions on Germanreunificationandthe
arms control issues that had more far-reachingimplications for their national security"(p. 2). Well, yes, but Germanyforsworemuchmore serious
territorialclaims, as did countriesthat were attackedby the Soviet Union,
such as Finland and Poland. Hasegawa's extended presentationfinds no
room for such comparisons,whose absenceis the book'smain shortcoming.
Nor does the book place Russo-Japaneserelationsin the context of postwar
Japanesediplomacymore generally.
Russia may or may not decide to relinquishthe four Kuril islands that
it grabbedviciously in war. But the irredentismon the partof the Japanese
is dangerouslydestabilizing and could boomerang.One can only wonder
what would happenin Asia if, say, China also took an unyieldingposition
on disputedterritories,to the exclusion of any otherissue in its foreign relations with neighboringcountries.What if Russia began to assertthatthe
bordersof the post-Soviet states are arbitrary-which they are-and began to insist on the "return"of Crimea, northernKazakhstan,and other
territories?Hasegawa does not shrink from writing of Japanese "singlemindedness,verging on simple mindedness"(p. 383) and refers to Japan's
northernterritories"syndrome"(p. 295). Yet he, too, concludes, "thatJapan can ultimatelyjustify its demand that all the disputed islands be returnedto it and that unless Russia agrees to the return,the two countries
will continue to experience strain in their relationship. ... I belong to the
Japanesewho stand for the returnof all four islands," which "sooner or
later will be returnedto Japan" (p. 535). The frustrationruns deep all
around.
NIMBY Politics in Japan: Energy Siting and the Management of Environ-
mental Conflict.By S. Hayden Lesbirel. Cornell UniversityPress, Ithaca, 1998. xvi, 187 pages. $39.95.
Reviewed by
MIRANDAA. SCHREURS
Universityof Maryland
One of the most contentiousaspects of electricity productionin Japanhas
been the siting of new powerfacilities. Historically,therealmostalwayshas
been protestfrom communitiestargetedas sites for coal-firedpower plants
and nuclear energy facilities. Much of that protesthas come from fishing