CONFLIT ÉMERGENT ENTRE LA PROPRIÉTÉ PRIVÉE ET LA PROTECTION DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT :
LES APPROPRIATIONS DE FAIT CAUSÉES PAR LES RÉGLEMENTATIONS ENVIRONEMENTALES
THÈSE PRÉSENTÉE À LA FACULTÉ DES ÉTUDES SUPÉRIEURES ET DE LA RECHERCHE
EN VUE DE L’OBTENTION DE LA MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDE DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT
JOEY R.VOLPÉ
PROGRAMME D’ÉTUDES EN ENVIRONNEMENT
FACULTÉ DES ÉTUDES SUPÉRIEURES ET DE LA RECHERCHE
UNIVERSITÉ DE MONCTON
AOÛT 2007
DÉDICACE
À ma familia!
REMERCIEMENTS
Je tiens à sincèrement remercier les personnes et organismes suivants pour
m’avoir permis d’apporter cette thèse à terme :
Mon directeur, M. Stephen Wyatt pour son dévouement, sa patience et ses bons
conseils;
M. Omer Chouinard pour son dévouement au programme de la Maîtrise en
environnement et aux étudiants de ce programme;
M. Sylvain Couturier pour son aide et son expertise dans la préparation des
mappes;
La Faculté des études supérieures et de la recherche pour m’avoir donné
l’opportunité de faire partie du programme de Baccalauréat en droit et Maîtrise en
environnement combiné;
L’Université de Moncton pour m’avoir accordé une bourse d’excellence;
Ma conjointe Christyna, ma mère Jo-Anne, mon père Rino, ma sœur Brigitte, mes
neveux Rick et Diego, mes nièces Krysta et Gabrielle et toute ma famille élargie pour
leur support inconditionnel;
Finalement, mais non le moindre, je tiens à remercier mon frère Éric qui m’a
légué son amour pour la forêt et qui m’a également appris à toujours persévérer devant
l’adversité.
ABSTRACT
As citizens have become more aware of the environmental degradation surrounding them,
they have pressured all levels of government to put in place more stringent regulations to
protect the environment. Regulation of land use has been one of the tools utilized by
legislative and regulatory authorities to reach this end. Regulating land use for the
protection of the environment is often accompanied by a decrease in the value of the land
affected by the given regulation. This situation has caused increased conflicts between
the rights associated with private property and the right of the State to regulate land use to
protect the environment. This study analyses Canadian jurisprudence dealing with de
facto takings caused by environmental regulations in order to examine how this conflict
is emerging in the Canadian judicial system. Subsequently, the position of Canadian
courts is applied to hypothetical situations dealing with private woodlots in New
Brunswick to consider the effects on the rights of landowners. In conclusion, it appears
that, in Canada, governments and delegated authorities have almost unlimited powers to
regulate land use while private woodlot owners have few legal recourses.
SOMMAIRE
Au fur et à mesure que la population prend conscience de la dégradation
environnementale qui ne cesse d’accélérer, les citoyens placent des pressions accrues sur
les gouvernements pour qu’ils légifèrent afin de protéger l’environnement. Les
gouvernements répondent souvent en légiférant des réglementations plus sévères pour
protéger l’environnement. Les réglementations applicables à la gestion du territoire sont
un des outils de choix des gouvernements pour s’assurer d’une protection
environnementale adéquate. Les limites à l’utilisation des terres découlant de ces
réglementations ont souvent comme effet de réduire la valeur des propriétés affectées.
Cette situation a créé des conflits émergents entre le droit de l’État de légiférer pour
protéger l’environnement et les droits associés à la propriété privée. Cette étude analyse
la jurisprudence canadienne traitant des appropriations de fait causées par les
réglementations environnementales pour examiner l’émergence de ce conflit dans le
système judiciaire canadien. Subséquemment, la position des cours canadiennes est
appliquée à des situations hypothétiques traitant des limites à l’utilisation du territoire en
vigueur sur les lots boisés privés du Nouveau-Brunswick pour considérer les droits des
propriétaires fonciers affectés par ce conflit. En conclusion, il semble que les
gouvernements et les autorités déléguées ont des pouvoirs presque illimités de
réglementer l’utilisation des terres et que les propriétaires de lots boisés privés ont très
peu de recours légaux.
TABLE DES MATIÈRES
I. INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
II. CONTEXTUALISATION
i.)
ii.)
iii.)
iv.)
Les éléments du droit des propriétés applicables à la thèse ……………………...……...........3
Les éléments du droit de l’environnement applicables à la thèse ……………....................6
L’interrelation entre les droits associés à la propriété privée et la
protection de l’environnement : le mandat des cours canadiennes……….…….…….....…6
Les lots boisés privés du Nouveau-Brunswick : l’intersection
du droits des propriétés et du droit de l’environnement ……………………………...................7
III. PROBLÉMATIQUE
i).
ii).
iii).
iv).
v).
Objectif ……………………………………………………………………………………………….………………..12
Questions de recherches …………………………………………………………….……………….………..12
Contributions académiques………………………………………………………………………………..…13
Méthodologie ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….13
Outils de recherches ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 14
IV. FORMAT DE PRÉSENTATION…………..………...…………………..………………………16
V. ARTICLE
De facto Takings Caused by Environmental Regulations:
An Illustration of the Emerging Conflicts between Private Property and
Environmental Protection
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………….………18
1. The intersection of property law and environment law in Canada:
Compensation for de facto takings………………………………………………………………………19
2. Property and environment in Canadian cases of de facto takings………………..23
3. De facto Takings: The guiding principles…………………………………………..………………26
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
Parliamentary sovereignty and property in Canada……………………………………….26
Land use restrictions are the norm…………………………………….…………………………...27
The presumption: The legal justification for compensation…………….…………….28
4. The test: De facto takings defined…………………………………………..……………………………32
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
Requirement 1: The loss of all reasonable uses of property………………………….33
Defining reasonable uses……………………………………………………….………………………33
Requirement 2: Acquisition of a beneficial interest………………….………..………….36
Defining beneficial interest…………….………………………………………..…………………….36
5. Land use limits affecting private woodlot owners in New Brunswick:
Discussing the position of the courts through hypothetical analysis….…………40
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
The property interest in question……………………………………….……….…………………..41
New Brunswick Clean Environment Act…………………...….……………………………….43
New Brunswick Clean Water Act………………………………..…………………………………44
Caraquet Heritage By-law No. 185…………….…………..………………………………………46
CONCLUSION………………………………………………..……………………………………………………………….48
VI. CONCLUSIONS GÉNÉRALES………………………………………………………………….50
BIBLIOGRAPHIE
ANNEXE 1 : Secteurs protégés des bassins hydrographiques du Madawaska
ANNEXE 2 : Secteur protégé du bassin hydrographique de la rivière à la Truite
ANNEXE 3 : Article de contextualisation
I. INTRODUCTION
La salle était remplie à pleine capacité. L’évènement était une table ronde
publique tenue à Edmundston, Nouveau-Brunswick le 1er février 2006. Le sujet discuté
était le futur des opérations forestières sur les lots boisés privés dans la région du
Madawaska. Il aurait été possible de couper la tension avec un couteau. Derrière moi, un
groupe de propriétaires de lots boisés privés avec le slogan « Vivre et laissez vivre! ». À
ma droite, un groupe d’environnementalistes supportant l’argument que les coupes à
blanc devraient être prohibées dans la région, ou du moins, réglementées. Les deux
groupes avaient tous deux du poids derrière leurs arguments. Les propriétaires de lots
boisés avaient vu leurs droits d’exploiter les forêts de leurs terres réduits au début des
années 1990 avec la mise en application de la Loi sur l’assainissement de l’eau, S.-N.-B.,
C-6, 1989 et encore une fois en 2001 avec l’entrée en vigueur du Décret de désignation
du secteur protégé de bassin hydrographique - Loi sur l’assainissement de l’eau, N.B.
Reg. 2001-83. Ils craignaient que l’imposition de réglementations additionnelles
apporteraient d’autres limites significatives à leurs droits d’exploiter leurs terres. Du
point de vue environnemental, n’importe qui conduisant à travers la vallée du
Madawaska pouvait s’apercevoir que les coupes à blanc avaient un impact considérable
sur la beauté naturelle de la région. Au fur et à mesure que les discussions s’éloignaient
du futur et s’ancraient solidement dans les conflits présents entre le droit des propriétés et
les enjeux environnementaux, plusieurs questions me venaient à l’idée, et j’avais très peu
de réponses.
Ayant récemment complété le curriculum d’un programme de LLB, mon instinct
fut de traduire ce conflit en termes légaux. Est-ce que le gouvernement avait le droit
d’empiéter sur les droits de propriétés privées des propriétaires de lots boisés? Est-ce que
les propriétaires de lots boisés avaient le droit de faire tout ce qu’ils voulaient sur leurs
terres à n’importe quels coûts sociaux et environnementaux?
1
La prochaine étape dans mon questionnement était de trouver une question
juridique qui me permettrait d’observer ce conflit en application. Est-ce qu’il existait
présentement un débat devant les cours de justice à l’intérieur duquel les droits de
propriétés et les intérêts publics étaient en pleine confrontation? La réponse se trouvait
dans les questions juridiques entourant les appropriations de fait causées par les
réglementations environnementales. Essentiellement, le débat était le suivant : jusqu’où le
gouvernement pouvait-il aller dans la règlementation des terres avant que ses actions
soient considérées comme l’équivalent d’une expropriation pouvant alors qualifier pour
une compensation?
Après avoir cerner la jurisprudence entourant les appropriations de fait il s’agirait
de développer certains exemples hypothétiques en se basant sur l’application potentielle
des législations néo-brunswickoises, qui ont comme effet de limiter les opérations
forestières, sur les lots boisés privés. Une fois ces lois appliquées aux situations
hypothétiques, il s’agirait alors d’appliquer le raisonnement des cours canadiennes pour
établir s’il serait possible pour un propriétaire de lots boisés privés d’obtenir une
compensation. Sans faire une analyse complète de toutes les limites imposées aux
propriétaires de lots boisés privés, cet exercice devrait tout de même permettre de cerner
les paramètres du débat et d’identifier les droits du gouvernement et ceux des
propriétaires de lots boisés privés du Nouveau-Brunswick.
Une telle approche apportera beaucoup plus de clarté à ce débat qui ne se limite
certes pas seulement aux salles d’audience du Madawaska. Au fur et à mesure que la
population prendra conscience de la dégradation environnementale qui ne cesse de
s’accélérer, les citoyens demanderont de plus en plus de protection pour l’environnement.
Les gouvernements répondront probablement avec des réglementations de plus en plus en
plus sévères qui auront souvent comme effet de limiter le champ d’action des citoyens,
peu importe s’ils agissent sur une propriété privée ou non. Cependant de telles actions
nous portent à réfléchir sur l’impact des coûts entraînés par l’application de ces lois et
règlements. Est-ce qu’un individu, ou un groupe d’individus, devrait porter seuls le coût
des réglementations qui apportent des bénéfices à la société en général? Il ne sera pas
2
question ici d’apporter les réponses à cette question difficile, mais plutôt d’analyser la
position des cours canadiennes par rapport à ce débat et de l’appliquer à des situations
hypothétiques dans l’espoir d’identifier quels sont les droits des parties impliquées dans
ce débat complexe entre le droit du gouvernement de protéger l’environnement au nom
de l’intérêt public et le droit des propriétaires de jouir de leurs propriétés et d’en tirer
profit. Le fait de connaître leurs droits légaux l’un envers l’autre devrait au moins servir
comme un bon point de départ pour tenter de trouver un équilibre entre l’intérêt public et
les droits associés à la propriété privée. Le débat juridique entourant les appropriations de
fait causées par des réglementations environnementales, quoique qu’il ne soit pas assez
large pour englober la totalité du débat entourant la propriété et la protection de
l’environnement, est présentement une des seules questions devant les cours canadiennes
qui nous permet d’établir les paramètres des droits des acteurs impliqués.
II. CONTEXTUALISATION
i.) Les éléments du droit des propriétés applicables à la thèse
Dans le travail qui suit, l’emphase sera presque exclusivement placée sur le droit
des propriétés applicable aux biens-fonds. Le droit applicable aux propriétés
intellectuelles, personnelles, etc., ne fera pas partie de l’analyse.
Il est également important de mentionner que la notion même de propriété est de
plus en plus contestée par certains groupes, notamment les différents peuples autochtones
du Canada. Le travail qui suit ne se penchera pas sur cette question puisque la complexité
du droit applicable à la propriété dans le contexte des droits ancestraux est trop vaste et
complexe pour être adressée ici.
Pour ce qui en est des cours canadiennes, elles prennent une approche large et
libérale pour définir ce qu’est la propriété, reconnaissant plusieurs types de propriétés,
soit tangibles ou intangibles. Les cours canadiennes n’accordent pas une attention
marquée aux types de propriétés en question lorsqu’elles prennent une décision par
3
rapport à l’effet des réglementations environnementales sur les droits de propriétés
privées. L’emphase est plutôt placée sur le fait que les limites à l’utilisation des terres
doivent avoir l’effet d’occasionner la perte de tous les intérêts dans le bien-fonds.
L’approche adoptée par les cours canadiennes a été exprimée dans le jugement de
Viscount Simonds dans l’arrêt Belfast Corporation v. O. D. Cars Ltd., [1960] A.C. 490 :
[…] whether anyone using the English language in its ordinary signification
would say of a local authority which imposed some restriction upon the user of
property by its owner that that authority had "taken" that owner's "property" . . .
He would agree that "property" is a word of very wide import, including
intangible and tangible property. But he would surely deny that any one of those
rights which in the aggregate constituted ownership of property could itself and
by itself aptly be called "property" and to come to the instant case, he would deny
that the right to use property in a particular way was itself property, and that the
restriction or denial of that right by a local authority was a "taking," "taking
away" or "taking over" of "property". (Belfast Corporation v. O. D. Cars Ltd.,
[1960] A.C., p. 517. dans Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply and Services)
v. Nilsson (2002), 220 D.L.R. (4th) 474. (A.C.A.), p. 497-498)
Au niveau de la recherche académique, beaucoup d’emphase a été placée pour
tenter d’identifier quel régime de propriété semble le mieux adapté pour assurer une
gestion durable des ressources naturelles. Certains auteurs suggèrent qu’un régime de
propriétés privées permet une meilleure gestion des ressources puisque les coûts de la
dégradation des ressources sont internalisés et doivent être assumés par le propriétaire.
Ainsi le propriétaire a intérêt à gérer la ressource adéquatement puisqu’il devra supporter
le coût d’agir autrement (Hardin, 1968). D’autres auteurs ont questionné cette position et
suggéré que dans certains cas, la propriété privée n’est pas nécessairement une solution à
la dégradation environnementale, puisque les économies de marché poussent parfois les
propriétaires à surexploiter certaines ressources (Acheson, 2000). Ainsi la propriété
publique et/ou commune gérée par le gouvernement, ou une communauté, comme
fiduciaire est donc parfois défendue comme une autre alternative au régime de propriétés
privées (Kidd, 2006). Dans la réalité, les différents régimes de propriétés ont rarement
une distinction aussi claire et agissent souvent simultanément sur la gestion des
ressources.
4
Dans l’article qui suit, il sera question d’établir que certaines réglementations
environnementales entrent en conflit avec la propriété privée et d’établir les droits des
acteurs impliqués lorsque ces conflits surgissent. Il ne sera donc pas question de faire le
point sur quel régime de propriété est le plus adéquat pour assurer une gestion durable
des ressources. L’emphase sera donc explicitement placée sur la propriété privée.
Cependant les conclusions générales serviront à contextualiser ce conflit spécifique à
l’intérieur du débat social plus large entourant la gestion des ressources forestières du
Nouveau-Brunswick.
Il est important de faire mention du fait que même si dans le travail qui suit
l’emphase sera placé sur les conflits émergents entre le droit des propriétés et le droit de
l’environnement, la relation entre ces deux branches du droit n’est pas toujours
conflictuelle. Le droit des propriétés sert souvent, en symbiose avec le droit de
l’environnement, à développer et appliquer des régimes de droit qui servent à protéger
l’environnement. Au Nouveau-Brunswick, la Loi sur les servitudes écologiques L.N-B.
1998, c. C-16.3 est un bon exemple de certaines symbioses très bénéfiques qui peuvent
ressortir de l’interrelation entre le droit des propriétés et le droit de l’environnement.
Finalement au niveau de la terminologie, une certaine spécification est de mise. Il
existe un débat académique par rapport à l’utilisation du terme « droit de propriété »
(Boudreau-Ouellette, 1990). Essentiellement, la question est à savoir si les détenteurs de
droits découlant d’un bien-fonds ont réellement un droit de propriété puisque
historiquement tous les biens-fonds du Canada étaient appartenus par la Couronne. De
plus, la constitution canadienne ne contient aucune clause par rapport à la propriété.
Ainsi, il reste à se demander si les propriétaires de biens-fonds canadiens détiennent
réellement des « droits de propriétés ». Dans cette thèse, le terme « droit de propriété »
est utilisé avec nuance – tel que l’expression « droit découlant de la propriété ».
L’utilisation de ces nuances est en ligne avec le fait qu’au Canada, les droits que l’on
détient par rapport à un bien-fonds ne représentent pas nécessairement que l’on appartient
le fond de terre comme tel, mais plutôt certains intérêts par rapport au bien-fonds.
5
Il est également d’importance de mentionner que le terme « droit de propriété »
est utilisé dans le contexte du droit des propriétés réelles, c'est-à-dire le droit applicable
aux biens-fonds.
ii.) Les éléments du droit de l’environnement applicables à la thèse
Le droit de l’environnement est une branche de droit relativement nouvelle. Il
peut parfois s’avérer difficile de définir exactement qu’est-ce que le droit de
l’environnement puisque ce type de droit est souvent greffé à des législations qui n’ont
pas comme seul mandat de protéger l’environnement. Dans le travail qui suit, le droit de
l’environnement sera considéré de façon large et libérale, c'est-à-dire que toute
législation, ou article de loi, qui a comme effet de protéger l’environnement sera
considérée comme faisant partie de cette branche du droit. Cependant puisque nous
traitons surtout des limites imposées sur l’exploitation des terres, il sera presque
exclusivement question de réglementations environnementales applicables aux biensfonds, c'est-à-dire à la gestion des territoires et des ressources. De plus, il ne sera pas
question ici des recours en common law, notamment le droit entourant la nuisance,
puisque le droit environnemental applicable à notre question relève exclusivement du
domaine de la législation.
iii.) L’interrelation entre les droits associés à la propriété privée et la protection de
l’environnement : le mandat des cours canadiennes
La constitution canadienne ne contient aucune disposition se rapportant à la
propriété privée (Allen, 2000, p.6). De ce fait même, le mandat des cours canadiennes est
très limité lorsqu’elles traitent de questions relatives à la propriété privée puisque la cour
ne détient pas le pouvoir de réviser la justesse des décisions législatives à la lumière des
dispositions constitutionnelles (Young, 2005, p. 345-346). Cependant, lorsque la
législature n’indique pas clairement son intention de ne pas compenser les propriétaires
pour leurs pertes découlant de l’application d’une législation, les cours canadiennes ont le
pouvoir d’appliquer une présomption en faveur de la compensation (Bauman, 1994, p.
563). C'est-à-dire que les cours interprètent les intentions du législateur à la lumière
d’une présomption selon laquelle le gouvernement n’a pas l’intention de prendre la
propriété de ces citoyens sans les compenser pour leurs pertes.
6
La thèse traitera des jurisprudences découlant de l’application de la présomption
en faveur de la compensation dans des cas où les demandeurs apportent une action en
appropriation de fait causée par une réglementation environnementale. L’analyse de la
jurisprudence traitant de ce sujet permettra d’établir les paramètres du débat juridique
entourant le conflit entre la protection de l’environnement et les droits découlant de la
propriété privée. Ainsi, il sera question d’établir les pouvoirs que les cours canadiennes
disposent pour tenter d’établir un équilibre entre la propriété privée et la protection de
l’environnement – c'est-à-dire comment les cours canadiennes peuvent-elles balancer le
droit du gouvernement de légiférer pour protéger l’environnement avec le droit des
propriétaires privés de jouir de leurs propriétés et d’en tirer profit? L’analyse de la
position des cours canadiennes par rapport aux appropriations de fait causées par des
réglementations environnementales permettra également d’établir les droits des
propriétaires
affectés
par
l’application
de
réglementations
environnementales
occasionnant des pertes d’intérêts découlant de leurs biens-fonds.
Il est cependant important de se rappeler que le pouvoir d’établir l’équilibre social
entre la protection de l’environnement et les droits associés à la propriété privée est
exclusivement du domaine politique au Canada, ainsi la thèse n’aura pas comme objectif
d’établir cet équilibre, mais plutôt d’établir les paramètres juridiques qui sont applicables
à la question et les droits des propriétaires affectés par les réglementations
environnementales.
iv.) Les lots boisés privés du Nouveau-Brunswick : l’intersection du droits des
propriétés et du droit de l’environnement
La superficie totale du Nouveau-Brunswick est de 7.2 million d’hectares
(Association des produits forestiers du Nouveau-Brunswick (APFNB), 2006, p. 4). Les
terres forestières occupent 6.1 million hectares dont 5.9 million hectares sont catégorisés
comme étant des terres forestières productives (Dansereau & deMarsh, 2003, p. 776;
APFNB, 2006, p. 4). Un calcul rapide nous permet de déterminer qu’environ 82% du
territoire néo-brunswickois est apte à l’exploitation forestière. Sous cette optique, la
gestion des terres forestières productives est évidement un des plus importants enjeux en
7
ce a trait à la gestion des territoires du Nouveau-Brunswick. Il devrait donc être évident
que d’assurer une gestion durable des forêts du Nouveau-Brunswick est d’une importance
capitale pour l’environnement de la province.
De plus, l’économie forestière au Nouveau-Brunswick contribue directement 1.7
milliard de dollars par année, représente plus de 17 000 emplois directs et environ 30% à
40% des exportations de la province du Nouveau-Brunswick (Atlantic Provinces
Economic Council, 2003, p.2). On peut donc rapidement conclure que les propriétés
forestières et les droits d’extraction des produits ligneux sont d’une importance cruciale
pour l’économie de cette province.
Au Nouveau-Brunswick, il existe présentement trois types de propriétés
forestières. Les terres de la Couronne sont appartenues par la province, mais elles sont en
grande partie gérées par des compagnies forestières. Les tenures libres industrielles sont
des propriétés privées appartenues par des compagnies forestières et gérées selon les
techniques et les normes
semblables à celles qui s’appliquent sur les terres de la
Couronne. Le troisième type de propriété forestière, les lots boisés privés, sont
appartenus par des individus (Comité spécial de l’approvisionnement en bois, 2004, p. 4)
et sont typiquement les petites superficies. Les trois types de propriété sont assujettis aux
lois environnementales, telle que Loi sur l’assainissement de l’eau, S.-N.-B., C-6, 1989.
Cependant, l’existence d’un cadre de gestion pour les terres de la Couronne et les tenures
libres industrielles, ainsi que des plans d’aménagement et d’un contrôle exercé par le
Ministre de Ressources naturelles (en fonction de la Loi sur les terres et forêts de la
Couronne, S.N.B., 1980, c-38) fait en sorte que la situation des tenures libres industrielles
diffère grandement de celle des lots boisés privés. L’analyse présenté dans cette thèse se
concentrera sur les boisés privés et n’adressera pas les particularités de la situation de
tenures libres industrielles.
Au Nouveau-Brunswick, les lots boisés privés représentent environ 30% de la
superficie des terres forestières productives, soit environ 1.8 millions d’hectares
(Dansereau & deMarsh, 2003, p. 776). On estime que 35% de l’approvisionnement
durable de bois franc (feuillus) et 24% de l’approvisionnement durable de résineux
8
proviennent des lots boisés privés du Nouveau-Brunswick (Comité spécial de
l’approvisionnement en bois, 2004, p. 4). Il va sans dire qu’une telle superficie de forêt,
additionnée avec une telle exploitation forestière, revêt une importance environnementale
qui ne peut être ignorée. Les lots boisés privés du Nouveau-Brunswick sont également
d’une importance cruciale pour l’eau, les paysages, la biodiversité, etc. – tous des aspects
de l’environnement que les différents paliers de gouvernements règlementent de plus en
plus dans l’espoir de les sauvegarder pour les générations à venir.
Les lots boisés privés sont donc un exemple idéal pour illustrer les conflits
émergents entre la propriété privée et la protection de l’environnement, puisque les droits
de propriétés qui leur sont rattachés sont essentiels à la fois pour l’économie et pour
l’environnement du Nouveau-Brunswick. De plus, le fait que les lots boisés privés sont
appartenus par près de 40 000 propriétaires (45 hectares par propriétaire, en moyenne)
ajoute un important volet politique aux aspects économiques et environnementaux
(Dansereau & deMarsh, 2003, p. 776). Contrairement aux tenures libres industrielles (1.2
million d’hectares de terres forestière productives) et aux terres de la Couronne (3
millions d’hectares de terres forestière productives) qui sont en grande majorité
appartenues ou gérées par 6 grandes compagnies forestières, les lots boisés privés du
Nouveau-Brunswick sont gérés et appartenus en grande partie par des citoyens du
Nouveau-Brunswick (Comité spécial de l’approvisionnement en bois, 2004, p. 4). Sous
cette optique, les propriétaires de lots boisés privés représentent donc un contrepoids
politique potentiel important contre la monopolisation et l’industrialisation incessantes
des pratiques forestières.
L’exemple des lots boisés privés du Nouveau-Brunswick est d’autant plus
pertinent si l’on considère que les conflits entre les droits des propriétaires d’exploiter
leurs lots boisés privés et le droit du gouvernement de légiférer pour protéger
l’environnement ont déjà été un sujet de débat au Nouveau-Brunswick.
9
Au début des années 1990, le gouvernement du Nouveau-Brunswick annonça que
de nouvelles réglementations seraient légiférées pour établir des restrictions par rapport à
l’exploitation forestière sur les lots boisés privés. Entre autres, la réglementation en
question était supposée établir des normes par rapport aux superficies des coupes
annuelles sur les lots boisés privés. Le gouvernement de l’époque proposait de limiter la
coupe annuelle sur un lot à 10% de la superficie totale du lot. La réaction de la part des
propriétaires de lots boisés privés et de l’industrie forestière fut tellement forte que la
législation contemplée a été retirée par le gouvernement (Wyatt et. al., 2006, p. 116).
Lors de la Table de concertation pour l’aménagement durable des boisés privés du
Nord-Ouest du Nouveau-Brunswick tenue à Edmundston en 2006, les conflits entre les
droits de propriété privées des propriétaires de lots boisés et la protection de
l’environnement
refirent
surface.
Plusieurs
propriétaires
ont
exprimé
leur
mécontentement par rapport à l’entrée en vigueur du Décret de désignation du secteur
protégé de bassin hydrographique - Loi sur l’assainissement de l’eau, N.B. Reg. 2001-83.
Les secteurs désignés comme bassins hydrographiques affectent des superficies
de territoire considérable dans certaines régions du Nouveau-Brunswick, notamment dans
la région du Madawaska (Voir annexe 1). De plus, les dispositions du Décret de
désignation du secteur protégé de bassin hydrographique - Loi sur l’assainissement de
l’eau, N.B. Reg. 2001-83 imposent des restrictions importantes par rapport à
l’exploitation forestière à l’intérieur des bassins hydrographiques désignés. Les
protestation des propriétaires de lots boisés privés par rapport à l’application de ces
restrictions découlent du fait que la grande majorité des secteurs désignés comme bassins
hydrographiques se retrouvent principalement sur des lots boisés privés de la région,
limitant ainsi la possibilité des propriétaires d’exploiter leurs boisés (Voir annexes 1 et 2).
10
D’après le rapport de la Table de concertation pour l’aménagement durable des
boisés privés privés du Nord-Ouest du Nouveau-Brunswick, il est clair qu’il existe un
conflit entre la propriété privée et la protection de l’environnement :
[…] l’entrée en vigueur en 2001 d’un nouveau règlement de la qualité de l’eau
[…] a été précédée d’une vague de coupes totales dans les zones où l’exploitation
serait éventuellement limitée. Les propriétaires étaient inquiets de perdre le droit
d’exploiter leurs territoires, et ils ont choisi de le couper d’une manière expéditive
avant l’arrivée de nouvelles limitations. (Wyatt et. al, 2006, p.116)
Les citoyens concernés par la protection de l’environnement ont également fait
part de leurs préoccupations par rapport à la gestion des lots boisés privés de la province
à plusieurs reprises. Cette citation tirée d’un article intitulé « Le Massacre forestier doit
cesser! » paru dans le journal communautaire La République exprime de façon explicite
la frustration et les attentes de certains citoyens du Madawaska :
Les pratiques abusives doivent non seulement êtres réglementées mais
empêchées, dénoncées. Arnaquer nos boisés sans égard à la responsabilité globale
envers la population, c’est un crime contre l’humanité. […] Les massacres
forestiers qui se déroulent sur plusieurs terres boisées au Nord-Ouest font
scandales. Les principes de l’aménagement forestier durable ne sont pas respectés.
Les auteurs de ces actes sont surtout préoccupés par un gain rapide sans se soucier
de l’importance de la forêt comme milieu de vie. (Pedneault, J., La République,
12 avril 2005)
On peut donc assez rapidement s’apercevoir que les conflits entre les droits des
propriétaires de lots boisés privés d’exploiter leurs terres et la protection de
l’environnement sont non seulement un sujet d’importance théorique, mais également
d’une importance pratique et réelle pour les citoyens du Nouveau-Brunswick.
Bref, il serait difficile de trouver un meilleur exemple dans la province du
Nouveau-Brunswick qui représente à la fois une ressource qui est essentielle à
l’économie et à l’environnement en plus d’affecter un aussi grand nombre de
propriétaires et de citoyens.
11
III. PROBLÉMATIQUE
i). Objectifs
•
L’objectif central de la thèse sera d’examiner et de clarifier le débat légal
entourant
les
appropriations
de
fait
causées
par
les
règlementations
environnementales au Canada pour démontrer qu’il existe un conflit juridique
émergent entre les droits associés à la propriété privée et la protection de
l’environnement.
•
Il sera également question d’établir les droits des acteurs impliqués dans la
gestion durable des lots boisés privés au Nouveau-Brunswick qui sont affectés par
le conflit juridique entre les droits associés à la propriété privée et les
réglementations qui visent à protéger l’environnement.
ii). Questions de recherches
• Est-ce qu’une analyse de la jurisprudence canadienne permet de conclure que la
compensation pour les appropriations de fait causées par des réglementations
environnementales se retrouve au centre des conflits juridiques émergents entre
les droits associés à la propriété privée et le droit des autorités canadiennes de
légiférer pour protéger l’environnement?
•
Qu’est-ce qu’une appropriation de fait causée par une règlementation
environnementale dans le contexte canadien? Quels sont les questions et facteurs
qui donnent naissance à ce recours?
•
Quelle est la position des cours de justice canadiennes par rapport aux
appropriations de fait causées par des règlementations environnementales?
Qu’est-ce que la jurisprudence canadienne relative aux appropriations de fait
causées par les réglementations environnementales nous permet de conclure par
rapport aux droits des acteurs impliqués dans la gestion des lots boisés privés du
Nouveau-Brunswick?
12
iii). Contributions académiques
•
Une démonstration des conflits juridiques émergents entre les droit des propriétés
et le droit de l’environnement dans la jurisprudence canadienne entourant la
compensation pour les appropriations de fait causées par les réglementations
environnementales.
•
Une analyse des facteurs et éléments sur lesquels les cours canadiennes se
penchent lorsqu’elles font face à une situation d’appropriation de fait causée par
une règlementation environnementale.
•
Une analyse de ce que la position des cours canadiennes sur la question des
appropriations de fait causées par une réglementation environnementale nous
permet de conclure par rapport aux droits des acteurs impliqués dans la gestion
durable des lots boisés privés du Nouveau-Brunswick.
iv). Méthodologie
Trois étapes méthodologiques seront nécessaires pour répondre aux questions de
recherches. Premièrement, il sera nécessaire de souligner brièvement les raisons pourquoi
le droit de l’environnement et le droit des propriétés se retrouvent dans une situation
conflictuelle. Il sera également nécessaire de spécifier pourquoi la compensation pour les
appropriations de fait causées par les réglementations se retrouve au centre de ce conflit.
Une telle approche permettra de cerner pourquoi la compensation pour les appropriations
de fait causées par les réglementations environnementales nous permet de comprendre la
position de la jurisprudence canadienne par rapport au conflit entre la propriété privée et
la protection de l’environnement.
La revue de littérature servira donc à créer un encadrement théorique qui sera
utilisé comme optique à travers laquelle il sera possible de mettre en contexte la
jurisprudence canadienne se relatant aux questions juridiques entourant les appropriations
de fait causées par les règlementations environnementales.
13
Deuxièmement, il s’agira d’établir les facteurs pris en considération par les cours
canadiennes lorsqu’elles font face à des situations d’appropriations de fait causées par les
réglementations environnementales. Ces facteurs seront plus tard appliqués à des
situations hypothétiques pour établir des paramètres portant sur jusqu’où le
gouvernement du Nouveau-Brunswick peut aller dans sa réglementation des activités
forestières sur les lots boisés privés.
Il sera donc nécessaire de faire une recherche de la jurisprudence canadienne
traitant de la question des appropriations de fait, et plus spécifiquement, celles causées
par les règlementations environnementales pour identifier les facteurs analysés par les
cours.
Finalement il s’agira d’illustrer, à l’aide d’exemples hypothétiques, jusqu’où le
gouvernement du Nouveau-Brunswick peut aller dans son processus de réglementation
environnementale sans être obligé de compenser les propriétaires de lots boisés privés.
Ceci devrait permettre aux acteurs impliqués d’identifier leurs droits respectifs l’un
envers l’autre.
Une recherche de la législation environnementale sera donc effectuée pour tenter
d’identifier certaines des limites imposées aux propriétaires de lots boisés privés du
Nouveau-Brunswick. L’emphase sera placée sur quelques-uns des articles de loi qui ont
le plus grand effet limitatif sur les opérations d’extraction de produits ligneux des lots
boisés privés du Nouveau-Brunswick. Les facteurs développés par la cour pour
déterminer si les limites imposées sont suffisamment sévères pour justifier une
compensation seront alors appliquées à ces situations hypothétiques. Ces situations
hypothétiques seront basées sur l’application des réglementations environnementales du
Nouveau Brunswick aux opérations de coupe de bois sur les lots boisés privés.
14
v). Outils de recherches
La revue de littérature a surtout été accomplie en utilisant les bases de données
électroniques. Premièrement, les bases de données plus générales telles Proquest, Science
Direct, etc., ont été consultées. Une fois ceci complété, les bases de données spécialisées
dans le domaine juridique ont elles aussi été consultées (Westlaw, Quicklaw, Lexis Nexis,
etc.). La plupart des bases de données qui se spécialisent dans le domaine juridique ont
également des engins de recherches dédiés spécifiquement au droit de l’environnement,
ceux-ci ont donc également été consultés.
Considérant que la majorité des bases de données électroniques sont seulement
rétroactives jusqu’aux années 1990, il a également été nécessaire de complémenter la
recherche électronique avec une recherche en bibliothèque. Les différents index de
périodiques juridiques ont été consultés (Index to Canadian Legal Literature, Periodical
Indexes, etc.). Les périodiques canadiens qui ne se retrouvent pas dans les index de
périodiques ont été recherchés individuellement pour ressortir les articles pertinents au
sujet de la thèse. Différents ouvrages de référence ont également été consultés (Words
and Phrases, Canadian Encyclopedic Digest, Black’s Law Library, etc.).
La recherche pour les livres pertinents au sujet a été faite à travers la Bibliothèque
de droit de l’Université de Moncton, la bibliothèque Rhéa-Larose de l’UMCE, et la base
de données de la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada ainsi qu’en consultant les
bibliographies des différents ouvrages choisis.
La recherche jurisprudentielle a été effectuée à l’aide des bases de données.
Quicklaw, une banque de données qui renferme la presque totalité des jurisprudences
canadiennes, a été l’outil de recherche le plus utilisé. La recherche a été effectuée à l’aide
de mots clés (voir la liste ci-dessous). Quickcite, un outil de recherche qui permet de
suivre l’historique du traitement juridique d’une jurisprudence, a été l’outil de recherche
le plus important dans la base Quicklaw. L’utilisation de Quickcite a permis de bâtir un
historique du traitement juridique des appropriations de fait causées par les
réglementations environnementales au Canada.
15
Mots clés:
appropriation de fait – de facto taking
expropriation - expropriation
expropriation constructive – constructive expropriation
expropriation de fait – de facto expropriation
lots boisés privés – private woodlots
préjudice – injurious affection
regulatory taking
Les versions électroniques des législations applicables à l’environnement et aux
ressources naturelles ont également été scrutées pour trouver les différents articles qui
pourraient potentiellement limiter l’exploitation et l’utilisation des ressources naturelles.
L’analyse des débats législatifs entourant les réglementations environnementales
applicables à l’utilisation des lots boisés privés du Nouveau-Brunswick n’a pas fait partie
de la méthodologie puisque ce qui importe pour le développement de la thèse est
l’intention finale de la législature, cette intention est représentée dans les textes de lois et
réglementations applicables à la protection de l’environnement du Nouveau-Brunswick.
Les différentes positions avancées à l’intérieur de la législature ne sont pas d’importance
puisque l’équilibre établi par la législature entre la protection de l’environnement et les
droits associés à la propriété privée est exprimé dans les textes législatifs.
IV. FORMAT DE PRÉSENTATION
La thèse sera présentée dans un format de thèse par article. Les premières sections
serviront à introduire la thèse, établir le contexte et la problématique et décrire la
méthodologie de recherche. L’article succède à ces sections; il est intégré directement
dans le texte de la thèse, mais aura la capacité de se tenir seul pour la publication. Cet
article sera soumise pour publication au Journal of Environmental Law and Practice qui
est publié conjointement par le University of Saskatchewan College of Law et la Law
16
Foundation of Saskatchewan. La thèse terminera avec des conclusions générales qui
relient l’article au contexte et la problématique. L’introduction générale, la
contextualisation, la problématique et les conclusions générales seront présentées en
français, cependant l’article sera écrit dans la langue anglaise afin de faciliter la
publication.
Considérant que cette thèse s’inscrit dans un contexte interdisciplinaire, un article
de contextualisation a également été placé en annexe de la thèse (annexe 3). Cet article
permettra aux lecteurs non-spécialistes de mieux cerner la place des appropriations de fait
dans le contexte juridique canadien, ainsi que les enjeux légaux plus généraux qui ne
peuvent être traités dans un article applicable spécifiquement au droit de
l’environnement. L’article de contextualisation ne fait pas partie intégrale de la thèse,
mais sera tout de même soumis pour la publication, à titre de travail de vulgarisation, sur
le site www.expropriation.ca qui regroupe des travaux visant à éclairer les enjeux
juridiques entourant les expropriations.
17
V. ARTICLE
De facto Takings Caused by Environmental Regulations:
An Illustration of the Emerging Conflicts between Private Property and
Environmental Protection
INTRODUCTION
As citizens have become more aware of the environmental degradation
surrounding them, they have pressured all levels of government to put in place more
stringent regulations to protect the environment. Regulation of land use has been one of
the tools utilized by legislative and regulatory authorities to reach this end (Bauman,
1994, p. 561). Regulating land use for the protection of the environment is often
accompanied by a decrease in the value of the land affected by the given regulation. This
has sparked debate, especially in the United States, as to how far government can go in
the regulation of land use (Riesel & Barshov, 1995, p. 565) – when have government
actions gone too far in regulating land use, hence moving away from the mere regulation
of land and towards a confiscatory action that should be compensated? In Canada,
landowners are afforded protection under the existing expropriation laws, but what
happens when authorities decide not to invoke expropriation statues and consider their
actions are not compensable? Do Canadian private landowners have any legitimate right
to compensation when environmental regulations severely limit the enjoyment of their
property?
This article aims to investigate the emerging conflict between property rights and
environmental protection in the Canadian judicial system. We begin with a brief
overview of the theoretical issues raised by the interrelation of property law and
environmental law and the importance of compensation as a tool to alleviate the potential
conflicts between these two distinct branches of law. We then proceed to analyze the
Canadian jurisprudence dealing with de facto takings caused by environmental
regulations in order to establish the context in which property rights and environmental
protection may come into conflict and the position and powers of Canadian courts when
18
making decisions related to the establishment of a balance between the right of
government to limit land use to protect the environment and the right of land owners to
freely use their property. Finally, by applying the position of Canadian courts to
hypothetical situations dealing with land use limits affecting private woodlot owners in
New Brunswick, the rights of affected owners will be established.
1. The intersection of property law and environment law in Canada:
Compensation for de facto takings
As environmental regulations limiting land use have become more prevalent in
Canada, private property and environmental law have been colliding in the courts. In
order to alleviate this conflict, courts – when their mandate permits it – can award
compensation. Two questions will be addressed in this section: (1) Why are the rights
associated with private property and environmental law colliding? (2) What role does
compensation play in alleviating the conflict between private property and environmental
law?
Property law and environmental law as they stand today are based on very
different philosophical pillars which represent different values that sometimes come into
conflict (Coyle & Morrow, 2004, p.3-5). The underlying conflicts between property law
and environmental law were described by Coyle & Morrow, 2004:
Property law is concerned with the freedom and ability to control and utilize
resources, and with ensuring the general efficiency of a scheme for the
distribution of rights and duties in this regard. It is therefore concerned with
regulating the use of resources. As a result, environmental ideas, particularly
within the law, will inevitably be closely tied to the prevailing legal conceptions
of property and property rights. At a superficial level, it is easy to identify the
direction of influence: conceptions of property rights tend to delimit the scope of
legitimate legal concern with our use of property in a way potentially harmful to
the environment. At the same time, the increasing importance of environmental
law as a distinct discipline with a developing body of distinctive legal principals
will profoundly influence attitudes towards the desirability and the extent of legal
entitlements freely to use property. (Coyle & Morrow, 2004, p. 5)
19
This underlying philosophical conflict noted by Coyle & Morrow can be observed
in the fact that property law has a very unitary view of land. Property law divides land
into parcels which are recorded as belonging to certain individuals, or legal entities, with
certain rights associated to the given land. On the other hand, environmental law
increasingly uses an ecosystemic view of the world, meaning that everything is
interrelated (Beggs, 1995, p. 904-906). The division of land into different parcels is
difficult to reconcile with the holistic view of land promoted by environmental law.
Furthermore, property law has historically been a very abstract branch of law
(Beggs, 1995, p.904). The traditional black acre serves as a reminder of this abstract view
of property (Freyfogle, 1999, p. 589). In this perception of land, the land itself is of little
importance, it is instead the rights associated with that land that become the central part
of the analysis. Perhaps the most obvious expression of this abstract view of land given
by property law is the most widely used metaphor of property which describes it as a
“bundle of rights” (Freyfogle, 1999, p. 589; Beggs, 1995, p.904). Environmental law, on
the other hand, is based on the land itself and the creatures that live upon it (Freyfogle,
1999, p. 589-590; Beggs, 1995, p.904-906). Such an approach based on land ethics aims
to respect the land for what it brings to society in terms of environmental goods and for
its intrinsic value, not necessarily and strictly for its utilitarian economical uses (Beggs,
1995, p.904).
Notwithstanding these and other philosophical differences between property law
and environmental law, there are also very practical reasons why we are seeing more
conflict between these two branches of law. As citizens become more conscious of
environmental degradation and demand more stringent land use restrictions in order to
protect the environment, property owners have seen the historic absolutism of their
property rights diminish. Bauman describes a:
[…] growing frustration of many owners of land otherwise suitable for development.
This frustration has increased dramatically in latter years with citizens’ groups
successfully encouraging local governments to virtually sterilize undeveloped tracts of
land – in effect, appropriating to the neighborhood, as an amenity, open space owned by
private citizens. At what point do such actions at law give rise to a right in the frustrated
owner to compensation? (Bauman, 1994, p.561)
20
This raises some important issues relating to compensation for the loss of property
interests caused by environmental regulations. It shows that the conflicts between
property law and environmental law are not only abstract philosophical notions, but more
importantly come into conflict in very real day-to-day situations where they are applied.
It also demonstrates that demands for land use are changing as the public expects more
stringent regulation of private property to protect the environment. Finally, it underlines
the fact that these increased demands for public restrictions on private property may also
lead to increased demands for compensation by land owners.
Compensation for loss of property interest caused by legislative control of land
use is certainly not the only solution to mitigating the conflicts between property law and
environmental law; co-operation and stewardship are promoted as alternatives to
regulatory control by an increasing number of people and organizations (Canadian Model
Forest Network, 2004). However, compensation is the most widely used legal remedy to
alleviate an owner’s loss of property interests. In fact the vast majority of statutory rights
afforded to owners through the various federal and provincial expropriation acts are
centered around how much, when and to whom compensation should be awarded (Todd,
1992).
Furthermore, compensation is the only remedy available for common law de facto
takings. Compensation for de facto takings is common law remedy, based on a legislative
interpretation presumption that government does not aim to take private property without
providing owners with fair compensation for their losses (Rock Resources Inc. v. British
Columbia, (2003) 229 D.L.R. (4th) 115 (BCCA), p. 148-152 [Rock Resources]). Courts can
award compensation for a de facto taking when there has been an acquisition of a
beneficial interest in the property by the authority causing the taking and when the
legislative scheme in question has caused the removal of all reasonable uses of that
property ((Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 227
(SCC), p. 239 [C.P.R. v. Vancouver]).
21
Compensation finds itself squarely at the intersection of property law and
environmental law as the most utilized tool, not only to establish a sense of fairness, but
also to help maintain a certain economic efficiency (Schwindt, 1992, p. 20).
In the case of environmental limits to land use imposed by governments, the issue
of fairness is essentially “whether the public at large, rather than a single owner, must
bear the burden of the exercise of state power in the public interest” (Schwindt, 1992, p.
34). The argument being that the loss of value or use occasioned by an owner should be
compensated with state funds and not absorbed only by him or her. The simplification of
the role accorded to compensation in this dilemma was stated concisely by Schwindt who
stated that: “compensability exists because the burden has become disproportionately
large for the property owner” (Schwindt, 1992, p. 34). Essentially the question is: Should
the government force some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness,
should be borne by the public as a whole? (Schwindt, 1992, p. 33).
Economic rationalization for compensating owners affected by the regulation of
land use is a complex issue that has been analyzed in depth by academic literature in the
field of economics. Again Schwindt illustrates the situation in general terms:
If the level or lack of compensation affects the behavior of economic actors
(either public or private), in subsequent decision making, there may be a marked
effect on social welfare in the future. This is because compensation introduces
incentives and disincentives for particular types of action. Too little compensation
might encourage government to convert too many resources to public use and
discourage investment in otherwise valuable endeavors. Too much compensation
could deter government from converting property to a higher valued public use
and could encourage investment in activities which had less economic merit than
others. (Schwindt, 1992, p.21)
So why have Canadian governments and courts found it so difficult to develop
fair guidelines for affording compensation for land use restrictions that don’t fall under
expropriation laws, but nonetheless cause important decreases in value of privately
owned land? Canadian courts are limited in their capacity to treat owners fairly and
balance this with the protection public interest, as they lack the constitutional power to do
22
so (Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Mariner Real Estate Ltd, (1999) 177 D.L.R. (4th)
696 (Nova Scotia Court of Appeal), p. 712-713 [Mariner Real Estate]). Governments for
their part may fear that recognizing such rights would limit their legislative capacity to
implement efficient land use regulation in the name of public interest.
This brings us back to the issue of de facto takings. Considering the importance of
compensation both for private property owners and environmental protection, how have
Canadian courts used their, albeit limited, powers to decide when governments have
effectively gone too far in regulating land use?
2. Property and environment in Canadian cases of de facto takings
Over the last twenty years, four cases in particular illustrate the existence of
points of friction between property law and environmental law in Canadian
jurisprudence. A brief review of the facts of these cases helps to understand the nature of
the conflict between environmental protection and private property and the central place
of compensation for de facto takings in the debate. The issues raised by these cases,
notably the principles underlying de facto takings and the test used by the courts, will be
examined in more detail in the following sections.
In British Columbia v. Tener ([1985] 1 S.C.R. 533 (Supreme Court of Canada)
[Tener]) the Court considered if the refusal of the Crown to grant permits necessary for
the exploitation of a property interest amounted to expropriation, giving rise to
compensation. The respondents were the registered owners of a mineral claim in British
Columbia Crown land, a claim dating back to 1934. In 1939, the Province established a
provincial park encompassing the land subject to the respondents’ claim and, over the
following years, increasing stringent rules were imposed on resource exploitation in the
park. Finally, in 1978, the Teners were advised that no new exploration or development
work would be allowed under current park policy. They then commenced an action
against the Crown since they considered their opportunity to explore the claims had been
conclusively denied (Tener, 1985, p.533). The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that
23
the permanent refusal of a permit by the Crown was derogation of its earlier grant, and
even given the fact that it was legal, amounted to an expropriation. The Court found that
this process was to be distinguished from zoning and the regulation of specific activity on
certain land since it constituted a taking for which compensation should by paid. The
claimants were found to be in full right to obtain compensation for the loss of their
property interest (Tener, 1985, 564-565).
The Crown’s right not to permit certain land uses on privately owned property
was examined in Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Mariner Real Estate Ltd ([1999] 177
D.L.R. (4th) 696. (Nova Scotia Court of Appeal) [Mariner Real Estate]. The respondents
owned land that had been designated as a “beach” under s. 5 of the Beaches Act, R.S.N.S.
1989, c. 32.; a designation giving the Minister of Natural Resource the power to control
development. An application by the owners to build a single family dwelling on their lot
was refused by the Minister, leading the respondents to bring an action claiming that the
Crown had expropriated their property interest (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 696).
Initially, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that the claimants were entitled to
compensation since the refusal of the necessary permits meant that the claimants had lost
virtually all economic value in their land and therefore lost virtually all rights of
ownership (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 699-700). However, upon appeal by the
Crown, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeals concluded that even if the claimants’
contention that they had lost virtually all economic value of the land was held to be true,
this did not amount to losing an interest in land within the meaning of the Expropriation
Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 156 [Nova Scotia Expropriation Act]. Judge Cromwell supported
this conclusion with the fact that Canadian jurisprudence does not recognize a decrease in
value in land, on its own, to be the equivalent of the loss of an interest in land (Mariner
Real Estate, 1999, p. 713). He also noted that the owners had not lost any of their
historical uses of the property – walking around, taking pictures, etc. – hence, they had
not lost the entire bundle of rights associated with the property (Mariner Real Estate,
1999, p. 706). Finally, the Court took notice of the ecologically sensitive nature of the
land, as stated in the legislation, in its determination of whether the proposed use was
reasonable (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 697). Judge Hallett, in his concurring
24
judgment, pointed out that the claimants had not exhausted all their recourses since they
still had the opportunity to modify their building plan and reapply to the Minister for a
permit (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 737).
The opening paragraph of Judge Cromwell’s concurring judgment is perhaps the
most explicit recognition by a Canadian court of the emerging conflicts between property
law and environmental law. Judge Cromwell began his judgment by stating:
This case involves a collision of important interests. On one side, there are the
interests of the respondents in the enjoyment of their privately owned land at
Kingsburg Beach. On the other is the public interest in the protection and
preservation of environmentally fragile and ecologically significant beach, dune and
beach ridge resources. (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 699-700)
Mineral claims and provincial parks in British Columbia were again at issue in
Rock Resources Inc. v. British Columbia ([2003] 229 D.L.R. (4th) 115 (British Columbia
Court of Appeal) [Rock Resources]. The claimants argued that their property interest in
two mineral claims on Crown land had been taken by the government of British
Columbia when the boundaries of a park were amended to include their claims (Rock
Resources, 2003, p. 121). The British Columbia Court of Appeals found that the taking
was authorized under the Park Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1995, c. 54 [Park Amendment
Act] and that a compensation claim could therefore be considered. The Court also
concluded that the fact that the Park Amendment Act was silent on the issue of
compensation triggered the application of a common law presumption that compensation
would be paid (Rock Resources, 2003, p. 148-152). The appeal was allowed and the
Court held that compensation for the loss of property interests should be awarded to Rock
Resources Inc. (Rock Resources, 2003, p. 154).
Most recently, in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City) ([2006] 1
S.C.R. 227 (Supreme Court of Canada) [C.P.R.. v. Vancouver], the court considered a
claim for compensation stemming from the effects of a municipal bylaw on private
property. At issue was land granted to the Canadian Pacific Railway [C.P.R.] by the
Province of British Columbia in 1886 for the construction of a railway line. As the use of
this railway declined and became unprofitable, C.P.R. sought to develop the corridor for
25
residential and commercial purposes. The city of Vancouver, however, adopted by bylaw an official development plan that designated the corridor as a public thoroughfare for
transportation and “greenways”; effectively freezing the redevelopment potential of the
land. C.P.R. brought an action claiming, amongst other recourses, that in confining it to
uneconomic uses of the corridor, the City had committed a de facto taking and that it
should be awarded compensation for its loss in property interest (C.P.R.. v. Vancouver,
2006, p. 227-230). The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, concluding that
the Vancouver Charter conferred broad power to the city to pass official development
plans. The Charter specifically exempted the city from liability for any adverse affects of
plans on land, thereby rendering inapplicable the common law presumption for
compensation (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 238-241). The Court also came to the
conclusion that the requirements for a compensable de facto taking at common law were
not met by the claimant. Firstly, C.P.R. had not lost all reasonable uses of the property,
notably its historical right to operate its rail line. Secondly, the court found that the City
of Vancouver had not acquired a beneficial interest related to the land even though it
gained an assurance that the land would be used or developed in accordance with its
official development plan (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 241).
3. De facto Takings: The guiding principles
The facts of the four cases presented above demonstrate the context in which
conflicts between property rights and environmental protection surface in Canada. The
following section will establish the principles followed by Canadian courts when facing
such conflicts. Outlining the general principles surrounding de facto takings will help
establish the context in which Canadian courts find themselves and provide some
clarification on the mandate afforded to them when applying the test for de facto takings.
3.1. Parliamentary sovereignty and property in Canada
In Canada, property is offered no constitutional protection (Young, 2005, p. 345).
Canadian courts are thus restrained by parliamentary sovereignty in cases dealing with
legislative limits to property. Hence courts are not allowed to analyze the soundness and
26
fairness of the laws imposed by legislative bodies (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 712713; Tener, 1985, p. 557). The will of legislators is strictly to be interpreted and applied.
However, when legislators fail to explicitly deny compensation for takings in a given
legislation there is some, albeit very restricted, common law right to compensation when
government goes too far in regulating property, but even that has often been interpreted
strictly as a legislative construction rule (Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply and
Services) v. Nilsson (2002), 220 D.L.R. (4th) 474. (A.C.A.), p. 496 [Nilsson]).
The mandate of Canadian courts when deciding cases of de facto takings was
perhaps best described by Judge Cromwell of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeals. When
discussing constitutional cases dealing with legislative restrictions of land use in
Australia and the United States, Judge Cromwell stated:
These U.S. and Australian constitutional cases concern constitutional limits on
legislative power in relation to private property. As O'Connor, J. said in the
United States Supreme Court case of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, (1998) 118 C.
Ct. 2131, the purpose of the U.S. constitutional provision (referred to as the
"takings clause") is to prevent the government from "... forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole." Canadian courts have no similar broad mandate to review and
vary legislative judgments about the appropriate distribution of burdens and
benefits flowing from environmental or other land use controls. In Canada, the
courts' task is to determine whether the regulation in question entitles the
respondents to compensation under the Expropriation Act, not to pass judgment
on the way the Legislature apportions the burdens flowing from land use
regulation. (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 712-713)
3.2. Land use restrictions are the norm
Canadian courts have recognized that while historically the rights associated with
the use of property were virtually unlimited, this situation has progressively changed and
land use restrictions have in fact become the norm (Nilsson, 2002, p. 498-500; Mariner
Real Estate, 1999, p. 713-714).
27
Canadian courts have relied extensively on the British precedent of France
Fenwick and Co. Ltd. v. The King, [1927] 1 K.B. 458 in order to justify the fact that
courts are not to interfere with negative prohibitions imposed by the legislature:
A mere negative prohibition, though it involves interference with an owner's
enjoyment of property, does not, I think, merely because it is obeyed; carry with it
at common law any right to compensation. A subject cannot at common law claim
compensation merely because he obeys a lawful order of the State. (France
Fenwick and Co. Ltd. v. The King, [1927] 1 K.B. 458, p. 467)
Over the years, Canadian courts have recognized and applied the analysis of Lord
Atkinson. After reviewing the jurisprudence relating to the issue of the governments’
power to restrict land use, the Court of Appeals of Alberta in Nilsson noted that:
From these authorities, it is obvious that not every interference with aspects of
property ownership will amount to a de facto taking. In the context of restrictions
on land use, it is clear that such restrictions, even down zoning or a development
freeze, do not amount to expropriation. Valid land use controls are an unavoidable
aspect of modern land ownership, through which the best interests of the
individual owner are subjugated to the greater public interest. (Nilsson, 2002, p.
500)
In Mariner Real Estate the Court of Appeals of Nova Scotia explicitly recognized
that “in this country, extensive and restrictive land use regulation is the norm. Such
regulation has, almost without exception, been found not to constitute compensable
expropriation” (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 713). Courts have thus attempted to
establish “a clear distinction […] between those cases where there is a compulsory
taking, as opposed to those cases where some right or interest in the property has been
restricted or affected […]” (Steer Holdings Ltd. v. Manitoba (1992), 99 D.L.R. (4th) 61, p.
64 [Steer Holdings]). However after reviewing the applicable jurisprudence, Judge
Marceau of the Alberta Queens Bench noted that: “At the outset, I recognize that there is
often a fine line between the use of a development freeze as legitimate planning
legislation, and as a de facto expropriation” (Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply
and Services) v. Nilsson, [1999] A.J. No. 645. (A.Q.B.) (Quicklaw), ¶ 57 [Nilsson
(A.Q.B.)] affirmed in Nilsson). Thus, recognizing that the “clear distinction” may not
always be as obvious as it may seem at first glance.
28
3.3. The presumption: The legal justification for compensation
In Canada, the decision whether compensation is payable for the de facto taking
of property is a question of legislative intention. However in addition to the ordinary
rules of statutory interpretation in determining the legislative intent, there is a
presumption based on the justice of fairness that the Crown does not aim to take property
without providing fair compensation. To rebut this presumption in favor of
compensation, the legislation causing the taking must contain a clear contrary intention.
Therefore, the applicable legislative scheme must state explicitly that the Crown will not
compensate for the taking of property. If such a clear intention not to compensate is not
found in the given legislation, the presumption for compensation applies. (Rock
Resources, 2003, p. 148-152)
The nature of the principle that government must pay compensation for taking
property has been described alternately as a common law right and as a principle of
statutory construction (Nilsson, 2002, p. 496). In practical terms, this means that if the
presumption is construed as a principle of statutory construction a statutory basis for
compensation must be found within the legislative scheme that causes the taking
(Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 712). Further the facts of a given case, such as the type of
property is in question, must be addressed within the definitions provided in the
legislative scheme (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 712). By contrast, if the presumption is
viewed as a common law right, then an omission to mention compensation in the
expropriating legislation has no effect on the claim for compensation and the presumption
in favor of compensation applies regardless (Rock Resources, 2003, p. 148-152).
In Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101 [Manitoba
Fisheries], the Supreme Court of Canada found that the federal government had to
provide full compensation for the loss of a property interests it had taken, despite the fact
that no provisions for compensation could be found in the legislation that caused the
taking (Manitoba Fisheries, 1979, p. 109). In Tener, the Supreme Court took the opposite
view stating explicitly that: “Where expropriation or injurious affection is authorized by
statute, the right to compensation must be found in the statute” (Tener, 1985, p. 547).
29
Most recently in C.P.R. v. Vancouver, the Court dealt with this question but did
not address it explicitly. The Court concluded that C.P.R. had failed to prove that there
had been a de facto taking and then proceeded to conclude that C.P.R. was not entitled to
compensation under the British Columbia Expropriation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 125
(C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 238-241). According to the court’s judgment, it would
appear that C.P.R. argued these two points separately and the court treated them as such
(C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 238-241). While the fact that the Supreme Court dealt
with the arguments of de facto takings and statutory expropriation separately may not be
a positive answer, it is certainly a strong indication that a common law right to
compensation in the case of de facto takings does in fact exist today.
Confusion can also be discerned in the different judgments rendered by some
provincial courts of appeal. In Steer Holdings, the Court of Appeals of Manitoba noted
that there is a general rule that the right to compensation had to be found in the given
statute, but also recognized that Canadian courts did not always abide by that rule. The
court found that:
But the general rule smacks of unfairness, particularly where there is more than
regulation or limitation of use, and so courts have strained to award compensation
for a taking of property by compulsory acquisition. (Steer Holdings, 1992, p. 63)
In Nilsson, the Court of Appeals of Alberta discussed the issue. Firstly, the Court
recognized that: “The principle that the state must pay compensation for expropriated
land has been alternately described as a principle of statutory construction and as a
common law right” (Nilsson, 2002, p. 496). However, the Court did not give its opinion
on the nature of the principle, but instead found that this distinction was not relevant to
the analysis of the case at hand. Instead, the Court concluded that it was sufficient to
“rely on the general principle that, in the absence of an expressly contrary statute,
compensation must be paid when the state expropriates a subject's property” (Nilsson,
2002, p. 496).
30
The British Columbia Court of Appeals also dealt with this distinction in one of
its most recent cases dealing with de facto takings caused by environmental regulations.
In the case of Rock Resources, the Court of Appeal reversed the position it had previously
taken in Cream Silver Mines Ltd. v. British Columbia (1993), 99 D.L.R. 4th 199 on the
issue of the necessity for a statutory basis for compensation. In reversing the position of
the court, Judge Finch found that requiring that the statute contain a compensation clause
was contrary to the common law presumption that the government does not aim to take
property without compensating an owner (Rock Resources, 2003, p. 151).
The issue of whether a statutory basis for compensation must be found in the
legislation in order for courts to award compensation has yet to be decisively resolved in
the jurisprudence. However it is important to remember that the presumption in question
finds its source in the common law and that courts have the power of making the
common law evolve over time. In fact, it is probably necessary for courts to make this
principle more flexible when deciding issues such as de facto takings caused by
environmental regulations since they involve complex issues of both fact and law in a
context of important private and public interest confrontations. Courts must apply the
presumption when it is warranted, but must also be careful not go beyond their mandate
by providing rights that are not conferred by the legislature.
Perhaps the best articulation of the principle in favor of compensation that takes
into consideration this need for flexibility of application is found in the case British
Columbia Medical Association et al. v. The Queen in Right of British Columbia et al.
(1984) 15 D.L.R. (4th) 568 [B.C. Medical]:
The rule is not a purely mechanical matter of examining the legislation and asking
whether there is an express written reference to the fact that the taking is to be without
compensation, in words that say "without compensation of any kind", or some equivalent;
and that failing such words, compensation must be paid.
Rather, it is the intention of the legislature that is being sought. The legislature will not be
presumed to have countenanced an injustice, unless the contrary intention appears. But
the rule does not override the legislative intention. It is not a device by which the courts
can enable a claimant to outwit the legislature. (B.C. Medical, 1984, p. 573)
31
The general position of Canadian courts seems to be that an omission to mention
compensation in a given statute does not constitute a clear intention of the legislature not
to compensate for a taking. However, courts do not necessarily conclude that
compensation should be paid if the legislation does not mention the remedy since it is the
intention of the legislative scheme as a whole that must be considered while always
keeping in mind that there is a presumption in favor of compensation if a taking occurs.
4. The test: De facto takings defined
Courts have attempted to distinguish between mere negative prohibitions to land
use and de facto takings but they have also recognized in the process that the line
between the two is rather fine (Nilsson (A.Q.B.), 1999, ¶ 57). In order to establish this
distinction, courts have relied on the analysis of certain judicial and factual elements – a
test.
Perhaps the simplest and most current expression of the test applicable to
situations of de facto takings can be found in the case of C.P.R. v. Vancouver, where the
Supreme Court stated:
For a de facto taking requiring compensation at common law, two requirements
must be met: (1) an acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property or flowing
from it, and (2) removal of all reasonable uses of the property. (C.P.R. v.
Vancouver, 2006, p. 239)
The analysis that follows will attempt to define the different requirements of this
test, most notably how courts have defined “reasonable use” and “benefit”. The
requirement that the owner must lose “all reasonable uses” of his or her property will be
addressed first since this branch of the test has proven the most crucial in determining
whether there has been a compensable de facto taking.
32
4.1. Requirement 1: The loss of all reasonable uses of property
Different courts have given different expressions of this requirement through the
years; however they all revolved around the fact that a claimant must prove that the
legislative scheme in question has stripped him or her of the entire bundle of rights
associated with the property. When determining the point at which regulation ends and
takings begin, courts must ask whether the regulation is of “sufficient severity to remove
virtually all of the rights associated with the property holder’s interest” (Nilsson (A.Q.B.),
1999, p. 48 cited in Nilsson, 2002, p. 488; Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 716-717).
The Supreme Court of Canada in C.P.R. v. Vancouver found that in order for the
requirement to be met a claimant has to demonstrate that the legislative scheme incurred
“removal of all reasonable uses of the property” (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 239). In
order to establish when Canadian courts will find that an owner’s property has been taken
it is crucial to establish how Canadian jurisprudence has defined “reasonable use”.
4.2. Defining reasonable uses: regulatory context, historical uses,
remaining uses and the nature of the property in question
In Canada, the concept of reasonable use has been interpreted and applied in a
context where stringent land use regulation is the norm. Judge Cromwell of the Court of
Appeals of Nova Scotia noted this:
Considerations of a claim of de facto expropriation must recognize that the effect
of the particular regulation must be compared with reasonable use of the lands in
modern Canada, not with their use as if they were in some imaginary state of
nature unconstrained by regulation. In modern Canada, extensive land use
regulation is the norm and it should not be assumed that ownership carries with it
any exemption from such regulation. (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 717)
In order to determine if this branch of the test for de facto takings was being met
– “removal of all reasonable uses of the property” – Canadian courts have also considered
the uses made of the property before the application of the legislation and those
remaining after its application (Tener, 1985, p. 564-565; Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p.
33
717; Nilsson, 2002, p. 498-501; C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 238-242). This approach
essentially attempts to place the bundle of rights associated with property in time (before
and after the regulation) in order to establish what has been lost and if what has been lost
amounts to a taking that leaves the claimant with no reasonable use of his or her property.
More recently, courts have also considered the nature of the property at hand as a way to
contextualize the effects of the limitation to land use (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 717;
C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 240). What is meant by the “nature” of the property has not
been clearly defined, but when it has been applied the given “nature” of the property in
question has found support within legislative scheme at hand (Mariner Real Estate, 1999,
p. 717; C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 240).
Historically, most cases did not discuss pre-existing or remaining uses of land –
they simply applied this rationale to determine what had been taken from the claimant.
However in Mariner Real Estate, the court discussed the issue and seemed to put into
principle what other courts had put in application. Judge Cromwell stated the importance
of pre-existing uses, remaining uses and the nature of the property in determining if the
claimants’ property had been stripped of all reasonable uses of property in this way:
[…] regulation will be held to be expropriation only when virtually all of the
aggregated incidents of ownership have been taken away. The extent of this
bundle of rights of ownership must be assessed, not only in relation to the land's
potential highest and best use, but having regard to the nature of the land and the
range of reasonable uses to which it has actually been put. It seems to me there is
a significant difference in this regard between, for example, environmentally
fragile dune land which, by its nature, is not particularly well-suited for residential
development and which has long been used for primarily recreational purposes
and a lot in a residential subdivision for which the most reasonable use is for
residential construction. (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 717)
Applying this line of thought to the case at hand, he noted in regards to the
remaining and pre-existing uses of the land in question that:
Aside from the denial of permission to build a house, there was no evidence that
the regulatory scheme inhibited other uses to which Mr. Rose wished to put the
land. The only use Mr. Rose made of the property was to walk around it,
sometimes taking pictures. (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 706)
34
Judge Cromwell went on to take into account the nature of the land in question:
Preclusion of residential development, as proposed by the respondents,
particularly on lands of this environmental sensitivity, is not, of itself, the
extinguishment of virtually all rights associated with ownership. (Mariner Real
Estate, 1999, p. 728)
Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada in C.P.R. v. Vancouver considered all four
factors – regulatory background, historical uses, remaining uses and the nature of the land
itself. The Court explained its position in the following way:
[…] the by-law does not remove all reasonable uses of the property. This
requirement must be assessed "not only in relation to the land's potential highest
and best use, but having regard to the nature of the land and the range of
reasonable uses to which it has actually been put": see Mariner Real Estate, at p.
717. The by-law does not prevent CPR from using its land to operate a railway,
the only use to which the land has ever been put during the history of the City.
Nor, contrary to CPR's contention, does the by-law prevent maintenance of the
railway track. […] Finally, the by-law does not preclude CPR from leasing the
land for use in conformity with the by-law and from developing public/private
partnerships. The by-law acknowledges the special nature of the land as the only
such intact corridor existing in Vancouver, and expands upon the only use the
land has known in recent history. (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 240)
The fact that property is defined within a context of stringent land use regulation
is a recurring theme in Canadian jurisprudence. The concept of reasonable use serves the
purpose of placing that loss of interest into the context of a country in which stringent
land use is the norm. However it could be argued that the concept of the “nature” of the
property also plays a role in contextualizing the reasonable uses. In both Mariner Real
Estate and C.P.R. v. Vancouver, the Court found legislative support for considering the
nature of the land as “special” and “ecologically sensitive” (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p.
728; C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 240). Despite this fact, the approach to
contextualization taken in these cases goes further than simply placing the regulation in a
historical context of stringent land use and historical and remaining uses. The analysis of
the “nature” of the property appears to open the door to considering the property in its
environmental or natural context.
35
4.3. Requirement 2: Acquisition of a beneficial interest
In order to demonstrate that there has been a de facto taking, claimants must not
only prove that there has been a “removal of all reasonable uses of the property”, they
must also prove that there as “been an acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property
or flowing from it” (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 239). The general position of courts is
essentially that “something must not only be taken away, it must be taken over” (Steer
Holdings Ltd. v. Manitoba, [1992] 2 W.W.R. 558 affirmed by Steer Holdings (A.C.A.);
cited in 64933 Manitoba Ltd. v. Government of Manitoba (2002), 214 D.L.R. (4th) 37,
p. 41-42). The question courts must answer is essentially: “What right did the
respondents lose and what interest did the government acquire?” (Tener, 1985, p. 556).
4.4. Defining beneficial interest: specific and general benefits
It is possible to discern some parameters, or factual elements, that courts consider
in order to determine if there has been an “acquisition of a beneficial interest”. However,
this branch of the test has been interpreted differently in different courts. Some have very
strictly limited the application of this branch of the test while others have questioned the
validity of such a restrained approach.
Judge Marceau of the Alberta Queen’s Bench came to the conclusion that there
were inconsistencies in the Canadian jurisprudence that attempted to define “benefit” in
the context of de facto takings:
Unlike Manitoba Fisheries, the government in Steer Holdings did not acquire a
piece of property that was immediately put to use. Instead, the Crown prevented
further development on a property that it intended to acquire and turn into a park,
and according to the Court, this form of taking was not something from which the
Crown benefited. In my view, this reasoning is difficult to reconcile with Tener,
supra, and Marina, supra, which stand for the proposition that the benefit does not
have to be in the form of the Crown making direct use of the owner's property in
the same manner as the owner would have, but can be a general benefit to the
public. (Nilsson (A.Q.B.), 1999, p.55)
36
Only three months later, Judge Cromwell in Marina Real Estate took a
conservative approach to answering what was meant by “benefit”. In this case, Judge
Crowell confined himself to deciding if there had been a de facto expropriation pursuant
to the Expropriation Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 156. Hence, the emphasis in determining if
there had been the acquisition of a beneficial interest centered on the acquisition of an
interest in land.
Judge Cromwell had this to say on the issue of what constitutes a benefit:
The respondents submit (and the trial judge held) that Tener stands for the
proposition that where regulation enhances the value of public land, the regulation
constitutes the acquisition of an interest in land. I disagree. (Mariner Real Estate,
1999, p. 730)
[…]
The crucial point, to my way of thinking, is that the asset which was, in effect,
lost by Manitoba Fisheries was the asset gained, in effect, by the new federal
corporation. (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 731)
[…]
I conclude that for there to be a taking, there must be, in effect, as Estey J. said in
Tener, an acquisition of an interest in land and that enhanced value is not such an
interest. (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 732)
The court’s position in Mariner Real Estate regarding what constitutes a benefit
can be resumed as follows: the benefit acquired by the Crown must be an interest in land.
Furthermore, the benefit acquired must be the same that has been taken from the claimant
and it must be acquired by the authority responsible for the taking. Finally, an “enhanced
value” to public land does not constitute an acquired benefit.
While this approach may seem clear, it would appear to have several flaws if
considered with the approach taken by other courts (Manitoba Fisheries, 1979, p.109110; C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 239). The insistence of Judge Cromwell on relying
strictly on the Nova Scotia Expropriation Act for defining the benefit acquired, being an
interest in land, is not to be applied broadly. The court took such an approach because the
plaintiffs filed their claim under the statutory provision for compensation found in the
Nova Scotia Expropriation Act (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 722).
37
In 2003, the British Columbia Court of Appeals held that a constitutionally valid
statute that has the effect of taking someone’s property was sufficient to be considered as
authorization for a taking (Rock Resources, 2003, p. 154). In light of this judgment, it
seems hard to conclude that the benefit acquired by the expropriating authority must be
established within a given expropriation statute. The fact that courts do not need to define
“benefit” within the parameters of a given expropriation statute should allow them to
recognize other benefits than the confiscation of interests in land when deciding if there
has been a de facto taking.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in C.P.R. v. Vancouver brought some clarity to the
issue by identifying several elements that courts must consider when establishing if there
has been an acquisition of a benefit by the expropriating authority. First, the Court stated
that in order for the test to be met, there must have “been an acquisition of a beneficial
interest in the property or flowing from it” (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 239). The lack
of the explicit use of the term land and the use of the expression “flowing from it” make
it rather clear that benefit acquired need not be an interest in land. Secondly, the Court
also made it very clear that the two branches of the test, being the “loss of all reasonable
uses” and the “acquisition of a benefit”, should be treated separately. When speaking of
the acquisition of a benefit, the Court stated that: “To satisfy this branch of the test, it is
not necessary to establish a forced transfer of property. Acquisition of a beneficial
interest related to the property suffices” (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 239). This
answers quite clearly the question of whether the benefit acquired must equate to what
was taken, hence the benefit acquired need not be the equivalent of what was taken from
the owner.
When establishing whether the benefit must be acquired by the expropriating
authority, or if a benefit to the general public suffices to meet the requirement, the
Supreme Court did not answer the question directly but did come to the conclusion that
no benefit was acquired by the “City” (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 239-240).
38
While it is admitted that that cases dealing with the creation of parks like Tener
and Rock Resources could be interpreted as providing a benefit to the public in general it
seems tenuous to make such an interpretation, especially in light of the long tradition of
zoning cases that have long recognized (mostly implicitly) that a general benefit to the
public is not to be construed as a benefit acquired by the expropriating authority (Mariner
Real Estate, 1999, p. 733-734). Especially in light of the fact that in Tener, Judge Wilson
held that the benefit acquired by the Crown was the removal an encumbrance from the
Crown’s land (Tener, 1985, p. 551-552). On this issue Judge Cromwell in Mariner Real
Estate found that: “In my respectful view, Tener, is at best, equivocal on this point”.
While a general benefit to the public does not seem to meet the requirements of
this branch of the test for finding a de facto taking, the Supreme Court has recognized
that the governmental authority that causes the taking need not be authority that acquires
the benefit (Manitoba Fisheries, 1979, p. 109-110). In Manitoba Fisheries, the Supreme
Court rejected the position of the Crown which attempted to draw a distinction between
the federal government, the body that authorized the taking, and the federal corporation
that received the benefits. Instead the court concluded that the property taken was
acquired by the Crown and that this was enough to meet the requirement (Manitoba
Fisheries, 1979, p. 109-110).
It will be interesting to see how Canadian courts will go about creating a clear
distinction between a specific benefit acquired by the expropriating authority and a
benefit for the general public. A good example of how fine the line may be between a
specific benefit and a benefit for the general public can be found in the case of Tener.
Judge Cromwell, in Mariner Real Estate, interpreted the specific benefit acquired in
Tener as being the removal of an encumbrance from Crown land. However in Tener,
Judge Wilson never specified that the benefit acquired was not a benefit to the public at
large. Instead Judge Wilson mentioned that the benefit acquired by the Crown did not
have to equate to what the owners had lost (Tener, 1985, p. 551-552). In Tener, Judge
Wilson considered that what had been acquired was the removal of an encumbrance for
Crown land (Tener, 1985, p. 551-552). When the Tener decision was rendered, the
39
difficulties in distinguishing between both types of benefits had not yet surfaced in the
courts. Hence, we should wonder if the removal of the mineral claim – the encumbrance
– really benefited the government or the public that still uses Wells Gray Provincial Park?
As citizens demand more stringent protection of environmental goods, including some
which the government may have significant economic incentive to preserve, the
distinction between a specific benefit acquired by the authority and a general benefits to
the public may prove to be conceptually difficult.
5. Land use limits affecting private woodlot owners in New Brunswick:
Discussing the position of the courts through hypothetical analysis
In New Brunswick, the property rights associated with timber extraction on
private woodlots are important for both the economy and the environment of the province
and should provide us with a good example of the existing and potential conflicts
between private property and environmental protection in that province.
In New Brunswick, 82% of total land area is covered by productive forest and
products derived from the forest represent 30 to 40% of the provinces exports
(Association des produits forestiers du Nouveau-Brunswick, 2006, p. 4; Atlantic
Provinces Economic Council, 2003, p. 2). There are 40 000 private woodlot owners in
New Brunswick; together they own 30% of the productive forest in the province
(Dansereau & deMarsh, 2003, p.776). Further, it is estimated that private woodlots
provide 35% of the sustainable supply of hardwood and 24% of the sustainable supply of
softwood in New Brunswick (Select Committee on Wood Supply, 2004, p. 4).
This section aims, via the application of the de facto takings test to hypothetical
situations, to provide some clarity as to what the respective rights of the different actors
may be, more notably legislators and private woodlot owners. This essentially comes
down to asking, how far the New Brunswick government can go in regulating timber
extraction on private woodlots without compensating owners. However, what follows
will not be an exhaustive analysis of all legislations that may limit land use on private
woodlots in New Brunswick. Instead, the de facto takings test will be applied only to
some of the most commonly applied legislations that have the potential to limit timber
extraction on private woodlots.
40
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the hypothetical application of the de
facto takings test to the chosen legislations will be utilized to discuss the position of
Canadian courts on the issue. This process should pinpoint some of the weaknesses in the
jurisprudence and illustrate some of the potential issues not yet addressed in the
jurisprudence.
The following hypothetical analysis, while not exhaustive, should suffice to
demonstrate that governments, and delegated authorities, can go very far in limiting
forestry operations on private woodlots in New Brunswick and also that private woodlot
owners falling outside statutory protection are afforded extremely limited opportunities
for compensation.
5.1 The property interest in question
The first issue that must be addressed before applying the courts test to our
hypothetical situations is whether the right to extract timber from private woodlots would
be considered a property interest by Canadian courts. Courts have recognized that
“property is a word of very wide import, including intangible and tangible property”
(Manitoba Fisheries, 1979, p.107-108) and have also recognized on several occasions
that mineral rights qualify as a property interest (Tener, 1985; Rock Resources, 2003).
Hence, timber extraction rights should logically considered property. In fact, the British
Columbia Supreme Court did recognize timber rights as a property interest in the case of
TFL Forest Ltd. v. British Columbia, [2002] B.C.J. No. 218 [TFL Forest Ltd.].
However, perhaps the most important question is whether the loss of the right to
extract timber from private woodlots would be considered as the loss of all reasonable
uses of land by Canadian courts? The loss of one stick in the bundle of rights associated
to private property does not qualify as a de facto taking in Canada (Mariner Real Estate,
2006, p. 718-726). Most cases in which courts have found that there had been a
compensable de facto taking came about when the owner in question did not own the
land, but instead had an exploitation right on public land (Tener; TFL Forest Ltd.; Rock
Resources). In these cases, the entire bundle of rights was in fact represented by the
41
exploitation right, hence the Court found that the regulation in question had the effect of
extinguishing the entire bundle of rights associated with the property – which was
constituted by only one right (Tener, 1985, p. 550-551). Private woodlot owners do not
have only one stick in their bundle of rights but several.
As the jurisprudence stands today, it would appear that the stronger the property
right of an owner is (the more sticks in the bundle of rights one owns), the less likely it is
that he or she will be awarded compensation for the loss of a property interest (Macek,
2003). This approach seems to be counter to traditional wisdom of property law, which
should logically provide more protection for stronger property titles.
However, it is important to remember that when determining if “all reasonable
uses” of the property has been extinguished, courts turn their attention mostly to the
historical uses of property and the nature of property to define “reasonable”. In Mariner
Real Estate for example, the Court found that the right to build a house was not part of
the historical uses of that property, which were instead to walk around it and take
pictures, and that those rights had remained intact (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 706).
Furthermore the Court considered that the nature of the ecologically sensitive land made
it even less apt for residential development (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 728). The
same train of thought can be discerned in C.P.R v. Vancouver where the Supreme Court
of Canada concluded that C.P.R. had not lost all reasonable uses of land since it retained
its historical use of the land which was to operate a rail line (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006,
p. 240). Up to now, Canadian jurisprudence has only dealt with cases where historical
uses of property limited the chance of an owner to obtain compensation; this may not
always be the case.
Let us consider a legislative scheme that has the effect of taking away the right of
private woodlot owner to extract timber on his or her land. Further, if the woodlot in
question was situated twenty kilometers out of town and that the only historical use and
current use of the woodlot was timber extraction. Could the woodlot owner argue that all
“reasonable” uses of his or her land had been effectively taken by the government? What
other reasonable uses could be left to the owner in such a situation? While this reasoning
42
cannot be supported by the line of jurisprudence currently available in Canada, it cannot
be discarded as simply irrational if it is considered within the context of the first branch
of the test for de facto takings. However, the woodlot owner would still have to
demonstrate that there has not only a taking but also the acquisition of a beneficial
interest by the expropriating authority. The difficulties in proving the acquisition of a
beneficial interest will be discussed in section 5.3.
A brief overview of some of the environmental regulations currently applicable in
the Province of New Brunswick will establish if the government has in fact gone too far
in regulating land use, hence moving from regulation towards compensable confiscation.
5.2. New Brunswick Clean Environment Act
The Clean Environment Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-6 [N.B. Clean Environment
Act] gives the Minister of the Environment or the Minister of Natural Resources of New
Brunswick, with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, the power to
designate, by issuing a Wetland Designation Order, a wetland as a protected area (N.B.
Clean Environment Act, art. 6.1 (2)). A protected area designated by the Minister may
include any land or water adjacent to the wetland (N.B. Clean Environment Act, art. 6.1
(3)). In a given designated area, the Minister has the power to limit, control or prohibit
any activity that may effect the environment (N.B. Clean Environment Act, art. 6.1 (6)).
The definition afforded to environment in the N.B. Clean Environment Act includes air,
water, soil, plant life, animal life, and human life, it even includes the social, economic,
cultural and aesthetic conditions that influence the life of humans or of a community
insofar as they are related to the elements listed above (N.B. Clean Environment Act, art.
6.1 (1)). While we will use wetlands as our example, it is important to mention that the
Minister also has the power to designate coastal areas as protected areas (N.B. Clean
Environment Act, art. 6.4 (2)).
As a hypothetical situation, let us assume that the Minister of the Environment
designates a wetland and a large track of land around it as a protected area representing
30% of the owner’s property. Let us further imagine that the Minister prohibits all
activity that may effect the environment within this protected area.
43
Under the current test for de facto takings, the owner of the given property
could not be afforded compensation, since he could not argue that he or she has lost all
reasonable uses of his or her property. This is due to the fact that the owner would retain
the right to use the remaining 70% of his or her land. Even if the restrictions rendered the
extraction of the remaining timber on the land uneconomical, the owner would not be
awarded compensation since it is established in Canadian jurisprudence that the loss of
value in land does not equate to a loss of interest in land (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p.
713).
Further, all arguments brought forward by private woodlots owners in the
province of New Brunswick would be futile since the N.B. Clean Environment Act
specifically negates any rights to compensation (N.B. Clean Environment Act, art. 6.3(1)).
Hence courts could not award compensation in this case since the intention not to
compensate is clearly stated in the legislation.
5.3. New Brunswick Clean Water Act:
Watershed Protected Area Designation Order
The Clean Water Act, S.N.B. 1989, c. C-6.1 [N.B. Clean Water Act] gives the
Minister of the Environment or the Minister of Natural Resources of New Brunswick,
with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, the power to designate, by
issuing a Designation Order, as a protected area all or any portion of a watershed, aquifer
or ground water recharge area that is used as a source of water for a public water supply
system (N.B. Clean Water Act, art. 14(1)-14(3)).
In 2001, the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly passed the Watershed
Protected Area Designation Order – Clean Water Act, N.B. Reg. 2001-83 [N.B.
Watershed Regulation]. This regulation established 30 watershed areas in New
Brunswick, some spanning over several hundred square kilometers (N.B. Watershed
Regulation, preamble). The regulation is not prohibitory, but instead permissive, meaning
that the only land uses allowed are the ones mentioned in the legislation. The regulation
44
divides the watershed into different protected areas with different land uses permitted in
each area (N.B. Watershed Regulation, preamble). Protected Area A represents the
watershed itself, Protected Area B represents the area within 75 meters of the banks of
each designated area and Protected Area C begins at 75 meters and ends only at the
designated border indicated by the watershed maps annexed to the regulation (N.B.
Watershed Regulation, art. 5, 6, 7).
In the following hypothetical situation the emphasis will be placed on outlining
the land use restrictions applicable to private woodlots that have the most limiting effects
on timber extraction activities. First, it is only permitted to do selection cut by mechanical
or non-mechanical means between 30 and 75 meters from the banks of a watercourse that
is within one kilometer upstream of the intake of a public water supply system (N.B.
Watershed Regulation, art.6(g)). Furthermore, selection cuts are not to cause the removal
of more than 30% of stems and not more than 30% of the volume of trees, and shall not
be done more than once every 5 years (N.B. Watershed Regulation, art.6(g)(i), 6(g)(ii)).
When an owner’s property finds itself more than one kilometer away upstream of an
intake of public water, the same rules apply with the exception that the restrictive zone is
defined between 15 and 75 meters of the banks of the watercourse ((N.B. Watershed
Regulation, art.6(h)). Essentially, this means that the property owner loses the right to
harvest all the wood that finds itself between the watercourse and either 15 meters or 30
meters from the bank of the watercourse, depending on if his land finds itself further than
one kilometer from an intake of public water. Further he or she may only harvest a
certain percentage of the stems that find themselves outside this zone.
While these restrictions can severely limit land use on private woodlots, it should
be apparent that they will not amount to a loss of all reasonable uses of land no matter
how severe they may be. Further, the N.B. Clean Water Act precludes anybody being
affected by its application from obtaining compensation (N.B. Clean Water Act, art. 14.2
(1)).
45
However, the application of the de facto takings test to the effects of N.B.
Watershed Regulation on private property is of interest because of the benefit it provides.
The benefit acquired by the expropriating authority plays a central role in the courts’
decision to award compensation. In this case, the benefit acquired by the government is
the protection of New Brunswick’s drinking water resources. This raises some interesting
questions: Would courts consider clean water as a benefit to the general public? It could
be argued that the N.B. Watershed Regulation provides a benefit to the general public,
since the citizens of the province will be provided with cleaner water. However, if the
water coming from the watershed is clean, it enables the authorities to avoid some
significant costs related to the building and maintenance of water treatment facilities.
Therefore, the benefit could also be perceived as a specific and financially calculable
benefit acquired by the authority responsible for the taking.
There is also the second question of who benefits amongst the authorities? In this
case, the expropriating statute stems from the provincial government and the benefit
flows to the municipalities who are responsible for providing water to their citizens. As
we have seen, the Supreme Court has recognized that the federal government was
responsible for a benefit acquired by a federal corporation (Manitoba Fisheries, 1979,
p.110). However, in our hypothetical situation, two levels of government are involved.
Municipalities are creations of the province (Municipalities Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-22),
so it would be interesting to see if courts would recognize that the province is responsible
for the benefit acquired by the municipality?
5.4. Caraquet Heritage Bylaw No. 185
The Arrêté sur la sauvegarde du patrimoine municipal No. 185 de Caraquet
[Caraquet Heritage Bylaw] was enacted by the municipality pursuant the powers
afforded to it by Municipalities Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-22 and Municipal Heritage
Preservation Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. M-21.1. Article 20 of the Caraquet Heritage Bylaw
prohibits anybody from cutting trees that are more than 5 centimeters in diameter at a
height of 1 meter and situated within 100 meters of a main street or any designated
46
provincial road within the designated area without first obtaining a permit (Caraquet
Heritage Bylaw, art. 20). The designated area essentially covers the entire jurisdiction of
the municipality (Caraquet Heritage Bylaw, Annex D).
If a private woodlot owner whose land is situated within the designated area is
refused a permit, he or she cannot pursue any timber extraction activities in the 100 meter
section bordering the given roads without a permit. As we discussed in our first
hypothetical situation, the owner could claim that timber extraction is the only reasonable
use that is possible given the historical use of the land – if this use was timber extraction.
However, a large portion of the land remains unregulated and all other uses remain intact,
therefore this argument would fail to meet the requirements of the de facto takings test.
Canadian courts recognize that the effect of a given regulation is to be considered in its
regulatory context. Therefore, courts could essentially throw out the claim simply by
relying on the fact that in Canada extensive land use limits are the norm and that
municipal zoning is part of the regulatory context in which the land finds itself (Nilsson,
2002, p. 500; Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 713). Perhaps Professor Todd’s words would
suffice to convince courts that “[…] in this country […] compensation does not follow
zoning either up or down” (Todd, 1992, p. 22-23).
This brief hypothetical analysis should suffice to demonstrate that NewBrunswick private woodlot owners have extremely limited opportunities to obtain
compensation for the loss of property interests occasioned by the application of
environmental regulations to their woodlots.
47
CONCLUSION
It seems to be established in Canada that governments and delegated authorities
have almost unlimited power to regulate land use to protect the environment without
having to compensate landowners. If governments, or delegated authorities, decide not to
invoke expropriation laws, owners who feel that their property has been taken must turn
to the courts. The mandate of the courts when ruling on such cases is restricted by the fact
that private property is afforded no constitutional protection in Canada. Hence, if the
legislature makes clear its intentions not to compensate owners, courts have no power to
review the soundness of such a decision. Even if the legislation in question is silent on
the issue of compensation, meeting the requirements of the test for de facto takings has
proven to be exacting since it requires both the extinguishment of “all reasonable uses”
and the “acquisition of a benefit flowing from the property” by the authority causing the
taking (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 239).
Thus Canadian citizens should be reassured that governments have the power to
implement land use restrictions to protect the environment without being burdened with
the high cost of compensating owners for their losses. However the fact that conflicts are
emerging in the jurisprudence should lead academics to study the broader question of
how property law and environmental law should be reconciled in Canada.
The position of the courts in cases of de facto takings does provide us with a
glimpse of how courts view the interrelation between property and environmental
protection. However, their limited mandate does not permit them to adequately address
the situation so the jurisprudence stemming from these cases is in fact a very poor
translation of this important social issue.
The political pressures applied by citizens groups to protect the environment will
probably push government to continue to develop new regulations and to apply the
existing ones more strictly. This will inevitably lead to an increasing conflict between
property law and environmental law. In this light, it seems unlikely that to continue to
simply deny compensation in the given environmental regulations will be an adequate
solution the emerging conflicts between private property and environmental protection.
48
Recognizing the conflict between private property and environmental law, there
appears to be a need to develop other alternatives to compensation for the loss of property
interests that would place the emphasis on alleviating these conflicts. Concepts such as
stewardship, public participation and community planning have all been evolving in landuse practice, but have for the most part been developed and applied outside a proper legal
framework. This has caused these concepts to be applied on an ad hoc basis and often
with little obligation for government to consider or follow up on them. Legal scholars and
environmental law practitioners should begin placing more emphasis on these emerging
concepts and mechanisms in order to help develop a legal jargon and institutionalized
legal structures and mechanisms that would provide alternatives to going to the courts for
compensation. Such structures with an adequate legal jargon would enable all actors
involved to progress towards a consensus on a new paradigm that would help clarify the
rights and obligations associated with private property in a society that places increasing
importance on protecting environmental goods.
49
VI. CONCLUSIONS GÉNÉRALES
L’analyse de la jurisprudence canadienne relative aux appropriations de fait
causées par les réglementations environnementales a permis d’éclairer plusieurs
questions juridiques entourant les conflits émergents entre les droits associés à la
propriété privée et le droit de l’État de légiférer pour protéger l’environnement. La
position des cours canadiennes nous permet de conclure que les gouvernements et les
autorités déléguées ont un pouvoir quasi-total de réglementer l’utilisation des terres pour
protéger l’environnement. De plus, les autorités ont le pouvoir d’imposer de telles
restrictions sans avoir à compenser les propriétaires fonciers par le seul fait de spécifier
clairement à l’intérieur de la loi que leur intention est de ne pas compenser les
propriétaires pour les pertes occasionnées par l’application de la législation.
Lorsque l’intention du législateur est ainsi définie à l’intérieur d’une législation,
les cours canadiennes n’ont pas l’autorité de questionner la volonté du législateur et, dans
cette éventualité, n’ont aucun pouvoir d’accorder des compensations quelconques ou de
faire le point sur les pertes et les bénéfices associés à l’application de réglementations
environnementales. De plus, même lorsque l’intention de l’autorité expropriante de ne
pas compenser n’est pas clairement établie à l’intérieur d’une législation donnée, les
propriétaires qui cherchent à obtenir une compensation devant les cours doivent prouver à
la fois la perte de toute utilisation raisonnable de leur bien-fonds et l’acquisition d’un
bénéfice par l’autorité à l’origine de l’appropriation.
Ce
fardeau de
preuve
est
tellement lourd à décharger, que rares sont les propriétaires qui réussissent effectivement
à obtenir une compensation.
Cette réalité juridique s’applique également au Nouveau-Brunswick. Le
gouvernement et les autorités déléguées peuvent réglementer l’utilisation des lots boisés
privés sans avoir à supporter les coûts importants reliés à la compensation pour les pertes
économiques subies par les propriétaires. D’un autre côté, les propriétaires des lots boisés
privés néo-brunswickois qui ne peuvent pas se prévaloir des recours statutaires établis
dans la Loi sur l’expropriation du Nouveau-Brunswick, L.R.N.B. 1973, c. E-14 ont une
chance très limitée de se voir compensés pour les pertes économiques occasionnées par
l’application de réglementations environnementales.
50
Les citoyens du Nouveau-Brunswick pour qui la protection de l’environnement
revêt une importance particulière peuvent donc être rassurés que les autorités néobrunswickoises aient les pouvoirs nécessaires d’adopter des lois et réglementations visant
à ce que l’exploitation des lots boisés privés soit faite de façon durable. Pour leur part, les
propriétaires de lots boisés privés qui n’ont pas recours à la compensation doivent
assumer les coûts reliés aux bénéfices sociaux qui découlent de la protection de
l’environnement.
Ainsi, au niveau juridique, les droits et recours des différents acteurs impliqués
dans le conflit entre les droits associés à la propriété privée et la protection de
l’environnement semblent clairement établis. Il reste cependant à se demander si la
jurisprudence canadienne traitant des appropriations de fait causées par les
réglementations environnementales traduit adéquatement le conflit social plus large
entourant cet enjeu? L’analyse de la jurisprudence nous porte également à se demander si
les cours canadiennes ont la capacité d’apporter une solution adéquate au conflit social
émergent entre les droits associés à la propriété privée et la protection de
l’environnement?
Considérant le fait que seules les parties impliquées directement dans un litige ont
le droit d’être entendues devant un tribunal, les décisions rendues par les cours ne
tiennent évidemment pas compte des arguments et de la position des autres intervenants –
tels les groupes de pression environnementale, les autres propriétaires de lots boisés
privés, les autochtones, les autorités étatiques non impliquées au litige, etc. – qui
pourraient avoir des intérêts dans le conflit social relié aux droits associés à la propriété
privée et la protection de l’environnement. Il est donc raisonnable de conclure que la
jurisprudence n’offre pas une traduction adéquate de l’entité de ce conflit.
Étant donné que le système juridique canadien est basé sur une approche selon
laquelle les adversaires doivent présenter leurs arguments pour tenter de convaincre la
cour de leur position, le mandat des cours n’est pas d’établir un consensus entre les
parties impliquées dans un litige, mais plutôt de trancher en faveur de l’une d’entre elles.
51
Le système juridique canadien n’offre pas non plus de procédures alternatives de
résolutions de conflits axées sur le compromis. Les décisions des tribunaux résultent donc
habituellement en la favorisation catégorique des droits d’une des parties par rapport à
l’autre. De plus, le seul remède offert par les cours dans des cas d’appropriations de fait
est la compensation, ce qui laisse peu de place à d’autres alternatives qui auraient plutôt
comme objectif la prévention de conflits.
Il est raisonnable de conclure que les cours canadiennes ne peuvent offrir des
solutions adéquates au conflit social découlant des droits associés à la propriété privée et
la protection de l’environnement, étant donné qu’elles ont un mandat très restreint
lorsqu’elles traitent de questions reliées à la propriété. De plus, elles ne peuvent pas tenir
compte de toutes les parties intéressées et sont tenues de rendre des décisions
catégoriques plutôt que de tenter de favoriser des compromis entre les différents acteurs.
Les cours disposent également de remèdes très limités pour compenser les propriétaires et
n’ont pas les outils nécessaires pour tenter de prévenir les conflits futurs.
Au Nouveau-Brunswick, certains mécanismes ont été développés pour tenter de
régler ce conflit social et d’établir un consensus entre les acteurs impliqués dans le débat
entourant la propriété privée et la protection de l’environnement dans le contexte de
l’exploitation durable des forêts. Par exemple, la Table de concertation pour
l’aménagement durable des boisés privés du Nord-Ouest du Nouveau-Brunswick – un
mécanisme de participation publique par invitation – a permis à plusieurs acteurs
concernés d’exprimer leurs positions par rapport à la gestion durable des lots boisés
privés du Madawaska. De plus, certains groupes environnementaux de la province tentent
de s’assurer d’un certain niveau de participation en intervenant publiquement dans les
dossiers reliés à la gestion durable des forêts du Nouveau-Brunswick. Certains
organismes tentent également d’établir des systèmes de gestion par partenariat en plaçant
l’emphase sur certains concepts tels que la gestion communautaire des forêts. Ces
systèmes de gestion placent souvent l’emphase sur l’intendance, c'est-à-dire la
reconnaissance que la propriété privée n’engendre pas seulement des droits, mais
également des obligations.
52
Ces différents mécanismes offrent des alternatives intéressantes au système
juridique, puisqu’ils visent à identifier la position des différents acteurs dans l’optique
d’établir un consensus. Ils ont également permis de développer un jargon plus spécifique
facilitant ainsi les discussions entre les différents intervenants. Cependant, ces
mécanismes alternatifs ne sont que sporadiques. De plus, ils s’appliquent de façon ad hoc
et n’engendrent aucune obligation de la part des autorités d’assurer un suivi. Ainsi ces
modes de gestion ne constituent pas la solution optimale pour compenser les lacunes du
système juridique.
Le système juridique et les mécanismes alternatifs actuels ont chacun leurs limites
individuelles qui les empêchent d’adresser la totalité du débat et d’établir un consensus.
Les académiciens devraient donc placer l’emphase à conceptualiser une approche
interdisciplinaire qui viserait à combler ces failles et d’arriver à un consensus social entre
les différentes valeurs et perceptions associées à la propriété privée et la protection de
l’environnement dans le contexte de la gestion durable des forêts du Nouveau-Brunswick.
L’objectif d’un tel agenda de recherche devrait être de développer un jargon et des cadres
juridiques et législatifs à l’intérieur desquels ces différents mécanismes pourraient opérer.
Ceci permettrait d’institutionnaliser ces différents processus apportant ainsi une
obligation
de la part des autorités néo-brunswickoises de considérer l’opinion des
différents intervenants dans le processus décisionnel applicable à la gestion durable des
forêts du Nouveau-Brunswick.
L’institutionnalisation des mécanismes, tels la participation du public et la
foresterie communautaire, assurerait également un processus continu et établi qui
obligerait, de la part des autorités, un suivi adéquat aux opinions et alternatives apportées
par les différents acteurs intéressés. De plus, contrairement aux procédures basées sur
l’adveristé prônées par le système juridique, cette approche permettrait aux parties
impliquées de prendre connaissance et de comprendre la position de tous les acteurs,
favorisant ainsi la considération des compromis et la possibilité d’établir un consensus.
53
L’analyse de la jurisprudence canadienne traitant des appropriations de fait
causées par les réglementations environnementales et son application à des situations
hypothétiques traitant des lots boisés privés du Nouveau-Brunswick a permis d’arriver à
plusieurs conclusions. Cette analyse a permis de constater qu’il existe en effet un conflit
juridique émergent entre le droit des autorités de légiférer pour protéger l’environnement
et le droit des propriétaires fonciers de jouir de leur bien-fonds et d’en tirer profit.
La thèse nous a également permis de clarifier les droits des acteurs impliqués dans
ce conflit émergent et a permis de conclure que la nature du système juridique et le
mandat des cours canadiennes ne leur permettent pas de traduire ou de résoudre
adéquatement le conflit social plus large entourant la propriété privée et la protection de
l’environnement. Il a également été établi que l’approche actuelle des gouvernements
d’offrir uniquement comme recours la compensation aux propriétaires ne permettra pas
de résoudre le conflit social entre les droits associés à la propriété privée et la protection
de l’environnement.
Plusieurs concepts et mécanismes tels l’intendance, la foresterie communautaire
et la participation du public ayant comme objectif de trouver un consensus par rapport à
ces questions existent déjà. Les juristes avec un intérêt particulier par rapport à la gestion
durable des forêts du Nouveau-Brunswick devraient miser leurs efforts à conceptualiser
et à développer une approche interdisciplinaire visant à harmoniser les concepts et les
mécanismes existants et à leur donner une expression juridique. Ceci permettrait une
institutionnalisation adéquate de la participation des différents intervenants dans le
processus décisionnel relatif à la gestion durable des forêts publiques et privées du
Nouveau-Brunswick. Une telle orientation devrait avoir comme effet d’amener le
gouvernement et les autorités déléguées à considérer d’autres options que la
compensation.
54
La présente thèse n’aura peut-être pas répondu à tous les questions et
préoccupations soulevées par les propriétaires de lots boisés privés lors de la Table de
concertation sur l’aménagement durable des boisés privés du Nord-Ouest du NouveauBrunswick. Cependant, ils auront appris qu’au Canada, les gouvernements et les autorités
déléguées détiennent de vastes pouvoirs pour réglementer l’utilisation des terres. Ainsi,
les autorités néo-brunswickoises ont le pouvoir de réduire les bénéfices associés à la
propriété privée dans l’objectif de promouvoir l’intérêt public. Ils auront également
appris qu’ils n’ont que très peu d’opportunités d’être compensés pour la perte de
bénéfices associés à la propriété privée occasionnés par les réglementations
environnementales. De plus, les mécanismes alternatifs qui sont actuellement proposés
pour tenter de faire la balance entre les intérêts privés et les intérêts publics n’ont pas les
encadrements juridiques et législatifs adéquats pour établir un consensus par rapport à
cette question. La Table de concertation tenue au Madawaska a permis de discuter de
plusieurs enjeux et proposer certaines actions pour le futur, mais n’est pas en mesure de
résoudre le conflit sous-jacent, soit le conflit entre les droits associés à la propriété privée
et le droit applicable à la protection de l’environnement. La recherche académique devrait
donc tenter de développer des mécanismes avec des cadres juridiques et législatifs
adéquats qui permettraient de résoudre ce conflit important. Peu importe l’approche
adoptée ou les disciplines considérées, l’objectif premier devrait être de développer un
nouveau paradigme qui viserait à établir ce que la propriété privée représente dans la
société néo-brunswickoise; plus spécifiquement, quels devraient être les droits et
obligations associés à la propriété privée dans une société qui place de plus en plus
d’importance sur la protection de l’environnement?
55
BIBLIOGRAPHIE
MONOGRAPHIES
Allen, T. (2000). The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Benedickson, J. (2002). Essentials of Canadian Law: Environmental Law (2nd ed.).
Toronto: Irwin Law.
Boyd, D. R. (2003). Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and
Policy. Vancouver: UBC Press.
Brubaker, E. (1995). Property Rights in the Defence of Nature. Toronto: Earthscan
Publications.
Coyle, S. & Morrow, K. (2004). Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law:
Property Rights and Nature. Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing.
Greenbaum, A., Wellington, A. & Pushchak, R. (Eds.). (2002). Environmental Law in a
Social Context. Concord, Ontario: Captus Press.
Knetschi, J.L. (1983). Property Rights and Compensation. Toronto: Butterworth.
Leopold, A. (1966). A Sand County Almanac. New York: Oxford University Press.
Macpherson, C.B. (Ed.). (1978). Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Parel, A. & Flannagan, T. (Eds.). (1979). Theories of Property: Aristotle to the Present.
Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
Todd, E. (1992). The Law of Expropriation and Compensation in Canada (2nd ed.).
Scarborough: Carswell.
Underkuffler, L. S. (2003). The Idea of Property: It’s Meaning and Power. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Waldron, J. (1990). The Right to Private Property. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ziff, B. (1996). Principles of Property Law (2nd ed.). Toronto: Carswell.
i
ARTICLES DE REVUES ACADÉMIQUES
Acheson, J. (2000). Clearcutting Maine: Implications for the theory of common property
resources. Human Ecology, 28(2), p.145.
Adamowicz, W.L. & Veeman, T.S. (1998). Forest Policy and the Environment: Changing
Paradigms. Canadian Public Policy, 24(2) [Special Issue], p. S51-S61.
Adelman, J. (1996). Property Rules or the Rule of Property? Carol Rose on the History,
Theory, and Rhetoric of Ownership. Law and Social Inquiry, 21, p. 1041-1060.
Alvaro, A. (1991). Why Property Rights were Excluded from the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 24(2), p. 309-329.
Archambault, J.D. (1990). Les troubles de jouissance et les atteintes aux droits d’autrui
résultant de travaux publics non fautifs. Revue générale de droit, 21, p. 5-137.
Archambault, J.D. (1974). Environnement, Usage Public et Démocratie. McGill Law
Journal, 20(1), p. 1-25.
Arnold, C. A. (2002). The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests.
Harvard Environmental Law Review, 26, p. 281.
Augustine, P. W. (1986). Protection of the Right to Property Under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. Ottawa Law Review, 18, p. 55-81.
Barns, D. W. (1982). Enforcing Property Rights: Extending Property Rights Theory to
Congestible and Environmental Goods. Boston College Environmental Affairs
Law Review, 10, p. 583.
Bauman, R.J. (1994). Exotic Expropriations: Government Action and Compensation. The
Advocate, 52(4), p. 561-579.
Beck, R. L. & Hussey, D. (1989). Politics, Property Rights, and Cottage Development.
Canadian Public Policy, 15, p. 25-33.
Beggs, J.F. (1995). The Theoretical Foundations of the Takings Clause and the
Utilisation of Historical Conceptions of Property in the Ecological Age. Fordham
Environmental Law, 6, p. 867.
Botello-Samson, D. (2006). You Say Takings, and I Say Takings: The History and
Potential of Regulatory Takings Challenges to the Endangered Species Act. Duke
Environmental Law and Policy Forum, 16, p. 293. (Westlaw: 16 DUKELPF 293)
ii
Boudreau-Ouellet, A. (1990). Aspects conceptuels et juridiques du « droit de propriété ».
Revue générale de droit, 21, p. 169-180.
Brach, D., Field, P., Susskind, L. & Tillman, W. (2002). Overcoming the Barriers to
Environmental Dispute Resolution in Canada. The Canadian Bar Review, 8,
p.396-430.
Breckenridge, L. P. (2005). Can Fish Own Water? Envisioning Nonhuman Property in
Ecosystems. Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law, 20, p. 293.
Brennan, N.J. (1997). Impediments to Environmental Quality and New Brunswick's
Clean Environment Act: An Argument for a New Statute. Journal of
Environmental Law and Practice, 7, p. 93.
Brun, P. (1993). La pollution du partage des compétences par le droit de
l’environnement. Revue Générale du Droit, 24, p. 191-225.
Burke, M. A. (2006). Much Ado About Nothing: Kello v. City of New London, Babbitt
v. Sweet Home, and Other Tales From the Supreme Court. University of
Cincinnati Law Review, 75, p. 663-719. (Westlaw: 75 UCINLR 663)
Caldwell, L. K. (1970). The Ecosystem as a Criterion for Public Land Policy. Natural
Resources Journal, 10(2), p.203-221.
Carter, C.C. & Taylor, J. (2006). Current Status of Property Rights Compensation
Statutes. Real Estate Law Journal, 35, p. 405. (Westlaw: 35 RELJ 405)
Chapman, B. (1993). Rational Environmental Choice: Lessons for Economics from Law
and Ethics. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 6(1), p. 63.
Clogg, J. (2004). British Columbia at a Crossroads: A Path to Sustainability or the
Enclosure of the Commons? Journal of Environmental Law and Practice, 14,
p.189-215.
Clune, M.H. (2006). Government Hardly Could Go On: Oregon’s Measure 37,
Implications for Land Use Planning and a More Rational Means of
Compensation. Urban Lawyer, 38, p. 275.
Cole, D. H. (1999). Clearing the Air: Four Proposition About Property Rights and
Environmental Protection. Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F., 10, p. 103.
Cole, D. H. (2006). Why Kello is Not Good News for Local Planners and Developers.
Georgia State University Law Review, 22, p. 803. (Westlaw: 22 GASTULR 803)
Cordes, M.W. (2006). Takings Jurisprudence as Three-Tiered Review. Journal of
Natural Resources and Environmental Law, 20, p.1. (Westlaw: 20 JNREL 1)
iii
Cutting, R.H. (2001). “One Man’s Ceilin is Another Man’s Floor”: Property Rights as the
Double-Edged Swords. Environmental Law, 31, p. 819.
Dansereau, J.P. & DeMarsh, P. (2003). A portrait of Canadian woodlot owners in 2003.
The Forestry Chronicle, 79(4), p. 774-778.
Doremus, H. (2003). Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental
Values. U.C. Davies Law Review, 37, p. 233.
Dreher, R.G. (2006). Lingle’s Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from Takings
Doctrine. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 30, p. 371. (Westlaw: 30 HVELR
371)
Elder, P.S. (1984). Legal Rights for Nature - The Wrong Answer to the Rights Question.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 22(2), p. 285-295.
FitzGerald, R.C. (1952). The Law and Ethics of the Compulsory Acquisition of Land.
Current Legal Problems, 5, p. 55-80.
Flournoy, A. C. (2003). In Search of Environmental Ethic. Columbia Journal of
Environmental Law, 28, p. 63.
Fox, M.F. (1988). Canada’s Agricultural and Forest Lands: Issues and Policy. Canadian
Public Policy, 14(3), p. 266-281.
Galgano, G. (1998). Just Compensation for Per Se Environmental Taking. Pace
Environmental Law Review, 16, p. 217.
Giesler, S. G., Lewallen, L. M. & Sandefur, T. (2006). Measure 37: Paying People for
What We Take. Environmental Law, 36, p. 79. (36 ENTL 79)
Girard, J.-F. (1998). Droit de propriété et protection de l’environnement : l’irréconciliable
réconcilié. Revue d’études juridiques, 5, p. 143-204.
Goldstein, R.J. (1998). Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental
Ethics and Ecology into Property Law. Boston College Environmental Affairs
Law Review, 25, p. 347.
Grandbois, M. (1999). Entre la Déréglementation et la Surréglementation : Le Droit
Québécois de l’Environnement. Canadian Bar Review, 78, p. 111-125.
Grandbois, M. (1986). Le droit de l’aménagement du territoire et de l’environnement.
Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 1, p. 81-108.
iv
Green, A.J. (1996). Appletex : ‘Fairness’ and the Protection of the Environment. Journal
of Environmental Law & Practice, 6, p. 303-315.
Green, H.M. (1997). Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment: A
Comparative Analysis of Historical Developments in the United States and
England and a Model for the Future. Cornell International Law Journal, 30, p.
541.
Grove-White, R. (1991). Land Use Law and Environment. Journal of Law and Society,
18, p. 32-47.
Haley, D. (1985). The Forest Tenure System as a Constraint on Efficient Timber
Management: Problems and Solutions. Canadian Public Policy, 11, p. 315-320.
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162, p. 1243-1248.
Harris, J.W. (1995). Private and Non-Private Property: What is the Difference. The Law
Quarterly Review, 111, p. 421-444.
Hill, B.E. & Targ, N. (2000). The Link Between Protecting Resources and Environmental
Justice. Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 28, p. 1.
Howlett, M. (1994). The Judicialization of Canadian Environmental Policy, 1980-1990:
A Test of the Canada-United States Convergence Thesis. Canadian Journal of
Political Science, 27(1), p. 99-127.
Hsu, Shi Ling. (2004). Fairness versus Efficiency in Environmental Law. Ecology Law
Quarterly, 31, p. 303.
Huffman, J.L. (1999). Land Ownership and Environmental Regulation. Ecology Law
Quarterly, 25, p. 591.
Huffman, J.L. (1997). Environmental Protection and the Politics of Property Rights: The
Public Interest in Private Property Rights. Oklahoma Law Review, 30, p. 377.
Hughes, E., Lucas, A.R. & Tilleman, W.A. (2003). Environmental Law and Policy
(3rd ed.). Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd.
Inden, W.L. (1996). Compensation Legislation: Private Property Rights vs. Public
Benefits. Dickinson Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, 5, p. 119.
Jacobs, D.A. (2006). Indigestion from Eating Crow: The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. on the Future of Regulatory Takings Doctrine. Urban Lawyer, 38, p.
451. (Westlaw: 38 URBLAW 451)
v
Jones, D.P. (1978). No Expropriation Without Compensation: A Comment on Manitoba
Fisheries Limited v. The Queen. McGill Law Journal, 24, p. 627-634.
Jones, W. (1929). Expropriation in Roman Law. The Law Quarterly Review, 80, p. 512527.
Keene, J. C. (2006). When Does a Regulation “Go Too Far” – The Supreme Court’s
Analystical Framework for Drawing the Line Between an Exercise of the Police
Power and an Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain. Penn State
Environmental Law Review, 14, p. 397. (Westlaw: 14 PENNSELR 397)
Kelley, K. M. (2006). Restoring Property Rights in Washington: Regulatory Takings
Compensation Inspired by Oregon’s Measure 37. Seattle University Law Review,
30, p. 287. (Westlaw: 30 SEAULR 287)
Kendall, D.T. & Lord, C.P. (1998). The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and
Assessment of the Process so Far. Boston College Environmental Affairs Law
Review, 25, p. 509.
Kennif, P. (1974). Development Control in Canada: Evolution and Prospects. Journal of
Planning and Environmental Law, p. 385-398.
Kibel, P.S. (1995). Canada’s International Forest Protection Obligations: A Case of
Promises Forgotten in British Columbia and Alberta. Fordham Environmental
Law Journal, 6, p. 231.
Kidd, S. (2006). Keeping Public Resources in Public Hands: Advancing the Public Trust
Doctrine in Canada. Journal of Environmental Law and Practice, 16, p. 187-209.
Kowal, T. (2006). Urban Runoff, Water Quality, and the Issue of Legal Authority
Syposium. Chapman Law Review, 9, p. 463. (9 CHAPLR 463)
Kwasniak, A. J. (1991). Comment on the Nature of a Landowner’s Property Rights to
Develop Wetlands. Journal of Environmental Law and Practice, 1, p. 317-322.
Kysar, A.D. (2003). Law, Environment, Vision. Northwestern University Law Review,
97(2), p. 675.
Lametti, D. (2003). The Concept of Property: Relations through Objects of Social
Wealth.University of Toronto Law Journal, 53, p. 325-378.
Langevin, L. (1988). Entre les mesures sociales et la propriété privée, une cohérence à
établir. Revue de droit de l’Université Sherbrooke, 18, p. 359-406.
Lazarus, R. (2004). Judging Environmental Law. Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 18,
p. 201.
vi
Leane, G.W.G. (1997). Ways Not to Think About Social Theory : Rethinking
Environment, Law and Society. Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 12(1),
p.193-237.
Lewis, T.J. (1975). An Environmental Case against Equality of Right. Canadian Journal
of Political Science, 8, p. 254-273.
Love, P.A. (1983). Renewing Our Renewable Forest Resource: The Legislative
Framework. The Dalhousie Law Journal, 7, p. 297-314.
Macek, A. (2003). Regulatory Expropriations: Takings Without Compensation.
www.expropriation.ca . p. 1-16.
Mangiaratti, R.S. (2006). Regulatory Taking Claims in Massachusetts Following the
Lingle and Gove Decisions. Massachusetts Law Review, 90, p. 54. (Westlaw: 90
MALR 54)
Mann, F.A. (1959). Outlines of a History of Expropriation. The Law Quarterly, 75, p.
188-219.
McBean, J. (1988). The Implications of Entrenching Property Rights in Section 7 of the
Charter of Rights. Alberta Law Review, p. 36(3), 548-583.
McGregor, J. L. (1997). This Land is Your Land, This Land is My Land: A Philisophical
Reflection on Natural Rights to Property and Environmental Regulations. Journal
of Environmental Law and Litigation, 12, p. 87.
Melville, J.B. (2005). Regulatory Takings in Canada. En ligne:
www.expropriationlaw.ca/articles/art00300.asp
Merrill, T. W. (2004). Private Property and the Politics of Environmental Protection.
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 28(1), p. 69.
Meltz, R. (2006). (Course of Study). Wetlands Regulation and Takings: The View From
2006. American Law Institute – American Bar Association Continuing Legal
Education, SL091 ALI-ABA 297. (Westlaw: SL091 ALI-ABA 297)
Michelman, F. I. (1967). Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law. Harvard Law Review, 80, p. 1165.
Moffet, J. & Bregha, F. (1996). The Role of Law Reform in the Promotion of Sustainable
Development. Journal of Environmental Law & Practice, 6, p. 1-21.
Mouly, C. (1997). Propriété publique, propriété privée et justice. Archives de la
philosophie du droit, 41, p. 267-291.
vii
Needleman, J.C. (2006). Exactions: Exploring Exactly When Nollan and Dollan Should
Be Triggered. Cardozo Law Review, 28, p. 1563. (Westlaw: 28 CDZLR 1563)
Nelson, S.B. (2006). Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc. Harvard Environmental Law Review,
30, p. 281. (Westlaw: 30 HVELR 281)
Nicholson, B. & Mota, S.A. (2006). From Public Use to Public Purpose : The Supreme
Court Stretches the Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London. Gonzaga Law
Review, 41, p.81-100. (Westlaw: 41 GONZLR 81)
Paehlke, R. (1990). Regulatory and Non-Regulatory Approaches to Environmental
Protection. Canadian Public Adminstration, 33, p.17-36.
Paradis, D. (1988). Synthèse – critique de l’Aménagement du territoire et la protection de
l’environnement et milieu rural: aspects opérationnels de Me François Robert.
Revue de droit de l’Université Sherbrooke, 19, p. 243-246.
Parenteau, P.A. (1993). Everything you Need to Know About Environmental Law, You
Learned in Kindergarten. Environmental Law, 23, p. 223.
Pearse, P.H. (1988). Property Rights and the Development of Natural Resource Policies
in Canada. Canadian Public Policy, 14(3), p. 307-320.
Penalver, E. D. (2004). Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership
in Regulatory Takings Law. Ecology Law Quarterly, 31, p. 277.
Penner, J.E. (2005). Misled by ‘Property’. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence,
18(1), p. 75-93.
Peterson, L. (1991). Ethical issues in land-use planning and development. Canadian
Public Administration, 34(1), p. 121-131.
Poirier, M. R. (1997). Property, Environment, Community. Journal of Environmental
Law and Litigation, 12, p. 43.
Pollak, D. (2006). Regualtory Takings: The Supreme Court Tries to Prune Agins Without
Stepping on Nollan and Dolan. Ecology Law Quarterly, 33, p. 925. (Westlaw: 33
ECGLQ 925)
Powell, B. H. (2000). A Comment by the Environmental Law Centre on the Use of
Compensation under the Proposed Species at Risk Act, Journal of Environmental
Law and Practice, 10, p. 283-285.
viii
Pritchett, W.E. (2006). Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the 21st
Century. Georgia State University Law Review, 22, p. 895. (Westlaw: 22
GASTULR 895)
Radford, R.S. (2006). Just a Flesh Wound? The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron on
Regulatory Takings Law. Urban Lawyer, 38, p. 437. (38 URBLAW 437)
Richardson, D. (1991). Ethics and the environment: beyond self-interest. Canadian
Public Administration, 34(1), p. 111-116.
Riesel, D. & Barshov, S. (1995). When Does Government Regulation Go ‘Too Far’?
Fordham Environmental Law Journal, 6, p. 565.
Rieser, A. (1991). Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right : An Emerging
Doctrine in Search of a Theory. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 15, p. 393.
Rose, C.M. (1999). From Local to Global Commons: Private Property, Common
Property, and Hybrid Property Regimes: Expanding the Choices for the Global
Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to OldFashioned Common Property. Duke Environmental Law & Policy, 10, p. 45.
Rose, C.M. (1994). Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental
Ethics. Environmental Law, 24, p. 1.
Rounthwaite, H.I. (2000). A Theory of Compensation Under the Species at Risk Act Bill
C-5. Journal of Environmental Law and Practice, 10, p. 259-281.
Sahajananthan, S., Haley, D. & Nelson, J. (1998). Planning for Sustainable Forests in
British Columbia through Land Use Zoning, Canadian Public Policy, 24(2), p.
s73-s81.
Salkin, P.E. (2006). (Course of Study). Swift Legislative (Over)Reaction to Eminent
Domain: Be Careful What You Wish For. American Law Institute – America Bar
Association Continuing Legal Education, SM004 ALI-ABA 865. (Westlaw:
SM004 ALI-ABA 865)
Salkin, P.E. (2006). (Course of Study). Property Rights at the Ballot Box. American Law
Institute – American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education. SM004 ALIABA 1155. (Westlaw: SM004 ALI-ABA 1155)
Salkin, P.E. & Lavine, A. (2006). Measure 37 and a Spoonful of Kelo: A Recipe for
Property Rights Activists at the Ballot Box. Urban Lawyer, 38, p. 1065.
(Westlaw: 38 URBLAW 1065)
Sax, J. (2002). Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental Law. Pace Environmental
Law Review, 19, p. 715.
ix
Schwindt, R. (1996). Takings of Private Rights to Public Natural Resources: A Policy
Analysis. Canadian Public Policy, 22(3), p. 205-223.
Sheffer-Wood, A.C. (2006). Where Do We Go From Here? States Revise Eminent
Domain Legislation in Response to Kelo. Temple Law Review, 79, p. 617.
(79 TMPLR 617)
Shumiatcher, M. C. (1988). Property and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 1(2), p. 189-213.
Sproule-Jones, M., & Richards, P.L. (1984). Toward a Theory of the Regulated
Environment. Canadian Public Policy, 10(3), p. 305-315. [135]
Stadel, A. et al. (1995). Wetlands on trial : Ontario Municipal Board decisions affecting
Wetlands, 1980-1993. Canadian Public Administration, 38(2), p. 222-241.
Stankey, G.H. (1989). Beyond the Campfire’s Light: Historical Roots of the Wilderness
Concepts. Natural Resources Journal, 29, p. 9-23.
Stedfast, S.M. (1999). Regulatory Takings a Historical Overview and Legal Analysis for
Natural Resource Management. Environmental Law, 29, p. 881.
Stone, C.D. (2001). Environment 2000 – New Issues for a New Century: Land Use,
Biodiversity, and Ecosystem Integrity: Land Use and Biodiversity. Ecology Law
Quarterly, 27, p. 967.
Sullivan, E. J. (2006). Year Zero: The Aftermath of Measure 37. Urban Lawyer, 38, p.
237. (Westlaw: 38 URBLAW 237)
Tingley, D. (1990). Responding to the Challenge: An Overview of Significant Trends in
Government Regulation. In Tingley, D. (Ed.). Into the Future: Environmental
Law and Policy for the 1990’s. (p. 11-24). Edmonton: Environmental Law Centre
(Alberta) Society.
Todd, E. C. E. (1982). Compensation For Injurious Affection Without Expropriation
Within The Context of Municipal Law. The Advocate, 40, p. 31-43.
Todd, E. C. E. (1967). The Mystique of Injuries Affection in the Law of Expropriation.
Cahier de droit – UBC Law Review, [Centennial Edition], p. 127-169.
Turner, J.F. & Rylander, J.C. (1997). Conserving Endangered Species on Private Lands.
Land and Water Law Review, 32, p. 571.
Underkuffler-Freund, L.S. (1996). Takings and the Nature of Property. Canadian Journal
of Law and Jurisprudence, 9(1), p. 161-205.
x
Van Kooten, G.C. & Wang, S. (1998). Estimating Economic Cost of Nature Protection:
British Columbia’s Forest Regulations. Canadian Public Policy, 24(2) [Special
Issue], S63-S71.
Vaughan, R. (2003). Environmentalists and Forest Landowners : Why we Must Work
Together. Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law, 18, p. 409.
Waldron, J. (1985). What is Private Property? Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 5(3),
p. 313-349.
Winston, M. (1954). Property Rights and Legislative Jurisdiction in the B.N.A. Act of
1867. Themis, 5, p. 98-104.
Wood, S. (2004). Canada’s “Forgotten Forest”: Or, How Ottawa is Failing Local
Communities and the World in Peri-Urban Forest Protection. Journal of
Environmental Law and Practice, 14, p. 217-251.
Wood, S. (2003). Environmental Management Systems and Public Authority in Canada:
Rethinking Environmental Governance. Buffalo Environmental Law Journal, 10,
p. 129.
Wright, D. C. (2004). A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of
Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis. Environmental
Law, 34, p. 175.
Wyman, K. M. (2005). From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private
Property. New York University Law Review, 80, p. 117.
Young, R.E. (2005). The Canadian Law of Constructive Expropriation. Saskatchewan
Law Review, 68, p.345.
RAPPORT GOUVERNEMENTAUX
British Columbia. (1992). Provincial Commission – Commissioner Richard Schwidt.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for the Taking of
Resource Interests. Vancouver: British Columbia Legislature.
Canada. (2004). Natural Resources Canada – Canadian Model Forest Network. Private
Woodlot Owners Meeting the Stewardship Challenge. (ISBN: 0-662-38221-8)
Nouveau-Brunswick. (2004). Comité spécial de l’approvisionnement en bois. Rapport
définitif de l’approvisionnement en bois au Nouveau-Brunswick. Fredericton :
Assemblée legislative du Nouveau-Brunswick.
xi
Pearse, P.H. (2000). Sharing Responsibility: Principles and Procedures for
Compensation Under the Species at Risk Act – A Report to the Minister of the
Environment (Report No. 101-03975). Ottawa: Minister of the Environment.
AUTRES DOCUMENTS ET RAPPORTS
New Brunswick Forest Products Association/Association des produits foresties du
Nouveau-Brunswick (NBFPA/APFNB). (2006). New Brunswick Forestry at a
Glance / Coup d’œil sur les forêts du Nouveau-Brunswick.
Atlantic Provinces Economic Council/Conseil Économique des Provinces Atlantiques.
(2003). The New Brunswick Forest Industry : The Potential Economic Impact of
Proposals to Increase Wood Supply. (Internet: http://www.gnb.ca/0078/APEC-e.pdf)
JURISPRUDENCES CANADIENNES
64933 Manitoba Ltd. v. Government of Manitoba (2002), 214 D.L.R. (4th) 37.
[64933 Manitoba Ltd. v. Manitoba (2002)]
Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply and Services) v. Nilsson, [1999] A.J. No. 645.
(A.Q.B.) (Quicklaw) [Nilsson (A.Q.B.)]
Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply and Services) v. Nilsson (2002), 220 D.L.R.
(4th) 474. (A.C.A.) [Nilsson (2002)]
Attorney General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel [1920] A.C. 508. [De Keyser (1920)]
Belfast Corporation v. O.D. Cars Ltd. [1960] A.C. 490, p. 517.
British Columbia v. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533. (S.C.C.) [Tener (1985)]
Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City) (2004), 237 D.L.R. (4th) 40
[C.P.R. v. Vancouver (2004)]
Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 227. (S.C.C.)
[C.P.R. v. Vancouver (2006)]
Casamiro Resource Corp. v. British Columbia (Attorney-General), (1991) 80 D.L.R. (4th)
1. (B.C.C.A.) [Casamiro (1991)]
Cream Silver Mines Ltd. v. British Columbia (1993), 99 D.L.R. 4th 199.
[Cream Silver 2(1993)]
France Fenwick and Co. Ltd. v. The King, [1927] 1 K.B. 458.
xii
Harvard Investments Ltd. v. Winnipeg (1995), 56 L.C.R. 241.
Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. et al. v. The Queen (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 756.
Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101. [Manitoba Fisheries (1979)]
Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 696.
(NSCA) [Mariner Real Estate (1999)]
Medical Association et al. v. The Queen in Right of British Columbia et al. (1984) 15
D.L.R. (4th) 568. [B.C. Medical (1984)]
Rock Resources Inc. v. British Columbia (2003), 229 D.L.R. (4th) 115. (B.C.C.A.)
[Rock Resources (2003)]
Steer Holdings Ltd. v. Manitoba (1992), 99 D.L.R. (4th) 61. [Steer Holdings (1992)]
TFL Forest Ltd. v. British Columbia, [2002] B.C.J. No. 218. (Quicklaw)
[TFL Forest (2002)]
JURISPRUDENCES AMÉRICAINES
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 26 (1897)
Dollan v. City of Tigard, (1994) 512 U.S. 374.
Kelo v. City of New London, (2005) 125 S. Ct. 2655 [Kello v. City of New London
(2005)]
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., (2005) 125 S. Ct. 2074. [Lingle v. Chevron (2005)]
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, (1992) 505 U.S. 1003 [Lucas (1992)]
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, (1987) 483 U.S. 825.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. (1978) 438 U.S. 104.
[Penn Central (1978)]
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 [Mahon (1922)]
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
[Tahoe-Sierra (2002)]
xiii
LÉGISLATIONS CANADIENNES
Arrêté sur la sauvegarde du patrimoine municipal No. 185 de Caraquet
[Caraquet Heritage Bylaw No. 185]
Bill C-33, an Act respecting the protection of wildlife species at risk in Canada. 2nd
Session, 36th Parliament (April 2000)
Canadian Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 14 & 15 Vict., 1851, c. 51
Clean Environment Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-6 [N.B. Clean Environment Act]
Clean Water Act, S.N.B. 1989, c. C-6.1 [N.B. Clean Water Act]
Expropriation Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 39
Expropriation Act, S.N.B. 1973, c. E-14 [N.B. Expropriation Act]
Expropriation Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 156
Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict., 1845, c. 18
Municipalities Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-22
Municipal Heritage Preservation Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. M-21.1
Park Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1995, c. 54
Park Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 309
Provincial Park Lands Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P20
Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict., 1845, c. 20
Watershed Protected Area Designation Order – Clean Water Act, N.B. Reg. 2001-83
[N.B. Watershed Regulation]
LÉGISLATIONS AMÉRICAINES
Measure 37, Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.352 (2006) [Measure 37]
Real Property Rights Preservation Act, Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2007.001, et seq. (West
2006), § 2007.002(5).
U.S. Const. Amend. V.
xiv
ANNEXE 3:
ARTICLE DE CONTEXTUTALISTION
De facto takings in the Canadian context:
A better understanding through comparison!
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………………………………1
1. Comparison with other closely related legal measures……………………….…………….1
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
Expropriation………………………………………………………………………..……………………..2
Injurious affection……………………………………………………………………………………….5
Illegal expropriations…………………………………………….…………………………………….7
De facto takings……………………………………………….………………………………………….8
Comparison with other related legal measures………………...…………………………9
2. Comparison between Canadian and American debates…………………………………12
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
2.6.
The scope of the debate in Canada and the United States………...………………13
Constitutionality versus Parliamentary sovereignty………………...……………….17
American and Canadian takings tests.....................................................................................19
The general position of American courts……………...…………………………………..19
2.4.1. Permanent physical occupation…………………………………………..…………..20
2.4.2. The Lucas test: Loss of all economical uses of land……….……………...21
2.4.3. The Penn Central test: Partial takings……………………...……………………..21
2.4.4. The test for Exaction Takings.......................................................................................23
2.4.5. Relevant parcel analysis....................................................................................................23
The general position of Canadian courts…………………………….……………………24
Comparison between Canadian and American tests……….………………………..25
3. Applying the differences to environment land use limits:
Comparing Lucas and Mariner Real Estate…………...……………………...……………………26
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
4.
Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Mariner Real Estate Ltd.…..……….………26
(1999) 177 D.L.R. (4th) 696 (Nova Scotia Court of Appeals)
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council………………………...……………..………..28
505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (United States Supreme Court)
Comparing the application of Canadian and American tests to……..……..…112
environmental land use regulations………………………….………………………………29
The unease of Canadian courts:
Parliamentary sovereignty versus fairness...........................................................................30
CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................................................................33
RÉFÉRENCES
De facto takings in the Canadian Context:
A better understanding through comparison!
INTRODUCTION
This article aims to better define the parameters of de facto takings in the
Canadian legal context. Describing other closely related legal measures related to the loss
of property interests in order to compare their similarities and differences with de facto
takings will help to better identify when and to whom compensation for de facto takings
is available in Canada. The Canadian and American debates surrounding how far
government can go in restricting land use before courts award compensation to affected
owners will also be compared. A particular emphasis will be placed on the effects of
environmental regulations on property and how courts in both countries decide to award
compensation for the loss of property interests caused by these regulations. This will
provide a deeper understanding of the parameters of the Canadian debate in terms of its
scope and the mandate of courts in cases in which private property and environmental
protection are conflicting.
1. Comparison with other closely related legal measures
In Canada, there are several legal measures applicable to situations where an
owner’s property interests have been affected by government actions. A broad outline of
some of theses other legal measures that are closely related to de facto takings is provided
here. This exercise should help differentiate these measures and remedies from situations
of de facto takings. Expropriation, injurious affection and illegal expropriations are not
only closely related to de facto takings but have often been confusingly treated together
by litigants and judges alike – since they share many defining characteristics.
Compensation for de facto takings is a relatively new remedy. Therefore, situating its
place within the remedies offered by these older more established legal measures will
provide a better understanding of where compensation for de facto takings fits in the
Canadian legal scheme. In order to reach this objective, each legal measure will be briefly
summarized and then each will be compared to de facto takings in the final sub section.
1
1.1.
Expropriation
Expropriation in its essence means “to take land without the consent of the
owner…” (Expropriation Act, S.N.B. 1983, E-14, Definitions, [N.B. Expropriation Act]).
Expropriation has always gone under many names – eminent domain, compulsory sale,
etc. – but its legal application goes back at least since Roman times (Jones, 1929, p. 516,
521). While it is unclear whether the Romans had proper procedures in place to execute
the expropriations in a fair manner (Jones, 1929, p.525-526), the history of the theory of
expropriation does tell us that the taking of land by a governing authority has for a long
time had certain recognized boundaries. The two most notable bounds being that the land
must be taken for public benefit and that compensation would be paid to the property
owner being deprived of his or her land (Mann, 1959, p. 201).
Historically, and still today, it is not the grant of power to expropriate that seems
to be the biggest issue, but the exercise of it within the bounds of public benefit and
compensation: “The problem is how to confer power to act to the public advantage
without, at the same time, unreasonably violating private rights” (FitzGerald, 1952, p.
60).
In Canada, most of our procedures for taking land for public use have been, at
least in their form, imported from England (Todd, 1992, p.3). Authors that have turned
their attention to the roots of Canadian expropriation law agree that modern law of
expropriation was born out of the railway boom in England in the 19th century. During
that period, British Parliament could barely keep up with enacting all the necessary public
and private bills to give the power and the necessary procedures to expropriate to both
private and public authorities in order to develop the railway (Archambeault, 1990, p. 8;
Todd, 1992, p.3-4). In an effort to consolidate and standardize expropriation procedures
and the method for determining compensation in the absence of agreement, the British
Parliament enacted, both in 1845, The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict.,
1845, c. 18 and the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict., 1845, c. 20. In 1851
the Canadian Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 14 & 15 Vict., 1851, c. 51 adopted,
2
with few modifications, its British equivalent (Todd, 1992, p.3-4). In 1886, Canada
enacted its first expropriation statute, the Expropriation Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 39 (Todd,
1992, p. 12). This statute, much like its English counterparts, did offer some procedural
remedies and stated that compensation was to be paid for land taken, but did not elaborate
on the modalities of how to measure compensation. The issue of how to compensate was
mainly left to the courts (Todd, 1992, p. 4).
Both federal and provincial expropriation laws remained in such a state until the
mid 1960’s and early 1970’s when provinces and the federal government began to review
their respective expropriation statutes in order to incorporate in them more substantive
law relating to the expropriation procedures and the quantum of compensation. Over the
last 30 years, statutory definitions of expropriation have been applied, and more
importantly, statutory procedures dealing the taking of land without asking an unfair
compromise from owners have been developed in all jurisdictions in Canada (Todd,
1992, p. 5-14). Today, the law of expropriation is well developed and procedures for
compensation have become part of substantive statutory law.
A brief review of the N.B. Expropriation Act will demonstrate what kind of
procedural rights and compensation methods are available to someone whose lands have
been expropriated.
The first part of the statutory procedural requirement is notification. Under this
procedure, the given authority must notify the owner it seeks to expropriate (N.B.
Expropriation Act, art. 6, 8(1), 18(1)). Following the reception of the notice of intent to
expropriate, the owner identified in the notification has a right to object to the proposed
expropriation and demand a public hearing where he must be allowed to present evidence
(N.B. Expropriation Act, art. 9, 10, 15(2)). If the expropriation is allowed, government
officials and the affected owner must attempt to negotiate a fair compensation agreement.
If the authorities and the owner cannot agree on the amount of compensation that should
be paid, the owner has the right to contest the amount of compensation in court (N.B.
Expropriation Act, art. 31 (1)). Courts, when deciding the quantum of compensation, are
bound by the N.B. Expropriation Act to use the following methods:
3
38(1) Where the land of an owner is expropriated, the compensation to the
owner shall be based upon
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
the market value of the land,
damages attributable to disturbance,
damages for injurious affection,
any special economic advantage arising out of his occupation of the
land that is not reflected in the market value of the land,
but where the market value is based upon a use of the land other than the
existing use, compensation under paragraphs (a) and (b) shall not exceed the
greater of
(e) the amount based upon the existing use to which the land is being put
and disturbance damages, or
(f) the amount based upon the highest and best use to which the land
may be put, and no compensation shall be awarded under paragraph
(d).
39(1) The market value of land expropriated is the amount that would have been
paid for the land if it had been sold on the date of expropriation in the open
market by a willing seller to a willing buyer.
In cases where the market value method is used, the fair market value is usually
determined by an appraiser or by appraisers representing both sides. When parties cannot
come to an agreement on the quantum of compensation the judge will ultimately decide
which appraisal seems to more fairly represent fair market value based on several factors
like the sale price of surrounding land, real property taxes evaluation, etc.
The method used by judges to determine compensation based on “highest and best
use” is however a little harder to corner. Highest and best use essentially means that an
owner can choose to ask for compensation either for the market value of the current use
of the property or can choose to ask for compensation for another use – called highest and
best use – that would ensure the highest economic return on the market. However, to be
considered by the courts, the highest and best use must be based on a reasonable
expectation and not on speculative ventures or over-optimistic expectations (Todd, 1992,
p. 135).
4
Finally, in cases of residential expropriations, the N.B. Expropriation Act also
affords extra protection to home owners. What the act prescribes is characterized in the
literature as a “home for home” clause (Todd, 1992, p. 228). This essentially means that
if market value does not permit the owner to buy equivalent accommodations to what has
been taken from him or her, the court will give additional compensation beyond market
value (N.B. Expropriation Act, art. 40).
1.2.
Injurious affection
Like expropriation, the Canadian roots of injurious affection can be traced back to
the railway boom of Great Britain (Archambault, 1990). Injurious affection, like
expropriation, is statutory in nature.
The N.B. Expropriation Act defines injurious affection as:
"injurious affection" means,
(a) where a statutory authority takes part of the land of an owner,
(i) the reduction in market value thereby caused to the remaining land
of the owner by the taking or by the construction of the works
thereon or by the use of the works thereon or any combination of
them, and
(ii) such personal and business damages resulting from the construction
or use, or both, of the works as the statutory authority would be
liable for if the construction or use were not under the authority of a
statute, or
(b) where the statutory authority does not take part of the land of an owner,
(i) such reduction in the market value of the land of the owner, and
(ii) such personal and business damages,
resulting from the construction and not the use of the works by the statutory
authority, as the statutory authority would be liable for if the construction were
not under the authority of a statute,
and for the purpose of this definition, part of the land of an owner shall be
deemed to have been taken where the owner retains land contiguous to that
taken or retains land of which the use was enhanced by unified ownership with
that taken; (NB Expropriation Act, Definitions: injurious affection).
5
A careful reading of the above definition of injurious affection brings us to the
realization that two types of injurious affection exist. The first type of injurious affection
is caused by a partial taking, that is, the expropriation of a part of someone’s land that
leaves the remaining property less valuable. In such a case, an owner can claim severance
damage. Such damage is caused by the actual separation of one part of land from another
and the subsequent decrease in value of the remaining land (Todd, 1992, p. 331-332). In a
case of partial taking, an owner can also claim damages for what is called “pure injurious
affection” (Todd, 1992, p. 332). Such a claim is based on the fact that the intended or
actual use made of the portion of land expropriated has the effect of decreasing the value
of the remaining land or the activities pursued upon it (Todd, 1992, p. 332).
In cases of injurious affection caused by a partial taking, the owner of the
remaining land must prove three things in order to obtain compensation. First, he or she
must prove that the parcel of land expropriated has a physical relationship with the
affected parcel and that the expropriated and affected parcels are held under the same title
(Todd, 1992, p. 334). The fact that both parcels are held under the same title does not
suffice to establish that the expropriated parcel and the remainder are connected. Eric
Todd, summarized this position taken be the courts in the following way: “It is clear that
unity of ownership in itself is not sufficient without some nexus through use, or possible
use. There must be some common purpose in the use of the several parcels which adds to
the aggregate of their individual values” (Todd, 1992, p. 338). Second, the property
owner must demonstrate that the decrease in value was caused by the activities on the
expropriated land (Todd, 1992, p. 338-339). Finally, the owner must demonstrate that the
damage caused by the expropriation is not too remote; there must be a causal connection
between the partial taking and the decrease in value of the remaining land (Todd, p. 342344).
The second type of injurious affection deals with damages that are caused when
no expropriation has occurred on the claimant’s land – injurious affection simpliciter. In
order for a claimant to obtain compensation for damage in such circumstances, courts
have developed four rules that need apply: the statutory authority rule, the actionable
rule, the nature of the damage rule and the construction rule (Todd, 1992, p. 370-393).
6
In his analysis of what he calls injurious affection simpliciter (without
expropriation), Bauman briefly explained these general jurisprudential rules as follows
(Bauman, 1994, p. 575):
1. the damage must result from an act rendered lawful by the statutory powers of
the person performing the act;
2. the damage must be such as would have seen actionable under the common law,
but for the statutory power;
3. the damage must be an injury to the land itself and not a personal injury or an
injury to business or trade; and
4. the damage must be occasioned by the construction of the public work, not by
its user.
In New Brunswick the statutory definition of injurious affection, given in the N.B.
Expropriation Act, seems to validate these general Canadian jurisprudential rules, at the
exception of the third. The N.B. Expropriation Act does specifically recognize personal
injury and injury to business as being part of injurious affection, even in cases where no
expropriation on the owners land has occurred (N.B. Expropriation Act, Definitions,
Definitions: Injurious Affection).
1.3.
Illegal expropriations
Illegal expropriations are statutory expropriations that are found to be
unconstitutional or fail to meet certain procedural requirements. This means that a statute
that causes a taking may be found unconstitutional, or illegal, thus making the
expropriation itself illegal (Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply and Services) v.
Nilsson, [1999] A.J. No. 645 (A.Q.B.) (Quicklaw), ¶ 69-71, [Nilsson (A.Q.B.)]).
There are several reasons why a statute may be declared unconstitutional by the
courts. The issue of constitutionality of statutes is in the realm of constitutional law and is
far too complex to be treated in this article. Generally, courts will declare a statute
unconstitutional in cases where a government enacts legislation outside of its
constitutional jurisdiction or in the case of a delegated authority outside the powers given
to it by its founding statute (Young, 2005, p.350-352).
7
The remedy afforded in cases of illegal expropriation is for the court to order the
legislative or regulatory authority in question either to repeal the law or bylaw in question
or to modify its content, or application, in order to render it constitutional (Young, 2005,
p. 350-352). Illegal expropriations do afford for compensation in some very restricted
cases where the tort of abuse of public office can be proven by the claimant. However
these punitive compensation mechanisms have no relation to compensation for
expropriation. Hence, the limited compensation available for illegal expropriations is not
to be confused with compensation for the loss of property interests (Alberta (Minister of
Public Works, Supply and Services) v. Nilsson (2002), 220 D.L.R. (4th) 474 (A.C.A.), p.
501) [Nilsson]).
1.4.
De facto takings
In its essence, a de facto taking is a situation in which the court finds that a
government, or delegated authority, has “gone too far” in regulating land use. Courts
usually find that regulation has gone too far when government actions have gone beyond
regulation by creating a situation where all reasonable uses associated with the claimants
property have been taken from the owner and a benefit flowing from the property
confiscated by the legislative authority in question (Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v.
Vancouver (City), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 227 (SCC), p. 239 [C.P.R. v. Vancouver]). However,
the remedy afforded for a de facto takings in not constitutional or statutory in Canada.
Instead, de facto takings find their judicial source in the common law (Young, 2005, p.
345-346). The power of courts to award compensation in situations of de facto takings is
based on a common law presumption that government does not aim to take property
without fairly compensating owners. This common law presumption is a statutory
interpretation rule. This means that since property is not constitutionally protected in
Canada, a legislative authority can choose to deny compensation by making its intentions
not to compensate clear in the given legislative scheme, and this even, in cases where it
confiscates all reasonable uses of property from an owner (Bauman, 1992, p. 568).
8
1.5.
Comparison with other related legal measures
De facto takings are closely related to expropriation. In fact, in the past the term
most commonly used by Canadian courts when discussing de facto takings was “de facto
expropriation” (Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1999), 177
D.L.R. (4th) 696, p. 702 (NSCA) [Mariner Real Estate]). However, de facto takings can
be distinguished from expropriation in several ways. First, expropriation finds its source
in statutes while de facto takings are a common law remedy. Expropriation statutes
contain specific rules regarding procedures and the modalities of compensation. A
claimant facing a potential de facto taking has none of the statutory procedural
protections afforded to someone facing an expropriation. For example, someone being
expropriated must first be notified, then he has the right to a hearing (N.B. Expropriation
Act, art. 6, 8(1), 18(1), 9, 10, 15(2)). While courts have recognized that authorities have a
duty of fairness in making administrative decisions, which has in some cases been
interpreted as meaning the right of affected owners to have their grievances heard before
the authority comes to a final decision, the contours of these procedural rights have yet to
be well-defined (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 242). While certain criteria are used, like
the potential impact of the given decision, the definition and application of these rights
are left to the courts to be decided on a case-by-case basis and hence, are very subjective
(C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 242). Equally important is the fact that courts have a very
wide degree of discretion in determining the amount of compensation in cases of de facto
takings. Hence, an owner’s procedural rights are not as well defined and assured in cases
of de facto takings as they would be in a situation of statutory expropriation. More
importantly, courts recognize today that procedural irregularities or expropriations caused
by illegal statutes are not to be brought forward under claims of de facto takings. Thus,
no compensation for the loss of property can be afforded in such situations (Nilsson,
2002, p. 500-502).
De facto takings also differ from expropriations because when courts decide
whether there has been authorization for a de facto taking, it is the effect of the legislation
in question that is considered and not the intent of the legislature (Young, 2005, p. 351).
For example, in a situation of statutory expropriation, the authority in question must,
9
through the process of notification, make its intention of expropriating clear to the owner.
This notification sets forth the process of expropriation in which the affected owner has
procedural rights at every step. In a case of de facto taking, the authority causing the
taking doesn’t notify the person affected and doesn’t make its intention known. In fact,
the government, or delegated authority, does not acknowledge that the given legislation
may have the effect of depriving the owner of all reasonable uses of his property. Such a
situation is what causes claimants to turn to courts in order to obtain compensation for de
facto takings, since they have not been notified they have no statutory right to
compensation. Courts must then decide whether the claimants’ case meets the
requirements of a common law de facto taking. To make such a decision, the courts turn
their attention to the effect the legislation has on the property in question and not to
whether the authority causing the taking had the intention of creating such an effect
(Young, 2005, p. 351).
Injurious affection, like expropriation, can be differentiated from de facto takings
by the fact that it is a statutory remedy and not a common law remedy. In order to obtain
compensation for injurious affection, an owner must find a clause in the given legislation
which offers compensation for such damage (Todd, 1992, p. 329). In the case of de facto
takings, a lack of denial of compensation in the given legislation triggers the application
of the presumption in favor of compensation (Bauman, 1992, p.598). However, in a de
facto takings case, the owner must demonstrate that all reasonable uses of his or her
property have been completely extinguished and that there has been an acquisition of a
benefit by the authority in question (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 239). When a claimant
instead pursues the statutory remedy of injurious affection, he or she only needs to
demonstrate that there has been a loss in value in the land and not a complete
extinguishment of the property interests. In cases where claimants are asking for
compensation for injurious affection caused by a partial taking, this remedy also
distinguishes itself from de facto takings by the fact that the injurious affection must be
caused by an expropriation (Todd, 1992, p. 331). Simply put, a part of the land has to be
expropriated in order to obtain compensation. Whereas, in cases of de facto takings, the
conflict stems from the fact that the authority in question never sets forth the
expropriation mechanism.
10
De facto takings can also be distinguished from injurious affection where no
expropriation is involved – injurious affection simpliciter. Firstly, while no taking occurs
on the owner’s land, this does not mean no expropriation has occurred at all. In most
cases, a taking has occurred on a neighboring land (Todd, 1992, p. 333). In cases like
these, the owner must file for compensation under his or her statutory right afforded by
the legislation that permits the expropriation. In cases where no taking occurs, the right to
compensation is very closely related the construction of a given work. Again
compensation must be claimed under the statutory right for compensation for injurious
affection found in the statute permitting the construction (Bauman, 1994, p. 575; Todd,
1992, p. 387-392). Finally, owners claiming for injurious affection without a taking need
to prove that their claims meet the necessary conditions mentioned earlier (Bauman,
1004, p. 575). In cases of de facto takings, expropriation procedures are not put forward
and no construction is required for the owner to claim compensation in the courts. Instead
it is the effect of the given legislation (or regulation) on the owner’s property that is
considered (Young, 2005, 351-352). However, when claiming compensation for de facto
taking, an owner’s possibility for obtaining compensation is severely restricted by the
fact that the effect of the legislative scheme, or action, must completely extinguish all
reasonable uses of the property (C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 239).
Finally, claims that an expropriation is illegal and claims for de facto takings
distinguish themselves by the remedy afforded to the owner. The remedy available for an
owner claiming that an expropriating statute is unconstitutional (illegal) or that
procedural inadequacies make it illegal is for the court to repeal the given statute
(Nilsson, 2002, p. 502). Claims for illegal expropriation offer no compensation for loss of
property interests and in fact offer only very limited opportunity for compensation
through the tort of abuse of public office, which is a remedy that finds its source in the
realm of tort law (Nilsson, 2002, p. 500-502). On the other hand, the remedy for de facto
takings is compensation for the loss of property deemed taken in fact, if not through the
course of statutory expropriation.
11
While the distinctions between expropriations, injurious affection, illegal
expropriations and de facto takings may appear clearer today, this has not always been
the case. For example, in the past owners often claimed compensation for de facto takings
under the expropriation act of given jurisdictions. In such cases, courts had to interpret
and attempt to qualify the taking in question and make it fit the requisites of the
applicable expropriating statute (British Columbia v. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533 (S.C.C.),
p. 542-552 [Tener]). Today, courts seem to recognize that it is the effect of the
legislation, or regulation, in question that causes the de facto taking and that there is no
need to find the express intent of the legislative authority to expropriate within the given
statute (Rock Resources Inc. v. British Columbia, (2003) 229 D.L.R. (4th) 115 (BCCA), p.
148-50 [Rock Resources]); Young, 2005, p. 305-352). Injurious affection also lead courts
and commentators astray when the facts of certain cases seemed to point in the direction
that the remedy afforded in cases of de facto takings permitted compensation for only one
stick in the bundle of rights associated with the property (See Tener). This led some
courts and commentators to believe that courts were compensating claimants for a
decrease in value of land (Bauman, 1994, p. 575; Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 722-724).
Courts later corrected this situation by clearly stating that the one stick in question
represented, in the given cases, the entire bundle of rights of the owner since it was the
only property interest the owner held in the given property (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p.
716). Finally, claimants also used to present procedural inadequacies or unconstitutional
statutes as proof that a de facto taking had occurred, until courts made it clear that these
two separate claims afforded very different remedies (Nilsson, 2002, p. 500-502).
2. Comparison between Canadian and American debates
This section aims to contextualize the issues surrounding de facto takings caused
by environmental regulations in Canada by comparing them to the environmental
regulatory takings issue in the United States. This comparison will present the broad lines
of the debates in the respective countries in an attempt to situate the position of the debate
in Canada compared to the United States. Such an exercise will situate the place de facto
takings caused by environmental regulations in the Canadian legal context. More
12
specifically, the analysis will illustrate the scope of the debate in Canada, the rights
afforded to owners, and the mandate of Canadian courts when deciding cases in which
the rights associated with private property and land use limits imposed by environmental
regulations are colliding.
It is important to mention that there are terminology differences between the two
countries. In the United States, the closest equivalent of Canadian expropriation is called
“eminent domain” and “de facto takings” are called “regulatory takings”. However, as we
will come to find out, this different terminology is not only a question of semantics, but
reflects the very real differences within these concepts in the two countries.
2.1.
The scope of the debate in Canada and the United States
A brief preliminary search in academic databases and Canadian and American
law journals reveals hundreds, if not thousands, of academic articles dealing with the
issue of American regulatory takings. In Canada, only one academic article that deals
directly with the issue of de facto takings was found and there are less than a dozen that
even mention the issue. Furthermore, in Canada, there has been little research done on
establishing the links between environmental regulation and de facto takings.
The difference in the scope of the debate can also be noticed in the implication of
different interest groups in two countries. In the United States, there has been important
intervention from many different umbrella groups representing the environmental side of
the debate, and even more activity from pressure groups representing property rights
interests (Carter & Taylor, 2006, p. 411-415; Kendall & Lord, 1998). These public
interest groups, through public campaigns, internet sites, lobbying, etc., have had an
important impact on the political debate surrounding the issue of regulatory takings. In
Canada, there has been very little activity on this front. The only evidence of interest
groups that can be discerned is the submission of briefs in the works of one commission
(Schwindt, 1992) and one report (Pearse, 2000) respectively dealing with the
development of a policy for compensating for the taking of property interest on public
13
land in British Columbia and an analysis of the compensation clause found within Bill C33 Species at Risk Act (Bill C-33, an Act respecting the protection of wildlife species at
risk in Canada. 2nd Session, 36th Parliament (April 2000)) – which ultimately was never
enacted. Neither of these works dealt directly with the issue of de facto takings.
The judicial debate is also much more important in the United States. In Canada,
we can only find less than a dozen cases stemming from the higher courts and no more
than twenty-five if we put together all the jurisprudence that dealt with the issue of de
facto takings. In contrast, the regulatory takings issue has been described by one
American commentator as “[…] one of the most important and controversial
constitutional issues in the fields of environmental law and the law of planning and urban
development” (Kenne, 2006, p. 399). The United States Supreme Court has turned its
attention to the question many times and there are literally hundreds, if not thousands of
cases, emanating from all levels of courts.
The American legislative branch has also been increasingly involved in the debate
surrounding regulatory takings. Legislation containing procedures for awarding
compensation for regulatory takings has been enacted in several jurisdictions in the
United States (Carter & Taylor, 2006; Burke, 2006, p.675-679; Salkin (2006)). In
Canada, no such legislation exists. Canadian regulatory authorities have instead relied on
the compensation clauses found in the given statutes or referred to the expropriation
statutes of the given jurisdiction. Hence, owners who feel their property has been taken in
fact, if not through the process of expropriation, have no statutory remedy available; they
must pursue compensation in the courts through the common law remedy of de facto
takings.
Perhaps the best example of the importance of the debate in the United States
compared to Canada is the wave of protest that followed the case of Kello v. City of New
London decided by the Supreme Court in 2005 (Kelo v. City of New London, (2005) 125
S. Ct. 2655 [Kello v. City of New London]). While this case was not a regulatory takings
case, it was an eminent domain case, it created social and political waves important
14
enough to have serious repercussions on the debate surrounding environmental regulatory
takings (Salkin, 2006; Salkin, 2007). The city of New London wanted to take Mrs.
Susette Kello’s property and provide her with compensation in the hopes of creating a
new business district that would bring about economic development in a town which
sorely needed it (Nicholson & Mota, 2006, p. 91-94). The Supreme Court held that the
owner had no choice but to surrender her property and found that economic development
was a sufficient ground for the government to seize property for public use (Kello v. City
of New London, 2005, p. 2665-2667 in Nicholson & Mota, 2006, p. 97).
Following the Kello v. City of New London decision, public interest groups and
state legislators began immediately to respond in an uproar (Burke, 2006, p. 665-666;
Carter & Taylor, 2006, p. 406). These pressures ultimately led to two things. Firstly,
some of these pressure groups began to sponsor ballot initiatives that either amended
existing laws or created new ones that would further protect property rights of owners
and limit the power of states to use its eminent domain powers and/or limit their ability to
impose restrictions on the property rights of owners (Salkin & Lavine, 2006). Secondly,
some state legislatures did this on their own without the need for special ballots (Salkin,
2006). In the months following the decision, over 40 states either had proposed
legislative changes on ballot initiatives or went ahead with legislative change on their
own; hundreds of legislative initiatives sprouted all over the United States (Salkin, 2006,
p. 869). One American commentator when discussing the political ramifications of Kello
v. City of New London stated: “These political developments at the national level
demonstrate the scope and seriousness of national concern over the ‘Takings Issue’”
(Keene, 2006, p. 401).
Some legislative schemes applicable to the modalities of compensation for the
loss of property interests existed in the United States prior to the Kello v. City of New
London decision. However, most were relatively moderate in their approach. For
example, some states passed legislations that afford compensation to land owners when a
land use regulation has the effect of reducing the owner’s property value beyond a certain
threshold percentage (Kelley, 2006, p. 299-300). In Texas, for instance, a land owner’s
15
property value has to go down by 25% before compensation is due (Real Property Rights
Preservation Act, Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2007.001, et seq. (West 2006), § 2007.002(5)
in Carter & Taylor, 2006, p. 408).
However, some legislative schemes have had extreme effects on the power of
states, and local authorities, to legislate land use restrictions to protect the environment.
The most often cited example of such a legislation is Oregon’s Measure 37 (Measure 37,
Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.352 (2006) [Measure 37] in Carter & Taylor, 2006, p. 411). This
legislation was adopted following a referendum ballot sponsored by well-financed public
interest groups representing developers and property rights activists (Sullivan, 2006, p.
242, 244). The proposed and ultimately legislated scheme essentially gives regulatory
authorities two options, either to compensate for any and all loss of value of property
claimed by owners or forgo the application of the land use regulations causing the loss of
value on the owner’s land (Measure 37, § 1-13 in Clune, 2006, p. 275).
While the full effects of this legislation has yet to be determined, it was estimated
in the winter of 2006, that there were 3 000 claims filed, covering 150 455 acres, and
representing approximately 6 billion dollars in compensation (Carter & Taylor, 2006,
p.412). The sheer amount of compensation demands will potentially paralyze the
administration of land use regulations in the state (Sullivan, 2006, p. 265-266; Clune,
2006, p.286). Furthermore, most seem to agree that administrative authorities will chose
to waive the application of most regulations to land use, since compensation will be
fiscally impossible for the state and local governments (Sullivan, 2006, p. 249-250;
Carter & Taylor, 2006, p. 412; Clune, 2006, p. 286). In fact, up to the winter of 2006, not
a single claim had been paid by local authorities who chose instead to waive the
application of regulations complained about (Carter & Taylor, 2006, p. 412).
Measure 37 also had a negative impact on developers. Banks, fearing a reversal of
the legislative context, are now refusing to lend money for projects fostered by waivers to
Measure 37 and people working in the real estate business operate under fear of
malpractice suits regarding possible consequences of the law (Carter & Taylor, 2006,
16
p.412). Perhaps most importantly, the state and local authorities have seen their ability to
regulate land use drastically reduced, hence a very important component of their ability to
protect the environment. This phenomenon has been happening in many states at various
degrees. As one American commentator observed: “The "Takings Issue" has moved to
center stage in legislatures around the country, along with limitations on administrative
regulations and the pruning back of some of the nation's basic laws that limit private
activities adversely affecting the environment” (Keene, 2006, p. 401).
In Canada, there has never been such a wide ranging debate surrounding the
effects of environmental regulations on private property with the result of bringing
together judicial, social and political spheres together. However, it is important to take
notice that while the Canadian context affords no place for a constitutional debate on the
issue of de facto takings, this country is not immune to legislative enactments similar to
those that have drastically reduced the ability of some American states and local
authorities to regulate land use for the protection of the environment. Canadian
legislatures, unlike Canadian courts, have the same powers afforded to them as their
American counterparts.
2.2.
Constitutionality versus Parliamentary sovereignty
The most important difference between the issue of regulatory takings in the
United States and de facto takings in Canada is the fact that in the United States, the right
to property is constitutionally protected. In Canada property is not protected by the
constitution, hence when deciding if they should award compensation for de facto takings
courts are governed by the principle of parliamentary sovereignty (Yooung, 2005, p.345).
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation" (U.S. Const. Amend. V. in
Keene, 2006, p. 403). This clause of the American constitution is now referred to as the
“takings clause”. Furthermore in 1897, the Supreme Court held that this provision was to
be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment so that it would apply to state and local
authorities (Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 26 (1897) in Keene,
17
2006, p. 403). So in the United States, the debate surrounding regulatory takings is very
much constitutional, often pitting the state’s right to protect public interest through its
police power and its obligation to compensate when it uses its power of eminent domain
or it “goes too far” in regulating land use, hence creating a situation of regulatory taking.
The fact that property rights are constitutionally protected in the United States
also has some very important practical legal effects. Essentially, it gives courts the broad
mandate to review the soundness of government decisions that affect property in light of
the constitutionally guaranteed rights to compensation. It also affords American courts
some leeway in interpreting what is meant by the 5th Amendment, thereby narrowing or
widening its meaning and application (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 712-713).
In Canada, no such constitutional protection of property rights is afforded; hence
courts do not have such a broad mandate to review the soundness of legislative decisions
relating to property. In fact, the only power courts have is based on the common law
presumption that the state does not aim to take property without compensation (Mariner
Real Estate, 1999, p. 712-713). If legislatures choose to amend the given legislative
scheme to specify that it will not award compensation, courts have no power over such
decisions since they are bound by the principle of parliamentary sovereignty – since
property is afforded no constitutional protection (Bauman, 1994, p. 568). In the United
States, such an action by a legislative authority could be held as unconstitutional by the
courts, since the right to obtain compensation for the taking of property is guaranteed by
the constitution. The central difference between the two countries is that American courts
have much more power to influence both the law and policy on the issue, while the role
of Canadian courts is limited to the application of a legislative interpretation rule in the
form of a presumption in favor of compensation.
18
2.3.
American and Canadian takings tests
How do courts in the United States and Canada go about deciding if a
compensable taking has occurred? When do courts judge that a legislative, or regulatory,
body has “gone too far” in regulating land use? This review aims to bring out the broad
lines of how courts analyze the issue of regulatory takings in the United States and de
facto takings in Canada. The takings jurisprudence in the United States has been
alternatively described as a “massive and growing swamp of muddled contradiction” and
a “constitutional quagmire”, amongst other qualifiers (Penalver, 2004, p. 228; Cordes,
2006, p. 1). The following analysis does not aim to untangle the complexities of this
debate, but only to provide a general understanding so that readers may better situate the
Canadian judicial issues surrounding de facto takings caused by environmental
regulations.
2.4.
The general position of American courts
In the United States, all levels of government have had the right to condemn
property via their power of eminent domain since the enactment of the constitution in
1789 (Keene, 2006, p. 398). This power is attributed to government as long as they meet
the obligations set forth in the Fifth Amendment, which are to take property only for
public use and to pay fair compensation to owners (U.S. Const. Amend. V. in Keene,
2006, p. 403). Historically, the Fifth Amendment was viewed as applying strictly to
situations of eminent domain, meaning that compensation had to be paid for direct
appropriation of land, usually to construct public works (Keene, 2006, p. 398). Over the
years, courts have increasingly interpreted the Fifth Amendment as also meaning that
there are situations in which government actions limit the use of land to such an extent
that owners should be awarded compensation for their loss, even if no direct
appropriation of land has taken place (Botello-Samson, 2006, 310). Such situations are
called regulatory takings. Further the emerging regulatory schemes applicable to the
protection of the environment have led to the debate surrounding environmental
regulatory takings.
19
The judicial roots, and the core principles, of regulatory takings doctrine can be
traced back to the judgment rendered by Justice Holmes' in his majority opinion in the
seminal case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 [Mahon]. This case set
forth that private property owners have a right to compensation when the actions of
government have essentially the same effect as appropriating or destroying the owner’s
private interest in the property (Mahon, 1922, p. 414 in Jacobs, 2006, p. 459). Justice
Holmes stated the general principle in these terms: "[t]he general rule at least is that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking" (Mahon, 1922, p. 415 in Jacobs, 2006, p. 459). Since then there
have been many tests developed by the courts to determine when government has “gone
too far” in limiting land use. Today, four of these tests, applicable to different situations,
seem to be recognized as meeting the requirements of what is now called “regulatory
takings” (Cordes, 2006).
2.4.1. Permanent physical occupation
The first situation where courts will recognize a taking under the Fifth
Amendment has occurred is when there has been a permanent physical occupation of the
property, no matter how small the occupation (Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct.
2074, 2081 (2005) in Keene, 2006, p. 407-408). In such situations, courts have come to
the conclusion that government has a categorical duty to pay compensation, meaning that
this test is what is called in the American takings jargon, a bright line test (Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) [Tahoe-Sierra]
in Keene, 2006, p. 408). A bright line test indicates that if the owner can prove that there
has been a permanent physical occupation; courts will recognize that there is a
categorical or per se taking without further analysis (Keene, 2006, p.420). Historically,
cases of permanent physical occupation were sometimes addressed under eminent
domain jurisprudence and sometimes under regulatory takings jurisprudence. Recently,
the United States Supreme Court held that cases of permanent physical occupation were
to be treated separately from regulatory takings cases and that the jurisprudence
applicable to these cases was not precedent for regulatory takings cases (Tahoe-Sierra,
2002 in Keene, 2006, p.408).
20
2.4.2. The Lucas test: Loss of all economical uses of land
The Lucas test, in honor of the seminal case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) [Lucas] in which the test was developed, can also be
categorized as a “bright line” test. Under the Lucas test, courts will find that there has
been a regulatory taking when the regulation in question has the effect of completely
eliminating the property’s use and/or economic value (Lucas, 1992, p. 1030 in Nicholson
& Mota, 2006, p. 83; Cordes, 2006, p.11-12). The notion of economic use is broader than
use that returns a profit. It embraces any use which imparts significant value to the
property. In fact, American courts often use the terms “value” and “use” interchangeably
(Meltz, 2006, p. 303-304). This bright line test is however limited by the fact that the
prohibited use must not qualify as a nuisance, since such a use is not part of the owner’s
property interest (Lucas, 1992, p. 129-131 in Cordes, 2006, p.12). As noted by the Court
in Lucas, the loss of all economical uses of land might only occur when the regulation
forces an owner to leave the property in its natural sate (Lucas, 1992, p. 1018 in Cordes,
2006, p. 31-32). It then becomes obvious that the Lucas test will sometimes be applicable
to environmental regulations that aim principally at protecting ecologically sensitive
areas.
2.4.3. The Penn Central test: Partial takings
The third test applied by American courts in cases of regulatory takings is not a
bright line test but instead requires a multi-factored test requiring courts to weigh and
balance several factors (Keene, 2006, p. 421). The Penn Central test, again in honor of
the seminal case setting it out, applies to situations where the owner faces a loss of
property that is something less than a complete elimination of use and/or value, or a
physical invasion falling short of a permanent physical occupation (Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) [Penn Central] in Keene,
2006, p. 421). In such a situation commonly referred to as “partial takings”, courts
attempt to balance the protection of public interest, through the application of the states’
police powers with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment in order to determine if the
owner affected by regulation has a constitutional right to compensation (Clune, 2006, p.
277-278; Keene, 2006, p. 398-399).
21
First, courts look at the economic impact the regulation has on the owner’s
property with a particular attention given to the owner’s reasonable “investment backed
expectations” – essentially meaning that the owner has invested money in the property
and could reasonably expect a return on his investment if not for the regulation at hand
(Kelley, 2006, p. 295; Pollack, 2006, p. 927). In determining if the owner has a
reasonable investment backed expectation, courts usually ask two questions: (1) did the
claimant have actual-backed expectations? and (2) were those expectations objectively
reasonable? (Meltz, 2006, p. 305-306).
Courts have not set out a mathematical formula to determine how much economic
use has to be lost in order for compensation to be awarded. However the general
principle is that the smaller the percentage decrease in the value of the property, the less
likely it is that it will afford compensation (Keene, 2006, p. 422). It is generally held that
the economic impact of the regulation on the value of the property must be extreme
(Keene, 2006, p. 422).
Secondly, American courts turn their attention to the character of the given
regulation. (Cordes, 2006, p. 13; Clune, 2006, p. 279-280). In Penn Central, the Supreme
Court held that a given regulation or action was more likely to be construed as a
compensable taking when it "can be characterized as a physical invasion by government"
than when it "arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good" (Penn Central, 1978, p.124 in Clune, 2006,
p. 280). When considering the character of the given legislation courts look at the
weightiness of the regulation, its comprehensiveness and if the government has enacted
the legislation in good faith (Keene, 2006, p. 421-422). For example, courts are more
likely to sustain a regulation that was enacted for public safety than a zoning ordinance
passed for aesthetic reasons (Keene, 2006, p.421-422). In terms of comprehensiveness,
courts would be more likely to afford compensation if they find that the interference with
property arises from a public program that does not have the general purpose of adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good (Keene, 2006,
p.421-422). For example, an ordinance to protect a historical site, applicable to only a
22
few property owners, would be more likely to be found requiring compensation than one
that is applied to society at large. Finally, if the regulation is enacted for a legitimate
public interest concern, like environmental protection, courts will also be less likely to
award compensation (Keene, 2006, p.421-422).
2.4.4. The test for Exaction Takings
The fouth American test for regulatory takings is applicable to a far more limited
number of cases where the owner finds himself facing a situation in which the regulating
authority will approve a development permit on the condition that he dedicates a portion
of the property for public use (Nicholson & Mota, 2006, p. 83-84). Under such
conditions, referred to as an “exaction taking”, courts will find in favor of compensating
the property owner if two conditions are met. The proposed exaction (dedication of land)
must lack what courts have characterized as an “essential nexus” to the purpose of the
permit scheme and the dedication of land must impose a cost to the developer that is
greater than "roughly proportional" to the costs the proposed development will impose on
the community (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S 825 (1987); Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) in Keene, 2006, p. 428-430; Cordes, 2006, p. 9-11).
2.4.5. Relevant parcel analysis
Before deciding to award compensation courts must also turn their attention to the
relevant parcel analysis – also called the denominator issue (Meltz, 2006, p. 308). In
order to determine what the owner has lost, courts must first determine what the owner
had and compare it to what is left after the application of the regulation (Meltz, 2006, p.
308). To assess what the owner still has, courts must first define the extent of the
plaintiff's property to examine – the relevant parcel (Meltz, 2006, p. 308). Claimants have
argued, amongst other things and with limited success, that the construction of a road and
the ability of a given parcel of the property to be economically viable on its own right
should be considered in determining the relevant parcel (Meltz, 2006, p.309). Courts have
also considered in certain cases, not only the physical or spatial aspects of property, but
also the functional and temporal relevance (Meltz, 2006, p. 310-312). However the
23
overarching principle, adopted by the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra, is that takings law
“does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated” (Tahoe-Sierra, 2002, p. 327
in Meltz, 2006, p. 308). There is however some room for debate surrounding the issue of
the relevant parcel analysis in American jurisprudence, since courts have sometimes
divided the property affected by regulation into relevant parcels (Meltz, 2006).
These tests and factors have been recognized by American courts and
commentators as representing the basic principles of the decision process to be adopted
by judges when facing a case dealing with the issue of regulatory takings. However it is
important to keep in mind that this approach is not a set formula (Cordes, 2006, p. 7), but
instead reflects the evolving jurisprudence.
2.5.
The general position of Canadian courts
Not only do Canadian courts have a narrower mandate than American courts do
because of their lack of constitutional backing in the field of property law, but they have
also applied, when their mandate permitted, much narrower (or strict) definitions and
guidelines to decide when government “has gone too far”. The Canadian test for
compensable de facto takings is exacting and claimants are rarely afforded compensation
for their loss of property interests.
While there has been some change in the formulation or the language in the test
for de facto takings there is in reality, only one test in Canada. However, it has been
noted by the courts that the decision to award compensation in cases of de facto takings is
based on a question of fact and law (Casamiro Resource Corp. v. British Columbia
(Attorney-General), (1991) 80 D.L.R. (4th) 1, p. 10-11. (B.C.C.A.) [Casamiro]). Hence,
the test could be subjected to change depending of the facts of a given case and the
court’s interpretation of the jurisprudence.
24
The most recent expression of the test for compensable de facto takings is found
in the case of C.P.R. v. Vancouver decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in February
2006:
For a de facto taking requiring compensation at common law, two requirements
must be met: (1) an acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property or flowing
from it, and (2) removal of all reasonable uses of the property (C.P.R. v.
Vancouver, 2006, p. 239).
2.6.
Comparison between Canadian and American tests
It should be apparent that the Canadian test is much narrower than the tests
developed by American courts. For example, the Lucas test applied by American courts
would not pass in the Canadian judicial system, since what is required for a de facto
taking is the removal of all reasonable uses of the property, and not the loss of economic
viability. Canadian jurisprudence has not recognized that a loss of economic viability
equates to a loss of all reasonable uses of property. In fact, Canadian courts have time and
again explicitly and implicitly recognized that the loss of value in land, even total loss of
economic value is not to be confused with the loss of all reasonable uses of property
(Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 718-726). Unlike their American counterparts, Canadian
courts do not equate value and use. Furthermore as seen earlier, the Lucas test does not
require the authority in question to acquire “a beneficial interest flowing from the
property”, it only requires the loss of all uses of land or economic viability (Lucas, 1992,
p. 1030). In Canada, the loss of all reasonable uses of property does not suffice by itself
to meet the requirement of a de facto taking, since it must also be accompanied by an
acquisition by the authority of a benefit flowing from the property (C.P.R. v. Vancouver,
2006, p. 239).
A case meeting the requirements set out by the Penn Central test would not pass
the Canadian test of de facto takings either. The Canadian test for de facto takings affords
no place for the recognition of a partial taking since the test is clear that it is only the loss
of the entire bundle of rights associated with the property that meets the requirements
(C.P.R. v. Vancouver, 2006, p. 239). In the United States, a loss less than the total bundle
25
of rights may be recognized as a regulatory taking under the Penn Central test (Penn
Central, 1978). There is also no mention of the relevant parcel analysis in Canadian
jurisprudence. Equally important to mention is the fact that the entire second prong of the
Penn Central test, which essentially analyses the legitimacy of government actions, has
no place in Canadian jurisprudence. Canadian courts do not have the constitutional
authority to question legislatures on the soundness of their decisions pertaining to
compensation for the loss of property interests (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 712-713),
since the Canadian constitution affords no protection for property.
In Canada the
mandate of courts is bound by parliamentary sovereignty (Young, 2005, p. 345-346).
3. Applying the differences to environment land use limits:
Comparing Lucas and Mariner Real Estate
A comparison between two cases, one Canadian (Mariner Real Estate) and one
American (Lucas), will bring some perspective as to the differences in the application,
respectively, of the de facto takings test and the test applicable to regulatory takings. The
two cases have very similar facts and both dealt with regulations that had the purpose of
protecting the environment.
3.1.
Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Mariner Real Estate Ltd.
(1999) 177 D.L.R. (4th) 696. (Nova Scotia Court of Appeal)
In the case of Mariner Real Estate, the owners were refused permission by the
Nova Scotia Minister of Natural Resources to build a single family dwelling on their lot
situated in an area designated as a “beach” under s. 5 of the Beaches Act, R.S.N.S. 1989,
c. 32. They brought an action to declare that the Crown’s refusal of the necessary permits
had the effect of expropriating their property interests (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p.
696). The Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that the claimants were entitled to
compensation since the refusal of the Minister meant that the claimants had lost virtually
all economic value in their land and therefore lost virtually all rights of ownership
associated with the property (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 699-700). The Crown
appealed the decision.
26
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeals first recognized that this case found itself at
the center of the conflict between property and environmental protection:
This case involves a collision of important interests. On one side, there are the
interests of the respondents in the enjoyment of their privately owned land at
Kingsburg Beach. On the other is the public interest in the protection and
preservation of environmentally fragile and ecologically significant beach, dune and
beach ridge resources. (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 699-700).
The court also recognized the different mandates afforded to American and
Canadian courts when reviewing government decisions to restrict the use of land. After
discussing cases that dealt with the issue in the United States and Australia Judge
Cromwell noted that:
These U.S. and Australian constitutional cases concern constitutional limits on
legislative power in relation to private property. As O'Connor, J. said in the
United States Supreme Court case of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, (1998) 118 C.
Ct. 2131, the purpose of the U.S. constitutional provision (referred to as the
"takings clause") is to prevent the government from "... forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole." Canadian courts have no similar broad mandate to review and
vary legislative judgments about the appropriate distribution of burdens and
benefits flowing from environmental or other land use controls. In Canada, the
courts' task is to determine whether the regulation in question entitles the
respondents to compensation under the Expropriation Act, not to pass judgment
on the way the Legislature apportions the burdens flowing from land use
regulation (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 712-713).
On appeal, Judge Crowmell and Judge Hallett gave separate judgments and the
Chief Justice concurred with both. Judge Cromwell viewed the issue through the
Expropriation Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 156 [Nova Scotia Expropriation Act] and based his
decision to grant the appeal on the fact that Canadian jurisprudence does not recognize
the loss of value in land as being the equivalent of the loss of an interest in land (Mariner
Real Estate, 1999, p. 713). Hence the claimants could not obtain compensation through
the Nova Scotia Expropriation Act which deals specifically and exclusively with the loss
of property interests related to land. Judge Cromwell also concluded that the owners had
not lost all reasonable uses associated with the property since they retained the right to
27
the traditional uses of the land – walking around, taking pictures, etc. (Mariner Real
Estate, 1999, p. 706). Judge Hallett concluded that the claimants had not yet lost all
reasonable uses of the property since they could modify the proposed plan and reapply
for a permit (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 737). Finally, both judges placed emphasis on
the ecologically sensitive nature of the land, as stated in the legislation, in their
determination of whether the proposed use was reasonable (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p.
697, 736).
3.2
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (United States Supreme Court)
In 1986, David H. Lucas purchased 2 beach front properties with the intention of
developing them for residential purposes. At the time of purchase, the development of
these properties did not require a permit (Lucas, 1992, p. 1008). In 1988, the Beachfront
Management Act S.C.Code Ann. § 48-39-280 (Supp.1988) [Beachfront Management Act]
was enacted. The Beachfront Management Act required the South Carolina Coastal
Council to establish a base line connecting the landward-most points of erosion over the
previous 20 years along portions of the state's coast (Lucas, 1992, p. 1008). In order to
prevent erosion subsequent destruction of the beaches and dunes along the South
Carolina coast, development was prohibited anywhere between the coast and the baseline
drawn by the South Carolina Coastal Council (Lucas, 1992, p. 1008-1009). The land
purchased by Lucas in 1986 was seaward of the base line. This put an end to his
development plans since the Beachfront Management Act precluded any development on
his beachfront properties (Lucas, 1992, 1008-1009). Lucas then filed suit claiming that
his land had been in effect been taken. The trial court found that the regulation
“deprive[d] Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots" and "render[ed] them
valueless" (Lucas, 1992, p. 1009). The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
decision since it concluded the Beachfront Management Act was designed to prevent
serious public harm and in such situations the government was not obliged to pay
compensation no matter how severe the effect on the property rights of the owner (Lucas,
1992, p. 1010).
28
Lucas appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court declared
that in cases where the regulation occasioned a complete deprivation of economic use of
the land, courts were not to balance the loss property interests with the greater public
interest (Lucas, 1992, p. 1015-1017). The Court concluded that in such cases, where land
was rendered valueless, courts were to find a per se taking (Lucas, 1992, p. 1019). The
Supreme Court stated that: "When the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to
leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking" (Lucas, 1992, p. 1019).
3.3.
Comparing the application of Canadian and American tests to
environmental land use regulations
The central difference between American and Canadian approaches to
environmental regulation that limit land use is the emphasis placed on the economic
value of land. In the United States, the Lucas case established that a regulation that has
the effect of rendering a property valueless was to be considered as a per se taking
(Lucas, 1992, p. 1019). The Lucas case established a bright line test. This means that
regardless of the purpose of the regulation in question, if it has the effect of rendering
land valueless, courts must declare that the land has been taken and that compensation
must be paid by the state (Lucas, 1992, p. 1015-1017, 1019). The complete loss of
economic use of land is considered as a categorical taking. Hence American courts are
not to balance this loss with the greater public interest.
In Canada, the jurisprudence does not recognize the loss of economic value in
land as equivalent to the taking of all reasonable uses of land (Mariner Real Estate, 1999,
p. 724-725). A long line of precedent establishes that zoning regulations that occasion a
decrease in the value of property, even when extreme, is not to be considered as the
equivalent of a taking (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 713-725). Canadian courts consider
the loss of all economic value related to land as only one stick in the bundle of rights
associated with property (Mariner Real Estate, 1999, p. 713-725).
29
Even if Canadian jurisprudence did recognize the loss of all economic uses in
land to be the equivalent of the loss of all reasonable uses, the fact that property is
afforded no constitutional protection in Canada would severely limit the possibility of
courts to afford compensation. In Canada, legislatures have the power to extinguish all
claims for compensation by making clear their intention to do so in the given legislation.
In the United States, such actions by government could be held unconstitutional.
It should now be established that, in Canada, legislatures and delegated authorities
have almost unlimited power to enact, and apply, land use regulations to protect the
environment without compensating land owners, no matter how severe the effect on
property may be. However, Canadian courts have often been frustrated by their lack of
power to mitigate the apparent unfairness occasioned by such vast powers.
4.
The unease of Canadian courts:
Parliamentary sovereignty versus fairness
As discussed in section 2.2, when deciding cases in which property and the
protection of the environment collide, Canadian courts are bound by the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty and this severely limits and sometimes completely
extinguishes the scope of their analysis when it comes to awarding compensation for
common law de facto takings. Courts are not allowed to interfere with the will of
government since property is afforded no constitutional protection (Mariner Real Estate,
1999, p. 712-713). This has sometimes created situations where courts have been forced
to come to a decision by law, even though they considered the result to be unfair towards
claimants. Such situations have also led courts to express their discontent towards
legislative authorities for failing to make their intentions clear in terms of compensation
for the taking of property interests and their lack of effort to find a compromise between
the right of owners to enjoy their property and the right of government to protect the
environment. It seems very likely that even though courts are not to overstep their
boundaries, the issue of fairness sometimes causes them to question the soundness of
legislative decisions.
30
The British Columbia Supreme Court expressed the fact that the government of
British Columbia should clarify its intentions in terms of compensation for the loss of
property interests:
In dealing with costs, I am not making any comment on the decision to create the
parks in question. However, it is my opinion that this litigation arose because of
the uncertainty or confusion that the Park Amendment Act, 1995, created with
regard to compensation for the company's individuals such as the plaintiff. The
Carmanah Pacific Park Act avoided that confusion by specifically dealing with
the issue of compensation. There was no doubt that the issue of compensation
would arise as a result of the passage of the Park Amendment Act, 1995. The
failure to address it in the legislation created the uncertainty and led inevitably in
my opinion to this litigation. (TFL Forest Ltd. v. British Columbia, [2002] B.C.J.
No. 218 (Quicklaw), ¶71-72 ).
Judge Hallett of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeals also pointed to the fact that
governing authorities must try to find a compromise between environmental protection
and the respect of the rights associated with ownership. He concluded his concurring
judgment in Mariner Real Estate by stating that:
In order for the dune preservation legislation to achieve its objectives the owners of
lands designated as a beach under the Beaches Act and the Province must
recognize the rights of each other and seek a just solution that would be fair and
reasonable to both. That does not appear to have yet occurred in this case. (Mariner
Real Estate, 1999, p. 737)
In the Case of Manitoba Fisheries, Judge Ritchie of the Supreme Court cited
Judge Urie’s (Federal Court of Appeals) position regarding the apparent unfairness of the
decision he had to make:
I do not wish to leave this case without saying that I fully recognize that the result
may appear harsh but […] our responsibility is to interpret the law as we see it
and we must leave to others the obligation to so frame it that unfairness does not
result in the implementation thereof” (Manitoba Fisheries, 1979, p. 116).
31
The same sentiments had also been expressed by Judge Collier of the Federal
Court Trial Division. When he rendered his judgment concerning the same case, he stated
in the last paragraph:
Based only on what I heard in the court-room, I suggest the plaintiff ought to
receive better treatment from its Governments. This Court cannot change the law.
Its function is to interpret (where necessary) and apply it. I have endeavored to do
that in this case. The law, as I see it, compels rejection of the plaintiff's claim for
compensation. It does not follow that justice, in the true sense, has been done
(Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. et al. v. The Queen (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 756).
Perhaps the most outspoken critics of government can be observed in the majority
judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeals and the concurring judgment of
Justice Southin in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City) (2004), 237 D.L.R.
(4th) 40 [C.P.R. v. Vancouver (BCCA)]. Judge Esson, speaking for the majority stated
that:
The result, if the Bylaw was validly enacted, is that the rights which CPR would
otherwise have to proceed with the redevelopment of its land are frozen or
sterilized for an indefinite period of time during which the only uses to which it
can be put are those which existed at the date of designation which by then had
become uneconomic.
That, from the point of view of CPR, is unfair and unreasonable. I have no doubt
that many right thinking people, not having CPR's direct interest in the issue,
would agree. But that is not a ground for setting aside the Bylaw. The court's
jurisdiction to set aside a bylaw is a narrow one (C.P.R. v. Vancouver (BCCA),
2004, p. 50).
These words may seem very poised compared to the concurring judgment of
Judge Southin. He wrote a one-page judgment to express his discontent at the fact that he
was compelled by law to make a decision he considered unfair and to criticize city
officials for not finding a compromise. When writing about the fact that Vancouver city
officials had frozen a large track of land owned by Canadian Pacific Railway, he wrote:
32
“Many years ago […] the Honorable J. O. Wilson, […] remarked that, in arriving
at a conclusion to which he was compelled by law, he was obliged to avert his
nostrils. […] As I can see no answer to the analysis in which I concur of my
colleague, Esson J.A., to me this is such a case. […] The shareholders of the CPR
ought not to be expected to make a charitable gift to the inhabitants. […] It is time
for this dispute to be brought to an end. If the City officials and the Board of
Directors of the CPR, by negotiation, cannot reach a bargain […] the Government
of British Columbia should intervene and impose such a bargain, perhaps after
public inquiry. […] The present impasse is an absurdity unworthy of this Province
which, on the way to the 2010 Olympic Games, is asserting to all and sundry that
it is a marvelous place”. (C.P.R. v. Vancouver (BCCA), 2004, p. 73-74)
The preceding section demonstrated that Canadian courts have expressed
discontent at the fact that they were forced by law to make decisions that they considered
unfair.
It also demonstrated that courts believe that governments and delegated
authorities should make increased efforts to find a compromise when it comes to
reconciling the rights associated with ownership and the right of legislative and
regulatory authorities to protect the environment. Even though they may express
discontent, no Canadian court has the power to reverse the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
In Canada, governments and delegated authorities are afforded much latitude in
enacting laws and regulations to protect the environment. Further, authorities will only be
burdened with the high costs of compensating for the lost of property in very limited
circumstances where the legislation or regulation causing the taking is silent on the issue
of compensation (or provides for compensation) and has the effects of confiscating a
benefit for the advantage of the expropriating authority and removing all reasonable uses
of the property. Hence property owners who are sometimes severely affected must, in
most cases, bear alone the cost of environmental regulations which aim to benefit the
public at large. Considering this, it is surprising to see that, in Canada, the issue of de
facto takings caused by environmental regulations has received very little attention
compared to the judicial, social, and political debate surrounding environmental
regulatory takings in the United States.
33
Up to now the approach of Canadian legislatures and courts has generally been to
categorically deny compensation to affected owners. This should lead us to question
ourselves as to how long such a situation can persists before Canada is faced with a
debate similar to what was occasioned by Kello v. City of New London decision, which
ultimately led to the enactment of legislations which severely undermined the capacity of
certain states and local authorities to enact and administer land use regulations to protect
the environment. While there is no doubt that Canadian legislatures need to retain the
power to enact legislations to protect the environment, it seems that to simply deny
compensation without offering any recourse to property owners burdened with
internalizing the cost of these regulations is not a recipe for consensus. Considering the
mandate of Canadian courts on this issue, it seems unlikely that governments will be able
to rely on the Canadian judicial system to find an adequate compromise between owners
affected by environmental regulations and citizens who want to protect the environment.
Hence it may become necessary for Canadian citizens to initiate a social and political
debate on what property means today. More specifically, what rights and obligations are
associated with property in a society that places increasing importance on protecting the
environment? If the current American debate surrounding environmental regulatory
takings gives us any indication of things to come in Canada, the evolution of the
relationship between property and environmental protection may prove to be tumultuous.
34
RÉFÉRENCES
ARTICLES DE REVUES ACADÉMIQUES
Archambault, J.D. (1990). Les troubles de jouissance et les atteintes aux droits d’autrui
résultant de travaux publics non fautifs. Revue générale de droit, 21, p. 5-137.
Bauman, R.J. (1994). Exotic Expropriations: Government Action and Compensation. The
Advocate, 52(4), p. 561-579.
Botello-Samson, D. (2006). You Say Takings, and I Say Takings: The History and
Potential of Regulatory Takings Challenges to the Endangered Species Act. Duke
Environmental Law and Policy Forum, 16, p. 293. (Westlaw: 16 DUKELPF 293)
Burke, M. A. (2006). Much Ado About Nothing: Kello v. City of New London, Babbitt
v. Sweet Home, and Other Tales From the Supreme Court. University of
Cincinnati Law Review, 75, p. 663-719. (Westlaw: 75 UCINLR 663)
Carter, C.C. & Taylor, J. (2006). Current Status of Property Rights Compensation
Statutes. Real Estate Law Journal, 35, p. 405. (Westlaw: 35 RELJ 405)
Clune, M.H. (2006). Government Hardly Could Go On: Oregon’s Measure 37,
Implications for Land Use Planning and a More Rational Means of
Compensation. Urban Lawyer, 38, p. 275.
Cordes, M.W. (2006). Takings Jurisprudence as Three-Tiered Review. Journal of
Natural Resources and Environmental Law, 20, p.1. (Westlaw: 20 JNREL 1)
FitzGerald, R.C. (1952). The Law and Ethics of the Compulsory Acquisition of Land.
Current Legal Problems, 5, p. 55-80.
Jacobs, D.A. (2006). Indigestion from Eating Crow: The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. on the Future of Regulatory Takings Doctrine. Urban Lawyer, 38, p.
451. (Westlaw: 38 URBLAW 451)
Jones, D.P. (1978). No Expropriation Without Compensation: A Comment on Manitoba
Fisheries Limited v. The Queen. McGill Law Journal, 24, p. 627-634.
Keene, J. C. (2006). When Does a Regulation “Go Too Far” – The Supreme Court’s
Analystical Framework for Drawing the Line Between an Exercise of the Police
Power and an Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain. Penn State
Environmental Law Review, 14, p. 397. (Westlaw: 14 PENNSELR 397)
Kelley, K. M. (2006). Restoring Property Rights in Washington: Regulatory Takings
Compensation Inspired by Oregon’s Measure 37. Seattle University Law Review,
30, p. 287. (Westlaw: 30 SEAULR 287)
i
Kendall, D.T. & Lord, C.P. (1998). The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and
Assessment of the Process so Far. Boston College Environmental Affairs Law
Review, 25, p. 509.
Mann, F.A. (1959). Outlines of a History of Expropriation. The Law Quarterly, 75, p.
188-219.
Meltz, R. (2006). (Course of Study). Wetlands Regulation and Takings: The View From
2006. American Law Institute – American Bar Association Continuing Legal
Education, SL091 ALI-ABA 297. (Westlaw: SL091 ALI-ABA 297)
Nicholson, B. & Mota, S.A. (2006). From Public Use to Public Purpose : The Supreme
Court Stretches the Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London. Gonzaga Law
Review, 41, p.81-100. (Westlaw: 41 GONZLR 81)
Penalver, E. D. (2004). Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership
in Regulatory Takings Law. Ecology Law Quarterly, 31, p. 277.
Pollak, D. (2006). Regualtory Takings: The Supreme Court Tries to Prune Agins Without
Stepping on Nollan and Dolan. Ecology Law Quarterly, 33, p. 925. (Westlaw: 33
ECGLQ 925)
Salkin, P.E. (2007). (Course of Study). Swift Legislative (Over)Reaction to Eminent
Domain: Be Careful What You Wish For. American Law Institute – America Bar
Association Continuing Legal Education, SM004 ALI-ABA 865. (Westlaw:
SM004 ALI-ABA 865)
Salkin, P.E. (2006). (Course of Study). Property Rights at the Ballot Box. American Law
Institute – American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education. SM004 ALIABA 1155. (Westlaw: SM004 ALI-ABA 1155)
Salkin, P.E. & Lavine, A. (2006). Measure 37 and a Spoonful of Kelo: A Recipe for
Property Rights Activists at the Ballot Box. Urban Lawyer, 38, p. 1065.
(Westlaw: 38 URBLAW 1065)
Sullivan, E. J. (2006). Year Zero: The Aftermath of Measure 37. Urban Lawyer, 38, p.
237. (Westlaw: 38 URBLAW 237)
Todd, E. C. E. (1982). Compensation For Injurious Affection Without Expropriation
Within The Context of Municipal Law. The Advocate, 40, p. 31-43.
Young, R.E. (2005). The Canadian Law of Constructive Expropriation. Saskatchewan
Law Review, 68, p.345.
ii
RAPPORT GOUVERNEMENTAUX
British Columbia. (1992). Provincial Commission – Commissioner Richard Schwidt.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for the Taking of
Resource Interests. Vancouver: British Columbia Legislature.
Pearse, P.H. (2000). Sharing Responsibility: Principles and Procedures for
Compensation Under the Species at Risk Act – A Report to the Minister of the
Environment (Report No. 101-03975). Ottawa: Minister of the Environment.
JURISPRUDENCES CANADIENNES
Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply and Services) v. Nilsson, [1999] A.J. No. 645.
(A.Q.B.) (Quicklaw) [Nilsson (A.Q.B.)]
Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply and Services) v. Nilsson (2002), 220 D.L.R.
(4th) 474. (A.C.A.) [Nilsson (2002)]
British Columbia v. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533. (S.C.C.) [Tener (1985)]
Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City) (2004), 237 D.L.R. (4th) 40
[C.P.R. v. Vancouver (2004)]
Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 227. (S.C.C.)
[C.P.R. v. Vancouver (2006)]
Casamiro Resource Corp. v. British Columbia (Attorney-General), (1991) 80 D.L.R. (4th)
1. (B.C.C.A.) [Casamiro (1991)]
Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. et al. v. The Queen (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 756.
Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101. [Manitoba Fisheries (1979)]
Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 696.
(NSCA) [Mariner Real Estate (1999)]
Rock Resources Inc. v. British Columbia (2003), 229 D.L.R. (4th) 115. (B.C.C.A.)
[Rock Resources (2003)]
TFL Forest Ltd. v. British Columbia, [2002] B.C.J. No. 218. (Quicklaw)
[TFL Forest (2002)]
iii
JURISPRUDENCES AMÉRICAINES
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 26 (1897)
Dollan v. City of Tigard, (1994) 512 U.S. 374.
Kelo v. City of New London, (2005) 125 S. Ct. 2655 [Kello v. City of New London
(2005)]
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., (2005) 125 S. Ct. 2074. [Lingle v. Chevron (2005)]
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, (1992) 505 U.S. 1003 [Lucas (1992)]
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, (1987) 483 U.S. 825.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. (1978) 438 U.S. 104.
[Penn Central (1978)]
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 [Mahon (1922)]
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
[Tahoe-Sierra (2002)]
LÉGISLATIONS CANADIENNES
Bill C-33, an Act respecting the protection of wildlife species at risk in Canada. 2nd
Session, 36th Parliament (April 2000)
Canadian Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 14 & 15 Vict., 1851, c. 51
Expropriation Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 39
Expropriation Act, S.N.B. 1973, c. E-14 [N.B. Expropriation Act]
Expropriation Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 156
Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict., 1845, c. 18
Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict., 1845, c. 20
LÉGISLATIONS AMÉRICAINES
Measure 37, Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.352 (2006) [Measure 37]
Real Property Rights Preservation Act, Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2007.001, et seq. (West
2006), § 2007.002(5).
U.S. Const. Amend. V.
iv