ON SENTENCES REFERRING
F. Robert BOHL, Jr.
Donald Da vid so n (') a n d Jo h n Wa lla ce (
versions
2
o f an argument d e rivin g f ro m Frege t o sh o w th a t i f
sentences
) h a are
v etakenb to ohave
t ahcertain sort of relation to e xtra linguistic
u
s entities
e
dthen a ll true sentences have that sort of relation to th e same e n tity. Jaegwon K im has g ive n a th e o ry o f
events in which sentences are said to refer to, describe, specify,
or express events; these relations between sentences a n d th e
wo rld are ju st the sort that the Davidson-Wallace argument is
deployed against. I n defense o f his theory, K i m (
that
the assumptions made b y the Davidson-Wallace argument
a
are
n
) h oa t sjustified.
a r Ig should
u e lik
d e t o argue th a t K im's a tta ck o n
the assumptions is n o t sufficient to avoid the consequences o f
the Davidson-Wallace argument, and, in answer to an objection
that mig h t be raised, argue th a t th e Davidson-Wallace a rg u ment cannot be applied to Davidson's o wn th e o ry o f concrete
events.
The general f o rm o f the Davidson-Wallace argument, su g gested by Ernest Sosa in correspondence, is as follows. Suppose
that it is maintained that there is a relation R such that it holds
between a sentence and some e n tity x and wh ich is such that
it satisfies the fo llo win g principles:
1) I f sentence S bears relation R to e n tity x and sentence S'
is lo g ica lly equivalent to S, then S b e a rs R to x;
2) I f sentence S bears R to x and sentence S' is obtained from
S b y substituting so me expression f o r a co rre fe re n tia l
expression in S, then sentence S' bears R to x.
Consider the fo llo win g sequence, wh e re p and q are a n y d istinct true sentences:
3
) i ( ( x = x) & p)
4)
P
;
=
x);
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.
5) 11((x = x) & q)
6) q.
ROBERT BOHL, JR.
=
x);
By principle (2), (4) and (5) bear R to the same entity, f o r (5) is
obtainable f ro m (4 ) b y substitution o f co rre fe re n tia l e xp re ssions, viz., ' i ( ( x = x) & q) f o r ' i ((x = x) & p)', wh ich are co rreferential b y virtu e o f the fact that p and q we re assumed to
be true. Furthermore, (3) and (4) bear R to the same entity, and
(5) and (6) also bear R to the same entity, in virtu e o f (1) and
the fact that (3) and (4), and (5) and (6), are lo g ica lly equivalent.
Notice that in this general form, the argument holds o f wh a tever re la t io n is ta ke n t o h o ld between sentences a n d so me
extra-linguistic entity, so long as that relation satisfies (1) and
(2). Thus, i t ma y be h e ld t o milita te against a n y th e o ry th a t
maintained th a t there is a re la tio n of, e.g., representation o r
expression, between propositions a n d sentences, o r one th a t
held that sentences and events a re related b y the re la tio n o f
reference, description, o r expression. Th e re a re t wo wa ys i n
which one mig h t seek to a vo id the force o f this argument: b y
holding, a s K i m does, th a t (1) a n d (2) d o n o t a p p ly e ith e r to
English o r t o th e sp e cific sentences wh ic h a re sa id t o h a ve
relation R to an e xtra lin g u istic e n tity; o r b y maintaining th a t
this argument has considerable fo rce against th e theories o f
those that use the argument against others.
II
Kim's first argument against (1) consists in an attack on the
unrestricted use o f th a t p rin cip le . F o r K im, those sentences
which re fe r to, describe, o r p ick o u t events a re those wh ich
"attribute a n e mp irica l p ro p e rt y ( o r re la tio n ) t o a concrete
object (or ordered set of objects) at a time"; this is not intended
as an exact crite rio n fo r wh a t K im ca lls event-describing sentences, b u t ra th e r as a rough and re a d y ru le f o r p ickin g o u t
such sentences. K im's intuitions t e ll h im that, o f the fo llo win g
sentences, t h e f irs t p a ir re fe rs t o th e same e ve n t wh ile th e
second p a ir refers to different events:
7) Socrates dies;
8) Xantippe's husband dies;
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9) Jo h n becomes a father;
10) John's first child is born.
I re strict myse lf in wh a t fo llo ws t o the notion th a t sentences
are said t o re fe r to, ra th e r than describe o r p ick out, events
for t wo reasons. First it seems to me that we are clearer about
the relevant characteristics o f wh a t I ca ll " o rd in a ry re fe rrin g
expressions" than about those o f the sorts o f expressions that
are said to p ick out o r describe. Second, and more importantly,
it seems to me that the o rd in a ry notion o f re fe rrin g o r something ve ry much like it is what K im has in min d as the relation
between sentences and events. I t mig h t be said that this suspicion o n my p a rt is to a vo id the "interesting" v ie w th a t there
is some special relation between sentences and events and opt
for th e "uninteresting" v i e w th a t th e re la tio n is, f o r K im, a
reference o r reference-like relation. But, i f K im does n o t hold
the v ie w I a m a ttrib u tin g to h im, then there are a number o f
interesting consequences. First , t h e Da vid so n -Wa lla ce a rg u ment becomes irre le va n t to K im's v ie w o f events, so there is
little point in Kim's concern wit h it. Again, it wo u ld seem that
Kim owes u s some cla rifica tio n o f the re la tio n between sentences and events; wh a t he has said, so fa r as I kn o w, is ju st
that principles (1) and (2) do not a p p ly to the re la tio n ye t the
relation is su fficie n tly simila r to lite ra l reference that it mig h t
be called reference. Fin a lly, i f the re la tio n is not reference o r
some " p ict u rin g " re la tio n , th e n i t seems tenuous a t b e st t o
argue f ro m the grammatical f o rm o f sentences t o th e " st ru cture" o f events, as K im does. (7) and (8) are said to refer to the
same events because th e same p ro p e rty is a ttrib u te d t o t h e
same person; (9) and (10) re fe r to different events, despite the
fact th a t they are lo g ica lly equivalent, because th e y attribute
different properties t o d iffe re n t in d ivid u a ls. A s is cle a r f ro m
these examples, a n d f ro m t h e crit e rio n o f event-describing
seatences mentioned above, t h e subject-predicate f o rm h a s
much to do wit h wh ich event, i f any, is picked o u t b y a sentence. I n general, transformations th a t preserve lo g ica l e q u ivalence cannot be counted o n to preserve g ra mma tica l fo rm.
But, K im continues, if a given transformation does not preserve
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ROBERT BOHL, JR.
the g ra mma tica l f o rm o f th e sentence, a n d o u r (o r a t le a st
Kim's) in tu itio n s as to wh ich event is being picked out depend
heavily upon the subject-predicate grammatical fo rm o f eventdescribing sentences, then that transformation wh ich does n o t
preserve g ra mma tica l f o rm ma y n o t y ie ld a sentence wh ich
refers to the same event as the original. In fact, the transformation may take the sentence out of the class o f event-describing
sentences altogether. Thus, we have no rig h t to say that (3) and
(4) p ick out the same event, p a rticu la rly since (4) is not in the
(rough) class of event-describing sentences, even if we assume
that (3) is. This argument cle a rly depends upon Kim's intuitions
as to the subject-predicate fo rm of sentences, namely that o n ly
subject-predicate sentences p ic k o u t events. (
4this argument is to have much force, it must be based on more
than
) B mere
u t intuitions,
s u r e unless
l y , K i m is willin g to cla im th a t i t is
merely
i
f a fact, apparent to a ll except perhaps those wh o defend
the Da vid so n -Wa lla ce argument, t h a t o n ly subject-predicate
sentences p ick out events. I fin d K im's in tu itio n s implausible,
p a rticu la rly wh e n t h e y a re co mp a re d w i t h wh a t w e k n o w
about o rd in a ry re fe rrin g expressions, i.e., p ro p e r names a n d
definite descriptions. First, i t is cle a r that a proper name and
a definite description, although o f d iffe rin g grammatical fo rm,
may p ick out the same in d ivid u a l; if sentences are to be re fe rring expressions analogous to names and definite descriptions,
it would seem that it could be the case that sentences of different grammatical forms mig h t p ick out the same event. Second,
one of the ways in wh ich we see if an expression is referential
or not is to examine those contexts in wh ich it ma y meaningfu lly appear; thus, if we have an expression 'e' wh ich we kn o w
to be referential, and we find we can substitute another expression 'e l' is referential as we ll. The o n ly context that comes to
mind that might wo rk for the class of sentences that K im wants
to sin g le o u t i s t h a t wh e re w e h a ve t w o sentences f i l l i n g
the blanks o f the connective " Th e fact that c a u s e s i t to be
the case th a t . . . " ; i f i t we re t o t u rn o u t th a t o n ly sentences
which Kim has singled out could be substituted here, then there
might be some grounds fo r singling them out. But this supposed
connective will not do, fo r consider:
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11) Th e fact that the temperature is below 32c) causes it to be
the case that if there is precipitation there w i l l be snow.
The sentence fo llo win g the second 'th a t i n (11) is, o f course,
not o f the subject-predicate fo rm. Th ird , w e have a stra ig h tforward wa y of saying in our language that two o rd in a ry referring te rms a re correferential, n a me ly id e n tity sentences. W e
do not have an analogous wa y of saying that two sentences are
correferential, i.e., a wa y in wh ich we use rather than mention
the sentences; Kim, of course, cannot accept the obvious use of
logical equivalence as the sentential analogue o f identity, f o r
that wo u ld be to accept (1). I t might also be noted that, if one
were t o ta ke th e a n a lo g y st rict ly, t h e " id e n t it y" co n n e ctive
ought t o b e co mp le t e ly extensional. Th e se co n sid e ra tio n s
serve, I th in k, t o cast doubt on K im's in tu itio n s th a t subjectpredicate sentences alone re fe r to events as we ll as th e in tu ition th a t sentences refer at all. O f course, such considerations
are n o t answers t o in tu itio n s, b u t ra th e r, se rve t o we a ke n
intuitions; one a lwa ys has the p rivile g e o f differing intuitions.
Kim's second a rg u me n t i s d ire cte d against t h e u se o f (1 )
even where (1) is restricted to event-describing sentences. Consider the f o llo win g p a irs o f event-describing sentences, each
of the pairs being lo g ica lly equivalent:
(12) A rch ie married Edith;
(13) E d ith married Archie;
(14) Xantippe's husband died;
(15) Xantippe became a widow.
Kim claims that (12) and (13) are not correferential because of
the explanatory (and perhaps causal) a symme try between them,
i.e., to explain wh y Arch ie married Edith is not to explain wh y
Edith ma rrie d Arch ie . (14) a n d (15) d o n o t re fe r t o th e same
event i f we accept the seemingly acceptable convention th a t
the lo ca tio n o f events i s determined b y th e lo ca tio n o f th e
individuals that make them up. Again, I do n o t fin d these p u rported counter-examples convincing. I n th e case o f (12) a n d
(13), i f explanation b y reasons is me re ly a va rie t y o f causal
explanation and causal explanation depends, a t least in part,
on h o w we describe the events to be explained, as Davidson
claims, (
5
)
t h e
n
t h
e r
e
i
s
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ROBERT BOHL, JR.
explanatory asymmetry between (12) and (13) to suppose them
to re fe r to different events. Again, th e convention concerning
location is not so cle a rly acceptable as K im takes it to be. Fo r
example, w h i c h in d ivid u a ls t a k e p a rt i n a n d w h a t i s t h e
location of the event described by:
(16) General S mit h o ve rt h re w Dict a t o r Jones wh ile Jones
was out of the country ?
Finally, i f events a re th e e xtra -lin g u istic e n titie s wh ic h K i m
takes th e m to be, th e re is no reason to suppose th a t the sentences that re fe r to th e m are the o n ly determinants o f wh ich
individuals ta ke p a rt in them; i t mig h t be the case th a t both
Xantippe and Socrates take part in the event described b y (15)
although o n ly the fo rme r is mentioned. One mig h t also argue
against both o f K im's attacks on (1) th a t the sentences wh ich
he holds to be lo g ica lly equivalent, i.e., the pairs (7)-(8), (9)-(10),
(12)-(13), and (14)-(15) a re n o t lo g ica lly equivalent a t a ll. A l though this wo u ld be a short wa y o f dealing wit h K im's counter-examples, I fin d i t unappealing in lig h t o f the elucidation
that can be reached b y taking them seriously. These supposed
counter-examples, then, depend upon accepting K im's n o tio n
of how and what sentences are related to events; the argument
depends upon what it is t ryin g to defend fo r its p la u sib ility.
If Kim's arguments are not sufficient to sh o w that (1) is not
an acceptable principle and yet, I suspect, the arguments I have
used in re p ly to K im are n o t sufficient t o do mo re than gain
an impasse wit h Kim, wh a t mig h t be said in fa vo r of (1) ? The
p la u sib ility o f (1) lie s wit h a consideration I raised above in
comparing ordinary referring expressions wit h sentences; there
I noted th a t wh ile we have n o w a y o f saying th a t t wo sentences re f e r t o th e same e n t it y wit h o u t me n tio n in g th e sentences, we do have a wa y o f doing so f o r o rd in a ry re fe rrin g
expressions. I n o rd e r t h a t w e ma k e t h e a n a lo g y b e twe e n
sentences and other referring expressions as strong as possible,
we ought to have some wa y o f saying that sentences re fe r to
the same e n t it y with o u t mentioning those sentences.
It is clear that material equivalence w i l l not do a t all, f o r then
any two true sentences will refer to the same event. To accept
logical equivalence would be to accept (1).
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1
Stronger, in te n sio n a l co n n e ctive s w i l l se rve t o b re a k t h e
analogy down, f o r we do n o t need such a strong connective
for definite descriptions a n d names; su ch connectives wo u ld
probably serve o n ly i f we we re willin g to sa y t wo sentences
refer to the same event if and only if they mean the same thing,
which wo u ld cle a rly be unacceptable to Kim. Perhaps the wa y
to make (1) clear in its ambitions is to make e xp licit the imp licit
antecedent thus:
(17) I f S' bears R to some entity, and if S bears R to x and
S' is lo g ica lly equivalent to S, then S' bears R to x.
The p la u sib ility of (1) (and, o f course, o f (17)), then arises fro m
the wh o le id e a o f sentences re f e rrin g a n d t h e a n a lo g y o n e
would like to maintain between sentences and other re fe rrin g
expressions. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that Frege
in h is fo rma l language used ' =' both as th e sign f o r id e n tity
and f o r ma te ria l equivalence; i t mig h t be suggested th a t th e
resulting a mb ig u ity in ' ' is the, o r a t least a, reason Frege
supposed that sentences had a reference as we ll as a sense.
Besides the above attempt to argue that (1) is not an acceptable principle, K i m wants t o re strict the range o f application
of (2). Consider the following sentences:
(18) Ch a rlie is the fastest man on the team;
(19) Ch a rlie is the best player on the team.
Assuming that Ch a rlie is both the best p la ye r and the fastest
man on the team, (2) tells us that (18) and (19) refer to the same
event. But, points o u t K im, there is a n explanatory, and p e rhaps a causal asymmety between (18) and (19), fo r (18) ma y be
used to explain (19) b u t not vice versa. K im's suggestion is to
use Wig g in s' d istin ctio n s between genuine a n d non-genuine
reference and identity statements. 'The fastest man on the team'
and 'Th e best p la ye r o n t h e te a m' a re th e n sa id n o t t o b e
making genuine reference i n (18) a n d (19), a n d one re stricts
(2) t o those sentences i n wh ich the substitutions a re o f o n ly
those te rms ma kin g genuine reference, Ag a in , K i m says th a t
genuine id e n t it y statements a re n o t e ve n t d e scrib in g ; t h i s
appears to be in line with his rough crite rio n fo r event describing sentences. I n a p p lica tio n t o Da vid so n 's a rg u me n t, t h i s
move w i l l be used to argue that, even is (1) is acceptable, the
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ROBERT BOHL, JR.
move f ro m (4 ) t o (5 ) i s n o t ju stifie d sin ce * ( x = x & p) a n d
5i(x x & q) f a il to make genuine reference in these sentences.
Considerations analogous t o t h o se b ro u g h t a g a in st K i m ' s
criticism o f (1) ma y also be brought against h is crit icisms o f
(2). First, there is the question o f his example; I fin d i t unconcincing f o r th e same reason I fo u n d h is p u rp o rte d co u n te rexamples t o (1 ) unconvincing, n a me ly, th e re is a t le a st one
alternative theory (Davidson's) wh ich shows the a symme try to
be no argument against identity. It must be noted that this consideration a lo n e i s o n l y su fficie n t t o g a in a n impasse w i t h
Kim's vie w, since K im ma y continue to maintain h is example
in th e face o f me re ly an opposing theory. Ag a in , i f we co n sider the analogy between sentences and o th e r re fe rrin g e xpressions, e.g., d e fin ite descriptions, we fin d t h a t in th e case
of definite descriptions such as 'th e present K in g o f Greece'
we ma y substitute fo r terms wh ich do not make genuine reference, in this case 'Greece,' and there is no change o f reference.
If, then, sentences are to be re fe rrin g expressions, there wo u ld
seem n o reason t o re strict possible substitutions i n th e w a y
Kim suggests. Th is la tte r consideration, I wo u ld suggest, also
lends p la u sib ility to (2) in the same wa y that the above analogy
to id e n tity sentences containing o rd in a ry re fe rrin g expressions
lent p la u sib ility to (1); in each case, the p rin cip le concerned is
plausible because there is an analogy between it and principles
which a re appropriate to o u r usual English re fe rrin g expressions. These considerations, then, seem to me to point out that
if one accepts that sentences are re a lly re fe rrin g expressions,
there is considerable p la u sib ility in (I ) a n d (2); i f th is is th e
case, then Davidson's argument also becomes q u ite plausible,
and argues a good case against ta kin g sentences a s re fe rrin g
expressions.
In defense of Kim, one mig h t re p ly to my arguments that a ll
Davidson's a rg u me n t sh o ws i s t h a t (1 ) a n d (2 ) a re n o t a p plicable to English, no matter what th e ir p la u sib ility when applied to some fo rma l languages. Th is re p ly, I th in k, wo u ld be
misplaced, f o r m y arguments a re based u p o n t h e analogies
between o rd in a ry re fe rrin g expressions a n d wh a t we sh o u ld
say about sentences if we were to take them seriously as refer-
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ring expressions; and the characteristics o f wh a t I have called
ordinary expressions are the characteristics that th e y have in
English, and are used in analogy to o rd in a ry English sentences
which a re supposed b y K i m t o be referential. M y argument,
then, is that if sentences in English are taken as re fe rrin g e xpressions, and if there are certain rules o r characteristics that
apply t o o th e r English re f e rrin g expressions, th e n th e sa me
or analogous ru le s and characteristics ought to a p p ly t o sentences, o r a t le a st t o th o se sentences w h i c h a re t a ke n a s
referential.
III
Two objections one mig h t propose to the Davidson-Wallace
argument take the fo rm of tryin g to a p p ly that argument to the
theory o f events th a t Davidson is t ryin g to defend. First, one
might argue that the concrete event theorist w i l l wa n t to sa y
that sentences ma y describe events. I n th is case, wh e re R =
description and ' x ranges o ve r concrete events, i t is plausible
to sa y th a t (1) a n d (2 ) w i l l a p p ly; cle a rly, t h e consequence
will be th a t a ll tru e sentences describe th e same event. Th e
second argument is th a t th e analogous consequence w i l l f o llo w if we take R — making true and 'x' ranging o ve r concrete
events, namely, th a t a ll tru e sentences a re made tru e b y the
same event. I f these sorts of counter-examples to the DavidsonWallace argument wo rk, then the concrete event theorist w i l l
be in clin e d to sa y th a t the argument does n o t wo rk because,
e.g., (I ) a n d (2) f a il t o h o ld o f th e relations ma kin g tru e and
describing, ju st as K im attempts to do wit h respect to the relation, wh a te ve r it is, th a t he wants t o sa y holds between sentences and events.
The f irs t a rg u me n t i s based u p o n a misconception o f t h e
concrete event theorist's position, f o r the concrete event theorist, i.e., Davidson, does n o t wa n t t o ma in ta in th a t sentences
ever describe events. Thus, although
(20) Th is bleeding of Hamlet occurred
contains an expression, a demonstrative-descriptive phrase, i.e.,
this bleeding o f Hamlet', wh ich does describe a n event, th e
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ROBERT BOHL, JR.
sentence as a wh o le does n o t describe an event, except, p e rhaps, in the h ig h ly problematic sense in wh ich
(21) Ha mle t bled
describes o r is "about" Ha mle t. Th is is Davidson's p o in t th a t
once we see the lo g ica l fo rm o f event sentences, i.e., once we
cast those sentences in a notation wh ich displays the truth conditions o f the sentence in a mo re perspicious w a y than does
English, w e see th a t th e sentences th a t p u rp o rte d ly describe
events d o n o t d o so. Thus, i f we recast th e sentence wh ic h
serves as one o f K im's examples o f an event describing sentence in t o t h e mo re perspicuous n o ta tio n o f q u a n tifica tio n
theory, i.e., we recast (7) ("Socrates dies") as
(21) (E x) Dyin g (Socrates, x),
we see th a t the sentence does n o t describe a single event a t
all, b u t ra th e r contains a n expression, ' Dy in g (Socrates, x ) '
which gives rise to a description of a p a rticu la r event i.e., (1x)
(Dying (Socrates, x)), b u t wh ich mig h t serve as a description
of more than one event. The concrete event theorist then wants
to maintain that in no case does a sentence describe an event,
although there are some cases in wh ich a sentence ma y contain an expression that does describe an event. Thus, ju st as
we wish to make a distinction between sentences th a t are, in
some sense o r o th e r, " a b o u t" a n d those expressions wh ic h
describe material objects, so the concrete event theorist wishes
to ma k e a d istin ctio n b e twe e n th o se sentences w h i c h a re
"about" e ve n ts a n d those non-sentential expressions w h i c h
describe events.
The second argument, it seems to me, has mo re in itia l plausib ilit y th a n does t h e f irst ; i t s in it ia l p la u sib ilit y lie s i n t h e
hoary philosophical theory that sentences are true ju st in case
they "correspond" to the world, ju st in case there is something
in the wo rld that "makes true" the sentence. This sort of theory
seems to be based on the notion that since it is sentences (o r
statements o r propositions o r utterances, p i c k y o u r th e o ry)
which are true, and we do not speak equivocally when we say
that two sentences are true, there must be something out there
in the wo rld that makes them true b y being in some one simple
relation to the tru e sentences. The imp licit suggestion here is
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that there must be this simple relation between sentences and
the wo rld o r our sentences will never be forced into the needed
confrontation wit h the world. It seems to me that there are t wo
courses that might be adopted here. First, one might, like Kim,
deny that (I ) and (2) hold o f the relation o f making true; thus,
it mig h t be said, we can see that (3) and (4) are not made tru e
by the same entity, since that would be counter-intuitive. Ho wever mu ch th is mig h t appeal t o one in it ia lly and agree wit h
common intuitions, it seems a we a k proposal to me, in th a t it
does depend so le ly o n o u r in tu itio n s o r, a t best, o n o u r in tuitions and o u r theory. Th a t is, i f we accepted th is ro u te o f
escape, we wo u ld be in no better a position than K im is wit h
respect to my counters to his appeals to intuitions and theory;
we wo u ld me re ly be maintaining a different theory and wo u ld
have reached an impasse. The second re p ly wo u ld be to p ro pose a th e o ry th a t d id ju stice t o o u r common in tu itio n s th a t
sentences mu st face a confrontation wit h th e wo rld and y e t
which avoided th e problems t h e tra d itio n a l theories o f c o rrespondence have in the face o f the Davidson-Wallace a rg u ment. Th is la tte r course is one in fa ct taken b y Davidson (
who
6
denies that there is some simp le re la tio n th a t holds ju st
),
between
sentences a n d t h e w o r l d wh ic h i s t h e g ro u n d o f
truth. Rather, h e maintains, there is th e re la tio n Ta rski used
between language and the wo rld , namely satisfaction, wh ich is
such that it is defined f o r both open and closed sentences and
the truth making relation is a special case of this more general
relation. I t turns out on this th e o ry that in an analogous wa y
to the usual sorts o f correspondence theories there is ju st one
relation between tru e sentences a n d th e wo rld , th a t o f being
satisfied b y e v e ry sequence. Ho we ve r, t h e in st ru ct ive a n d
interesting, as we ll as u ltima te ly saving, p o in t about Davidson's
approach is th a t wh ile th e re su lt is th e same, t h e routes b y
which the result is reached differs fo r different sentences, since
different open sentences a re satisfied b y d iffe re n t sequences
and different closed sentences a re constructed f ro m d iffe re n t
open sentences. It is this crucial change from the usual theories
of correspondence between language and the wo rld , f ro m the
theories t h a t ma in ta in th a t th e t ru t h ma kin g re la tio n is o n e
356
F
.
ROBERT BOUL. JR.
between sentences and th e wo rld , t h a t enables th e concrete
event theorist to avoid the consequences o f his o wn argument.
Iv
What puzzles me about K im's defense o f the v ie w th a t (a t
least some) sentences in English re fe r to o r describe events is
wh y he defends the vie w a t all. I t seems to me that he mig h t
as we ll o r better defend a vie w wh ich took gerundives o r sentence nominalizations as expressions re f e rrin g t o events. H e
might then say that a. gerundive refers to an event if and o n ly
if that gerundive is the nominalization of an English E-sentence,
where a n E-sentence is a me mb e r o f th e class o f sentences
K im now calls event-describing. He then wo u ld be able to say,
I ta ke it , a ll th a t he has sa id so f a r and appears t o wa n t t o
say about events wit h o u t h a vin g t o defend th e p o sitio n th a t
sentences are re fe rrin g expressions. I wo u ld suggest then that
while K im's th e o ry as i t presently stands is weak, due to the
central position o f the thesis th a t sentences re fe r, th e re is a
re la tive ly unradical change th a t he mig h t make in his th e o ry
to avoid this central difficulty.
College of Willia m and Mary, Willia msb u rg , V irg in ia
F. Robert Bout., Jr.
REFERENCES
(1) Do n a ld DAVIDSON, "Ca u s a l Relat ions , J o u r n a l o f Philos ophy , L X I V
(1967), pp. 691-703.
(2) — , "Th e Logic al Form of Ac t ion Sentences** in Nic holas RESCHER (ed.),
The Logic of Decision and Ac t ion (Pitts burgh: Univ ers it y of Pitts burgh
Press, 1967), pp. 81-95.
(
764.
3
(4)
) — , "Tr u t h and Meaning, " Synthese, 17 (1967), pp. 304-323.
,(5) J aegwon K im, "Caus at ion, N o m i c Subs umption, a n d t h e Co n c e p t o f
Event," mime o g ra p h — forthc oming).
"
(6)
,
"Ev ents and Th e ir Des c riptions ," in Nic holas RESCHER (ed.), Essays
T
in Ho n o r o f C a r l G . He mp e l (Dordrec ht : D. Re id e l P ublis hing Co.,
r
u
e
t
o
t
h
e
F
a
c
ON SENTENCES REFERRING
3
5
7
1970), pp. 198-215.
(7) - , "O n the Psycho-physical I dent it y Theory , " Americ an Philos ophic al
Quarterly , 3 (1966), pp. 227-235.
(8) J ohn WALLACE, "Propos it ional At t it udes and I dent it y , " J ournal o f Philosophy, D W I (1969), pp. 145-152.
FOOTNOTES
( (1) pp. 694-695; (2) pp. 91-92; (3) pp. 752-753; (4) pp. 305-306.
1( p. 146.
) (2 (
(3
) (6),
6 pp. 204-5, 209.
(4
) (1)
) pp. 697 ff.
(6
) (3)
• pp. 756 ff.
6
)
)