Center - State Relations in the Ethiopian Federal
Setup: Towards Coercive Federalism?
A view from the Practice
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF LAW OF ADDIS ABABA
UNIVERSITY, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS (LL.M CONSTITUTIONAL AND PUBLC LAW).
BY
KALKIDAN KASSAYE
PREPARED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
Dr. SOLOMON NEGUSSIE
December 2010
Center –State Relations in the Ethiopian Federal
Setup: Towards Coercive Federalism?
A glance from the Federal Practice
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF LAW OF ADDIS ABABA
UNIVERSITY, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS (LL.M CONSTITUTIONAL AND PUBLC LAW).
BY
KALKIDAN KASSAYE
PREPARED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
Dr. SOLOMON NEGUSSIE
December 2010
DECLARATION
I, Kalkidan Kassaye, hereby declare that this dissertation is original and has never
been presented in any other institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I
also declare that any information used has been duly acknowledged.
LL.M Candidate Name:
Signature:
Kalkidan Kassaye
___________________
November, 2010
This dissertation has been submitted for examination with my approval as University
supervisor.
Supervisor:
Signature:
Date:
Dr. Solomon Negussie
_____________________
December 2010
i
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
First and foremost, I have got a lot to say God the Almighty and his mother St
Virgin Marry. God made everything right and for good!
The preparation of this thesis would not have been possible without the help of a
number of people. The most important contribution came from my supervisor, Dr
Solomon Negussie, who tirelessly read the drafts and provided insightful
comments. The thesis benefited immensely from his perceptive comments. Not only
for his academic qualities but also for his unreserved–proper friendly approach,
which I wish all the academics would have managed to posses, I am deeply
indebted to thank him.
I would like to say thank you to all members of my family. It is your huge
aspirations that hold me up for this day. But, I promise, this is still not enough, you
have got a lot to see yet!
My sincere gratitude goes to the Forum of Federations and especially Mr. Shawn
Houlihan and all his staffs for providing me the opportunity to be part of the
prestigious Summer University Program at the Fribourg Institute of Federalism.
Equally, it is impossible to Passover the wholehearted assistance of Colonel Ahmed
Hamza that made possible my travel to Switzerland. My paper has also benefited
greatly from the summer university sessions and the discussion that I have made
with students of various backgrounds. For their wonderful preparation and
unreserved endeavor to help each and every participants of the summer university
Professor Eva Maria and Yvonne Heiter deserves my appreciation.
I would also like to thank all of my interviewees that have spent their precious time
in providing me all the necessary information’s in this somehow sensitive area of
study. In this particular catalog, I have to include John Kincaid, the famous
American author who has made an extensive research on federalism for sharing his
opinion on my paper while he was invited at the 5th International conference on
federalism. Thank you John, I owe you!
Last but not least, all my neighbors in Ferensaye Legasion specially Alem, for her
delicious coffee that keeps me bright all through the day and her companion Kassa;
my brothers, sisters and friends– Fistum, Niway, Wouibshet, Mule, Alemtshay,
Selamawit, Addis and her mother, Israel, Feke, and Borex, thanks a lot for your
contribution and the time we shared together! I am truly grateful.
ii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANDM
Amhara National Democratic Movement
CCI
Council of Constitutional Inquiry
CUD
Coalition for Unity and Democracy
EDP
Ethiopian Democratic Party
ELF
Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
EPDM
Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement
EPRDF
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU
European Union
FDRE
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
HoF
House of Federation
HPR
House of Peoples’ Representatives
ICG
International Crisis Group
IGR
Inter Governmental Relation
MoFA
Ministry of Federal Affairs
OLF
Oromo Liberation Front
OPDO
Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization
SEPDF
Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Front
SNNPR
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region
TGE
Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF
Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front
UDHR
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
UDJP
Unity for Democracy and Justice Party
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION .................................................................................................................................... i
ACKNOWLEDGMENT .......................................................................................................................... ii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................................... iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................................... iv
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY .................................................................................................... 1
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM .................................................................................................. 3
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTION ................................................................................................................. 6
1.4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY ................................................................................................... 6
1.5. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCE OF INFORMATION ..................................................................... 5
CHAPTER 2: FEDERALISM AND FEDERATIONS, GENERAL
2.1. FEDERALISM AND FEDERATIONS: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS ................................................ 11
2.2. «FROM THE PANACEA OF NATION-STATE(S) TO FEDERATION(S)»: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF
FEDERALISM AND FEDERATIONS ................................................................................................. 15
2.3. CATEGORIES OF FEDERAL ARRANGEMENTS................................................................................ 19
2.4. BASIC FEATURES OF FEDERATIONS ............................................................................................. 25
2.5. RATIONALES AND MOTIVES FOR FEDERAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE CAPACITY
TO FEDERATE .............................................................................................................................. 29
2.6. CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................. 32
CHAPTER 3: THE ETHIOPIAN FEDERAL EXPERIMENT: SALIENT FEATURES
3.1.
«FROM UNITARISM TO FEDERALISM»: BRIEF HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF NATION BUILDING IN
ETHIOPIA ............................................................................................................................... 35
3.1.1. THE IMPERIAL REGIME ................................................................................................... 36
3.1.2. THE MILITARY REGIME OF DERG .................................................................................... 39
3.1.3. THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND THE DISCOURSE ON THE FEDERAL OPTION .............. 40
3.1.4. CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE FEDERAL IDEA ................................................................... 41
3.2. THE PRECURSORS AND MOTIVES OF THE FEDERAL OPTION ...................................................... 43
3.3. SALIENT AND UNIQUE FEATURES OF THE ETHIOPIAN FEDERAION ............................................ 45
3.3.1. ETHNICIZATION OF THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE AND THE VIGOR ROLE OF ETHNICITY ... 46
3.3.2. SELF DETERMINATION: THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE FEDERAL PACT ........ 50
3.3.3. SECESSION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RHETORIC ............................................................... 52
3.3.4. TAMING PARLIAMENTARY UNICAMERALISM WITH THE FEDERAL IDEA ....................... 56
3.3.5. “WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIAN?” INTERPRETING THE “COVENANT” BY THE SECOND
CHAMBER ....................................................................................................................... 59
3.3.6. NO RULE OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY OR PREEMPTION ................................................... 63
3.4. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................. 66
iv
CHAPTER 4: DISTRIBUTION OF COMPETENCIES IN THE FDRE
CONSTITUION: A BRIEF REVIEW
4.1. DIVISION OF COMPETENCIES IN THE FDRE CONSTITUTION ....................................................... 69
4.1.1. LEGISLATIVE POWER DISTRIBUTION .............................................................................. 70
4.1.1.1. “ENUMERATED” EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL POWERS ................................................ 71
4.1.1.2. A “NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE” TO CONFER THE CENTER AN IMPLIED
AUTHORITY ....................................................................................................... 73
4.1.1.3. RESIDUAL AUTHORITY TO THE STATES OF THE FEDERATION. .......................... 75
4.1.1.4. SHARED LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCIES .............................................................. 77
4.1.2. EXECUTIVE POWER DIVISION ......................................................................................... 79
4.1.3. LOOKING AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS SERIOUSLY: DOES IT
MATTER TO KEEP THE FEDERAL BALANCE OF POWER IN ETHIOPIA? ........................... 82
4.2. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................. 85
CHAPTER 5: CENTER-STATE RELATIONS IN THE ETHIOPIAN
FEDERAL DISCOURSE: A LOOK AT THE PRACTICE
5.1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN ETHIOPIA: THEORETICAL APPRAISAL………………………… 89
5.2. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: THE DE JURE PRINCIPLE OF CENTER-STATE RELATIONS? ............ 92
5.3. THE CHALLENGE OF CENTRALIZATION ....................................................................................... 96
5.3.1. GENERAL ..................................................................................................................... 96
5.3.2. INFORMAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION VIS-À-VIS THE STATES
AUTONOMY................................................................................................................. 98
5.3.3. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY OF THE POWER HOLDERS AT THE CENTER ........................... 99
5.3.4. PARTY CONGRUENCE .................................................................................................. 02
5.3.5. CENTRALIZATION AS A NECESSARY EVIL: IS THE ARGUMENT CONVINCING IN THE
ETHIOPIAN CASE? ........................................................................................................ 04
5.4. COERCIVE FEDERALISM: THE FUNCTIONAL TREND OF THE CENTER-STATE
RELATIONS ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..108
5.4.1. COERCIVE FEDERALISM DEFINED ............................................................................... 109
5.4.2. THE VANGUARDIST PARTY ARGUMENT ..................................................................... 111
5.4.3. MARRYING DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM WITH THE FEDERAL IDEA............................ 113
5.4.4. A FEDERAL PRACTICE OPERATING UNDER DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND INSUFFICIENT
CONSTITUTIONALISM ................................................................................................. 118
5.4.5. THE CENTERS' VISIBLE PRESENCE IN THE REGIONAL STATES MACHINERIES ............. 122
5.4.6. USING THE NATIONAL POLICYMAKING POWER AS A DEVICE OF COERCION ............ 126
5.5. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................ 127
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................ 131
6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................................................. 135
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 140
Appendix 1: List of Interviewees ....................................................................................................... 146
Appendix 2: Interview Guide............................................................................................................. 147
v
Map: the Nine Regional States and the two City Councils of Federal Ethiopia
1. Addis Ababa City Council
2. Afar Regional State
3. Amhara Regional State
4. Benshangul Regional State
5. Diredawa City Councils
6. Gambella Regional State
7. Harari Regional State
8. Oromia Regional State
9. Somali Regional State
10. The Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
11. Tigray Regional State
vi
Abstract
A comprehensive understanding of the operational part of a federal system calls for the study of the
comportment on which the center-state relationship is based. Keeping this line, the Ethiopian
federal setup which is suspected of being coercive as regards the rapport between the orders of
government, is an interesting area of academic as well as political significance. The paper aims at
exploring whether such suspicion is valid or not by scrutinizing the prevailing politico-economic as
well
as
constitutional
stratum
in
which
the
federal
experiment
is
functioning.
vii
1. Introduction
1.1.
Background of the study
Following the demise of the long-lived historical de facto federal1 setup, prominent
political elites of the 20th century by and large labeled Haileselassie I as the chief
architect of modern state of Ethiopia through the Western ideal of nation-state. His
majesty, who reigned for forty-four years up until his forceful removal from the crown
in 1974 by the radical military group led by Mengistu Hailemariam, otherwise branded
as Dergue, was principally celebrated as the one who revealed the better days of Ethiopia
and honored to be a modernizer and avant-garde sovereign who fiercely guarded the
sovereignty and independence of this northeast African polity.
Weakened by a protracted revolutionary war in Eritrea and by withdrawals of Soviet
support, Mengistu's regime was overthrown by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
(hearafter TPLF) and its allies in May 1991.2 The new Transitional Government of
Ethiopia (TGE) is dominated by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic
Front (hereafter EPRDF), a party created by ethnic oriented alliances. Most
governmental and opposition groups attended the July 1991 Conference that approved
the Charter under which the TGE operated, and which forecast the contents of the new
Constitution.
The Transitional Government that was established by the Charter and elaborated by the
subsequent proclamations was not explicitly designated as federal. Neither the Charter
nor the Proclamation that provided for the establishment of self governments referred to
1
The long lived historical decentralization in Ethiopia has been at the forefront of the academic as well
as political debate concerning its correspondence or otherwise with the concept of de facto federalism.
Some notable federalism writers for example enunciate such a pedigree in Ethiopia as a de facto federal
experience (at least the time until the coming into power of emperor Haileselassie I) while some others
considers it as lack of centralization. Though, the argument still goes, for my purpose, it is not as such
relevant to boil down all the concerns and issues here. What I need to explain here is there was no
unified strong central governance in much of the country’s political history. See for example Assefa
Fiseha (infra), and Tsegaye Regassa, Comparative Relevance of the Ethiopian Federal System to other
African Polities of the Horn, Bahir Dar University Journal of Law, Vol.1 No. 1 at 14 for such a debate.
2 Paul H. Brietzke, Ethiopia's "Leap in the Dark": Federalism and Self-Determination in the New
Constitution, Journal of African Law, Vol. 39, No. 1 (1995) at 19.
1
this government as federal or decentralized for that matter. Subsequently however, on
the way to illuminate the Ethiopian choice and after this enough margin of transition, in
December 1994, a constitutional assembly ratified the new constitution, which was
lauded for its commitment to a fully fledged federalism attached with liberal democracy
and respect of political freedoms and human rights.3
The Constitution, after adopting a federal governmental configuration characterized by
a coordinate relationship between the center and the constituent units, tries to
emphasize on the equality, even in some cases the states (under the guise of Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples) supremacy. The two tiers of government are constitutionally
empowered to act exclusively on their affairs which fall under their respective
jurisdiction. This is to signify the de jure equality of the parties to the federal bargain.
Thus, constitutionally speaking, the FDRE Constitution opted for the American replica
of dual federalism as opposed to the executive or administrative model of German or
Swiss. There is nothing provided about federal supremacy unlike its US counterpart or
federal preemption principle as the case in some federations.4
The concept of Coercive federalism5, as it was used by federalist advocates, indicates
the situation by which one level (perhaps in most cases by the center) dominate the
whole politico-social affair of a country that is constitutionally established as federation.
Thus, Coercive (Controlled) Federalism is a term used mainly by political theorists who
sought to examine the constitutional and political space (room) available to members of
The constitution was ratified on 8 December 1994 and entered into force on 21 August 1995 (The
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 1/1995, and
Proclamation of the Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 1st
Year No. 1, and Addis Ababa-21st August, 1995, (Here in after referred as The Constitution or the FDRE
constitution)). So, as of this date Ethiopia is a federation de jure. However, many argued against the
composition of the constituent assembly by labeling it as an affiliated group of individuals to the
ideology of EPRDF. Such contest was exacerbated by the highly rigged election took place sometime after
the constitutional making and very recently.
4
The concept has got its origin from the American constitutional history. Accordingly, after an agreement
has been reached on the federal option, a large measure of the States' sovereignty was ceded under the
Constitution to the federal government by virtue of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI, which declared
that all laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land”.
5
For further analysis of this federal jargon, see John Kincaid, Contemporary U.S. Federalism: Coercive
Change with Cooperative Continuity, Reaf, no. 6, April 2008, p. 10-36, John Kincaid, From Cooperative to
Coercive Federalism, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 509, American
Federalism: The Third Century (May, 1990), at 139-152, Sage Publications, Inc. Note also that, I have
used terms like, the federation, central government or the center, general government interchangeably
to refer to the federal government.
3
2
the federation. To this end, whenever there exist no or little space for political pluralism
and diversification other than those determined by the politically dominant general
government, the federal bargain is characterized as coercive Federalism/ Federation as
the case maybe.
The idea has emerged mainly in the American context as the competencies of the
federal government have got predominance through various post-constitutional
developments. Among others, the different grant systems and the supreme courts
position can be mentioned. As John Kincaid argued, the ideal dual thinking has lost
currency when the federal government invented the cooperative scheme of arrangement
as a viable means to come up with a common understanding.6 However, recent
developments are coming into the political scene and resulted in usurpation of the
cooperative arrangement to take dominance over the states. This has undoubtedly
resulted in a biased relationship between the two tiers and vividly resulted in a coercive
trend of relationship.
Therefore, it is wise to analyze such a leaning in a federal country which can be
considered by many as on its infant or experimental stage and always suspicious for its
nonfederal character.7
1.2.
Statement of the Problem
According to the Federal Constitution, which is taken as a turning point of the
previously centralized state structure (especially after the reign of Haileselassie I), while
serving the role of being a covenant of the federal bargain, uniquely (or as some prefer to
explain, confusingly) among the ethno-linguistic groups of the country; Ethiopia is a
federation operating under the Republican principle.8 Consequently, the ethno
nationalities, through their representatives preserve all the sovereign powers. Hence,
they are the loci of sovereign authority in this country.9 The constituent units are shaped
in line with such understanding and vested with powers that can be viewed by many as
An extensive personal discussion with John Kincaid by the author. December 6, 2010, Addis Ababa.
A cursory look at recent reports by many International Organizations reveals such a scenario.
8 See Article 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (supra 3). But note that,
Federal non-centralization was formally adopted in 1995 with the adoption of the Constitution though
hinted by the Transitional charter alongside the regime change.
9 Ibid, Article 8.
6
7
3
overwhelming. Constitutionally speaking, the states power extends from those routine
businesses of local authority to self determination, secession included.10 Some also
contends that, the Ethiopian states are in a much better position than any other federal
experience.11 In connection with this view, as the prevailing view suggests, the
constitution adopts an incomplete federal structure that leaves enough constitutional
space to the members of the federation back from its inception. Thus, by adopting a
dual federal setup, it establishes a two- fold lawmaking scenario which is described by
the federal jargon; Legislative Federalism as opposed to the German replica of
Executive (Administrative) Federalism. Therefore, states are in a position to legislate
and thereby to follow up execution on matters reserved under their competencies.
Moreover, member states can have their own constitution which can be treated as an
expression of their sovereignty. Under its unique modus operandi of 'Nations, Nationalities
and Peoples', the constitution also acknowledged other tangible privileges. Among
others, members of the Federation may by law determine their respective working
language and such a choice shall enjoy equal state recognition.12 The establishment of
the House of Nationalities, with all its critics (on its composition and power), is another
concrete measure in the position of states under the pretext of defending ethno-national
groups from assimilationist policy.
This House, which is the second chamber in the Ethiopian parliamentary edifice, is
equipped with important powers that make it the vanguard of the constitutional rights
and interests of the contracting parties to the union. It interpret the covenant, decides on
the right to self determination of groups; it also exclusively determines the allocation of
revenue derived from the joint federal and state tax basis and the subsidies that the
federal government may grant the states.13 This all underscore the central position, at
least in the words of the constitution, the Ethiopian states have. Legal pluralism, in the
course of the constitutional recognition of customary and religious laws and courts has
been effected and sensibly went into action in the areas of family and personal matter
on the way to reflect the self identity of various groups residing in the constituent
Ibid, Article 39.
See for example, Assefa Fiseha, Theory versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia’s Ethnic
Federalism, in David Turton (ed.), Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative
perspective (Oxford: James Currey, 2006) at 131-164.
12 Article 5 of the Constitution, supra note 4.
13 Article 62 0f the FDRE constitution.
10
11
4
units.14 Some also argued that, the Ethiopian federal understanding is characterized by a
soft center.15
Earlier, we have noted that, under the previous regimes, political and economic
supremacy was concentrated at the center. This scenario has condemned most of the
country and its residents to backwardness and underdevelopment. It is by taking full
account of this that the constitution made an attempt to lay emphasis on the autonomy
of member states of the federation through an ethnic based federal arrangement.
Political theorists see the decentralization policy as a way to foster democratization
process inasmuch as it enables more people to influence the political process.16
However many doubt the commitment of the government to realize such constitutional
aspirations. To many critics, Ethiopia’s federal arrangement is a de facto one party state
in which ethnic organizations are mere satellites of one vanguard political party;
EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) which is a multiethnic
ruling coalition.17 Particularly, there are a number of signals that Ethiopia’s government
has failed to devolve real power to the Regions and bring about decentralization as
opposed to the constitutional framework. There is a continued policy of power
centralization which resulted in the diminishing autonomy of member states.
Consequently, the federal-state relation is becoming un(federal). There are both
constitutional and extra constitutional factors for this leaning. This is the main subject
that this study seeks to deal with. It examines how the federal practice influenced the
intergovernmental relation enunciated by the federal compact. In particular, it examines
the basis of the relationship between the two orders of government and whether such
underpinnings are anticipated by the constitutional framers or/and whether such
arrangements are the true facets of federal political systems.
Ibid, Articles 34 and 78.
Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal
Publishers, the Netherlands (2006), Assefa Fiseha (supra note 11). The softness of the center connotes
the fact that, there is no well established federal institution in the regional states to take care of the
implementation of federal laws as some times considered as an extreme understanding of duality.
16 Among others M.A.M Salih and John Markakis can be mentioned, see Salih and Markakis: Ethnicity and
the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1987) at 8.
17 See Alem Habtu, Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A study of the secession clause in the constitution,
Oxford University Press, published by Publius/Spring 2005 at 313-335, Kidane Mengisteab, Ethiopia’s
Ethnic Based Federalism: 10 years after, African Issues, Vol. 29, No. 1-2, African Studies Association,
2001, at 20_25.
14
15
5
1.3.
Research Questions
After examining the theoretical frameworks on the idea of federalism and federations,
cumulative with the unique features that Ethiopia reveals, the subsequent research
questions will be raised and addressed in brief throughout the study:
Which category does the Ethiopian Federal setup, especially from the
perspective of state-center relation fit in? Is it competitive? Cooperative or What?
What centralizing predispositions characterize the Ethiopian federal system? Are
these tendencies constitutionally anticipated by the architect(s)? Did the political
atmosphere by which the federal framework is tinted contribute to such a
tendency?
What significant ramifications it enclose on the overall state-federal relations?
Does the idea of “Coercive Federalism” fit the Ethiopian current situations
though cooperative federal configuration is implicit in the covenant?
1.4. Justification and Significance of the study
A comprehensible understanding of the operation of federal system requires an analysis
of the institutional framework and the character of intergovernmental relations which
are usually dependent on the underlying politico-social and economic factors.
Livingston for example judges a state as federal not by its federal constitutions or legal
structures but by the way social, political and economic interests were organized. For
many observers, in order to consider a specific polity as federal, its political, economic
and social diversity should be expressed at all levels and at all times. Political pluralism,
a relationship based on agreed terms (as between the orders of government), financial
autonomy etc are the basics of healthy federations.
In consonance with this view, Intergovernmental cooperation becomes a moderate way
of bridging the gap between the governments of a federation. However, in some
countries, the center tends to usurp the idea of cooperation to influence the whole
operation of the federation and at the end to install its policies and ideologies in the
6
constituent units. There are institutional and non-formal ways of doing this. Whenever
the informal ways got prevalence, the federal formula may be challenged since the
constitutional principles are susceptible to be ignored. Therefore it is advisable to bed in
the institutional mechanisms also.
The principal reason for selecting this study area is to look into the actual state-center
relationship in our federal experiment from the practical point of view. The way I look
at the issue is not strictly lined with the analysis of the constitutional lexis on the
concept of Intergovernmental relation (hereafter IGR) rather it is to glance from the
operational reality whether the existing system of IGR reveals what federal writers
enunciate as coercive federalism. The research is conducted with the full recognition of
the fact that, many Ethiopian as well as foreign federal writers touched or at least
attempted to tell us the operational paradigm of the Ethiopian federation. In addition,
there are some efforts by some writers to look the Intergovernmental relation and allied
facets. But, no one has dealt with real political practice of the Intergovernmental
Relations in a comprehensive manner and sort out how the political realities exactly
influence the federal practice, mainly the relationship of the levels of governments. On
top of that, the attitude and actual response of both level of governments for the federal
practice has not yet well researched. It is also aimed at taking the debate one step
further by including new phenomenon and notions of looking the center-state
relationship from the very idea of federalism. More importantly, the idea of coercive
federalism is not well-known in our federal literatures as well as academic debate.
Therefore I am trying to bring in the prospect of looking the center-state relationship
from this perspective. An important approach of looking the federal idea in comparison
with the practice of intergovernmental relationship is not as such familiar in our federal
discourse and academic research. So, mine will be the pathfinder even if not the pioneer
of such a technique. The other important thing is the detailed analysis of party politics
and its impact on the federal practice in general and in the relations of the governments
in particular. It is true that parliamentary system of government is tied with party
structure and it is inevitable to look the politics without its party dynamics.
Nevertheless, the exact nexus between party politics together with decision-making,
organizational structure, ideological orientation and other related aspects with the
federal notion and practice needs to be studied to evaluate the successes or otherwise of
7
the system. In this regard, even if some authors tried to raise the issue, mine is a pioneer
to evaluate the Ethiopian federation from this angle. The reason is clear, the party
structure and its concomitant issues is the driving force not only of the
Intergovernmental relation aspect but also the Ethiopian federal discourse in general.
Accordingly, a comprehensive and all-embracing research is needed in this regard.
From this angle too, my effort is acceptable though not enough to boil down all the
debates and thoughts here. In sum, the main theme of the study is evaluating the factors
and features that lead the system of IGR to exhibit a coercive trend, if any. In fact, it is
not the prime objective of the study to deal with the concept and variables of IGR in
Ethiopia, rather, it specifically seeks to examine the politico-legal or socioeconomic
factors that are inherent and practiced in the IGR process.
As I have mentioned above, the practice will tell us how the federal idea (specifically in
determining the relationship between the two levels) is put into practice. The bottom
line is; a federal government must be a device by which federal qualities of a society are
articulated and protected. The underlying assumption of this thesis is that examining
the manner and basics of the relationship between the federal bargainers will undeniably
helps us to take a relatively more objective stance as we asses the success or failure of
Ethiopia’s federalism. After analyzing the realities of the federal-state relation now
operating in Ethiopia, the research will strive to provide some suggestions that must be
considered by all the concerned especially by the political actors if the federal structure
is meant to give the required political pluralism and democracy.
1.5. Methodology and Sources of Information
Predictably, the analysis of the Ethiopian federal system relies on three different kinds
of sources: qualitative interviews, documents and academic
literature. The
information’s used in this thesis therefore are gathered from books, laws, cases and
periodicals. Moreover, official reports of the council of Representatives, other
international organizations and personal observation are also taken as a source of
information. To substantiate the practical trends of the federal set up, interviews with
concerned groups has also been conducted. Legal as well as socio-legal method will be
applied in analyzing the information collected.
8
2. Federalism and Federations, General
Introduction
This chapter dwells on the examination of different theoretical perspectives on
federalism and federal systems. It has tried to incorporate both a brief exploration of
federal theory in general and some more specific aspects of the issue under
consideration. In the first part, I have attempted to provide definitions on basic concepts
that are related in one way or another to federalism and federations.
In this connection, it has to be noted that, federalism as a political idea and federations
as institutional expressions is among the rapidly accepted political trend in the last two
centuries.18 Besides serving as a panacea of maintaining unity under a single strong
central government, contemporary discourse reveals the fact that, federalism is more
than a form of government but it is also a solution to conflict ridden societies.
To elucidate this trend, federalists glimpse the issue from different theoretical
perspectives. Among others, putting a clear borderline between the concept of
federalism and federation is common. The reason seems clear; the distinction will guide
the purpose and prospect of federal option. There are perceptible and concrete stimuli
for such an undertaking. The way the country opted for this political decision will shape
the definition thereof. There are noticeable distinctions between these ideals with
imperative ramifications that one need to take up. In this line of understanding, by this
section, I have attempted to look the theoretical underpinning of the issue that I believe
will have a lot to contribute in future analysis of the concept with other sensible
variables.
When the twentieth century began, there were nine formally constituted federal states in the world:
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Switzerland, The United States of America, and
Venezuela. As the twentieth century comes to an end, this number has grown to twenty plus, with
Austria, Belgium, Comoros, India, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Tanzania, the United Arab
Emirates and South Africa added to the club. Since, these federations include some of the largest and
most populous countries in the world, this means that more than half of the world's space and almost
half of its population are governed by federalism.
18
9
As a caution, my readers have to be systematic in understanding my attempt to provide
for the conceptual frameworks and related theoretical dilemmas which are not yet fully
addressed even by notable federalist scholars. Mine is a petite effort to give a brief clue
on these points, not to raise and discuss in detail all these complexities. Hopefully, they
will be addressed in meticulously designed researches that give emphasis on the
theoretical and ideological aspects of federal structure. Undeniably, the addressee in this
particular work is Ethiopia. So, the discussion under consideration is projected to give
and also to take a brief account of the Ethiopian way at least impliedly.
The subsequent section is deliberately designed to look at the governmental structure of
the world with the evolving federalism ideal and the historical responses therein before
the system attains its current understanding. Full evaluation of the long way that a
federal structure has gone through remains unfeasible task in the academics. But efforts
are made to create a visible appraisal of this 17th century phenomenon. Without losing
sight of such unattainable endeavor, my vision in this section is only to generate a bird’s
eye view on the mind of my readers concerning the historical aspects of federalism and
federations along with world history.
Federalism as a political system is not something that can be randomly introduced to
rectify internal political unrests or to rally round state building attempts. There are
factors that need serious considerations before a country or a realm opted for federal
system. In some cases, there are naturally federal polities while on the other spectrum
there are nations that best suit unitary arrangements leads us to ascertain factors that
have a significant portion to play in making a state either federally suitable or not.
Keeping this line, I have taken a brief account of these factors that on one or another
way determines the state’s ability to federate together with its concomitant agendas.
Some of these features antedate the coming into picture of the state itself which I
identified as naturally federal or these factors may represent an artificial creation of the
political elites that supervise the nation building process of the particular polity. In
addition, some of these realities may carve up similarities with other countries features
while most of them are atypical to some polities. As per the dictates of notorious
federalism writers, I have tried to look into some of the facets that will probably justify
federal option.
10
Hence, this chapter can be viewed as a holistic account of preliminary issues of the
system in general and their ramifications in the changing world of politics as well as the
concept itself. To many observers, the most difficult task in studying federalism and
federal systems is the quest by many to find out one size fits all scenarios which is far
from being real. Every system explains its own exceptionalities and peculiar tenets
rather than replicate the features of others. This needs solemn thought of federal writers.
Even, internal and external politics, Economy, social realities etc can shape and reshape
the federal bargain. The main reason behind dealing with the theoretical framework of
federalism and federations while studying one aspect of the Ethiopian federalism may
be useless or irrelevant as some may think. However, this chapter is designed to shed
lights on the major issues and principles of federalism and federal systems that will
ultimately contribute its own in analyzing the Intergovernmental relation aspect of the
Ethiopian federation. As pointed out in the introductory chapter, the study will attempt
to compare the federal practice with the basic tenets of the concept.
2.1.
2.1. Federalism and Federations: Conceptual Frameworks
In federal studies, it has become common to distinguish between federation and
federalism as two separate concepts, each describing different aspects of federal theory.19
To this end, federalism as opposed to federation is considered to be an ideology or a
value concept including philosophical perspectives promoting federal solution.20 Here
the emphasis is to consider federalism as organizing principle advocates a 'multi-tiered'
government combining elements of 'shared rule' through common institutions for some
purposes and the regional 'self rule' for constituent units for some other purposes,
thereby accommodating unity and diversity within a larger political union.21 On the
other hand, federation is an empirical reality; a specific type of institutional
arrangement which refers to essentially an institution defined by federalism. As King
Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991 2000, Chr.
Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights (Report 2000) at 12. Treating federalism as
a concept means that when we refer to the classical writers, such as K. C. Wheare and William Riker, we
shall employ the term "federation" where they often used "federalism.
20 Michael Burgess, Federalism and Federation: a reappraisal in Burgess, M. and Gagnon, A. (ed.)
Comparative federalism and federation. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf (1993). Preston King,
federalism and federation, London: Croom Helm (1982). Ronald Watts, federalism, federal systems and
federations, Annual Review of political Science (1998).
21 Raoul Blindenbacher and Ronald Watts, Federalism in a changing world: A conceptual framework in
Raoul Blindenbacher and Arnold Koller (eds.), Federalism in a changing World: Learning from each other
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queens University press) at 9. Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and
accommodation of diversity in Ethiopia, supra note 15 at 102.
19
11
noted, federation is a descriptive concept referring to the actual system of government.22
Note that, this distinction not still win the hearts and minds of all writers on the subject,
thus it is not consensual.
In a purely legalistic definition, the essence of federation is that, the territorially based
regional units23 are represented at the central level of government not by the will of the
national government but rather through a supreme constitution which is presumably
beyond the reach of both levels. But still, the bargain is always guided by the dictates
and principles of federalism. The institutional expression is backed by ideological rules
and philosophical perspectives of division of autonomy between the central and
regional forces. Therefore, as Smith rightly articulated, federalism is more than an
ideology in the ordinary sense of the term; it is more of a “pragmatic orientation”.24 It
could be a perspective guide for action recommending and promoting the support for
federation.
Commonly, as a matter of understanding and ordinary aphorism, federalism is a
perspective guide to the values of “unity in diversity” or “shared rule and self rule” giving
regional interests some authority of their own inside the frame of a wider unity.25 The
term has been seen to be applied to many successful combinations of unity with
diversity, pluralism and cooperation within and among nations. For this reason,
federalism is defined as the division of powers of government between national and subnational levels, with each level possessing and exercising important powers.26 One
reason that I like to use the term "federalism" to describe a governmental structure with
(at least) two different, significant levels of governments-one national unit and several
sub-national units-is to emphasize that federalism is compatible with many different
kinds of values and substantive rules. It even is compatible with many different kinds of
governmental structures.
King, Supra note 20 at 74.
The name of the regional units varies enormously all the way through the federations. But typically,
province, state, canton, länder, republic and autonomous units are amongst the commonly established
labels.
24 Graham Smith, Federation, de federation and re federation: from the Soviet Union to Russian statehood
in Smith ed. Federalism the Multiethnic challenge. London New York: Longman (1995) at 34.
25 See also Daniel J. Elazar: Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, (1987) at
12.
26 Martha A Field' The structures of federalism, Emory University Journal of International law and policy
Volume 8: 445: 1998 at 121.
22
23
12
Thus, the probable consequence of a federal choice, by and large, is to realize the
division of legislative, executive and judicial powers among the central and regional
governments. In principle, matters that have a direct bearing and importance upon the
local people should be left to the units, whereas those matters with a prevailing national
application have to be reserved for the national government.27 By allowing
constitutional expression for such a division, it is submitted that, both levels must act
within their boundary and the viability of one level of government should not depend
on the other.28
In strict terms however, federalism and devolution of power or decentralization of
competencies are different, even there is no direct and crucial association between the
two.29 This is basically due to the reason that federalism is always constitutionally
entrenched while decentralization, in most cases is the mercy of a strong central
(unitary) government. From this, the federal political bargain should be based on a pact
or a covenant, where each unit freely and voluntarily surrenders some degree of
autonomy to the central government in exchange for some compensating advantage.30
Not very far from the accepted wisdom of the idea of federalism, notable scholars
enlightens it from the doctrine of balance.31 This is an attempt to describe the federal
idea as a compromise between integration and diversification, decentralization and
centralization. The late Elazar delineates federalism as “a political remedy for political
diseases” designed to prevent tyranny without preventing governance.32
Besides, federalism can possibly be articulated as a new version of the canon of
separation of power thereby preventing the concentration of authority. Constitutional
Solomon Negussie, Fiscal Federalism in the Ethiopian Ethnic- based Federal system, Nijmegen, Wolf
Legal Publishers, the Netherlands (2006) at 119 -148.
28 In practice however, such strict dual existence seems not appealing and some form of coordination is
apt. I will come back to such issue of balance of division of power in the next sections.
29 King, supra note 20.
30 However, it should be noted that, such thoughts of considering federal explanation is a purely
American perception. It explains what is identified as a coming together federation or a federation
created in the course of aggregation (integration). As the subsequent discussions divulges, there are
federations evolved through devolution of power from a formerly unitary center to a newly created
regions. For example in Ethiopia, it was the central government who surrender some of its authorities to
the regions.
31 Smith, supra note 24.
32 Conversely, prudence must be taken so as to treat federalism as a panacea for all political diseases.
There are experiences by which federalism has failed to give a solution.
27
13
lawyers have started to treat federal solution as a fourth branch of the government. For
those who advocates for liberal democracy, federalism is presented as a way of
preventing tyranny by creating a more sophisticated type of representation, both
nationwide and regionally based.33
Recent developments of the concept also reveals that, federalism becomes an instrument
to regulate conflicts emerged from ethnicity or other identity differentiations. It is
conceived as one better instrument to mute conflicts among groups separated by
different cleavages i.e. federalism has become an instrument to accommodate diversity
in heterogeneous society.34 This paradigm shift gives rise to a new understanding of
federalism, federalism is not only a division of autonomy between the levels of
government but also takes in to consideration forces of ethnic, religious or linguistic
diversity in multiethnic, multicultural or multilingual states.35
Twentieth century political theorists boldly argued that, federalism, together with
electoral reform, is the device to change the institutional format in which conflicts
occur, 'altering the structure of incentives for political actors without making any
promises about ethnic outcomes'.36 In Nigeria, Ethiopia, India, Sudan (very recently),
Sri Lanka, etc, federalism is seen as a stabilizing measure because it meets the claims for
autonomy by concession instead of repression.37 It is important to consider however
that, federalism has not yet attained the status of being a remedy for all conflicts based
on differences.38
Finally, there are also other group of academics who have tried to describe federalism as
the most promising way to accommodate incongruence of national identity and
Aalen, supra note 19 at 13.
Donald Horowitz, Ethnic conflict management for policy makers in Monteville, Joseph V. (ed.) Conflict
and peacemaking in multiethnic states. New York: Lexington Books (1997).
35 The concept in its original form (in America especially) was not perceived as regulatory tool of
diversity.
36 Horowitz Supra note 34 at 121.
37 See also Aalen, Supra note 19 at 14.
38 O'Leary and Mc Garry stated that, the very huge number of minorities who are not satisfied by the
federal option in several polities are not satisfied by this option and insisted for secession which
indirectly shows the insufficiency of federal elucidation alone.
33
34
14
colonial territory in the postcolonial world.39 Nevertheless, only few of these
postcolonial federations endured as stable federal systems, many more ended in failure
which shows that federalism is not a one size fits all remedy.40
2.2. «From
From the panacea of NationNation-state(s) to Federation(s)»:
Federation(s) :
Historical Overview of Federalism and Federations
Over the past several years, an increasing number of scholars and statesmen have taken
note of the fact that the world as a whole is in the midst of a paradigm shift from a
world of states, modeled after the ideal of nation-state emerged at the beginning of the
modern epoch in the seventieth century, to a world of diminished state sovereignty and
increased interstate linkages of a constitutionally accredited federal character.41 Through
this paradigm shift, it is not that states are disappearing, it is that the system is acquiring
a new dimension, one that began as a supplement and is now coming to overlay (and,
at least in some respects, supersede) the system that prevailed throughout the modern
epoch. This overlay is a network of agreements that is not only militarily and
economically binding for the de facto reasons but is also becoming constitutionally
binding, de jure.42
According to Elazar, this overlay increasingly restricts what was called state sovereignty
and forces states into various combinations of self-rule and shared-rule to enable them
to survive at all.43 That means, federalism, understood in the broadest political sense as
a genus involving combinations of self-rule and shared rule rather than as the one
species of federalism accepted in modern times, namely, federation.
39 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph, 1863 Du Principe Federatif. J.-L. Puech and Th. Ruyssen, (eds.) 1959, Paris: M.
Riviere (Translated version is available online www.joseph/federalcom//th accessed on February
2010).
40 Among others, United Arab States and the Federations of the West Indies have broken apart while
Libya and Indonesia were transformed into Unitarism and often autocratic systems of governance.
41 Here, the term “Federal” is used in its larger historical sense, not simply to describe modern federation
but all the various federal arrangements including federations, confederations and other confederal
arrangements, federacies, associated states, special joint authorities with constitutional standing and
others. See also Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd ed., Montreal, McGill-Queen's University
press, (1999).
42 Daniel J. Elazar, From Statism To Federalism: A paradigm shift, Publius, Vol. 25, No. 2, Oxford
University Press, (1995), at 5-18
43 Ibid.
15
The post-modern legitimization of ethnic claims for self rule and self expression is also
another underpinning in the shift. Consequently, all states are forced to recognize their
interdependence over their claim for self sufficiency, heterogeneity over homogeneity
and the fact that their centers, if they ever existed, are no longer single centers but parts
of a multi-centered network that is increasingly non-centralized.
Federal advocates also justified the shift from political, economic and other social
dimensions; stretching from the need to strength security to the preservation of
economic interdependence (free trade possibilities). But, one thing seems clear, in the
world of interdependence, with the introduction of technological machineries short of
boundary (such as Missiles' and Atomic Energy); absolute sovereignty of states is no
longer possible. Thus, states started to negotiate for confederation and later federation
i.e. the move is not only from nation states ideal to federalism but also from confederal
arrangements to federal organizations.
In a purely historical scrutiny, from the Western contemplation, Johannes Althusius is
often regarded as the father of modern federalist idea.44 He argued in Politica Methodice
Digesta for autonomy of his city Emden, both against its Lutheran provincial Lord and
against the Catholic Emperor. Althusius was strongly influenced by French Huguenots
and Calvinism. As a permanent minority in several states, Calvinists developed a
doctrine of resistance as the right and duty of "natural leaders" to resist tyranny.
Orthodox Calvinists insisted on sovereignty in the social circles subordinate only to
God's laws.45
The French Protestant Huguenots developed a theory of legitimacy further, presented
by an author with the telling pseudonym "Junius Brutus" in Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos.46
The people regarded as a corporate body in territorial hierarchical communities, has a
God-granted right to resist rulers without rightful claim.47 Rejecting theocracy,
Althusius developed a non-sectarian, non-religious contractualist political theory of
Althusius, Johannes, 1603, Politica Methodice Digesta, Frederick S. Carney, translated by; Daniel J.
Elazar, introduction, (1995), Indianapolis: Liberty Press. See also Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University, Oct , 2006, Alain de Benoist, The First Federalist:
Johannes Althusius, Krisis 22 (March 1999), at 2-34 Translated by Julia Kostova.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
44
16
federations that prohibited state intervention even for purposes of promoting the right
faith. Accordingly, accommodation of dissent and diversity prevailed over any interest
in subordinating political powers to religion or vice versa. Borrowing a term originally
used for the alliance between God and men, Althusius holds that associations enter into
secular agreements — pactum foederis — to live together in mutual benevolence.48
In The Spirit of Laws, Baron de Montesquieu argued for confederal arrangements to
ensure the ideal scale of government required for political liberty understood as nondomination — that is, security against abuse of power.49 A ‘confederate republic’ with
separation of powers secures the requisite homogeneity, identification and self-sacrifice
within sufficiently small sub-units where the common good subdues private interests
thus preventing tyranny and ‘internal imperfection’. The sub-units pool powers
sufficient to secure external security, reserving the right to secede.50 Sub-units also serve
as checks on each other, since other sub-units may intervene to quell insurrection and
power abuse in one sub-unit.
Several 18th century peace plans for Europe recommended confederal arrangements.
For instance, the 1713 Peace Plan of Abbé Charles de Saint-Pierre would allow
intervention in sub-units to quell rebellion and wars on non-members to force them to
join an established confederation, and required unanimity for changes to the
agreement.51 Jean-Jacques Rousseau presented and critiqued Saint-Pierre’s proposal,
listing several conditions including that all major power must be member, that the joint
legislation must be binding, that the joint forces must be stronger than any single state,
and that secession must be illegal. Again, unanimity was required for changes to the
agreement.52
Ibid.
Montesquieu Baron de, The Spirit of Laws, (2002), Prometheus Books. [Text available online at
www.despritlaws//montesque27.fel accessed on February 2010].
50 Ibid.
51 Note that, the historical scrutinies consider with the move either from the independent states to
federation (confederation) perspective and quite a few also from the devolutionary trend of the move.
52 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe. C. E. Vaughan, transl.,
(1917), London: Constable. This understanding is also accepted as the most important precondition of
federal bargain.
48
49
17
Immanuel Kant defended a confederation for peace in On Perpetual Peace. His Second
Definite Article of a Perpetual Peace holds that the right of Nations shall be based on a
pacific federation among Free states rather than a peace treaty or an international state:
This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely
to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself, along with that of the
other confederated states, although this does not mean that they need to submit to
public laws and to a coercive power which enforces them, as do men in a state of
nature.53
John Stuart Mill, in chapter 17 of Considerations on Representative Government,
recommended federations among "portions of mankind" not disposed to live under a
common government; to prevent wars among themselves and protect against
aggression.54 Last but not least, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, in Du Principe fédératif
defended federalism as the best way to retain individual liberty within ‘natural’
communities such as families and guilds who enter pacts among themselves for
necessary and specific purposes. The state is only one of several non-sovereign agents in
charge of coordinating, without final authority.55
In country specific terms, federalism in its modern understanding backs from the
American constitution. The Articles of Confederation of 1781 among the 13 American
states fighting British rule is possibly considered as a turning point towards modern
conception of federalism. What has latter become known as the U.S. Constitutional
Convention met May 25_September 17 1787 was explicitly restricted to revise the
Articles, but ended up recommending more fundamental changes.
The proposed constitution prompted widespread debate arguments addressing the
benefits and risks of federalism versus confederal arrangements, leading eventually to
the Constitution taking effect in 1789. During the negotiations among the Federalist
and the anti federalists camp, The "Anti-federalists" were fearful of undue
centralization. They worried that the powers of central authorities were not sufficiently
Kant, Immanuel, 1784, "An Answer to the Question: ‘What Is Enlightenment?" In Hans Reiss, ed., 1970,
Kant's Political Writings, 54-60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
54 Mill, John Stuart, 1861, Considerations on Representative Government. 1958, New York: Liberal Arts
Press.
55 Proudhon, supra note 39.
53
18
constrained e.g. by a bill of rights, which was eventually ratified in 1791. They also
feared that the center might gradually usurp the sub-units’ powers. In what has become
known as The Federalist Papers, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay
argued vigorously for the suggested model of interlocking federal arrangements.56 They
have argued in favor of setting (constitutionally) a strong central government that will
keep the people of America under a single union by justifying it from different
connotations.
In general, it is just after the Americans bright starting that the 20th century witnessed a
rapid acceptance of federalist idea and federal political arrangement. Even those older
federations like Switzerland, though the motive was different, have taken lesson from
the American understanding in inventing the federal solution.
Countries of the world are not expected to share a single form of federal arrangement.
Rather, in answering their own peculiar characteristic, they tend to adopt a structure
that best fits them. As Watts noted, there is no single ideal or pure form of federation.57
From the very reason of adopting federal accord to the distribution of power between
the levels of government and including the degree of political centralization or non
centralization is utterly different when we go through federations. The next section
deals with some of these grounds of divergence.
2.3. Categories of Federal Arrangements
Arrangements
Using different facets, federations can be seen from different angles and all through,
there are some major distinctive institutional and operational features of the system. In
the real world however, these attempted classifications combine in an almost infinite
number of federal variations or types.58 For the purpose of this study, I have focused on
the foremost underlining reasons of departures to consider the nature of the federal
56
Federalist papers No. 10, 45, 51, 62, see The Federalist Papers, A Penn State Electronic Classics Series
publications.
R. Watts, Supra note 41.
One particularly meticulous scholar has put together a list of 460 types of federalism mentioned in the
literature, ranging from active, amplified or anti-vacuum federalism, via bamboo fence, consultative or
minimal federalism, to paternalist, respectable, strict and finally world federalism. See Thomas O.
Hueglin, Conflict Resolution in an Emerging Multilateral world, Curtin University,(1999) Western
Australia.
57
58
19
organizations in various jurisdictions which in due course signify where the Ethiopian
set up fit in. in line with this view, the rationale leading to federalization, the functional
division of powers between the governments and the style of intergovernmental
policymaking provides the basis for my classification though there are different
variations between these.
The rationale for federalization of a political system may broadly rest on either cultural
or territorial justifications. Since federal states in most cases are the result of
compromise among competing elites, the compromise is usually about different cultural
interests such as language, religion, or generally distinct cultural histories. In these cases
of cultural federalism, the motivation for federalization is the desire to build a strong
union without giving up regional cultural autonomies.59 Switzerland, for instance, is
divided into seventeen German, four French, one Italian and four plural-lingual
cantons. In Canada, the dividing line runs between nine Anglophone provinces and the
Francophone province of Quebec. The Belgian constitution recognizes four linguistic
regions; French, Dutch, German, and the bilingual capital region of Brussels.60 The end
behind cultural federalism is always the establishment and upholding of cultural peace.
In this category, one may also looks into the motives and precursors of the Ethiopian
federal political bargain.
In some other federations, cultural difference have ceased to be the driving force of
compromise and it may be not easy to find out a single cohesion factor that bind
together the portion of the community in a state. Instead, such federations have simply
retained a territorial division of government. These are cases of territorial federalism.
In Germany, for instance, traditional cultural cleavages between the protestant north
and catholic south are no longer relevant political factors.61 It is really difficult to find
out cultural or ethnical differences in the fifty states of the United States of Americathey are culturally diverse, to be sure, but at least in comparative perspective, this
diversity is not a prime factor in American federalism. In Australian federation, the
Ibid.
Wilfried Swenden, Belgian Federalism Basic Institutional Features and Potential as a Model for the
European Union, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Robinson College, Cambridge UK, (April
2003).
61 Wolfram Zunzer, Key Features of the German Federal System, Speech given on the occasion of the Sri
Lanka Peace Conference, Munich 29.3.03.
59
60
20
rationale for the preservation of territorial federalism is both democratic and
pragmatic.62 In such federal organizations, the pioneers insisted that, the vertical
separation of powers brings government closer to the people and they have accepted
federalism as a fact of political life. The goal is more of Administrative expediency and
effectiveness.
The functional division of powers between the levels of the government in a federation
as well furnishes an additional critical distinction between federations. Following the
institutional path of dividing powers, most federations construct a division of different
legislative tasks.63 As I have tried to mention elsewhere, the responsibilities of the
federal government will typically include such national concerns as defense, monetary,
trade and commerce and foreign policies. In these systems of legislative federalism, the
legislative functions are divided among different levels of government.64 In their
respective domains, each level of governments is responsible for policymaking in its
entirety; from policy initiatives and formulation to legislation, implementation and
administrative execution. As a result, citizens will not deal with two (or three in
instances of local government jurisdiction) separate wisps of public administration.
In the typical German model of Administrative (Executive) federalism, at least for the
citizens, there is only one stand of public administration. Nearly all administrative tasks
in the federation are carried out by the regional governments, or Länder. As in more
orthodox federations, the Länder are autonomous in the administration of their own
exclusive legislative power. However, the regional governments of such federation are
also responsible for applying most of federally designed policies based on exclusively
federal standards even though they have the chance to partake on the deliberations.
Such commitment is dependent on how a specific federal law has been stipulated.65
Sometimes they will do autonomously in their own right but in most cases on behalf of
How and Why Australia Became a Federation (Available athttp://onlineessays.com/essays/history/his
104.php)
63 Thomas O. Hueglin, supra note 58.
64 Some deems such a strict dissection of legislative autonomy as a basic expression of duality principle
in which both levels legislate and as a corollary execute policies fall under their competencies. See
Ronald Watts, New Federations Experience in the commonwealth, Oxford, (1966), at 177.
65 For more analysis see Articles 83 and 84 of the Basic Law of Germany and see also Philip Blair,
Federalism, Legalism, and Political Reality: The Record of the Federal Constitutional Court, German
Federalism Today (Edited by Charlie Jeffry and Peter Savigear) New York: St. Martin’s Press (1991) at 63.
62
21
the center.66In either case they possess considerable discretion for implementation and
execution.67
In addition to Germany, Switzerland has also adopted this unique system of
Administrative federalism by which administrative responsibility has not coincided with
legislative authority; rather administration for many areas of federal legislative authority
is constitutionally assigned to the governments of the units.68
Cooperative versus Competitive Policymaking Approaches:-The way in which
federal and regional governments deal with one another can be a point of inquiry into
the institutional set-up and performance of federal systems. There are cooperative
regimes by which many policy initiatives in a complex and interdependent world is
believed to be successful through cooperation. On the other hand, each government
wants to be successful and will tend to use their powers to compete against one another
on such matters and policy preferences seen as enhancing their respective electoral
chances. Even if the borderlines usually are more blurred, there is cooperation and
competition in all federations.69
In some federations such as Germany, Switzerland or the United States, there is a basic
national vision both about the general direction of politics and policy, and about
underlying processes of achieving it, which is shared by both levels of government. For
instance, the rigidity of basic notions in the constitution, together with the rules of the
game is accepted by all, at least in principle. A cooperative predisposition is at least the
general norm of political conduct.
In other federal systems, such as Canada, Australia and Belgium, there is considerably
less common ground. Fundamental differences exist with regard to political culture,
mode of regional representation, division and allocation of powers, and basic questions
Ibid.
To effectively implement federally designed laws, the Länder governments are empowered to pass
specific laws of implementation and regulation or in areas of concurrent jurisdiction, they can enact
supplementary provisions.
68 Notable federal authors tend also to consider India as Semi-Executive federalism (R. Watts, Comparing
Federal Systems supra note 41 at 37).
69 That is why Watts, Adamovich and Hosp stress the importance of the supplementary coexistence of
competitive and cooperative federalism.
66
67
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of market regulation and welfare.70 Therefore, in such federations, the competitive
nature of federalism will control the whole scene and cannot fade away to be consumed
by cooperative aspects.71
At times, there are conflicting visions among federal and regional governments that will
result in periodic or at least occasional constitutional crises between centralizing and
decentralizing forces. Often and particularly so in parliamentary federation; these
differences are enhanced by party competition. If different majorities govern in lower
and upper chambers of a federal legislature with coequal powers, one may try to
obstruct the political will of the other.72 Policy cooperation and intergovernmental
relations can also be strained further when different party configurations tend to prevail
at the different levels of government.73
With regard to horizontal competition; competition between regional forces, it is
possible to envisage the same scenario as existed with the center. Constituent units may
vie one another for corporate investment by offering infrastructural and tax incentives,
regulating union activities and so on, or by allowing local governments under their
supervision to pursue such strategies. They may also seek policy advantages for
extraction and marketing of their natural resources.
In sum, one thing has to be clear; the interdependence between the levels of government
hinges on the manner in which the federation is formed, the prevailing socio-economic
conditions and the political history of the country in question.74 Unsurprisingly it is
expected and apparent that, in exclusively federal or state matters, envisaging
competition be idiocy and almost impractical. It is only on those perplexing areas or
concurrent (and including framework) competencies that competition between levels of
government is lucid.
Thomas O. Hueglin, Supra note 58.
Solomon Negussie, Supra note 27 at 41.
72 Instances of such competitive partisanship have occurred in both Germany and Australia.
73 In Canada for instance, the electorate in almost every province shows distinct party preferences, and
some parties only compete in provincial elections. In Belgium, even some of the major national parties
have split up in regional-linguistic organizations.
74 Solomon Negussie, Supra note 27.
70
71
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In addition to these criterions of taxonomy, federal authors also suggest federations to
be seen from the process of origination. In this connection, federations may be classified
into coming together or federation by aggregation and holding together or federation
by devolution.75 And then there is what Stepan calls "putting-together" federalism, a
heavily coercive effort by a nondemocratic centralizing power to put together a
multinational state, some of the components of which had previously been independent
states. Note that, such a division is also rooted from the justifications and reasons of
adopting a federal system.76
Besides, federalist suggests that, federal processes may be territorial or consociational or
both.77 Even if there are non-territorial constituent units recognized in the constitution
of some classic federations like Belgium, the constitutional distribution of power among
territorial units is by far the most common pattern among federations. This latter
thinking implies that, the constitution assumes that all groups can be linked to a
particular territory and that the exercise of rights (whether ethnic or group-specific) can
happen within and through this territory.78
In many federations the constitutional powers are divided equally among the main
category of constituent units.79 It is noteworthy however that in some federations there
is some asymmetry in the relationship of the main constituent units.80 In some others,
the main constituent units are classified into two or more categories with “territories”
distinguished from the major constituent units by having less autonomy.81
Alfred Stephan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model, Journal of Democracy Vol. 10, No. 4
(1999) at 19-34. Coming-together federations emerge when two or more than two existing sovereign
independent states agree to create a federal system for governmental efficiency, economic development,
and security purposes. On the other hand, in a holding-together federation, an already existing large
polity is subdivided into various sub-units that enjoy sovereignty over certain policy areas. Holding
together federalism is an approach used to cope with ethnic divisions, or it is a strategy used to save a
disintegrating unitary state.
76 Through Devolutionary federation, liberty and the power of elected officials could be reconciled
within a federal structure that would constrain the power of the government by balancing it in the
institutional separation of powers of branches of government and the territorial division of power
between the center and the states. While federations through aggregation will have the opportunity to
create a larger state and enjoy greater access to economic and military resources.
77 Watts, Supra note 41.
78 But, it will appear impossible to territorialize the habitat of a particular group or, to put differently, to
realize an overlap between ethnic (or any differentiation of a group) and territorial boarder especially in
multiethnic federations like Ethiopia.
79 Ibid.
80 Canada, Malaysia, India, Spain and Russia are among the classic examples of this sort.
81 Watts, supra note 41.
75
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The degree of centralization or decentralization, financial arrangements, the character
of federal legislative and executive institutions, institutional arrangements to facilitate
intergovernmental relations, judicial arrangements for umpiring internal conflicts,
procedures for constitutional amendment and the degree of Asymmetry can also serve
as further grounds of taxonomy if we consider the issue critically.
In recent years, federalism is considered as one of those good echo words that evoke a
positive response toward many concepts as democracy, progress, constitution, etc. Such
popularity is not without reasons, there are some attributes by which this political
process reveals and becomes the basic tenets of the system. The following section is
devoted to raise and discuss some of these features very briefly and with the view of
evaluating the Ethiopian scenario on these values at the end.
2.4. Basic features of Federations
There has been some disagreement over which governments in the world are to be
considered federations and which are not. At one end of the spectrum, there have been
"quasi-federations” in which power lies with the national government, while the
constituent governments are subordinate. At the other end, there have been
confederacies (or confederations) in which the constituent governments have most of
the power, and the confederate government is weak and subordinate. Are all of these to
be considered federations?
Ronald Watts, having reviewed the works of K.C Wheare, Preston King, Ivo
Duchacek, and Daniel Elazar, has summarized the characteristics of federations with a
number of propositions. Like the other writers, he has defined a federation in largely
American terms.82 But generally, from whatsoever perspective we are apprising the
issue, the term 'federation' would refer to the specific form of federal political system
first invented by the founding fathers of the United States at Philadelphia in 1787, a
form whose characteristics involve at least the following:
Ronald Watts, "Contemporary Views on Federalism" (Paper presented at the Centre for Constitutional
Analysis, Republic of South Africa, 2-6 August 1993), at 11.
82
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(1). Two orders (not levels) of government;
(2). A formal distribution of legislative and executive authority with some autonomy for
each order;
(3). A written constitution; A constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the
consent of all or a majority of the constituent units;
(4). Provision for the representation of regional views within the national policy-making
institutions;
(5). Revenue resources allocated between the two orders of government;
(6). An umpire (courts or referenda) to rule on disputes between governments; and
(7). Processes to facilitate intergovernmental relations.
Therefore, a political setup which is described as a federation should demonstrate the
above mentioned features. In essence, it is the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of
both the federal and state governments and their ability to act directly upon the citizens
that distinguishes federations from other types of political configurations.83
Basically in a federation, the political authority is territorially divided between two
autonomous sets of separate jurisdictions, one national and other provincial, which
both operate directly from the people. As well, the existence of a single, indivisible but
yet composite federal nation is simultaneously asserted.
In this regard K.C Wheare made an important observation that for the existence of a
federal principle, it is important that the power of governance is divided between coordinate and independent authorities.84 Further, an examination of the U.S.
Constitution shows that, the principle of organization upon which it is based, (the
federal principle) is that, the field of government is divided between a general authority
and regional authorities which are not subordinate to one another. The basic notion of a
However, it is also argued that for the state in order to be called as ‘federal’, it is not necessary that the
Constitution should adopt the federal principle completely. It is enough if the federal principle is the
predominant principle in the Constitution.
84 Wheare defined a federation as a system in which the relationship between the national and
constituent governments, in law and in practice, is not subordinate but rather coordinate. Both orders of
government are governed by the Constitution, which is supreme. It is also important to note that this
coordinate principle of power division is puzzling as to its exact connotation.
83
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federal arrangement therefore remains to be the existence of (basically) two orders of
government which are autonomous to some extent and administer their own affairs.
The natural consequence of this will turn out to be adopting a constitution which is
envisioned as the power basis and far-off from the reach of both parties to the bargain. It
is obviously a written and precise document that briefly embraces the respective rights
and duties of the states as well as the center. In order to accommodate future
developments, the covenant may provide for the possibilities of amendment but only
based on the consent of both orders.
The other basic institutional characteristic of a federation as I have mentioned is the
representation of regional interest to have a real say at the central decision-making. This
is usually done through adopting a bicameral legislature at the center. Such array is
found to be the most suitable in combining regional and central representation. The first
chamber would normally fill the function of representing the interests of the federation
as a whole and serve as a power base for central government. While, the second
chamber serves as representative institutions for the constituent units of the federation
by which real regional interest will be protected via special devices.
As indicated elsewhere, a federation is a type of government in which the two tiers of
government coexist in a coordinate manner, both exercising sovereign power in their
respective jurisdiction. This is inclusive of government finance which is closely related
to governmental structure and organization. Idyllically, any order of government within
a federation should meet its expenditure or, at least; its revenue on core services should
come from its own resources. According to Watts, these resources enable governments
in achieving their policy objectives within their constitutionally assigned legislative and
executive responsibilities. Division of fiscal prerogatives is as a result regarded as one
additional feature of federal system. It is a key in determining the actual
implementation of constitutionally entrenched rights.85
Aalen, Supra note 19 at 19, Fiscal issues are also treated as essential parts of intergovernmental
relations, and reflect the interplay between structures (the provisions in the federal constitution),
processes (the actual fiscal policies that are implemented), and society (the economic realities of the
federation).
85
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However, there is no comprehensible consensus as to the literal way of dividing the
revenue power as well as the expenditure responsibilities between the orders of
government. Conventionally however, those sources with a wider macroeconomic
impact will be assigned to the national level while the rest reside on the constituent
unit’s control.
Burgess and King also add constitutionalism and Democracy as another attributes of a
federal system of government.86 King emphatically concludes that, only those
governments which are subordinated to the law, and there by practice democracy, are
judged as federations. Consequently, one can argue that, the Soviet and Yugoslav
federations should not be considered as genuine, because the unity of their ethno
regional parts was maintained from above through coercion.
Watts demonstrate that, a strong predisposition to democracy is among the significant
characteristics of federal processes since they presume the voluntary consent of citizens
in the constituent units; non-centralization as a principle expressed through multiple
centers of political decision making; open political bargaining as a major feature of the
way in which decisions are arrived at; the operation of checks and balances to avoid the
concentration of political power; and a respect for constitutionalism and the rule of law,
since each order of government derives its authority from the constitution.87
Furthermore, because most of the federal institutions are based on direct election by the
citizens, federation as a form of government provides all citizens with an opportunity to
participate fully through democratic processes in the legislative and executive
operations of shared-rule thereby taken as an additional avenue of democratization and
democratic thought. Note also that, proliferating points of access to government,
competing power centers, the right of exit, and local experimentation relates to the
attributes of federalism.
Nevertheless, it is also essential to note that, there are other writers who have a more moderate view
upon the relationship between democracy and federations. Riker claims that the link between
federalism and freedom and democracy is an ideological fallacy. See Riker, William, Federalism; Origin,
operation, significance, Boston: Little Brown, (1964) at 74. Alfred Stepan also considers the American
model of federalism as demos constraining, See Stepan, supra note 75.
87 Watts, supra note 41.
86
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2.5. Rationales
Rationales and Motives for Federal Arrangements and
The Capacity to Federate
In this section, I have found interesting to recur what Watts asked in dealing with the
formation of federations in his pioneer work. What factors and processes have led to the
adoption of federations? This is essential in understanding the fundamental justifications
that have something to say concerning federal option in a given polity. Federal writers
also suggest many casual factors for such process. For instance, Riker attributed a
significant external or internal threat as a motive common to the creation of all
federations. But, while this factor has been important in some cases, notably
Switzerland, Canada and Mexico, it doesn’t explain all federations that are now
operational. In my view, this Rikerian notion on the creation of federations has lose its
currency since there is an obvious leeway of forming military alliance rather than going
through federal arrangement which is often tends to be complex, legalized and rigid
from different perspectives.
Accommodation of ethnic diversity in multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural states
is also considered by many as the underlying reason for adopting a federal system of
government. This is true even though it is not the exclusive rationale in many
federations. The prevalence of cleavages of different sort is the chief reason to come up
with a federal solution in Ethiopia, Nigeria, etc. But, there are also some additional
motives behind federal discourses. There are purely democratic and political arguments
from the American and German perception for instance. It is neither the need for
secured nation nor the existence of deep-rooted ethnic diversity that leads the adoption
of the Philadelphia accord.
By far, consensus has been reached on the fact that, political elites will take into account
a combination of factors that are responsible for the choice of federation as a form of
government. Such factors will take a variety of forms according to the federation we are
referring. In federations which are labeled as coming together, the existence of some
desire to manage the degree of spillover,88 geographic proximity of constituent units, the
desire for security and greater international influence can be the major justifications of
The level of homogeneity or heterogeneity, differences in the level of modernization, economic
development and political ideology or outlook, the degree of disparity in relative wealth and potential
influence among constituent units can be cited as the basis of spillover.
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the federal pact. On the other hand, the demand for self-expression, dignity and selfrule is the core reason (but not the exclusive) of federal option in societies marked by
differences of language, race, religion, social structure, and cultural tradition. As a
result, politico social, historic and economic reasons will contribute their own towards
the choice of federal organization.
Contemporary writers on the issue insisted that, the increasing worldwide
interdependence on the one hand and direct and indirect external influence upon
regional consciousness on the other should not be overlooked when one indulge the
catalysts of federal bargain.89
As Wheare noted, the desire for federation and those factors that contributed to the
capacity to create and operate a federal form of government should be differentiated
though there exist a strong link between these. A strong sense of joint identity and
interest to achieve loyalty for common interest together with a strong sense of distinct
identities to maintain real autonomy are raised by Watts as instances for the capacity to
operate a federal system. Nonetheless, for the purpose of dealing the issue in a
moderately comprehensive fashion, the following cases, as to my understanding, will
contribute something towards the working and upholding of a federal system. In one
way or another, the stability or instability, success or failure of a particular federation
can be determined by analyzing the contextual variables that the system reveals. Let I
glance them!
Geographic Size and Population: federations vary enormously in size, and there seems
to be to be no general prototype which would make stability predictable. There are or
have been large stable federations (United States, Australia), large unstable federations
(Soviet Union, Pakistan), small stable federations (Switzerland, Austria), and small
unstable federations (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia). An argument can be made,
however, that large countries are more likely to adopt a federal form of
governance.90 But, I do believe also on the argument that, size and population is not the
Watts for instance considers Quebec (Canada), Biafra (Nigeria) and Jura (Switzerland) as powerful
examples of the impact of direct encouragement of regional separatist movement by foreign
government. See Watts supra note 41, at 66.
90 Thomas O. Hueglin, supra note 58. Of the world eight largest states, Russia, Canada, China, the United
States of America, Brazil, India, Australia and Argentina, seven are formally constituted as federations.
89
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exclusive reason to maintain the federal balance of power, rather political stability
requires more than this. There are some extra federal factors that need serious
consideration such as party structure and the prevailing political ideology in the
federation we are referring.
Number of Constituent Units: The number of constituent units ranges from two
(former Czechoslovakia) to fifty (United States). Some of the largest federations are
subdivided into only a few units (six states in Australia); some of the smallest
federations contain a large number of units (26 cantons in Switzerland). Obviously
again, there is no general correlation between size and number of units. But there may
be one between number of units and stability.91
The main argument has been that a large number of units contribute to the overall
stability of a federal system because it facilitates changing interest coalitions. The
obvious example is the United States of America.92 By the same token, the argument
has made that a small number of unit governments tends to strengthen their influence
upon the overall system. They can gang up on the federal government more easily.93
The so-called bi-communal federation in which the number of the constituent interest
parties is essentially reduced to two is the most extreme case of this latter scenario.94
Finally, Demographic and Socioeconomic Asymmetry that exists between constituent
units, as I have mentioned elsewhere, is treated as an additional variable that will
determine the working or otherwise of a federal system. In an increasingly globalized
and interdependent world, different size, uneven numbers and glaring asymmetries
more than ever will be the contextual norm for the conduct of politics and the design of
Common sense alone would lead one to believe that countries of this magnitude cannot be governed, at
least not democratically, without some form of federalism.
91 Ibid.
92 At least since the Civil War, in the United States of America, there neither have been deeply
entrenched regional cleavages, nor have the fifty states ever challenged the federal government
collectively. See also Id.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid. Czechoslovakia has been the most extreme case of this kind because there were indeed only two
constituent units, the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics, inhabited by two different cultural groups,
Bohemian/Moravian and Slovak, who were moreover divided by different stages in their economic
development. Belgium is also another example of this sort since the federation is predominantly divided
between the Dutch speaking Flemish and the French speaking Walloons.
31
policy. Uneven concentration of population95 or economic resources96 therefore will
have equally significant impact on the operation of a federation.97
2.6. Conclusions
Any effort to provide real clarity on the study of federalism must discern the term
federalism from related terms like federations and attempt to map the conceptual
topography of the entire underlying issue. To this end, in this particular chapter,
following the others path, I have argued that, federalism and federations must be clearly
distinguished as two different but related concepts. Federalism connotes an abstract and
normative concept which guides those state craftsmen. It is more of an ideology with its
own peculiar dialects. Federations on the other hand refer a political institution crafted
on the dictates of the federal idea. Therefore it is more of descriptive.
From the earliest works of Johann Althaus (who has been celebrated as the inventor of
the federal idea) down to contemporary inventions, federalism has gone through many
variants. One can look several historic attempts of federal system throughout literatures.
But, as a matter of conclusion, the Philadelphia conference among the representatives
of the American states can possibly marked the turning point towards modern federal
thinking. Following the Americans experiment, now we have more than twenty-five
federal countries, Ethiopia being the one and among the recent, which constitute forty
percent of the world’s population.
Based on some distinguishing marks, federations and federal arrangements may be seen
from different perspectives. Among others, the rationale for federalization, the process
of origination, the prevailing policymaking approach, the functional divisions of powers
between the levels of the government etc are the obvious grounds of classifications as
discussed in this introductory part.
The overpowering role of Russia in the Soviet Union was the most extreme case of this kind,
dominating all aspects of Communist party rule and deeply resented by all others. See also Id.
96 In Spain, one of the seventeen so-called Autonomous Communities, Catalonia, produces nearly a
quarter of the national GDP.
97 Thomas O. Hueglin supra note 58.
95
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Division of power between the regional forces and the center which is backed by a
written constitution that can only be amended through joint decision can be mentioned
as the basic and common feature of true federations. In addition, there are other
auxiliary federal features. An impartial umpire of federal disputes, democracy and rule
of law, financial autonomy of governments and many others will fall under these latter
categories of federal attribute.
The reason to go through federal arrangement varies enormously among jurisdictions.
Some tend to justify it as a panacea for ethnic, linguistic and religious oriented clashes
while the early version of the American and German federalism has been vindicated by
democratic and rule of law reasons. There are also economic, security and ideological
justifications for the adoption of federalism as a political ideology and system of
government in a specific nation. Currently, the argument that espouses circumstantial
causation (combination of factors) as a factor for federal choice wins the hearts and
minds of federal advocates. The working of the system however is determined by the
prevailing politico, economic and social realities.
Having said this much about the basics of the concept of federalism and federations, the
next chapter is devoted to address the specific features of the Ethiopian federal structure
which reveals outstanding exceptions in the discipline.
33
3. The Ethiopian Federal Experiment: Salient Features
Introduction
The previous chapter presented theoretical and conceptual approaches to federalism
and federations, the historical account of the system, its major attributes and also
related issues of sustainability in a particular polity. This chapter aims at providing a
general background about the politics of federalism in Ethiopia from different angles. In
the first part, since it will endow my readers a general explanation on the choice, the
historical incidences that lead to the adoption of federalism will go to be dealt in a
relatively illustrative manner. In this connection, the divergent views that explains state
making, the countries experience (at least de facto) of decentralized governance before
the reign of Haileselassie I will be evaluated to substantiate the precursors and motives
behind the federal choice.
In order to appraise whether the initial objectives for the state building process are
achieved, it is mandatory to thrash out what has been the point of discussion during the
constitutional making sessions that gave rise to the present form of government i.e.
parliamentary federalism. As many argued, including I, the very basis to decide on the
federal discourse was the prevailing consideration of 'the then Ethiopia' as a prison of
nationalities even if historians and many observers wrote as regards the countries unique
character as a museum of nationalities. As the President of the Transitional Government
(the incumbent Prime Minister) noted in the early days of the negotiations, Ethiopia is a
nation that will only continue as a country if and only if ethnic federalism become the
prime factor of nation building. So, the emphasis was on realizing ethnics’ right to self
governance. How much this has been went into practice having the prevailing socio
political realities will be the point of discussion that will contribute its own for future
analysis of the federal practice.
Without losing sight on the basic theoretical frameworks that explains federalism, each
country in the globe elucidates its own exceptionalities through its political
configuration. As I have tried to pinpoint in the introductory part, there is no single
34
formula of federalism. There is no one size fits all scenario. In line with this view, the
Ethiopian federal setup, though shares some communalities with other systems, is full
of distinctive traits that proves my argument. In this particular section, the salient
features of our federal organization will be the point of discussion. Generally, this
chapter aims at raising issues of the federal plan in Ethiopia both its antecedents and
what is pointed out in the federal covenant essentially to relate the federal features with
the overall federal-state relations.
3.1. «From Unitarism to Federalism»
Federalism»: Brief Historical Account of
Nation Building in Ethiopia
Conventionally, the historical foundation of the Ethiopian state goes back at least three
thousand years.98 The mythology begins in the days of the Old Testament and the reign
of King Solomon of Israel and Queen of Sheba of Ethiopia in the tenth century B.C.
According to this legend the Queen while paying a visit to the King of Israel conceived
a baby who latter become a king. This legend has in fact been propagated by church and
state and served as a powerful source of legitimization by the subsequent Ethiopian
monarchs. In spite of Ethiopia’s recognition as a polity for three thousand years the
current geographical boundary is of recent phenomenon. The polity is rather known for
its fluid territorial boarder which is later shaped by the extent of conquest made by the
Ethiopian Emperors of the 19th and 20th century.99
Despite the country’s long history, let alone federalism, the concepts of separation of
powers, secularism and generally the fundamental constitutional principles were alien
to the political system. It was after the first written constitution (in 1931) that such
principles began to be incorporated. For a long period, the majority of the country was
dominated by the cultural prevalence of the north, especially by the Amhara and
Tigrayans. It is possible to argue that the southern part was completely ignored from
being incorporated into these predominant culture and civilization except little efforts to
collect tributes by some kingdoms.
See Teshale Tibebu, The Making of Modern Ethiopia 1896-1974 (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press
Inc., 1995); Harold Marcus, A History of Ethiopia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
99 Abate Nikodimos, Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Challenges and Opportunities (Master thesis), Faculty
of Law, University of Lund, fall 2004 at 28.
98
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Among others, the long history of the country can be characterized by conflicts among
regional lords to expand their political hegemony and with some attempt to realize a
centralized administration. Real power was exercised by the regional lords rather than
the unstable kingdoms. For this reason some argues that,100 except for the twentieth
century, a cursory reading of history reveals that Ethiopia has for the most part been
under a decentralized rather than a centralized system of governance.101 This
observation essentially characterizes all periods that preceded the coming to power of
Emperor Haile Sellassie in 1930, leaving certain exceptions of brief unitary attempts by
Emperors Tewodros (1847-1868) and Menelik II (1889-1913).102
For the sake of convenience and as the main objective of this section, in the following,
the process that leads to the current federal set up should be seen together with the
modern political history of the country and its concomitants towards shaping the polity.
3.1.1. The Imperial Regime
The modern Ethiopian state emerged in the second half of the ninetieth century with
the ascension of Tewodros in 1855 to the throne.103 Emperor Tewodros initiated the first
effort to unify and modernize the fragmented entities of the early Abyssinian Empire
during his reign from 1855 to 1868. Although he tried to instigate and as the same time
implement many modernization agendas, oppositions from the clergy and outside
sparked all of his efforts and his army was eventually defeated by the British forces at
Maqdela.
After Tewodros's heroic death in 1868, Kassa Mircha of Temben (Tigray) came to the
throne following his coronation as Yohannes IV in 1872. He adopted a much less
confrontational stance towards the church and powerful principalities though indirectly
100 For example Assefa Fiseha and Solomon Negussie. See Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and Accommodation
of Diversity in Ethiopia, supra note 15. Solomon Negussie, Fiscal Federalism in the Ethiopian Ethnic- based
Federal system, supra note 27.
101 Aberra Jembere states that until 1854 Ethiopia consisted of loosely united territorial states. Aberra
Jembere ‘Ethiopia: The Major Institutional Arrangements of Federation and Decentralization,’ in Lidija
Basta, Jibri Ibrahim (eds.), Federalism and Decentralization in Africa: The Multicultural Challenge v. 24
(Fribourg: PIFF, 1999) at 167-169.
102 Assefa Fiseha, supra note 10.
103 As Bahru noted, this historical fact heralded the emergence of the country out of two centuries of
decline and endless squabble between provisional rulers. Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia
1855-1974 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1991) at 11.
36
pursued his predecessor's policy of unification. Yohannes devolves power to some
regional aristocrats who recognized his status as 'Neguse Negast' (king of kings).104
Therefore, in contrast to Tewodros, he was less centralist and satisfied in so far as the
regional nobility were ready to recognize his authority to pay their tribute and respect
his title as 'Neguse Negast'. Since his period was marked by increasing international
interference, Yohannes's rule ultimately came to its end at the battle of Metma defeated
by the Sudanese Mehadist forces.
Menelik (1889-1913) who managed to control the imperial throne after Yohanes's
death followed the twin imperial policies of modernization and centralization. He
embarked on an aggressive, at times brutal, westward and southward expansion,
subjugating and incorporating some of the ethnic groups such as Oromo, Sidama,
Gurage, Wolayta and etc.105 However, his expansion was coupled with advances in
road construction, electricity and education, development of a central taxation system
and foundation of the new capital, Addis Ababa.106
Undoubtedly, Minilik's lasting legacy has been the emergence of Ethiopia with its
present geographic shape (excepting the Eritrean recent situation), capital and ethnic
makeup. Bahru noted that, the present-day Ethiopia is mainly the result of the
incorporation process of emperor Minilik. Further he stated that “the creation of
modern Ethiopia was started by Tewodros, incorporated by Yohannes, consolidated by
Minilik and completed by Haileselassie”. Misunderstandings and the resultant tensions
on the treaty of Wuchalie between Minilik and his Italian friends culminated with the
Ethiopian victory at the battle of Adwa on March 1896 and led to international
recognition of the countries boundary.107 By and large, Menilik's era (with all its
discontents) brought together different ethno-national groups that had their own
104 African Report by International Crisis Group: Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents, 4
September 2009 at 2. Asnake Kefale, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of
the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Lidein University, the
Netherlands, 2009.)
105 In his policy of 'Reunification', 'Expansion', or 'Colonization' depending on interpretation, the
Neftegna (Amharic for rifleman) conquered the new territories in the name of the emperor, settled the
lands and levied tribute from farmers. In the mean time, they tried to impose Amharic language and the
Christian Orthodox religion.
106 See also ICG, supra note 104; Asnake Supra note 104 and Yonatan Tesfaye Institutional Recognition
and Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: Federalism in South Africa and Ethiopia, Faculty of Law,
University of the Western Cape 9 (June 2008).
107 Ibid.
37
identity, culture and language although the domination of the Amhara culture and
language is unconcealed.108
In the name of “Ethiopian Unity”, there was an attempt to suppress all non-Amhara
identities. This resulted in uneven representation of various ethnic groups in central
government affairs. Such centralization drive has been continued even after the death of
Menilik under his grandson, Iyasu (1913-1916) and Haile Sellassie I (1930-1974).
For many observers, the centralization process and the vigorously fragmented state
formation attempt was finalized by emperor Haile sellassie I. His rule is characterized
by high rate of military and repressive measures to secure all the powers together with
continuing and realizing the policy of centralization and modernization, in fact with a
renewed vigor and tenacity. The emperors' era has dominated much of the 20th century
history of the country.109 In 1931, his regime introduced the first written constitution of
the country, but not aimed at realizing constitutionalism or democracy rather to
consolidate his power. The constitution neither included provisions on civil liberties nor
established a representative legislature.110
After a brief interruption due to the Italian invasion, the emperor introduced Decree
Number 1 of 1942 that brought unprecedented levels of centralization in the history of
the country.111
Amid the intensification of the emperor's resolve for centralization of power, there was
an attempted federal arrangement between Ethiopia and Eritrea under the auspices of
the United Nation. The federation which is lasted for a decade was more of an
autonomous arrangement than a federation as Eritrea that had a liberal constitution
which recognized limited rights of freedom of association and speech became part of a
highly centralized state under an absolutist monarch with guarantees of self-rule. In the
108 Leulseged Tadesse Can Diversity be Accommodated”? The case of Ethiopia; in policy issues of
Federalism: International Perspectives at 4. Clapham also enunciate that the expansion was accompanied
by an assumption of Amhara supremacy and a policy of Amharaization.
109 He ruled Ethiopia first as a regent for 14 years (1916-1930) and later as emperor for 44 years (19301974).
110 Bahru, supra note 103 at 141.
111 The Italian occupied the country from 1936 to 1941 in an attempt to colonize the polity there by to
revenge their shameful defeat at the battle of Adwa.
38
end, as Markakis pointed out, the constitutional asymmetry between the two leads to
the demise of the federal pact.
Immediately after the demise of the federal union, the regime began to face opposition
particularly on its domestic policies. Political protest by university students and famine
has increasingly challenged the rule of the emperor.112 University students and some
radicalized groups joined the opposition camp with the mottos like “Land to tiller” and
the “Nationality questions”. In 1974, the regime has showed its inability to handle the
increasing demands for change and eventually overthrown by a popular revolution in
September 1974.113
3.1.2. The Military Regime of Derg
For many observers, the decisive blow to the imperial regime was dealt not by the
popular uprising, however, but by mutinous military officers, who in June 1974
established the coordinating committee of the Armed Forces, the Police and the
territorial Army known as Derg (Amharic term for Committee).114 Following bloody
power struggles, Mengistu Hailemariam emerged as the strongman within the Derg
which deposed the emperor on 12 September 1974, abruptly ending the legendary
Solomonic Dynasty.
Consequently, Derg began to rule the country on the basis of brutal military dictatorship
under its Marxist -Leninist lexis and vague patriotic slogan of Ethiopia first. It has also
introduced several reforms in the country.115 Though Derg lacked apparent political
agenda, it was well structured in military aspects and has been able to organize one of
African well regimented Military camp. The regime showed its intolerance for any
political movement when it proclaimed the Red Terror campaign against any protest to
the military socialist affiliated rule. Mengistu himself suppose that, political pluralism
A coup d’état by the commander of the imperial guard was an indicative of this. Note that, until the
beginning of the 1950s Haileselassie was perceived as a modernist by educated Ethiopians. By the end of
1960s, they blamed him for the country’s backwardness. Donald L. Donham, Marxist Modern: An
Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian Revolution (Berkeley, 1999) at 123.
113 Clapham supra at 32.
114 John Markakis and Nega Ayele: Class and Revolution in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, 2006).
115 Among others, the nationalization of all private urban and rural land was the main.
112
39
with all its concomitants are not essential to the then Ethiopia. He had never thought of
any sort of self rule arrangement for groups who claimed autonomy such as Eritrea.
The ruthless political violence, failed economic policy and the consequent famine
created massive resentment against his rule. However, the chief challenge against the
military government was the adoption of an uncompromising position towards ethno
nationalists of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation
Front (EPLF) who had already taken up arms against Haileselassie in their quest for
regional autonomy.116
In addition to the massive counter insurgency campaigns from the north,117 the
withdrawal of Soviet support accelerated the abrupt collapse of the largest army in black
Africa.118 In the years between 1989 and 1990 the EPLF and TPLF made important
military gains and on May 21, 1991 Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe. The victories rebel
forces conquered the capital on the 28th of May 1991.
3.1.3. The Transitional Period and the Discourse on the
Federal Option
After its protracted seventeen years armed insurgency, indeed relied on mobilizing the
peasantry, the TPLF (Later EPRDF (the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front which is a coalition of regional/ethnic based political parties)119 has begun the reconstruction of this east African polity under its own ideology and political thinking. It
Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism 19411993(Cambridge, 1995).
117 Latter, for their own sake, the EPLF and other guerrilla insurgent group TPLF (Tigray Peoples
Liberation Front) form an alliance to see Derg's downfall.
118 During his period, Mengistu has established a strong link and received patronage and support from
the Soviet Union and Communist bloc. Derg, at the virtue of its downfall has tried to show some
allegiance to the right of the ethno national groups as it recognizes some of their rights constitutionally.
See the PDRE constitution, Article 2.
119 The coalition included the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) later renamed as the
Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) to represent the Amhara ethnic group within the
coalition, the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO) as a vanguard oromo party and the
Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Front (SEPDF).
116
40
was after establishing the giant EPRDF that the former insurgent warriors prepared
themselves for the national leadership and state architecture.120
To this end, as per an agreement reached at London, representatives of twenty-seven
Ethiopian political organizations and groupings participated in the international
conference which was convened at Africa Hall from the 1st to the 5th of July 1991. It was
the negotiations of this conference that have resulted a Transitional Period Charter of
Ethiopia.
Many criticize the conference as discriminatory and dominated by TPLF officials.121
But, in the meantime agreement has been reached on Eritrean Question, the Self
determination right of ethno national groups and some initiatives for federal design
between the victor - the EPRDF and the only other force of military significance- the
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). As Sarah Vaughan noted, this had been cemented with
the consensus of almost all the participating delegates. So, it was this Charter guided by
the TPLF ideology of the Nationality Question in its primordial notion that hinted the
federal option.122
3.1.4. Constitutionalizing the Federal Idea
The Transitional Government that was established by the Charter and elaborated by the
subsequent proclamations was not explicitly designated as federal. Neither the Charter
nor the Proclamation that provided for the establishment of self governments referred to
this government as federal or decentralized for that matter.123 This is surprising given
the fact that the system had incorporated important elements of autonomy. Fasil
Though the EPRDF was conceived as a coalition of all ethnic members, from the onset it was the TPLF
that has taken the dominant position.
121 For instance, Professor Mesfin Woldemariam, a veteran politician, declared that « […] either you have
to belong to an ethnic group or you have to belong to an armed political group to participate at the
proceedings of the conference.” In the same token, Isayas Afeworki of EPLF doubted the conference by
arguing that “[…] how this be an Ethiopian Conference when there are so many talented people who do
not participate.”
122 Specifically, the Transitional Charter incorporated the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), promised multiparty democracy, freedom of association and speech, legalized EPRDFs
position on Eritrea’s secession and incorporated the right of ethnic self determination up to and
including secession. See also Asnake Kefele, supra note 104 at 57.
123 Yonatan Tesfaye Institutional Recognition and Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: Federalism in South
Africa and Ethiopia, supra note 106.
120
41
Nahom in his pioneer work is of the opinion that, the transitional government is
federal; “What is envisaged is nothing short of federation”.124
Then, on the way to illuminate the Ethiopian choice, in December 1994, a
constitutional assembly ratified the new constitution, which was lauded for its
commitment to a fully fledged federalism bewared with liberal democracy and respect
of political freedoms and human rights. It defined Ethiopia as a multicultural federation
that operates on the basis of ethno national representation. A bicameral parliament was
created: the House of Peoples’ Representatives, with 547 members directly elected for
five years, and the House of Federation, with 108 representatives of the country’s
nationalities and tasked with constitutional interpretation and deciding issues related to
national self-determination but without a legislative role.125 A powerful prime minister
and a ceremonial president make up the federal executive.126 Within the new federal
structure, the different multicultural elements are reflected in the state members. Nine
constituent states are organized based on settlement patterns, language, identity, and
consent. Accordingly, the nine states are Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia,
Benshangul Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, and the SNNPR (Southern Nations,
Nationalities, and Peoples Region). Added, Addis Ababa and later Dire Dawa became
federally administered city-states.
Fasil Nahom Constitution for a nation of nations: The Ethiopian prospect, New Jersey and Asmara: The
Red Sea Press, Inc (1997). However, some major features of a federal government were absent in the
Transitional charter. For instance, the powers of the constituent units was emanated from not the text of
a supreme constitution i.e. the Charter did not outline the division of powers between the national
government and the self-governments. This was rather left to the national legislator, which is purely a
character of unitary devolution of power. As it is clear from the texts of the Charter, another important
element of a federation, which is the provision of ‘effective separate representation of the sub national
units’, usually in the form of a bi-cameral parliament, was also lacking. See generally Yonatan Supra note
9. Generally speaking, although the Transitional Government with its enablement charter had
incorporated aspects of a federation, it could not be regarded federal as such.
125 Each member of the House of Peoples’ Representatives represents approximately 100,000 persons.
Twenty seats are reserved for minority groups. Each nation, nationality and people has one
representative in the House of Federation, plus one additional member for every million of its people.
See also ICG (Supra note 7) and Chapter Four and Five of the FDRE Constitution (Proclamation No.
1/1995, Proclamation of the Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Federal Negarit
Gazeta, 1st Year No. 1, Addis Ababa-21st August, 1995, adopted on 8th of December 1994 and came into
force on 21st August 1995).
126 Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study supra
note 15 at 213.
124
42
Federal Level (Addis Ababa)
Regional State Administration Level
Zone
Woreda
Kebele
Figure 1- Organization of the federal hierarchy in the new Ethiopia
3.2. The precursors and motives of the Federal option
Ethnic inequality and economic exploitation characterized the multiethnic Ethiopian
empire that emerged after the expansion of Emperor Menilik II and the following
periods. This particularly refers to the imposition of the Amhara elite, Orthodox
Christianity and the Amharic language as embodiments of the Ethiopian state.127
Clapham noted that, the chief instrument the imperial government used to bring some
form of unity among the ethnically diverse peoples of the country was assimilation to
the culture, language and religion of the dominant Amhara rulers. This was successful
to a certain extent as the Ethiopian state gave ‘relatively little weight to issues of ethnic
origin’ and as a result, ‘individuals from peripheral areas as well as from humble social
backgrounds could reach’ not only ‘positions of power’ but also ‘authority and prestige’
once they passed through the ‘assimilation’ process. However, this did not bring the
desired ‘unity’ because of a number of interrelated reasons such as oppositions and
rebellions.128
Even though successive regimes tried to suppress the unique cultural identities the
country’s more than eighty distinct ethno-linguistic groups, none of them were able to
succeed in maintaining the unity -diversity line. There was no mechanism of
accommodating and tolerating the manifestations of difference. It was with this milieu
that the EPRDF came up with a federal solution that is likely to respond the
longstanding ethnic equality claim. On coming to power, the EPRDF decided not to
Merera Gudina Ethiopia: Competing ethnic nationalisms and the quest for democracy, 1960 – 2000,
Shaker Publishing, 2003.
128 For The Detailed Analysis Of Such Failure, See Asnake Supra Note 104 At 60.
127
43
suppress the national aspirations of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups, but instead to allow them
the full expression of their languages and cultures. It decided, in less than two years,
that the country would be administratively and politically reorganized, creating what
are largely (but not exclusively) ethnically based national/regional governments or
states.129
Upon coming to power, the EPRDF was immediately faced with the problem of
managing an ethnically diverse polity. Many in the general population were uncertain
about their future as members of nationality groups. Some viewed the decentralization
implicit in ethnic federalism as the best way to demonstrate the regime’s commitment to
social equity and democracy while some others were panic about the disintegration and
collapse of Ethiopia. Democratic principles were eventually enshrined in a well-crafted
national constitution in 1994 which also officially introduced Ethiopia as a new
member to the federalist camp. Nevertheless, there were different views and opinions
among the diverse groups before such a decision was reached.
To put it in terms of the diverse perspectives, the framers of the Federal Constitution
had five choices. The first was a blanket denial of the existence of diversity and its
political expression. The second was to promote Ethiopian nationality as an
overarching ideology, thereby denying the existence of ethno-linguistic communities.
The third was to promote Ethiopian nationality as an overarching ideology while
recognizing ethno-linguistic communities, but disallowing any political expression and
space for them. The fourth was to promote the right to self-determination as
overarching, regardless of the implications for Ethiopian unity. Finally, there was the
option to promote Ethiopian nationalism while also recognizing and allowing political
expression and territorial self rule for ethno-linguistic communities. This last option is
perhaps the best of all the options for unity with peace and equality. It looks at
federalism as an instrument for conflict management – a political solution to a political
concern – and as a tool to contain disintegrative forces and to create a balance between
Edmond J. Keller and Lahra Smith: Obstacles to implementing territorial decentralization: the first
decade of Ethiopian Federalism. The official line of the EPRDF went something like this: “The nations,
nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia have historically been denied their rights to self determination.
This was as true under the imperial regime, as it was under the Marxist regime. The New Ethiopia is
committed to redressing these historic wrongs, and to giving all its peoples the right to selfdetermination up to and including independence. To insure that the multi-ethnic state remains intact,
there will be guarantees of individual and collective rights enshrined in a federal constitution.”
129
44
the forces of unity and of diversity. It also addresses the concerns of the forces of
diversity, and averts the secession inclinations.
In sum, even though there is no consensus among the academics and political elites, the
motives and precursors of the federal choice is answering the long-established
nationality question and avoiding discrimination and inequality among the diverse
nationalities of Ethiopia. During the bargain,130 emphasis has been given to the
autonomy and equality of ethno national groups. Political pluralism and every aspects
of sovereignty are assigned to these groups and the constitution is appeared to be the
ultimate guarantee of all these privileges. Ethnic communities were promised that they
could exercise their rights to self-determination in the New Ethiopia-a federation
comprised of ethnically based states.
By looking at such constitutional aspirations, political scientists of the time labeled
Ethiopia as a country which legitimately recognized the self determination and political
autonomy of its peoples. Regions were organized basically on ethno-lingual lines to
serve as institutions that should tolerate the practical expressions of the constitutional
promises. Perhaps such arrangement of ethnic autonomy has been treated as a panacea
for the continual existence of Ethiopia as a polity.
3.3. Salient and Unique Features
Features of the Ethiopian Federation
Every federation has its corresponding ideological inspiration, organizational system
and other significant features. Similarly, the federal system introduced in 1994 in
Ethiopia is not an exception; rather it reveals many distinctive features with its own
ideological and pragmatic orientations. This conscientious part is devised to discuss the
foremost traits of the system from diverse stances. In line with this, there are federal
activists who consider the Ethiopian replica as the most unique setup in the federal
spectrum. The emphasis on ethnic territoriality and ethnicization of the federal design,
institutional recognition of ethnic self determination, constitutional certification of the
The bargain that leads to the Federal option is not as such a bargain in the strict sense of the term.
Unlike many developed federations, in Ethiopia, the relative strength of regional elites was less
pronounced and the federation may be qualified as a putting together one following Alfred Stepans
classification. Even there was no public discourse and discussion about the new system and its
concomitants.
130
45
right to secede, unicameralism etc are among the qualities that explains the
arrangement and briefly discussed in this section of the thesis.
We have to note however that, EPRDF was the only visible political force that initiated
the reconstruction of the Ethiopian state along federal lines. It was this multiethnic
coalition that can be considered as the architect behind the federal bargain.131 Hence,
almost all the central features of the federal formula in Ethiopia are the innovations of
the political party in power.
The main basis of dealing with the unique and salient features of the federal framework
at this stage is aimed at assessing whether these features of the federation have
something to do with determining the Intergovernmental Relationship in one or another
way. It is predictable from the very foundation of the system itself that, prominence has
been given to the self rule aspect by which subnational units and states are considered to
be the major actors of the political process. Consequently, the unique features of our
federal setup are, in most part related to such ideological underpinning. Thus, it is
crucial to look at such features and their consequence in the overall federal practice or
in determining the center-state relation. As Solomon rightly noted, the constitutional
aspirations could not be without serious implications to the nature of the relationship
between the two tiers of government.132
3.3.1. Ethnicization of the federal structure and the vigor role of
Ethnicity
The classic federations which have been historic successes, such as those in the United
States, Australia, and Canada (except for Quebec) have not been organized primarily
based on ethnicity133. It is rather the historical, economic, and social factor prevalent in
This indirectly tells us about the absence or limited participation of the public in the federal
discourse. Which will possibly resulted in a fractured beginning.
132 Solomon Negussie, Intergovernmental Relations and fiscal issues in federations: the situation in
Ethiopia and its implications to the Horn, Conference on Constitutionalism & Human Security in the
Horn of Africa, August 2008 Addis Ababa.
133Here ethnicity, for the purpose of this thesis, refers to a social differentiation of groups who shares the
same language, habit, and way of life (all the cultural stuff) with its own objective marker. Hence ethnic
groups as noted by anthropologists; are those who believe in a myth of coming from common
descendent. The myth of common descent serves as a basis for excluding people who share the culture
but not the common descent or in the opposite case to include people who share the common descent
131
46
these countries which have held them together. In the same fashion, no African
government has seriously entertained the idea of devolving powers to ethnically based
regions. Until recently, it is a taboo to talk about ethnic self determination and ethnic
equality let alone secession in the continent.
Conversely however, from around two hundred countries under the United Nations
system, there are nearly one thousand ethnic groups who claimed for autonomy. With
the prime motive of maintaining the status quo, on the basis of undivided state
sovereignty ideal, nations are fighting to stifle any sort of claims for autonomy by
ethnically based groups. The narration between the central regime and the claims of
these groups is ample. The state considers them as tribal groups that are anti-state
stability while the group believes that they need to be accommodated and be part of the
political system.134
As a fundamental breakthrough from other countries of the world and following the
previously Soviet Union understanding, ethnicity constitutes one of the major features
of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the basis for the
internal organization of the federal state. The point of departure for self government as
expressed in the federal arrangement is geographical areas based on ethnic criteria. This
explains why the Ethiopian federalism is often referred to as ethnic or, as its detractors
sometimes refer to it, tribal federalism.135 So, the new constitution created a federal
system largely consisting of ethnic-based territorial units. The constitution aspires to
achieve ethnic autonomy and equality while maintaining the state.136 Plurality of
but not the culture. See also Chaim Gans, The Limits of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003) at 10; James Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London: Macmillan, 1991) at
51.
134 The clear example here is the Turkish government understanding of the Kurdish movement.
Nowadays however, It has become clear to both politicians, and theoreticians and academics that
ethnicity is a force to reckon with as it has become the single most important factor to destabilize the
internal cohesion of states and create international tension.
135 Yonatan, supra note 106.
136In terms of anthropological understanding of the Ethiopian state, Conti Rossini, the famous Italian
scholar, described it as un museo di popoli ‘Museum of Peoples’. To date, that remains an accurate
description of the multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-faith Ethiopia. A little less than eighty ethnic
groups, speaking twice as many dialects, inhabit the country. Despite its numerous ethnic groups,
however, two-thirds of the 70 million populations belong to three major ethnic groups. According to the
information obtained from the Central Statics Authority based on the 1994 census report, the Oromo are
the largest ethnic group accounting for 32.1% of the population, followed by the Amhara (30.1%) and
the Tigre (6.2%); the next four numerically strong ethnic groups are the Somali (5.9%), Gurage (4.3%),
Sidama (3.5%) and Welayta (2.4%).
47
languages, multiculturalism and territorial recognition of ethnic groups are the major
inspirations of the federal agreement.
By whatever name the system is designated, it is important to note the extent to which
the system went in incorporating the ethnic factor in the designing of the state. Ethnic
balance was seriously taken into account in the geographical configuration of the state,
the structuring of cabinet as well as in the organization of the legislative council. Ethnic
consideration permeated the constitutional architects in its entirety.137 Accordingly, the
constitution established a federal republic comprising nine regional states created on the
basis of predominant ethnic group, except the Southern regional state formed by 46
ethnic groups, and except two federal territories, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.
Unlike the titular gesture of the Derg in the form of nominal regional autonomy, the
constitutional assembly demonstrated a strong commitment to the upholding of ethnic
diversity by establishing an institutional framework that allows for the expression of
these diversities. For instance, the House of the Federation (the Second Chamber of the
Ethiopian Parliament) is the house in which “nations, nationalities, and peoples” (i.e.,
ethnic groups) are directly and proportionately represented. The House is composed of
at least one representative from each of 67 ethnic groups in the country, and one
additional representative for every one million population of each ethnic group. As a
result, most ethnic groups are represented in the 112- member House of Federation.
Note that, this is the body that is constitutionally empowered to be the ultimate
interpreter of the federal supreme constitution.
The present dispensation has also given the different ethnic groups the opportunity to
use their towns and institutions to somehow reflect their cultural and historical identity
including the use of indigenous and historic symbolic codes. The Constitution starts
with the words: ‘‘we the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia.’’ It assigns
sovereignty to the ethnic groups constituting Ethiopia. Article 8 reads; ‘‘All sovereign
power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia.’’
138
Thus, the nations,
Yonatan, supra note 106 at 395.
Although Ethiopia is a multiethnic state, the preamble affirms that the Ethiopian peoples,
‘‘in full and free exercise of [their] right to self-determination,’’ strongly commit themselves to build ‘‘one
political community’’ and ‘‘one economic community’’ based on their ‘‘common interests, common outlook
and common destiny.’’
137
138
48
nationalities and peoples are accorded the political center-stage to decide on their own
futures as well as on that of the Ethiopian state.
The excessive insistence on ethnicity can be justified from different perspectives. But the
chief reason is the historical domination of the Amhara and Tigre ethnic groups and the
resultant segregation of the others from the central political process. By taking this
background, the new Ethiopian approach rejects the patriotic narration about historic
Ethiopian nationhood and replaces it with an idea of Ethiopia as a multination state.
Ethnically based federal arrangement is found to be the panacea of ethnic conflicts and
this historic mistake in Ethiopia.
There are however arguments against such orientation on ethnic factor in the process of
nation and state building project. For some groups, a positive attitude towards ethnicity
is a lost tradition and argues that, all the historical incidences reveal a horrible end of
the venture. According to these groups of scholars, the extreme tone given for ethnicity
will result the disintegration of the country and Ethiopia will probably join the Soviet
and Yugoslav scenario. The other attack stems from the existence of ethnic minorities
in regions which are controlled by dominant ethnic groups. The argument basis itself on
the idea that; the members of the regionally dominant group may consider the region as
their own property and there by threatening both the universal and group specific rights
of ethnic minorities.139
In sum, by 1991, political and historical factors had created a social context within
which only a constitutional recognition and accommodation of ethnicity could herald a
successful nation and state building process in Ethiopia. Therefore, the constituent
assembly influenced and dominated by EPRDF; institutionally recognize ethnicity as
the leading aspect of the federal strategy. At the forefront of the rationales for such a
venture is the need to respond to the long standing demand of the “national question”
of Ethiopia’s diverse ethno-linguistic groupings. Accordingly, by settling the problem of
power distribution and enhancing access to power for the hither to ethnically
These clauses were inserted into the preamble, after a long debate, in order to underscore the need for
political and economic unity among the constituent ethnic groups and regional states. The preamble also
affirms ‘‘full respect of individual . . . freedoms and rights.’’
139 See also Christophe Van der Beken Ethiopian Constitutions and the Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity:
The Limits of the Territorial approach (Constitutional Law Series Vol.2, Addis Ababa University, Law
Faculty 2009).
49
marginalized groups, ethnic federalism can be considered as a major positive departure
from the Ethiopian past.
The excessive insistence on the right of ethno-national groups of the country and
considering ethnicity as a prime factor for nation building, in fact expectantly, should
resulted in the greater autonomy of this groups which indirectly permits the states as an
ultimate manifestation of the political process at subnational level, either to compete
and challenge the center or at least to cooperate in a predetermined formula as equal
bargainer of the federal design.
3.3.2. Self determination: the Ideological
Ideological foundation of the Federal pact
In the early days of the struggle against the Imperial and Military regimes, the radical
multiethnic student movement was inspired by the Leninist approach to the question of
the nationalities. In solving what they saw as the fundamental problem of society, the
class conflict, ethnic groups should be given various degrees of autonomy while a strong
multiethnic communist party should stay in power. During the negotiations of the
transitional period, a model akin to a federation was offered as a solution to the
problems of state reconstruction in Ethiopia. The right to self determination for the
nationalities was the cornerstone of the charter. Accordingly, every “nation, nationality
and people” obtained the right to promote its own culture, history and language and
administer its own affairs in addition to participating in the central decision making.140
The incumbent Prime minister (Meles Zenawi) in the transitional conference justified
the adoption of the right to self determination by stating that,
The key cause of the war all over the country was the issue of nationalities. Any
solution that did not address them did not address the issue of peace and war. […]
people were fighting for the right to use their language, to use their culture, the
administer themselves. So, without guaranteeing these rights it was not possible
to stop the war or prevent another one coming up.141
Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991 2000, supra
note 19 at 40.
141 Sarah Vaughan The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991: Its Origin, history and
significance. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, Center for African Studies, 1994.
140
50
With the same ideological and socio-historical milieu, the constitution declares the full
and free exercise of self determination. The rationale behind this constitutional
recognition, as highlighted in the preamble of the constitution is to show that “our
destiny can be best served by rectifying historically unjust relationships”. The argument
is that if the different nationalities did not obtain any kind of autonomy, Ethiopia would
soon erupt into war again. As King noted, such thinking is based on decentralist or
balanced federalism.142
As a norm, the right to self determination engrosses two sides; the internal right to self
determination and the external one. Following this normative view the FDRE
constitution recognized both aspects of the right conceivably in a manner which is
apparent. As per Article 39 of the constitution, the internal aspects of self-determination
constitute five major rights. Every “Nation, Nationality and People” in Ethiopia has the
right to: a) use its own language; b) to promote its own culture; c) to preserve its history;
d) to exercise full measure of self-government and e) to have equitable representation at
both federal and regional decision making process. Surprisingly and as an exception in
the contemporary understanding of the right (in terms of practice), apart from the
internal aspect, the constitution recognize the external aspect of the right to
self-determination i.e., secession.143 In order to prove the bona fide commitment to the
realization of the right, unlike international human rights documents, the constitution
stipulates the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination- Nations, Nationalities and
Peoples.
It has been argued elsewhere that the Ethiopian model is unique in the sense that it
blends ethnic federalism with self-determination. The federal model is designed in a
way that provides expression to ethnic identity. Besides, the federal arrangement paves
way to the exercise of the right to self-determination of the various nations, nationalities
and peoples of Ethiopia. The fact that the federal model is based primarily on ethnicity
enables every nation, nationality and people to use its language, promote its culture,
In this way people can express their political aspirations along ethnic lines and that the abolition of a
strong central government and empowerment of lower ethnically defined units will ensure stability. See
also Aalen, supra note 19.
143 Even if it is not questionable as regards the external facet of the right to self determination, at least in
theoretical terms, there are authors who argued that it has not yet attained the international customary
norm status i.e. jus cogens.
142
51
and preserve its history.144 The Ethiopian federalism also enables a nation, nationality
and people to exercise the right of to full measure of self-governance. In turn,
self-determination is also perceived to be a means to achieve a lasting peace by
resolving ethnic conflicts. Hence, it is maintained that the Ethiopian federalism is a
means to the exercise of the right to self-determination, which is given utmost emphasis
in the Ethiopian constitution.
The proponents of the right to self-determination in Ethiopia argue that it is a guarantee
for lasting peace and Promotes democracy. On the other hand, its opponents argue that
the right to self-determination would lead to the disintegration of the Ethiopian state as
witnessed by the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia.145 However, in a rational way and
from the nature of the country as a multiethnic nation, it could be argued that the
incorporation of the internal aspects of self-determination in to the Ethiopian
constitution is a pragmatic approach to the way of life in Ethiopia after EPRDF took
power. Providing appropriate platform for the use of one’s language, promotion of
culture, preservation of history, full measure of self governance and equitable
representation at both regional and federal level is a matter-of-fact solution to the
problems of ethnic identity that will possibly arise owing to lopsided treatment or office
sharing scenarios.
3.3.3. Secession as a constitutional rhetoric
Devolution of state powers has been on the political agenda of governments in Africa
since the 1970s when the failure of centralized regimes became increasingly apparent.
However, no African government has seriously entertained the idea of devolving
powers to ethnically based regions, much less explicitly granting their constituent
elements the legal right to secede. And in the past, Ethiopian leaders have been
consistent in their efforts-usually through repressive means-to overcome regional,
religious, and ethnic divisions, weaken local administrations, and establish strong
central governments on the way to forbid any sort of secessionist or separatist
movements. International law is also reluctant to grant the right to secession as part of
Yishak Kassa Federalism and Self determination in a Multicultural Context: The Challenges of the
Ethiopian Experiment, IFF Summer University 2008 working paper.
145 Ibid.
144
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the right to self-determination. Some vehemently argued against it on the ground that
such right is the exclusive right of nations under colonial domination or alien
subjugation and that its recognition leads to fragmentation.
Interestingly, despite the controversy revolving around the right to secession in
international law and with an obvious departure from the past, the FDRE Constitution
explicitly articulated the right as the right of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples.
Undoubtedly the constitution is unique in its enunciation of the right in the domestic
setting. From the very drafting stage of the constitution, Article 39 becomes one of the
most controversial provisions, which attracted criticisms and praises.146 In most
Ethiopianist discourses the secession clause is seen as a divide and rule tactic by the
EPRDF or alternatively, as a justification for “the independence of Eritrea without
intent of applying equally to other parts of the country”.147 As argued by some other
scholar’s, constitutional recognition of secession will stimulate a surge of nationalism,
and it is inconsistent with competitive politics under federal arrangements.
In terms of political theory, secession and federalism are considered to be foes rather
than friends. While the former is an exclusive guiding principle of self rule and
persistence on a complete independence the latter is a combination of unity and
diversity or self rule and shared rule according to its founding fathers. But, the FDRE
constitution which is totally influenced by the political and philosophical outlook of the
EPRDF cadres, tries to build a positive linkage between federalism and secession.
The EPRDF officials believed that they could not maintain Ethiopia as one sovereign
state if they did not include a secession clause. They hold the opinion that the secession
clause is a guarantee to democracy, human rights and inclusiveness than a threat to the
unity of the country.148 For the advocates, the right to secession is not only a guarantee
Abate supra note 99 at 58.
P. Brietzke Ethiopia’s Leap in the Dark: Federalism and Self-determination in the new Constitution,
Supra note 2 at 27.
148 Nevertheless, a few members of the Constitutional Commission, including its chairman, objected to
the secession clause, but the overwhelming majority supported it. See also Minutes of the Constitutional
Assembly. November 1994, Minute Number 20 of Hidar 12 and 13 of 1987EC (unpublished document
on the archives of the HPR).
146
147
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for respecting the right of nations, nationalities and peoples to self determination but it
is also an affirmation of the consensual basis of the federal union.149
Moreover, during the transitional conference as Alem noticed, the inclusion of
secession has served the purpose of convincing some ethnically based opposition political
organizations.150 According to Alem,
A secession clause was placed in the Constitution because the major forces (the
TPLF and the EPRDF) that overthrew the military government and other
important organizations such as the OLF, Somali parties, and Afar parties had
inscribed the right to self determination in their political programs and
objectives.151
Apparently, from the motives and antecedents of the constitutional making process, as
discussed in the above sections, one can clearly understand the fact that, the Ethiopian
federal pact is offered by the Tigrayans and Eritrean liberation forces after they succeed
to topple down the military centralist rule. Undeniably, the agenda behind the military
insurgent struggle for successive seventeen years was to realize the self governing right
of Eritrea and Tigray. This according to politicians of contemporary Ethiopia was only
possible through realizing the secession rhetoric. The architects copied the leeway of
such a tactic from the unfortunate Soviet Union constitution that gave ethnically
defined republics the right to secede to their own political memo. And at the end of the
day secession attained a forefront position in all the negotiations and the public
discourse. For this explanation the Ethiopian federal experiment is premeditated in a
manner to give utmost accent on the self rule aspect while the living together i.e. the
shared rule value is overlooked.
Concerning the essence of the right, it has been noted that the right to secession is the
unconditional right of “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” save for the procedural
requirements152 that need to be met. Once the claimants of the right are clearly defined
P. Brietzke, Self-determination and Jurisprudential Confusion exacerbating political conflicts,
Wisconsin International Law Journal (1995), at 65.
150 In this case the Oromo Liberation Front, the Somali and Afar peoples Movements can be sited.
151 Alem Habtu Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution,
supra note 17, at 327.
152 According to this provision, the right to self-determination, including secession, of every Nation,
Nationality and People shall come into effect:
149
54
as per the elements enumerated in Article 39(5),153 and a group fulfils both the objective
and subjective criteria of nationhood, people hood or nationality, they can readily
exercise the right of secession. When such is the case, obviously, secession poses an
insurmountable challenge to the unity of Ethiopia.154 But there are writers who argued
that the right to secede from the federation is a last resort measure rather than being
unconditional right as enunciated by the constitutional lexis.155
In my opinion, at least in theory, Article 39 imposes no substantive condition; unlike
the transition charter it simply establishes procedures for the exercise of the right to
secession and the right is granted in two feasible manners; an ethnic group as defined by
sub article five (5) of the pre-eminent stipulation (Article 39), may require secession
from the regional state it formerly belongs or it may demand an independent statehood
status without the need to be the constituent of the federation.
On the other way round, if one argues from the pragmatic point of view, things will take
different connotation. Following the constitutional recognition of this extraordinary
entitlement, though there were a number of apparent demands, its practicability
remains to be a myth. The political elites who advocates the constitutional inclusion of
the right themselves regard those who claims for the same as separatist and secessionist.
This has remained to be a self-contradictory perceptive of the constitution in present day
a) When a demand for secession has been approved by a two thirds majority of the members of the
legislative council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned;
b) When the Federal Government has organized a referendum which must take place within three years
from the time it received the concerned council’s decision for secession;
c) When the demand for secession is supported by a majority vote in the [regional] referendum;
d) When the Federal Government will have transferred its powers to the Council of the Nation,
Nationality or People who has voted to secede; and
e) When the division of assets is effected in a manner prescribed by law.
153 In a very fuzzy manner the constitution qualifies the claimant in the following way. A ‘‘Nation,
Nationality or People’’ for the purpose of this Constitution, is a group of people who have or share a large
measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common
or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly
contiguous territory.
154 Abate supra note 99 at 59.
155 For example, F. Tiba -among others- basis his reasoning on the literal reading of the Amharic version
of the constitution and the Transitional Charter, on whose principle the new constitution is based.
According to the Transitional Charter, for nations, nationalities and peoples to exercise their right to
secession their right to self-determination should be proved to be denied, abridged or abrogated. See
T.Firew Protection of Human Rights under the Ethiopian Federalism and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism,
(2001) at 10, unpublished. The Amharic version of Article 39 (1) of the FDRE Constitution reads: - ‘the
right of every Ethiopian nation, nationality and people to self-determination up to and including secession
shall be respected in every manner and without restriction.’(Translation by him)
55
Ethiopian political life. Preferably, it can be argued that, the secession clause has a
symbolic value since it is unlikely that any regional state or ethnic group will actually be
permitted to secede from Ethiopia.
Indeed, honest recognition of the right should permit the right holder to exercise the
same freely as long as the procedural requirements are fulfilled. On the other hand, such
a generous provision will tells the ultimate right of the subnational units or the
nationalities either to live their own way or at least to remain in the federation as equal
bargainers of the system. Equally, the federal bargainers can possibly claim the right
whenever coercion or misuse of power occurs.
3.3.4. Taming Parliamentary Unicameralism with the Federal Idea
The principle of bicameralism is ‘the natural ally of federal countries’ due to the very
nature of the system itself. As noted everywhere, federalism is a compromise between
(at least) two levels of governments- the regional and federal. Therefore, both levels
need to have a say on the overall policies and issues. Consequently, the Philadelphia
accord has came up with the possibility of regional representation on central decision
making via the second chamber.156 As Watts enunciated, the foremost role of the second
chambers in federations is legislative, reviewing federal legislation with a view to
bringing to bear upon it regional and minority interests and concerns.157 Adopting a
bicameral legislature is therefore considered as a natural consequence of opting for
federal arrangements.
Conversely, in Ethiopia this is not the case. When a federal government with
parliamentary system has been put in place, formal bicameralism was envisaged. As
Tsegaye noted, even if the constitution tries to create an impression that the country
have a bicameral legislature, a more serious scrutiny will suggest otherwise i.e. the
constitution take up bicameralism in form not in its stricto sensu. The second chamber
156 However, as the practice in some federations reveals, regional entrenchment is not necessarily done
through a bicameral system but could also arranged in a unicameral way. For instance the federal
systems of Pakistan and former Yugoslavia realized this latter trend.
157 Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd ed., supra note 41. However, federal second chambers
also perform some other functions of federal character, such as nominations for federal appointments,
consent to treaties and approval of emergencies or the use of federal overriding powers. In some other
federations, second chambers are important forums for intergovernmental cooperation and
collaborations.
56
formally known as the House of Federation (HoF) has little legislative role.158 The
supreme legislative power resides on the lower house (the House of Representatives).159
Minassie Haile in his extremely pessimistic critique uttered that;
The second chamber is not a legislative organ sharing general lawmaking power
with the lower house. For unclear reasons, the constitution implies that the House
of the Federation is a legislative body, particularly in saying that the “Federal
State” consists of two “Federal Councils”, the HPR and the HoF. The
Participation of the HoF in actual legislative tasks with the lower house is
extremely limited; being mainly confined to performing certain functions
concurrently entrusted to it and the HPR, such as electing the president of the
Republic.160
In addition the Inter-Africa Group after pointing out that the HoF is not a legislative
body as it has no legislative powers, observed that, “the first impression one gets is that
the HoF is an upper House of Parliament. But it is not. It is not a legislative
chamber”.161
The Second Chamber is the representative institution of “nations, nationalities and
peoples” in the center. Pertaining to its composition, the constitution (Article 61)
affirms that: ‘Each Nation, Nationality and People shall be represented in the House of
the Federation by at least one member. Each Nation or Nationality shall be represented
Tsegaye Regassa, Issues of Federalism in Ethiopia: Towards an Inventory of Legal issues, Ethiopian
Constitutional Law Series Vol.2, May 2009.
159 Article 50 (3) of the Constitution. However, there are some powers of initiating laws by these House
though they are not strictly legislative roles. A look at Article 62 suggests only two matters among a total
of eleven as the ones relating to legislation. These matters are A). Determination of the division of
revenues derived from joint federal and state tax sources and the subsidies that the federal government
may provide to the states. B). determination of Civil matters which require the enactment of laws by the
House of peoples Representatives. A strict scrutiny of these roles of the House also suggests the fact that
they are not a legislative role in the normal sense of the term rather they are directions on what to
legislate upon, sort of a license for the HPR to legislate on matters indicated. See also Tsegaye Regassa,
Sub national Constitutions in Ethiopia: Towards Entrenching Constitutionalism at state level, Mizan Law
Review, Vol. 3 No. 1, 2001.
160 Minassie Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact upon Unity, Human Rights and
Development, Suffolk Transitional Law Review 1, (1996–1997) at 27.
161 Carlson Anyangwe, Comments on the Draft Constitution of Ethiopia by International Legal Experts, the
Inter Africa Group at 1. (November 1994).
158
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by one additional representative for each one million of its population’.162 Even if this
House is devoid of legislative role, it is empowered with other considerable
prerogatives.163
As pointed out above, each “nation, nationality and people” has the right to have one
representative in the House of Federation. The issue is whether such representation
guarantees the groups participation at the center. There is a huge academic and
political164 debate on the lack of real legislative power to the House of the Federation.
These groups consider the very system as an exclusion of states interest at the federal
level. The argument goes; such arrangement will curtail the other side of federalism i.e.
shred rule which is already overlooked in the Ethiopian federal discourse. Notionally it
is also possible to squabble that; such arrangement may have unenthusiastic
consequence in preserving the interest of the states especially where there is unmitigated
party competition in the two levels of government.
Evidently the Ethiopian federal set up is among the exceptions with respect to
comprising constituent units with no role in the law making process at the central level.
On the other hand, the American experience suggests that, the political process can
provide a better alternative when both the federal and state governments are actively
involved in the federal legislative process.
In the absence of the states say at the central policymaking process, undoubtedly, one
may imagine the existence of institutional based cooperative forums as the states are not
well informed of the laws exclusively made at the center. In order to create a smooth
implementation of such policy frameworks the institutionalization of intergovernmental
cooperation forums is apt. Perhaps, it will be a weird thought if the center compels the
162 Such a formula of composition is also regarded by many as a self defeating scenario since the House is
dominated by the nationalities with a huge amount of population. And it is suggested to adopt the USA
model of equal representation if the goals are to be achieved.
163 Among the major functions of the House, making of decision on issues relating to the rights of
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self-determination, including the right to secession; promote the
equality of the Peoples of Ethiopia enshrined in the Constitution and promote and consolidate their
unity based on their mutual consent; make every effort to find solutions to disputes or
misunderstandings that may arise between States; determine the division of revenues derived from joint
Federal and State tax sources and the subsidies that the Federal Government may provide to the States;
determine Federal intervention if any State, in violation of this Constitution, endangers the
constitutional order can be mentioned. See also Article 62 of the constitution.
164 For instance one of the competitors in the last election (2010), Medrek proposes a Second Chamber
with a legislative role.
58
constituent units to execute laws exclusively made by the central personnel’s without
entrenching a cooperative approach of relationships.
3.3.5. “Who Guards the Guardian?” Interpreting the “Covenant” by the
Second Chamber
Among the essentials of federalism, constitutional adjudication is among the principals.
The issue is judging fairly the two players in a neutral manner. The covenant is
expected to be placed beyond the reach of the bargainers. More importantly, a federal
constitution must provide a method for resolving possible conflicts over the legal
powers of the two orders of government. It is to denote that the Constitution is serving
as the basis of the federal framework and it is the guarantee for the viable existence of
the two levels of governments.
George Anderson enunciates that;
Two independent orders of government in a federation create a need for
Constitutional arbiter to resolve conflicts over their respective constitutional
competencies this role is usually assigned to the courts.165
With regard to the necessity of having an adjudicatory body, it is also argued that, there
must be an institution that enforces the supremacy clauses of the ‘covenant’ and there
must also be an institution that takes care of the daunting task of demarcating the
boundary of the powers of the federal government and the states. While federal
constitutions attempt to define the scope and powers of the two levels of governments,
there will have a natural imprecision in the language of the constitution. It is also in the
very nature of constitutions that they are often stated vaguely, so that they will serve for
generations.166
Even if there is no one size fits all argument, federal constitutions establish either the
regular courts or special constitutional courts to this venture. Technically the two
George Anderson Federalism: An Introduction, Forum of Federations, Oxford University Press, (2008)
at 56.
166 Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and the adjudication of constitutional issues: the Ethiopian Experience,
Netherlands International Law Review, LII: 1-30, (2005) at 11.
165
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systems of adjudicating constitutional disputes are the Diffused167 and Concentrated168
forms. There exists a range of differences amid these models staring from the very
composition, jurisdictional bounds and standing procedures to the effect of decisions.
In addition to the above two well-known systems of constitutional adjudication, there
are various other strange mechanisms of doing the same. Among these categories the
Ethiopian system of constitutional adjudication is incredibly inimitable from different
standpoints. In Ethiopia, the House of Federation (hereafter HoF), a parliamentary
political organ that represents the political interests of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups, is
mandated to interpret the Constitution at the exclusion of the judiciary. Note that,
though its legislatives are limited, this is the second chamber of the federal parliament.
The justification forwarded in favor of such an enterprise, according to the
constitutional making history, is related to the covenant character of the constitution
between the different nationalities of the country. Since the HoF is the House of
nationalities, and the constitution is considered as the manifestation of the ‘free will and
consent’ of these groups, the framers decided that, only the contracting parties that are
the nationalities should be the ones to be vested with the power of interpreting the
Constitution.169 In addition, there has been a debate as to the unsuitability and
(de)legitimization of the regular courts as well as the idea of constitutional court from
the lopsided argument of judicial adventurism.170
In dealing with this daunting task, the HoF is assisted by the Council of Constitutional
Inquiry (hereafter CCI), consisting of eleven members that among others comprise, the
Chief Justice and his deputy of the federal Supreme Court, who also serve respectively
as chairman and vice chairman of the CCI, six other legal experts appointed by the
President of the Republic with the recommendation of the lower house, as matter of
practice coming from different constituent states, and three persons designated by the
This is a system that accords every branch of the judiciary the right to review the constitutionality of
laws (such as in the USA and India). In principle, any court has the power to declare any law or decision
of executive body unconstitutional, if such a law or decision violates the Constitution, final appeal being
reserved to the federal Supreme Court.
168 The concentrated or centralized model of constitutional review confers the power of reviewing the
constitutionality of laws to constitutional courts (for instance Germany).
169 See also the minutes of the Constitutional Assembly vol. 4, 21-27 November 1994, discussions on
Articles 59, 61 and 62.
170 Assefa supra note 166.
167
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HOF from among its members.171 The CCI has the power to investigate constitutional
disputes. The investigation may result in a prima facie case calling for interpreting the
Constitution, in which case the CCI is required to ‘submit it recommendations’ to the
HOF or remand the case and render a ‘decision’ if it finds there is no need for constitutional interpretation.172 In the latter case, the party dissatisfied with the decision of the
CCI may appeal to the HOF.173 Therefore, it is clear that the CCI is merely an advisory
body to the HOF, lacking the competence to give a binding decision. The HOF as well
has been at liberty to disregard the CCI’s opinions in some cases.174
The debate is whether there is any ground to trust the political process to safeguard
federalism. Is the Second Chamber an appropriate choice to guard the guardian?
Various arguments can be drawn from both extremes. Some suggests, in line with the
argument forwarded during the constitutional making, that the Ethiopian model though
it is inimitable can defend aptly the interests of the contracting parties to the covenant.
And further insisted that, the judges in Ethiopia are not in a position to shield the
interests of the nationalities as history and past practice tells us.
On the other side of the argument, obviously from the detractors of the constitutional
adjudication project, there are academics as well as political scientist who forward their
criticism against the system from the standards of impartiality which is the basic traits of
constitutional arbitration in federations, from the principles and theory of checks and
balances175, and from the sides of protecting minority interests and rights owing to the
composition of the House. With regard to the first criticism it can be said that, the
members of the HoF are accountable, not to the Constitution, but to the different
nationalities of Ethiopia whom they represent. The HoF is also a political organ
operating within the context of a federal government dominated by a ruling party, the
EPRDF, which has an excess of power in all branches of government. There for the
171 Article 82 of the Constitution; Article 4 of Proclamation No. 250/2001, Council of Constitutional
Inquiry Proclamation, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 7th Year No. 40, Addis Ababa, 6 July 2001. See also Assefa,
Supra note 166 at 19.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid; Article 84 of the Constitution; Article 6 of Proclamation No. 250/2001.
174 Ibid.
175 The argument basis itself on the fact that, under the current
arrangement of non-judicial
constitutional review, the executive can do or undo what it wishes with no judicial check on its activities.
They further hold the opinion that, the breakdown of separation of powers in Ethiopia is a result of a
system in which a political organ with strong ties to the executive is the final arbiter of the
constitutionality of the executive’s political acts.
61
House lacks complete independence from the EPRDF and the executive branch of
government.176 As a political organ under the influence of the executive, the HoF
should not be called upon to decide sensitive political issues because it cannot be
expected to decide such matters in a fair, unbiased manner which will ultimately defeat
the very idea of constitutional adjudication in federations.177
In consonance with this latter view, one commentator sympathetically argued that,
[…] more critically, the Ethiopian federal project suffers from the absence of an
independent constitutional interpretation procedure. …the HoF is a political
institution as its members are elected or appointed from elected party members,
besides its members are strongly connected to and influenced by the winner party
in the government. As a result, the power to interpret the constitution can
certainly fall down into non-independent and partisan arm of a government.178
The House also suffers criticisms which are directed concerning its pro-minority stance.
The argument goes; though the HoF is meant to protect minority ethnic groups, reflect
the diversity of the Ethiopian people and promote equality and unity among Ethiopia’s
various ethnic groups, this cannot be fully realized due to the House’s majoritarian
make-up.179 This is in a direct opposition to the ostensible aims of the Constitution, as
an expression of the sovereignty and self-determination of all of the ethnic groups of
Ethiopia.
Generally, I personally also share the view that, the HoF is suffering from inefficiency
and political subjectivity in interpreting the Constitution which is the supreme law of
the land and serving as the basis of the federal pact, and there are numerous avenues for
abuse, that will result in the failure of constitutional review. Hence the Ethiopian
experiment is not credible from each slant of the system. All in all, despite the fact that
176 Chi Mgbako et al, Silencing the Ethiopian courts: Non-Judicial Constitutional Review and its Impact on
Human Rights, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 32, No. 2. Number 1(December 2008), at 285
et seq.
177We can cite here one practical case at the level of the CCI which has been decided in favor of the
government though consensus was not reached concerning the opinion. See the claim of the members of
the Coalition for Unity and Democracy against the emergency declaration of the Prime Minister in the
aftermath of the highly contested election 2005.
178 Berhanu Gutema Constitutionalism in the Horn of Africa: Lesson from the new constitution of Ethiopia,
DIIPER Research Series Working Paper Number 15, DIIPER & Department of History, International and
Social Studies Aalborg University, 2009 at 13.
179 Chi Mgbako et al. supra note 176 at 292.
62
the constitution is more than a legal document, its meaning should be ascertained by
legal experts and the final say has to be reserved either in the hands of the regular
judiciary or a standardized constitutional court. This is the most successful experience
in developed as well as recently evolved federations. The federal sprit tell us the
necessity of established an independent, impartial organ for this venture who is at the
same time far from the political tone. If not, it is unreasonable to qualify as an arbiter of
contesting constitutional issues in a federal system.
The issue is, if the constitution is aimed at giving the ultimate say on the meaning and
spirit of the covenant to the nationalities, they are conceived as the main point of the
federal bargain and in their relationship with the central government; they can equally
decide or at times challenge the center whenever their preference or interest is
prejudiced. In this way, the nationalities or the constituent units may become the vigor
players of the political process. In the course of relationship, as the nationalities are
vested with the most important power of federal adjudication, it is wise to expect their
prominent role in proposing or setting agenda and also the power to veto in some
extreme cases unless the practice paralyses this constitutional motive.
3.3.6. No Rule of Federal Supremacy or Preemption
The division of powers between the federal government and the states is among the
basic facets of a federal system. In addition, in federal systems, not only is the federal
constitution supreme, but the federal law also should be declared supreme over contrary
state law.180 However, the supremacy of the federal law is not without limits. The
federal legislature should enact its laws and policies within the limits set by the federal
constitution.181 Once that condition is met, however, federal law breaks with contrary
state law.
In USA for instance, the text of Article VI, Clause 2, establishes these principle as the
highest form of law in the American legal system, both in the Federal courts and in all
The concept has got its origin from the American constitutional history. Accordingly, after an
agreement has been reached on the federal option, a large measure of the States' sovereignty was ceded
under the Constitution to the federal government by virtue of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI, which
declared that all laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land”.
181 Assefa supra note 166 at 7.
180
63
of the State courts, mandating that all state judges shall uphold them, even if there are
state laws or state constitutions that conflict with the powers of the Federal government.
In addition, the fourth amendment also upholds the same principle which totally
shaped the constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.182
Such a coherent principle does not exist in the federal Constitution of Ethiopia. The
Constitution is silent as far as the thorny issue of regulating the relationship between
federal and state law is concerned. As Assefa has pinpointed, it is possible to draw two
opposing views concerning such constitutional muteness. If one adopts the federal
supremacy clause by default, then the principles stated in other federations will hold
true in Ethiopia as well.183
But if one adheres to the ‘supremacy of nations, nationalities and Peoples’ literally,
because of the principles stated on the Preamble, the pretentious aggregate nature of the
federation (Arts. 8 and 39), then it may be difficult to state that federal law will preempt
state law.184 To arrive at a conclusion as to the existence or otherwise of the principle in
the Ethiopian Federal array, Assefa emphatically recommend that;
[…] the best compromise is to decide case certainly refers to federal framework
legislation but its long-term effect remains to be seen the issues on a case-by-case
basis rather than subscribing to either principle on the abstract level.185
Yet, practice has demonstrated that, the federal law takes a supreme position over a
contradictory state law.186 In addition to the case mentioned here, the constitutions of
the different states of the federation declared expressly that their constitution is
interpreted in line not only with the Supreme federal constitution but also with the
182 The difference between the two (the Supremacy clause and the Fourth Amendment), however, is that
whereas the Supremacy Clause deals with the relationship between the Federal Government and the
states, the Fourteenth Amendment deals with the relationships among the Federal Government, the
States, and the citizens of the United States, with emphasis being placed upon the rights of the citizens.
See also cases such as Ableman v Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859) and Edgar v. Mite Corporation, 457 U.S. 624
(1982),
183 Assefa supra note 166 at 8.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
186 In Biyadglegn Meles et al. v. the Amhara National state, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry ruled any
law issued by the states regarding the administration of land shall be of no effect if it contradicts with
the Federal Rural Land Administration Proclamation.
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federal laws.187 Tsegaye on the other hand argues that, although there is no rule of
federal supremacy or paramoutcy, the federal constitution adopts the principle of federal
comity by which the states should respect the powers of the Federal government and the
vice versa.188
In sum, unlike some other federations, the Ethiopian federal bargain does not explicitly
stipulate the existence of the rule of federal supremacy. As a result, there is a continued
debate on this matter whenever there is a contested legislation or a contradictory
interpretation thereof between the two orders of governments. So, this feature again
supports the idea that the Ethiopian states enjoy a substantial autonomy in the course of
their relation with the federal government unless there is a failure from the practical
dimension.
In addition to the above discussed features, the Ethiopian twenty years federal
experiment reveals other important qualities that make it an exception in the widely
accepted federal discourse. I can mention here the nonexistence of concurrent
competence (except in the field of tax), the explicit recognition of ethnic groups as
building bricks of the federation, the existence of a clear de facto political asymmetry,
absence of viable constituent units since some of them do not seem to have acquired the
status of nation/nationality, which the Constitution ascribes to them, the failure to
notice historic mobilization and the resultant minorities in the accommodation process
which is exacerbated by the granting of mother state and etc.
The point is each and every set of federal features, whether unique or common, will
have a substantial impact in determining the practice of relationships between the two
tiers of government.
187
188
See for example the Constitution of the Benshangul Gumuz and SNNPR constitutions.
Tsegaye Regassa supra note 159 at 47.
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3.4. Conclusions
Ethiopia has become and is a federal polity de jure since 1995. Marking a complete
break from a unitary and centralist past, Ethiopia dared to experiment with a multiethnic federation. The federal option has been taken lacking much public debate hence
the process was largely dominated by the EPRDF actors. The driving force and the
prime motive for the federal arrangement was the issue of answering the nationality
question.
The Ethiopian federal experiment is considered by scholars on the area as an inimitable
arrangement from several angels. The optimistic attitude towards the political
expression of ethnicity, the constituionalization of secession, the choice a political
organ as a system of umpiring the federation, and the (un)clarity of the federal
supremacy can be mentioned among the distinctive features of the federal project in
Ethiopia.
From the general discussions in this chapter, one can clearly appreciate the fact that, the
ethno nationalities in Ethiopia, through their representatives preserve all the sovereign
powers. Hence, they are the loci of sovereign authority in this country. The constituent
units, at least in theory, are shaped in line with such understanding and vested with
powers that can be viewed by many as overwhelming. Constitutionally speaking, the
states power extends from those routine businesses of local authority to self
determination, secession included. Some also contends that, the Ethiopian states are in
a much better position than any other federal experience. In connection with this view,
the constitution adopts an incomplete federal structure that leaves enough constitutional
space to the members of the federation back from its inception.
At all, this chapter has tried to raise some of the contested issues in the area of the
structural setup of the federal venture in Ethiopia. The main focus of the discussions is
normally to identify the basic traits of the structure as pointed out in the constitution
since it will guide to evaluate the practical aspects in the subsequent chapters. This is
due to the fact that, analyzing the salient features of the system will tell us more about
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the expected manner and approach of intergovernmental relationship in one or another
way. The basis of intergovernmental relations lies always on the major ideological,
political, social and historical underpinnings by which a federal system is configured. It
is the combination of this factors and features together with the operational reality that
determine the nature of relationship between the two levels of governments.
More clearly, the division of competencies in the constitution that established the
federal framework is another major indicator of the intergovernmental relationship
aspect. As the next chapter tries to elucidate this point, the interaction between the
governments more or less depends on the constitutional approach of dividing the
respective powers.
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4. Distribution of Competencies
Competencies in the FDRE
Constitution: A Brief Review
Introduction
The study of a federal system of a country, from any of its context, should entail a
vigilant analysis of the division of competencies between the federal and state
governments.189 Almost with no exception, all federations have provisions in their
constitution dealing with the allocation of powers between the orders of governments.
However, it has to be noted that, constitutions differ enormously in the levels of detail
and approach.190
Primarily, from the very conception of the idea as in the United States, when we talk of
a federal system of government, we are referring to a system in which the powers of
government are distributed between a central government and parliament and
governments and parliaments in the regions or provinces. An important consequence of
distributing power between orders of government is to limit the power of governments
or of any particular majority.191 If the central government becomes either too strong or
too weak, the federal balance is said to be upset and either the regions lose most of their
effective powers or the federation falls apart (as has happened in a number of
Federations in Africa, Asia and Europe).
The powers to be distributed usually refer to the assignment of legislative, executive, judicial and
financial functions.
190 In this regard we can mention the United States constitution which has only a limited number of
enumerated powers for the federal government; all other powers (the residual powers) remain within
the states. On the other side of the spectrum, the Indian constitution has there long lists: the Union list
with 97 headings, the concurrent list, 47 and the state list 66. Moreover, the approach by which powers
are aside takes mainly two forms- dual and integrated.
191 David Black Federation Issues: Curtin University of Technology Series Papers for Discussing the
Australian Federalism, (1999).
189
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The Ethiopian constitution, serving as a covenant for the federal setting, also stipulates
the competencies of the regional and central governments together with some shared
powers. This chapter, in its first part, is designed to discuss and dig out some of the
issues pertaining to the allotment of competencies as appeared in the terms of the
constitution since it will have its own contribution towards analyzing the de facto centerstate relations.
4.1.
Division of Competencies in the FDRE Constitution
As pointed out in the first chapter of this thesis, the division of authority between the
federal government and the states is one of the hall marks of federations- There is no
reservation for this. However, there is an ongoing debate as to the manner of the
sharing out of the competencies. Some federations prefer to take on the rule of duality
while some others stand for executive federalism. The end is just to reflect the existence
of two orders of governments with their own autonomy.
On the other way round, a common feature among federations has been the existence of
powerful motives to be united for certain purposes on the one hand and well-established
motives for autonomy for other purposes, on the other. Therefore, in line with this
vision, in most matured federations, the federal government is often empowered with
those powers that are shared in common and symbolize the people of the country as a
whole. Similarly, with a different rationale, the constituent units retain those powers
which are generally considered to be vital for the full exercise of regional autonomy and
self-governance. By this, the unity-diversity recipe that explains the core values of
federalism can be comprehended.
Equally, we have to be cognizant of the fact that, it is almost impracticable to set the
layers of governments with a perfect compartment in the absence of coordination and
common institutions. The units of the federation are entitled to have a say at the central
decision making process- which federalists dubbed as shared rule.
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The considerable variation in the distribution of powers resulted in the manner by
which the federation is operating. For instance the obvious result of the style of power
distribution is visible in the degree of centralization, decentralization and noncentralization revealed in the federal spectrum.
The FDRE Constitution has put in place a fully-fledged federal form of government in
which the states created by the Constitution are empowered to establish their own
legislative, executive and judicial powers parallel with and independent from that of the
federal government. From this constitutional stipulation, we can say that, the Ethiopian
federal framework has adopted the normative division of competence between the two
layers of the government. In the structure, there is a federal list of power which may
create an impression that the powers of the center are limited and enumerated. In
addition there is an open-ended clause which exemplifies some of the regional powers
and as the same time declares the place by which the residual competencies are
positioned. In the other section of the constitution, the division of financial power has
been settled in a manner that reflects exclusivity and concurrency. In this part of the
thesis, the power division between the regional and federal governments together with
some related thoughts will be analyzed in terms of the type and manner of the
competence.
4.1.1. Legislative
Legislative Power Distribution
In most federations, the constitutional allocation of policy-making is defined on the
basis of three categories, namely exclusive federal and state powers, concurrent powers
and reserve (residual) powers.192 In federations which are described as coming together,
most of the time, the federal government is empowered with enumerated exclusive
powers. But this is not always the case. For instance, Ethiopia which is a federation
evolved from a previously unitary regime also adopts such a system of “limiting” the
powers of the central government by inscribing a long list of the powers of the same
there by leaving the residue for the states.
D.P. Wessels, ‘The Division of Powers in a Federation’ in D.J. Kriek ed., Federalism: The Solution?
Pretoria HSRC (1992) at 43.
192
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4.1.1.1.
“Enumerated” Exclusive Federal Powers
The notion of exclusive powers refers to the powers for which the federal constitution has
created a monopoly which either is in the hands of the federation or of the states.193
Such powers are exercised entirely by the level which is specified. The need to have
such a strict division is justified by averting the potential conflict of jurisdictions
between the members of the federal bargain. Note that, the manner by which exclusive
powers are designed may vary according to our understanding of the subject and the
particularities of the federation we are referring. In most cases, the federal government
is assigned with exclusively listed powers while the states remain with the
unenumerated and reserved powers. In other unique cases, there may be an exclusive
list of powers to both the central and regional governments.194
The issue of tagging residual powers as exclusive authorities is not yet settled. However,
if the constitutional proviso of allocation evidently confers the monopoly of residual
power to either level of government, it is feasible to argue safely that the government
retains an exclusive authority over the reserved powers.195
The constitution of FDRE under Article 51 has a list of 21 generally designed
jurisdictions exclusively given to the federal government.196 The caption of this
provision; “powers of the federal government” implies that, the powers of the center are
only those enumerated under Article 51. But, on the other hand, the provision dealing
with powers and functions of the House of Peoples Representatives (hereafter HPR)
(which is Article 55) and similar other provisions further enumerates additional powers
belonging to the federal government. Though the argument still goes, it is possible to
conclude that, this latter provision is drafted in a specific term and this stipulation that
Solomon Negussie, Fiscal Federalism in the Ethiopian Ethnic- based Federal system, Nijmegen, supra
note 27 at 60.
194 The Indian case will exemplify this latter scenario.
195 A similar conclusion has been made by Solomon Negussie and some other Federal authors. See also
Solomon Negussie supra note 27 at 60.
196 At the first glance, some doubts as to the exclusivity of those federal powers under Article 51. If one
adopts the statutory interpretation of the maxim expresso unius exclusion alterius (I.e. mentioning of one
thing implies the exclusion of the other), these powers specifically mentioned under the federal
government never belongs to the residual (exclusive) authority of the states. Therefore, it may be
possible to construe the Ethiopian way by employing this established rule of interpretation and of the
federal idea. Still, we can argue that the Ethiopian way of adopting the exclusive powers principle is
loose by which there are many shared competencies in between.
193
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enumerate the powers of the center is not exhaustive. Hence, to grasp all the powers of
the center, one has to go through the text of the constitution.
In terms of substance, the federal government is assigned with the wide-ranging powers
in the areas of currency, national defense, foreign policy, the establishment and
implementation of national standards on health, education, science and technology197
and etc. As a rule, if we apply the federal practice and the doctrine of enumerated
powers, the HPR cannot endorse any law unless it is affirmatively authorized by the
constitution.
Particularly, the legislative areas in which the federal government exercises exclusive
authority are enumerated in Article 55. This provision states that:
The federation shall have exclusive power to legislate with respect to ‘foreign
affairs and defence, including the protection of the civilian population;
citizenship, freedom of movement, passports, immigration, emigration, and
extradition; currency, money and coinage, weight and measures and the
determination of standards of time; the unity of the customs and trading area
foreign trade; air transport; federal rail ways; postal and telecommunications
services; industrial property rights, copy rights and publishing; statistics;
regulation of federal employees.198
At the end, before winding up this section, one thing must be clear. As I have pointed
out above, the legislative competencies of the center should not be understood in an
exhaustive mode as illustrated or enumerated under Article 51. It might appear that by
virtue of the reserve clause, any power not mentioned under Article 51 belongs to the
states. But a close reading of the constitution reveals that, there are other significant
powers of the federation199 all the way through the text of the constitution which nullify
197 There is a clear controversy concerning such power of the center since the states also retains similar
powers unless the argument is boiled down to give a positive interpretation of the constitutional
stipulation in the way it indicates a framework of concurrent legislative power to both levels though
there is no institutional mechanism to implement this.
198 Surprisingly this list did not include the Electric power plant establishment and distribution which is
in fact the power exercised by the federal government.
199Among others the power to enact a labour code, commercial code, penal code, approval of federal
appointments submitted by the executive, and the establishment of federal institutions are not included
in the federal exclusive list of powers under Article 51.
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the above assertion of empowering the states with the unenumerated fields.200 The
elusive concept of the theory of subsidiarity201 as in some European federations seems
disregarded in the Ethiopian federal milieu because the federal government maintains
many of the powers even without the need to rationalize the existence of a prime
objective. But it is possible to argue that, some of the major powers of the federation
take into account the subsidiarity rule as they can be best achieved by the center than
the regional governments such as Defense and Foreign policy.
4.1.1.2. A “Necessary and Proper Clause” to confer the Center an Implied Authority?
Article I, clause 18 of the United States constitution technically known as the necessary
and proper clause, is the origin of the theory of implied powers. According to this clause;
the Congress is empowered to make all laws which shall be deems necessary and proper
for carrying out (executing) those enumerated powers and all other powers vested by the
constitution or any department or officer thereof. In the famous case of McCulloch v.
Maryland202 chief justice Marshal incorporated the doctrine of implied powers to settle
an issue whether the Congress could incorporate a federal National Bank or not. The
chief justice constructed the necessary and proper clause and the gist of implied power
of Congress as follows:
‘[...] Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution are
constitutional.’203
Conversely, the constitution of FDRE has not expressly used an expression comparable
with the “necessary and proper clause” as in the United States. Some tends to argue
that, such constitutional muteness should not in any way leads us to the conclusion that
200 But as per the discussions on the provisions that deals with division of legislative powers during the
constitutional making process, it appears that Article 51 is intended to cover a whole list of powers
conferred on the federal government and then other provisions were to specify the respective powers of
each federal body, for instance that of the HPR and the executive, as if there existed a separation of
powers among the federal bodies. See also Assefa supra note 15 at 179.
201 The concept of subsidiarity is a principle which dictates that the central government should take on
powers only when it is necessary to achieve an object and when it adds value in comparison to what the
governments of the constituent units could achieve on their own.
202 McCulloch v. Maryland 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
203 Ibid; And also quoted by Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia, supra
note 15 at 176.
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the federal government is not empowered to exercise implied powers. Rather, with the
view of saving the center from the adventurous task of interpreting the general
constitutional provisions dealing with its mandate, the HPR may issue subsidiary
comprehensive laws that will make life easier and secures its functional existence. Thus,
there is the possibility of arguing that, even if the constitution is silent about the federal
implied powers, it is logical to confer the center with such authorities from the
pragmatic point of view. In addition, as I have tried to point out in the previous chapter,
though the center has no supreme authority to derogate incongruous state legislations,
there are few decisions that argue to the affirmative i.e. to empower the center with the
power of preemption.
Without losing site of the constitutional distribution of authorities between the two
levels, there are some provisions which give the center, in fact confusingly, to establish
and implement national standards and basic policy criteria for various essential matters
such as health and education. From this it may be argued that, the constitution also
have a tendency of giving a necessary and proper clause defense to the center, at least to
take the enterprise of channeling the constituent units with some policy directions.204
In my opinion, keeping intact the authority of the center to enact such legislations in
exercising implied powers, for the purpose of preserving the interest of the constituent
units and the federal practice, it has to justify the rational connection between the
implied and enumerated powers. And also, the application of the doctrine should not
extend the authority of the center against the reserved or enumerated powers of the
constituent units.205
See Article 51(2) of the FDRE Constitution.
there are opponents to such affirmation of empowering the center with implied powers
from diverse viewpoints. Some bases their critics on the unique nature of the Ethiopian federal project
and its concomitant emphasis on the autonomy of the Nationality groups which according to them, must
result in limiting the powers of the center. In addition the other argument supporting this view comes
from the idea that, the powers of the federation in Ethiopia is already listed out and thankfully the
constitution empowers the states with the rest of the powers. Nonetheless, the nature of implied powers
is not in a way to evade the powers of the states or the nationalities rather it is to secure the functional
existence of the center as one important limb of the polity.
204
205Obviously,
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4.1.1.3. Residual Authority to the States of the Federation
Constitutional division of powers in federations should take into account change of
circumstances as they may have a direct influence on the federal distribution of powers
and consequently on its operation. The idea of residual or reserve powers is directly
linked with such a rational backdrop as invented by the founding fathers.
Conceptually, residual powers are those powers which are not included in the list of
exclusive or shared powers. The reason for their neglect at some point in the federal
making process is their very nature of specificity and unforseeness. As a human person,
the constitutional drafters may not comprehend each and every detail of the powers in a
given polity. More importantly in the dynamic and sophisticated world, it is
impracticable to make an exhaustive list of potential powers of the government
whatsoever its level is. So, reserve powers are important tools that can serve as filling
this lacuna of the federal formula.
In the same way as the 10th Amendment of the United States constitution, Article 52(1)
of the FDRE constitution states that ‘All powers not given expressly to the federal government
alone or concurrently to the federal government and the states are reserved to the states.’ This is a
clear affirmation of the states authority regarding the residual powers. Curiously, in
addition to declaring the place of residual powers, the same provision enumerates, in
fact in an open ended manner, six classes of jurisdictions to the constituent units. The
issue is the reason of having such list after the constitution opted for the states
enjoyment of all the unenumerated powers. In my opinion, the list is merely serving the
purpose of illustrating and defining in certain respect their power to legislate in such
fields. So, the provision is intended to exemplify the vast residual legislative, executive,
and judicial power of the constituent units of the Ethiopian federation.
Another important concern is how much these powers can be exercised by the states in
the existence of enumerated list of authorities given to the center. There importance is
very much dependent on the the scope of exclusive powers conferred upon the other
unit of government. In terms of formula, as Assefa and some other federal authors
75
noted, the greater the list of enumerated powers, the less significant the residual powers
will be and the vice versa. The Ethiopian case of residual powers has to be seen from
this standpoint.
The very reason that leaves the states with these powers, as in some matured
federations, is to limit the influence of the centre against the autonomy and sovereignty
of the states. For example, in the United States with the ‘police powers’ as they prefer to
identify the reserve powers, the states will enjoy enough constitutional space to be
laboratories of democracy and to implement their specific policies in the absence of any
pressure from the centre. This may for the most part related with the foundation and
background of their federal system and Americans exceptionalism but generally
intended to save the units from the adventures and ever-growing powers of the new
comer i.e. the federation.
The Ethiopian case is not yet clear. From the very outset the constitution puts a twofold
division of legislative, executive and judicial powers. And, the states are entitled with
some specifically mentioned authorities and the residual powers. However, in my
opinion, the states powers are exactly those which are explicitly mentioned under
Article 52(2).206 Meaning, it is very much tricky to envision any power which is not
mentioned under the “enumerated” federal powers and other provisions that are
designed to deal with authorities of the centre in a particular fashion. Hence, the notion
of residual power in the Ethiopian federal setting plays only an artificial role of
designating the states as the power centres. But we have to note that, there are other key
powers which are generally given to the states but not in a residual manner. Such
powers includes the right to self determination and secession, the power to frame and
ratify their own constitution, and etc.
According to this provision, states shall have the powers and functions: a) to establish a state
administration that best advances self-government, a democratic order based on the rule of law, to
protect and defend the Federal Constitution; b) to enact and execute the state constitution and other
laws; c) to formulate and execute economic, social, and development policies, strategies and plans of the
state; d) to administer land and other natural resources in accordance with federal laws; e) to levy and
collect taxes and duties on revenue sources reserved to the states and to draw up and administer the
state budget; f) to enact and enforce laws on the state civil service and their conditions of work; in the
implementation of this responsibility it shall ensure that educational, training and experience
requirements for any job, title or position approximate national standards; g) to establish and
administer a state police force, and to maintain public order and peace within the state.
206
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4.1.1.4. Shared Legislative
Legislative Competencies207
In a federal system the allocation of competencies is one of the most risky venture and
according to federal writers, it is quite difficult to clearly divide all the powers into a
perfect cubicle. As a result, almost all federations provide another set of powers other
than the exclusive and residual authorities, which are commonly described as shared
powers. With the view of securing uniformity across the nation, the centre will take
some powers of legislations in line with the states power on the same areas. Principally,
in these categories of competencies both orders of government can claim ownership but
practically the centre will take the frontage and the initiative. Among the policy reasons
for these parallel jurisdictions, avoiding spillovers on other states or on the federation
itself and the inevitability of overlapping of jurisdictions are the most important.
Therefore in theory, shared powers indicate the powers of each order of governments to
legislate in broad areas of jurisdictions and to make decisions independently but in a
cooperative manner which incidentally nullifies the impracticability of the duality or
coordinate division.
In terms of the field of coverage it can be stated broadly that for the most part the social
and economic spheres fall into this category.208 Shared powers may take either of two
forms- Concurrent or Frame work. This taxonomy is clearly indicated in the Basic Law
of Germany.209 Accordingly,
Framework powers are generally powers which are shared between the centre and the
regional governments but calls for some sort of cooperation between the two. The
There are some notable federal writers that have tried to treat the taxonomy in different manner. For
instance R. Watts considers shared powers as authorities that are different in some respects from
concurrent and framework powers while other writers opted to use shared powers as a collection of the
wide-ranging concurrent and framework powers. For the purpose of my study, I prefer to use shared
powers as a principal power that can also embrace concurrent and framework powers. The reason is just
related with the very nature of these powers in one way or another concurrent and framework powers
are shared by both orders of the governments. Indeed, it is in this area of shared competencies that the
need for intergovernmental collaboration becomes visible. It calls for institutionalized, politically
committed, and disciplined system of intergovernmental relation forum by considering the possibility of
overlap of jurisdiction and at times conflict.
208 Assefa supra note 15 at 188. The areas may include regulation of trade and commerce, industries and
labour and economic planning and from the social agendas- education, health protection and welfare of
citizens, insurance, and assistance for old age, unemployment, accident, and workers’ compensation can
be mentioned.
209 See the Basic Law of Germany Article 75 which says the federation has the power to enact framework
legislation for the Lander with regard to those subjects listed in this provision such as higher education,
legal relations of the press, land distribution, management of water resources, nature conservation, and
the registration of persons residence and domicile.
207
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centre is entitled to design the skeleton or to take the initiatives of issuing general
provisions but expected to leave substantial room for the states to enact their own
legislation within the standards set by the federation.210 The centre should leave to the
states a power which is something of substance. It is aimed at securing nearly equal
standard of living conditions and thereby avoiding imbalances which may be resulted
from political asymmetry and also to secure a basic national uniformity.
The states under this category of powers are allowed to fill-in the gaps with more
detailed laws.211 As Watts noted,
Unlike the concurrent powers in which the federal government has the potential
competence to absorb, federal framework legislation indicates an interesting
compromise that requires significant decentralization of policy-making authority
without sacrificing uniformity where it is needed.212
At first glance, the Ethiopian constitution may be regarded as a federal constitution
short of shared competencies except in the field of tax. But, a closer look at the details
suggests that the constitution provides for many areas of shared powers of legislation.
First, Article 55(6) which empowers the HPR to enact civil laws213 that may deem
necessary to sustain one economic community by the initiation of the second Chamber
(HoF) is indicative of the existence of framework competencies. Second, the cumulative
reading of Article 51(2-3) and 52 (2 (C) that gives the central government to establish
and implement national standards that directs the states towards adopting their own
specific policies in the same areas can be mentioned. The area covered under this latter
scenario includes public health, education, science and technology as well as the
protection and preservation of cultural and historical legacies. There are a lot of
overlaps between the two provisions unless the argument is boiled down to the
recognition of framework powers. The issue which is not settled yet is the extent of
power left to the states and the position that will be taken whenever conflict arises in
exercising such powers.214 But as regards to the first concern, the constitution stipulates
Solomon supra note 27 at 66.
Assefa supra note 11.
212 Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd ed., supra note 41 at 90.
213 Note that, enacting civil laws is in principle a state jurisdiction as per the provision of Article 52.
214 Here, it is important to look at the decision of the CCI (in chapter three) regarding the allegation filed
by Biyadglegn Melese et al against a law issued by the Amhara National regional state concerning land
redistribution.
210
211
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that, the states of the federation are endowed not merely with administrative power but with
the power to formulate and execute economic, social and development policies.215
Thirdly, the provision that deals with the utilization and conservation of land is another
area of interest concerning the parallel exercise of legislative powers in the same field
but in different ways.216 Though the practice suggests otherwise, as the constitution
stands now, legislation on these issues of land is the prerogative of the federation while
the states has retained the power to administer the same.
Generally, even if the constitution is not clear with the taxonomy and the issue in
general, these are some of the areas that can be regarded as framework legislative
competencies by which the centre at Addis Ababa will enact some policy guidance by
which the states are expected to take into consideration.
Concurrent powers on the other hand are powers that are in principle shared between
both levels of government but in practice left to be exercised usually by the states until
the central government step in at the moment when it becomes a matter of federal
importance.217 According to Watts, concurrency has a number of advantages in
federations. It will provide an element of flexibility in the distribution of power enabling
the federal government to postpone the exercise of potential authority in a particular
field until it becomes a federal main concern.218 It is also the leeway for the federation to
correct backward states or to deal with difficulties arising from state legislation which
has spill-over effects on other states.219
Coming to the Ethiopian case, the constitution provides for concurrency only in the
areas of taxation. Lovise Aalen for example argued that, the Ethiopian federal
framework has not adopted the concept of concurrent powers other than some
indications regarding the power to tax.220 Conversely however, there are some
Article 52 (2) of the FDRE constitution and see also Assefa supra note 15.
See Articles 52(2) d, 55(2) a, and 51(5) of the Constitution.
217 Assefa Fiseha, Theory versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism, supra note
11 at 131-164.
218 Watts supra note 41 at 89.
219 Ibid.
220 Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991–2000, supra
note 19 at 56.
215
216
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Ethiopian authors who have tried to explore the possibility of coming with concurrent
powers as the constitution stands now.221 The first base for their argument is Article
55(5) which enunciates as regards the possibility for the states to enact penal legislations
in the areas which are not exhausted by the centre. The other area of concurrency
according to Solomon is the declaration of state of emergency.222 Accordingly, both the
federation and the states can declare emergency in their own spheres.
4.1.2. Executive Power Division
The other area of interest in the study of division of competencies, and in fact have a
substantial impact on the federal-state relation is the authority of the governments in a
federation to execute legislations issued under their respective domain and related issues
of cooperation. In relation to this, we have to note that, in some federations the regional
states may tend to implement not only their own exclusive policies but also assigned by
the federation to apply laws issued at the centre. That means the regional governments
are responsible for applying most federal laws and delivering most federal services. This
latter scheme of arrangement is common in Germany and Switzerland by which the
Ländres and the Cantonal authorities are someway restricted from the policy making
stages but consequently empowered to execute these laws in their respective areas. As
indicated in the second chapter, this arrangement is technically known as executive
federalism.
But, on the other hand in the United States, Canada and Australia, the distribution of
administrative responsibilities in most matters corresponds with the distribution of
legislative authority. That means executive power is co-extensive with the legislative
power.
In Ethiopia, the constitution explicitly says that the federal government and the states
shall have legislative, executive and judicial powers which suggests that the
organization of the federal executive with the division of legislative power- that there
will be a federal executive in charge of enforcing federal laws and a parallel state
221
222
Among others Assefa supra note 15 and Solomon supra note 27 can be mentioned.
See also Article 93 of the FDRE constitution and similar provisions in the states constitutions.
80
executive that takes care of state laws.223 In doing so, unlike the German experience, the
Ethiopian system adopts the duality rule. For that reason in Ethiopia, federal laws are
to be implemented through the federal executive not by the regional governments unless
we tempted to look at the possibilities of delegation which is a different devise. The
constitution reserves the executive responsibility to each level of government on matters
in which they exercise the legislative power. The role of cooperation in implementing
federally designed legislations as another avenue for the states to exercise some kind of
shared rule has been ignored during the constitutional making. Consequently, the state’s
role of administration of federal laws is not yet clear.
There are some loopholes to confer the states a power to administer and follow-up the
implementation of federally designed policies. This is when the constitution expressly
reserves legislation power to the centre and leaves the states with the administration of
the same224 and as indicated above, there may be delegation of some federal powers to
the sates concerning its execution.225 The other area is the provision dealing with
framework powers by which the centre is entitled with providing policy direction
concerning basic socioeconomic matters.226 Taking into account the policy directions
from the centre, states are entitled to endorse implementation legislations. From the
reading of the wordings of the constitution, one may consider some of the legislative
powers of the federation as incomplete and leave some spaces for the regions to
administer them.227 There are also some federal powers which cannot be properly
enforced unless the states are willing or legally bound to cooperate with the centre.
If we look at the practice, there are some federally established and administered offices
at the regions that are enforcing federally designed legislations.228 But, this trend seems
not all-inclusive and appealing as these offices are limited when we balance them with
the broad policymaking powers of the centre as enshrined in the supreme law.
Article 50 (2) of the Constitution and Assefa supra note 11 at 151.
The state’s role in the administration of the land utilization and conservation law to be issued by the
federal parliament as pointed out under Article 51 (5) and article 52(2,d) of the FDRE constitution can
be mentioned here.
225 See Article 50(9) of the Constitution.
226 Article 51(3) of the FDRE constitution. It may be argued however that, this is also a power left to the
states not only to implement federal frameworks but also to legislate on the same.
227 Powers with regard to issuing legislations on unlawful possession and bearing of arms and laws
governing political parties can be mentioned here.
228 Among others, the Customs and Revenue Authority, Telecommunications, Postal Services, Insurance
and Banking and Federal Public Prosecution are operational to date.
223
224
81
Indirectly this implies that the other areas are covered by the executive institutions of
the states. Undoubtedly, in the absence of formal intergovernmental relation tools and a
comprehensive list of concurrent powers, confusions may arise on the implementation
of federally deliberated policies in the regions.
In sum, in Ethiopia, though the constitution has tried to set a dual system of division of
executive prerogatives, in practice there is no proper adherence. There is a gap to put in
practice such constitutional aspiration due to some constraints and lack of political
commitment.
4.1.3. Looking at the Constitutional Distribution of Powers seriously:
Does it Matter to keep the federal balance of power in Ethiopia?
Ethiopia?
This section is built-in at this stage only with the intention of evaluating whether the
formal division of authority in the federal constitution can be regarded as the principal
guideline in the federal practice of Ethiopia. And, it is just to look at the constitutions
approach of the venture in a close manner. The public or political discourse during the
federal bargain and even these days is that, the states are empowered with the most
significant powers in the principal motive of ensuring the absolute sovereignty of the
nationalities. This thinking is also dominant among the academics and contemporary
Ethiopian elites. However, as far as me is concerned this must be carefully analyzed
first from the text and substance of the constitution itself and finally from the practice.
Otherwise it will be a hasty generalization without having the objective parameters of
measuring such “overriding” role of the constituent units in Ethiopia.
Definitely the nationalities thereby the regional states of Ethiopia are considered to be
the forming bricks of the federation and also, at least literally entitled with the triumph
rights of self determination and secession. In addition, they are the holders of equal
rights with the federation which is substantiated by the principle of federal comity. There
are also some financial sources allocated to the states. More than everything, the states
are entitled with the residual authorities.
My concern is to evaluate how much the constitution itself leaves a space for the states
to put into practice these powers. In other words, how much these rights weight in light
82
of the overall constitutional set up. First let’s see the exclusive federal powers. The
center is entitled with the major policymaking roles and in the most substantial affairs of
the country. It is practically difficult for the states to come up with a law in the major
areas of socioeconomic sphere unless they allege the residual nature of the said
jurisdiction which is almost impossible. The center exhausts most of the areas of
legislation and by virtue of the theory of “reserve powers”; the states are left with some
administration like powers than policymaking prerogatives.
With regard to the framework powers as discussed above and invented through
interpretation of the constitution, they are derivative powers by their very nature which
may or may not give enough space for the regions. For instance, in most of the cases,
the center produced a detailed laws and policy “frameworks” to be implemented and
observed by the states which validate my argument. That means there is no substantial
guarantee as to the manner by which the center is going to manipulate these areas of
competencies. The worst scenario is the absence of comprehensive concurrent
jurisdictions in the area of policy formulations.
And again let’s have a look at the residual powers. As argued elsewhere, the center is
constitutionally certified to pass legislations in the main fields of “life” in the country.
Establishing a state administration, which is the first of the residual authorities that is
expressly stated by the constitution for example, is more of an executive and
bureaucratic power rather than being an area of lawmaking. The same argument may
be produced for the subsequent powers in this provision. I don’t think a constitutional
authorization to endorse a state constitution which is subsidiary to its federal
counterpart and as some argued to federal legislations can be also comparable with the
power of participating on the major policy directions and principles that in one way or
another influence the day to day deed of the public at large.
On the other way round, neither the states nor the so called nationalities are empowered
to participate in the lawmaking process of the centre. From the very foundation, Federal
law is a law which is applicable throughout the country and it governs the polity as a
whole. So all interested parties, let alone the forming bricks of the state, should have a
say on these generally applicable legislation or policy guideline. I was wondering
whether the states lacking of legislative power in the center can be compensated by their
83
role as adjudicator of constitutional disputes. But federal practice shows that, this is
another concern which is not equivalent with participating at the deliberations and
reflecting the views and opinions of the states at the very inception of national policies.
In the constitution, there is also a provision that empowers the center to intervene at the
regions whenever there is a failure to bring suspected human right violations to a court
of law even without the request of the state. Even if it is a special approach, it is an
additional avenue inside the constitution that bestows the federation to manipulate and
abuse the states existence. One may argue that, the states may claim their selfdetermination or in worst cases secession right whenever there exist coercion from the
center. But, a cursory look at the faces of the constitution, as I have tried to point out
earlier gives the impression that the federation basis itself not at the center rather on the
states. So, the states may not assert such rights merely on the grounds of lacking policy
making powers. In addition, apparently we have no viable federal entities that are in a
position to construe and then challenge the constitutional division of authorities.229 Last
but not the least, there are non-formal devices of coercing the constituent units as
discussed in the next chapter. Consequently, one can also question the possibilities of
exercising these sensitive rights citreous-paribus i.e. as the constitution stands now.
A related matter is the financial authorities of the members of the federation.
Constitutionally, both levels of governments share the right to levy taxes and collect
duties on revenue sources. But, the central government has monopolized most of the
lucrative revenue generation powers under the guise of redistribution role. This can easily
be ascertained from the close reading of the sections that are dedicated to deal with
financial matters. Unlike expenditure responsibilities where we find residual power (at
least in theory); there is no such thing in revenue source allocation. The residual
principle does not hold true for assigning taxation prerogatives.
Some scholars hold that the Constitution itself has denied the states of important powers. Hence, the
argument is that the Constitution has from the outset established weaker states and the political practice
simply ‘reinforces’ the dominance of the center. For instance, according to Treisman and Andreas Eshete,
the Ethiopian constitution gave weak powers to sub-national governments. See Daniel Treisman,
Defining and Measuring Decentralization: a Global Perspective, Department of political science, University
of California, Los Angeles (2002); Andreas Eshete Ethnic Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian politics;
in First National conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building (Addis Ababa, United Printer, Plc.
2003)
229
84
In sum, if one looks the constitutional division of autonomy critically, the powers
allocated to the regions by any of the scheme of arrangements seems colorful but with
little significance. In line with this view, several writers, including Abbink claims that
the actual division of powers between member states and federal government is “not
federal enough” because the states do not have any role in debating the policies and in
proposing legislation formulated at federal level. He justifies this claim by pointing at
the fact that other federal systems, such as the German, Canadian, Nigerian and
Mexican, have given more power of this kind to the member states.230
I am not denying the states (or the ethno-national groups) recognition as the major
actors in the federal system of Ethiopia; rather my argument is based on their role as a
policy makers and the authority to reflect their autonomous existence through the
obvious apparatus of policy deliberations at the centre. If everything is legislated at the
center short of reflecting the states view, though there are some way-outs, the story will
be totally changed and the very existence of the system will be questioned. Thus the
formal division of power in Ethiopia does not matter to maintain the federal balance
power and the impression that the states are the superior actors in the Ethiopian federal
makeup seems an argument based on the motives and aspirations of the front pages of
the constitution. But the issue that remains unsettled is whether the states are in a
position to use some of their powers even in implementing freely without any pressure
from the center those major policies set by the latter. I will come up with this issue latter
in chapter five.
4.2. Conclusions
The division of competencies in Ethiopia is one of the highly debated and contested
subjects as regards its form and substance. Taking lessons from the previous centralized
states structure, the constitutional framers has tried to empower the diverse nationalities
of the country unrestricted rights of self determination up to and including secession.
Towards the effective realization of such privileges, the constituent units are also vividly
becomes the central players in the division of state power. Consequently, the
constitution, following the matured federations such as the United States adopts the
See Abbink, Jon Ethnicity and constitutionalism in contemporary Ethiopia, Journal of African Law 41:
(1997), at 159-174
230
85
duality system of dividing legislative, executive and judicial powers between the federal
parties. More importantly, the federal powers are enumerated while the states take the
residue which may create an impression that the federation is an aggregate of these
constituent units. But the constitution, almost throughout the text incorporates further
federal powers not mentioned in the enumerated list.
The framework of division of authorities also reveals other important features such as
the nonexistence of an express federal supremacy or preemption. Added, the
constitution overlooks the relevance of a catalog of competencies that can be taken as
shared autonomies either concurrently between the two orders or by letting the center to
lay down the framework and accede to the states to adopt them by considering their
priorities. However, as discussed in this chapter, there are areas of framework and
concurrent legislative competencies that need serious considerations because they might
have an impact on the overall performance of the federation as well as the daily deed of
the public at large.
The other important topic in this chapter is the close analysis of the constitutional
division of competencies between the governments and its real implications as to the
balance of power. The aim was to look critically the substance of the jurisdictions given
to the federal bargainers. Consequently this particular section concludes that, though
the constitution superbly empowers the constituent units with the triumph rights of self
determination and secession, their influence with regard to legislative as well as
executive autonomy is already weakened by the constitution itself. Such weakness is
also exacerbated by some other additional factors such as their exclusion from the
central law making process.
To substantiate the constitutional and other theoretical dilemmas that have an actual
impact on the federal process in general and on the center-state relations in particular,
the next chapter has tried to look the issue from the operational side of the federal setup.
The chapter will try to investigate the basis of the relationship between the two tiers of
government, factors that have a substantial impact on the maintenance of the balance of
power, and other post-constitutional or extra-constitutional features that have a real
influence in determining the trend of the relationships.
86
5. Center–
enter–State Relations
Relations in the Ethiopian Federal Discourse:
Discourse:
A Look from the Practice
Introduction
It is argued elsewhere that the motives and the initial mind set in setting up a federal
arrangement in Ethiopia is to give sufficient politico-economic autonomy for the diverse
nationalities through decentralized governance. As the constitution precisely
pronounces, ‘[…] adequate power shall be granted to the lowest units of government to
enable the people to participate directly in the administration of such units’231 so as to
point to the incomplete nature of the Ethiopian federalism in the way to let the states or
the so called nationalities in filling the political space. In theory, the states power
extends from those routine businesses of local influence to self determination, secession
included. Some also contends that, the Ethiopian states are in a much better position
than any other federal experience. Member states can as well have their own
constitution which can be treated as an expression of their sovereignty.
The establishment of the House of Nationalities, with all its critics (on its composition
and power), is another concrete measure in the position of states under the pretext of
defending ethno-national groups from assimilationist policy. This House, which is the
second chamber in the Ethiopian parliamentary edifice, is equipped with important
powers that make it the vanguard of the constitutional rights and interests of the
contracting parties to the union. It interpret the covenant, decides on the right to self
determination of groups; it also exclusively determines the allotment of revenue derived
from the joint federal and state tax basis and the subsidies that the federal government
may grant the states.
These all underscore the central position, at least in the language of the constitution, the
Ethiopian states have. Legal pluralism, in the course of the constitutional recognition of
231
Article 50 (4) of the FDRE constitution, supra note 3.
87
customary and religious laws and courts has been effected and sensibly went into action
in the areas of family and personal stuff on the way to reflect the self identity of various
groups residing in the constituent units.
However, when it fully materialized, Ethiopia’s new state building attempt through the
federalism ideal becomes a near to unitary federation than being a devolutionary one.
Many doubt the commitment of the government to realize such constitutional
aspirations. To many critics, Ethiopia’s federal array is a de facto one party state in
which ethnic organizations are mere satellites of one vanguard political party; the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (here in after EPRDF) which is a
multiethnic ruling coalition.232 Particularly, there are a number of signals that Ethiopia’s
government has failed to devolve real power to the Regions and bring about
decentralization as opposed to the constitutional framework.
At the end, the Federal-State relation takes a top-down approach and the states are now
serving as an administrative agent of the center rather than being independent entities
created by the supreme law. In this very chapter the bases and realities of the FederalState relationships in the federal practice will be analyzed and the responses and
perceptions of the constituent units towards such a dominant role of the federation will
be considered. To substantiate the issues and concerns, interviews are conducted with
some concerned regional and federal officials, members of the opposition camp and the
ruling party as well as with the staffs of Ministry of Federal Affairs. In accomplishing
this, I have first tried to look at the theoretical frameworks of Intergovernmental
relations and the cooperation tenet between the two levels of the governments as hinted
by the constitution itself then proceed with the centralizing trends of the federal
experiment to come up with the coercive features of the Center-State relations.
.
See Alem Habtu, Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A study of the secession clause in the constitution,
Supra note 17 pp 313-335, Kidane Mengisteab, Ethiopia’s Ethnic Based Federalism: 10 years after, supra
note 17, at 20_25; Kalkidan Kassaye Nonfederal Features of the Ethiopian Ethnic Based Federal
Experiment, IFF working papers 2010.
232
88
5.1. The System
System of Intergovernmental
Intergovernmental Relations
Relations in Ethiopia:
Theoretical Appraisal
Intergovernmental relations (hereafter IGR) are a ubiquitous – if sometimes
underestimated – dimension of any federation.233 This is the case, whether the federal
regime is the result of a process of unification or of devolution, whether it is “dualist” or
“integrated”, whether it has a “federal chamber” or not, whether it is coupled with a
parliamentary or a presidential system or a directorate along Swiss lines, and regardless
of the legal tradition in which it is grounded.234 The concept is very important in
understanding the operational part of a federal system since it has the tendency to alter
or entirely change the constitutional division of power. The term connotes both formal
and informal relations between the governments at different levels and capacities.235
Substantially, the relation may be treaty based agreement or at the level of
memorandum of understanding. Constitutional ambiguity, fiscal relations, public policy
interdependence, investment and trade, infrastructure management, environmental
protection, policing and security, and the sharing of resources are some of the issues
that necessitate the forum of cooperation.
The other issue is whether the cooperation should be strictly legalized or takes into
account the informal devices. Practices so far shows that, some constitutions include
relatively detailed provisions concerning the interactions between orders of government,
while informal and partisan factors (including the conduct of intergovernmental
relations through internal party machinery) frequently play a critical role.236 The
common accord is however, rather than leaving the issue totally to the informal tools, it
is better to take the middle i.e. there should exist some room for evolution from informal
practice and some general guidelines in the constitution.
233 Johanne Poirier and Cheryl Saunders, Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Countries, global
dialogue theme 8, (November 1st, 2008) at 1.
234 Ibid.
235 The relationship may be envisioned as between the federal government and constituent units, among
the units, federal-local or it may take the form state-local even local-local. The specific participants
include Ministers, Cabinets, Legislators, officials and Agencies. But it is usually dominated by the
executives. And for the purpose of this study, the focus is on the vertical aspect of the system.
236 Poirier et al. supra note 225. Exceptionally however, in South Africa, an Intergovernmental Relations
Framework Act was enacted in 2005.
89
In this section, the aim is to appraise the formal or legal mechanisms (if any) of the
intergovernmental cooperation aspect of the Ethiopian federal discourse. The prime
spotlight here is the Federal-State contacts.
The common understanding in Ethiopia is that, the constitution or other subsidiary
legislations are ignorant concerning the issue of intergovernmental relations. It is the
less treated subject in the federal setup of the country. But the institution of cooperation
between the states and the center is especially significant in Ethiopia because the formal
distribution of powers neither follows the dual arrangement nor empowers the states to
implement federally deliberated policies. The constitution has tried to highlight under
Article 50 (8) about the co-existence of the two levels of governments by placing the
federal comity principle. But this should not be taken as a guiding rule for the existence
of cooperative forums in achieving the national goals and programs. There has to be at
least some formal systems that shape the cooperation phases. Otherwise, it will be
unfairly manipulated by one of the parties (usually by the center) in setting an agenda or
coercing the partakers.
Some Ethiopian publications have tried to suggest the inclusion of formal ways of
collaboration even from the lexis of the constitution. The provision dealing with
delegation of some administrative like authority to the states with all its shortcomings is
the first way of cooperation as indicated by these groups.237 However, delegation may
not always create the opportunity to discuss the manners and possibilities of enforcing
the power in question. And, delegation is not an appropriate tool of cooperation since it
is a blessing from one of the parties (the central government in our case). Note that,
through intergovernmental cooperation forums, federal partners pursue a wide variety
of objectives from information sharing to policy coordination, from the elaboration of
joint projects to coordinated law (or treaty) making, from the setting up of joint bodies
to the establishment of mechanisms for dispute resolution. Even if we argue in favor of
such a practice of delegation, the only area which is explicitly delegated to the states is
judicial authority which means the center-states relations through delegation is not as
such impressive and serves no or little purpose for the coordination between the two.
See Article 50(9) of the FDRE constitution that adopts the possibility of downward delegation- by
which the center may expressly delegate some of its powers to the states.
237
90
Following the constitutional adoption however, the federal government has come up
with the Ministry of Federal Affairs to deal with the intergovernmental cooperation side
and with some other related aspirations. But as the track record of this institution
suggests, its rationale of establishment was to provide the less developed regional states
with technical assistance. The office is now considered as a key instrument of
intergovernmental co-operation (at a department level) for the most part in terms of
managing conflicts of jurisdictions and misunderstandings while the emphasis on the
capacity building of less developed regions remains the same. Therefore, at least in
theory, the Ministry is one of the formal institutional mechanisms of Intergovernmental
cooperation in Ethiopia.238
In the absence of flexible delegation regime in either of the legislative or executive areas
together with the constitutional omission of the notion of opting out or opting-in 239to the
exercise by a government of certain legislative powers, in Ethiopia the formal
intergovernmental collaboration is at its inception stage through the informal channels.
It is only on the second chamber of the parliament (HoF) which is serving as an
instrument of intergovernmental consensus on some misunderstandings between states
and the Ministry of Federal Affairs that the whole issue of collaboration formally
placed.
The argument in Ethiopia so far is the issue of whether the formal institutions are the
major channels for negotiating cooperative arrangements.240 Since a dominant political
Nevertheless, many including the staffs of the Ministry thinks that, the office lacks the competence
and influence to create a neutral forum that facilitate the cooperation aspect of the federal practice and
its operation is limited in giving training to its staffs and some regional political actors. (Interview with
some Anonymous staff members of the Ministry, October 18, 2010)
239 These concepts of opting in and opting out are common in the Canadian federalism which provides
absolute flexibility in applying a de jure asymmetry and empowering the provinces to override federal
legislations relating to certain issues of regional interest. See also Watts supra note 41 at 121.
240 Even if there is no plain formal guideline for Intergovernmental Cooperation, every branch of the
government, both in the state and the center is doing IGR which reveals the existence of picket-fence
federalism in Ethiopia. Picket fence federalism underscores the importance of the coordination of
functions by functional bureaucrats in relation to their respective functions without the need for having
a focal institution. For examples in Ethiopia, the various federal executive institutions such as the
ministries and agencies engage themselves in a cooperative discussions and meetings with their regional
counterparts such as bureaus and offices. See also, David Nice, Patricia Frederickson, politics of
Intergovernmental Relations, 2nd ed. Chicago: Nelson Hall Publishers, (1995) at 122. Also cited in Assefa
Fiseha, The System of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) in Ethiopia: In search of Institutions and
Guidelines, Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol.23 No.1 at 109.
238
91
party is in power from the very inception of the federation to date, critics indicates that,
many of the intergovernmental issues are virtually dictated by the federal government
and disagreement are resolved through this informal technique of party congruence.
Thus, added to the dearth of constitutional guidelines for intergovernmental
cooperation, the focal-point remains to be the non-formal means which perhaps opens
the door for the center to take all the initiatives and in that way install centrally
“crafted” agendas.
In the existing federal structure, having those areas of framework authorities by which
the center is at the top in providing certain directions to the states, the relevance of
formal or semi-formal intergovernmental cooperation forums becomes visible. The
broad areas of socioeconomic interactions falls in these category and the states may
necessitate such institutionally based collaborations in applying those policy directions
exclusively made by the federation. Concerning the informal tools of cooperation, and
the resultant states response, the subsequent sections will have a say by looking at the
operational sides of the federation.
5.2.
Cooperative Federalism: the de jure principle of CenterCenter-State
Relations?
Federal system not only stands for the distribution of powers between national and
regional governments, it also desires sincere co-operation between the two sets of
political organizations in order to ensure that the ideal of coordination and complete
administration of the divided spheres is attained as effectively as possible.241 Though the
classical federalists like Wheare argued that in a federation the general and regional
governments shall be independent each of the other within its sphere, the concept of
cooperative federalism which implies a strong central government is the reality in most
federations. This does not however mean that the regional governments are weak rather
It is after the recognition of the fact that, dual federal setup is only a myth by which federalist come
up with a cooperative scheme of arrangement as an ideal form of relationship between the tiers of
government. The author who popularized the concept of cooperative or the Marble cake federalism, was
Morton Grodzins and he defines it as an inseparable mingling of differently colored ingredients, the
colors appearing in vertical and diagonal strands and unexpected whirls. It is just to signify the complex
intermixing of powers and responsibilities between the federal government and the states with shared
rather than layered powers. See Morton Grodzins, The Federal System, in Laurence O‘Toole, Jr.ed.
American Intergovernmental Relations, Washington, D.C, CQ press, 1985) at 43. Cited in Assefa, supra, at
97.
241
92
they are largely administrative agencies for central policies. Cooperative federalism is
taken as an instrument by which the center will take the front hands in designing
policies and initiatives and the states to follow the federal guidelines.
Federations which are considered to be dual in terms of the mechanism of power
distributions are not as such interested in providing for constitutionally entrenched
cooperative framework between the two orders of the governments despite the existence
of de facto cooperation forums. These informal co-operations within the federal
framework may take the form of conferences held to discuss common problems, the
sharing of information between the levels of government, or the initiation of policy at
one level of government which encourages or promotes similar policies to be adopted at
other levels of government. Ultimately, the central government will become the major
player of the political scene by letting the states to be mere implementers of the centrally
deliberated ideas.
The Ethiopian federal framework has to be examined from the perspectives of whether
the de facto intergovernmental cooperation has been hinted by the constitution or it is a
purely post-federal development. The bottom line is there is a wide-ranging
intergovernmental cooperation forum in Ethiopia by which the federation proposes
some projects and the states retains the authority to implement or to follow up the
implementation of these projects. The vast areas of socio-economic policies such as
education, health, trade and investment are issues that are dealt with the cooperation
regime. The very purpose of this section is limited only to deal with the areas by which
cooperation is found or expected to ensue not to examine the institutions put in place
for this venture since I have another section to deal with the institutional aspect.
The
constitution,
generally
speaking,
has
nothing
to
say
explicitly
about
intergovernmental cooperation or competition on the other extreme.242 There is an
emphasized theory of duality which vividly shows the constitutions commitment to
ensure self rule of the nationalities there by the states of the federation. Keeping this line
of argument, there is a provision that states about the respective duty of the bargainers
However, from the reading of the four corners of the constitution, as dual federalism is put in place,
one can conclude that, competition has been taken as a norm at least with regard to powers assigned
exclusively to one of the levels.
242
93
towards respecting the areal jurisdictions of each.243 This is what federal writers labeled
as the rule of federal comity or obuntu as in South Africa. From this provision one may
argue that, the autonomous existence of the two levels is by itself an analytic of their
mutuality and undeniably results in cooperative arrangements. None of them can be
self-sufficient and lives in a vacuum.
More importantly, the preamble of the constitution gives some sort of implication
concerning the importance of cooperation though the intent is between the diverse
nationalities of the country. Accordingly, the preamble reads as:
Fully cognizant that our common destiny can best be served by further promoting
our shared interests; convinced that to live as one economic community is
necessary in order to create sustainable and mutually supportive conditions for
ensuring respect for our rights and freedoms and for the collective promotion of
our interests.244
As Solomon noted, this assertion is more of an assignment of responsibility to the
center as a facilitator of common destiny and unity with the view of realizing the
creation of one economic community which doesn’t necessarily promote cooperation
between the various nationalities. In this regard one can also mention the federal
government’s responsibility of strengthening equality, unity and fraternity245 among the
people which requires an entrenchment of a cooperative arrangement.
Apparently, the constitutional provisions that deal with the distribution of finances
explicitly recognize the inexorableness of co-operations. For instance, the allotment of
federal grants to states emergency, rehabilitation and development assistances and loans
as hinted by Article 94 is an apparent stipulation of the issue under consideration. More
significantly, the federal subsidies (the equalization grants) as indicated in chorus with
the powers and duties of the House of the Federation are also another avenue of
cooperative federalism in Ethiopia.246
Article 50 (8) of the FDRE constitution, supra note 3.
See also Solomon Negussie, supra note 132 at 57.
245 Article 88 (2) of the constitution.
246 Here it is important to note that, the House of Federation is another formally established forum of
cooperation in the Ethiopian federal framework though its mandate is limited only to the financial
matters and in settling misunderstandings and conflicts among the states. Its role in promoting the
243
244
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Since the constitution leaves no space for formal247 intergovernmental cooperation
towards implementing the socioeconomic policies and strategies, it is possible to
conceive the argument that, unless there is an intergovernmental cooperation regime,
the execution of the national policies and standards will not be doable. Therefore,
according to this view, by empowering the central legislature to come up with the
federation-wide standards and policies, the constitution impliedly introduces
cooperative federal framework.248 Last but not least, Article 89 of the constitution can
be another clue of the constitutional recognition of intergovernmental cooperation in
the Ethiopian federal edifice.249
However the huge academic debate cannot be boiled down simply in this way. The
clear constitutional recognition of cooperative federal system is not yet clear. The
practice however is patent; everything is going on through the cooperative forums either
arranged in consultation with the respective states or by the exclusive initiatives of the
center. So, despite the existence of some constitutional clues of cooperation, the system
of cooperative federalism seems not the de jure principle of intergovernmental relations
in the Ethiopian federal experience rather it is invented and developed through the
pragmatic oriented arguments.
Incidentally however, such cooperation, usually dominated by the center owing to
several factors that will be discussed latter, resulted in the concentration of powers in
the hands of the central government. The following section is intended to create a
intergovernmental cooperation aspect of the federation is severely limited due to the absence of
legislative function and the un-clarity of some of its powers and mandates.
247 For the purpose of this study, formal intergovernmental relationship and institutions refers to those
interactions and institutions as between the tiers of the government based on predetermined laws
including the constitution as opposed to the incidental mechanisms or party based relationships without
viable legislative guidelines.
248 Article 51(5), and 52 (2, d) of the constitution can be mentioned.
249 Article 89 talks about the responsibility of the government in ensuring equitable development among
the people and the regions. On the other hand, in fact arguably, the possibility for delegation of authority
may create another avenue of cooperation. The regulation of interstate commerce, the process of
constitutional amendment, conducting population censuses, administration of areas under emergency
situations are considered to be the obvious cases of cooperation though the constitution has failed to
expressly state about it. See also Solomon Negussie, supra note 132. Solomon also enunciates the need
for cooperation between the federal government and Oromia region as regards the administration of
Addis Ababa is concerned. See also Article 49(5) of the constitution.
95
possible link between the de facto cooperation between the two layers of governments
and the resultant centralized federalism in Ethiopia.
5.3. The Challenge of Centralization
Centralization
5.3.1.
General
“The greatest threat to the successful construction of federal structures is
subnational institutions without the basic capacity to govern; such institutional
weakness
prompts
the
central
government
to
unilaterally
intervene,
institutionalizing a set of centralizing pathologies that can eventually undermine
the sustainability of federal structures.”250
Some federal arrangements moved in a certain direction back from their inception. In
most cases, the standard explanation credits the constitution as the reason for this
pattern.251 In this view, the constituent units are constitutionally in a weak position visà-vis the federal government. In such a case, the general government can take advantage
of its initial powers and may be in a position to swell the same into policy areas under
the jurisdiction of states using different techniques. In extreme cases, the federal units
may be relegated to the position of mere administrative subunits in a decentralized state
rather than retaining their position as the constituent members of a federal union.
Federalists tend to use the term centralistic federation to explicate this prototype.252
Some other federations may come up with a centralized federalism structure through
political practice as an expected (intended) goal of the constitutional designers.253 On
the other line, there are federations which are influenced by the previous political
arrangements; hence, former unitary states are inclined to exhibit a more centralized
feature of federal set up while a federation established through integration tends to
empower the constituent units as an acknowledgement to their role as a forming bricks
D.Ziblatt, Structuring the state: the formation of Italy and Germany and the puzzle of Federalism,
Princeton: Princeton University press (2006) at 147.
251 The Indian (1950) and Austrian (1920) Constitutions are among the explaining examples of this
situation.
252 For example, see Ludwig K. Adamovich, Bernd Christain Funk and Gerhart Holzinger (all being
authors from Austria criticizing the centralizing features of the country’s federal set up).
253 The United State is a classic example here because the power at Washington DC becomes
overwhelming through the Supreme Courts' interpretation of the constitutional division of powers
between the two tiers and as some includes other post constitutional political developments not totally
due to the constitutional design. As I have tried to illustrate elsewhere, the architects of the US
constitution emphasized on Duality.
250
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of the political bargain. Still other federal governments may tend to remain centralized
due to external factors; in most cases, through institutional means laid down by the
general government with the view to influence decision-making there by to exercise its
superior position by introducing the rule of preemption, not constitutionally but through
other channels. Among others, party structure, fiscal sharing, court system, policy
making and etc can be mentioned. In these latter categories, the centralization is not
anticipated by the framers of the federal covenant rather it is a de facto imposition of the
center using the less dominant position of the units.
Through the canon of cooperation as pinpointed above, the center can influence the
states and will take the whole federation under its control by adopting uniform party
structure and policy making stratagem. Even though the articles of the covenant
proclaims residual and exclusive competencies reserved to the member states of the
federation, the center can effectively encroach upon such competencies in the course of
various channels as I tried to cite above. As per the residual clause (shortly means
anything that is not specified as federal competence is state competence by default
(almost in all federations except Indian)), the union members should be able to protect
their prerogatives and add many more as new policy areas emerged over the years. In
such federations which are characterized by politically invented centralization (which is
not part of the federal bargaining agenda); this is not the case nonetheless. Members of
the federation have weakened position from the angle of the political process though
this is not manifested by the constitution. The constitutional generous grant of power to
the states may either be systematically reduced or the center through its strong muscles
will make them non-existence or invisible as prefer to describe.
The Ethiopian Federal structure should be seen from this latter trend but with some
remarkable cautions. In the following, I have argued that, the centralization tendency in
the Ethiopian curious case is not totally linked with the constitutional makeup; rather it
is supplemented (most significantly) by implementation realities by which the federal
bargain is working. Thus, the following part of my discussion is devoted in examining
both the de jure factors of centralization and those contributing features from the
practice. To be specific, this study seek to demonstrate that the answers to the working
of the Ethiopian federation together with the manner of controlled system of State-
97
Federal relation lie not so much in its formal constitution as in its operational reality
even if there are some constitutionally inherited underpinnings.
It is argued that, in the existing party based intergovernmental relation and a superiorsubordinate link (top-down approach) which is also exacerbated by fiscal and
policymaking centralization in the midst of less federal outlook and principled
commitment to the division of constitutional competencies, Ethiopia’s federal system is
moved in a centralist direction even after two decades of experiment.
5.3.2. Informal254
autonomy
Intergovernmental
Cooperation
visvis-à-vis
the
States
The intergovernmental cooperation formula in Ethiopia as argued elsewhere takes a
unidirectional type in which the center takes all the frontlines of setting the agenda and
even compelling the states to submit their specific concern towards the priorities set by
the center. In this regard Merera Gudina, a veteran opposition politician argued that,
the principal reason of centralized federalism in Ethiopia is the absence of formal forum
of cooperation between the states and the federal government and the concomitant
dominance of the party device in governing the operation and way of life in the regional
states. Accordingly, the ruling coalition at anytime may pass an order for the
constituent unit governments not by inviting them to discuss on a certain course of
action rather to seek its implementation in accordance with the priorities set by the
Politburo.255
The Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) as pointed out in the previous chapter is
considered to be the obvious formal institution of intergovernmental relationships in
Ethiopia. Besides, even if there is a debate as to the overlap of power between MoFA
and the House of the Federation (HoF), the latter is in fact considered as another
As pointed out, informal intergovernmental cooperation, for the purpose of this study includes the
meetings, discussions, and other dialogues between the governments and their specific departments
without any prearranged institutional or legal frameworks including in fact the party channels.
255 The hierarchy of power that one can observe in all systems that are distinguished as authoritarian, by
which ordinary party members submit their power to a congress, the congress to a central committee,
the central committee to a politburo and the politburo in turn to the chairman of the party has been also
operational in the EPRDF system including absence of the chairman’s term of power. According to
Article 17 of the EPRDF Statute, the three top level positions in the organizational structure of the party
are General Congress of EPRDF, Council of EPRDF and Executive Committee of EPRDF.
254
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prescribed institution of cooperation between the two tiers of governments. This is
particularly true in relation to the House's role in the determination the federal
equalization grant and subsidies and as an organ in charge of adjudication of federal
disputes.
Nevertheless, as Assefa noticed, the activity of the Ministry of Federal Affairs in the
states is one of the semi-formalized practices that have an impact on the overall federalstate relations. It is an executive institution of the federal government by which the
Prime minister exercises a leading role. The attachment of the constituent units in this
organ is highly unlikely and also unfeasible if we argue from the constitutional point of
view.256 Therefore, from the concept of Intergovernmental collaboration itself, MoFA
should not be the appropriate candidate. If we insisted on this organ as an institution of
collaboration, ultimately we are giving the federation a dominant role in determining
how the cooperation aspect should look like. From the very foundation, some also tend
to condemn this trend as a mechanism of controlling the states by the centre.
The evolving practice of intergovernmental cooperation indicates that it is a top-bottom
approach in which the states have not yet commenced establishing forums for airing
their common agenda in their relations with the center and ultimately creates another
door to the latter in the enjoyment of wide-ranging unrestricted political powers.
5.3.3. Political Legitimacy of the Power Holders at the Center
Lovise Aalen and some other authors on the Ethiopian federalism argued that, the
Ethiopian federal project lacks original legitimacy.257 The main basis of the argument is
the way through which the incumbent leaders came into power and the following
“bargaining” process on the federal option. Concerning this latter issue, Aalen argued
256 It should be clear that, IGR is a forum for bargaining between the federal and state governments on
matters of common interest and as Assefa noted, if conducted based on some sense of partnership
between the two governments then in the long run it is meant to be a forum for attainment of common
goals through cooperation. See also Assefa Fiseha, The System of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) in
Ethiopia: In search of Institutions and Guidelines, supra note 240 at 96.
257 Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000, supra
note 19 at 48; Sarah Vaughan The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991: Its Origin, history and
significance. Supra note 141. Original legitimacy is different from derivative legitimacy in the sense that,
the former implies legitimacy acquired during the constitutional making while the latter comes through
redemptive political practice. For detailed analysis of this issue see Tsegaye Regassa Issues of Federalism
in Ethiopia: towards an Inventory, Ethiopian constitutional Law Series, Vol 2. No. 2, AAU 2009 at 20.
99
that, there was lack of transparency and participation in the process of the federal
bargain and most of the political elites consider the idea as a way of ensuring the
Tigray's People Liberation Front (TPLF) hegemony.
For many, such as Lidetu Ayalew, the chairman of the Ethiopian Democratic Party
(EDP), “the process of introducing federalism in Ethiopia is more of a federal
imposition (though it has gained acceptance at least moderately) than a federal bargain
and there was no or little consultation of the public”.258 When a federal option is offered
in Ethiopia, the EPRDF never really asked the opposition whether they wanted
federalism or not.259 The military superiority of the TPLF and the control that they
imposed during the negotiations made the oppositions unable to reject the offer or to
reflect their own view.260 Consequently the constitution is considered to be produced
single handed by one organization and its partners and has failed to acquire legitimacy
from the very inception.
The above arguments on the lack of legitimacy during the early days of the federal
bargain can also be substantiated by recent political events that show its continuity. In
the highly contested election of 2005 by which EPRDF lost many of its seats in both the
federal and regional parliaments, the public discourse during the pre-election periods
was an indication of the absence of trust on the central institutions and the federal idea
itself by the public at large.261
Knowing this the EPRDFs‘influence in each and every aspect of life, both in the
regional states and the center increases overwhelmingly. There are federal legislations
issued immediately after the election that have the potential of restricting any sort of
political movements in the four corners of the country. Hence, the central power
holders are always busy of widening their sphere of influence there by covering the
questions concerning their legitimacy. One may argued that the result of the recent
election (May 2010) shows otherwise of the argument produced above. However, it is
Interview with Ato Lidetu Ayalew, The chairman of the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) September
2010 Addis Ababa. On the other side however, Ato Seiko Toure Getachew, The EPRDF chief public
relation officer told me that, the federal system in Ethiopia has been introduced with the basis of
democratic process and it was supported by the representatives of each nationality groups.
259 Aalen supra note 19.
260 Ibid.
261 Abyi Teklemariam, Addis Neger, September 01, 2008, at 4.
258
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wise to consider the number of votes casted especially in urban areas that EPRDF has
got in comparison with its contestants such as Medrek. If Ethiopia has adopted the
proportional electoral model, the number of seats that the EPRDF should have will be
almost comparable with its oppositions at least as far as the major cities are
concerned.262 In addition, as the chairman of the European Union Election observer
team noted, the playing ground is far from being leveled.263
At this stage it is also important to point out the new instruments of the slogan of
‘developmentalism’ as coverage to the question of political legitimacy. For many
Ethiopian scholars and economists, the main reason behind the sudden promotion of
developmentalism appears to be the need to provide a new legitimacy for a regime that
failed to translate its promises of democracy, peace and development into practice not
as a justification for the market failure with neo-liberalism.264 This becomes evident
when one looks at the manner in which the ERPDF overplayed the recent economic
growth in the country to justify its tight grip over political power.265 It even coined an
illusory developmental objective of bringing Ethiopia into the group of middle-income
countries of the world in a matter of two or three decades.266
As Asnake noted, the mantra of developmentalism that is played day and night in
Ethiopia resonates what has been preached by authoritarian regimes from Latin
America to East Asia. Almost all of these regimes like Ethiopia today appealed:
[to the]…masses of the poor by presenting themselves as forces for progress, as
agents of development, as shortcuts to modernity. Their claim to legitimacy, their
appeals to loyalty, were that they were uniquely capable of mobilizing resources,
and energies to break the chains of poverty, to build a better future, to lead their
respective countries to affluence, power and prestige. Whatever their particular
ideological stripes, such regimes plastered their walls and minds with images that
See the official election results by The Ethiopian Electoral Board at www.electionethiopia.org/en/.
As accessed on July 11, 2010.
263 See the preliminary statement made by EU election observers, at www.ethiosun.com/eupreliminary-statement-ethiopias-election. As accessed on July 11, 2010. See also the final report on
www.afriquejet.com .
264 In this regard the notorious outstanding economist in Ethiopia Berhanu Abegaz calls for deep
economic reforms through liberal thinking not by reinventing ideologies or philosophies. See also
Asnake supra note 104.
265 Ibid.
266 Annual Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs October 2007.
262
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pictured how everything, homes- schools- hospitals-would grow in the radiant
future.267
In sum, EPRDF is challenged with the question of political legitimacy that resulted in
the concentration of all political powers at the central official’s levels through a range of
tactics rather than creating a decentralized system and open deliberation among the
public at large or to the lowest level of governments. Hence, under the prevailing
conditions in Ethiopia, one cannot talk about federalist decentralization of power. The
centralization trend which resulted from the absence of proper legitimacy of the power
holders exacerbates the rather coercive trend of the center-state relation. Since the
central power holders have not trust on their regional counterparts, they always employ
various ways of controlling the activities of the latter even in contradiction with the
constitutionally entrenched autonomy.
5.3.4. Party Congruence
Do political parties exert any significant influence on the ability of subnational
governments in federal systems to shape their own destinies? Fueled by persistent
tensions between regions and the center in a vast majority of political systems, the study
of the institutional conditions such as political party arrangements, for the maintenance
of centralization or peripheralization of federalism has come to the forefront of
scholarly and public debate. Whether the party organization is centralized or
decentralized have crucial effects on the relationship between central and regional level.
Riker argued that;
The federal relationship is centralized according to the degree to which the parties
organized to operate the central government control the parties organized to
operate the constituent governments. This amounts to the assertion that the
proximate cause of variations in the degree of centralization (or peripheralization)
in the constitutional structure of a federalism is the variation in degree of party
centralization268
Przeworski et al. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 19501990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
268 Riker, William H. Federalism: origin, operation, significance. Boston, Little Brown (1964) at 167.
267
102
In Ethiopia too, the existence of a single party dominance in all the regions as well as
the federation is condemned by many as the main cause for the centralization of power.
Since the EPRDF exercises hegemonic control269 in all the regional states through its
member and affiliated parties, absorption of power in the hands of the Politburo or the
central committee is evident. Needless to say, the concept of intraparty democracy is
unthinkable in the existence of party-discipline doctrine. In an interview with one
central committee member of the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM)
and a Woreda Administrator, I understand the fact that, everything which is proposed
by the central committee of the EPRDF at Addis Ababa should be endorsed by the
respective regional party which shows the commitment of every member to his parent
political organization (EPRDF), otherwise he/she may be condemned as hesitant of
respecting the party’s rule of obedience.
As argued above, one of the chief markers of continued centralization is the EPRDF
conception of ethnic based satellite Parties, which run the regional governments under
the supervision of the Central Committee of the ruling coalition.270 Through this channel,
the central government enjoys the absolute right to do or undo anything in the
federation. Whatever is proposed by the central government, whether it is in line with
the states priority or not, must be respected and should be taken as a parameter.
According to some of my informants from the opposition camp, the EPRDF regime
forced out its opponent ethnic parties that wanted to assert the right of their regional
states to “self-determination up to and including secession,” and it manipulated political
and administrative institutions to preserve its dominance in the political arena.
Note also that, it is not always the case that such party congruence is perpetual. There
are instants by which interparty or intraparty conflicts or disintegrations have been
occurred. The 2001 TPLF disintegration may exemplify this scenario which ultimately
It is important to note that, there are some short run benefits which are attributed to a complete,
harmonious and smooth party congruity though it is rare to happen in a free society and at times
resulted in the collapse of the system. However, there is ample evidence pointing to the fact that a
centralized party system and federalism are more an oxymoron. Such a centralized party structure
appears to have impact on the autonomy of the regional states that is expected to exist in a federation.
See also Assefa, supra note 240 at 128.
270 The ruling coalition is led by the central committee aka council, composed of one hundred eighty
members from the four member parties (45 members from each) and executive committee that
comprised of thirty six members (nine members from each). (Interview with Ato Seiko Toure Getachew
EPRDF's Public Relations Chief November 2010 Addis Ababa).
269
103
endangers the very continuity of the system as well as its contribution towards the
concentration of powers at the national government especially in the hands of the office
of the Prime minister.271 As a result, the party politics plays a twofold role in shaping
and reshaping the federal balance of power- Extreme party congruity absorbs all the
vital powers to the central committee while the internal conflict among the sister parties
has a domino effect in the lack of trust among themselves which ultimately opens the
door for the Politburo to severely oversees each and every movements of the regionally
based member and affiliated political parties.
In connection with the role of the party dynamics in shaping the federal practice in
Ethiopia, I have other sections that will be discussed in a moment. The rationale is
plain; in Ethiopia the center-state relationship is the direct derivation of the party
politics.
5.3.5. Centralization as a Necessary Evil: Is the argument convincing in the
Ethiopian case?
case?
One should not say a priori that centralization is “good” or “bad” as such, because it
automatically diminishes the autonomy of member states. Such an assertion is political
or polemical, but not scientific.272 From a scientific point of view, once the necessity of
the balance corresponding to the definition of federalism has been stated, it is possible
to consider-even if the distinction sounds too simplistic that centralization is “good” as
long as it corresponds to the search for efficiency that all members of the federal
community are going to benefit from, and on the contrary that is “bad” only if it risks to
destroy the dialectical process the system has launched, because it weakens or even
erases its decentralized elements.273
271 During the split in the central committee of the TPLF in 2001 those who opposed the prime minister,
including Gebru Asrat, President of the State of Tigray, Kuma Demeqsa, President of the State of Oromia,
and Abate Kisho, President of the State of Southern Peoples, Nations, Nationalities — the latter two had
apparently allied with the TPLF dissidents — were simply thrown out of office. Although they were
supposedly elected by the people, they found themselves replaced by those who are completely loyal to
the leadership. For a detailed analysis of the background and contexts of the disintegration see Assefa
Fiseha Theory versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism,’ supra note 11.
272 Nicolas Schmitt the Diminishing Autonomy of Sub-National Entities in Federal countries, New Trends
on Federalism, working Papers No 1, Institute of Federalism 2004 at 6.
273 Ibid.
104
In some federations, centralization is part of their efficiency project and in some others
it is a respect for the constituent units because the process may allow the principle of
subsidiarity. In Switzerland for example, the centralization agenda is justified by these
couple of arguments and also accompanied by democratic guarantees whose aim is to
limit centralization to what is necessary to the changes that are imposed by the
adaptation to political, economical or social circumstances.274
Since the concept of federalism is characterized by the search for balance between
elements of shared rule and elements of self rule, centralization is not illegitimate as
such. As Schmitt275 argued certain centralization is sometimes justified. Such argument
is prevalent in European federations due to the overwhelming and ever increasing
policy of Europeanization. Likewise, the hidden force behind the American federalism
was the necessity to centralize powers that were previously too scattered to be efficient.
In these federations therefore, centralization is taken as a necessary evil to preserve the
countries unity under a federal formula. Centralization can be justified from the angle of
efficiency and also in resisting the global influence.276
In Ethiopia as pointed out in the previous sections, there is continuous power
centralization due to factors that are out of the constitutional arena and its aspirations.
Still the Ethiopian federal experiment is grouped under those federations by which R.
Watts called centralized federations. Therefore, the issue is whether this centralization
is justified by the global influence on the politico-economy of the country given that
Ethiopia is now member to various regional and global organizations or it is just the
result of a mere political practice. In addition we have to be serious as to the goals and
reasons for this centralization policy. A related matter is, Can we argue from the
efficiency perspective?
In this regard Merera argued that,
“Although the Ethiopian Constitution declares that the states may prepare their
own constitutions, decide their own official languages, develop their own
Ibid.
Ibid.
276 Note that, in the early days of some federations, the argument for confederations and latter for
federations was based on security justifications.
274
275
105
administrative systems, establish separate police forces, and collect certain taxes,
the initiative for such arrangements in fact has come more from the center than
from the regional states. At a very fundamental level the implementation of
decentralization has been a political process intended to keep the EPRDF in the
position of being the dominant player in Ethiopia’s reconstruction and the
centralization trend can only be justified from this angle of protecting the interest
of this vanguard party and nothing else.”277
On the other hand Ato Seiko Toure emphasized on the need to have a consensus on
some nation-wide policies by which due to the states inefficiency in terms of finance
and manpower, the central government takes the initiative and cooperate with the
regional states towards their implementation. This, according to him should not be
taken as a centralization of power rather it is a cooperation reflecting common national
goals.278
Ato Lidetu has tried to look the issue from the point of view of the regionally based
parties influence on the general decision making process and their ability to bargain in
the overall federal practice. In this connection he concludes that, these political
organizations are mere satellites of the EPRDF and they can even be restructured by the
latter by its own will. Accordingly, up to these days he says, we haven’t witness a
regionally member or affiliated party that has tried to challenge the center.
Consequently, the political architects at the centre can do or undo whatever they please.
The centralization process therefore is resulted from the will of EPRDF not from the
need to cooperate with the regions or to pursue national policies and objectives.
In my opinion, the centralization practice in Ethiopia, though justified from the
efficiency perspective as we have a relatively young federal experience and inefficient
constituent units, it is a little bit severe i.e. the influence of the national government
throughout the federation exceeds its limits and for that matter centralization is not
taken as a necessary evil rather an important tool to keep the political interest of the
ruling class. According to federalists, centralization is detrimental when it risks
destroying the decentralized side of the federal dialectic as what is happening in
277
278
Interview with Dr Merera Gudina member and vice chairman of Medrek.
Interview with Ato Seiko Toure Getachew, supra note 270.
106
Ethiopia now. Most matured federations have come up with the policy of centralization
due to the increasing influence of their constituent units in the overall political practice.
However in Ethiopia, from the very beginning the regional states are not as such viable
and one can consider them as the creations of the new state building attempt.
To be specific, the country’s overall policy is designed at the central level through
different formats. Among others, the five years development plan, the Business process
reengineering package, the newly invented Development and Transformation Plan, the
Millennium Development Goals, the federal grant equalization scheme, International
Funds and Assistances usually comes from the center with conditions etc exacerbated
by the party dynamics opens a loophole for the center to stretch its hands in regulating
the daily affairs of the regional units and even the local governments. There are a
number of policy documents prepared at the central EPRDF level and required to be
uniformly applicable down to the Woreda and Kebele.279 Needless to say, the apparatus
of implementing all this plans is the party channel rather than organizing formal
negotiation forums.
Not only the policy making power that is subject to the central party process but also
the state’s political, economic as well as other important privileges entirely assigned to
them are now in practice taken by the central governments and its special units. Merera
emphatically argued that, the states are not in a position even to elect their
administrators and other officials since the central government already fix on who are
the presidents or vice of a particular regional state which according to him is an
attribute of severe form of unitary not federal governance.280 Consequently, the
accountability of those “elected” officials remains solidly to the central government, not
to the people whom they are supposedly representing. Accordingly, in what appears to
be a neo-patrimonial system, the prime minister maintains power through personal
patronage and clientelism.
Woreda and Kebele are the lower and lowest administrative units in the Ethiopian political
configuration respectively. It is not surprising to hear a simple manner of expression of the Premier at
the Woreda or Kebele level. In worst cases, a person who is appointed as a regional or Woreda governor
believes that his power is conditional upon the decision of the central committee of his mother party at
the regional or central levels as the case may be (personal discussion with one member of the ANDM
central committee)
280 According to Merera, in the recent establishment of government in Ethiopia, the majority people in
Oromia region has been opposed through petition the removal of their former president Ato Abba Dula
Gemeda though it was not successful.
279
107
All this factors has lead the federal project in Ethiopia to demonstrate the features of
what federal writers called coercive federalism281 or an aspect of intergovernmental
relationship by which the center always takes the frontline in initiating policies and
guidelines at the expense of the autonomy of subnational units and usually short of
consultation.282 The following sections are designed to deal with features, in fact that
has also contributed in one way or another to the anomaly of the balance of power in
the federal practice, which vividly signify the coercive nature of this young federal
experiment.
5.4.
Coercive Federalism: the Functional trend of the CenterCenter-State
Relations in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, although there is a constitutional commitment with regard to devolution of
power to the constituent units of the federation, the functional trend reveals otherwise;
there is a clear lop-sided relationship between the two tiers of governments. As Salih
and Markakis283 noted, decentralization in Ethiopia is a way to democratization
inasmuch as it enables more people to influence the political process. However, due to
several factors that undermine such constitutional promise, the devolution project
becomes an instrument for the power holders at the center to preside over the whole
aspects of life all over the realm. As the following discussion suggests the Center-State
relation in Ethiopia takes a top-down approach and everything said at the federal level
is considered to be “Words of God” and at the end states remains to be the
implementers of centrally deliberated and calculated projects.
The concern of this part of my thesis is to evaluate the major features of the center-state
relations in the federal practice of Ethiopia. It is a look to appraise whether this vertical
281 From a personal discussion that I have made with John Kincaid, who is in fact the author who has
introduced the concept of coercive federalism in the American viewpoint, it is possible to consider the
Ethiopian Federal practice as the one which desperately satisfies all the coercive elements of a federal
framework.
282 For further analysis of this federal jargon, see John Kincaid, contemporary U.S. federalism: coercive
change with cooperative continuity, supra note 2 John Kincaid ,From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism,
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 509, American Federalism: The
Third Century (May, 1990), pp. 139-152: Sage Publications, Inc.. On the other hand however, there are
some EPRDF personnel’s who argued that, the regional states are in a much better position to challenge
the central initiatives as the constitutional framework is designed in such a way to allow them to do this.
Interview with Ato Sekotoure Getachew (supra note 270).
283 M. A. M. Salih and John Markakis Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa, supra note 16 at 8.
108
relationship reveals what federal writers called coercive federalism or not. The key
difference with the centralizing tenets of the federal framework, which discussed above,
is only an approach of looking at the way in which the relationship is based and at this
juncture the spotlight is entirely on the reciprocal relations of both governments
established de jure.
Now it is almost two decades that the Ethiopian federal project is constitutionally put in
place and in parallel grouped under federal systems that are tabularized in the category
of centralized federalism. In the mean time, the political response for such a dominant
role of the center is an area of interest in the political as well as academic discourse. As
noted by several authors on the subject, intervening social, economic and political
variables are essential in determining the functioning of a federation. In line with this
view, before reaching at a conclusive answer, an attempt has been made to look at the
center-state relation trend in the country from these perspectives.
5.4.1. Coercive Federalism Defined
Some federations can be described as “coercive” because major political, fiscal,
statutory, regulatory, and judicial practices entail impositions of many federal (i.e.
national government) dictates on state and local governments. The concept has emerged
from the American experience of cooperative and collaborative federalism. As Kincaid
noted, the era of coercive federalism has been marked by a shift of federal policymaking
from the interests of places (i.e., state and local governments) to the interests of persons
(i.e., voters and interest groups). That is, elected federal officials, as well as the federal
courts, have been highly responsive to electoral coalitions, interest groups, and
campaign contributors and much less responsive to elected state and local government
officials.284 Through such a shift, states began to lose some of their autonomies and
subjected to federally set priorities and guidelines. As the trend reveals, quite frequently,
the states are unable to prevail against powerful interest groups that can bring crucial
financial, ideological, and voter rewards and punishments to bear on the electoral
fortunes of federal officials.
284
Kincaid supra note 5 at 1.
109
The major instruments of coercion by the federation include Grants-in-Aid- especially
conditional grants that embrace federal backings for social welfare of states citizens and
grants for infrastructure, economic development, and education; Mandates which is a
direct federal order requiring state or local governments to provide certain services or
perform certain duties; preemption rule that declares the overriding role of the federal
government with a uniform federal law and federal constraints on state taxation and
borrowing.
Coercive federalism is therefore a concept invented by federal writers to designate a
relationship between the states and the federation which is dominated more often than
not by the latter. Even if autonomous existence is conceived as an ideal theory during
the era of K.C Wheare, in practice cooperative arrangement takes the overriding
position. Nonetheless, coercive relationship is not appealing and even contradicts the
very principle of federalism and federal theory. Due to the dominant position of the
central government and institutions, by virtue of several methods, the states autonomy
will be eroded and ultimately may fall under the auspices of the federation.
Closer to home, though our case reflects some of the above mentioned coercive
elements of federalization, in the opinion of this writer, there are other important
features that enunciate the coercive trends of Center-State relationship in the context of
Ethiopia which are not the case in America or somewhere else. Therefore the Ethiopian
federalism remains to be a near to unitary system due to these factors which
unswervingly challenges the constitutional aspirations of devolution and autonomy of
states or nationalities and also the federal idea itself. As Lidetu Ayalew points in his
recent book “Medlot”; the Ethiopian federation is a federation of constitutional
principles which is already failed to be realized as the country is still operating as a
unitary state with less or no federal attitude.285 His major emphasis is the role of
EPRDF as a vanguard political force behind the federal practice that eventually resulted
in the meager position of the states in the socio-economic as well as political practice of
this country. The purpose of this particular section is to dig out this and other
contributory factors that may influence the intergovernmental relationship between the
two orders of the federal bargainers.
Lidetu Ayalew Medlot (an Amharic term which connotes a local measurement devise) 2nd edition,
2010 at 336.
285
110
5.4.2. The Vanguardist Party Argument
After its official adoption of a multiparty system in 1991, the EPRDF reinvented itself
as a dominant party.286 There is a relatively long narrative behind such domination
starting as of the early days of the constitutional making. Samuel Huntington, who
came in 1993 to Addis Ababa to advise the leaders of the EPRDF on the writing of the
1994 federal constitution, contributed to the development of the theoretical basis for a
dominant party system in the Ethiopian context.287 According to him, under a dominant
party system, there will be ‘one broad based party that has a wide appeal to a number of
groups, regularly wins elections and more or less continuously controls government.’288
In the opinion of this advisor such a system also allows ‘smaller parties which may
reflect particular ethnic, regional, or ideological interests’. Therefore from the very
inception, EPRDF is established to be a semi-permanent ruling party with some
opposition parties who will not be tolerable to control either the legislative or the
executive289 Huntington underscored that building a dominant party system under the
EPRDF serve two key purposes. First, it would provide political stability needed for
economic development and attracting foreign investment. Second, the presence of
smaller opposition political parties that compete in elections but can never form a
government either individually or collectively provide ‘democratic legitimacy’ for
EPRDF’s rule and facilitate the flow of foreign aid.290 According to some Ethiopian
authors, the reasons behind Huntington’s promotion of these ideas could be because of
his belief that poor countries like Ethiopia cannot maintain multiparty democracy.
However, the emergence and continuity of EPRDF as a vanguard political force is
accompanied with authoritarian tactics. The first of such tactics is the election fraud and
the absence of leveled playing field for all the political parties. Political parties with
different shades of ideology could not compete in an equal footing and elections remain
286 As a matter of clarification, Ethiopia under the EPRDF ruling is a de jure multiparty country while it
remains a de facto one party state.
287 Huntington, Samuel P. ‘Political Development in Ethiopia: A Peasant- Based Dominant-Party
Democracy: Report to USAID/Ethiopia on consultations with the Constitutional Commission, March-April
1993’, in W.H. Tecola (ed.), Democratization in Ethiopia (1991-1994): A Personal View? Cambridge, MA:
Khepera Publishers. See also Asnake, supra note 104 at 70, 1993.
288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
111
neither free nor fair.291 According to International Crisis Group and some other
unofficial data’s such as the Ibrahim Moy’s report, Ethiopia is among the world’s
leading country in its huge number of asylum seekers in Europe and America by which
all the claims are based on political persecution and intimidation by the ruling party.
By any count, such a vanguardist party argument292 should not be justified in a federal
country since it cannot endure political pluralism and divergence of opinion. The
nation, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia are dissimilar not only in terms of culture,
language or way of life but the political outlook of these diverse peoples should also be
added to the parameter. The hegemonic control of EPRDF restricts the right of the
people to search for alternative ideologies and politico-economic recipes.
In terms of theory, the Ethiopian party politics in general and the organization of
EPRDF in particular seem democratic and offer adequate space for regional interests.
This is because both the members and affiliated parties to the coalition are prearranged
along their ethnic (regional) lines. However, in reality power is strenuous at the central
level especially under the monopoly of the EPRDF central committee. The concept of
Intraparty democracy is not known due to the strict adherence towards the notion of
party discipline-No member of the EPRDF is allowed to vote against the proposal
offered by the party.293
According to the final election observer’s report of the European Union, the ruling party is
condemned for its tight control of such institutions as the electoral board, the courts and the electronic
media whose independence is crucially important for holding free and fair elections.
292 There are instances by which the argument is based on the free choice of the people as in the case of
South Africa (ANC is in power for the last several years controlling most of the provinces and the federal
seats through a clear support of the electorate). Conversely, In Ethiopia, according to some opposition
political groups and reports, the vanguardist party argument has developed through the misuse of the
political space by the EPRDF and through its tactic of ousting the viable oppositions from the public
stages. Moreover, the dominance of EPRDF is inextricably linked with persecution, intimidation and
arrest of opposition political groups. See also The African Report by International Crisis Group (supra
note 104 at 26).
293
Such a vanguard or dominant party design with all its concomitants such as party discipline has been
practiced in South Africa for the last two decades and still considered as friendly with their federal like
structure. The difference with the Ethiopian model is that, the African National Congress (ANC) has
already won the hearts and minds of the people of the country and also according to some opposition
political party leaders, is working for the development and accommodation of diversities of opinions in
the entire nation. ANC according to Patricia De Lille a leader of the Independent democrats is a
legitimate political party and the young ones should have a lot to learn from it. More importantly the
vanguardist thinking is not as such exaggerated in the case of ANC; in the recent election for instance, it
has received nearly 64 percent of the votes and there is the Western Cape Province which fall under the
control of opposition (The Democratic Alliance). (Note that EPRDF in now be able to control 99.7% of
the seats in parliament and no regional state has been controlled by oppositions). See also Roger
291
112
Ultimately, though the party system resembles at least on paper, Lijiphart's
consociational democracy notion (when we look the party organization formula in light
of Article 39(3)) in practical terms, the states are forced via their mother party to
consent for the center even in matters they hold reservations which in due course defeat
their autonomous constitutional existence. So in Ethiopia, the courageously stated right
of self rule is a myth than being a reality if we look critically the operational system of
the federation. The EPRDF hegemony is now an instrument for the center to install
whatever discussed and approved at the central party level. It will not be that much
problematic if there is a possibility for the regionally based parties to decide on their
own exclusive affairs. One anonymous interviewee told me that in worst cases there are
federal personnel’s who are named as loyalists that be present at the central committee
meeting of the member parties and report the same to the central politburo. According
to my informant from the Oromia region, there was one incident that some central
personnel’s who wish to attend the central committee conference of the Oromo Peoples
Democratic Organization (OPDO) one of the member parties to the coalition, are
forced to evacuate from the hall. At the end, the prime minister office intervened on the
matter and some of these party officials are expelled from their positions as suspicious
of being adherent of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) which is an opposition and
ardent supporter of the Oromia's secession from the federation.294 The worst scenario of
such philosophy and its incompatible element with the very idea of federalism is its
decision-making manner which is the next agenda.
5.4.3. Marrying Democratic Centralism with the Federal Idea
Before dealing with the elusive concept of democratic centralism295 and its appliance in
the existing Ethiopian federal political discourse, it is wise to point out that even if the
constitution officially recognized multiparty politics in the country thereby declared that
political power should only be seized through a democratic election, to date, as many
Southall the dominant party debate in South Africa, afrika spectrum, 39 Institute fur Afrika Kunde
Hamburg at 2.
294 Personal discussion with OPDO member, October 2010 Sebeta.
295 As Assefa noted, Democratic centralism is a vague concepts which generally implies that decisions are
often reached at top executive party officials level and flow directly to the grass root party members. The
consensus is only as between the top party officials. Assefa , supra note 240 at 129.
113
politicians pointed it out, twenty years after the EPRDF came to power, there is no
viable political movement and democratic election held in this country.296 The
dominant political party argument is now fashioned in the EPRDFs new program
especially after the party’s unprecedented victory in the recently held national
election.297
The issue is however the EPRDFs unenthusiastic stance and the ensuing political
stratagem towards the encroachment of multiparty democracy in the new federal
Ethiopia. The argument is based on the fact that, genuine federalism is not only the
accommodation of cultural and linguistic multiplicity but also embraces the realization
of political pluralism and the capacity to have room for the same. Obviously in a
country of more than eighty ethnic groups categorized under nine different regional
states and two additional federally controlled units, it is predictable to encompass
several political views and ideologies unless there is something wrong. It is curious to
tame similar political attitude in the entire nation. But in contemporary Ethiopia this is
the reality, EPRDF and its grouping enjoys a hegemonic control in this federally
arranged country for the last two decades.298 For various reasons (such as protesting
persecution and intimidation), independent opposition Parties boycotted all elections
held in the history of the country, leaving EPRDF and its satellite Parties to monopolize
political power. The May 2010 election shows the fact that the country is now ruled by
a single party without any viable opposition. Without any significant opposition, the
EPRDF has/ is maintained control over the Regional Governments, and the
protectorate Parties have become vehicles by which the EPRDF drills an indirect rule
over the entire realm. In my opinion this biased tendency strictly goes against the
underlined tenets of political pluralism; let alone Democracy and Constitutionalism.
296 In this regard, Leencho Leta, Merera Gudina, Professor Mesfin Woldemariam and Negede Gobeze can
be mentioned. For some Ethiopians the 2005 national election can be considered as the Ethiopia’s great
success and once in life time opportunity though at the end it also reveals its ugly results.
297
In an interview with some staffs in the House of the Federation one anonymous respondent told me
that China is seen by the Ethiopian leadership as a political model with its one central dominant party
that co-opts politics, its single ideology, and tactics such as strategically suppressing opposition groups.
But Ato Sekotoure succinctly argued that the relationship between China and Ethiopia is only on
Economic terms not of political.
298
In the words of Asnake, one of the key factors that explain the discrepancy between the officially
professed multi-partyism and the prevailing de facto single party rule under the EPRDF is the
vanguardist tradition of political parties in Ethiopia as I have tried to briefly point out above.
114
In this connection we have to mention also the TPLF's (Tigray's People Liberation
Front, one of the foremost forming bricks of EPRDF) continued dominance in the
ruling coalition which is considered by many as an auxiliary reason for the prevailing
political centralization in the hands of not only the center but also in specific groups.
Without losing site of the federal compact, at all times it calls for genuine
decentralization and ethnic neutrality of state at the center, both in essence and in
appearance.299
The point is the federation has now basis itself in this system of single party rule in all
affairs whether economic, social or political. In other words, it is via this party channel
(in fact, surprisingly for many federal advocates after the collapse of the Soviet Union)
that the Federation is working. Intergovernmental relation and state(s) allegiance to the
center is measured not by their willingness to be part of the political process rather
through the underpinning of Party discipline which eventually driven the country’s
political leaning to demonstrate the features of Democratic Centralism.
The idea of Democratic Centralism, having its derivation from the Soviet
communism300 experience reveals the aspect of a political trend that is characterized by
centralized decision making without or little involvement of the electorate. All the
deliberations and decisions of state affairs are concluded in camera or behind the walls
without the active participation of the populace; usually at the top party level. Decisions
always follow a top-down approach. Palmiro Togaliatti explained democratic
centralism in the context of the former socialist bloc as:
a simple and new type relationship of the Citizens, the Party and the State. Both
the Party and the state maintain basic units in the work places. They constitute
the foundation of both the Soviet organs and organizations of the Communist
Party. It is the task of the Party, the organizations of the Communist Party. It is
Conversely however, there are arguments which show an indication of losing grip of power by the
TPLF. Such argument is mainly advocated by former TPLF leaders and members as the new EPRDF
cabinet is more or less over controlled by the SPDM.
300
For many Ethiopian authors the Ethiopian federal formula is clearly a resemblance of the Soviet
federal experience in many respects. Among other things, as Asnake succinctly states, there is a strong
similarity between the federalism of the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia in terms of the centralisation
of power by a vanguardist political party. Like the Communist Party of the ex-Soviet Union, the EPRDF
provides political leadership to all of the ethnic regions either through its member organisations or
affiliates. This may warrant characterizing Ethiopian federalism as ‘national in form’ and ‘revolutionary
democracy in content’ by borrowing one of the well known adages of Soviet federalism – ‘national in
form’ but ‘socialist in content’.
299
115
the task of the Party, the vanguard of the working class, to direct the economic,
administrative, etc. activities of the state. The leading function of the Party
originates in the fact that it plays a leading role in the Soviet organizations and
mass organizations, and that it is the Party, which elaborates the main course of
the development of the society and struggles for the realization of its plans. The
resultant system of democratic centralism is the system of proletarian
dictatorship. In it leadership and consensus are inseparably one.301
In Ethiopia too such thinking has got an overriding support among the EPRDF
members and supporters. There is insufficient space for independent initiative, dissent
and debate. The party is the originator of the whole thing that is going to be
implemented and practiced in the entire territory. Democratic centralism provides the
top leadership of the EPRDF uncontested authority to decide both the ideological and
organizational affairs of the organization and the country itself. Like the practice of the
Soviet Union, the decision to give a certain level of administrative status to ethnic
groups, to define the competence of regional and local officials, to design the education,
health and economic policies of the nation as well as the regional states is solely rests
upon the ‘vanguard’ party- the EPRDF.
The major question regarding the devolution process in Ethiopia should be whether real
authority is shared between the central government of the EPRDF and the constituent
political units or ethnic groups. In the view of opposition political camp and some
commentators,302 the democratic centralism ideal is dominant in this country and the
making or unmaking of the Ethiopian state is dependent on the decision of the EPRDF.
The ruling party appears to have a ‘religious’ conception of politics, seeing it as
ontological and in a class by itself, a way that cannot be entertained in any other form
than its own, and one rooted in an ideology called ‘revolutionary democracy’. In this
undefined notion of revolutionary democracy,303 the basics of liberal thinking and
Cited in Asnake supra note 104 at 74.
Among others, Forum for unity and Democracy, Unity for Democracy and Justice and Ethiopian
Democratic Party can be mentioned.
303 When I was a summer fellow at the Fribourg Institute of Federalism (Switzerland), I have asked one
of my professors whether revolutionary democracy can be included in the taxonomy of democracy like
that of evolutionary democracy, liberal democracy or deliberative democracy. Surprisingly however she
is not clear with my question and told me that such sort of democratic ideology is not yet acknowledged
among academics or the political discourse.
301
302
116
deliberative democracy are totally disregarded from the political panorama. According
to a recent report, this innovative but obfuscating formula left the federal government in
control of a largely non-negotiated political order throughout the country.304 The
EPRDF also sees itself as a vanguard party that is invincible and incapable of being
wrong so that whatsoever designed or initiated by the central party must be endorsed as
the right policy for the country as a whole.
Policy initiatives that have a direct impact on the regional states are designed at the
central party level and there is no apposite legal or institutional apparatus for the latter
to be part of the process. The democratic centralism dogma in general and the
revolutionary democracy rhetoric in particular relies often on non-constitutional
techniques, such as administrative appointments on the basis of political loyalty instead
of qualification and other tools that are far from being the practice of true federal
democracy. In order to freed themselves from forced self-evaluation sessions (gimgema)
on the basis of the party ideology and policy, regional as well as local officials reserves
from challenging any sort of federal proposal despite the fact that it is incompatible with
the states predilection.
This party chain of command has effectively replaced state control. Almost all decisions
of the party are made and implemented using party structures, instead of the state
structure. Procedurally, this system violates no laws; substantively, this party control
does not encourage discourse and deliberative democracy.305 While the Federal
Constitution provides a relatively formal institutional ground for federal practice in
Ethiopia, and ownership of decision-making powers – including politico-economic ones
by local people – EPRDF party culture and structure inhibits the implementation of the
constitution and its federal spirit successfully. In short, democratic centralism is an
antithesis of federalism and resulted in a coercive trend of relationship between the
states and the center in Ethiopia. For example, regional state presidents are more
accountable to the party than to their election constituents or parliaments which finally
defeat the rationale of defining the state structure along federal design. On top of this,
centralizing attitudes are also widely shared among technocrats and civil servants in
304
Political culture in Ethiopia: A balance sheet of post-1991 ethnically based federalism, Info sheet,
African Studies Center Leiden, The Netherlands, June 2010.
305 Mehari Taddele Federalism and Conflicts in Ethiopia, African Union the African Rally for Peace and
Development: available at www.aar.ufre//meh.rally (as accessed on July 2010).
117
Ethiopia who prioritize party projects and orders before administration of justice and
protection of human rights.306
5.4.4. A federal Practice operati
operating
perating under
under Democratic Deficit and
Insufficient Constitutionalism307
Galligan has raised an important question in relation to the interdependence of
democratic practice308 and federalism. Can there be genuine federalism without
democracy? According to him the answer is negative if we are referring to modern or
republican form of federalism.309 Note that, there is a huge academic debate concerning
the affiliation between federalism and democracy.310 Some argues that the two concepts
are friends while others consider them as foes. However, the current understanding is
that, in the words of Chryssochoou:
It is possible to consider federalism as a particular type of democracy: a pluralist
democracy based on a constitutional system of delegated, reserved or shared
powers
between
relatively
autonomous,
yet
interrelated,
structures
of
government, whose multiple interactions aim to serve the sovereign will of the
federal demos.311
As I have tried to illustrate in the second chapter, for those who advocates for liberal
democracy, federalism is presented as a way of preventing tyranny by creating a more
sophisticated type of representation, both nationwide and regionally based. Even more
Ibid.
The issue of democracy and constitutionalism is among the widely debated area in the Ethiopian
political as well as academic discourse. However, the aim of this section is limited to shed light on the
fact that, the absence of well-developed culture of democracy and a hesitant commitment towards
constitutionalism and rule of law, which in one way or another is resulted from the governments
understanding of its political ideology or less commitment towards the realizations of the same, has
contributed to the coercive trend of the federal practice. As a matter of fact, these concerns, if seriously
considered can also be independent factors of political centralization and biased tendency of federalstate relationships.
308 For the purpose of this paper, democracy connotes the presence and proper protection of basic
human rights principles, free and fair election, the possibility for accommodating diversity of opinions
and political pluralism, citizen’s participation in the states affairs etc and not intended to raise the
debate as to its content and definition.
309 Brian Galligan, Australian Federalism: Has it a Future?, , Australian Adam Smith Club (Melbourne),
www.economic-justice.org/LF81.pdf accessed on (August 2010).
310 See for instance the works of D.J Elazar (1987, 1995 and 2007), Riker (1975 and 2007), Dahl (1983),
Chryssochoou (1998) and others.
311 Dimitris Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration, sage publications inc, 2001
306
307
118
emphatically, Elazar says that, federalism must be considered a mother form of
democracy like parliamentary or direct democracy. And he added that it is liberal
democracy with its emphasis on pluralism that is highly conducive to federal
arrangement.312
If this is the case, successful federalism requires robust democracy in which citizens
share membership of two political communities and participate politically in both. If
there is the deficiency of such political milieu for liberal or deliberative democracy, the
assertion that is produced above will be futile. The Ethiopian experience of federalism
and the manner in which Federal-States relation is based should have to be seen from
this standpoint. If federalism requires democracy and its manifestations, it may be
possible to raise first a question as to whether Ethiopia is a democratic country in real
political practice or not. For the purpose of this paper, the question is raised whether the
devolution process promised in the constitution is undergoing in a way that reflects the
interests of the federal bargainers and the public at large. And, to analyze whether the
center-state relationship in the federal process is based on the democratic view of
diversity of opinions and freedom?313
As argued elsewhere, true federalism has to be based on the principles of freedom of
opinions and political pluralism including the equality of the states and the center in the
process of decision-making. In the Ethiopian present situation, this is not easy however,
since the authors of decentralization are also wedded to the modus operandi of
democratic centralism, inhibiting decentralization and democratization. From the very
foundation, democratic centralism is against the cardinal values of diversity and
consequently democracy itself. Given such practice, democratization would be
extremely difficult to realize, despite the principles of political pluralism enshrined in
the constitution.314 As indicated above, in Ethiopia a dual dynamic is at work: a more
D. Elazar, Federalism and Consociational Regimes, Publius, the Journal of Federalism, (Fall 2010).
However, these questions by themselves require a detailed study based on some concrete empirical
case study which is not in fact possible in this thesis. The overall aim is only to enunciate that, the
Ethiopian democratic development is a vital instrument to answer how much the center-state
relationship is influenced by the political process and the realization or otherwise of some of the
democratic rights. The study will not engage itself in proving or disproving the Ethiopian status on the
road to democracy.
314 For an excellent study of this challenge at the Woreda level, see Mehret Ayenew, "Decentralization in
Ethiopia: Two Case Studies on Devolution of Power and Responsibilities to Local Authorities," Ethiopia: The
312
313
119
visible, formally decentralized state structure and a more discreet but effective capture
of the state by the EPRDF and its affiliated regional parties.315
According to the highly debated report of the International Crisis Group
Relations between party officials are characterized by upward accountability and
patron-client dynamics. Higher officials promote lower ones to government posts
that offer regular income and privileges, e.g., access to food aid, fertilizer and
scholarships. Appointees owe allegiance to patrons. Employment in the public
sector or selection for state-sponsored education requires being a member or close
to the party.316
This shows the ugly faces of decentralization practice in Ethiopia which ultimately
resulted in using the federalization process as a means for personal benefits and
challenge the democratic process that has been hinted by the constitution. Note that,
good governance and accountability of officials together with transparent political
practice are the key indicators of democratic regimes.
Revolutionary democracy317 which is the EPRDF fiction is another challenge to the
effective realization of the federalism project. The ideology advocated a class approach
on such key democratic rights as freedom of association and speech. According to the
ruling party’s manifesto and several documents issued subsequently, such rights be
allowed for the progressive forces of revolutionary democracy, and the ‘enemies’ of the
Challenge of Democracy from Below, eds. Bahru Zewde and Siegfired Pausewang (Addis Ababa: Forum
for Social Studies, 2002), 130-146.)
315 See also Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism and Self-Determination for Nationalities in a SemiAuthoritarian State: the Case of Ethiopia , International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol. 13, no.
2-3 (2006), at 243-261; Jon Abbink, Breaking and making the state: The dynamics of ethnic democracy in
Ethiopia, supra note 224 at. 149-163; Alem Habtu, Ethnic Pluralism as an Organizing Principle of the
Ethiopian Federation, Dialectical Anthropology, vol. 28, no. 2 (2004), at 91-123; Edmond J. Keller, Ethnic
Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia, African Journal of Political Science,
vol. 7, no. 1 (2002), at. 21-50; Paulos Chanie, Clientelism and Ethiopia’s post-1991 decentralization,
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 45, no. 3 (2007) at 355-384; Kjetil Tronvoll, The Process of
Democratization in Ethiopia – An Expression of Popular Participation or Political Resistance? Norwegian
Institute of Human Rights, 1995 at 134-139.
316 Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents, International Crisis Group Africa Report, supra note
104 at 15.
317 For an important manual on this ideology of rule, see the revealing position paper Our Revolutionary
Democratic Goals and the Next Steps (1993), and the Guideline for EPRDF’s Organizational Structure and
Operation (1997), produced by the party’s Dirigitawi Ma’ekel (Organizational Centre). Extracts were
published in the magazine Ethiopian Register, issues of June 1996 and September 1997.
120
people should be restricted from them.318 The “enemies” of the people, according to
politicians of the country connote those who advocates for liberal democracy and other
ideological camps.
According to reports, in Ethiopia little space exists for non-partisan involvement and
debate.319 Freedom of expression and association has been severely undercut by the
EPRDF, which categorically rejects criticism. Few journalists, academics, human rights
advocates and intellectuals dare to publicly criticize the government.320 This is the
political paradox in the country that vividly contradicts the contemporary federal
principles of liberalization and democratic governance. Whenever the central
government tries to widen its sphere of influence, the states right to propose alternative
projects and ideas will be hampered and the devolutionary process promised in the
supreme law will become a lion without a teeth.
There is a firm authoritarian hand trying to intimidate critical voices and dissidents321
and to reinforce power from above. Democratic consultation with the population, with
civil society organisations or with opposition groups is thereby not needed. A recently
issued legislation also restricts the civil societies to stay aloof from politics, human
rights work or policy advocacy.
With regard to the issue of constitutionalism, the concentration of power in the hands
of the prime minister which emanates from the constitution itself and the resultant
absence of checks on the central executive due to the strict adherence of
parliamentarianism contributes a lot towards the authoritarian control of the
government at all levels. Furthermore, the House of the Federation does not have any
role in checking the ordinary legislating process in the lower house, which contradicts
with the practice of other federal, bicameral parliamentarian systems. Consequently, as
pointed out earlier, in practice the constitutional interpretation is controlled by the party
in power.
See for instance EPRDF 2005 and EPRDF 1991 documents printed and distributed to the political
actors in the country.
319 Lahra Smith, “Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia”, U.S. Institute of Peace, August
2007 ICG Report (supra note 104) Human Rights Watch, World Report (New York: Human Rights Watch,
1999)
320 Ibid.
321 This is particularly true after the contested election of May 2005.
318
121
The democratic deficit that we are now encountered with therefore becomes another
coercive factor which restrains the regional states from developing a policy of openmindedness and public dialogue on the best possibilities and from realizing the
constitutionally recognized self-determination privileges. Whenever the central ruling
elite is condemned by the public at large and the international community as unsuitable
to democracy, the state’s on their own way may consider the political process as an
instrument of coercion. At the end of the day, the bond between the two orders of the
government will take a superior-subordinate type. In this regard, a Woreda official from
the Amhara region remarked:
...here at the Woreda level, everything that comes from the central government is
a done-deal. Public meetings to decide on a matter exclusive to us…must be
communicated to our superior party officials at the zone and regional level after
that to the center. [...] the public gathering on every Sunday is to talk about the
centrally designed projects and plans. The regional or zonal officials always send
us letters which are prepared and determined at the central level only for the
purpose of adherence to it.322
This contention also corroborates what Abbink dubbed as the democracy of EPRDF.
According to him
Democracy in the EPRDF model is understood as “participation of the Ethiopian
people at the grass roots level”, via the party and the government organs which
“mobilize the people”, not for debating and voting, but for executing policies and
measures decided elsewhere.323
5.4.5. The Centers' Visible Presence in the Regional State Machineries
In addition to the asymmetrical relationship that prevails between the centre and the
regions in terms of policy-making and finance, the federal government especially the
executive twig, routinely intervenes in the day-to-day activities of the regions. The
central government has maintained an indirect rule on some of the peripheral regional
states that according to the ruling party are weak to administer their own affairs.
Interview with anonymous Woreda Cabinet member in the Amhara Regional State on October 2010,
Abbink, Jon The Ethiopian Second Republic and the Fragile “Social Contract”, in: Africa Spectrum, 44, 2,
3-28 at 12.
322
323
122
Gambella, Benshangul-Gumuz, Afar and Somali, are labelled as ‘emerging states,’ or
‘less developed states’ that calls for the centres’ assistance in terms of developing
infrastructural stuffs and in general to be viable members of the federation.324
At least until 2001 the federation has maintained a direct rule while afterwards; the
Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) replaces the centrally appointed officials in these
regional states. Through the Ministry, which is a federal executive institution
responsible for the prime minister office in its establishment legislation325 is mandated to
First, regarding in all the regional states, the operation of the federal police, setting of
national standards for urban planning; finding solutions to inter-regional conflicts;
coordinating federal intervention in the regions and others. Second, it is specifically
responsible to coordinate the assistance that the federal government provides to the four
peripheral regions (Gambella, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali) of the
federation.326
Even though initially it was considered as an institutional framework for
intergovernmental cooperation, in practical terms,327 as studies and observations
suggest, the federal government used the Ministry as an intrusive ministry of interior
with wide powers of intervention in local and regional councils than a ministry in
charge of ordinary coordination.328
On the contrary, the Director of the Intergovernmental Relations, Ato Ewnetu Blata
remarked:
… [the] rationale of the establishment and the legal mandate of the Ministry in
general and this directorate in particular is to facilitate the communication
For many observers, their backwardness can be explained in terms of little or no manpower to run
the regional public offices, dearth of basic infrastructures etc which in turn makes self rule awkward.
325 Proclamation 256/2001 as amended by Proclamation No. 471/2005, Definition of Powers and Duties
of the Executive organs of the FDRE, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 12th year, No.1, November 2005.
326 See Article 21 of Proc. No. 471/2005 and Asnake supra note 104 at 240.
327 Structurally there is an Intergovernmental Relations Directorate within the Ministry which is directly
responsible for such issues of State-Center Relationships. The Ministry has also other Directorates that
deal with economic and political developments in the regions which are categorized as emerging states
and in all the federation. The Directorate on conflict Resolution is also responsible for the management
and transformation of conflicts between the federal government and the states or between the states
themselves while the religious affairs core process is working on developing religious tolerance. From
the information that I have gathered from the Ministry, there is a new proposal to launch regional
branches of Intergovernmental Relations Department with the view of making the states part of the
process.
328 Assefa supra note 11; Asnake supra note 104.
324
123
between federal and regional government and to give the appropriate assistance to
the regions which are listed under the group of developing states. The federal
government would not become a patron or a boss to the regions since it will go
against the overall federal practice and constitutional setting.329
So far, critics on the other hand suggests that, even if the center ceases to send the socalled advisors in this regional states thereby completely be in charge of the states
apparatus, even today a new approach is put in place to uphold the centers control.
Several officials of MoFA are now regularly shuttle between their headquarters in Addis
Ababa and the capital of the respective regions to deal with not entirely on the
cooperative forums but principally to secure the regions responsiveness towards central
initiatives. In spite of all the promises of the new approach, the power and influence of
MoFA over the regions has not declined.330 It is undeniable fact that many of the
programs in these regions are designed either by the central officers or under the
auspices thereto. For instance, the task of revision of some of the constitutions in these
regions has been exclusively supervised by a committee established by MoFA though
the final authority to ratify the same rests upon the respective councils.331
In paving the way as regards the presence of the central officials in these regions via the
ministry, the puppet EPRDF affiliated party’s plays the foremost part. Since they are
the same adherent of revolutionary democracy ideology and overseen by the strictest
form of party discipline, it is expected that, the central officials can easily sway their
regional counterparts. Ato Gezehagh Tilahun of MoFA told me that, the
Intergovernmental Relations Directorate of the Ministry is working with the view of
replacing this informal and constantly biased party channel of communiqué with official
forums of cooperation based on mutual understanding.332 Therefore by means of MoFA
and the support of the affiliated parties in some of the regions, the central government
takes the leading role in determining the states preferences and way of thinking.
Interview with Ato Ewnetu Blata, Director of the Intergovernmental Relations Directorate, MoFA,
November 2010.
330 Asnake supra note 104 at 241.
331 Interview with Dr. Merera Gudina; According to Merera, who have done an extensive research on the
political structure of some of these regions (especially Gambella and Benshangul Gumuz), the states
machineries are operating under the central personnel’s. He told me that, the color of their skin or ethnic
background of the government office holders is self-evident as to the physical appearance of the center
in these regional states which is not the case in the rest of the federation members.
332 Extensive discussion with Ato Gezehagh Tilahun, MoFA Intergovernmental Relations Directorate,
Expert on the Intergovernmental Relationship, November 2010,
329
124
The other most important area by which one can notice the central governments evident
presence is the MoFA and the HoF role as federal institutions equipped to the task of
conflict resolution and transformation in the regional states. The Ministry for instance is
be able to launch a forum of understanding in solving the border dispute between
Oromia and Somali regions which shares an extensive (around 1000 Km) common
border. According to one informant from the participants however, there was an air of
political belongingness to the central government personnel’s thereby accepting the
details which are already set-in at the central party level.333 In most cases, the regional
government officials are not capable to challenge the central officers that are in charge
of dealing with the said conflict due to the political atmosphere. With regard to this,
there is at all times frictions and political instability in the regional state of Afar resulted
from the attempt to defy against the central government officers and overall policy
frameworks.334 Though the center is victorious in the tenacity of such conflicts, the
contribution of all concerned local personnel’s is still at its ebb. It is the central
government through the HoF or the MoFA that is now playing the foremost role.
In general, because of such highhanded approaches, officials of some of the regional
states, especially those of the emerging states do not as such see much difference in the
administration of centre-regional relations after the establishment of the MoFA.335 One
official of the Benishangul Gumuz region, for instance, underscored:
… [the] relationship between our region and the Ministry of Federal Affairs is not
a relationship of partnership. The ministry’s main function is to control our
activities. Its officials do not come here to provide assistance but to monitor and
supervise our activities. If there are differences between the ideas of the regional
officials and MoFA, the ideas of the latter would prevail.
However it is important to appreciate the Ministry’s effort in reaching at such a compromised
solution and as Ato Gezehagh reveals, they are now be able to create a common forum seated in Harari
that comprised of the five neighboring regional states (these are Afar, Somali, Oromia, Harari and Dire
Dawa ). Through this forum, according to Ato Gezehagh, which is supported by a memorandum of
understanding, the regions are now in a position to set up agendas and discuss common concerns such
as cross border crime of contraband.
334 Personal discussion with MoFA’s staff working on the conflict Resolution core process September,
2010,
335 See also Asnake supra note 104 at 243.
333
125
While the intervention of the central government can be justifiable from the angle of
ensuring symmetry between constituent units, excessive manipulation of the regional
politics under the semblance of assistance cannot be tamed with the idea of federalism.
In the Ethiopian context, some of the sub national units are historically marginalized
and not integrated in the long-lived unitary political discourse. As a result, they are not
yet in a position to manage their own affairs. So, the assistance and capacity building
project of the central government may be necessitated but should only focus on the
socioeconomic aspect rather than putting the states under its full political dominion.
According to observers, these regional administrations have a dual structure, remaining
under the tutelage of the federal government and the ruling party. Behind the visible
office holders who come from the states themselves (i.e., being of the “right ethnic
background”) stand advisors and policy makers linked directly to the federal EPRDF
offices that in due course militate against the federal setup.
5.4.6. Using the National Policymaking
Policymaking power as a device of Coercion
Coercion
Repeatedly I have argued that, the constitution and also the general development of
federalism empowers the national government to design the major policy frameworks of
the country that are uniformly pertinent throughout the federation. In the same fashion,
in Ethiopia the national government in general and the central legislator in particular as
per Article 51(2) is empowered to '…formulate and implement the country’s policies,
strategies and plan'. However, in practice the central government is now abusing its
constitutional authorization by using such a power to embrace the vista of restraining
the state's autonomy to design their own parallel policies and strategies according to the
federally designed framework. Several studies made by the Ministry of Federal Affairs
reveals that, the central sector offices frequently propose an overall policy and plan that
is directly applicable in the regional states and contradict with the division of powers
stipulated in the constitution.336
The Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority
are among the sector offices of the federation which has been frequently breaching such fundamentally
basic federal principle. According to the study reports by MoFA, there are a very comprehensive
standards and priorities set by the Ministry of Education that are projected to be mandatorily followed
by the respective regional Education Bureau's.
336
126
While the Americans notion of Federal Mandate337 does not squarely fits the Ethiopian
case, the federal sectoral office's less federal outlook may lean on us to consider such a
coercive factor in our context. One friend of me from the Amhara Technical and
Vocational Institution told me that, the curriculum for the regionally administered
Vocational training is designed at the central level to all the regions even if we have
changed the cover page of the same by inserting our regional office as a designer. I have
also got the opportunity to partake in a curriculum development conference for the
regional vocational schools by which the coordinator orders us to directly copy the
federally designed courses and details for each and every module.338 The same argument
can possibly produced for the rest of sectoral offices in the central government. Ato
Gezehagh of MoFA remarked that, there is a clear federal dominance with respect to
policy formulation and implementation. Accordingly, the federal executive institutions
believe that, the regions are subordinate to them and for all the time remains to be
dependable to the center's initiatives and orders without taking notice of their
independent constitutional existence.
In general the states accept the economic, social and development plans issued by the
federal government. In theory they can adapt the policies to fit their own circumstances
but the federal government does play a key role in influencing through national policies
mainly due to the party congruence and decision-making structure and secondly,
because the states lack the required expertise to bring alternative policies.339 As some of
my interviewees point outs, there are states who exactly copy the centrally designed
policies without any attempt to modify them in line with their particular conditions.
The worst scenario in the Ethiopian case is the lack of states participation in the central
policy deliberations by which they will not challenge the appropriateness of any sort of
legislations exclusively enacted by the central regime. They are forced to design their
337 In the American federal experience, a mandate is a direct federal order requiring state or local
governments to provide certain services or perform certain duties by which failure to comply can trigger
civil and/or criminal penalties.
338 Earlier the curriculum for vocational education was administered by the Ministry of Education and
latter transferred to the respective regional bureaus. However when the 10+1, 2… mode is changed to
level 1, 2… in the central vocational institutions, without even knowing the policy reasons, the regions
are ordered to follow the former which substantiates our case.
339 Assefa Supra note 15 at 248.
127
implementation legislations even if incongruity is there with their regional priorities and
interest.
5.5.
Conclusions
The first section of this chapter is designed to look into the theoretical framework of
intergovernmental cooperation in the Ethiopian federal project. Since it is almost
common in every federation to leave some flexibility for center-state and inter-state
contacts they usually tend to lay down some guidelines of such collaborations with the
view of giving all the partakers equal opportunity of discussing and deliberating issues
on the table.
In Ethiopia, let alone in the constitution, it is not possible to discern sufficient
guidelines as to the relationship between the two in subordinate legislations or there is
nothing concrete which is developed from practice. There is the Ministry of Federal
Affairs established with the prime motives of assisting the less developed regional states
and resolving some conflicts of interest in the same regions which is taken by the
government as an institution that can serve the purpose of facilitating intergovernmental
collaborations. Needless to say, the Ministry is still under its formation stage and
limited in providing training and finding solutions for inter-ethnic or some other
federalism-born quarrels. According to a report release of the Ministry itself,340 there are,
in practice, some intergovernmental relations between sectoral institutions but always
manifest federal dominance, lack of consistency and irregularity of meetings, lack of
equal participation, deficiency in the implementation of shared programs and failure to
incorporate the needs and preferences of states which all stand against the very
principles of federalism in general and the equal partnership, inclusive decision making
and consultative process tents of IGR in particular.
As pointed out, Ethiopia is constitutionally a federal polity, but as the practice implies
its federal entities are controlled by the strongly centralized EPRDF that predetermines
decisions from the prime minister’s palace in the capital to remote rural kebeles. As the
Ministry of Federal Affairs, Department of Intergovernmental Relations Coordination, 2008: A
preliminary study on the practice of Intergovernmental relations between the federal and regional
Governmental institutions (unpublished Amharic version).
340
128
above discussion points out, the father of the constitution – EPRDF itself – has, through
its organizational culture of democratic centralism and centralized party structure,
weakened the federal system and regional state structures. The political constitution of
EPRDF effectively antagonizes the federal system it has built. The federal government
uses various mechanisms to influence or manipulate policy in the regional states.
Policymaking descends from the EPRDF executive committees via the EPRDF’s
member and affiliated parties to local government. Executives and members of the
regional councils are expected to conform to decisions taken at the federal level. The
center is now fully in control of all the activities of the states either by way of party
channel or its central executive offices such as the Ministry of Federal Affairs. The
federalization of the country without genuine democracy and constitutionalism which is
evident from the restricted public debate and freedom of association, press and etc is
also an additional causal factor for the coercive trend of this young federal experiment.
As hinted above, through various tactics, such as the five years development plan or the
recently introduced Development and Transformation Package, the central government
has continued to show its hesitant position towards legitimate federalism and in the
mean time challenges the very autonomous existence of the states. Even if it is not
discussed in the main part of this thesis it should be noted that, state spending decisions
most often are heavily influenced by priorities set nationally in the EPRDF Five Year
Program. In other words, officials at the state and zone levels, who are generally party
loyalists, structure the choices at the Woreda and sub-Woreda levels so that they conform
to centrally determined priorities.
The role of the Intergovernmental relations directorate in the MoFA and the HoF as an
institutions of managing conflicts and ensuring symmetry between the center and the
states as well as between the states can also be considered as an additional apparatus of
intervention though it have something of value in some respects.
There is a mismatch between the liberal-democratic political-pluralist elements of the
constitution and the political praxis of the dominant party. The Ethiopian federal
practice is exception in terms of the essential attribute of the system i.e. political
pluralism is at its ebb. Consequently, the center-state relationship in Ethiopia reveals a
top-bottom approach and the constituent units are always under the incessant influence
129
of the center. This trend, among the academics and federal writers is called coercive
federalism which is also described by many other groups as putting together federalism.
The restructuring of the Ethiopian state in an ethnic federalism under the EPRDF
therefore could be nothing but the image of its thinking, perhaps with some
modifications in order to avoid the looming pressure from outsiders. This stance, as
Turton observed, was “the blurring or elision of party and state, according to the
Leninist party-state model, a process which began under the Derg and was continued by
the EPRDF”.
130
6.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Recommendations
6.1. General Conclusions
Now it is almost two decades that the Ethiopian federal system has been put into
practical reality. The 1995 constitution, which is the turning point from the traditionally
dominant centralization trend of nation building, has officially endorses the ethnic
federal re-structuring in the country by declaring the establishment of a federal and
democratic republic and establishment of nine regional states thereby affirming that,
sovereign power should reside with the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia.
Nevertheless, as this study tries to underscore, the federalization process is not as such a
well debated and all-embracing since the options provided by political actors has not
been well considered. The federal formula is the reflection of the motives and thinking
of the then victorious group in the military camp.
Foundationally, as chapter three and four has tried to briefly point out, the Ethiopian
federation is a federation based on the ideological fundamentals of solving the longlived nationality question there by granting each and every nationality groups the right
to self determination and autonomy. In line with this view the victorious groups has
introduced a federal structure which, at least on paper seems to achieve the
aforementioned aspirations. The council of the constitutional assembly was guided by
the rule of giving as much as possible autonomy and self governance right to nation,
nationality and peoples of Ethiopia. It is because of such sympathetic that many,
including the officials of the ruling party argued that the Ethiopian federation is more of
a federation based on the consent and free will of the nationality groups; hence it is
more of a confederation.
The constitutional federal formula introduces many unique and as the same time weird
variables that are on occasions not prudent for the proper practice of the very idea of
federalism itself. Among others, as pointed out in chapter three, the political tone
131
towards ethnicity and ethnicization of the federal arrangement and the concomitant
recognition of nationality groups as a building bricks of the federation, the
constitutional recognition of the right to secede, the practice of federal umpiring
through a political organ, the absence of clear rule of federal supremacy, the constituent
units absence of legislative competence at the center etc can be mentioned.
The other fascinating issue in the Ethiopian federal constitutional framework is the
unicameral parliamentary structure by which the states are totally devoid of legislative
capacity in all central initiatives. Added to this is the division of competencies
(legislative, executive judicial and financial). The constitution has tried to exhaustively
list the exclusive and as the same time enumerated powers of the federation by which
the states are entrusted with the reserve (residual) competencies. However, the
constitution is not as such consistence in following the normal trend of distribution of
powers as we can find purely federal competencies throughout the text. Hence, the
concept of enumerated authorities remains to be rhetoric. Unlike the case in other
federations, there is no exhaustive list of concurrent jurisdictions in Ethiopia. However,
it is possible to observe the implied recognition of such a concept of concurrency by
reading the constitutional lexis between the lines (see chapter four).
The constitutional muteness regarding the guideline, framework or system of
interrelationship between the two orders of government is another area of interest and
in fact partly the subject of this thesis. In the existence of inevitable contact between the
two tiers of government, the FDRE constitution has neither provided for a common
forum of cooperation nor gives a clue concerning the basics of coexistence between the
federal bargainers. This is on the other hand a clear ignorance of the manner in which
federal laws are going to be enforced throughout the federation. To some extent, it is
possible to argue that, the constitution has already established a dual executive structure
by which the respective governments are empowered to legislate and execute their own
laws and policies. However, such independent existence is far from being real and
interdependence is also another version of the federal idea – shared rule.
In the absence of comprehensive regime of concurrent powers, and a law making
second chamber, we have to be concerned about the existence of formal
intergovernmental relationship mechanisms. In this connection, post constitutional
132
developments demonstrate some attempts of filling the constitutional lacuna. The
Ministry of Federal Affairs with all its short comings is now the only formal (semiformal as some prefer to describe) institution for intergovernmental collaborations.
As the main area of concern, the center-state relationship in Ethiopia therefore has to be
considered from the perspective of both the formal and informal relationship
mechanisms that are now in practice. In other words, as the main research question of
this thesis suggests, we have to be concerned about whether the intergovernmental
relationship now in practice is the replica of what the Americans called coercive
federalism or not since the IGR process is almost fully dependent on either of the
semiformal or informal tools of cooperation without any convenient, transparent and
predetermined arrangements.
As my investigation suggests, the answer to this question is to the affirmative. The basis
of the relationship between the central and state governments reveals the reality of such
a coercive trend in this young federal experiment. As one can infer from the definition,
coercive federalism is a federal jargon by which one order of the governments, most
often the center, has dominated the overall politico economic as well as social affairs in
a polity which is de jure federal. The tactics and systems by which the domination of
the center can be envisaged are different among federations. In Ethiopia, the coercive
trend of the actual federal-state relationship is linked for the most part with the
democratic centralism ideology and the resultant vanguardist political party argument
which is advocated by the ruling party, EPRDF.
The EPRDF is now in power dated from the very inception of the federal design and
control almost all the parliamentary seats both at the federal and regional level. Even if
the multi party ideology is constitutionally acknowledged, till these days, there is no
proper adherence to it, for that reason opposition parties boycotted elections or
otherwise jailed due to their political concern. This trend inexorably contradicts one of
the cardinal principles of federalism-political pluralism. The ethnic satellite parties
which are established as member or affiliate to the vanguard EPRDF are always under
a strict party discipline oversight and intraparty democracy is at its ebb in the decision
making process.
133
Consequently, as the last chapter (chapter five) reveals, the states are not in a position to
formally implement their own priorities and policies. All the countries main policies
and strategies are designed at the central committee’s level of the EPRDF without
proper consultation of the public at large. Obviously, the central committee is composed
of the representative of the state governments, but usually it is over-toned by the
revolutionary democratic thinking and the agenda is only to see everything from this
perspective. It is unthinkable for the state governments to design a project which is not
part of the five years development plan or which does not reflect the revolutionary
democratic idea. Opposing the central initiatives and proposals is considered to be
disrespecting the rule of obedience of the party. Thus another key binding factor for the
coercive trend of state-center relationship in Ethiopia is the ruling party’s excessive
control of regional party leaders and the central government resource backed
centralizing drifts and attitudes. The gradual effect, however, can be devastating for the
unity of the country when such strong party control weakens or vanishes, for the
regional states may fall into the hands of extreme nationalist officials. The lower
echelon of EPRDF’s leadership and the rank-and-file members are to implement the
decisions made by the higher officials. As a result, there is only one-way channel of
accountability within the organization that comes from the higher leadership to the
lower. And, the constitutional right of the states to formulate and implement plans and
policies are severely diminished by the fact that the state governments are in one way or
another forced to follow the centrally designed policies and plans.
In addition to the democratic centralism decision making scheme and vanguardist
political party argument, there are other factors that exacerbate the coercive trend of
center-state relationship in Ethiopia. This includes democratic deficit and the
insufficient constitutionalism which resulted in little or no space for public debate and
divergence of opinion in the political process, the visible presence of the federal
government in regional states machineries, the challenge of centralization of power
through various mechanisms such as designing detailed policies under the cover of
framework competencies and et cetera. To be specific, as the argument in chapter five
suggests, one of the fundamental problems of the Ethiopian state is the lack of a genuine
federal system of governance based on democratic principles and the institutions that
help such a system keep functioning – a system and institutions by which the people can
express their will and needs, and mediate for reasonably acceptable outcomes.
134
As federal practices recommend, if federalism is a system of government where power
and functions are distributed with the aim of maintaining an acceptable balance
between central and regional authorities and where free and democratic participation of
citizens in the decision making process and key issues of concern are secured, then the
federal structure devised by the EPRDF is not even remotely close to popularly
understood federalism.
6.2. Recommendations
After examining the unadvisable trend of intergovernmental relationship in Ethiopia,
which is basically based on coercive techniques of collaborations, and with the view of
realizing genuine federal structure that gives enough political space for the federal
bargainers and hasten the country’s transition towards democracy, the following
recommendations are submitted:
1. The
absence
of
formal,
institutionalized,
politically
committed
intergovernmental relation institution which results in the total dependence on
the informal devices such as party channel should be considered seriously in the
first place. As argued elsewhere, an institutionalized, accountable, impartial and
transparent IGR system is the preeminent instrument of ensuring the
continuation of the federal framework enunciated by the constitution beyond the
life span of the regime that authored it (in our case EPRDF). It is undeniably
considered as a devise which can contribute towards the efforts of making the
federal setup as well as the constitution a permanent institution and feature of
Ethiopian political life. In turn, as some suggests, institutional mechanisms for
intergovernmental relations should be permitted to evolve in the form of
autonomous government bodies which will survive regardless of party bickering.
In this regard, the MoFA, under its current conditions, lacks all this attributes to
be a robust institution of IGR-not only in terms of its competence and
unmanned character, but also its very nature of being a federal executive wing
established to deal with issues of federalism and other administrative duties from
the perspective of the federal government. And, unlike some other matured
135
federations, the task of practicing nationwide IGR is assigned to a department
(directorate) within the Ministry which vividly shows lack of political
commitment to have a meaningful process of intergovernmental coordination
and collaboration from the side of the government.
Apart from this, the initial consideration behind its establishment (as yekilil
Guday Zerf (Regional Affairs office) in the Prime minister office) is associated
with securing the willingness of the regional governments to be part of the
political process at the center and to assist some of the regions in terms of
capacity building and good governance which also continued to date as its
primary concern. Meaning, the issue of dealing with IGR proper is a latter
development in the history of this organ of government and yet is limited to a
directorate level. On the same vein, the states are not in a position to take part in
the process as part of it rather they consider the Ministry’s role as another
avenue of the center's dominance. IGR even conceptually is linked with a
common forum of cooperation and coordination. Whenever a political party
with a different program and ideological orientation takes control of one/more
of the state/s or the center for that matter, the necessity for common forum of
cooperation becomes visible. For obvious reasons mentioned earlier, such a
political party will not accept any invitation from the MoFA and may not be
willing to be part of the shared rule or the political process of the center. In
addition to this, as Assefa remarked, MoFA assures its lack of effective political
leadership to coordinate nationwide IGR activities.
The worst scenario in Ethiopia, as pointed out, is also linked with the states lack
of any place in the central lawmaking process. In this regard too, a commonly
established accountable, transparent and neutral institution of IGR is badly
needed. By any count, it is not fair and reasonable to punish the states two wise.
How the states are going to implement the centrally designed policies and
projects? Can we expect the states to be angels? Or are the meetings, central
directions and party consensus sufficient? We have to consider such concerns
before we are nominating or naming an institution as IGR institution.
136
Therefore the establishment of an intergovernmental institution (forum) that
comprised of officials from both the federal and state governments and
accountable for their respective councils is needed to shun this biased tendency
of relationship. As Assefa rightly noted, the more we rely on institutions and laws
than party channels the more mature and stable the federation will be. As the
experience of some other developed federations reveals, there has to be either
intra-jurisdictional (like second chambers as in Germany which composed of the
representatives of both tiers of government accompanied with an influential say
on policymaking) or federal-state IGR institutions (such as a prearranged regular
meetings of political figures of both levels) at various levels if IGR is to have
meaningful effect in our federal experiment. The institutions (the forums) has to
be established with the objective of circumventing unjustified central
interferences there by to encourage equal partnership between the members of
the federal process. The intergovernmental relation institution should have to
carry out its responsibilities on the basis of equality, compromise, mutual
understanding and consensus.
2. For the short run, the regional governments must build up their regional affairs
departments that are now almost nonoperational with the intent to challenge
undue federal interventions and to have the opportunity of setting agenda's with
the federation and with their fellow regional states.
3. The other issue that has to be considered seriously and resulted in a more
coercive trend of federalism is the EPRDF’s effort in merging the party with the
state bureaucracy and the federal system as a whole. This has been resulted in a
federation operating under a single political thinking and for its success or failure
the party remains to be both the author and auspice. One can think of the
internal split of TPLF as discussed before-the crisis shows how much the federal
as well as the constitutional framework is dependent on the party. So, as this
argument on vanguardist political party and democratic centralism elsewhere in
the world is a history of ever increasing dominance by the center and at times
resulted in failure, it is better to create an independent room (party free zone) for
free initiatives, civil service, regional politics and etc or generally it is
137
recommended to adopt a policy of strict separation of party and bureaucracy.
This is not without explanation; it is this trend of merging party politics with
every aspect of life that has resulted in a coercive trend of federal-state relationship
as indicated in the last chapter. Coercive federalism conceptually connotes
coercion by the central government through various instrument by which the
party channel is the main in our context to influence both the states and their
electorate to be part of the political process.
4. One condition under which the federal practice can survive, even acquire
vibrancy, is if currently dominant ethnic parties within the EPRDF membership
(i.e., TPLF, ANDM, OPDO, and SEPDF) openly tolerate competing political
parties in their respective regional areas. This in turn realizes the required
opportunity for public participation and open debate on the options available
rather than adhering to a single political ideology which may or may not be the
right choice for this mythical but underdeveloped polity. The theory of
multicultural federalism tells us not only about the accommodation of cultural,
linguistic or ethnic diversity, but also the possibility of creating an
accommodative system for political diversity. The concern here is the possibility
for the states and their people to come up with their own politico-economic
options without affecting or endangering the shared rule and the leeway for
having one economic community. Apparently, revolutionary democracy may
not be suitable for some of the constituent units (but theoretically speaking
Ethiopia is de jure multiparty and some of the affiliated parties are considered as
unsuited for revolutionary democracy). Therefore, an appropriate ground for
political diversity and a clear stature for dynamic politics should be considered as
vital to the survival of our federal system. This is suggested at this juncture due
to the fact that, among the coercive features of the federal-state relations, the
intolerant attitude of EPRDF towards opposing politics is found to be the one
and most influential.
5. The success of the federal experiment is contingent on the ruling party’s
willingness and capacity to disengage itself from democratic centralism, extend
and deepen the democratization process, and tolerating divergence of opinion.
138
Therefore, the political stature which is dominated with secrecy and noninclusiveness should have to be avoided. Enough space for public debate and
initiatives has to be put in place. Added, membership to the political process has
to be open for every citizen of the country without the need to acknowledge the
revolutionary democratic thinking. Yet, the effective realization of shared-rule or
the resultant creation of common politico-economic unit is dependent on the
culture of negotiations and mutual respect not on installing a coercive tactic of
control.
6. The centralized party structure of the EPRDF is clearly contradictory to the
provisions of the federal and regional constitutions, which give these levels the
right to self-administration. It promotes upward accountability to the party
organs above rather than downward accountability to the people of the region,
Woreda and Kebele. Therefore, the party has to develop the culture of intraparty
democracy and transparency of decision-making by which the representatives of
the people must be loyal to their electorate than to the dictates of the party
ideology.
In sum, rather than seriously engaging themselves on securing the states and the
people’s willingness to be part of the EPRDF agenda thereby framing the system
on the dictates of revolutionary democracy and democratic centralism standard,
the central officials, who are suffering from less federal outlook, should have to
build the ground for the continuation of this young federal setup even beyond
the life span of the architect (EPRDF). It is mainly this centralized and unitary
outlook of the central officials which resulted in the coercive federal-state
relationship.
139
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Appendix 1: List of interviewees
Ato Ewnetu Blata, Ministry of Federal Affairs, Intergovernmental Relations
strengthening Directorate Director, November 2010, Addis Ababa.
Ato Gezehagh Tilahun, Ministry of Federal Affairs, IGR Expert, November 2010, Addis
Ababa.
Ato Lidetu Ayalew, Chairman of the Ethiopian Democratic Party, September 2010,
Addis Ababa.
Dr. Merera Gudina, Vice Chairman of Medrek, October 2010, Addis Ababa.
Anonymous Central Committee member of the Amhara National Democratic
Movement, November 2010, Debre Birhan
Anonymous Woreda Chief Administrator, Amhara Regional State
Anonymous OPDO central committee members, October 2010, Adama and Sebeta
Ato Seiko Toure Getachew, EPRDF Public Relations Chief, Addis Ababa
Ato Wondossen Yosef, Ministry of Federal Affairs, Expert at Conflict Resolution and
Transformation Directorate
146
Appendix 2: Interview guide
1. What do you consider as the major motivations behind introducing as federal
system in Ethiopia?
2. How do you see the Bargaining process during the constitutional making?
3. What do you perceive as the major strengths and weaknesses with the
constitutional framework for the federal arrangements?
4. Do you think that the Ethiopia states are powerful enough to challenge the
central government from undo intervention?
5. If not, what are the major reasons for the states inability?
6. What is the status of federally initiated policies and projects in the local
government levels, such as Woreda and Kebele? How such programs are going
to be implemented?
7. What do you think the role of the EPRDF in the overall State-Center
Relationship?
8. Are the Member and Affiliate parties to the EPRDF autonomous to decide on
behalf of their regional concern?
9. In general do you think that the current Intergovernmental relationship is
based on cooperation and mutual understanding between the states and the
federation?
10. What is the major role of the Ministry of Federal Affairs in general and the IGR
Directorate in particular? Do you think that this federal institution can properly
handle its mandate as IGR forum?
147