THE
NAVAL
REVIEW
TO PROMOTE THE ADVANCEMENT AND SPREADING WITHIN
THE SERVICE OF KNOWLEDGE RELEVANT TO THE HIGHER
ASPECTS OF THE NAVAL PROFESSION.
Founded in October, 1912, by the following officers, who had
formed a Naval Society:
Captain H. W. Richmond R.N.
Commander K. G. B, Dewar R.N.
Commander the Hon. R. A. R. Plunkett R.N.
Lieutenant R. M. Bellairs R.N.
Lieutenant T. Fisher R.N.
Lieutenant H. G. Thursfield R.N.
Captain E. W. Harding R.M.A.
Admiral W. H. Henderson (Honorary Editor)
It is only by the possession of a trained and
developed mind that the fullest capacity can,
as a rule, be obtained. There are, of course.
exceptional individuals with rare natural gifts
which make up for deficiencies. But such gifts are
indeed rare. We are coming more and more to
recognise that the best specialist can be produced
only after a long training in general learning. The
grasp of principle which makes detail easy can
only come when innate capacity has been evoked
and moulded by high training.
Lord Haldane
Issued quarterly for private circulation, in accordance
with the Regulation printed herein, which should be
carefully studied.
Copyright under Act of 1911
Vol. 70
No.3
JULY 1982
Contents
Page
EDITORIAL
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161
ARTICLES:
THE WRECK O F HMS RALEIGH
GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY AND THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
IN REDUCED CIRCUMSTANCES
.
DEFENCE
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REVIEW REVISITED
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THE VIEW FROM WESTMINSTER BRIDGE
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THE ETHICS O F NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
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THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET
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CORRESPONDENCE ...
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AWAY SEABOOT
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217
COMMANDER'S TABLE .
WILHELMSHAVEN RAID .
THE DEFENCE REVIEW .
... AND ANOTHER THING ...-- THE DEFENCE REVIEW -- SUPPORT AT THE TOP
.
LESSONS AT SEA .
RECRUITING PROPAGANDA .
FUNCTIONAL LEADERSHIP
.
WHAT IS IT T O BE, BEST CASE OR WORST CASE PLANNING? .
PORT STANLEY
FORTY YEARS AGO
REVIEWS -- I: NAVAL
PERIODICALS AND OTHERS
REVIEWS -- 11: BOOKS . . . . . .
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225
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228
Editorial
OOKING BACK over my first two
years as Editor I would like to thank the
many contributors of articles, letters and
reviews that have made my task both
possible and rewarding. Although I can trim
the sails of The Naval Review the motive
power is provided by the contributors. I am
deeply grateful to them.
The aim of The Naval Review remains
unchanged; that is to promote the
advancement and spreading within the
service of knowledge relevant to the higher
aspects of the naval profession. As far as
practicable this aim controls my editorial
policy.
The task force sails
It is too early to analyse the lessons of the
Falkland crisis. In common with the other
conflicts in which our forces have become
involved since 1945 the outbreak of
hostilities was unexpected. However, the
flexibility of the armed forces and their
supporting services was such that the nation
saw the departure of a formidable task force
within the space of a weekend.
This naval force became an important
element in generating pressure on Argentina
even while it proceeded towards the South
Atlantic thereby demonstrating the utility of
maritime power; as the elements reached the
Falklands area the country witnessed a
progressive increase in military force
designed to achieve a solution to a dispute
that could not be solved solely by diplomatic
or economic measures.
The chartering and otherwise taking up of
merchant marine tonnage on a vast scale,
fifty ships of more than 700,000 tons at the
time of writing, is another object lesson on
the uniquely flexible character of sea power.
Misinformation
The present long-term plans for the Royal
Navy set out in the last White Paper on
defence and covered extensively in the
January 1982 issue of The Naval Review,
show that the Surface Fleet will be severely
reduced in the decade ahead. Against this
background it is particularly sad that at the
beginning of the Falkland crisis the
Government saw fit to release information
that claimed to demonstrate that there
would be no 'running down' of the Royal
Navy. Such wild claims do not match the
reality of the situation that was spelt out in
the Government's own White Paper.
Maritime Heritage Trust
The Maritime Trust was established in 1969
to restore, preserve and display vessels of
historic importance in Britain's maritime
heritage. The Trust now has in its care some
twenty vessels. The majority of these are
fully restored and open to the public offering
a unique opportunity to step back into a
bygone era at sea. A visitor can board ships
that have shaped our island history; HMS
Warrior - Britain's first battleship, an
ocean-going armoured iron warship Gipsy Moth ZV, Lively Lady, The Cutty
Sark and (still under restoration) Discovery
which was built for Captain Scott's first
Antarctic expedition.
Twelve months ago the Maritime Trust
launched a Friendship Scheme. Details are
contained in a leaflet that will be found in
this issue.
Back copies
A naval and maritime bookseller has agreed
to act as a 'focus' for members who may
wish to sell or purchase back numbers.
Members should write direct to:
G. L. Green,
104 Pitshanger Lane,
Ealing, London, WS 1QX 01-997 6454
~ncreased'subscri~tion
The Trustees and Committee much regret
that rising costs necessitate another increase
in the annual subscription to The Naval
Review. Regretfully, therefore, the £8
subscription which was introduced on
1 January 1981 will be increased to f10 next
year, 1 January 1983(£5 for Sub-Lieutenants
1
162
/
I
EDITORIAL
and below). Approval is being sought to
introduce Direct Debiting for the payment
of subscriptions (on an optional basis for
existing members); in the long term this will
both save administrative costs and be of
greater convenience to members than the
Bankers' Standing Order method of
payment. Members will shortly receive in
the post a letter from the Chairman of
Trustees giving more background to the
need to increase subscriptions, together
with a letter from the Secretary-Treasurer
and the appropriate forms. Members are
advised to wait for these letters before
taking action t o increase their
subscriptions.
Annual General Meeting
By courtesy of the Commanding Officer,
the Annual General Meeting of The Naval
Review will be held on board HMS
President in King's Reach, London, at 5.30
p.m. on Wednesday, 27 October 1982. The
Wardroom bar facilities will be available
after the meeting. Members will be most
welcome; they are asked to introduce
themselves to the Quartermaster at the top
of the gangway as members of The Naval
Review.
Tailpiece
Perceptive readers will notice that the April
1982 issue of The Naval Review included an
article on the recent experiences of a Naval
Attache in Argentina. The fact that the
issue went to press some weeks before the
invasion of the Falkland Islands
demonstrates the remarkable quality of the
crystal ball currently in use by the Editor.
J. NUNN
The Wreck of HMS Raleigh
(This article is an extract from the diary
written by Vice Admiral Sir Stephen Carlill,
KBE, CB, DSO, when he was a
midshipman - Editor.)
Tuesday 8 August 1922
HE MOST extraordinary and exciting
Tday
of my life. According to
programme, we were due to leave Hawke
Bay and arrive at Forteau, Labrador; about
a six-hour run. Hawke Bay - and the
entrance - is entirely devoid of any buoys
or leading marks, and the chart is from a
somewhat old survey. The part around
Robinson Island is very tricky too, and
there are several tide rips. Commander 'N'
wanted to verify the chart in this locality,
and also to lay out two temporary buoys to
assist us in going out; so we went away in
the second motor boat early. I turned out at
05.00 and raised some very excellent coffee
from the ship's galley. Then I got all the
necessary gear down from the chart house
- sextants, station pointers, charts, rulers,
etc. We left the ship at 05.50 - Tassles
running the motor boat.
A straight run across the bay to Robinson
Island, then it started raining. Dobson, the
Chief Quarter Master, came with us for
sounding purposes. We dithered about for
hours - Nuts fixing the boat by sextant
angles, Dobson sounding, and me writing
down or doing sundry things. About
halfway through, my abscess started
hurting, and I got thoroughly fed up.
Having dropped the first buoy, we went
away over to the entrance, messed about,
came back, and dropped the second buoy;
and finally returned to the ship at 10.05.
I had left everything to Adams, who is
giving me a hand with 'Tanky'; he wound
chronometers and synchronised gyros. As
soon as we returned, the motor boat was
hoisted and we got under way. Tassles and I
went to breakfast! Then I cleaned and had
dinner at 12.00. Afterwards, I fell soundly
asleep in the gunroom armchair. However,
at 13.30, I went up to the chart house doing
various things. I read out the deck log to
Nuts and wrote up the gyro logs. On my
return to the gunroom, I found the others
in the throes of the gunnery exam. There
were little 'throes' though and still less
'exam'. I read the paper through and
discovered how very little I knew about a
7.5 gun. But I have only been at a control
station the whole time, so I didn't mind.
Moke seemed to have done a very good
paper; but I discovered that he had had a
long discussion on various knotty points in
the papers, with Bill Bailey, the Director
Gunner! This much he shamefacedly
confessed to me.
Lambe was the OOW, and sent a
messenger down to say that there was an
iceberg about six miles on the port beam. I
went up to have a look at it. Immensely
massive and motionless - I remember it
struck me what an awkward thing it would
be to bump into in a fog or at night. This
was about 15.20, and I returned to the
gunroom for a cup of tea. Hearing that
Commander 'N' wanted to see me, I
bounced Fanny Adams into going up. I
finished my tea. The start of the siren was
the first intimation that we had run into a
fog. We were due at Forteau at 1615.
After one cup of tea I went up to the
bridge to take over from Fanny. The fog
was very thick, and the sounding boom was
out on the starboard side. I don't know
what it was that made me aware that
something was wrong - a commotion on
the bridge, a shout, or instinct. Anyway, it
doesn't really matter what started me off
but by the time I got to the flag deck, I
became aware that something was wrong. I
ran forward by the upper conning tower,
and there through the fog, on the starboard
bow, loomed a white line of breakers.
It was the most weird feeling - that of
seeing and hearing the surf through the fog.
I turned and ran for the bridge. Lovegrove,
dropping like a stone and regardless of
ladders, just missed putting his foot right
through my face. Engines were going full
166
THE WRECK OF HMS RALEIGH
astern: Skipper, from starboard side: 'Put
the helm over.' Lambe: 'Hard a-starboard.'
From the Skipper again: 'Good God, Bott,
where are we?' He suddenly looked ninety;
and old Nuts looked cold and blue. Massey,
from the other end of the bridge and
through a megaphone: 'Hands to collision
stations!' Never did I expect to hear that
'pipe' in any actual circumstance outside
evolutions. My first thought on seeing the
breakers was 'iceberg'! From the bridge
though, I saw a bit of green through the
fog. 'Cheer up Billy, you're not dead yet.'
About thirty seconds after my arrival on
the bridge, or, to be exact, at 15.39, we ran
aground. Bump - crash - bump. All
impossible and incredible.
We were quickly swung beam on to the
heavy sea and the strong South West wind.
'Get the stream anchor out!' shouted the
Skipper who left the bridge and went aft. It
was too late, though. From now onwards,
there was a continuous succession of the
most prodigious bumps and crashes, rolling
over each way and bringing up each side
with colossal jerks. But then - imagine
9,500 solid tons of steel being lifted up and
crashed down again against something very
hard, every fifteen seconds - and it won't
be so hard to understand the state of
affairs, nor why it was impossible to stand
up alone without being hurled about.
We went 'full ahead port', to try t o keep
her stern off; and the starboard helm was
taken off. We didn't use the starboard
engines on account of the propellers against
the rocks! When it was hopeless - engines
were stopped.
The greatest trouble came from the
topmasts, and why they didn't come down,
I don't know. Wireless aerials came
clattering down about us. People were all
over the upper and boat decks now, and
one of the foremost boilers started blowing
off. Orr-Ewing and people on the fo'c's'le
let go the port anchor. Then we heard 'Fire
party!' sounded off; the straw that broke
the camel's hump. Lambe and I agreed
afterwards that that was the worst moment.
Thoughts of oil fuel floating down in the
boiler rooms, and blazing away merrily.
passed through our minds. But it was
nothing worse than a fire in the ship's
company galley, which was soon sat on.
The somewhat surprising pipe of 'Abandon
ship' must have come hereabouts. Manning
the port boats was out of the question; but
the first cutter was manned and lowered. I
saw none of this but shortly afterwards,
hearing shouts, we looked down over the
starboard side and saw men struggling in
the water. What apparently happened was
this: she was manned with a mixed crew of
seamen and stokers, with Hutton, whose
boat it was, in charge. They didn't fend her
off sufficiently from the ship's side, as she
was being lowered; and as the ship lurched,
she swung into the ship, and Hutton
declares that she was holed before she ever
reached the water: probably a plank or two
stoved in. She was washed onto a ledge of
rocks, and most of the men foolishly
jumped out in a panic. Then she was
washed over it and onto a further ledge in
shallow water where she stuck. Hutton did
some noble work. He returned to one man
who was unconscious: and, being directed
by cries from the ship, pushed an empty
breaker in front of him. He managed to get
the man to the ship's side, where they were
both hoisted inboard. The man, Reynolds,
was resuscitated on board. About six were
drowned. It was terrible seeing them from
the bridge. It must have been the cold water
that did them in. They had life-belts on, but
seemed helpless. Hutton, who is a very
weak swimmer, was without a life-belt and
in his shirt sleeves. One man, I remember
was washed down the ship's length drowned - with his head thrown back and
his arms crossed over his life-belt akimbo.
His face was terrible.
Adams took the log and I folded up the
chart, tucking it well away. All power
was now off the ship, and a rather creepy
feeling down my back this report gave me!
'Pelorous' on No.1 Gyro had stopped, but
the antics of the bridge repeater on No.2
amused us very much. The repeater went
round in small circles, and we roared with
laughter! Incidentally, it was knocked clean
off its sockets, and Lambe and I replaced it.
THE WRECK OF HMS RALEIGH
About now, I was sent down to find out the
state of affairs in the engine room. I made
my way aft, mostly down the port side. The
pinnace was having a fine time on her own,
she had been turned out and manned for
'Out stream anchor' but quickly unmanned again, as Willy Wood afterwards
told me - and luckily nobody was hurt.
Now, she was turning herself in and out at
the most incredible speed. Her rudder was
smashed and she wasn't improving the stern
of the second motor boat; but I feel sure she
was enjoying herself! I saw Hops and Moke
by the gig. In the above water flat, the
torpedoes had taken charge. Luckily, I met
the Senior Engineer who told me that the
main steam pipes in the after engine room
had buckled; steam had been turned off
from the boiler rooms; and everybody was
up from down below. With this
information I made my way, by darts and
dashes, back to the bridge.
Lines were got ashore with the Coston
gun, and Carley floats were hoisted out. I
managed to secure some hot tea on my way
up; we got some warm gear on the bridge
and started smoking. Boy Lewis was the
Messenger; very blue and perturbed - but I
assured him he would see Bromley again.
Lovegrove went to the Engineer
Commander to get the starboard tanks
flooded to prevent her keeling over to port
any more. Complete darkness reigned
'tween decks now and the fog was thicker
than ever.
Ashore, they had got the Carley floats
and large hawsers. Hops had got himself
ashore somehow and was working there in
charge like a Trojan. We had a wonderful
view of it all from the bridge. Imagine a
typical shipwreck picture and then add
reality. On an invisible hillside, in line with
the bows, fires had been lit, showing
mysterious patches of pink and red through
the fog; and then away in the distance
astern, were lines of men in seaboots and all
kinds of rigs, hauling on ropes and lifting
people out of Carley floats. All this and
much more dimly seen through the fog, and
with the crashes of the ship, the shouts of
the men and the breaking of the surf going
167
on the whole time. 'You know I haven't
realised it yet' said Lambe. Nor had any of
us - but I was enjoying it now.
Nuts wanted soundings taken all round
the ship, and I went down to d o it. I found
a hand lead and line in the Quartermaster's
store on the quarter deck and, armed with
this, I got hold of Moke and Forrest.
Forrest wrote down, Moke held the line,
and I sounded: right aft, bulkhead 250 on
the Q.D., top of the slope, No.3 gun, the
chains, the fo'c's'le breakwater, and right
forward port and starboard side. We had
fine sport on the port side and got a wee bit
damp! By the time we had finished, they
had come down from the bridge, and I gave
Nuts the results when I met him on the boat
deck.
People were thinning on board; and
ashore Hops was managing wonderfully.
Several times I went down aft, with a torch
and got my loose cash, watch, automatic,
luscious fawn cardigan, a sweater, shirt, my
rugger cap, best gloves - and changed my
shoes. Luckily, Lovegrove had had my
Burberry, which he gave to me.
There were now about eighteen of us left:
Captain, Nuts, Major of Marines, No.1
who had been in great form, Torps
O'Cally, Orr-Ewing, Garnett, the Chief
Bosun's Mate, Chief Yeoman of Signals,
about six Petty Officers and myself.
In order to establish quick connections
with the ship from the shore for tomorrow,
the idea was to reeve the I%in. wire
through a snatch-block on the Q.D. and
send both ends ashore. The 1 Min. wire is
for the fog buoy and is 300 fathoms! We
unreeled it, flaking it beautifully down the
port side. It took hours - and lumme! how my abscess hurt! We got the bight
through the snatch-block and both ends
into the Carley float. P.O. Freddy
Humphries and a cat went in the Carley
float. Then things went wrong! To start
with, the fool forgot to say that two ends of
the wire were in the Carley float. They
didn't notice the other one in the dark and
surf ashore. Also, quite suddenly, we had
three seas over the quarter deck, which,
apart from making us all leap up and seize
168
THE WRECK OF HMS RALEIGH
I
I
11
onto something substantial, and nearly the decency to get wet!
washing P.O. Territt, over the side,
I shan't forget the cup of tea - it
completely messed up the flaked out wire warmed the cockles of my heart. There was
on the port side - 200 odd fathoms of wet a good deal to do with the billeting of the
1%in. flexible steel wire in a tangle!
men; and finally I lay down alongside OrrThe ship was heeling over more, and my Ewing on my burberry by the fire outside.
abscess was hurting like hell.
The wet came through too and later we
People didn't quite seem to know what to shifted in to a bare room. Here we lay and
do now, or rather, were of several opinions. froze on under his duffle coat. But it was
The wire was cut! Why - I don't know - miserable, and my abscess hurt so much
or how it was rerove. The main thing now that I couldn't sleep.
Later, - but that's tomorrow.
was to get ashore, and the people on the
beach seemed very dense. We couldn't
'Oh Wind - if Winter comes, can Spring
move that Carley float and so turned our be far behind.'
attention to the aftermost one. It was dark
now, getting foggier and the tide had risen a Wednesday 9 August
good deal. We got the float close enough up
Moke, I think, was about the only person
to load it with our persons and some of the in our room who slept, and he had %
Skipper's 'ready-use' baggage. Two loads hour's good 'shut-eye'. One thing, - never
got us all ashore. I went in the first one with be shipwrecked with an abscess. 02.00-ish,
Orr-Ewing, Garnett, and most of the POs. or before, both 0.-E. and I found it damn
God - the water was cold! - and ashore cold, and got up. We went out to the fire
there were great lumps of ice. We were outside where there was quite a crowd. The
soaked up to our waists, and a bit above, wind was punishingly cold, but I finished
and splashed a good deal. Mr Gould helped most of my drying, going up in clouds of
me out and after wading through the surf steam. Moke came out shortly afterwards,
and swirl, and stumbling over rocks, I and at sunrise, we went for a bit of a stroll
arrived on terra firma. A quarter of an hour then we went down to the ship to look at
later, the next and last Carley float with the her; we met Massey down there. On our
remainder arrived. 'My days! I was glad.'
return to the lighthouse, I looked in at sick
There were bonfires all round us, and bay to see how the invalids were getting on.
they were needed, for the wind was bitterly Reynolds, Hutton's man, was there. He
cold and the ground and everything sopping was unconscious, breathing in great gasps
wet. From now onwards, I 'doggied' Nuts and groaning. The face was completely
who was most awfully nice to me. The yellow, and his lips blue. Hideous - but
skipper, he, and I dried at one of the fires: they seemed very happy about him, and
the former lay full length on the wet ground said he was developing double pneumonia.
and the firelight played on one of the Soon they started getting on board. The
saddest, tiredest, and fiercest faces I have skipper and Nuts went in the first Carley
ever seen. I remember seeing Forrest drying float, and I followed shortly afterwards.
and going up in clouds of steam. I thought The hands of the first party had broken
he was burning for a minute. Then we open the ship's canteen and thus started the
walked up to the lighthouse about % mile beastly looting that continued for several
away - a post captain, a commander (N), days. I cleared up the chart house with
and a damned snotty. I was tickled over the Dobson; it was in a beastly state. After a
area. We went to the wireless house a bit bit, Nuts came up, and together we went
beyond and then to the lighthouse, where through the gear. It was very sad. He
there were lots of officers having a meal. I chucked his pilotage notes down with a
was annoyed with the padre, who had made 'Well! I shan't need them again.' We went
himself as comfy as possible in an armchair on the bridge and for the last time, he fixed
as soon as he had landed. He hadn't even the ship by horizontal angles. My abscess
THE WRECK OF HMS RALEIGH
hurt a good deal all this time. Then we came
down. The Gunroom was in the most
appalling mess, first, all the lockers had
swung open and disgorged their contents,
and then the whole locker case had fallen
dqwn. The whole deck was littered with
every conceivable kind of gear from music
to revolvers. Yesterday's tea was still very
much in evidence too. I found a half bottle
of brandy, which just filled an empty Eno's
bottle; this I carefully stored away for future
use.
There was a lot of sherry in a decanter
too, and I gave Nuts a good tot, in a tooth
mug, in his cabin. I went aft, and started
packing myself. What kind fate guided my
choice on 25 July 1921, when I chose an
athwartships chest; the drawers of nearly all
the other chests, were out. Despite the
absence of a trunk or packing case I
managed to get most of my gear packed mostly in a mattress cover I pinched out of
Shaw's cabin. Old Higginbottom (short for
'Haslehurst') presented me with a cabin
curtain, in which I put nearly all my books,
lashing it up with cod line. In this way I used
up a blanket, and I stuffed my helmet case
full of small gear. The most useful thing was
a tin case - a service thing - about
2'xl 'x5' - a lot of which were sent over by
the Calcutta. The one I got hold of belonged
to Lingard-Guthrie, 'him as I saw playing
rugger' against the Harlequins, at Christmas
1919.
The ship had a list of about 8" to port,
which doesn't sound much, - but is quite
appreciable when you get on it. Oil fuel was
the thing that messed nearly everything up,
and nobody seemed to know how it got
about the ship. But I went to see if our
hammocks were obtainable from the
Officers bathroom flat outside Massey's
cabin. The thick brown oil fuel was awful
here; I slipped at the edge too. It was all dark
and this thick stuff gurgled away happily as
the ship rolled. I climbed round the gun
support, but all the hammocks were ruined.
Torps, Guns, the 'Senior' and Massey have
lost all their gear, being the unfortunate
owners of these port-side cabins. All my
gear I added to the heap on the quarter deck,
169
which was gradually being sent ashore on
the Carley float. I managed to raise a very
substantial meal from the Admiral's galley,
of bangers and bacon mostly. The brandy
helped here. I then helped Nuts with his
packing. H e was very depressed, and was
going to leave all his books behind. So I
seized'his blankets, laid them on the deck
outside his cabin and repeated operations.
H e was sadly grateful.
My abscess hurt very much all this time,
and about 17.00, when I went ashore I saw
Hull going u p to the temporary sick bay at
the lighthouse, I tracked him down, and he
said he would have 'to go into it'. It was
hurting so much that I didn't care if he went
through it. However, I was shaken a bit
when on looking round, they discovered
they were minus all their instruments. So
Hull got an old pair of rusty pointed scissors
(rusty is an exaggeration, but it sounds well,
and they were dirty), and cut! Slight pause
for contemplation. It was worth it, and
when it was bound up, I suddenly fell fast
asleep. For two whole hours too.
Later, I hobbled back to the ship about % mile - and got my blanket and
burberry from the officers dump.
Todhunter wanted to go for me, but I knew
just where they were, and also on the way
back, a Labrador native gave me a lift o n a
cart. I had another meal in the lighthouse
and Hops got me a billet in a hayloft
opposite. It was a gem in its way! and when
I went across there I found Hops and
Johnny snoring away. Guns came in later
and curled down in one corner; and with
hay and a blanket I assured myself that
nothing 'ud budge me. I made myself so
comfy that I lay awake for a long time
appreciating it. I was just dropping off in to
the proverbial slumber when the door
suddenly burst open and Massey's towering
form stood silhouetted against the floods of
freezing moonlight. A torch flared in my
face. 'All officers turn out. Hands will fall
in at 04.30 and embark in Empress of
France at 07.30. About 150 will be left
behind and a meeting t o decide whom now!' Incidentally, he was about 2 % hours
out in his present time and thought it was
THE WRECK OF HMS RALEIGH
Y
02.00. I rose and went down to the fires by
the ship where we waited for the meeting
results. The morning and the evening were
the second day.
f
I
I
Thursday 10 August
We had a pleasant little party down by the
bonfire. Armitage had come over during the
day in the Capetown's cutter, as also
Lt. Hussey from the Calcutta; both had
been unable to get back, and were round the
fire. Lots of other people were there too.
The marines were keeping guard on all the
gear, and I give them full marks for the
excellent brews of cocoa they produced
continuously; also excellent bread and jam!
The meeting ended about 01.00 and they
came back around our bonfire. Adams,
Lovegrove, and I having been on the bridge
at the moment of bumping, have got to stay
behind for the Court of Enquiry. A salvage
party of about 120 men, all picked, are
staying - O'Cally, Hops, and several
officers. The remainder to England. Despite
our blankets, it got too cold about 02.15,
and a general move was made in the
direction of the lighthouse. In the hayloft,
again I got about two hours sleep. They
called the 'ands about 04.30. I wrote a tiny
note home, which Moke swore to take care
of and post in England. All the home-party
left, I think sometime in the forenoon walking, with all their packs, round to
Forteau, about six miles. I never saw them
go, but heard afterwards that they were a
funny sight - a long straggly line,
stretching right away in the distance,
trudging along, with their worldly wealth on
their backs.
I went on board in the forenoon, and
packed up Nuts private gear, such as
sextant, typewriter, etc. and his
instruments. I also received all sorts of
stuff, Gowlland, L.'s rug and Moke's cricket
bag. The latter was most useful, as I stuffed
it with all my note books, etc. that I got out
of the after gun support. The ship was still
rolling a bit, but settled down later, with a
permanent list of 9" to port. This doesn't
sound much, but it looks a lot, and seems
colossal when you are actually on board.
Oil fuel is getting everywhere too, and the
decks are very slippery. The salvage party's
camp is about the same distance from the
ship as the lighthouse is, but on the Forteau
side. I went there for lunch. Our mess is
really very comfy, being in a house which
the inhabitants vacated, or at any rate from
which they have made themselves very
scarce! An extraordinary rough and fierce
crowd of Newfoundlanders have come
across the Belle Isle straits, solely for the
purpose of looting. They are mere wreckers
and tell us candidly that they understood it
was a merchantship that had run ashore and
are disappointed. However, despite their
disappointment, there is a considerable
amount of gear in the officers' dump
abreast the ship, which they cast longing
glances at, and they lie about on the ground
all round. Consequently, Nuts wants
Adams and me to remain on guard, by the
dump the whole time. I went back to relieve
him, staying there till about 17.00. I was
going to spend the night out there, but Nuts
had found out about my abscess and he told
me to stay in the mess the rest of the day.
We have got a guard of eight men under
P. 0. Pegden in a tent abreast the ship, so
Adams stayed with them for the night. We
were all very sleepy indeed, in the mess
tonight. After dinner, Nuts made out the
Camp Routine and General Orders. O'Cally
in making out a list of his topmen, fell fast
asleep and shortly afterwards we turned in,
on the mattresses we had brought along
with us from the ship.
Friday 11 August
Today, I believe, is the anniversary of our
arrival in Bermuda! Then, the Raleigh was a
live ship; now she is an inert mass, on the
rocks off Labrador. I awoke this morning
feeling fat-headed, and with two new boils
on my legs. Altogether, I felt rather rotten.
A boat came in from the Capetown about
07.30. Lambe and I went off to have a bath.
Nuts told me to go to the sick bay then
not to hurry back. They were very
hospitable on board, and I had a good bath
and a better breakfast. Then I went up to
the sick bay, where I saw their P.M.O. and
THE WRECK OF HMS RALEIGH
had hot fomentations put on sundry boils. I
read out the fair log to Love, who is doing a
bit of 'Tanky'. I went to sick bay again
after dinner and again before I left about
16.30. In the course of the day, most of the
Raleigh snotties came on board, from
Forteau. I fell very fast asleep p.m. and was
woken up in the middle by Moke, who had
some long yarn about selling the Zdumso to
the Navigator of the Capetown for £9 being
the price we (Moke, Forrest, and I) paid
Johnny Grindle for her. I gathered it in
parts, and fell asleep again. I forgot to say
that the home-going party never embarked
in the Empress of France after all. She came
in that afternoon, but hadn't got enough
food on board to feed 500 men; also, it was
too rough to embark anybody then, and she
proceeded to England. Now, they are going
in another C.P.R. liner, the SS Montrose,
in a day or two. Oh! the lucky devils.
I went ashore in a shore boat about 17.00
and heard from Adams that the three
snotties, i.e. us, were not staying after all,
but going home. Accordingly, I had to get a
move on with my gear and went on board
the Raleigh to get a chest of drawers, which
I was going to convert into a packing case.
With two hands to help me, I got it up and
down into a shore boat, which took me
round to the camp. There I learnt what I
had really been expecting all along, that our
home-going was cancelled. Lovegrove and
Adams had already gone to the Capetown
with their gear, and I sent them a signal. So
I was a chest of drawers to the good, and it
came in very handy. Our food is rotten, and
not nearly as good as the men's. Only dry
bread and some meat. Wilkins, the steward,
is a fool and utterly incapable. After our socalled dinner, I wrote a short letter home
and also worked out increase of draught
due to our list, from the shipwright's
drawings. To bed 23.45.
Saturday 12 August
Grouse shooting starts today. We got
fifteen brace, and had a wonderful day of
it. But that's only my 'pretence'. What
actually happened was the burial of two
stokers whose bodies had been located in
171
between the ship and the beach, and who
were fished up with meat hooks early this
morning. O'Cally turned up in a sword and
sea-boots and most of the guard put on
khaki. Matelots do love a funeral, but I
didn't go to it. I went up instead to the sick
bay at the lighthouse, where three boiling
hot and simultaneous fomentations shook
me a bit. I returned and mucked about with
my gear. I can't do any of the camp or ship
work much. I wish I could, as I should
enjoy it enormously. I am getting jealous of
Hops who is fit as a fiddle and in roaring
spirits, and I know I should be if I could do
things. But with three boils and several
more coming. . . After lunch, (dry bread
and beef again, damn that steward) feeling
very filthy, I went up a hill behind
the camp, to a pool I had heard about.
Here I had a very excellent wash all over,
much to the amazement of two of our
Newfoundland friends, who watched the
strange process with much amazement and
great interest. Then I put on a clean shirt
and clean soft collar, returned to the camp
looking like a blooming gentleman.
The Montrose is calling in tomorrow,
and the Skipper and about three others
walked round to Forteau this afternoon
presumably to give them a chuck-up. They
never returned tonight and so we had four
less in the mess, though we were very
cheery. We played word games after supper
- had lots of fun. O'Cally's brainwaves
were wonderful. We played the game of
different subjects all starting with the same
letter. O'Cally - a trifle shot - thought
for hours about his subject, and then when
we were all thinking it was going to be
something really 'cute' said, in a weak
voice, 'Oh! a tree'. The Engineer
#Commander had rather a gem; the only
agricultural implement starting with N, that
he could think of was a 'nibblick'.
So to bed.
Sunday 15 August
I worked out the Tide Table for the next
week this forenoon, and afterwards bent
my footsteps towards the sick bay. Three
hot fomentations then back to the camp
172
THE WRECK OF HMS RALEIGH
where I wrote up my diary a bit. The
Skipper sent a signal last night to say that
'he was bringing back Mr Gould with him'
as we were all tired of being starved.
However, the Captain's steward had taken
over and we were now getting 'enuf' to eat,
so we replied that it was unnecessary.
Wilkins, we had sent around to Forteau to
go home, as we were fed up with him. After
lunch today, the Skipper, Hops, and co.
came back. Apparently, the officers are
living in great comfort at the other side and
last night had a great sing-song. They are
billeted at the mission there, to which I gave
25 cents when we were here last September.
SS Montrose arrived at about 14.00, and
embarkation was carried on without a
hitch. So much so, that she sailed away at
16.30.
We waved!. . .
Dramatis personae, etc.
Captain Arthur Bromley
Commanding Officer
Commander L. C. Bott
Commander (N) 'Nuts'
Lieutenant Commander E. W. H. Blake
Lieutenant Commander Gaisford St Lawrence
Lieutenant Commander M. Goolden DSC
Surgeon Lieutenant Commander Hull
Guns
Torps
Massey
Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Johnny
Hops
O'Cally
0.-E.
J. A. Grindle
H. G. Hopper
O'Callaghan
D. Orr-Ewing
Sub. Lieutenant C. E. Lambe
Sub. of the Mess
Midshipman
Midshipman
Midshipman
Midshipman
Midshipman
Midshipman
Midshipman
Midshipman
Midshipman
Midshipman
Midshipman
Fanny
W. L. G. Adams
J. W. Forrest
R. b. Garnett
G. Gowlland
L. Gowlland
W. E. Halsey
P. C. Hutton
H. Lovegrove
I. M. Martineau
R. C. Todhunter
W. H. Wood
Mr Gould
Epilogue
The Board of Enquiry was held in HMS
Constance on Thursday 17 August in
Forteau Bay. Captain E. E. Strutt (C.O.
Constance) was President.
The Court Martial on the stranding of
HMS Raleigh took place in the Royal Naval
Barracks, Portsmouth in Autumn 1922
with the Captain of Dryad, Captain
H. 0. Reinold as President. The
Tassles
Willy
Gunroom Messman
Commanding Officer of the Raleigh was
dismissed his ship and reprimanded; the
Navigating Officer was dismissed and his
ship severely reprimanded. Both officers
retired soon afterwards.
Midshipman P. C. Hutton was later
awarded the Stanhope Gold Medal for 1922
for life-saving.
The hull of the wrecked Raleigh proved
THE WRECK OF HMS RALEIGH
something of an attraction to passengers on
C.P.R. liners passing through the Belle Isle
Straits in the summer months. In, I think,
1926, HMS Durban was given the job of
blowing it up.
The Raleigh Diary continues until
Saturday 19 August when Lovegrove and
Carlill joined Constance and returned to
Bermuda (and a hurricane) subsequently
joining HMS Dartmouth (trooping) for
passage to the UK.
173
The Raleigh gunroom as a whole did not
meet up again until they joined the RN
College Greenwich as Acting Sub.
Lieutenants in the Autumn of 1923.
In parenthesis, it might be added that
Carlill relieved Fanny Adams for the second
time - thirty-two years later - as Flag
Officer, Training Squadron, in the comfort
of Portland Harbour and not as 'Tanky' on
the bridge of the Raleigh on the
inhospitable shores of Labrador.
CARLILL
STEPHEN
Gunboat Diplomacy and the
Conventional Wisdom
The conventional wisdom
ARLY IN MAY there appeared in The
Times an elegant little essay on the
subject of gunboat diplomacy. It was not
written by their defence correspondent, nor
even by the anonymous author of that
extraordinary effusion - 'We Are All
Falklanders Now' - which had appeared in
April as a leading article. No, this subject
had been entrusted to the literary editor,
who had looked up the word in the Oxford
English Dictionary and found its earliest
use to be enshrined in the phrase: 'the days
of gunboat diplomacy are over'.
The authentic voice of the conventional
wisdom had delivered a characteristic
verdict. I have heard it from Foreign
Secretaries, from professors, from
Directors of the Institute for Strategic
Studies, from Admirals. It is urbane, it is
gently dismissive and, as General Galtieri
has rather roughly reminded us, it is wrong.
Why were so many eminent persons so
sadly surprised when Argentina employed
limited naval force to capture the Falkland
Islands? As a classical use of definitive force
to create a fait accompli, it was a text-book
operation of gunboat diplomacy. During the
seventies five other islands had gone the
same way in as many years. The Argentine
claim was strident, their protracted
negotiations had been unavailing, and their
interest in gunboat diplomacy was known.
What was to deter them? Not the spinning
out of talks, not the repeated hints that only
the wishes of the islanders blocked the path
to concessions, not the progressive reduction
over the years of the British naval presence
-even to the announced withdrawal of that
token ship, Endurance. Only a few months
ago some English judges would have told
Britannia that her conduct invited rape,
General Galtieri's action may have been inexcusable, but his surprise at the lady's
reaction is at least understandable.
Britannia, of course, had previously been
sedated by her own conventional wisdom.
This had three main ingredients. Opinionmoulders had persuaded themselves and the
public that force was obsolete as an
instrument of international relations.
Practical politicians rejected the principle
which Kissinger chose as the title of one of
his books: The Necessity for Choice. And
the admirals were preoccupied by the gravest
threat rather than the likely threat. All three
voices swelled the refrain of that popular
lullaby: the days of gunboat diplomacy are
over.
Now there is nothing discreditable about
accepting the conventional wisdom. It has
been the condition of many a brilliant
career. Any other course suggests arrogance,
insensibility, lack of judgment, and, very
frequently, sheer crankiness. I would
strongly recommend the conventional
wisdom to my son or my friend. Nations,
however, tend to suffer when the
conventional wisdom is too strongly
entrenched to be vulnerable to challenge,
criticism, and change. That is the fault of
their institutions - not of those individuals
who have chosen to be orthodox. I am
attacking a climate of opinion, not those it
conditioned.
Is force obsolete?
One of the conditioning processes was the
very widespread belief that force had lost its
potency in the conduct of international
relations. All kinds of people had this
notion, but I will quote the view - a
balanced, carefully phrased, generally
shared view - of the Professor of
International Relations at the London
School of Economics and Political Science.
He said:
In the last three decades of the twentieth century
very important restraints have developed on the
use of force as a form of international pressure.
GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY AND THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
It is certainly not the 'big stick' method of
compelling compliance which it used to be in the
days of gunboat diplomacy.
As I commented in a revised edition of
Gunboat Diplomacy last year, perhaps our
books are read in different capitals.
In a recent article, where I was tightly
constrained by limits on space, I described
the proponents of this view - not only
professors but also politicians and mediapersons - as 'culture-bound' and accused
them of being unduly influenced by
contemporary British reluctance to
contemplate the use of force. This is not the
whole truth. Admittedly we do encounter,
both in this country and in the United
States, what ought to be a contradiction in
terms: the monoglot student of
international relations. But the problem
goes deeper. Those who decry the use of
force have correctly perceived that this
instrument failed the United States in
Vietnam, as it did after the capture of the
USS Pueblo, as it did in the release of the
American hostages from the Tehran
Embassy. They have noted similar, indeed
repeated, British failures to impose their
will on less powerful countries. But they
have drawn the wrong conclusions.
They have not asked themselves what
expedients were successfully employed by
Vietnam, North Korea, Iran, Iceland,
Egypt, or the rest. It was not prayer, or
international law, or world opinion: it was
appropriate force. This is no more related
to power than it is to morality. In 1917 we
had the strongest battle fleet in the world
and we almost lost the war at sea because
the Admiralty, slaves as ever to the
conventional wisdom, were stubbornly
refusing to employ appropriate force
against the U-boats.
Force is not obsolete. Inappropriate force
remains as useless as it has always been. At
the height of our Victorian ascendancy,
during the Schleswig-Holstein crisis,
Bismarck was asked what he would do if the
British fleet appeared off the coast of
Pomerania: 'send for the police', he replied.
Navies cannot do everything. They never
175
could. The conditions have to be just right
before 'a fleet operating against the shore is
able . . . to solve the tasks connected with
territorial changes'. Those are Gorshkov's
words - a salutary reminder that naval
force is nobody's monopoly. There are over
a hundred navies in existence today and
more than half of them are capable of using
force in some circumstances.
Times have certainly altered since the
somewhat mythical era of automatic British
naval supremacy depicted by some
historians, but the effects of change are less
simplistic than is often supposed. There is
no obvious, elementary shift of advantage
from big to small, from North to South,
from goodie to baddie. Change has
favoured those who have adapted to it. In
the last dozen years a score of nations have
successfully employed limited naval force,
sometimes more than once. If Britain has
more often been the victim than the victor,
bad workmen should not blame their tools,
but read some books, even the newspapers.
In the last ten years conflicts involving the
armed forces of more than one nation have
averaged five a year. Nor is this a particularly outlandish phenomenon. In the thirtyodd years since the foundation of NATO
eleven of its sixteen members have used or
threatened significant force against
foreigners, occasionally including one
another.
The necessity for choice
Nevertheless the conventional wisdom
regarded limited force as an expedient
which could neither serve nor menace
Britain. This view undoubtedly encouraged
the reluctance of practical politicians to
make the choice which had long confronted
them: to cede the Falklands to Argentina or
to defend the islands. Admittedly both
options were thoroughly disagreeable: the
first would have been acutely unpopular
and the second extremely expensive.
Politics being the art of the possible, it was
always possible to hope that a claim
advanced for so many years would never be
pressed and to believe that those who
repeatedly threaten never actually perform.
176
GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY AND THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
Maintenance of the ostrich posture was
assisted by one of the deficiencies of British
bureaucratic organisation: inability to
discriminate between the important and the
urgent. Ministers expect instant answers to
the questions of the day and reward those
who provide them. The problems of the
future and the horrors of the hypothetical
are for the boys in the backroom - and the
backroom is where they remain.
That weakness is particularly damaging
in the Foreign Office, which receives an
unremitting flood of telegrams requiring an
immediate reply, which is for ever
preparing briefs for next week's meeting of
a dozen multinational committees, whose
Ministers and senior officials never stop
travelling. For that Department operations
are always active, and speculation about
what might happen in the conjectural
future excites an understandable impatience
in those preoccupied by the here and now.
The charge against the Foreign Office is not
blindness: those concerned knew what
might occur. Deafness there may have
been. Access to the Secretary of State is
never easy for officials with unfashionable
responsibilities, nor is it always facilitated
by those whose more topical tasks have
earned commanding positions in the
hierarchy. But accusations of turpitude are
absurd: ceding the islands, with proper
provision for the inhabitants, was a more
respectable option than retaining their
allegiance, yet denying them protection.
The fault of the Foreign Office, which was
largely a fault of their organisation, was the
failure firmly to confront Ministers with a
clear and unwelcome choice that had
existed for a dozen years. As Beatty said
after Jutland, 'there is something wrong
with our system'.
Efforts have been made to deny the
existence of a choice and to present the idea
of defending the islands as absurd. To do so
is to misunderstand the nature of gunboat
diplomacy, which is not an act of war, but
an alternative to war. It is true enough that,
in war, it would be difficult to defend the
Falkland Islands against an enemy enjoying
the immense advantages of proximity. Even
in peacetime an assured defence of such
distant islands against an ever-present
threat of war would be intolerably
expensive and a constant strain on Britain's
ability to meet any other kind of threat
nearer home.
But there is no reason to suppose that
Argentina intended or expected war when
the invasion was launched. What future
attitudes might be, now that fighting has
occurred and substantial casualties have
been suffered, is another matter. On 2 April
1982 they knew they could capture the
islands without serious fight, thus creating a
fait accompli which Britain could not resist
and to which she could only respond by
acquiescence, however reluctant, or war. In
Buenos Aires it must have seemed
inconceivable, not least in the light of the
recent British record, that Britain would go
to war for islands she had not considered
worth defending.
British politicians do not realise what
little account is taken of their words
abroad. We have no recent reputation for
backing them with deeds. To convince
foreigners that Britain means business
demands visible military preparation and
deployment. That could have taken two
forms: a garrison on the islands and a naval
presence in the South Atlantic. Neither
need have been strong enough to ensure
victory against all-out attack. The mere
prospect of fighting on a scale that would
make war inevitable would probably have
sufficed to deter Argentina. Less still might
have done the trick. In June 1981 the
Ministry of Defence declared, in 'The Way
Forward':
We intend to resume from 1982 onwards the
practice of sending a substantial naval task group
on long detachment for visits and exercises in the
South Atlantic (and elsewhere) . . . . We intend
to make particular use of the new carriers, with
Sea Harriers and helicopters . . .
Why was this not done - and done sooner?
Successive visits, by separate task forces,
could have demonstrated, not perhaps a
permanent presence, certainly not naval
GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY AND THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
supremacy, but resolution. Nobody can say
for certain that this deterrent would have
worked, but it was worth trying and the
Ministry of Defence clearly regaided it as
feasible in naval terms. Deterrence is
fallible and defence is expensive, but either
is in every way preferable to counterattacking a position that need, perhaps,
never have been lost.
The fallacy of the single threat
To those causes already considered must be
added certain weaknesses in British
strategic thought. This has been excessively
centred on the single threat and even the
single scenario. It is not true, as the
conventional wisdom would have it, that
preparation for the gravest threat
automatically provides reliable cover
against lesser contingencies. The task force
sent to the Falkland Islands (why we can't
call it a fleet I don't know) was centred on
four ships scheduled for disposal as
superfluous: Invincible, Hermes, Fearless
and Intrepid. It was fitted out by dockyard
workers with redundancy notices in their
pockets.
Grievous sacrifices, of course, must
sometimes be made to meet the gravest
threat, as when we abandoned the
Channel Islands in 1940, but it is as well to
be sure both that the threat is real and
imminent and that the sacrifice will serve to
meet it. Both propositions seem to me open
to question in recent conceptions of naval
strategy.
As I understand the orthodox case, The
Royal Navy now exists to defend the
seaborne reinforcement and resupply of the
Central Front against Soviet submarine
attack. Scenarios can certainly be contrived
to justify this assumption, but I find them
unlikely. They require the following
irrational decisions to be taken in Moscow:
attacking the Central Front, where the
Alliance is best prepared, militarily and
politically, to meet them; not making
reinforcement irrelevant by the use of
surprise or nuclear weapons; allowing
sufficient warning time (say eight weeks)
for Allied agreement to be reached and
177
reinforcements, supplies, and shipping to
be assembled; then relying on naval
operations (where they are at a relative
disadvantage) rather than on blitzkrieg,
nuclear ultimatums, or destruction of
ports, airfields, and land communications
to prevent the reinforcements arriving.
None of these decisions is individually
impossible - the Russians are quite as silly
as anyone else - but I find their
combination implausible. Especially as the
timing would have to be rather precise on both sides.
Lord Carver, speaking with the
knowledge of high military office and the
candour of retirement, told the House of
Lords in July 1981:
Unless the reinforcements and supplies reach
this side of the Atlantic before hostilities
start . . . then I have not much hope, whether
they come by air or sea, that they will be very
relevant to the situation.
Naturally the Third Battle of the Atlantic
is possible, though it could scarcely offer
decisive advantage to either side in total
war. Nor does it seem a likely opening move
in the more plausible contingency of limited
war. Perhaps the most that can be said for
it is that it would be more attractive to the
Soviet Union if there was no provision to
meet it. It deserves that much, but not at
the expense of every other task.
I do not say that because of the
Falklands. Personally I believe we would
have done better, long ago, to say to the
islanders: we are sorry, but we are not
prepared to guarantee your future defence.
If you do not want to come to terms with
Argentina, we will offer you full rights of
citizenship (which we had denied them) and
we will pay the full costs of your resettlement in the British Isles or anywhere else
you care to go. That would have been
unpopular, but decent and justifiable. It
would have cost fewer lives and less money.
As we did not, as we invited aggression, I
agree we had to respond. Otherwise we
would have lost such claim as we still
possess to rank among those wicked
animals which defend themselves when
attacked.
1
I
,
GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY AND THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
178
Argentina was not - and is not - our
only potential challenger. Even when we
have finally paid off the death duties of our
imperial past and returned to the insular
status we enjoyed under the first Elizabeth,
we shall still have to reckon with external
threats. The mistake is to suppose that these
threats are of only one kind and have a
single source.
Many different conclusions can be drawn
from the perceived risks of total nuclear
war and from the fact that nuclear weapons
have not been employed in combat since
1945. One of them is relevant, though not
undisputed. This is that the balance of
terror has created a protective canopy
positively encouraging to the prudent
exercise of limited force. On the
thermometer of violence there is, not a
point, but a broad, ill-defined band of
temperatures at which disastrous explosion
is possible. Prudent statesmen - and in the
major countries there are more of them
than there used to be - are thus concerned
to keep well below the red sector when
assessing the extent of force they might
employ, or tolerate.
This is by no means the only possible
prognosis. But it only requires a degree of
optimism to argue that future conflicts are
more likely among lesser countries than
between the superpowers; that escalation
will be threatened rather than implemented;
that success or failure - even where
superpowers are involved - will be
determined by the employment of limited
force, because a limited success, and even a
limited failure, will seem preferable to total
disaster. The conventional wisdom may
expect, and does prepare for, the worst of
which perceived adversaries are capable. In
practice a lesser challenge may be more
probable - and pose more complex
problems, soluble only to the extent that
they have been foreseen.
In any realistic survey of Britain's future
prospects the likelihood of disputes must be
accepted. The gradual liquidation of the
last relics of Empire may remove some
causes, but others will take their place.
Developments in the law of the sea, new
possibilities of exploiting the oceans,
popular resentment of marine pollution,
the control of international straits, the
scarcity of oil and fish: all these are
potential sources of disagreement, even of
conflict. And the traditional rivalries of the
nations are not about to disappear. There is
more than one potential adversary and
there are different ways in which force can
serve or menace Britain.
Neither nuclear deterrence nor alliance
offer a sufficient answer to this problem:
they can only cope with high-level threats
- and even the Russians are perfectly
capable of coming in under the political
radar and presenting a deliberately limited
challenge. Moreover the political climate,
whether at home or abroad, can change in
less time than it takes to reshape a navy
designed for what turns out to be the wrong
single task.
The Navy's task
The function of navies is to provide the
instrument of appropriate force at or from
the sea. What is appropriate force depends
on the nature of the dispute, the location of
the conflict, the identity and motivation of
the opponent, the constraints of time, the
international environment. Only a flexible
and versatile navy can hope to provide the
many different kinds of response that may
be needed.
Naturally it is the task of policy to
narrow the range of options by relieving the
Navy of responsibility for certain regions of
the world, for some contingencies, even for
types or levels of conflict. This balance
between potential commitments and actual
resources has never been satisfactorily
maintained in the past and, although the
scope for easy improvement is obvious, is
likely to be less than perfect in future. The
Navy will always have to do more than it
was asked or equipped to do. This is one of
the harsh laws of life.
But there should be no self-inflicted
wounds: no naval acceptance of the single
scenario; no reliance on the division of
peace from war by warning time; no
sacrifice of the flexibility that is the
GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY AND THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
Navy's distinctive and essential feature as
an instrument of force.
The political application of limited naval
force, as gunboat diplomacy is properly
called, is not the Navy's only task; nor is
resistance to its exercise by others. Naval
war, if it occurs, will not necessarily be as
limited as, relatively speaking, it has been
around the Falklands. But limited conflicts
are likely contingencies, even if the
Russians are involved, even in the
Norwegian Sea. Nuclear war is improbable,
but not as improbable as a general war that
escapes both political constraints and
nuclear escalation. The highest levels of
combat cannot be neglected in planning and
preparation, but they should not so
dominate the minds of men as to divert
attention from those conflicts which are
both more likely and more capable of being
successfully resolved by appropriate naval
force. Small wars can be won.
Naturally it would be better to prevent
them. The Falklands War was unnecessary.
Churchill said the same of the Second
World War. If anyone is able to repeat his
verdict about the Third World War, it will
probably be a New Zealander.
Nevertheless, for an unnecessary war
and, no less deplorably, an unexpected war,
it must be admitted that the response of the
Royal Navy was highly creditable. They
deployed and exercised appropriate force at
a great distance in a remarkably short space
of time. The organisation involved, the
successful improvisation, the endurance of
the ships and their crews - particularly the
indispensable aircraft carriers - were no
less admirable than the combat performance of sailors, soldiers, and airmen. The
losses so tragically sustained were the direct
and inescapable result of the Navy being
required to do what it had been expressly
told could no longer be demanded.
It was gs long ago as 1966 that Her
Majesty's Goyernment publicly declared it
unrealistic to count on British ability to
undertake 'the landing, or withdrawal, of
troops against sophisticated opposition
outside the range of land-based air cover'.
It is as much to the credit of the Royal Navy
179
that they attempted the officially impossible
as it is a cause for shame among the
nation's leaders that the Navy were ever
asked to do so. When Eagle and Ark Royal
went, without replacement, to the breaker's
yard, British sovereignty over the Falklands
- and other territories outside the range of
land-based air cover - should have
accompanied them. The necessity for
choice is not merely a political and strategic
requirement. It is a moral imperative.
Conclusions
Which of the various options earlier
available should have been adopted will be
long debated. That any choice would have
been better than none seems obvious and a
point worth remembering. Tomorrow's
choices, now being hammered out in the
clash of arms, will be even less agreeable.
Some of them will range wider than the
Falklands.
When the lessons are being digested and
the future pondered, two awkward
quotations ought to be recalled. The first
scarcely requires comment. It comes from a
Foreign Office memorandum of 1907, still
as true seventy-five years later as it has been
often and lamentably disregarded. It was
written in protest against Fisher's reshaping
of the Royal Navy to meet the single
scenario of the day: a fleet action in the
North Sea.
The opportune presence of a British ship of war
may avert a disaster which can only be remedied
later at much inconvenience and considerable
sacrifice.
The second comes from the debate in
the House of Commons on 19 May 1981.
Mr Nott, Secretary of State for Defence,
was assessing the Invincible class of carriers
in the light of the single scenario and had
two things to say:
Ideal ships for out-of-area activities . . . I do not
believe we would order them if we were making
the decision today.
When the smoke of battle has finally
dispersed, nothing will be in more urgent
need of renewal than the nation's ideas.
JAMES CABLE
In Reduced Circumstances
- Defence Review Revisited
OW THAT THE DUST has settled on
the 1981 Defence Review, and The
Naval Review readers have had a chance to
have their say, it is worth taking stock of
where we stand, the lessons to be learned,
and what is needed to get the defence of
these Islands back on to a sensible footing.
I believe that the evidence is now
overwhelming that the contention in my
article 'In Reduced Circumstances' (The
Naval Review, October 1981) that the
decisions were mainly political, was correct,
and the quality of the naval case, and its
presentation, had very little to do with
them. I base this assessment on statements
by the Secretary of State for Defence and
other government ministers, inside and
outside Parliament, on articles in the press
and informed journals, and from personal
observation and discussion.
Economic considerations
Before discussing this further, however, I
feel I should remind readers of the
economic climate in which the Review was
conducted. Regrettably the British
economy has been in almost constant
decline since 1945, especially compared
with other industrial countries. OECD
statistics show in stark reality how sharp this
decline has been in almost every area production, growth, share of trade,
shipping and services. The reasons for this
are arguable and not appropriate to this
article; suffice it to say that in a nation
whose main asset is its workforce, only a
fundamental change in the habits and
attitudes of the workforce is likely to effect
the significant improvement needed if the
situation is to be reversed. I do not despair
- in the long term - because we have been
through this so many times before in
history, and our very bloody-mindedness
has proved to be a great strength in real
crises, if sometimes rather late in the day.
Whether the present Government will
succeed in stimulating this change is also
arguable, but in the short term, resources
are likely, at best, to remain static, and may
well continue to decline. Relate this decline,
then, to the view of virtually all
governments since the war that the most
which the electorate is prepared to spend on
defence is somewhere about 5 per cent of
our wealth, that most of the electorate do
not see any direct imminent threat to
Britain, and finally relate reducing
resources to the vast increase in defence
equipment costs (in real terms) and you see
why defence reviews are a regular and
continuing feature of British defence
policy, irrespective of the government in
power.
The present Secretary of State, who was
very much concerned with the economic,
financial, and political aspects of defence
policy (what Mr Speed called in the House a
'cash register defence policy'), rather than
with the threat, which we in the military
would judge to be the prime factor, was,
like most of his predecessors, faced with a
programme which resources could not
sustain. Unlike his predecessors, however,
he had virtually no overseas commitments
which could be discarded in order to make
the necessary savings, and he was therefore
faced with slashing one or more of the four
pillars of defence policy which had stood
since the last review - the strategic nuclear
deterrent, the defence of the home base, the
contribution to the Alliance in the Eastern
Atlantic, and the contribution to the
Alliance on the European continent. The
maintenance and eventual replacement of
the strategic deterrent was a cornerstone of
government policy, providing the relatively
cheap fall-back 'tripwire'; there was little
room for cuts - only abandonment - and
the short-term savings would be small. The
defence of the home base was an emotive
political issue, again with little scope for
saving in the short term anyway. So the two
IN REDUCED CIRCUMSTANCES
remaining pillars would have to be put into
an order of priority. I believe that all the
evidence demonstrates that the Secretary of
State, in broad terms, wholly accepts the
arguments in favour of a powerful maritime
posture, in the Eastern Atlantic and
elsewhere. However, it is also evident that
he found the political arguments for giving a
greater priority to our continental
contribution to be even more convincing,
and so the Navy bore the greater part, but by
no means all the cuts.
Political factors
As I have said previously, and reiterated
above, the decisions were based on political,
not military factors, which were, I suggest:
(a) The Brussells Treaty obligation, on
which also rested a speculative view
that a reduction in British Forces in
Germany would be a signal for other
NATO allies to follow suit, and would
lead eventually to a break up of the
Alliance upon which our national
security ultimately rests. The evidence
to support this contention is slim.
Britain has not been backward in renegotiating treaties in Europe in the
light of her reduced circumstances, and
the FGR and USA, with their present
governments and present interests will
not allow the treaty to break even if
such an event did seem possible
following some British action. If the
Alliance does break up, it is much more
likely to be the result of US isolationism
stemming from an unwillingness of the
European partners - including Britain
- to pay a greater share of the cost of
their defence, and from an unwillingness to consult the principal
partner on matters affecting NATO
force levels. No, this argument will not
really stand scrutiny. It reflects that
wholly unjustified British arrogance
which so upsets our Allies, that same
arrogance that holds BAOR in much
greater esteem than either our allies or
our enemies do. And Mr Nott cannot
have it both ways; either the Alliance is
the cornerstone of defence policy, as
DEFENCE REVIEW REVISITED
181
HMG claim, in which case the senior
partners - USA and FGR - are
consulted before cuts are made in a
capability, or cuts are made arbitrarily
and entirely nationally, in which case
the Alliance - and the Brussells Treaty
- must be secondary. The implications
of the latter are far more dangerous to
the stability of the Alliance than any
cuts in our relatively small continental
contribution.
(b) A need to demonstrate in every
possible way HMG commitment to the
EEC and Europe generally.
(c) The political problems which a
reduction of at least 25,000 soldiers and
perhaps some airmen, with their
dependants, would create. This is
especially so in a time of critical
unemployment problems, because the
Army is manpower intensive and
manpower costly, and reductions
would have to be made very quickly to
achieve the savings needed.
It has been suggested that the 'short war'
scenario played a part in the decisions but I
can find no evidence of this. Such a scenario
needs no more to be said here in order to
reject it - the record for forecasting the
events and length of war is abysmal, and a
short war must, for the West, be a lost war!
From what the Secretary of State and
ministers have said, I doubt whether this
was a serious factor, politically convenient
as it might be.
The Generals who rejoice in the belief,
therefore, that they have won some sort of
inter-service battle by their military
arguments delude themselves - the
decisions were political. Regrettably, unless
there is a sharp upturn in the country's
economic fortunes, and whatever further
decisions may be made regarding the
strategic deterrent, sooner or later a British
Government, probably in this decade, and
probably immediately following a General
Election, will have to recognise that we can
no longer afford to maintain even the
present modest force on the continent, with
its huge tail of dependants and civilian
support, paid for in hard currency, and
182
IN REDUCED CIRCUMSTANCES - DEFENCE REVIEW REVISITED
costing a figure approaching a thousand
million pounds annually. It takes a disproportionate and increasing share of
resources in order to provide a static and
small share of responsibility on the ground.
The colour of the government which will
have to make this decision will only
influence the scale and the speed with which
it is implemented. I take no pleasure at all in
this, but write it only to emphasise that the
Defence Review decisions were, I believe,
wholly political, as they have been in the
past and will be in any future reviews.
The naval case
Where, then, do we go from here? If we
believe, as I do, that HMG have made a
serious error of judgement in the Review,
how should we go about ensuring that it is
not repeated, and that defence policy is put
back on to a more sensible course?
If my contention that the decisions were
wholly political/economic/financial is
accepted, then the arguments in support of
the naval case must take these factors into
account, as well as the vital threat factor,
and not treat them as secondary matters
which are hardly the business of the
military. See how political, for example,
Jackie Fisher was - and how he succeeded.
To use these factors, we must put our own
house in order in the matter of equipment
costs, and educate our officers, especially
those serving in MOD - back to the Staff
Course again! And we need to argue the
naval case vigorously, and with one voice back to the 'Gorshkov RN' book again.
Incidentally, I am grateful to Stephen
Roskill for reminding me of his excellent
book The Strategy of Sea Power, I have
read it and a copy sits on my bookshelf. It
forms a first-class basis for the sort of
volume I have in mind, and there are other
books which could be drawn upon, such as
Rear Admiral Richard Hill's The Royal
Navy Today and Tomorrow. All this needs
to be pulled together on the lines I
mentioned earlier and related to Britain's
changed position in the world; if this
changed position makes no difference to
our need for a strong maritime posture, it
needs to be argued logically and forcibly.
See how persuasive Gorshkov must be to
the Soviets in Sea Power and the State
because he relates maritime matters to the
USSR's changed position in the world and he is arguing for something they do not
need. We need not be too proud to emulate
his methods if we believe our case is right.
Finally, we must not only press our case
with vigour, taking account of the threat,
of finance, of politics, and of economics.
We must also use these factors to point out
the patent nonsenses which are uttered and
written in support of a continental strategy,
which has so often led us into disaster, or
near disaster in the past. This is what we
have failed to do with sufficient force in the
recent past; whereas the continentalists
have not been averse to using any argument
to damage our real interests as a maritime
nation.
One of the penalties of living in a
democracy is that after forty years of peace,
or near peace, we have reached a point
where we no longer get the right decisions
on defence policy, because they are so often
politically unattractive. This government
has made the wrong decisions for the wrong
reasons. Surely we can persuade them and
the public at large to do better than this.
RATAPLAN
The Uncertain Trumpet
'If the trumpet give an uncertain sound who
shall prepare himself to the battle?'
N THE LIGHT of the 1981 Defence
I White Paper (Cmnd. 8288), the question
asked by Saint Paul is very apposite. This
crisis (for such it is) has even impelled the
writer to break into print in this august
publication for the first time in over thirty
years. My qualifications for contributing,
for what they are worth, are as follows. I
was for some thirty years a Seaman Branch
Officer, TAS sub-specialist, with time spent
with Submarines, the Fleet Air Arm and
Coastal Forces and with two turns in Joint
Warfare, and two in Whitehall, one with
the old Admiralty and one on the Central
Staff. Since leaving the Navy I have spent
some fifteen years with a defence-based
industry: in that capacity I have been
privileged to maintain contact with many in
the Service and in Whitehall. What I have
to offer here, however, owes nothing to
information that could not have been
gathered from the public press and defence
magazines, which indeed form an
interesting sub-culture in themselves; the
best of them are studied in MOD'S worldwide, including our own.
The Defence White Paper (Cmnd. 8288)
I am going to be deliberately provocative.
Mr Nott has, in large part, done brutally
and in an unbalanced way what the Navy
and the Ministry of Defence ought to have
done long since. Indeed, did not Lord
Mountbatten preside over a Way Ahead
Committee one of whose recommendations
was to close Chatham Dockyard, some
twenty years ago? Let us reflect how much
easier that part of the task might have been,
had these decisions been taken at that time,
and not subsequently reversed by sectional
interests.
To return to Cmnd. 8288. Mr Nott arrived
after his predecessor had proved unwilling
to make the cuts in his part of the 'public
sector' that were demanded, rightly or
wrongly, by the Government as part of its
economic strategy. In the words of a
respected defence analyst,
In 1979, the Labour Government bequeathed to
its successor a massive shipbuilding programme,
together with a programme of mid-life refits
costing as much as the original ships themselves.
In addition, the four RN Dockyards were
absorbing a disproportionate share of Naval
money, A/S warfare was taking the largest slice
of the R and D budget, and more cash had been
spent on air protection for the Fleet, than for the
air defence of the Home Base. '
These propositions are, I believe, true.
Much as I agree with many of the criticisms
voiced by Admiral Jungius (The Naval
Review, January 1982) that the White
Paper is as full of contradictions as is a
Gruyere cheese of holes, I must ask
cynically - so what is new in that? Our
older readers will recall, no doubt with a
frisson of horror, the infamous Sandys
White Paper of 1957 (from whose ill
effects, mostly due to the attempt to obtain
defence 'on the cheap' by opting for the
nuclear arm, we are still suffering) which
was equally full of inconsistencies. Despite
indignant letters to The Times and the
fulminations of the retired, governments do
not usually allow themselves to be shifted
off their chosen courses unless these present
obvious parliamentary or electoral dangers.
Defence, alas, is to most of the public an
arcane, where it is not a rather sinister,
subject: the response of CCA's MP (letter
to The Naval Review, January 1982) is all
too typical of the genre.
Let us therefore, cease to delude
ourselves that by mere general public
pressure or posturing we can produce any
marked change in this Government's
approach to defence. The one real
vulnerability for the Government lies in the
proposed Trident programme. It seems
from the newspapers, that a number of
'Derek Wood in International Defence
No. 12/1981.
Review
184
THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET
backbenchers on the Government side are
having 'serious doubts' about Trident. Join
the club, say I! What I hear about the
costing and the provenance of this system
fills me with misgiving. Again, from the
press, it seems that we are being driven
down the road at the end of which lies the
Mark 2 ('DS') weapon, which requires, so
we are told, even more expensive vehicles.
Since this Trident system, whichever variant
is chosen, now seems to be being financed
out of the Naval Vote, this must mean even
more constraints on the 'conventional war'
budgets, and hence even worse cuts for the
maritime defences and the Navy. Here
surely, is where the pressure ought to be
applied, and the real debate initiated. I
must confess that I (for the moment at
least) accept that there is a need for a UK
deterrent. Must it however be this
enormously expensive system and must it be
funded from the Navy's money? These are
questions that this writer believes ought to
be discussed, as far as restrictions permit, in
open forum and in Parliament. The effect
of Trident 2 (DS), in a shrinking defence
context, could mean the total emasculation
of the rest of the Navy's part in our
maritime defences, for all the Minister's
assertion that it will only amount to three
per cent of our Defence Budget.
How have we got where we are?
Part of the key to this lies in our
collective failure over the years to recognise
our shrinking economic base and to
assimilate the decline in our world position.
The reversal of the Way Ahead recommendations on Chatham is a good example.
The failure of the CVA 01 project and our
enforced withdrawal from the Middle East
after it, although accompanied at the time
by much dubious manoeuvring and phoney
statistics (cf. Cmnd. 8288 again), were parts
of the same trend - the retreat from
Empire and the overseas role which was
occasioned by our economic failure, long
concealed, but at last out in the open. In
circumstances of this kind, we cannot avoid
committing the old Staff College crime of
'situating the appreciation'. The questions
then become, or should become, 'How do
we get the best value for our restricted
money?' and, 'Where do our real (as
opposed to our ostensible) interests lie?' Too
often I suspect it is the ostensible interests
that win, because the real interests might
conflict with hitherto accepted military
roles, or could impinge on some powerful
sectional interests.
It was to sort out these priorities that the
new MOD was set up in 1964, and again on
the procurement side that after the Rayner
report, the Procurement Executive was set
up under the Heath Government. Unfortunately the ills have not been cured and
in many ways the resulting bureaucracies
seem to have created more difficulties than
they have solved. Let us now turn to some
of these problems and suggest, if we can,
remedial ideas to be explored.
The training of the Naval Officer
When Winston Churchill was trying to get
obtuse Admirals before the Great War to
see that a Naval Staff and/or War College
was needed, he remarked in a famous aside
that the Navy 'had procurred many fine
Captains of ships, but few Captains of
War'. I had hoped that the attitude of
young Commanders in the MOD had
changed from that which largely prevailed
in our day; many of us, quite wrongly as I
see now, regarded service in the Whitehall
arena as a penance to be endured, rather
than, as it should be, as an avenue for
promotion and a job which done well could
have a real influence on the country's
defences. I am not so sure that it has
changed all that much. The other Services
undoubtedly have a different attitude. I
think that Rataplan's article 'In Reduced
Circumstances. . .' (The Naval Review,
October 1981) hits the nail on the head
under his heading 'Staff Training'.
Selection for the Staff Course and Service
in MOD ought to be part of the promotion
stakes. However, we must remember that
there are always a small number of
exceptional people who deserve promotion
on other grounds, and who are too good to
lose.
THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET
The Navy, the scientists, and public opinion
I am full of admiration for the work of the
Royal Air Force, and have been for years
alarmed at the fall in numbers of our
aircraft for the defence of these islands.
Likewise, the part of the Air Force that deals
with maritime defence (what I used to know
as Coastal Command) is highly professional
and an absolutely essential component of
our national defences. (I eschew here the
arguments about Operational Control of
Maritime Operations and the control of the
aircraft that sustain them, which is not to
say that I do not have views.) Nonetheless,
there seems to have grown up an alarming
kind of caucus, apparently based on the
DOAE, which is propagating the idea that
the surface Navy is somehow 'out of date',
that it will have little part to play in the sort
of 'real' war in which we could be involved,
and that its main task, that of assisting in the
surveillance in peace and destruction in war
of our potential enemies' submarine forces
can really be done more effectively and at
less cost by maritime aircraft. Hence by
extension, A/S ships do not need a sonar
except for one suited to surveillance, and
really need no point defence either on the
grounds that if they come under those sorts
of threats 'the deterrent has failed'; there is
thus no point in having warships fitted with
an effective self-defence suite. We could end
up having a force of super-tugs. Mercifully,
Saclant does not believe this sort of
nonsense, and after all, we are still part of
NATO on the sea as well as on the Rhine, so
this dkbkle may be further off than the
pessimists fear.
How on earth, may it be asked, can these
views gain such credence? If the submarine
threat is real in any sense (and surely it must
be, or else why have the Soviets gone to such
enormous lengths to build and sustain its
submarine fleets?) common sense should
make it plain even to politicians that in the
A/S War, defence in depth is all-important?
This means that the distant tasks of
surveillance detection and attack require
SOSUS, the LRMPA, the carrier group,
and its escorts, and that at the end of the line
are the ship-borne helicopter and the frigate
185
itself, equipped not only to detect but also to
kill.
The answer seems to be that the part
played by the surface Fleet in maritime
defence is today rather badly served in the
matter of operational analysis. One
remembers the brilliant paper on 'Convoy
Defente' by P. M. S. Blackett, in the late
war so well summarised by Admiral
McGeoch in a recent article. Blackett could
analyse objectively, because he was able to
collect facts, about operations and about
casualties arising directly from war. This is
not so today, and I confess to being deeply
suspicious about the activities of the
Defence
Operational
Analysis
Establishment at West Byfleet, which as
Admiral McGeoch notes is reported in The
Statement on Defence Estimates as having
carried out a study 'of the relative
effectiveness of varying combinations . . . in
anti-submarine warfare in the Eastern
A t l a n t i ~ ' . On
~ what information was this
study based? What allowances, lacking the
actual war experience that Blackett could
draw upon, were made for such factors as
human fatigue, failures in equipment,
weather, etc.?
We need a latter-day Blackett to put the
awkward questions. One suspects that the
worthy people at DOAE succeeded in
making recommendations that were
superficially attractive because they seemed
cheaper, and that there was no effective
naval corrective applied. I wonder if this
could be at least partly an effect of the gaps
in the Naval Officers' training referred to in
passing above. The writer believes that the
Navy should make a real effort to reverse
this trend. We ought to make the best
possible contribution to DOAE. The
imagination of our best analysts,
professors, and authoritative commentators
should be stimulated towards examining the
problems of maritime defence, and the
Navy's part in it, and promoting more
public debate about these important
subjects. There is far too much obfuscating
'I refer to Admiral McGeoch's editorial 'Operational
Analysis' in the magazine Naval Forces No. V1/1981.
186
THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET
so-called 'security', designed to conceal
matters of interest from our own people
rather than from the enemy. I feel certain
that informed debate on these lines would
help to arouse an informed public opinion.
We do not want the ill-informed popular
clamour of the 'we want eight and we won't
wait' variety, but we do need a proper
public evaluation of the pros and cons.
I am therefore much in favour of a
revived and rejuvenated Navy League,
which is now being canvassed; I hope that
serving and retired officers will give it their
support from as wide a spectrum of
informed opinion as possible, and that the
council or the organisers will not be afraid
to invite opposition views to be presented
and argued about, in whatever publication
eventually emerges. We must at all costs
avoid giving the impression that the new
League is a platform only for the retired
(and often out-of-date) officer: eminent
and -intelligent defence analysts, newspaper
correspondents, and all who are truly
interested in the maritime defence of these
islands should feel that they can be heard. I
even wonder if Navy League is an
appropriate name: perhaps Maritime
Defence League might be better?
The procurement cycle
The great Procurement Executive was set
up to rationalise procurement and, it was
no doubt hoped, to speed up the process
and prevent duplication. What a hope! We
are now saddled with something more
Byzantine, more arcane, it sometimes
seems, than the old Chinese Imperial Civil
Service so lovingly mocked by Ernest
Bramah in his Kai Lung series. The
procurement cycle, so far from shrinking,
seems to be lengthening. We are behaving
as if we had all the time in the world to
prepare, when we all know that we have
not. The procedures now in force could
indeed be designed specially to exacerbate
delays. Specifications are too complex and
enforce in many cases a higher degree of
design than is warranted by the sort of
threat under which we live. When ships are
most unlikely to survive a direct missile hit
as combatant units, what is the point of
specification designed for a prolonged war,
depth charging, shell damage, and so forth?
Often it seems to this writer that the true
vulnerability lies as much in the complexity
and proliferation of its delicate command
and control systems, and their centralised
computers and their reliability (or lack of it),
as in the danger to the ship from enemy shot
and shell. To take another example: the
Navy does not seem to be able to step out of
the horse and buggy age in the matter of
handbooks for operators and maintainers.
Do we really need, for example, up to eighty
volumes of handbooks for an equipment?
Ought we not long ago to have embarked on
a rationalisation in this field? Are there no
examples from industry which we could at
least think about?
Until these problems are attacked with
vigour not only will ships take too long to
produce, and be needlessly costly, but also,
to quote Moneybag's acid words (The
Naval Review, January 1982), they will
continue to emerge 'over-wired and
unrefittable'. I believe that Moneybags says
much truth when he castigates the great
'Baronies' of the MOD. It is sometimes
quite amazing what properties of delay an
organisation like DGS or CED can build
into a project, and how insulated they seem
to trends in the outside world. Has anyone
asked DGS for example why he cannot
consider a modular containerised weapons
system for the Type 23 frigate? Perhaps this
idea too is a victim of cost-cutting, but
somehow I doubt it.
Concepts, costs, and financial control
The October editorial said harshly '. . .
the Naval Staff must bear a heavy responsibility for pricing the. surface fleet out
of business.' I have a lot of sympathy for
the unfortunate Staff, but nevertheless they
are there to sort out the priorities, and to
allocate the money to the 'right' projects
and in the 'right' proportions. Can they do
this, and are they now, and will they be in
the future, well enough equipped to make
these decisions in the face of the intense
lobbying they may be subject to, both from
THE UNCERT'AIN TRUMPET
the great 'Baronies' of Moneybags, and
from industry itself? I have my doubts,
more particularly when the PWO with his
relatively limited training comes fully into
his own. I believe that much more attention
must in future be paid to reliability and to
'designing to a price' - both good
commercial concepts that are becoming far
more relevant in today's scenarios. To
achieve this the Staff must regain and
maintain their control over the technicians,
and not be beguiled by tempting so-called
advances which do not have convincing
arguments to back them up! In short, more
of the true requirements and less of the
technical shopping lists.
The Naval Staff ought to have a better
follow-up systems on how the money it
allocates is being spent. All too often it
seems to me, the Staff allocates the money
and then loses control over its spending,
until it is faced with some horrendous cost/
time overrun, under the eagle eyes of the
Parliamentary Accounts Committee. This is
not good enough, and the financial control
aspects and the relations between the Staff
and the PE need re-examination.
The MOD - Navy -industry interface
One of the causes of the present ills in the
system, is the rather inadequate
Navy - industry interface that exists. There
is consultation of a sort at project level:
there is now more general acceptance in, for
example, the DGW 'Barony' that industry
may talk under safeguards to the Staff.
There is also general agreement that
industry must, faute de mieux, accept more
responsibility for conceptual thought, for
design, and for project management. The
other services seem to have accepted all this
more easily than has the Naval section of
the PE. Least touched of all by these
principles is that part of the PE dealing with
underwater weapons, where there is still
much resistance, stemming I suspect from
over-obsession with security, residual fears
of a new 'Bloodhound' case, and fears for
loss of jobs and status.
We must take steps to obtain a better
Navy-industry interface. I know that
187
there are difficulties: security (again),
commercial confidentiality, and the feeling
that good small firms ought not to be shut
out by the 'big boys'. Industry has much to
offer, and I wish to plead for a more
effective tripartite forum or forums,
comprising Staff, PE, and industry for
discussions from the earliest possible
appropriate stages of the NST/NSR cycle.
Once again, the other Services appear to
have advanced further in this respect than
has the Navy, which so far has paid lip
service only to these ideas.
Contracts, tenders, and competition
The writer is no expert in these complex
fields, but fifteen years in industry has
allowed me to see something of the effects
of the present rules. There is much loose
talk about the evils of 'cost-plus' and the
virtues of 'fixed price'. I think cases must
be taken on their merits. One thing is
certain - 'fixed price' can only work when
there has been really efficient project
definition and effective 'designing freezing'
has been agreed and accepted. Here again
this is a field in which the active
participation in discussions by industry
seems essential if a good balance is to be
obtained. The abiding need must be to cut
down the overhead costs of the monitoring
services of the PE, and to make the future
system of procurement self-regulating, in
the interests of both parties.
As for competition, it is usually agreed
that this is a 'good thing' per se. In
principle, in a free society, this must be
true. However, in the procurement field,
competition when invoked too slavishly,
can lead to mare, and not less, cost to the
taxpayer, as may result well in the break-up
of established teams. This is a very complex
subject and not appropriate for a general
article, but I believe that it is a question
deserving further study.
Finally, in a time of recession, the
defence industry knows that it has to take
its share of the knocks. The Government
and MOD must however, take great care
not to smash up capacity that has taken
years to establish, and which we may need
188
THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET
believed that, we should long since have
r e a c h e d a n a c c o m m o d a t i o n with
Argentina, and all Governments since 1%6
are equally to blame. An uninvited landing,
with an 8,000 miles L of C, opposed by
some 8,000 dug-in troops, and with barely
adequate air cover, is, I submit, a very
Conclusions
The theme of Cmnd. 8288, and the policy of dangerous nonsense. Let us hope by the
the Government which underpins it, has time this appears in print that we do not
precipitated a very serious crisis for our have to cash this cheque in full.
2. Deterrence. The Navy is a deterrent
maritime defences, particularly for our
Surface Fleet, - a crisis which has been force above all in so-called peace. I am
building up for a very long time. The personally convinced that a minimum
country is in a grave economic mess out of effective Naval force, present at Port
which no clear path has yet emerged, and as Stanley or in the close vicinity, would have
far as the Navy is concerned the prospective deterred the Argentine Government from
purchase of the D5 Trident system is invasion. I simply do not believe that there
extremely alarming, if it is to be financed was no warning.
from Navy Votes. The Navy has failed
3. Nuclear Deterrence. Clearly, although
dismally to make its case effectively at the the Falklands crisis may prove to be
bar of public opinion and in Parliament. aberrant, in the broader context of 'out of
Unless some drastic steps are taken to theatre operations', there must be a severe
improve the methods and procedures for review of the UK's defence policy. We need
evaluating requirements, and for designing to think very seriously indeed about the
and purchasing ships and weapons, we shall related questions of the size and shape of
be faced in the very near future with the Fleet, our own Air Defence, BAOR,
further, perhaps catastrophic, decline. Let and the decision on Trident. Is it, when the
us hope with all our hearts that these events chips are down, really necessary to opt for
will shake us out of our national D5 for any reason other than commonality
complacency. We have not too much time. with the USA? If we must have an
HARPSICHORDindependent deterrent (nuclear) not under
US control, could I suggest the following
solution. Let Polaris plus Chevaline run on,
Postscript
This article was written before the current and initiate Anglo-French talks forthwith
South Atlantic crisis blew up. I believe that to see if our future deterrent could'not be
its main thrust has been substantiated based on Anglo-French capability? Is this
rather than invalidated by these events. idea so far-fetched or unacceptable? Is it
However there are a number of points that not at least worth discussion?
4. Public Debate. One good effect of the
have, I submit, been thrown into sharp relief
crisis has been to bring the whole question
by the crisis.
1. Cutting our coat. . . . I mentioned the of defence, and the place of the Royal Navy
1957 Defence Review, and its continuing within it, right into the public forum. Let us
pernicious effects. The 1966 one was as try to keep it there. It is much to be hoped
bad. If I recall it rightly after so long, it that the proposed Maritime Defence
contained words to the effect that '. . . we League will get off the ground, and will
shall not in the future attempt opposed attract to itself a core of well-informed
landings, and will only accept seaborne persons, from every field, who have the
landings by invitation . . .'. If we had really maritime interests of the country at heart.
at short notice in the very near future. After
all, in any future emergency there will be no
time to call up the industrial reserves: we
shall have to fight with what we have on the
ground.
The View from Westminster Bridge
HEN MEMBERS RETURNED to
Westminster after the summer recess
one may wonder how many of them were
prescient enough to see what series of
events would most closely engage their
attention. We had had the decision about
Trident I and the traumas of the June
Defence Review. Most would probably
have said that living with the consequences
of those would be sufficient for the present.
The Commons devoted 5 November to
foreign affairs in the customary series of
debates that follow on from the Queen's
Speech at the beginning of a new
Parliamentary session. Mr Shersby spoke
about the problems of the South Atlantic
and the lack of reference in the Speech to
the Falklands. How were our interests being
protected? Not by withdrawing HMS
Endurance. In his reply Mr Hurd, Minister
of State, spent no more than a few words
on Mr Shersby's speech.
On 10 November the Lords considered
foreign affairs and defence in their debate
on the Address. Lord Peart dealt with
speculations that the Government were
thinking of buying Trident I1 and the
additional cost that would entail. He
repeated what others had said, that
corresponding cuts would have to be made,
and deplored the fact that they were falling
on the Navy. In reply Lord Trenchard gave
what has now become the standard defence
of the decision. In retrospect the debate was
also interesting for Lord Murton's speech.
He developed much the same theme as
Mr Shersby had in the Commons and ended
with the same plea, that Endurance be
reprieved. He warned that failure to do so
could turn out to be a costly error.
Cost escalation
On 9 December Earl Cathcart opened a
short, general debate on defence in the
Lords. He was of the opinion that although
the June proposals were a shock they were
economically realistic and not disruptive of
our defence posture. In his first
contribution Viscount Trenchard dealt with
the reason why defence costs rose more
quickly than prices in the economy
generally; the Government were trying to
'bend the cost-escalation line' in order to
achieve a balance between sophistication
and numbers. Lord Kennet warned of the
danger of a Maginot line mentality: an
excessive concentration on the central front
to the exclusion of possible dangers
elsewhere, and particularly NATO's flanks
and the Atlantic bridge. Lord Mottistone
pointed to our dependence on the sea and
then went on to speak of the position of the
dependent territories. This led him to
consider the role of the Soviet fleet. What
was it for? He concluded that it was for
bullying gestures short of war. The best way
to counteract these was by a switch from a
concentration on land to one on maritime
force.
The Earl of Glasgow dealt with the
Surface Fleet; how trade routes were to be
defended was an evenly balanced question,
but for shows of force surface ships are
needed. But he was not happy about the
June proposals for the Surface Fleet.
Smaller, cheaper platforms and more of
them are required, and thus he favoured the
Type 23 concept and possibly even
something like the Hunt-class vessels of the
last war. The Type 23 is needed to bridge
the gap between minesweepers and
destroyers and frigates.
Lord Murton spoke of the
NATO - Warsaw Pact naval balance and
the implicit threat to the West. The next
decade will be critical. There will be a
worldwide replacement demand for 450
ships over the next few years. British
shipbuilders, by taking a leaf from the
Russians' book, could get a part of this
business. We need a basic hull design,
which would be subjected to 'project
definition' later, both to improve the RN's
capabilities and to try to win export orders.
In winding up for the Government Lord
Trenchchard defended the 1981 Review as it
I
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T H E VIEW FROM WE STMINSTER BRIDGE
190
affected the Navy, while noting what several debate on defence in the Commons on
peers had said about the projected Type 23 15 February. The wording of his long
design. H e was adamant about out inability motion gave a somewhat perfunctory nod
to support five dockyards and doubtful towards Trident but then went on to
whether we could provide more out-of-area catalogue all the ills that were besetting the
RN and the RAF. Sir Frederick began by
forces.
raising the dockyards study carried out by
the former Minister, Mr Speed. In August
H M S Endurance is withdrawn
1980 the then Secretary of State confirmed
On 16 December the Lords held a two-hour
debate on development opportunities in the that the four naval dockyards were needed
south-west Atlantic, opened by Lord and that there was sufficient work for them.
Morris. Inevitably the decision about HMS Yet only a few months later the June Review
Endurance reverberated throughout the announced severe cutbacks, including the
debate: in the face of increasing activity by closure of Chatham. As a result the refitting
other nations we had decided to take the of nuclear submarines will be transferred to
ship away. Lord Shackleton pointed out Devonport, which has yet to complete even
that it was the one naval vessel capable of one such operation. Added to the weakness
entering ice; it also had an economical which this decision will bring, we have the
performance. Lord Buxton of Alsa reduction in the uniformed manpower of
wondered what other ministers had thought the Service, the reduction of the Surface
about the Endurance decision. Other Fleet and the intended sale of Invincible.
matters were at stake apart from the MOD'S The Member urged the Secretary of State to
finances: the Falklands and the think again.
Mr Crawshaw took a similar line and
Dependencies are the key to our future
economic interests in Antarctica and not an repeated the arguments already heard many
irksome problem to be got rid of. times that the Surface Fleet was being
Endurance is important, but the Navy is the penalized in order to pay for Trident. Mr
critical factor. Lord Hill-Norton was Amery began by quoting a remark by Lloyd
scornful of the Endurance decision: the George - that a back-bencher should make
saving its scrapping would make in relation only one point in a speech; his concerned
to the defence budget was equivalent to l p HMS Endurance. T o illustrate its role he
in £40. Offsetting this tiny saving was the referred to Operation Tabarin in 1942, when
cost of local deterrence and without a group of Marines was landed in Antarctica
Endurance the Royal Marines detachment in order to prevent the Germans from doing
would lose its effectiveness. Lord Geddes so, and he ended by reminding the House of
was convinced that the proposed withdrawal a French saying: 'The absent are always
of Endurance and the refusal to give British wrong. '
Sir Patrick Wall ranged widely over the
nationality t o the Falklanders were
indications of something going by default.
defence field: the short-war and the longLord Skelmersdale replied for the war scenario, deficiencies in the Rhine
Government. He was at pains to point out Army, problems with the northern flank
that we were not losing interest in the and the need to save Fearless and Intrepid,
Falklands. Endurance would be missed, but the folly of selling Invincible, the declining
she was withdrawn as part of the broader ordering rate for SSNs, the design of the
defence review. A military presence would Type 23 - it should be a conventional
be maintained, but we could not adequately frigate armed with Sea Wolf and Sea Dart police a 200-mile zone in the area. In his and finally anti-satellite warfare - and all in
conclusion Lord Morris thought that he eighteen minutes.
detected yet another sign of the
Government's neglect of the Falklands.
The future of dockyards
Sir Frederick Burden opened a short Mr Silkin was speaking as the new Shadow
THE VIEW FROM WESTMINSTER BRIDGE
Defence Minister. He began by attacking
the 1981 decisions as they affected the
dockyards. He thought that the ripple
effect on unemployment might be as high as
50,000. All of these cuts stemmed from the
extravagance of the Trident decision. The
result would be the country's inability to
defend itself in a conventional war. The
next speaker was Mr Blaker, the Minister of
State. He sought to separate the Defence
Review from Trident: spending on the latter
is low now, while the problems that gave
cause for the former already exist. He
raised the question of inflexibility in the
management of the defence budget from
one year to the next; because of the
recession equipment was being delivered
earlier than would otherwise be the case an argument that clearly annoyed Mr Alan
Clark. The Minister rejected the idea that a
smaller Surface Fleet would lower the
nuclear threshold; without the Defence
Review we would have been in a much
worse state and more susceptible to a
lowering of the threshold. He then went on
to present a more positive list of new orders
and achievements, although he did not
convince the opening speaker in the debate
when he came to the dockyards. He made a
passing reference to the South Atlantic:
Endurance will go, the Marines will stay,
and our policy towards the Falklands is
unchanged. He then referred to alternatives
to Trident and in particular urged that the
cruise missile option should be considered.
In essence a deterrent based upon cruise
missiles would be more vulnerable to
detection and more expensive than Trident.
The idea that cruise missiles might be
mounted vertically in SSNs is not a choice
open to us although it is to the Americans.
Mr Douglas, with a constituency interest,
spoke of the dockyards: the continuation of
present policies will result in there being
only two left, Devonport and Rosyth. He
went on to criticise the Ministry's project
management and the way the House was
given information in this area.
Mr Churchill spoke with his usual vigour
and attacked most of the 1981 Review
decisions: the Government's defence policy
191
was gravely adrift and the commitment
made before the general election had been
forgotten. He was followed by Mr Speed
who took up much the same theme: what
has happened to the Type 2400 submarine,
to the SSN ordering rate, to the
modernisation programme, to orders for
new surface ships? We are storing up
trouble for ourselves in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. He deplored the decisions
about Endurance and Speedy. At a time of
great threat to NATO our security is being
put at stake for a cash register defence
policy.
The Trident decision
Speculation had been growing at the
beginning of the year that a decision would
be announced that we were buying Trident
11, the D5 instead of the C4 model. This
duly came in a statement on 11 March; as
before, the Government simultaneously
published the exchange of letters between
HMG and the American government1 and,
supporting this, an unusually informative
explanatory d o c ~ m e n t .Mr
~ Nott said that
it had now been decided that the four
submarines to be built at Barrow would be
larger than was earlier planned, and would
have an advanced propulsion system and
the latest sonars. The number of warheads
to be carried remained for the Government
to determine but it is not likely to differ
significantly from that planned for the C4
missile. For the Government to stay with
the C4 would mean that the UK and the
USA would be out of step, with all the
financial burdens that would impose. We
were getting Trident I1 on more
advantageous terms than we were offered
with Trident I and there would be scope for
British firms to compete with American
ones for sub-contracts. The additional cost
is estimated as flOOm., this will include the
new British reactor system. A seven-year
refit programme is planned and the D5
'The British Strategic Nuclear Force, March 1982.
Cmnd. 8517.
'The United Kingdom Trident Programme. MOD.
Defence Open Government Document 82/1, March
1982.
192
!~
/
i
i
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THE VIEW FROM WEISTMINSTER BRIDGE
missile should have an in-tube life of the
same length of time. Thus it should be
possible to keep three boats in the operating
cycle for a high proportion of the time. At
September 1981 prices the cost overall is put
at f7,500m.; over the total procurement
period this is estimated to be three per cent
of the whole defence budget. No other use
of our resources would contribute so much
to the deterrent strength of NATO.
In response Mr Silkin promised that
Labour would cancel Trident because it
represented an escalation of the arms race,
because it breaks the spirit if not the letter
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
because of its effect on our conventional
forces. In reply to Mr Steel the Secretary of
State said that our NATO allies welcomed
our decision to buy Trident. Sir Hugh
Fraser, a former Air Minister, expressed
scepticism on behalf of a number of Tories:
he questioned the cost involved and also the
fact that we would be buying superpower
weaponry. Replying to Dr Owen the
Minister ridiculed the ideas that the life of
the Polaris submarines could be extended
beyond 2000 and that cruise missiles were
an acceptable solution, and to Mr Douglas
he made it clear that the warhead had been
properly tested; it was the same design as
that proposed for Trident I. To Mr Newens
he repeated the claim that in no year will
Trident ever bulk as big as Tornado will
next year. To Mr George he said that it was
true that C5 was more accurate than D4
would have been, but this was not why we
were buying it; it was in order to achieve
commonality with the USA.
A few days later Mr Nott went before the
Defence Committee to give evidence on the
Trident programme. The questioning to
which he was then subjected enabled
Members to probe the new decision in a way
that is not feasible on the floor of the
House. Thus the Minister would not commit
himself when the question was brought up
of how many D5 missiles we would be
buying. A figure of sixty put to him he
dismissed as speculation. Later, when it was
said that a purchase of sixty would leave
launch tubes empty, he would not be drawn,
claiming that forty years ahead a degree of
flexibility had to be maintained. In answer
to Dr Gilbert, who raised the issue of
command and control Mr Nott insisted that
our arrangements were satisfactory partly
because they were at least simpler than those
which the USA needed to maintain.
A four-boat fleet is proposed with the
prospect of three being at sea at any one
time. As regards the building programme, it
is intended to have brought SSN18 into
service by the end of the decade, giving a
fleet of seventeen (i.e. less Dreadnought).
Then a decision on SSN19 will be needed.
Once the SSBNs take over there will be a
straight build of all four, thus interrupting
the SSN programme.
The Minister would not confirm a figure
of 50,000 new jobs being created as a result
of the DS choice although he was confident
that there would be much new work
available.
Answering Sir Patrick Wall the Minister
was at pains to deny the belief that it was
the strategic deterrent programme that had
led to the naval cuts: they would have had
to take place in any case. No extra money
has been provided for Trident; it has had to
come out of central funds. Replying to Dr
Gilbert he made it clear that there were no
cancellation penalties associated with the
programme. The same questioner later
raised the matter of the reopening of the
Polaris motor production line and taxed the
Minister with replies he had given to earlier
hearings when he had dismissed the
possibility of doing what had now been
done at a cost of f300m. It was now
apparently possible to run on PolarisChevaline whereas earlier this had been
discounted on the grounds of cost. This
turned into an heated exchange when Dr
Gilbert tried to get the Minister to admit
that the clinching argument for Trident was
its range, although given our geographical
position such extra range was unnecessary.
The Minister and his advisers countered by
asserting that the extra sea room was a
valuable asset. A final attempt to persuade
)Published as H.C. Paper 266, 1981 -2.
THE VIEW FROM WESTMINSTER BRIDGE
the Minister that the SSN - SSBN ratio was
wrong was unsuccessful; he argued that we
needed the deterrent to prevent our being
blackmailed by the Soviet Union.
On 29 March the House debated a
Government motion to approve the Trident
I1 decision. Mr Nott opened by putting
forward what has long been the standard
defence of our being in the nuclear business
and repeating many of the points made on
11 March. To an interjection from Mr
Speed the Minister said that the debate was
too important to be diverted into a
consideration of HMS Endurance: he was
to be reminded of that remark on several
occasions in the days ahead. The official
Opposition's motion condemned the
decision along the lines put forward by Mr
Silkin when the statement had been made.
He argued that Trident is an indication that
we no longer control nuclear weapons, they
control us; it also shows our lack of
independence from the USA; it is 'the
badge of our servitude'. He concluded that
the direction of our defence policy must be
changed to give a greater emphasis to naval
and air strength.
Sir Hugh Fraser once more expressed his
scepticism - about the nature of Trident
itself and its relevance to Britain's needs
and to the second centre of decision-making
argument. He favoured the prolongation of
Polaris's life. Dr Owen repeated the
argument he had used in 1981, that a
decision on Trident need not be made now
nor for the next five years during which
arms controls should be more thoroughly
explored. Mr Onslow quickly demonstrated
the need for Trident to his own satisfaction
and cast admiring glances towards France,
which appears not to be beset with such
wrangling over nuclear policy as we have
had.
Dr Gilbert was provocative: by opting for
D5 the ease with which a new government
will be able to cancel the order has been
increased. He was worried by the system's
vulnerability and redundancy of sea room,
matters that he had deployed in the Defence
Committee hearing. The only sound
argument for Trident that bears
193
examination is the one based on
commonality with the USA. The Minister
had not provided any indication of the
opportunity costs associated with the
Trident decision and he had not given
serious consideration to the alternatives
that have been put forward.
Mr Duffy began by concentrating on the
cost implications of Trident and the effects
it was undoubtedly having on the rest of the
defence budget. It is conventional
equipment foregone that needs to be borne
in mind. America has now locked us into
the Trident programme. But the offset
promises are of debatable credibility.
Trident is unnecessary and undesirable.
Mr Bill Walker said that the Navy needs a
new kind of ship capable of co-operating
with UK-based aircraft to meet the
combined threat of hostile submarines and
land-based aircraft with over-the-horizon
weapons. But we need Trident, too, in
order that verifiable arms reductions shall
be negotiable.
Mr Pattie wound up for the Government,
assured the House on costings, the Nonproliferation Treaty, on command and
control, and on the jobs prospect,
despatched the alternatives, and
commended the decision. On the main vote
the Government won by 297 to 248.
Weapon systems
It is convenient at this point to mention a
number of other occasions on which
systems and weapons developments were
brought to the House's attention. In
November the Government published its
observations on the Defence Committee's
report on S t i n g r a ~ .On
~ 21 December Mr
Palmer raised the question of the proposed
improved radar tracking system for Seawolf
and whether the contract should go to
Marconi or the Dutch company Signaal; on
9 February the Secretary of State
announced that Marconi were the
successful company.
On 16 December Mr Nott announced the
placing of the contract with Marconi for the
'Published as H.C. Paper 473, 1980- 1.
194
I
THE VIEW FROM WESTMINSTER BRIDGE
heavy torpedo replacement for Tigerfish
and on 10 February the placing of the
contract for Sea Eagle for the Navy and the
RAF.
On 31 March Mr Speed, the former
Minister, opened a short adjournment
debate on HMS Speedy, but his pleas for
the extension of the vessel's career fell on
the deaf ears of the present Minister, Mr
Wiggin: in brief, she is incapable of full
performance above Sea State 5 by day and 4
by night and she has only limited
endurance.
In April the Committee of Public
Accounts published a highly critical report
on the Chevaline p r o j e ~ t .The
~ Committee
found failure to provide contingencies,
serious underestimates of costs and timescales, and poor management. They also
commented adversely on failures to inform
Parliament on what was being undertaken:
although studies began in 1967 it was not
until 1980 that the House was told of the
project's existence.
The Falklands Islands
We now turn to the events that have
dominated this period under review. There
has always been a small group of Members,
in both Houses, who have taken an interest
in the Falklands and the Dependencies and
have seized the opportunity when it was
possible to do so to bring to Parliament's
attention the ominous turn of events there.
However, it could not realistically be
claimed that they have had a great deal of
success. Then the pace of events appeared
to quicken: negotiations with the
Argentines ran into trouble and on
23 March Mr Luce found himself making a
statement on the Argentine landing on
South Georgia. He made another on
30 March, by which time the situation was
looking more threatening.
At the end of that same week the
Falklands were invaded and this triggered
off a spate of parliamentary activity
unprecedented in recent years, beginning
with the first Saturday sittings since 1956. It
would not be practicable to attempt to
summarise what was said in all the debates,
statements, and questions since 3 April.
Instead a selection of those speeches and
questions that dealt most closely with the
scale and direction of military events will be
given.
In her speech on 3 April the Prime
Minister announced the assembling of the
task force (a term, incidentally, which
greatly annoyed the Earl of Cork and
Orrey, as he explained on 14 April) and a
part, but only a part, of its make-up was
outlined by Mr Nott on 7 April. That our
naval policy would now need serious
revision was a theme dealt with by several
speakers, for instance, Mr du Cann on
3 April and Sir Frederick Bennett on
20 May. But Dr Gilbert (7 April) thought
that the Falklands provided no guide to the
future. Labour members in particular drew
attention to the events in 1977 and the
lessons to be drawn from them: had prompt
action then headed off a similar
confrontation? Dr Owen (3 April) said yes
and so did Dr Gilbert (7 April): the fact that
it was being assembled was leaked and with
success; but on 3 April Mr Nott said that
1977 provided no precedent for 1982. The
risks of inadequate air cover were brought
out by Mr Whitney (3 April) and Mr Healey
(7 April) and, related to this, Mr Steel
(7 April) drew attention to the irony that
both Invincible and Hermes were to go
and Mr Silkin in the same debate wondered
whether we could have coped so well a year
from now.
As events began to quicken the focus of
interest inevitably changed. The sinking of
the General Belgrano prompted questions
(4 May) about why the better-armed (Sea
Dart and Exocet) escorting destroyers were
not attacked instead? Mr Nott did not
respond. After making his statement on
5 May about the loss of HMS Sheffield Sir
Patrick Wall asked Mr Nott whether
lightweight Sea Wolf would now be
generally installed? The Secretary of State
in reply said that until recently Warsaw
Pact vessels were not deploying seaskimming missiles. Lord Orr-Ewing asked a
similar question on 14 May which elicited
'9th Report, H.C.Paper 269, 1981 -2.
THE VIEW FROM WESTMINSTER BRIDGE
little more information from Viscount
Trenchard. (Lord Trenchard also gave
evidence on Sea Wolf to the Commons
Defence Committee in private session, but
no transcript has yet been released.)
In the debate on 13 May Sir Patrick
sketched out the military lessons to be
drawn from the Falklands invasion. There
is the question of intelligence, of the ability
to mobilise rapidly, the fact that we are now
demonstrably in the missile age, the
importance of air cover, and finally the key
role of the Marines and the assault ships
Fearless and Intrepid.
The wider issues were inevitably touched
on. On 3 April in his last speech as Foreign
Secretary, Lord Carrington claimed that
the Falklands were indefensible at such a
distance, a view echoed by Mr Peyton and
Sir Anthony Kershaw on 7 April. On
3 April Mr Amery drew attention to the
paucity of our out-of-area forces and the
fact that we had had no forces in the South
Atlantic since the withdrawal from the
Simonstown base. Mr Mates returned to
this theme on 7 April and pointed to the
difficulties in maintaining the Beira patrol
fifteen years ago when the Navy was much
bigger than it is now. Mr Speed, speaking in
the same debate, seemed not to agree: a
195
sufficient naval presence in the South
Atlantic would be three destroyers plus
occasional, unannounced visits by a
submarine: he put the annual cost at
£20 - 25m. Without such a presence there
was the danger that the Falklands might
become a naval base for another power.
Such fears also concerned Lord Buxton of
Alsa on 14 April and in the same debate
Lord Morris dealt with the potential
importance of the Cape Horn route. Sir
Philip Goodhart, a former Defence
Minister, also spoke on this on the same
day; he suggested the possibility of
transferring the local responsibility to the
USA and the setting up of a joint UK - New
Zealand - Australian force.
At this moment operations are still in
progress with their outcome yet uncertain.
We await the 1982 Defence Statement with
the possibility that changes may have been
introduced since its publication was first
promised. But perhaps the note on which to
end is the extract that Lord Chalfont
quoted on 14 April from a letter he had
received from a member of the public:
Godspeed to the fleet, good sense to the
Government, and for the people of Britain, an
honourable solution.
TUMBLE-HOME
The Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence
(Some refections by a Chaplian RN, the
Revd Dr Malcom McCaN MA, from HMS
Pembroke, Chatham - Editor.)
Background
N THE FIRST years of the 1980s,
disarmament became a subject of
popular debate in Britain, as had happened
before in the mid-1930s and early 1960s.
Disarmament movements also developed in
several West European countries and
aroused considerable public interest. The
disarmament movements concentrated their
attention on nuclear weapons, aiming at
exposing the dangers of the so-called arms
race with particular reference to the
deployment of flexible response theatre and
tactical nuclear weapons in Western
Europe. The disarmers also castigated the
assumed immorality of the whole doctrine
of nuclear deterrence. They were drawn
from a broad spectrum of intellectual
positions and, therefore, those who
accepted the need for nuclear-based defence
found it difficult to engage with them in
rational debate. Positions taken in
discussion by one nuclear pacifist might not
be accepted - might even be contradicted
- by another.
However, one assumption consistently
made within the nuclear disarmament lobby
(and far outside it) was that the doctrine of
nuclear deterrence could not be squared
with Christian morality. There were good
reasons for this assumption. Many
prominent Christians took a lead in the
nuclear disarmament movement; and the
whole issue of nuclear arms was widely
understood as presenting a moral problem.
Of even more significance intellectually, the
traditional Christian doctrine of the 'just
war' was seen to be inadequate when
applied to nuclear weapons. The just war
was understood as pure in its motives,
righteous in its goals, controlled in its
means, and predictable in its outcome. '
While in practice no war in history was
fought by either side in complete accordance
I
with any just war theory, yet it provided a
standard by which possible military courses
of action could be weighed. But, by its very
nature, a strategic nuclear weapon cannot
with certainty be discriminate or
'proportionate' in inflicting less injury than
has been incurred; certainly not, if indirect
effects of radiation and nuclear fall-out are
also taken into consideration. Since just war
theories could not encompass strategic
nuclear weapons, it was often concluded
that nuclear deterrence was morally
indefensible.
Some commentators suggested that the
change of emphasis in NATO policy during
the 1970s from 'mutually assured
destruction' (M.A.D.) to 'flexible response'
affected the morality of nuclear deterrence
doctrines. But it was symptomatic of the
ethical problems surrounding the whole
issue that moralists disagreed about whether
flexible response provided a greater or lesser
degree of justification for nuclear weapons
than M.A.D. Some argued that since 'small'
tactical weapons could be used against
isolated military targets with minimal danger
to the civilian population, such weapons
might conceivably be used without
infringing the traditional strictures imposed
by just war theories. Others argued, by
contrast, that flexible response lowered the
nuclear threshold, and made war more likely
by encouraging war preparations.
Furthermore, it was argued 'small-scale' and
'limited' war would inevitably escalate into a
full-scale exchange of strategic nuclear
weapons, especially once the nuclear
threshold had been crossed. Others again
insisted that whether military experts talked
of 'mutually assured destruction' or 'flexible
response', the moral issue was essentially
unaffected. By this, they meant that in
determining matters of morality, the whole
basic military strategy had to be taken into
account. And the basic strategy of
deterrence depends on a potential aggressor
recognising that, in certain extreme
circumstances, strategic nuclear weapons
THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
would be used against his country.
Therefore, each nuclear power has to live
with the morality of at least possessing the
means of destroying a potential aggressor's
heartland together with millions of the
civilian population.
The conclusion that using nuclear
deterrence was an immoral stance was
reinforced in many people's minds by the
failure of those who believed in the need for
nuclear deterrence to offer a convincing
argument in favour of the doctrine on
moral grounds. One of the few exceptions
to this general failure was Mr Michael
Quinlan, for some time Deputy Under
Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence. As
a convinced Catholic, and one near to the
heart of policy and plans for British
strategic nuclear weapons, Mr Quinlan
writes with authority, Christian concern,
and 'grave practicality'. It has been noted
with some justice that his 'strategic
argument is his moral argument'. ' The crux
of Mr Quinlan's argument is that 'because
governments have been able to find no
surer practical method of prevention than
deterrence, deterrence has become the
centrepiece of security policy'. The present
writer's paper affirms that the 'because' of
Mr Quinlan's sentence not only implies
(rightly) the lack of a viable alternative
policy, but also the 'because' can be
encompassed within a Christian ethical
perspective. This paper is offered, however,
not as a systematic treatise on an
enormously complex subject, but as some
introductory personal reflections. For the
present writer the moral argument arises
out of a particular Christian perspective. A
morality which has only a mild hedonism as
its base cannot justify the maintaining of
nuclear weapons; neither can a morality
arising from a non-Christian humanism,
which believes that human history is
essentially a story of 'the ascent of man', in
which man is considered to have made
moral progress over the years.
In setting down these reflections, a
number of theological assumptions have
inevitably been made. These assumptions
may seem initially to be far removed from
197
practical politics, yet, in fact they have over
the centuries enormously influenced sociopolitical thought and action in Britain and
elsewhere. First, our universal situation
contains, within itself, a judgement upon the
individual, the nation, and upon humanity
collectively, as it demonstrates man's
rejection of the divine pattern for human
life. To condemn nuclear weapons, as
though we could disentangle both them, and
ourselves, from the whole human condition
is in some ways a comfortable position. It is
harder, but more in keeping with the
Christian prophetic tradition to recognise
and declare the judgement which is present
in the whole of our social life (of which the
prophet himself is part) - not only in our
possession of nuclear weapons. We have
brought this judgement upon themselves by
our common failure to obey God.
Secondly, God is Sovereign over all His
creation, which includes the practical affairs
of the nations; nothing can happen which is
ultimately outside of His control and
permitted Will - not even a nuclear
holocaust. In some theological circles in the
early 1980s a curious opinion gained some
credence; namely, that only God has the
right to bring the world to an end, but
through nuclear weapons, man has now the
power to destroy the world himself. This
was supposed to explain why the possession
and manufacture of nuclear weapons was
evil. Such a dichotomy between right and
power is not compatible with the Christian
understanding (in scripture and tradition) of
God's sovereignty. No power or authority
whatsoever exists which is beyond God's
contr01;~and, despite man's disobedience,
God's sovereignty is exercised towards
humankind in unfailing mercy and
compassion.
Thirdly, safety and wholeness, whether
personal or global, are to be fully defined in
Christian terms only by reference to Jesus
of Nazareth. Peace and security are, at
base, spiritual, not military, concepts. Jesus
made clear that real peace hinges on a
man's response to Himself.' Adequate
national defence is a proper military and
political concern; but the degree of real
198
j
1
/
THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
peace and security thereby attained will be,
at best, severely limited and provisional. To
hope for more in the military and political
sphere is to indulge in a dangerously
misleading utopianism.
Peace-keeping in the nuclear age: the
problem
In turning specifically to defence policy and
nuclear deterrence, the assumption that
nuclear pacifism is the only position
consistent with Christian ethics needs to be
challenged because it relies, in the present
writer's view, on a fundamental misapprehension concerning social relationships. The misapprehension is, that fear
and distrust are the basic causes of the
threatened nuclear war: remove fear and
distrust by international 'confidence
building measures' and the reasons for
maintaining nuclear weapons will disappear! This opinion has been
aphoristically expressed by Dr Kenneth
Greet: 'The main threat arises from the fear
and distrust which prompt the building of
ever larger arsenals.'' In general terms
(though not with particular reference to
nuclear arms) this view is given some
support by so eminent an historian as
Professor Herbert Butterfield. He writes
that in all human relationships there is an
insurmountable obstacle to perfect trust
and goodwill, which is a Hobbesian fear:
'you yourself may vividly feel the terrible
fear that you have of the other party, but
you cannot enter into the other man's
counter-fear.'9 Professor E. P. Thompson
enlarges on the theme of 'this deep
structure of mutual fear'.
which he sees
as being deliberately fostered by 'the men
of the military-industrial interests'.
Presumably, on this analysis, 'mutual fear'
may trigger war-fighting through panic
pressures at a time of crisis. The antidote to
this fear is 'a popular movement of
conscience' ' - the implication being that
populist pressure will automatically be
exerted towards rational, morally good,
and even altruistic ends. In this
understanding of the situation, Professor
Thompson has no time for any orthodox
defence policy: he stresses the importance
of 'disregarding national considerations of
interest or "security" '." Dr Greet
endorses 'the need for a vast increase in
popular peace movements in every part of
the world'.14 The argument is, apparently,
that such popular movements will
demonstrate the ending of fear and distrust,
thus providing both the conditions and the
impetus for nuclear disarmament.
This faith in the powerful and beneficial
effects of 'the support of multitude^"^
seems na'ive in the extreme. But supposing
that fear and distrust could in fact so easily
be dispelled, not even the core problem
would yet have been addressed. For fear
and distrust are not basic causes, only
serious symptoms of a much more serious
sickness. There is a potential evil, ugliness,
and warpedness deep in individual and
national life which may generally be kept
below the respectable surface, but which is
real none the less. It requires only the
wicked genius of a Hitler to make it a
conscious element in national life and
policy. And Hitler's Germany is by no
means a unique example in the twentieth
century of this terrifying phenomenon. This
element of evil in human nature needs to be
named and recognised as more than simply
fear and distrust; that is not a denial of the
potential goodness in humanity, but only
an insistence that the potential wickedness
of man should also be properly considered.
Despite its enormous political effects in
twentieth century politics - in both civil
and international affairs - this element in
man is still frequently ignored, or even
wished away.
How, then, is this human potential for
evil to be handled? The Christian focuses
on the ultimate triumph of Jesus; yet few
Christians have ever believed that this
precludes the present maintenance of
adequate restraining force at family,
national, and global level. Indeed, many
New Testament passages may be adduced
to demonstrate that such force has divine
sanction, Romans 13.1 - 8 being the best
known instance concerning state authority.
Some have argued that the Apostle was
THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
referring here only to internal civil affairs;
but the power of imperial Rome, which
Paul had in mind, was 'international' in
extent. Moreover, it would be illogical to
accept the need for internal civil restraining
force (to prevent internal anarchy) whilst
denvine, the need for external international
rest;aiGng force (to prevent international
anarchy). 'It is like advising a householder
to prevent fire within when the whole city is
in flames.' l6
The Apostle Peter clearly refers to
external restraining force when he urges his
readers to submit to every properly
constituted human authority: 'to the
Emperor, who is the supreme authority, and
to the governors, who have been appointed
by him to punish the evildoers and to praise
those who do good'." and it would seem
natural to interpret the comment of Jesus 'pay the Emperor what belongs to the
Emperor, and pay God what belongs to
God'" - along these lines. Restraining
force is needed to limit aggression and
prevent anarchy in human society, both in
civil affairs and in inter-state relationships.
Aggression is perhaps the primary
manifestation in political life of that
potential evil in humankind which has been
under discussion. Anarchy is arguably the
worst social evil which can befall a human
grouping, each individual or sub-group
justifying their own particular aggression at
the expense of the common good.
Discongruity of 'just war' theories
If the need for adequate restraining force is
accepted, then the argument about the
morality of nuclear arms must concern the
degree of potential force deployed (and,
perhaps, the indirect effects of using such a
weapon), not the existence of restraining
force as such. But nuclear weapons have not
caused the need for adequate restraining
force to be superseded. What they have
done is to render traditional 'just war'
theories not only inadequate, but also
inapplicable. These theories proved
valuable between the fifth and nineteenth
centuries, and still provide useful moral
guidelines which it is hoped may limit the
199
incidence of conventional warfare, and
regulate its conduct along the most humane
lines possible. But in respect of strategic
nuclear weapons, these theories are
outmoded; they simply do not fit the
existing moral case. Yet many studies of the
moral issues involved in nuclear deterrence
unquestioningly assume that any weapon or
strategy which fails to fit the categories of
just war theories must be immoral. This
assumption would only be justified if just
war principles represented absolute moral
laws - a position which few moral
theologians would hold. Nevertheless, this
assumption appears even in the booklet
Nuclear Weapons and Christian
Conscience, which is one of the clearest
presentations of the moral arguments
against nuclear deterrence. l9 It is stated that
'we have a full and precise tradition of the
Church's thinking, evolved over the
centuries, about the tolerable limits of war',
and NATO's nuclear strategy is held to
'transgress the traditional limits'.20 The
author then slides into using the word
'immoral' without making a proper case for
doing so: 'For the most part, however,
participants in this discussion do not deny
the claim that a total nuclear war would be
immoral. ' 21
Yet the moral argument for nuclear
deterrence starts not with the sophistication
of just war theories, but with the most basic
elements in the human situation as they have
been outlined in this paper: the potentially
evil nature of man; the character of
elementary social relationships; and the
consequent need for adequate restraining
force. Nuclear disarmers encourage
consideration of the horrendous effects of
using strategic nuclear weapons. A balanced
view would require a consideration not only
of this potential destruction, but also of the
actual misery, death, and violence already
suffered by millions of people in the
twentieth century who were not adequately
protected from their aggressors, and from
anarchy, by restraining force. There is, of
course, a need to beware of simplistic
generalisation at this point. For example,
much actual destruction since 1946 has been
200
THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
the result of civil disorders; and nuclear
deterrence has failed to prevent war, death,
and destruction in the Third World. Yet
even in these situations, the principle
remains generally valid: where restraining
force has been inadequate to prevent
aggression, there has been violence and
misery, and sometimes anarchy.
This is not to argue that the exercise of
restraining force is always morally right, but
rather that restraining force is in itself
necessary. The moral question depends on
the use to which restraining force is put, and
the attitude which its possessors adopt: this
will be discussed later. The two points being
made here are, first, that deterrence is, in a
nuclear age, a morally legitimate form of
restraining force. Nothing less than a
nuclear capability will undergird NATO
defence policy with adequate restraining
force. Secondly, the moral problem is not
essentially about restraining force at all, but
about the heart of man which makes such
force necessary. Strategic nuclear weapons
- like the fear and distrust which surround
international relations - are symptoms of
the problem, not causes. They indicate the
extent of the problem, but they do not
account for either the existence of the
problem or its character. T o inveigh against
nuclear weapons and to suggest that a
solution lies in the abolition of these
weapons, is to mistake the essence of the
problem. Men may ease the psychological
pressure of their guilt by externalising it and
transferring it to nuclear weapons; but the
personal relief gained thereby should not be
confused with the solving of the moral
problem. In addition, there is the danger of
trying to suppress the symptoms, while
leaving the disease untouched.
Even if abolition of strategic weapons did
provide a solution in principle there are
insurmountable difficulties in ~ractice.
Since the technical knowledge andmphysical
means for the ~roduction of nuclear
weapons now exist, they cannot either be
'disinvented' or effectively legislated out of
existence. If nuclear weapons could in fact
be totally abolished, there would be an
unanswerable case for doing away with
them; for, although the moral problem
would not be solved, the potential for
destruction at man's disposal would be
considerably reduced. But this is not, in
fact, an option which is open. As the 1981
Reith Lecturer put it, 'I do not believe that
there is any infallible way to avoid nuclear
war, even at any political price, now that the
weapons have been i n ~ e n t e d . 'Given
~ ~ the
moral problem of the inherent human
potential for evil, the subsequent
observation is relevant here: 'I find it
surprising that those who daily observe our
incapacity to do much effectively about the
chronic unproductive quarrelsomeness of
British industry can with such apparent
complete confidence advance panaceas for
the age-long phenomenon of international
conflict and the immensely complicated
problems of nuclear strategy.'13
Those who do recognise the need for
adequate restraining force, and accept the
continued need for nuclear deterrence, have
often argued - wrongly, in the present
writer's view - that the possession of
strategic nuclear weapons is a 'necessary
evil', or a 'lesser evil' than any conceivable
alternative. In terms of the moral issues, the
use of such phrases is confusing; though if
the aim is to emphasise the terrible effects of
waging an all-out nuclear war, the
phraseology is understandable. Yet, unless
we live in a morally ambiguous world, evil
can never be 'necessary', and is unacceptable whether it is 'lesser' or 'greater'.
However, in the present provisional world
order, the presence of evil in the fabric of
things is undeniable, and is partly an
inevitable consequence of man's rejection
of the divine plan for human life. Man
cannot avoid the political consequences of
this rejection; it entails, in the instance
under discussion, the lack of any realistic
alternative strategy to nuclear deterrence in
the late twentieth century. If, in this light,
some people insist on describing nuclear
deterrence as a 'lesser evil', the purpose
must not be to make evil more acceptable;
nor should it be taken to indicate that
nuclear deterrence is necessarily morally
wrong. The phrase 'lesser evil' should
THE ETHICS OF NU'CLEAR DETERRENCE
simply signal the depth and intractability of
the moral problems which arise in politics (as
in every other area of life) from that prior act
of disobedience against God on the part of
everyman.
Therefore, we have to live, politically and
socially, with many shades of grey rather
than absolute blacks and whites. Yet within
those shades of grey there may still be a
course of action which is clearly the morally
right one to follow. Professor T. E. Jessop
has made the same basic point in slightly
different terms: 'in reality "the right"
becomes "the best possible in the given
circumstances". This may fall short of the
concept of "perfect right", but it is the best
we can do. To refuse the title of "right" to
this sort of action is to play fast and loose
with words.' 24
All this should, at least, guard against
uncritical acceptance of such facile statements as 'war is contrary to the will of God'
and, by extension and implication, that
nuclear deterrence is immoral. 25 If a little
child, in disobedience to father's will, rides a
bicycle onto a main road, is knocked down
by a passing car, and killed, the father's grief
may know no bounds. But no one would
think of commenting that the fatal accident
was 'contrary to the father's will'. The only
relevant point concerning the father's will in
this tragic story is that the father had
forbidden the child to ride on the road in the
first place; and the relevant moral point,
therefore, is the child's initial wrong choice
to ride onto the main road. In a similar way,
to find man having to choose 'between two
morally repugnant courses' in international
affairs does not necessarily imply 'a world
that is morally self-c~ntradictory';~~
nor
that nuclear deterrence is immoral. It implies
rather that mankind chose a basically wrong
course at a much earlier point. To identify
the consequences of this wrong choice as
causes, can only be an exercise of confusion.
To moralise about the consequences can
only obscure the real causes - and therefore
the real moral issues -in a haze of synthetic
emotion.
Justice of nuclear deterrence
If adequate restraining force is in itself a
201
morally neutral necessity, standing between
man's wickedness and socio-political
anarchy, then the crucial moral question
becomes the use to which restraining force is
put, and the motives of its possessors. In
other words, the aims of a policy of nuclear
deterrence becomes paramount. In many
writings about this subject, the words
'threaten' and 'deter' have often been used
as though they were interchangeable.
Although these words do not represent
mutually exclusive concepts, their emphases
are quite different. To 'threaten'
emphasises a conditional intention of
inflicting injury: 'to deter' emphasises an
attempt to restrain someone from acting. In
the former case, in terms of strategic nuclear
weapons, it may be justifiable to speak of an
'immoral threat'; in the latter case, of a 'just
deterrent'. The strident emotions surrounding this whole issue may have obscured the
primary and urgent moral need to establish
guidelines for 'just deterrence'.
For a deterrent to be effective at all there
must be, in the last resort, the political will
and physical means to use it. For a deterrent
to be just it should, firstly, be detained with
the sole aim of preventing war breaking out
(not with the aim of threatening, fighting, or
winning a war). Secondly, it should be
retained only at a level which will make it an
adequate restraining force, which means at a
level whereby a balance of power is
maintained in relation to potential
aggressors. Thirdly, a just deterrent should
be targetted, and contained, within military
planning in such a way that, if it ever had to
be used (which God forbid) its use would be
'as selective and limited as possible'. 2 7
Of course, if strategic nuclear weapons
were in fact ever used, then they would have
demonstrably failed as a just deterrent. Yet
the absence of war-fighting in Europe and
between the super-powers over the last
thirty-five years may have resulted,
politically, from the existence of NATO's
just deterrent. At this point weencounter the
common logical difficulty of proving a
negative. Thus, one of the moral oddities
of the situation is that the absence of
war-fighting can only be posited as a result
202
THE ETHICS OF NU( :LEAR DETERRENCE
of nuclear deterrence; it can never be
proved, although common sense would
suggest a direct connection.
However, in examining the motives of a
political grouping which maintains a policy
of nuclear deterrence, there is a need to
look behind immediate policies to the whole
aim and significance of their position (if
such a broader motivation exists at all).
Nuclear disarmers often label nuclear
weapons as immoral, but immorality begins
in human affairs when an individual or a
group consciously oppose, suppress, or
distort truth. The Christian need never be
hazy about the essence of truth, for Jesus
told Pilate, the regional political governor
of His day, 'I was born and came into the
world for this one purpose, to speak about
the truth. Whoever belongs to the truth
listens to me.'ls And He also said, 'I am the
way, the truth, and the life.'19 Yet the
political rulers of the Warsaw Pact
countries teach that faith in Christ is a
delusion: Christianity is seen as distracting
the masses of the people from fulfilment
through socio-economic reorganisation.
The political philosophy of MarxismLeninism contains a corpus of belief which
stands in direct contradiction to Christian
faith; and active Christians often face
extreme persecution within the countries of
Eastern Europe and the USSR. 30
Although truth never needs defending
militarily, yet politically and socially there
will sometimes come a point where lies and
evil must be confronted: despite all the
obvious dangers, moral right must be
defended by that degree of force which is
necessary to restrain wickedness. Many
believe such a situation arose during the
1930s with the growth of Nazism in
Germany. The present writer believes a
similar situation exists today, represented
by the growing military might of
governments committed to MarxismLeninism as a philosophy. In this
confrontation with evil, the worst
eventuality would not be physical death
(which, for a Christian, is never the
ultimate tragedy), but the suppression and
distortion of the truth. The issue may be
put somewhat starkly by noting from the
biblical evidence that war and death may be
within the permitted Will of God: the
betrayal of the truth never is. In dealing
with this theme, the Old Testament shows
an honest, if sometimes apparently harsh,
realism. In the New Testament the
emphasis is upon spiritual confrontation
and conflict between truth and evil, with
the victory of Truth being achieved by the
sacrificial death of Christ, and His
resurrection. Yet the New Testament
nowhere indicates that the passion and
crucifixion of our Lord provide a blueprint
for socio-political action within the present
world order. Indeed, as has been shown
earlier, the New Testament clearly states
that in our provisional political situation,
governments still need to exercise adequate
restraining force. Moreover, many
Christian pacifists believe their
understanding of the Gospel is a 'spiritual
vocation' which cannot be turned into a
'political policy'.
Professor E. P. Thompson is reported to
envisage, through his European Nuclear
Disarmament movement, a Europe which
stands apart from the super-power
confrontation: 'We in Europe are in the
middle of an argument that is going on over
our heads, between still-born Marxists and
born-again Chri~tians."~ Although it is
expressed in somewhat crude terms,
Professor Thompson is making a real point
here concerning a difference between the
USSR and the USA. However, he cannot
expect support from the committed British
Christian. The latter will not want to
disengage completely from this super-power
confrontation but will want his own nation
to stay within that Christian tradition
which, despite every qualification,
continues to exert an influence in the UK. 3 3
He will treasure the privilege of propagating
the Christian Gospel, within the
governmental and educational institutions
of the nation, and in society generally.
There are, in fact, grounds for believing
that a refusal to confront evil squarely
could increase the threat of war rather than
reduce it. Unilateral disarmament might,
THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
for example, disturb a balance of power
sufficiently to encourage a political
aggressor to go to war because of the
tempting prospect of a quick and easy
victory. 3 4 Certainly a potential aggressor in
the Hitlerian mould might be encouraged to
initiate war - even nuclear war - by the
appearance of weakness and uncertainty in
surrounding nations.
Like it or not, the existing order of
international affairs cannot be ignored.
Whatever developments are envisaged, they
must take account of strategies of nuclear
deterrence already in existence; that is,
nuclear weapons, maintained by two
opposing blocs of nations, have created a
balance of power. This does not mean,
however, that a mere continuation of the
present deployment and stockpiling of
nuclear weapons can be viewed with
complacency. When sufficient nuclear
weapons exist to destroy the world many
times over, the nations can only be
described as 'over-armed'. Moreover,
accident or opportunism may trigger a
nuclear exchange which was neither
planned nor wanted: this is a possibility
which, if unlikely, can never be completely
ruled out. More seriously 'still, the
proliferation of nuclear weapons among the
nations of the world must inevitably
increase the risk of an actual nuclear attack
sometime, somewhere in the world. And
the horrors of an all-out exchange of
strategic nuclear weapons cannot be fully
grasped by the human mind, so terrible
would they be.
Conclusion
Nevertheless, in the present writer's
opinion, Nuclear pacifism is not the proper
or morally right response to the
international state of affairs. This paper has
aimed to show that nuclear disarmers are in
fact seriously misled on four main counts.
First, they are wrong in an over-optimistic
assessment of unredeemed human nature.
Secondly, they largely ignore the sociopolitical requirements for adequate
restraining force to deter aggression and
prevent anarchy. Thirdly, they are
203
unrealistically utopian in hoping for new
forms of international relationships, based
on 'good' populist pressures, which will
replace traditional diplomacy based on
sovereign states.35 Fourthly, they fail to
recognise the essentially untruthful and evil
nature of Marxism-Leninism, which
providks the politico-philosophical
motivation for Warsaw Pact governments'.
This paper concludes that it is morally
right, given present political realities, for
the British Government to continue a policy
of nuclear deterrence. This does not mean
there can be any sympathy with those who
dream of an endless increase in the military
power which is available to their own side in
order that one day they may achieve the
absolute political victory. Evil is not to be
defeated by means of a military 'crusade'.
The final victory lies in the hands of God
alone, who will one day bring an end to all
causes of sorrow and suffering in the last
great triumph of His Son, the eradication
of evil, and the denouement of human
history. Meanwhile, we live in a provisional
world, and it is an escapist luxury to
pretend that there are ultimate solutions in
the political realm to the dilemma presented
by nuclear weapons. The idealist looking
for a day when warfare will be universally
renounced, can only distract, with his hope
of the unobtainable, from what may be
politically possible here and now.
In maintaining a British just deterrent,
the Royal Navy can neverprove that Polaris
submarines have helped to provide a
crucial, if provisional, politico-military
instrument in preventing the outbreak of
war in the European theatre and between
the super-powers during the last thirty-five
years; but, as has been argued, they may
have done so. They have certainly given this
country an adequate restraining force by
which, politically, potential wickedness has
been in some measure contained; and by
which, also Marxism-Leninism has been
confronted, however imperfectly.
Britain, as a result of an historical
process, finds herself in possession of
strategic nuclear weapons. For nations
which have not yet become nuclear powers,
204
THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
the dangers of proliferation outweigh the
advantages of possessing nuclear weapons.
But unilateral renunciation of nuclear arms
by Britain might disturb the present balance
of power, and would most certainly reduce
the United Kingdom's military capacity to
confront political manifestations of man's
wickedness. For the individual who can take
up an outright pacifist stand there is real
moral justification. But the present writer
contests the claims to moral excellence of
nuclear disarmament movements which
display a virulent anti-Americanism, a
selfish (and unobtainable) desire to save our
own country from nuclear attack
irrespective of the cost to others, and a
withdrawal from the real world.
The morally right and responsible
handling of a continuing British nuclear
Notes and References
' A usefully concise description of the 'just war'
tradition was provided by Stott, Rev. J., in 'Calling for
Peacemakers in a Nuclear Age',
Contact,
1981, the quarterly magazine
August -October
published by the Officers' Christian Union (Aldershot,
Hants., UK). This whole issue was devoted to The
Nuclear Debate.
'Stein, W., 'Preventing War?', The Tablet, 22 August
1981. Mr Stein believes the 'special impressiveness' of
Mr Quinlan's writing derives partly from this 'grave
practicality'.
)Ibid.
'Quinlan, M., 'Preventing War', The Tablet, 18 July
1981. Mr Clifford Longley, Religious Affairs
Correspondent of The Times, described Mr Quinlan, in
mid-1981, as the 'Government's principal adviser on the
theory of nuclear deterrence'. Not surprisingly,
therefore, this interchange in The Tablet between Mr
Quinlan and Mr Stein was generally regarded as the best
summary of the state of the debate in the early 1980s.
Attention should also be given to the letter from Father
Mark Ruston, OP, Prior of Blackfriars, Oxford in The
Tablet, 25 July 1981. Chatham House, London, plan to
publish a symposium on the morality of nuclear
deterrence during the year 1982.
'See John 3.19, and surrounding verses.
6Romans 13.1 is a key reference on this subject in the
New Testament. Isaiah 45.1 - 8 is a relevant Old
Testament passage - particularly because Cyrus was
not a member of God's chosen people; and it is stressed
that Cyrus did not know the Lord God.
'See Luke 19.41 -4; a particularly relevant passage
because it relates politico-military peace to the peace
which Jesus alone provides.
'Greet, Rev. K. G., 'Priority for Peace', Methodist
Recorder, Thursday 15 October 1981. Dr Greet,
Secretary, and an ex-President, of the British Methodist
deterrent involves certain basic elements.
First, there should be an eagerness to limit
and reduce as far as possible the
international dangers inherent in the
existence of strategic nuclear weapons.
Secondly, the theory and practice of just
deterrence should be explicitly developed.
Thirdly, and most important, we should
individually and communally seek a deeper
knowledge of that Christian Faith which as
a nation, however shallowly, we still
generally profess: in this alone lies real
peace and security. The present writer
believes that the practical way forward
(though it will not seem so to many) lies in
the intercessory prayer of those Christians
who are deeply concerned.
Conference, indicated that these views in his article
would be amplified in his book The Big Sin, to be
published as a Marshalls Paperback in early Summer
1982.
'Butterfield, H., History and Human Relations (Collins,
London, 1951)p.21; quoted in L. Martin, (ed.), Strategic
Thought in the Nuclear Age (Heinemann, London, 1979)
pp. 199- 200, where Butterfield's comments are
described by Garnett, J., as amongst 'the most profound
in the entire literature of international politics'.
'OThompson, E. P., and Smith D. (eds), Protesf and
Survive (Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, UK,
1980) p.54.
"Ibid., p p 55-6.
I2Ibid., p.59.
131bid., p.58.
"Greet, op. cit.
"Thompson, op. cit., p.57.
16WillisI., in a letter to The British Weekly (Christian
Weekly Newspapers) 18 - 24 December 1981.
I' I Peter 2.13 - 14.
"Matthew 22.21.
I9Stein, W., (ed.), Nuclear Weapons and Christian
Conscience (Merlin, London, 1961; reissued with
additional material by Cardinal Books, 1%5; and
reprinted 1981).
l0Ibid., p.31.
lllbid., p.32.
"The Two-Edged Sword' by Professor Laurence
Martin, BBC Reith Lectures 1981; Lecture One, 'if you
knows of a better 'ole. . .', reprinted in The Listener, 12
November 1981, p.562 ff.
"Ibid.
"The Morality of Pacfsm and the Nuclear Deterrent.
A shortened account of the talk by Professor T. E.
Jessop, D.Litt., Ferens Professor of Philosophy in the
University of Hull (issued by the Chaplain-in-Chief
(RAF), photocopied, n.d).
THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
' T h e Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent, a Report
to the British Council of Churches by the Council on
Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament,
(The British Council of Churches, London, 1979) p.15.
"Stein. op.cit., p.38.
27Willis, I., 'Should Christians be Nuclear Pacifists?',
Contact, August -October 1981 (see note 1 above).
2'John, 18.37.
l9Ibid. 14.6.
'OFrom a vast, well-documented literature on this
subject, see, e.g. Brown, Cdr, D., RN, 'The Significance
of Dissent by the Christian Church in the USSR',
Contact, May - July 1981.
J'In a moving and eloquent letter to The Times,
Saturday, 31 October 1981, the Reverend E. H. Chitty
stated, 'For me, Christian pacifism is a spiritual
vocation . . . . It was never a political policy.'
"Reported in Newsweek, 24 August 1981, p.10.
jJThis does not mean, though, that the committed
British Christian will want to engage in a politicomilitary anti-communist 'Crusade'; nor will he want to
whitewash the political systems of NATO countries as
ideal (for some seem almost the opposite).
"Garnett, J., 'Disarmament and Arms Control since
1945, Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age (see note 6).
pp. 194 - 8, discusses fairly fully how ill-considered
disarmament proposals may diminish rather than
enhance the prospects for world peace.
J51bid., p.192: 'In essence, the disarmers are
revolutionaries; at heart, they wish to abolish military
power and to abandon many of the traditional practices
of inter-state relations. In contrast, the arms controllers
are conservatives, they believe in evolution rather
revolution, and instead of seeking a transfprmation of
the international system, they merely want to make it
work properly.'
Away Seaboot
. . . And then the Justice,
In fair round belly with good capon lin'd,
With eyes severe, and beard of formal cut,
Full of wise saws and modern instances.
'Are you ready in the boat?'
'All ready in the boat, Sir.'
'Out Pins.'
'Pins out in the boat, Sir.'
OONER OR LATER, for almost all of
US, the engines of the warship are
ordered to stop and, although there is no
perceptible loss of way through the water, a
small boat with you in command is lowered
to the water line.
With a splash of soda, usually mixed with
something stronger, your small boat hits the
cold water and you are on your own, in
command of your own ship, perhaps for
the first time. It is too late now to be
hoisted once again to deck level and to
climb back inboard to the secure warmth,
comradeship, and protection of the
wardroom life you have left behind: you are
in deep water, steep seas, with limited vision
and scant experience.
Already, the boat rope is slipped and the
warship is moving ahead. But the watch is
changing and they are looking ahead, not
astern: you are no longer on the plot. For a
time, the lifebuoy sentry may make a
cursory glance in your direction, but almost
certainly not. You are on your own.
Plan ahead
Some officers who could have been
Admirals leave the Navy as Sub.
Lieutenants. Others, who think they are or ought to become -Admirals stay until a
bitter end. For some, there is a 'golden'
moment (but ponder well whether it be
'fool's gold' or real gold), but for most of
us there is a natural break between these
two ranks. It may be that we have reached
the top of the List, been 'passed over' for
promotion, saddened by the erosion in
defence, disillusioned about pay (rare these
days), or merely caught by Anno Domini.
But whatever the reason, it is imperative to
recognise that the soldier of our 'seven
ages' is old, and that we should proceed,
hopefully with some dignity, to the next
which, perhaps appropriately enough, is to
justice. To some extent, the choice is ours.
But too many are aroused too late and wake
to find the blade of their sword towards
them because they had no plan.
The longcast
All of us have a longcast. It is dramatic,
succinct, critical, and brilliant in
conception. Also frequently updated,
usually in the wardroom at about 03.00,
over a glass of whisky after a run ashore,
when its stark simplicity is revealed
to anyone who cares to listen - or
remember it. Few do so, least of all the
authors.
But this is the moment to start storing
your seaboat for the moment when you, like
Bligh, will be cast adrift and must make a
long voyage relying only on your own skills
and experience. A Certificate of
Competency which may be highly relevant
to the the complexities of a modern warship
is of minimal use in an open boat. So you
must set about acquiring certificates which
will be useful. Paradoxically, almost any
certificates will do and your naval
examinations and experience, provided they
are suitably packaged, will be found in
many cases to provide the key to degrees at
one end to membership of institutes
carrying suitably impressive initials at the
other. It does not matter that these can be
purchased like Ruritarian Doctorates
because the possibility that they were
acquired by exemption rather than by
examination does not seem to arise or be
probed. If you do actually have time to
study for the real thing, better still, but this
is rare because few successful Navy Officers
are appointed to sinecures. Sadly, a
MOD(N) sponsored review of civilian
qualifications was set on such a blinkered
AWAY SEABOOT
course that the whole point and value of
acquiring these qualifications was missed.
It is a fact that each such qualification
acquired will probably stand to gain you
£500 p.a. in starting salary; and it is best to
purchase your portfolio over a period of
some years and appointments so that your
qualifications can appear to show the
continuing growth of a fertile brain since
leaving training. Consider that a ten year
investment o f f 100 p.a. in subscription fees
(upon which income tax relief may be
claimed) could earn you an extra £2,000
p.a. in your first and every subsequent
year's salary as a civilian.
The shortcast
Every naval officer worth the name writes
at least one letter of resignation. Most are
withdrawn, usually the following morning,
because hot heads often mean cold feet.
But, if you have decided to go, make the cut
incisive, quick, and clean. No Captain
wants a disillusioned canker in his
wardroom spreading disaffection to
impressionable young officers. Your letter
should be short and sweet: rambling
bitterness causes heartburn and nausea.
The Second Sea Lord is not, alas, going to
be able to change government policy
because some officers want to leave the
Service. It is, however, fashionable - and
fun - to offer some sort of pithy comment
and if you are too moribund to think of
even one, you can always fall back on
'separation' or 'job satisfaction' which are
still OK buzzwords in Whitehall.
The I specialist
Most ndval officers become increasingly
short-sighted as they grow older. This
dimming of the vision is mainly attributable
to duty free gin but it can be cured by a visit
to your friendly (I) specialist - a man
whom you probably only know remotely
from his daily comments about the
weather. He can show you some spectacles
to refocus your eyes and restore the clarity
of vision that a pair of glasses will never do.
And this new I-sight is free. The first
I-test will probably reveal the existence of
207
some nearby courses at, say, Bristol
University. As further test lenses are
applied to the frame, you will see in the
middle distance several more short courses
of a more practical nature to prepare you
for your forthcoming voyage, and on the
horizon there may be a longer course of
four to six weeks to provide a 100 per cent
overhaul of your craft and skills ready for
the moment you hit the cold water.
University courses
The extra-mural courses are usually about
one week in length and cover a myriad of
topics from accountancy to Zimbabwe.
They provide an ideal opportunity to
exercise the mind with others whose
interests may be in a different plane to air
defence. Furthermore the ambience and
environment of the pubs in a university
town will be rather different from those in
Old Portsmouth.
The week-end course
There is a rather fascinating hotel in
Kensington, not far from the Wrennery at
Furse House, whose patrons obviously find
it less expensive than Brighton for a weekend. In its labyrinthine passages one may
encounter ladies whose style of dress and
soothing manner suggests that their
telephone numbers might be found in the
back pages of a titillating magazine.
Here some long forgotten but obviously
virile DNEdS who perhaps got a rake off,
or was one, has arranged for generations of
Naval OFficers to spend a week-end,
peeling off the tantalising seven veils of
obscurity and penetrating the mysteries of
civilian life beneath.
All the lectures, which are designed to
prepare students to think about all aspects
of the transition from Service to civilian
life, are given by ex-Service officers who
have themselves made this transition in
many different ways. The course explores
the opportunities in civilian life and
includes sessions of individual counselling.
If you only go for the beer, it will, at
least, slake one thirst.
;EABOOT
'
course in almost any subject and in the past
this was quite usual. For instance, a
gentleman who is now a well-known racing
correspondent booked his EVT course
touring the country's race courses at the
taxpayers' expense. Literally a case of
horses for courses: And why not? It is little
enough preparation and reward for those
going 'outside' after many years service to
the nation. Sadly such halcyon summer
days are now only a memory. Dark
evenings of financial stricture now point
towards a more dismal lecture. It is now rare
even to try being a publican for a month, let
alone a sinner.
D o not delude yourself that you are too
busy, minding paper in the Mod o r
counting socks in Collingwood, t o spare
yourself for an EVT course. You may find
yourself with rather too much time to rue
this; but after your terminal date. There are
still plenty of very good vocational courses
t o choose from; but d o something, even if it
is only just t o say goodbye.
Physical fitness
You will not be allowed t o leave the warship
without a visit to the sick bay and the dental
surgery. This is your chance to make sure
you are in really good shape and have
'group flashing jaws' for the voyage ahead.
So if you need to have something cut off,
have it done by your friendly Sister.
Gunfire can lead to deafness in later life
but an audiogram, if it is carried out,
should detect this. Make sure it is, and if
deaf, even for only one sector of the audible
frequency range, make sure such deafness is
recorded in case you need to claim a
disability element in your pension.
Back troubles are notoriously difficult to
cure. If you have ever suffered from back
aches make sure that this too is documented
in case of further recurrence. A shot in the
back could, of course, give you both.
EoEEy
After sounding the chest comes counting
the chest. You will receive a visitation of
Their Lordship's pleasure at your departure
by the delivery of some talents. As in all the
best stories, some receive ten, some five,
and some only one; but equally, they can be
squandered or sown wisely.
They will generally arrive in four lots.
Lot one will be a large bag which will have
been clearly marked 'Not to be opened until
Christmas Day' and will not arrive before.
It should also be marked 'Not Wanted On
Voyage' as you will need to keep this for
use after your landfall. Ask your coxswain
and kingsman for advice about this: but
plan to keep this lot intact until you have
been ashore for at least two years and can
have taken a really good appraisal of your
terrestrial environment. Lot two, although
due at the start of your voyage, will be maildropped about a fortnight later. This will
be a small talent which a lady called Miss
Musters will apparently have found sculling
in the pay office. Make sure she has not
kept any for herself - it has been known.
Lot three will be released in monthly
instalments by an agent known only by the
cryptogram P M G who lives in Crawley.
About one third of this will normally be
withheld for PAYE income tax on earned
income, but you can ask for it to be paid
grossly if you wish. You may ask for up to
half of Lot 3 to be commuted. For some
unknown reason, the best value for money
is obtained by asking for this between July
and your forty-seventh birthday. It is
desirable to have some sort of excuse ready
if you are asked why you want to double
your money. On first sight, commutation
of up to half of an inflation-proof pension
seems foolhardy, but when you find, (as
you almost certainly will) that you need, for
tax purposes, t o reduce your total income,
it may well be wise to reduce it by investing
elsewhere and paying CGT at 30 per cent
rather than IT at 60 per cent. Your widow's
pension is not of course in any way reduced
by your own commutation. You are, in
effect, only getting your own money which,
if not commuted, will die with you.
There is however one further source of
succour available and, although not a
particularly exclusive club, your previous
AWAY SEABOOT
membership contributions can, if you are in
irons and have two black balls up, be
refunded on a weekly basis, by flying the
code flags DOE or, if in real straits, DHSS,
RNBS, or ARNO. The Club Secretary, a
somewhat Scrooge-like Person Friday
appears to top up a parsimonious onearmed bandit which releases a trickle of
spoil when you pull the handle. In most
cases, this lot four will amount to about £30
per week.
The crew
Your Mate will already have been
appointed with some care and will be an
'old ship' who will have sailed in troubled
waters with you before. Like any good First
Lieutenant, she should be able to do your
job and everybody else's. This means that
she must act as Second-in-Command,
Captain's Secretary, Quartermaster,
Communications Operator, Propulsion
ERA, Boiler Room Watchkeeper, Duty
EM, Sew Sew, Snob, Char, and Dhobey
Wallah, in addition to all normal duties.
When you delegate command to your First
Lieutenant, do not make the mistake of
criticising the manner in which it is
exercised, because it will certainly be
different to yours and this may prove to be
your first opportunity to observe it.
There may be room in your seaboat for a
cabin boy or a cook's mate. If so, you
should clear lower deck before the voyage
and tell your ship's company your future
plans, where you are going and when you
hope to get there. This will enhance esprit
de corps and reduce mutinous talk about
the last ship being the best. Above all, make
sure your supply officer pays the ship's
company regularly even if this must
necessarily at first be less allowances than
those to which they have previously become
accustomed.
Emergency stores
Those who really want to see how the land
lies will have already mastered the contents
of their boat bag. This should contain a
typewriter (second-hand will do provided
not purchased from a well-used actress who
209
will have worn out the capital I), two reams
of white quarto paper, carbons, pins, at
least 200 large envelopes, and about £30 of
postage stamps. It may also be useful to
spend the remaining balance in your Gieves
account by including a trouser press. If not,
Mate can do - perhaps?
Ditch the gash
No vessel should proceed to sea with
unnecessary stores, so make sure your gash
is ditched before the voyage. You will not
need those rather comfortable brown suede
shoes that have walked abroad in foreign
parts and whose tongues could tell, in
fascinating brogue, the story of a heel.
Brown suede shoes have an inference
outside the Navy which gives rise to ribaldry
and raised eyebrows. Brown hats are the
same. And brown suits. No gentleman ever
wears brown. Kruschev wore a brown suit
(but no shoes) at the UN building in 1957.
Green shirts are also outre'. (There is only
a market for green shirts in the Clydeside
docklands.) Plain red or blue, and even red,
white, and blue, ties can be dangerous
unless you are a glib politico. Club ties too
can be a handicap to start with. Remember
that the Personnel Officer who interviews
you, and who can say no but cannot say
yes, may well have been a frustrated
National Service Lance Corporal in the
Pioneer Corps whose empathy with the
Establishment Club is zero.
As your voyage will take you into hostile
waters, all identity documents must be
destroyed. The paybook in its prophylactic
cover and the ID card shewing you as a
keen but pimply youth of eighteen before
dissipation set in are collector's items at
Centurion and you cannot pass Go or
collect your £200 with such talismans still in
your pocket.
Your AGR too suddenly acquires a
noxious importance never detected in all its
former years lying fallow in its canvas bag.
For some reason, this masks a face of much
greater secrecy than the mere triviality of
taking leave of the Official Secrets Act. St
Barbara will apparently have an apoplectic
seizure if this fascinating example of
AWAY SEJABOOT
military archaeology is not returned before
sailing. So if you want to keep your gas
mask for mowing the lawn during the hay
fever season, you will have to pay dearly for
the privilege. But the gas mask bag is not in
the same class and can be retained. It makes
a useful camera bag.
The coastguard
Never underestimate the Coastguards. They
can be contacted on any frequency, even a
weak one, but are constantly alert to the
problems of inexperienced small craft in
busy shipping lanes and port approaches.
Once you have reported your position as a
distressed seaman, the local PER section of
the Department of (un)Employment will
send you a welter of advice about preparing
a track chart, arrange a series of courses to
steer, and transmit regular notices to
mariners (executive post) listing at least 500
new job vacancies on the professional and
executive register every week.
Track chart
There is more flotsam and jetsam
surrounding CVs than any other aid to
single-handed ocean sailing. Try to skim off
the slicks of crude black debris but leave
enough white spirit to preserve the bright
work. Most advice tends towards your CV
being on only one side of paper; probably
up to foolscap size: at least until looking for
your second or third civilian job when you
may wish to enlarge the chart folio.
Prepare your own track chart; usually
under six main headings: personal details,
education and qualifications, career,
experience, interests, and aim. Refine it and
refine it, exterminating jargon, navalese,
and Service initials. Translate everything
into English. By all means hone and whet
the text in your small brown souvenir
edition of the Navigating Officer's note
book, but the resulting track chart must be
produced in such pristine condition that its
readers must be persuaded to exclaim, and
then to demand 'This man I must meet!'
Your track chart must be truthful but it
need not contain the whole truth. Why
provoke questions that you would prefer
not to have to answer by allowing old cocoa
stains to appear on the chart? By all means
have your CV professionally typed but do
not spoil the effect of this by using a Second
XI photocopier when you are a First XI
player. This is an advertisement for people
to buy you: it must be immaculate.
Printed CVs, and more specifically those
professionally written, printed, and bound
can sometimes be counter-productive.
Certainly these will be looked at by the
personnel manager but they may then be
discarded by him if he feels that Sinbad's
Voyage is just too good to be true. In other
words, beware lest your ghosting 'Nav Yeo'
will have written out the originality and
spontaneity from your CV.
Even when you think you are 'Up
Homers' with feet under the table in your
new port, always keep your track chart at
immediate notice for steam. You never
know when (good news) a tomahawkbrandishing brave may seek your scalp for a
better world, or, (not so good) when a
sudden Fohn call may funnel down from
the mountain peaks on the twenty-sixth
floor to dislodge you from your perch in an
avalanche of redundancy.
Other shipping
As a matter of courtesy you should call up
any other old ships which you may have
passed; in the night or at any other time.
This will at least alert their OOW to your
existence and they may have a suitable port
for you on their horizon but not yet visible
to you.
Busy ships may not reply, but remember
there are far more ex-Servicemen about
than there are present Servicemen and they
comprise a very much more comradely
group than those you left behind in the
warship. Most commercial shipping will
therefore at least give you a friendly wave in
the right direction, and maybe much more.
Warships and their auxiliaries are not
much use. They are always dashing about in
social circles and are bemused by their own
wake. Old warships are more useful than
newer ones; foreign warships look good to
start with but may not bear close scrutiny if
AWAY SEABOOT
you are considering another long series of
ocean voyages. RO-ROs and defenceorientated auxiliaries are appalling,
officered by the Second XI who have been
recruited on the cheap to accept conditions
they don't know can be improved.
Dockyard- port-based auxiliaries, in UK
and the Gulf, are the worst of all. Platforms
in the North Sea are, on the contrary,
rather good and very well paid.
The old buoy network
You will not need to have much of a flair to
light up the position of buoys but it is
important to sight these and identify as
many as possible because they will give you
an accurate fix of your position and
indicate the safest passage ahead. Buoys
seem to come in three shapes headhunters, personnel consultants, and
employment agencies. Ex-NOS have
secured permanently to such buoys and
contact with these is particularly valuable.
In addition, you may come across a Danny
buoy which probably has a Lorelei's siren
but is very poorly moored.
Headhunters show high-powered fixed
white lights penetrating the murk for, and
seen only by, the sleekest ships keeping the
tautest look-out, with Masters who wear
Rolex watches and guide the destiny of the
world. Not normally seen by the average
naval officer. Personnel consultants give a
good radar echo and have occulting lights
with a broad all-round sweep, usually seen
by the sharper naval officers. Good for a fix
if no other navigation marks are on the
plot, but sometimes poorly maintained and
shewing signs of rust, especially those,
curiously, which are manned by ex-NOS.
Employment agencies have group flashing
lights and are seen by almost everyone but
nevertheless give a general indication of the
channel ahead.
The Danny buoy may look smart enough
and may appear to offer a smooth and
rapid passage home by an unknown and as
yet undredged channel, but such buoys
shew a fixed red light and are on no account
safe to pass a line to as the rope will be
snatched and your boat boarded, hassled,
21 1
and probably pirated. Harbourmasters of
ports you may subsequently want to visit
may take one look at your Q flag and refuse
you permission to enter harbour.
Lightships
More useful than the buoys, more positive
for a fix, are the light vessels; of florid
complexion and sans engines, with glib
names like 'Tongue', 'Shambles', and
'Cork' but manned by NOS who will
usually give you the latest notice to
mariners and sometimes offer a chart
correction service.
The first lightship, the White Ensign
Association, founded by Commander
Charles Lamb after the 1957 axe (was it
really that long ago?) now has its offices in
HMS Belfast in the pool of London. An
excellent organisation, efficiently run and
on a shoestring but will provide
introductions to a number of influential
city institutions for sound financial advice.
They also have a string of companies in the
'Top 1000' as subscribers - ask to see a
copy of their latest Annual Report - and
will pass copies of your CV to potential
employers.
The second lightship, ELON, is situated
in Admiralty Arch. Although still so close
to the warship as almost to be part of it, he
will also offer advice to those who seek it
about ocean voyaging in an open boat. He
too has some useful contacts and will
circulate details of landfalls.
The third lightship will be your
appointer. Chairmen of firms who may
never have heard of the Officers
Association, the White Ensign Association,
or ELON, but who need to take on an exNO will contact the only place they have
heard of - the Admiralty. Such calls are
diverted to your Appointer and discovery
of some choice havens may thereby come
his way: So before the old shades lengthen
in Whitehall, remember to take a star sight
of the silver cross.
The lighthouse
The most useful landmark of all is the
Officers' Association. With offices newly
212
AWAY SEABOOT
moved from Belgrave Square to Pall Mall
(all ops rooms know that lighthouses
move), the OA has an impressive record of
second career placement and job finding.
Make a point of taking a series of running
fixes from the lighthouse; there is much
valuable advice to be gained thereby.
The lighthouse transmits a powerful
beam in three colours; one red sector and
two blue (one dark, one light). This of
course increases the competition somewhat
but to nowhere near the levels caught by the
press gang.
At the top of the lighthouse, as near to
aeroplanes as he can get, sits the present
keeper and although there is rumour that
the lamp shines more brightly in the light
blue sector, this is not much evidenced in
discussion with the sailors who work near
the waterline.
The press gang
The National press gang is at work all the
time but its harvest is garnered in March
and October, after Christmas and after the
summer holidays, when the big league
interviewers have spent their foreign travel
budgets and their holiday bonus. By the
same token December and August are
moribund for recruiting: no one wants to
miss their Christmas bonus or have to work
in a new firm in the summer holidays. There
is also a weekly harvest. Press gangs 'Delta
Tango' and 'Foxtrot Tango' do best on
Thursdays; 'Tango' is best on Wednesdays.
'Sierra Tango' is better than 'Oscar' on
Sundays. Don't overlook the press gang's
smaller forays.
A nationwide search carried out by the
press gang will probably cost its Master
£1,000 for the advertisement alone. If, in
addition, buoyage is employed to mark the
swept channel so that only three potential
crew members are presented at the harbour
bar, this will incur costs of at least a further
£2,000 (representing 15 per cent of starting
salary) plus expenses. All this without
'costing' the time of the Master and before
the recruit himself has even started work;
and it will take him at least six months to
become productive and a further six
months for this outlay to be recovered. So
the press gang is expensive. How much
better for everyone to save this trouble by
the keeping of a good look-out for likely
anchorages. A volunteer will always be
worth ten pressed men.
In order, however, for the press gang to
save itself some effort, it has devised
various methods of capturing its prey. Very
few captives seem prepared to allow
themselves to be herded into boxes, whose
very anonymity seems to act like an
opposing pole so that only non-magnetic,
but nevertheless very valuable, mettle gets
in. Box numbers therefore can sometimes
eliminate a lot of the opposition: but there
are other reasons for their use. Perhaps to
avoid the bother of a reply; perhaps to deny
knowledge of expansion of their harbours to
rival harbourmasters; perhaps even to deny
knowledge in their own harbours that they
are about to be dredged. Perhaps sometimes
to trawl the fishing grounds to see what
valuable cargo may be lying offshore.
The challenge
A challenge can be relayed to you from any
of the NavAids previously mentioned, or
from the press gang. Replying to the
challenge should be done swiftly but not so
swiftly that you inadvertently use
yesterday's NUCO.
Practice will evolve a permutation of
groups, probably totalling twelve, from
which, say, four may be chosen to make a
reply depending on the type of harbour you
are facing. So that a reply to an oil company
for an appointment overseas may use
Groups I , 6,7,and 12; whereas a reply to a
merchant bank in the City may use Groups
1,4, 5, and 12.
The sharpening of every phrase in this
letter of application so that every word
carries its full weight and none is wasted is
every whit as important as arrow-heading
your track chart. When you are absolutely
satisfied that your letter has been brought to
the highest degree of readiness; when you
have proved this by some successful
skirmishing; when you are confident that a
challenge received at any time can be
promptly dealt with; then you may stand
AWAY SEABOOT
down from defence stations and take an
occasional make and mend. You may well
thereby meet a likely harbourmaster: some
of the best chains are forged at the links.
It is usual, but not essential, to send a
copy of your track chart with your letter of
application. Guidance on this can be gained
by very careful analysis of the challenge. If,
for example, it is clear that you will have to
complete an application form, it is not
worth sending a track chart straight away.
Application forms are a bore: some of
them are ludicrous; some need photographs
(so obtain a stock which show you in a
better light than the 'escaping prisoner-ofwar' look captured by 'Photo Me'
machines on railway stations). Because
application forms are such a bore, some
people don't bother to complete them.
Good; more of the opposition is eliminated
but only if you bother to complete yours.
Most applications ask the same questions
but - different ships, different cap tallies.
Prepare a stock answer crib. This will not
only make it easy for you to reply, but also
enable you to know what you have said to
each challenger. This may be vital later if
you are called to enter harbour. Whatever
else you say in reply to a challenge never
ever declare that you are 'retiring' from the
Navy. To the terrestrial, this will only
conjure up a mental picture of a deckchaired Long John Silver; hardly likely to
be considered a promising runner.
Approaching a port
Experience and statistics prove that you
may sight the shore nearly two hundred
times in your voyage and you must be
prepared to make a successful landfall on
each occasion. This means having a fully
worked-up and efficient ship which can
make a confident and well-ordered attack
at action stations and wearing battle
ensigns. First impressions are vital - on
both sides. Decisions to hold or open fire
are made within thirty seconds.
When you have got a positive reply to the
challenge, you may request permission to
enter harbour. You must expect to have to
visit about thirty harbours, some twice or
213
even three times, before you can put a line
ashore.
When called to enter a harbour, find out
everything you possibly can about it from
the port guide. Call up the firm's company
secretary and ask for a copy of the latest
Financial Report and Accounts, and for
any other relevant publicity material. Say
who you are and why you want them - the
buzz will almost certainly filter back to your
interviewer. Learn his name in advance;
check its pronunciation at reception, or
with the switchboard. Visit Companies
House and inspect the firm's records. Visit
the City Business Library or your local
Public Library and look up details of the
firm in Kompass. Do as much homework as
you can.
Known by their boats
A ship is known by her boats; by her
correspondence; and by her QM's lobby.
So is a firm. When being called for
interview, observe the company's 'boats' in
the directors' car park. Are they all new?
from the same stable? clean? Observe too
the reaction of the 'QM'. Is she alert,
attractive, knowledgeable? Is she expecting
you? name correct? What is the reception
area like? What is the waiting room like?
What sort of magazines? How old are they?
If you have to telephone (or even if you
don't), check the manner and speed of
reaction of the telephone operator. If the
person you want to speak to is still at lunch
at 15.30, how does the telephone operator
cover this? Does her story agree with his
secretary's? Answers to questions like these
will tell you just as much about a firm as
they have done in the past when you visited
another warship.
Taking on the pilot
You will have to meet at least one pilot
before you can hope to meet his harbourmaster. Most ports will insist that you take
on an ocean pilot, then a harbour pilot, and
only finally the harbourmaster. Sometimes,
in small harbours, you can see all three in
one day. At other times, you may have to
return on further occasions, especially for
214
AWAY SEiABOOT
the very large commercial ports. The aim of
meeting the ocean pilot is to get close to the
harbour pilot. And the aim of meeting the
harbour pilot is to get to the harbourmaster
because only he will be the positive
decision-taker. But at some stage in this
final discussion with the harbourmaster you
will realise that he wants you in his port.
The sea boot is suddenly on the other foot.
Instead of struggling to throw a line
ashore you are suddenly in a position to
stop both engines and wait for the Master
Rigger to put enough of his gang on the
wharf armed with enough grapnels for you
to consider whether they are worth even
passing a heaving line to, let alone a hawser.
But only ever discuss the number of
grapnels, and then only with the
harbourmaster. You may even choose to go
astern; or to drift in the tideless water inside
the lock gates for a day or so while you
confer with your crew. Think especially
carefully before settling on the first port in
which you are offered a billet. Aim to be
offered at least three; better five.
Before shifting the ensign to its harbour
position, make sure that you are on exactly
the same wavelength in your discussions
with the harbourmaster and that everything
that you have discussed has been recorded
for your log. To discover, only after you are
firmly secured, that the port is infested with
rats will be too late to place rat guards.
Pilotage money
Three years ago, before living memory, it
was a standard procedure to claim pilotage
money for those who safely brought their
craft into a strange port when no pilot was
embarked. However, since the glacial age of
recession has spread icy fingers of frugalism
into rivers and estuaries far removed from
the normal limits of pack ice, there now
float growlers, hazardous to small craft,
who will not, at least at first, pay this.
Nevertheless there is no good reason why
your interview travelling expenses should
not be paid and, especially if you are of
doleful countenance, every reason why they
should. Some firms will settle travelling
expenses at each interview or at the end of a
series; so will consultancies. But others have
learnt at least one trick from Nelson and
put an air trumpet to their deaf ear. Do not
take no for an answer but equally do not
pursue a claim from a firm from whom you
may still, in future, want a job.
(Remember? - the Personnel Manager can
only say no; he cannot say yes.) A polite
letter requesting refund will usually bear
fruit, especially if an invoice is included as
this will be easier for the petty cashier. If
not, try another. If this does not succeed,
try writing to the boss of the firm
personally: he can wreak havoc in his
personnel department! You will only have
spent three postage stamps and may thereby
recover twenty quid.
Salary
Unlike the warship where everyone's salary
is, or can be, common knowledge; civilian
salaries are a taboo topic. You are dealing
with a Q ship. Estimate your cargo carrying
capacity too generously and you could
scuttle yourself through naxvety; too low
and you will be regarded as scarcely worth
the sweat of capture. The most effective
countermeasures to such torpedo attack is
to turn towards - 'What starting salary did
you have in mind?' - or turn away - 'I
am not too concerned about the starting
salary providing there is a realistic review
after three or six months.' Your naval
salary is only of academic interest. Not
everyone leaves the Navy to run a run-down
casino for a colossal salary paid into an
offshore bank. Most are content to, and
indeed have to, settle for a good deal less.
And much less than service pay, even
without its X-factor loading, is (and
especially for the WRNS) far in excess of
what the private sector thinks you are
worth. But don't undersell: many succeed
in clawing back to their equivalent service
pay after a year or so, and may then well
overtake it and never look back. Others
may neither wish nor need to seek for
financial reward. There is infinite
contentment to be gained by abandoning
the hassle of the rat race and pursuing other
interests or hobbies that pay very
reasonably. After so many years of jumping
AWAY SEABOOT
from pier heads and gilding the ship at your
own expense, now is the time to put you
and your family first.
The fundamental difference between
service pay and a civilian salary is in the
attendant remuneration package. You
should not unreasonably expect to get at
least a further 25 per cent of your salary in
perks; it is not unusual to get a further 50 per
cent in perks. The list of perks, some of
which are taxable, is very long indeed but the
usual ones would be pension fund
contributions, life insurance, medical
insurance, loan schemes, car and motoring
expenses, dining facilities, LVs, expense
account, telephone rentals, newspapers and
magazines, membership of professional
institutes. There are many others, but merely
costing the ones listed, and then grossing up
for tax, will reflect your civilian salary
package in an altogether different light.
Remember however that in addition to
your new civilian salary you will still have
your service pension which is inflationproofed and will escalate annually from your
fifty-fifth birthday onwards. This should
never be a reason for any harbourmaster to
pay you less than the proper commercial
rate. Ponder carefully whether you really
wish to work for a firm which makes
mention of or, worse still, asks you about
what is essentially your private income for
which you have paid throughout your naval
career.
Entering harbour
When all the leading marks are aligned;
when you like the harbour, the other boats
in it, and when you have received an
invitation from the harbourmaster to join
his marina, consider, while your answer
pennant is still at the dip, whether your
special sea dutymen can cope with
continuous day running at all states of the
tide and weather. Your interviews will
probably have taken place at slack water,
about 11.00 or 15.00. The harbour mouth
may take on quite a different look in
darkness and foul weather, when the tide is
in full flood at 08.30 or ebbing fast at 17.30.
Maybe the course you would have to steer
215
will be wind against tide. Check it all out
before your answer goes close up.
Wading ashore
Even when you have safely and successfully
made a suitable landfall, take care not to
splash about in the shallows as you haul
your boat up the beach. These shallows are
alive with fish which may seem pleasant and
harmless but which in fact can prove
extremely dangerous; even fatal. There are
far more of them than ever swam round the
warship in the Med when hands were piped
to bathe. But they are all there nevertheless.
The flesh-eating piranha, the slippery eel,
the sword-fish and the saw-fish, sharks and
their attendant pilot fish, the skate; in fact a
whole in-Seine net full. Know your plaice
and stick to it. Above all do not get swept
out into deep water unless, and until, you
have really learned to dive and swim with
the big fish. There are killer whales about
who thrive on taking over whole shoals of
smaller fry that swim heedless of danger
only to be spouted skywards without ever
knowing what swallowed them.
The donkey boiler
Merchantmen neither consume fuel in such
quantities nor of such high octane as menof-war. He of the mighty wine bill who may
be esteemed in blockhouse or ark as a duty
free 'player' will probably find himself
derided as a blockhead or nark on duty
paid shore power. Certainly his name on
the ship's Articles need not be marked 'T',
but neither should it be 'G' where G tends
to 2(4 x !h gi11)l + 2 CSB per day. A single
G and T, or at the most a double is a more
typical commercial consumption.
Within the confines of a warship closed
down to Mental State 1 Condition Zulu
Alpha, a whisky can be tolerated; is
sometimes amusing; even useful; and
quickly forgotten. In a merchantman,
where a missed tide means lost money, it
will be unacceptable, unfunny, valueless,
but long remembered.
Home port
While you were in the warship you probably
216
AWAY SEABOOT
had a home base near one of the main naval
ports, which your wife and children had
become used to, convenient to shops and
schools, and above all, friends. Do not be
in too much of a hurry to change this.
Piping 'Sale is now ready for collection'
when you are only secured by a head and
stern rope can leave you without any
working hands on the upper deck while
your libertymen swarm ashore into a casbah
of unknown souks, schools, and sheisters.
Better first to send out from your new
Mount Ararat a raven and a dove, before
allowing the whole menagerie to disembark.
Evening colours
Having spent my Midshipman's time in the
previous HMS Hull, I was delighted to
accept, last summer, an invitation from the
Captain of the present HMS HUN to a 'SeaDay'.
We had a marvellous time. We were
entertained royally in the wardroom,
although I sensed that this had lost
something of its former panache; we met
the same sailors, drank with the same senior
ratings, smelled the same smells, and were
treated t o an impressive display of what I
would have called General Drills but which
were now Evolutions. I had been prepared
for a fit of nostalgia but I did not find that I
missed the Navy one tot.
In the course of the Evolutions, a Man
Overboard drill was exercised:
'Are you ready in the boat?'
'All ready in the boat, Sir.'
'Out Pins.'
'Pins out in the boat, Sir.'
'SLIP!'
Are YOU ready in the boat?
TEARLESS
Correspondence
COMMANDER'S TABLE
Sir,-I
find it interesting to compare
A. J. W. W. Wilson's experiences (The
Naval Review, April 1982) at the
Commander's table with my own in the
early fifties.
My experience covered a large ship
followed by a Portsmouth shore establishment and the first thing that struck me was
the absence of any mention of SSAFA. In
connection with requestmen I found this
organisation invaluable and most efficient. I
remember one case where an Ordinary
Seaman put in a request to attend his
grandmother's funeral. The ship was at
Portland at the time and the late
grandmother in Newcastle upon Tyne.
In those days attendance at funerals was
normally limited to parents and sisters and
brothers, more distant relatives only in cases
of special hardship. I had no way of
assessing the latter but SSAFA through their
office in Portmouth produced an almost
immediate answer that there were no special
considerations in this case, so that when the
man appeared in tears at the requestmen's
table I had to let him know gently that his
request could not be granted. The tears
immediately ceased and the lad seemed
positively relieved. He had no wish to spend
a lot of money on the trip to and from
Newcastle, all he wanted to be able to tell his
relatives was that he had tried and that that
inhuman Commander wouldn't let him off!
Drugs had not appeared on the scene and
all the indecency offences that came my way
were dealt with by the civilian courts ashore.
There was quite a bit of theft but little
drunkenness. No desertion that I can
remember but a lot of AWOLeave. There
were still a good many old three badge ABs
about and their excuses were one of the
highlights of defaulters, ranging from alarm
clocks that didn't, to trains and buses that
mysteriously were not there, to the girl who
had pinched his trousers. They knew that
they would not be believed but a good story
was expected of them by the Commander,
the MAA and their messmates.
Once when the Captain of the Heads was
adrift, one of his friends was heard to
remark that he really did have to alter as the
whole 'sanity of the ship depended on him'.
Avrs
WILHELMSHAVEN RAID
Sir,-Air Vice Marshall Dudgeon kindly
sent me a copy of his letter to you
concerning the Wilhelmshaven Raid in
December 1939 which I accompanied, so
that I could comment as I wished. In part
his somewhat rude description of me as a
'near lunatic' is softened by his later
description of me as a 'dark blue expert
observer'. I must state however that while I
was always ready to become a hero I never
tried to become a dead hero, and Robin
Kilroy and I who cooked up the idea of
attacking Wilhelmshaven Docks in bad
weather using that great aircraft the
Swordfish had no doubt that we could
achieve our object and return very much
alive. However the Admiralty would not
allow.
I have always wondered whether the
Admiralty discussed our plan with the Air
Ministry and they said that they could do
the job so much better. If so it was only
right that I should be the Observer chosen
to go with them, and face what dangers
there were.
Reading between the lines of Tony
Dudgeon's story it is clear that all was very
much not well with the Wellingtons. In
particular I was astonished at the attitude of
the Squadron Commander that he could go
from aircraft to aircraft and accept a bomb
aimer strange to him. I had found the same
attitude before the War when we went to an
RAF Practice Bombing Camp at Catfoss in
Yorkshire. There I heard an RAF pilot
complaining that his bomb aimer was not
very good, and saying that he thought that
pilots should take turns with the good
aimers so that they, the pilots, would get
credit for good performances. It was when I
218
CORRESPONDENCE
found the extreme inexperience of the
bomb aimers in this, England's Premier
Day Bomber Squadron, that I accepted the
role of aimer for the leader.
With us in the FAA the team was
everything, and in the Carriers a few years
back Tony Colthurst, my pilot and
Squadron Commander, and our TAG who
also was an essential member, became truly
experts in this fascinating pastime. We tried
bombing with flights, and then with the
whole squadron against the wireless
controlled Battleship Centurion. Then the
whole squadron became part of the team
with resulting five to six hits every time
from a height of 12,000 feet (the same as the
Wellingtons). But this only resulted from
intensive training in the air and in the
Carrier.
These experiments were carried out while
we were nominally under RAF Command
though in fact the work was demanded by
our C-in-C and carried through by our
initiative. All results went through the A 0 0
Malta to the C-in-C Mediterranean Fleet
yet they did not seem to be considered of
importance to the RAF nor to be of interest
to Bomber Command. As far as one could
see the RAF had little interest in Naval
Warfare.
One could go on for a long time with
criticisms of that squadron which was
trying to d o a job that was second nature to
me but for which they had never practised,
and for which, as a result, they had little
competence. Their navigation, the lack of
binoculars, without which we never flew
(with mine I was able to tell them that they
were not approaching the low-lying land off
Wilhelmshaven but the rocky island of
Heligoland), the provision of oxygen
through a tube, the lack of vision from the
pilot's seat (my suggestion that the
Squadron Commander should not be the
pilot so that he could exercise command,
including the navigation, was of course
received with horror), no attempt to find
the wind as close to the target as possible,
thus leaving the aimer a difficult task.
As an experienced back seat aviator and
bomb aimer I wrote out what I thought of
the operation afterwards and gave it to the
Squadron Commander. T o my consternation he forwarded it to the A.O.C.
Bomber Command, Air-Marshall LudlowHewitt who in turn demanded my presence,
and then went through all I had written. He
was a most polite and nice man and I
escaped unscathed. Whether anything I
wrote had any effect, whether it promoted
the idea of Officers in the back seat (to get
an educated brain), or the revision of
navigation o r bombing methods I d o not
know, but for sure the Wellington was later
removed from its daylight role and put on
night work.
Of one thing I am sure however and that
is that had the RAF had officers as bomb
aimers their bomb sight would soon have
been replaced with a better one. With the
existing bomb sight, bombing was an art
not a science.
Another thing that disturbed me was to
find that the Wellington's bomb load was
the same as that of the despised Swordfish,
three 5001b bombs. Robin and I could have
carried the same load to the same place.
I confess that I felt a little guilty about
pressing the bomb release aimed at a
warship alongside the docks, dockyards
being verboten as a target in 1939, but I felt
that if we hit, and I was confident of the
run in, that no one would be too angry, and
in a sneaky way I also knew that I was not
the boss. Besides, having been ,sunk in
Courageous I wanted to get my own back.
My last thoughts on this operation are (1)
That it provides a really great opportunity
for someone to write a new and modern
version of The Charge of the Light Brigade
and (2) I would much rather have gone in a
Swordfish choosing my own weather.
When we got back from Wilhelmshaven I
found my relief waiting for my return, one
Lt. Cdr Phillimore. When I last saw him he
promised that if my story was published he
would tell of his time with Bomber
Command working over the North Sea, as
they still needed a Naval Observer to tell
them what was a warship and hence
bombable.
HANKROTHERHAM
CORRESPONDENCE
THE DEFENCE REVIEW LEARNING THE LESSONS
Sir,-Moneybags in his article (The Naval
Review, January 1982) states '. . . compare
the scanty armament and complacent
attitude to the air defence of the Fleet in
1939 with the measures taken in the
following years, to the multiplying gun
batteries, the drilling of lookouts,
and perhaps most of all the change of
attitude . . .'.
Such a statement is not true and very
unfair to large numbers of very senior
officers, senior officers and not so senior
officers in the fleet of the 1930s. Included in
the first group are Admirals Chatfield,
W. W. Fisher, Backhouse, Pound, Forbes,
Henderson, James, Cunningham and
Fraser.
I suspect the change of attitude and
measures taken to improve the fleet's air
defences started around 1933. When the
Abysinnian crisis broke (September 1935)
the measures were greatly accelerated. One
example - the first AA cruisers (two
converted 'C' class) arrived at Alexandria in
early 1936, each with twelve (I think) single
4 inch guns; two AA controls; air defence
positions with lookout arrangements; and
close range AA.
Between mid-1936 and September 1939
the LRAA guns in all battleships and
cruisers was doubled (twin 4 inch instead of
single); two LRAA controls fitted instead of
one and ADPs fitted. All new ships built
and those given major refits each mounted
even more and larger guns and had up to
four LRAA controls.
During the same period there was some
increase in CRAA weapons, but on this
subject there has been correspondence in
several recent issues of the journal.
From September 1935 great attention was
paid to the training of lookouts (both AA
and SU) and by 1939 the lookouts in all
ships, destroyers and larger, in the Med.
Fleet were very efficient. From experience in
CFX 1939 I believe those in the Home Fleet
were just as good. I feel sure that Captain
Roskill would be interested to learn that his
lookouts in the Warspite in 1937 and 1938
219
were not properly 'drilled' (and, apparently,
not very efficient). And so would very many
others of their own ships in the 1936 to 1939
period.
Moneybags starts his article with a myth,
so I hope the rest of the article is soundly
based.
M. CRAIGWALLER
...
.. .
AND ANOTHER THING
Sir,-Since the Defence Review a number of
comments have appeared pointing at the
weaknesses of our Naval Establishment.
One common judgement is that some of our
important organisations are 'impervious to
external stimuli', and this surely means that
we need to introduce a new kind of
discipline.
Let us assume our simple purpose is to
maintain a strong and efficient seagoing
navy. We are getting many things but in
terms of overall cost we are not getting this,
so let me offer alternatives to the seemingly
sacrosanct structures of our administration.
The MOD
Our London operation losses effectiveneis
because we have too many policy-makers.
Such numbers bring about confusion and
overheating of the system just when we need
to be sure and cool. There was a time when
officers not employed at sea went on half
pay. It cannot have been a pleasant decision
then, nor would it be now, but it should be
considered. In a broadly similar situation in
1847 two hundred captains were given flag
rank to soften the blow. Why not in 1982?
The remainder should get uniformed staff
support to avoid reliance upon civilians who
often do not recognise our aim or, in some
cases, actually appear to oppose it. The
Active List Navy's presence in London
should be further consolidated with the
provision of a central and good meeting
place (called a club if you like).
Procurement
Are our MOD designed ships camels or
greyhounds? A clue is given by the
successful commercially designed Type 21.
Another clue is that we have difficulty in
giving away some of our quite recent MOD
designs. It seems that Bath is producing
220
CORRESPONDENCE
camels under the pretext 'we need this
awkward beast to meet the threat'. It is
certain that their weapons equipment is
overdesigned and unreliable, and their
propulsion plant a 'triumph of engineering
over common sense'. Are we to believe that
the thinking that produces this state of
affairs also meets the threat?
The trouble is that DGS and DGW are
populated with experts, many outstanding
in their field, who have not been brought u p
to form teams, communicate freely, or
achieve things within time limits. Moreover
the hours are too comfortable, and Bath is
too far from the sea. Few incumbents
outside the submarine world hint that they
have a feel for the operator's routine tasks,
o r that they appreciate that the average age
of a ship's company is only twenty-one. The
solution is to move the designers nearer the
scene of action: Portland Bill will d o very
nicely.
Dockyards
Whilst one of the problems is that ships are
too complicated and unreliable, another is
that commanding officers with only fifteen
months in the chair tend t o go for
expediency. The effect, combined with the
usual national problems, is that wholehearted dockyard support failed long ago,
and, not being under the discipline of
commercial competition, dockyards have
got away with patchy and disaffected
support ever since.
Several complementary means of remedy
exist: one is t o man all the dockyards with
entirely uniformed personnel (cf. Faslane
and the Portsmouth of the future); another
is to give support staff permanent
responsibility for a given ship; thirdly t o
give the ships the right to decide whether
they are getting the support they need and
some teeth to use if they are not; finally, t o
bring the training establishments within the
boundary fence as, for example the Danish
Navy do, the effect being stimulating to
both young and old.
Research and Development
A White Paper came out years ago
recommending that industry took o n MOD
Research and Development. not much has
changed since. Once again our organisation
is not on the discipline of commercial
competition, and though their results are
sometimes useful, they take too long to
come through. This is particularly apparent
where the uniformed element have lost
control, and in this instance there is little
alternative to closing the place down. Any
that remain should be confined to the
comparative evaluation of commercially
designed equipment, and should produce
their results like Which? magazine.
One could go on but these measures
should be right to tip the balance in favour
of the seagoing fleet, and too many will be
as bad as too few. In summary we have to
ask ourselves whether we are trying to
protect jobs, or maintain an effective navy.
It is clear where duty lies, but who has the
courage to d o it?
DRUMBEAT
THE DEFENCE REVIEW
Sir,-'Rataplan' wrote (October 1981) that
it would be nice to know why the Secretary
of State disregarded Naval arguments. I
reported (January 1982) that I had attacked
my M P who had asked the Secretary of
State who had given an unsatisfactory
political answer. Members may like to
know that, after further harrying, my M P
has now come clean and explained to me
Mr Nott's real thinking.
Apparently this is:
(a) We cannot afford all the defence we
need, therefore we must concentrate
our spending on dealing with the worst
case.
(b) This is envisaged as a war in Europe
which could not last more than three
weeks without a nuclear exchange.
(c) Meanwhile reinforcements could not arrive within three weeks and, thereafter,
would be largely academic anyway.
(d) There is therefore no role for the Royal
Navy, which can be cut accordingly.
My MP, who is a good one, is now at
least unhappy about the situation and is
anxious to know more about the Naval
case. He assures me that many of his
colleagues feel the same.
CORRESPONDENCE
22 1
newly built whaler being fitted out as a
Convoy Escort at Blyth) as First Lieutenant,
and such was the urgency of getting us to sea
that we were ammunitioned, stored,
victualled, and so on, all in one day, so that
it was quite impossible to check all that was
received on board. Accordingly I carried
out a check while on passage to Belfast, and
found that we were short of seven oilskins.
Mindful that I might be charged with the
SUPPORTATTHETOP
Sir,-Deficiencies in both numeracy and cost of these, which at nine bob a day didn't
literacy are common amongst Naval appeal to me, I reported the matter on
Officers. We must all, in particular in these arrival. The CPO to whom I spoke assured
times, be avid supporters of Nelson when me there was nothing to worry about; all I
he wrote to Lady Hamilton 'I hate your pen had to do was sign the form he gave me. As
and ink men; a fleet of British ships of war a solicitor I thought it prudent to read the
are the best negotiators in Europe.' It form before signing. It was a certificate that
would appear in the Navy we are doing our the oilskins had been lost overboard in
heavy weather, no fault being attributable
best to achieve that.
However, perusal of Table 2 on page 12 to anyone on board. 'But,' said I, 'won't
of the Supply Estimates 1982-83 - Class 1 somebody ask what happened to the men
DEFENCE printed on the 9 March 1982, who were wearing the oilskins?' 'Oh no Sir,'
gives some surprising statistics in its analysis he replied, 'the Navy wouldn't think of
of headquarters staff numbers. It would asking about that.' I was learning.
appear that the Chief of Naval Staff and
My next lesson came about a year later
First Sea Lord requires 165 officers, the when I was First Lieutenant of a trawler,
Chief of the General Staff gets by with 248, Ayrshire. We were repeatedly in trouble
yet the Chief of the Air Staff needs 295 with the base (note the small 'b') Gunnery
officers.
Staff who, whenever they came on board,
In these stringent days are we not all in always complained that we didn't properly
the same boat, or airframe?
look after the four-inch shells in the readyIncidentally, the numbers required by the use racks round the gun. Determined to get
Chief of Fleet Support, Quarter Master the better of them, the next time we sailed,
General, and the Air member for supply with the certain prospect of typical WNA, I
and organisation are 52, 57, and 345 personally went on the gun platform and
respectively; enough for an awful lot of applied a more than liberal dose of a gooey
paper darts!
substance, which I think was called luting,
IVY to every ready-use shell.
We returned to Greenock (after the
LESSONS AT SEA
expected weather) shortly after noon and,
Sir,-Lieut.
Commander Fairthorne's when the hands had been piped to dinner, I
reminiscence (April 1982) about his gong went on the platform to make sure that, this
made from a shell case logged as 'lost time, there could be no complaints. I started
overboard by accident during heavy on the time-fused shells on the starboard
weather' carried my mind back to the early side, unscrewing the caps and carefully
days of the last war, when I was a solicitor checking the fuses. The first two were all
disguised as a Probationary Temporary right but, when I came to the third, I found
Acting (and almost unpaid) Sub-lieutenant to my horror that the fuse was 'spitting'.
RNVR, with much to learn of the ways of 'Oh me gawd,' I thought, 'the bloody
the Navy.
thing's going to go bang.' I must confess
I had been appointed to Southern Pride (a that my immediate reaction was to make for
I hope that as many members of The
Naval Review as possible will join in the
campaign and approach their own MPs and
explain to them the simple facts of life. It
may go against the grain after a lifetime in
the Service but it does seem to have an
effect and the cause is surely worth it.
C.C.A.
222
CORRESPONDENCE
the ladder going down to the upper deck
(where there was an armoured shelter below
the platform) but as I put my foot on the top
rung. I thought 'you can't do this, you're in
the Navy now', so I ran back, picked up the
bloody thing with the intention of throwing
it overboard. But then I realised we were
moored alongside another trawler and, I
assumed, if the thing went bang in the
course of its descent it would blow holes in
both ships. I was sure their Lordships of the
Admiralty would not approve of that, so I
went across to the port side, only to realise
that, a few minutes previously, another ship
had berthed outside us. There was only one
thing to do; run forr'd across the platform,
jump down on to the fo'c's'le, dodge round
the winch and chuck the shell into the clear
water at the entrance to the Albert Dock.
I retraced my steps, down to the upper
deck and thence down to the Wardroom
where I helped myself to a large glass of gin.
The CO, Leo Gradwell, commented that I
looked a bit white, but I explained that it
was cold up top.
However I then had the most awful
thought: it was low tide, not much depth at
the dock entrance and just about then
numerous launches would be entering the
dock laden with dockyard mateys who had
been working on ships at the Tail of the
Bank. What would happen if that wretched
shell went bang underneath one 0: them?
Saying that I had to go ashore for a few
minutes, I ran down the west side of the
dock to the Base (capital 'B' this time)
Gunnery Office where I explained the
enormity of what I had done. 'Was it,'
asked the CPO who greeted me with what
seemed to me in my agitated state quite
inappropriate heartiness, 'spitting like
this?', followed by - forgive the pun -the
spitting image of just what the fuse had been
doing. Hanging my head, I confessed that
this was indeed the case. 'Law bless you,
Sir,' he replied, 'that fuse has got water in it
and will never go off; the trouble is,' he
added, 'you don't use enough luting.'
Saddened, I once more retraced my steps,
went down to the wardroom and helped
myself to an even larger glass of gin. I was
still learning.
Arising from the above, perhaps I may
correct a statement in David Irving's 'The
Destruction of Convoy PQ.17' where he
says that Leo sent me aboard Ironclad, one
of the ships we had taken into the ice
following the order to scatter, to 'defuse' a
shell which had gone into her bows. This is
quite wrong, for I would have been unable,
and much too frightened to attempt
anything of the sort. I found it was a fourinch HETF which must have been fired by
one of the Escorts during a torpedo-bomber
attack and I felt confident that, if bashing
into the bows of a merchant ship had failed
to explode it, nothing I did was likely to
achieve that result. So all I had to do was get
hold of the thing, take it out on to the upper
deck and chuck it overboard where there
was a gap in the ice. I had at least learned
that much.'
DICK ELSDEN
RECRUITING PROPAGANDA
Sir,-A
recent article ('Still Smiling
Through the Tears', The Naval Review,
January 1982) queried the tone and content
of recruiting propaganda for the Royal
Navy, suggesting that it emphasised the
wrong things and, failed to present a
challenge to youth.
My own experience as Master of the
Adventure Training Schooner Captain
Scott from 1971 to 1974 may be of interest.
We ran a series of tough four-week courses
of sailing (square rig) and mountain
expeditions in the North of Scotland
throughout the year for young men between
sixteen and twenty years of age, and of
every conceivable background.
My committee produced an advertisement (for which I decline any
responsibility!) which emphasised such
things as 'for school leavers', 'no previous
sea experience needed', 'fully insured',
'waterproof clothing provided', etc. - in
its tone rather reflecting the Welfare State
mentality. It produced six immediate
bookings (we needed thirty-six) and five
enquiries, one of which led to two further
bookings.
My committee was then urged to publish
a more challenging advertisement reflecting
the actual experience applicants would face,
and what we called the Wild West Wind
advertisement was produced. This
emphasised the course's adventurous
aspect, its uniqueness, its toughness and
strenuous routine, the stormy northern
weather and that 'softies' should not apply
- it was for young he-men. This advertisement brought fifteen immediate bookings
and fifty-two enquiries, many of which led
to further bookings.
As the late Dr Kurt Hahn of
Gordonstoun once said, 'He who demands
much from the young commands their
willing service.'
VICTORCLARK
FUNCTIONAL LEADERSHIP
Sir,-At the time that Royal Arthur was
persuaded to adopt Functional Leadership I
was the senior course officer. Perhaps a
view from the coal face concerning the
different points of view expressed by
Admiral Clayton and Commander Styles
might be of interest.
At the time that we were told to adopt the
Functional Leadership package (when
Admiral Clayton was CINCNAVHOME),
there was very insistent pressure to use it as a
three-day undiluted block of classroom
instruction, at the beginning of the course.
This was seen as cutting right across the
spirit of Royal Arthur, by undermining the
requirement for physical fitness and
detracting from the team spirit which is
generated in the course through physical
exertion. It was seen as starting the course
on completely the wrong foot. Furthermore
some aspects of the Functional Leadership
package were seen, to use Commander
Styles's words, as mid-Atlantic gobbledegook - X and Y factors in motivation were
unlikely to appeal to Petty Officers.
We therefore set about diluting and
reforming the package by injecting periods
of gym and parade training and by rewriting
some of the material. The end result was a
working compromise, the combined
package lasted throughout the first week
and was acceptable to the lead school.
There is no doubt in my mind that
introduction of Functional Leadership
training was necessary. It is hard to believe
that Royal Arthur had sought for years to
improve the leadership ability of Petty
Officers without discussing motivation as a
subject in its own right. The approach
appeals much more to the intellectual pupil
than the 'Action Man' alternative, although
the obverse argument is also true. What is
really needed is a chance to suit the course to
the man, an approach which was given some
thought but unfortunately required rather
more resources than were available.
I hope this has shown how we came to
terms with the Functional versus Qualities
approach to leadership: we aimed to teach
the functions and develop the qualities.
K. WILLINGALE
WHAT IS IT TO BE, BEST CASE OR
WORST CASE PLANNING?
Sir,-In our justification of the British
independent nuclear deterrent we
emphasise that we must look forty years
ahead and we must allow for American
political vacillation or a reduction of
NATO resolve that could put our vital
national interests at risk.
Sensibly we allow for the 'worst case' so
beloved by Soviet planners.
Yet in our provision of anti-submarine
protection for reinforcement shipping we
put great emphasis on the excellent
technical potential of the maritime patrol
aircraft and the anti-submarine submarine,
a potential that is only of full value if
the political decision to attack Soviet
submarines is made at an early stage of any
confrontation. Surely this is 'best case'
planning and, if we are not careful,
vacillation in the making of that 'destroy'
decision will result in a 'worse case' for
which we shall in the next forty years
become increasingly less prepared?
IVY
PORT STANLEY FORTY YEARS AGO
Sir,-At the time of the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbour HMS Birmingham was
224
CORRESPONDENCE
cruising off Rio. We were immediately khaki clothing in the islands and dressed
ordered to the Falkland Islands with all Alcantara's ship's company as 'soldiers'.
despatch and told to put Port Stanley in a She then set off through the Drake strait well
state of defence.
out of sight of land and up the west coast of
It appeared that the Japanese South America. Off Valparaiso she reversed
Ambassador at Buenos Aires had told the course and closed the coast so that she could
Argentine Government that they intended to be clearly seen from the shore and sailed
take the islands and, after the war, hand south advertising her presence and the
them over to the Argentines. This may sound 'soldiers' as much as possible.
a bit far-fetched with the value of hindsight,
Meanwhile we sailed from Punta Arenas
but in fact at that time there was little to stop and went south through the Le Maire Straits.
them. Anyway it was taken seriously in It was a lovely sunny day with a calm sea so
we launched our Walrus amphibian which
Whitehall and off we went.
On arrival the Gunnery Officer and proceeded to fly round the weather station
myself the Torpedo Officer were sent ashore on Staten island and then along the coast of
to see what we could do. The total offensive Tiema del Fuego wherever it could see a
weapons we could find consisted of one six- settlement. After three hours of this we
inch gun e x - ~ a n o p uthe
s obsolete battleship recovered the aircraft near Cape Horn. This
that fired the first rounds in the ~ ~ ofthe
t t l ~is still, I believe, the furthest south that a
Falkland Islands, one four-inch gun of fixed-wing aircraft has been launched from
of HM ships.
Japanese make, two six-pounders dated one
We
then met AIcantara off Cape Horn or
1875, and two modern defence searchlights.
the cape, just
to say that
Ammunition was available for all these at least
had just west ofthe
and escorted
ancient pieces of ordnance. The trial firings, her back to port stanley whe;e the ~ ~ l k l
particularly of the six-inch seemed some- Islands defence force were reunited with
what hazardous SO we retired behind a their uniforms.
convenient hill with a long piece of cod line
Subsequently a battalion of troops were
attached to the trigger and the Gunnery stationed in the islands for the rest of the war
Officer pulled. All went well and the shell and some destroyers were sent there for a
disappeared in the direction of South time as well.
Georgia.
Whether all this had any effect one cannot
In addition to this we went in for a bit of tell, but we suspected that Whitehall was
bluff. The Birmingham with an extra canvas more concerned with the possibility of an
funnel and a canvas screen to heighten the Argentine rather than a Japanese invasion
quarterdeck appeared and disappeared whilst our forces were busily employed
along the coast of Argentina, sometimes as
AVIS
herself and sometimes as a county-class
cruiser, finishing up with a visit to Punta
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
Arenas in Chile. Rear Admiral Pegram who
Sir,-I should like to raise two points in
his flag in Birmingham had been a connection with the Falkland Task Force.
member of the British Naval Mission to
that one or more senior officers
Chile before the war and was an Honorary (1) Iofhope
the RCNC are with the force as it is
Captain in the Chilean Navy. He had his
essential that the Royal Corps should
Chilean uniform on board and went ashore
have personal experience in the ships
to pay his official calls so dressed which
under severe weather and battle
created a great and favourable impression
conditions.
on the Chileans. The object of the visit was (2) One of the logistic problems in the BPF
to 'leak' information about the increased
was shortage of fresh water as most
naval force available and the fact that a
merchant ships have very limited if any
battalion of Canadian troops was on its way
distilling capacity.
to garrison the islands.
I hope this factor has had proper
The only other ship available to US was the consideration and provision in the logistic
Armed Merchant Cruiser Alcantara of some for the Falkland Task force.
20,000 tons. We borrowed all available
F.T.E.O.
Reviews-I:
Naval Periodicals and Others
Proceedings of the United States Naval
Institute (The first part of this review
appeared in the April 1982 issue -Editor.)
are such poles apart in their treatment of
drink in ships, when their societies are so
similar.
Clothes and the man
PHOTOGRAPH supporting the paper
on the quality of the officer corps,
depicting sixteen officers being addressed
by their XO, drawn up in some semblance
of order on the upper deck of their ship, but
dressed in a curiously disparate range of
different rigs, has fanned the flames of
debate to the extent that a Supply Corps
Officer (whose colleague in the photograph
was, he observed, the only one correctly
dressed) suggested that '. . . the quality of
the officer corps could start from the
outside. If we could get them dressed
correctly/uniformly, maybe some other
things would fall in line easier.' In the same
issue, a USNR Lieutenant Commander (the
Naval Reserve seems to have been in the
forefront of comment in recent months)
contributed some trenchant thoughts in a
'Nobody Asked Me, But . . .' article, in
which he records his solution to the
problem of winter blues (commonly known
as the 'Gestapo' uniform) as either to come
to work in civilian clothes and change to a
flight suit, or not come in at all. When he
retires, he says, he plans to be piped over
the side by a bosun in all-wool bell bottoms
and a dixie cup hat, alongside one officer in
tropical whites and an aviator in a flying
jacket, with beside them a female aviator in
her maternity uniform. This comparatively
light-hearted concern with the confusion
surrounding the outer man receives sterner
support in a messianic paper (November
1981) on the abuse of drugs, ashore and
afloat, and of alcohol, which seriously
insists on yet further constraints on
consumption of drink in the Navy, taking
the whole thing even further than the late
secretary Josephus Daniels would have
dared. It is constantly astonishing how the
navies of the two principal species of North
American man, the USN and the Canadian,
Ave Atque Vale
Subjects come and go. On a more positive
note than some of late, a new approach yet reflecting American anxieties in a role
still comparatively novel and perplexing is the study of 'Naval Diplomacy in the
Persian Gulf' (November 1981), which
deserves the attention of those who may
have forgotten what history has taught us.
In a clear and logical discussion of the
relationship between diplomatic objectives
and the use of force, a subject which in the
light of recent events may be expected to
flourish in coming months, the author
begins by observing that the latter, of itself,
is not the decisive factor in the former;
rather that the perception of credibility is
the essence of influence. Citing the
examples of 1958 and 1973, when American
diplomatic objectives were made quite clear
by the operation of the Sixth Fleet, and then
by contrast the Soviets' limited deployment
which showed only that Soviet diplomatic
interests in the Middle East were perceived
in Moscow as peripheral, the author arrives
at the view (still not widely understood or
articulated in the West) that 'the military,
economic and diplomatic elements of power
are interactive and mutually supportive.'
But it is the relevance of Soviet land power
to the present situation in the Persian Gulf
which is the new and critical dimension,
distinguishing super-power naval diplomacy
in the area from earlier crises in the
Mediterranean; the Soviet deployment in
the Indian Ocean marks the first time that
the Soviet Navy has been employed as a
defensive flank for the Soviet Army in time
of peace. The military confrontation is
therefore no longer restricted to naval
diplomacy, and the immediate challenge for
American foreign policy is thus to offset the
political advantage of Soviet military
superiority in the Persian Gulf. This can
A
226
REVIE
I
'
I
I
only be done by reasserting American
military superiority in the region. Not
surprisingly, the author is a marine. Yet this
is a subject on which we could well hear
more.
On the other hand, discussion of the
merchant marine has for several months
(including the October 1981 number,
purportedly given over to the subject) been
attracting the attention of earnest, and
occasionally rather laboured pens.
Somehow, despite the serious pictures
repeatedly painted of the way the Soviets
increasingly dominate the world's shipborne trading system, it takes more light to
clarify the issue for your reviewer than has
yet been shone on it. Again, however,
recent events have dramatically
demonstrated the need for merchant ships
in war. Here, perhaps, is a new challenge,
ready to be picked up in our own pages, by
igniting a discussion in the way that
Admiral Rickover did in last year's
Proceedings over leadership articles.
And just to finish on a note of classic
compromise, there is in the story of 'The
Fate of the Badger State' (October 1981) a
reminder of the power of the sea, by which
we all live, to humble man's aspirations and
to expose with relentless unforgiving the
weakness of the idle and the unprepared, as
well as of the brave. The Badger State,
under charter to the Military Sea
Transporation Service, loaded a cargo of
more than six thousand tons of munitions
at the naval ammunition depot, Bangor,
Washington, and sailed for Vietnam on
the 14 December 1969. The loading had
been surrounded by controversy and
disagreement, arguments about the
stowage, including the blocking and
bracing of bombs, and by dissatisfaction
from the crew on the lack of supervision
and other irresponsibility on behalf of those
ashore. The disgusted first assistant
engineer had walked off the ship, and was
persuaded only with difficulty to return.
From the 18 December, when the weather
began to deteriorate, things got worse and
worse; a defect in the shaft allowed water to
pour in to the lower engineering spaces; a
leak developed in the steering gear,
necessitating the ship's lying stopped and
rolling up to thirty-five degrees; a boiler
defect had to be repaired, taking twelve
hours of heavy rolling when the cargo
started to shift; and finally loose equipment
as well as heavy bombs in the holds began
to take charge and break loose. Shortly
after midnight on Christmas Day, with the
wind at Force Twelve and the barometer at
955 millibars, the ship rolled fifty-two
degrees either way. A few hours later, there
was an explosion in the forward starboard
corner of one of the bomb spaces, blowing
a hole in the ship's side; 2000 1b bombs
began to slide out of the ship into the
sea; one fell into a manned lifeboat as the
crew abandoned ship. On the morning of
5 January 1970 the ship finally sank, with
the loss of twenty-six of her crew of
forty.
When we tend, as professionals we do, to
get carried away on a tide of adrenalin
taking us unseeing down this specific path
or that - whether it be one of high
strategy, or intelligence, or weapon
capability, or 'the education of a warrior';
or even, heaven help us, the low field like
drink or the problems of merchant navies
- it is very meet, right and proper that we
should be reminded from time to time, as
judiciously selected papers in the
Proceedings constantly do, of the elemental
antipathy to our designs which the
capricious sea can exercise; and that we
should ponder (Ronald Hopwood again)
the question
. . . if the Truth were better sought.
In the latest words of Science, or the deeds our
Fathers wrought.
P.M.S.
(concluded)
LA NOUVELLE REVUE MARITIME
There are four issues for review; from
December 1981 to May 1982. In a
December review of the new Flottes de
Combat, the section on the Royal Navy
includes the following passage:
But it is above all, in spite of North Sea oil,
the slow and continuing deterioration of the
REVIEWS-I
economic and political power of the United
Kingdom, which are the origins of the decline of
the Royal Navy. But, for all that, all is not as dark
as some have written - the thoughts in which
some impenitent anglophobes rejoice. In the near
future, the British Navy will become numerically
less important than it is today: but it will be
composed of less aging units and will possess the
finest fleet of nuclear attack submarines in
western Europe. Taking account of its
composition, manned by magnificent personnel,
it will be wholly fit to fill what has become its
principal and perhaps only mission: to support
the U.S. Navy, facing the threat in the Atlantic of
the Soviet drive for maritime expulsion.
The opening article in February 1982 sets
out the naval budget for 1982. In his message
to the Fleet, the Chief of Naval Staff,
Admiral Lannuzet regards the authorisations as barely satisfactory - if that: 'My
most ardent wish is to see them rise to a level
compatible with the objectives of "Marine
2000" ' (the naval way ahead programme).
The principal article, in the series on
foreign navies, is by Stephen Roberts,
analyst at the USN Center for Naval
Analysis at Alexandria. Sub-titled
'Vigilance and Presence', it is a personal
view of the US Navy, lengthy and fully
expounded.
In March, the major historical article is by
Jacques Raphad-Leygues, himself a
brilliant politician and, latterly, diplomat. It
is a biographical sketch in honour of his
maternal grandfather, Georges Leygues,
eleven times Minister for the Navy between
1917 (aged 62) and his death in 1933.
Although he had no seagoing background
or tradition, Georges Leygues, on becoming
Navy Minister in 1917, quickly became an
effective and understanding leader in his
field - his early ministerial experience had
been largely in education. With a place in the
War Council 'it was notably these that he
endeavoured to serve the Navy that he had
just discovered and for which he was smitten
by a passion that would never leave him'.
With this driving sense of dedication, he was
the political architect of the magnificent
fleet with which France started World War
11. His main contribution had been the
successful fighting of the political battle for
the Navy's needs. He was keenly aware of
227
the submarine threat. Shortly after his death
in 1933, one of the 6-inch cruisers coming
forward in the building programme was renamed Georges Leygues. This reviewer had
the honour of serving in her in 1943 - a
happy and efficient ship.
A brief note lists the various old warships
preserved as memorials or museums
throughout the world (e.g. HMS Belfast),
the United States having by far the longest
list. It came as a pleasant surprise to note
that the Polish destroyer Blyskawica, well
known in World War I1 is preserved at
Gdynia.
The May foreign navies article is a
relatively brief one on the Swedish Navy by
its Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Per
Rudberg and timed to coincide with his
official visit to Paris. The principal and
historical article 'The French Admiralty
(1939-1940), at Maintenon and on the road'
by Captain Arnaud d'Antin de Vaillac, now
retired, who, as a Lieutenant had been guard
commander and executive officer of the
Admiralty HQ unit.
The term 'Amirautd' with the heavily
qualifying word 'franfais' for the Supreme
Command of naval forces was adopted on
the eve of the outbreak of war as was the
rank of 'Admiral de la Flotte' for Admiral
Darlan. The writer in a lighter vein remarks
that the word Admiralty immediately
suggests the Royal Navy, applying
exclusively to 'Leur Seigneuries les Lords de
la Mer' (TLS) - 'striped with gold and
covered with decoration, who one visualises
bending over charts in opulent offices in the
heart of London'.
It was planned for each Service HQ to
move out of Paris, as the bombing threat
was taken seriously.
The site selected for 'I'Amiraute'franqaise
was in the grounds of the chateau at
Maintenon, seventy-five kilometres from
Paris and the hutted accommodation was
being assembled as war broke out. The
article is a very interesting account of the
Admiralty Unit which continued to function
well until its arrival at Vichy, 'the last stage
in a heart-breaking Tour de France'. Very
interesting and worth careful study.
C.M.S.
I
I
I
Reviews-11:
THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR
STRATEGY
by LAWRENCE
FREEDMAN
(Macmillan, 198 1-£ 25)
Nuclear strategy is not a jolly subject, but it
is of such compelling and universal
significance that argument about the topic
has become a game at which all can play. In
the emotional dimension the players range
from the bra-less, muesli-eating, folkweaving CND marcher to the dry, rimlessly
bespectacled,
totally
strangelovian
theoretician. The first has an entirely
justifiable fear of nuclear war and a
legitimate concern for the survival of future
generations of the human species, but,
perhaps, little understanding of or
sympathy with the iron imperatives of
power politics. The second may also have a
similar set of concerns but conceals them
well behind a wall of impenetrable jargon;
he speaks of megadeath, doomsday
machines, and splendid counterforce.'
Communication between these two is liable
to be fragmentary and laced with the sound
of slamming doors.
In the intellectual dimension the players
range from the geo-strategic political
animals, who can couch the most delicate
of interrelated concepts within the finest
nuances of language, to the military
scientists who regard the squeezing of the
last hundred metres of CEP out of the
possible physics of the guidance system as
their own personal challenge and whom,
one often fears, seldom look up to see what
they are doing, Pugwash notwithstanding.
In the military dimension, the terrain is
tailor-made for dissension. At one end
there are orders of battle, throw-weights,
yields, accuracies - all of which are
susceptible to number-crunching and to
statistical (lying?) analysis. At the other end
there is the inaccessible nature of the other
sides' perceptions about the nuclear threat
and how he, or you, might act under crisis
conditions. Is he self-deterred? Am I
deterring him? The further one gets away
Books
from the numbers, the more weighty is the
value of untestable personal opinion. And
the game is conclusively overlaid by the fact
that none of the players know what a
nuclear war would be like, nor whether
there would be any pay-offs for anybody
afterwards.
A review of this book in the Economist
read as follows:
. . . it is written in a style that is difficult at the
best of times and which sometimes slips into
grammatical constructions of gruesome
awkwardness. Such writing is hard to plough
through when the subject is simple; when it is the
convoluted subject of nuclear philosophy the
result is not only burdensome but often nearly
incomprehensible.
I really could not disagree more; the
structure of the subject matter is admirably
laid out chapter by chapter, the arguments
are clearly exposed with apt and significant
quotation, the sentences are not very long,
the grammar seems adequate to your
impurist reviewer, and such jargon as is
used is necessary. Perhaps those who find
argument of this quality incomprehensible
should just try harder. A lot of literature is
noticeably more technoboggling than is this
lucid exposition. In my view, Lawrence
Freedman's work would be a rewarding
read for all the stereotypes limned above,
no mean achievement.
Readers will recall that the other
Laurence, Laurence Martin, made the point
in the 1981 Reith Lectures that, compared
to the study of war in general, the study of
nuclear philosophy is a young one and that
we have had little time and fortunately few
live examples against which to test our
theories. A short forty years have passed
since the Manhattan Project, and since then
the pace of technological advance has been
matched only by the exponential growth of
argumentative verbiage. This book
compares with the 1981 Reith Lectures;
"Splendid counterforce - that degree of counterforce
which can eliminate an enemy's entire nuclear force
before retaliation. Today, largely a theoretical concept.
REVIE
they appeared concurrently and are both
surrounded by the same fuzzy cloud of
close media attention that has become such
a feature of the present day. There is a
distinct difference of treatment between the
two, however, for the flavour of Laurence
Martin's lectures contained much of his
personal viewpoint and much consideration
of the impact of nuclear affairs upon
conventional military thinking and upon
today's geopolitical situation. This book is
highly impersonal; it is indeed a history of
the evolution of pure and applied nuclear
strategy at the highest level.
Since Hiroshima, the intervening
historical period can be divided into four
major phases. There was the American
nuclear monopoly until about 1953, the
first Russian nuclear test being in 1949.
From 1954 to 1960 there was the period of
'massive retaliation' under which the USA
threatened to respond to aggressive actions
using massive force. From 1961 the
American administration under Kennedy
and Johnson sought to develop flexibility in
nuclear forces and a twin doctrine of
'assured destruction' and 'damage
limitation', emphasising the need for
control during the course of a nuclear war.
This phase set the mould for the present
day; from 1969 NATO has adopted a
strategy of 'flexible response' in which the
declared position is that any level of
aggression would be met with an
'appropriate response', including, if
necessary, first use of nuclear weapons. (As
one of the progenitors of these policies, it is
interesting to note Robert McNamara's
recent subscription to a no-first-use policy
for NATO - taking risks at the conventional level in Europe, no doubt, but a
proposal which could become an element in
damping down the protest movement.)
NATO policy is backed by American
central strategic systems which introduce an
element of Mutual Assured Destruction
into the equation should exchanges escalate
to that level. Threading through these last
two phases is the search for a strategy that
might ameliorate an intractable problem,
the need never to be confronted with a
choice between surrender and annihilation.
A recent IISS study * by Desmond Ball into
the surviveability of strategic communications throughout a nuclear exchange
does nothing to establish confidence in the
viability of a controlled response strategy;
the prediction that chunks of the
communications systems of both
antagonists would become inoperative due
to EMP, TREE, and other effects adds
another dimension to the uncertainty
confronting both aggressor and defender.
But as Dr Freedman states, the basic
axioms of the nuclear age were early
established: the impossibility of defence,
the vulnerability of cities, the attraction of a
sudden attack, and the concomitant
necessity of a survivable retaliatory
capacity. It has been the hardware that has
caught up with the thinking in the interval;
while counterforce targetting and damage
limitation was possible and planned for in
the heyday of the Strategic Air Command,
the intercontinental ballistic missile ushered
in both a real capability for pre-emptive
strike and a real defencelessness for the
attacked. Sufficient missile accuracy has
now made possible the reinstitution of
strategic calculations about flexible
targetting; no longer is city-busting the only
deterrent option. Both superpowers have
built nuclear forces which are each capable
of functioning under the same basic Mutual
Assured Destruction scenario; a preemptive strike against central land-based
systems must be sufficiently survivable to
leave enough uncertainty that the secondstage aim of being able to hold the preemptee's cities hostage is not achievable.
Both superpowers have without doubt a
significant first-strike capability which,
logically, must be used first in the
counterforce mode. This is inherently
unstable but a capability which neither
superpower can afford to forgo. Stability is
restored by the many operational factors
contributing to uncertainty and by a
survivable force, again held by both, of
second-strike weapons mostly carried in
'Adelphi Paper No. 169, Autumn 1981.
REVIE
I
SSBNs. As with all insurance policies, it is
worth paying a high premium to avoid a
catastrophe. This explains the avidity of the
technological race and the desire of both
superpowers to block off any conceivable
option available at any level to the other
side. This tendency is visible all the way
down the escalatory staircase; in NATO's
Theatre Nuclear Force modernisation
programme and even to the ostensibly quite
unnecessary MIRV-ing of the SS20
warheads, for example.
Approximately the first third of this book
deals with these topics, explaining the early
theories of Douhet, Fuller, and Liddell
Hart, the evolution of a philosophy of
deterrence and the manner in which the
nuclear arms race has gradually foreclosed
all theoretical options until an interlocked
state of stalemate obtains. Both Martin and
Freedman note the difficulties in
dismantling this edifice by means of
disarmament or arms control; it can clearly
be argued (especially if one was Russian) that
the early years of this evolution were less
stable than today and that any reversal of the
process, unless most carefully arranged,
might lead to dangerous imbalances.
Dr Freedman supports his major themes
with a variety of peripheral expositions.
One of these is the Soviet approach to
deterrence which exhibited an early lack of
congruence t o American thinking,
postulating an ultimate triumph of
Socialism even through a victory in nuclear
war. Gradually, although their closed
society and an absence of freedom of
debate militated against reliable western
assessment, Soviet thinking appeared to
begin to follow that of the Americans and
to accept the Mutual Assured Destruction
philosophy and its corollaries. Recent
statements by President Brezhnev seem to
underline this viewpoint. It has been said
that the Soviet Union believes in a 'warfighting' capability for its nuclear weapons
rather than a 'deterrent' one; indeed, in the
BBC debate on the Reith Lectures chaired
by Michael Charlton, the sometime
Director of SIPRI, Frank Barnaby,
attacked the introduction of the Pershing I1
missile because of its accuracy and hence
'war-fighting' capability. Passing over the
fact that such thinkers, among whom are
those imputing dangerous motives to US
Presidential Directive 59, must logically
prefer attacks on large targets (i.e. cities full
of people) rather than small ones (i.e.
weapons), this line of thought conceals a
semantic confusion. True deterrence will
exist if each side perceives that the other has
a competency to fight the war, not
otherwise. Avoiding this confusion lies at
the heart of an understanding of nuclear
strategic thought.
There is a short chapter of formal game
theory in which the possible outcomes of
two 'games', 'Prisoner's Dilemma' and
'Chicken', are exposed. Both have their
applications to nuclear strategy. Prisoner's
Dilemma, in which players are forced into
confrontation and must extricate
themselves by estimating an unknown
degree of mutual trust, is applicable to arms
control. Chicken, the well-known test of
toughness between two teenagers in a headon automobile collision situation, is
applicable to international confrontation.
Each side must convince the other that it is
prepared to go to the brink. Ruses are
possible; one player can pretend to be
drunk or to lack the option of swerving
(videlicet the Doomsday Machine) and thus
discountenance the other. But the game
takes on significance if it is repeated; it is in
this context that the tragic Falklands
Islands crisis is so important for NATO.
Repetitive defeats in games of non-nuclear
Chicken bring closer the day that nuclear
Chicken might have to be played.
The evolution of the European nuclear
option is also described in detail, the
philosophies behind the decisions, the
details of the French and British
acquisitions and the failure of the MLF
idea. Lawrence Freedman concludes that
the French have found themselves staying
closer to NATO than expected, despite their
nuclear independence, and that Britain has
had some difficulty in maintaining a
consistent rationale for Polaris as the
strategies evolved.
REVIE
In his article in the Sunday Times of
21 February, Field Marshal Lord Carver
made a case against the replacement of
Polaris by the Trident system. Besides cost,
his ground were a rejection of the immoral
'trigger' or 'Samson in the temple'
argument, wherein the Kremlin might be
made to perceive that unilateral nuclear
initiation by a Britian under stress might
lead to superpower engagement, that the
presence of American troops in Europe is a
sufficient guarantee of involvement, and
that, as well as using the money to better
conventional ends, the absence of
Polaris/Trident would force British
governments and Chiefs of Staff to take
conventional defence more seriously. He
does, however, support the maintenance of
a theatre capability as part of NATO's
forward-based systems, to .be Britishmanned and based either in UK or in the
surrounding waters. Here his argument
seems weakened; for unless the range of
these systems is to be artificially (and
immorally?) constrained to Warsaw Pact
satellite territory, thus not provoking the
USSR, it would seem that the thickly
populated UK would be more of a hostage
to Soviet nuclear weapons than if an
invulnerable strategic system existed to
protect it. Lord Carver's further argument
is that Trident is an insignificant addition to
American systems. But however inadmissible it may be to speculate about the
future of transatlantic cohesion, there must
be some risk that somewhere in the
uncertain future there may be a need for
Europe itself to be able to stand up against
the adjacent superpower. The French
certainly believe this; it is a highly malleable
set of presumptions to work to, for there is
an argument that says that the very
existence of an independent European
strategic deterrent might give the United
States a tolerable and internally attractive
reason to disconnect its umbrella, thus
bringing about the undesired outcome. To
those who say, 'But Switzerland or Spain
don't seem to need a nuclear deterrent', the
answer is 'Yes, they rely on Britain and
France.' To which the reply might be 'Why
should we protect Switzerland and Spain?'
To which one might say 'If you are arguing
that because Switzerland and Spain don't
need a deterrent, and Britain is no
different, then you are proposing to rely on
American protection. Why should they
continue to do so?' It must also be observed
that to deny oneself nuclear weapons is no
protection against nuclear attack, especially
if one is heavily armed conventionally.
There is no space here to dwell on the
views of both Lawrences about nuclear
proliferation; there are dangers in saying
that, in the uncertain future, Trident might
be a deterrent against a minor proliferated
power such as the Argentine. But given that
the United Kingdom is already a nuclear
power, that our foreign policy is likely to be
less acquisitive than most, that Trident
costs less than the Tornado Project and
about the same, over twelve or so years, as
seven months of the Department of Health
and Social Security, it does seem that
Trident is a worthwhile premium to pay.
How it should be paid is another matter.
In his conclusion, Dr Freedman says: 'An
international order that rests upon a
stability created by nuclear weapons will be
the most terrible legacy with which each
succeeding generation will endow the next.'
He foresees that our future will depend
upon our ability to address the problems of
nuclear arsenals in a world of political
change. Those responsible for these
weapons live by the motto that if they ever
have to use them they will have failed 'C'est magnifque mais ce n'est pas la
stratkgie'. While I would have liked to have
seen more discussion of the linkage between
nuclear action at sea and on land, this book
is comprehensive, rational, and informed; a
book for stealing if you find the price too
steep.
G. F. LIARDET
THE CRISIS IN WESTERN SECURITY
edited by LAWRENCE
S. HAGEN
(Croom Helm 4 3 3 . 9 5 )
Lawrence Hagen has assembled a very
powerful team of defence analysts and his
'The Crisis in Western Europe' splendidly
232
REVIE
complements Kenneth Myers's 'NATO:
The Next Thirty Years' which came out in
1980, also from the Croom Helm stable.
Like Myers's book, this is a collection of
articles springing from a conference, but
one which is welded into a coherent whole
much more effectively than is usually the
case with this genre of academic analysis. It
makes a first-rate collection, and is essential
reading for the student of western defence.
The articles focus on the problem of arms
control and western security. Without
exception, the contributors believe that
arms control is in deep trouble, and that
this is partly due to the paradox that real
arms control agreements are only possible
between countries which do not think they
will have to fight each other. Lawrence
Freedman emphasises for instance the
extent to which arms control negotiation in
practice is only a hard-nosed process of
arms race manipulation. He points out that
the central difficulty in radical arms control
agreements, which really restrain the
deployment of military forces, is that they
are unnecessary in situations of strategic
stability and impossible otherwise. The
difficulties in the way of achieving success
are such, he says, that pushing for talks and
agreements will not, as is often thought to
be the case, improve the atmosphere in its
own right. Failing to bring about an
agreement will probably do more harm than
not trying at all. Probably, it would be
better to restrict oneself to very modest
objectives indeed, in the hope that one can
actually achieve them.
Colin Gray and Richard Burt both take
up the point that arms controlling is a
particularly dangerous game for the West to
play as its conduct and outcome could do
substantial harm to western security. In the
first place, the Soviet Union is now much
more powerful and self-confident than it
used to be; it has a greatly enhanced allround capacity to make war. There are,
says Richard Burt, dangerous times ahead
for the United States. As a result, the
Americans will be less able to establish the
ground rules for arms control negotiation
(- though it has to be said that the track
record of such negotiations in the period of
American ascendancy was pretty dismal
too). Secondly, NATO is a most inefficient
agency for conducting arms control
negotiations for Europe because European
electorates expect so much more of them
than they seem likely to deliver. Western
negotiators are consequently under a
special pressure to seem to be successful,
and this could produce unequal agreements
whose terms might undermine western
strategic interests. Alternatively, if such
attempts eventually fail (as all the analysts
in this book think they will), their failure
may be put down by a disillusioned public
to NATO's present workings, force deployments and strategic assumptions. This
could lead to a slackening of general
support for the western alliance. Indeed the
rhetoric of E. P. Thompson and the
European Nuclear Disarmament movement
already tends to view Brezhnev and Reagan
as equal in malignity towards western
Europe and their Generals as equally
culpable in the failure to achieve
agreement.
One of the reasons for this misperception, it seems, is that the West has
not really evolved a coherent defence policy
- or so at least believes Philip Windsor.
Despite the jargon and the arguments adds
Colin Gray, the West is still reluctant to
think strategically. Nothing could illustrate
this more than the current furore over the
modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear
forces. Lothar Rue1 usefully reminds us of
the oft-forgotten point that it was at the
behest of the Europeans (the West Germans
in particular) that NATO decided on this
modernisation programme in 1979.
Nevertheless, it is not completely selfevident that the deployment of 108
Pershing 11s and 464 ground-launched
cruise missiles would in fact tighten the
links between the strategic interests of the
United States and NATO Europe, and nor
is it obvious that the numbers being
considered are enough for NATO's strictly
operational requirements. Paul Buteux
introduces a useful discussion of these
points.
REVIE
Nevertheless, the real crisis in western
security is more substantial than all this
implies. Differences in approach to arms
control, and even the furore over TNF
modernisation, are really to be seen as
symptoms of a deeper malaise best explored
by Pierre Hassner. He argues that the real
crisis is political; it is a crisis which shows
itself also in an incoherent response to
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a
failure to agree a common economic policy
toward the Soviet Union, varying attitudes
to Poland's troubles and a marked
difference in approach to the problems of a
wider world (as shown by policies towards
Israel, Iran, El Salvador and so on). All
these disputes divide Europe from the
United States to a greater or lesser extent,
but the Falklands conflict, which broke out
long after these articles were written of
course, threatens the even more damaging
possibility of intra-European disputes as
well. In a conflict where the United States
publicly weighs support for Britain against
its political aspirations in South America,
where West Germany carefully balances the
need to support Britain against her trading
interests in the area and where one NATO
member (Spain) works assiduously to push
a resolution through the UN Security
Council which it knows another (Britain)
would certainly veto, the Western Alliance
may come to be seen simply as a cynical
arrangement in which countries help each
other just to the extent that it is in their
immediate interest to do so. Should this
impression gain ground, we could see a
crisis in Western security that would make
those discussed in this excellent book pale
in comparison.
GEOFFREY
TILL
ALANBROOKE
by DAVIDFRASER
(Collins-£ 12.95)
'His life's climax was as professional head
of the British Army and Chairman of the
British Chief of Staff's Committee in the
Second World War. As such he was without
peer . . . . He was the best Chief of the
Imperial General Staff ever produced by
the Army, and he was produced at the vital
hour. Britain was fortunate indeed.' So
concludes General Sir David Fraser in what
must be one of the finest biographies ever
written.
The part played by Field Marshal Lord
Alanbrooke in the Second World War has,
of course been the subject of two admirable
books written by Sir Arthur Bryant, based
on Alanbrooke's diary and notes, and with
the latter's collaboration. It is fitting,
therefore, that Sir Anthony Bryant has
written both a Prologue and an Epilogue to
Sir David Fraser's book. As Sir Arthur
points out, this biography provides an
invaluable corrective to Alanbrooke's
wartime diary, for it presents him 'not as he
drew himself in his exhausted and harassed
midnight diary entries . . . but as he was,
and was seen to be by those who served and
worked with him'. This reviewer can
certainly endorse that statement, for he was
fortunate enough to be in intermittent close
contact-with this great soldier during the
1940 campaign in France and Flanders.
It is not possible to pay more than
cursory attention to Alanbrooke's earlier
career in a short review. He was born in
1883 in a village in the French Pyrenees and
spoke French before he could speak
English. Deciding at the age of sixteen that
he wanted to be a soldier, he went through
the Royal Military Academy and was
commissioned into the Royal Field
Artillery. By 1914 he had served for three
years in Ireland, followed by eight in India
(during which he failed the Quetta Staff
College examination). Coming home on
leave he got married (not a popular act by a
subaltern) and had his honeymoon
interrupted by the outbreak of war and an
order to return to India.
At Port Said he met his own unit on its
way to France; and there Brooke served
until the end of the war. During most of it
he held Artillery staff appointments, in
which his outstanding ability was noted. It
was rewarded by his nomination as a
student in the first post-war Staff College
course at Camberley. After a subsequent
period on a divisional staff, he returned to
234
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the Staff College as an Instructor and then
went as a student to the Imperial Defence
College. Whilst he was at Camberley, in
1925, his life was completely shattered by
the death of his wife in a car accident.
After leaving the IDC, Brooke went back
to regimental duty. This did not mean
command of an artillery brigade, because
Brooke, though now a Brevet LieutenantColonel, was still a major in his regiment.
In fact, Brooke was never a commanding
officer (a job normally considered the best
in the Army), and this may have been the
reason for General Sir Bernard Paget (as
quoted by Fraser) saying that Brooke 'had
little understanding of the average soldier
or day-to-day life of Regiment or Unit'.
Brooke was soon offered command of a
medium artillery brigade in India; but in
February 1929 this offer was overtaken by
his appointment as Commandant of the
School of Artillery with the temporary rank
of Brigadier. In the same year he achieved
happiness again in a second marriage.
From then on, until the beginning of the
Second World War, he was, in succession,
Instructor at the IDC, Commander 8th
Infantry Brigade, Inspector of Artillery (as
a Major-General), Director of Military
Training, Commander of the Mobile
Division, Commander Anti-Aircraft
Command (as a Lieutenant-General), and
Commander-in-Chief Southern Command.
On 3 1 August 1938 Brooke was told that
he would conimand the I1 Corps of the
British Expeditionary Force. The Corps
included the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions,
but it was short of equipment and many of
its supporting arms and services were units
of the Territorial Army without any postmobilisation training. Brooke took full
advantage of the months that elapsed
before active operations began to train his
Corps. He commanded it brilliantly in the
short and disastrous campaign that
followed. Indeed, General Sir Ronald
Adam, to whom he handed over command
when ordered to return to England,
described Brooke's handling of it as
'perfect'.
Once back in England, Brooke was
ordered to form a new BEF and return to
France. He was not there long, for, in an
acrimonious telephone conversation, he
convinced Churchill that a second
evacuation was necessary.
Brooke returned to Southern Command,
but on 19 July 1940 he was appointed
C-in-C Home Forces. On 16 November
1941 Churchill asked him to succeed
General Sir John Dill as CIGS, and he did
so on Christmas Day. Churchill's first
choice had in fact been Lieutenant-General
Sir Archibald Nye, but the latter protested
that Brooke was the only possible selection.
Churchill was most reluctant, saying:
'When I thump the table and push my face
towards him, what does he do? Thumps the
table harder and glares back at me - I
know these Brookes - stiff-necked
Ulstermen, and there's no worse to deal
with than that.' It was a fair if slightly
exaggerated description of encounters
which were to take place between these two
great men during the years that followed despite these encounters they became
devoted to each other. They were indeed
complementary: Churchill providing the
broad strategic vision, though totally
ignorant of logistics and military realities;
whilst Brooke, with his practical grasp of
what would and would not work, and with
his firmness of purpose, fought, says
Fraser, 'with tenacity, courage, and skill for
a realistic strategy and for a path that would
lead most surely and most economically to
victory'.
Brooke became Chairman of the British
Chiefs of Staff Committee on 8 March
1942, a post for which he was peculiarly
fitted because of his appreciation of sea
power as the basis of allied strategy. Of the
other Service Chiefs, in Portal (later
Marshal of the RAF Lord) he had a
colleague with similar interests to his own.
He was not impressed by Admiral of the
Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, but he did not
realise that the gallant old man was fatally
ill. When Pound died on 22 October 1943,
Brooke was delighted that Churchill
selected the later Admiral of the Fleet Lord
Cunningham to succeed him. The two
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identical armaments and it was the rule
rather than the exception for the armament
to be changed during the life of a ship.
Then come the chapters describing
cruiser actions, the chapter headings
speaking for themselves - 'Cruisers against
Warships',
'On Trade Protection',
'Classical Roles and New Concepts',
'Against Aircraft'; and 'Army Cooperation'. Finally there is a chapter
assessing their role and final days.
Every action that the authors have
researched is described in brief detail some
of which I have not seen in print before. It
is not easy to highlight important points
from these descriptions since they are so
varied but those that struck me are:
CRUISERS IN ACTION
1939 - 1945
(a) Cruisers we started World War I1
with had good sea-keeping qualities
by PETER C. SMITH and JOHNR. DOMINY
but lacked protection and had very
(William Kimber-£1 1.95)
poor AA capabilities.
This book is much more informative than
its title might lead one to expect. It desires
(b) It was often difficult to bring a
warship or disguised merchant ship
cruisers' actions of all types classified in
raider to action as the enemy policy
separate chapters by the type of action, that
was to avoid the risk of damage.
is against warships, on trade protection
duties, against aircraft, and in support of
(c) The Italian Navy never stood up to
a bold offensive policy and nearly
the Army. It also includes a number of
always sought to avoid action.
tables and appendices giving details of a
variety of facts concerning cruisers in the
(6) The Japanese Navy's training in
night fighting and naval aviation
World War I1 period and after, and these
was much in advance of what was
make it a very useful reference book.
believed to be the case.
Appendix 111 in particular records each
individual cruiser's service from 1939 to
(e) Some of our losses can be directly
attributed to cruisers being
1946 and no doubt can provide the answer
employed on unsuitable tasks for
to many queries.
political reasons.
It opens with two chapters outlining
cruiser construction from 1914 to 1939 and
u> Only too often when dealing with a
suspected disguised commerce
analysing the problems and policies
raider the cruiser approached too
resulting. The authors show how the several
close before taking action.
Naval Conferences and scarcity of money
influenced our building programmes,
(g) Armed Merchant Cruisers were no
resulting in types of cruisers we did not
match for disguised raiders since
really want, that is the eight-inch gun
they had very inferior armament.
cruisers, while at the same time forcing us
( h ) When attacked by dive bombers no
solution of how to deal with them
to accept a lower total number of cruisers
than was considered necessary. It was a
was ever found and the casualties
difficult period, since neither America nor
were heavy.
Japan accepted our needs for trade
( i ) Troops ashore in trenches and
protection.
protected positions will stand up to
An interesting point is made that cruisers
bombing from theair but do not like
of the same class did not always have
facing heavy-gunfire from the sea.
became firm friends, and the team of
Brooke, Cunningham, and Portal lasted till
ultimate victory and beyond - the most
effective wartime tri-Service leadership that
has probably ever existed.
There was unfortunately no such close
association of views with the American
Chiefs of Staff, and dealing with them was
always difficult. Brooke liked General
Marshall, but had no great opinion of his
strategical ability.
This is one of the few books which the
reviewer has felt compelled to reread all
over again from the beginning!
HUGHROGERS
236
1
REVIE
The authors do not mention a curious
point in analysing cruiser losses and damage
which came out early in the war. The
C-in-C Home Fleet had a hunch that certain
ships and certain captains were unlucky and
he had the records to date analysed.
Curiously enough a pattern did emerge and
woe betide an unlucky captain who was
appointed to an unlucky ship!
Within my knowledge the facts are
carefully researched and correct but a
minor comment is that, considering the
detail, no mention is made of the Vindictive
being fitted with the first aircraft catapult
sometime in the 1920s.
There are unfortunately a number of
errors - not misprints - where wrong
words should have been corrected in proof
reading. But this is cavilling at an excellent
book.
There are a small number of very good
photographs and a large number of detailed
line drawings by the joint author, John R.
Dominy. These would be of great assistance
to model makers as is claimed.
C.C.H.H.
DESTROYERS AT WAR
by GREGORY
HAINES
(Ian Allan Ltd-£9.95)
The author points out in his preface that the
subject is too vast to cover in detail in a
reasonably sized book and that he has
tackled it by selecting outstanding and, in
many cases, well-known, episodes. They
are recorded in a very readable style and
frequently are embellished with personal
reminiscences of individual eye-witnesses.
Further in certain cases the opponent's
version is included, for example the Glowworm's encounter with the Hipper with one
or two photographs of the former's last
minutes.
;:, As a preamble the first two chapters
outline how destroyers come into being and
our destroyer building programmes from
the end of World War I up to the Ca class
- but why no mention of the battle class of
which five were with the British Pacific
Fleet at the time of the Japanese armistice?
In all 456 destroyers, some manned by
allied naval forces, took an active part in
the war and of these 153 were sunk or
became structural total losses.
I must, not for the first time, protest at
the statement that 'for short range defence
against aircraft the Admiralty put itself at a
disadvantage by opting against the 20mm
Oerlikon and 40mm Bofors guns both of
which were available before the war'. They
were - but not to the Admiralty; the
Bofors production was completely
contracted to other purchasers and the
Oerlikon only came to the Admiralty's
notice in 1936 and was not fully evaluated
and a contract signed till a year later.
The third chapter is devoted to the spirit
and camaraderie that permeated the
personnel of the destroyer world. The point
is made that there existed a strong flotilla
spirit, due to the units working together and
knowing each other well, which
unfortunately was to some extent lost when
the needs of war resulted in flotillas being
broken up and hardly ever operating as a
unit. Roskill's conclusion on the Dieppe
raid supports this when he says from the
naval point of view the most important
lesson was the unacceptability of the
practice of collecting from all over the place
the ships and vessels required for such an
intricate operation.
After these three preliminary chapters the
author in the remaining nine chapters
narrates the episodes which he has selected
from the enormous number available. The
chapter headings do not in all cases indicate
their contents; for example 'Close
Encounter - 1' deals with the Norwegian
compaign.
The stories are basically factually
accurate though there are inevitably points
of detail which can be called to question;
some of these points are unlikely to be
checkable from official records, and
unfortunately too many of the survivors are
no longer with us to be interrogated.
There are many points of interest
brought out in these accounts: for instance
the first two Victoria Crosses of the war
were won by Naval Officers in the
Norwegian campaign - Warburton-Lee of
REVIE
the Hardy and Roope of the Glowworm.
The limitation of the elevation of most
destroyers guns to 40' which was useless
against dive-bombers is remarked on but
the menace of the dive-bomber was not
appreciated before the war - not even
known - since the Air Force did not have
any and the Fleet Air Arm only had a small
number of a very unsophisticated type. I
suppose with hindsight one could say that
this was another by-product of the Air
Force control of aircraft production
between the wars. The Air Force did well
but it was not particularly interested in the
Navy's special requirements.
That St Nazaire and Dieppe raids are well
described but destroyers were really
incidental to them except for the
Campletown in the former. Hence I much
prefer the other chapters dealing with
episodes where destroyers occupied the
main role - A/S work, support of the
Army in the Mediterranean and finally the
sinking of the Japanese cruiser Haguro by
the 26th Destroyer Flotilla in a classic star
attack.
Altogether a very readable book with
first-class photographs in profusion and a
comprehensive Appendix listing all the
destroyers active in the war and what their
fate was if sunk. Recommended reading
and cheap at the price.
C.C.H.H.
the names of all the Commanding Officers
of every ship during World War I1 and
another lists ships by classes with principle
dates and particulars.
Points that struck me were that the
Canadian Navy only came into existence on
4 May 1910, went into a serious decline
between the wars - for a time it only
consisted of one destroyer and two trawlers
on each coast - and although it expanded
slightly in the thirties it entered World War
I1 with a total of thirteen ships. Then came
the biggest expansion of a n y - ~ a v to
y some
450 shivs, excluding the smaller auxiliaries,
and b; 1945 man; of the corvettes and
minesweepers were being built in Canadian
yards. Though it has inevitably decreased to
a notable extent in numbers since then it is
still a fairly significant force.
Since 1965 Canadian naval ships have
ceased to fly the White Ensign.
From what I have said it will be apparent
that this book has extremely limited appeal
to non-Canadians. The photographs and
fo; reference
appendices are very
vurDoses. but the book is a verv awkward
sizea- 14in by lO%in
C.C.H.H.
THE BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIER
by PAUL BEAVER
(Patrick Stephens Ltd-£9.95)
Mr Paul Beaver, a young chartered mineral
surveyor, has always had a great interest in
the Royal Navy, particularly in aircraft
THE SHIPS OF CANADA'S NAVAL
carriers and the Fleet Air Arm. This is the
FORCES 1910 - 1981
by KENMACPHERSON
and JOHNBURGESS latest of several books by him, and in it he
follows the story of carrier flying and the
(Collins, Toronto-£29.95)
This book is divided into three parts of carriers from the death of Squadron
which the first is considerably smaller than Commander Dunning, while carrying out
the other two - 1910- 39; 1939-45 and the first British deck landings, to the
1945-81. Each part starts with a brief present day.
survey of the period covered including the
It is a lot to get into one book, but he has
ship building programmes and acquisitions researched it well. He interviewed many of
and this is followed by the history and a the participants, and the results of his many
photograph of practically every ship other conversations with aircrew of the Second
than very minor vessels in the Canadian World War, the Korean war, and those who
Navy. In fact the book is a mini-Jane as took part in the many technical developments of the period, are of great interest.
someone described it to me.
Finally there are a number of very The book is valuable as history. The story
detailed appendices - one for instance lists of all British carriers is told, even those
238
REVIE
which were sold, and never flew the White
Ensign.
Despite the many details the book is very
readable, mainly because of the personal
stories. The author is not excessively
political; but is obviously well-informed
about the importance of air power at sea.
He brings out the RN/RAF controversies
over the years, emphasising the constant
excellence of the practical relationship of
the two services.
There are one or two mistakes: for
instance, who was Admiral Ironbridge on
page 74?; presumably this was Rear
Admiral Tom Troubridge, commanding
TG 88. I during Anvil.
This book is very well illustrated with
photographs, has useful appendices,
including one on terminology which opened
my eyes (for instance after half a lifetime in
the business I did not know that an aircraft
handler was called a Chockhead). There is a
useful index; here again I suspect that the
gremlins have been at work for I discover
that Admiral Ironbridge's christian name
was Joan! To be fair these were the only
two mistakes I found in a most interesting
and historically valuable book. I
recommend it. Well worth the money.
D. C. E. F. GIBSON
THE BLACK CATS
by RICHARD
C. KNOTT
(Patrick Stephens Ltd-£8.95)
The author is editor of the magazine Naval
Aviation, a USN Naval Aviator, and a
flying boat pilot.
The USN had noted the success of the
slow, rugged Swordfish used at night at
Taranto and as radar became more
sophisticated they developed a successful
use of their PBY (Catalina) flying boats
against Japanese warships and transports.
A typical attack was made in a shallow glide
from about 2,000 feet. The use of these
aircraft in daylight attacks had proved too
costly, specially if fighters were about.
This book is the story of the PBYs in
night attack, and evacuation of people from
under the noses of the enemy. It is told in a
quiet and moderate style, commencing with
defeat, and destruction of many PBYs, at
Pearl Harbour and in the Phillipines, and
ending with victory. The book highlights the
heroism, determination, and tenacity of the
aircrew in carrying out this exceptionally
dangerous duty and the ability of the
aircraft to withstand severe punishment.
The PBY was known for its long endurance
and slow cruising speed (95 thin knots), and
many of the attacks were carried out after
hours of flying.
I found this book hard to put down. It is
well illustrated and has a good index. Good
value for money.
D. C. E. F. GIBSON
THE OTHER ULTRA
Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan
by RONALDLEWIN
(Hutchinson-f 10.95)
Ronald Lewin is one of our most
distinguished military historians and has
recently been awarded the RUSI's Chesney
Gold Medal. His latest book does for the
Pacific war what his Ultra Goes To War did
for the European theatre. It shows the
enormous impact of cryptanalysis on the
political decision-makers and the
commanders of the armed forces. I found it
quite fascinating, not only because it is
vividly, and beautifully, written, but also
because there is a lesson on how or how not
to handle very secret intelligence on almost
every page.
Although the Americans were, in 1941, in
some ways better prepared for the
intelligence war than the British had been in
1939, they had entirely failed to devise a
system for co-ordinating, analysing, and
acting upon the results of the work of the
small but devoted band of Navy and Army
cryptanalysts who had broken the Japanese
diplomatic and navy codes. Thus the Chief
of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, fondly
believed that Admiral Kimmel in Pearl
Harbor was receiving information which
had in fact been denied him for several
months past and nor were any of the
decision makers in Washington apparently
able to draw the right conclusions from the
decodes which were available to them. Pearl
REVIE
Harbor was not the result of a conspiracy
by Roosevelt; it was the result of a failure in
peacetime to develop an organisation, and a
frame of mind, capable of acting swiftly in
an emergency.
Although it took some time to put
matters right, no nation could have done so
more quickly than the Americans. The
apparently miraculous American recovery
after the disaster of Pearl Harbor owed a
great deal to the abundant supply by the
codebreakers in Washington and in Hawaii
of cast-iron intelligence about Japanese
intentions and also to the way in which
Nimitz, the 'Neptune' of the Pacific
accepted and made use of that information.
MacArthur, by contrast, is severely
criticised by the author for preferring his
own hunches and for ignoring his Ultra
advisers.
There were, of course, setbacks, when
the Japanese changed their naval codes and
the less than satisfactory outcome of a
series of battles in the Coral Sea was largely
due to a temporary cessation in the flow of
'special intelligence' similar to that
experienced in the Battle of the Atlantic in
1942. Other sources, traffic analysis and the
splendid work of the Australian
coastwatching organisation in the islands
captured by the Japanese, filled the gap
until the new code was broken.
The Americans had few inhibitions about
using the work of the cryptanalysts.
Individual US submarine commanders were
regularly sent Ultra signals of a most
revealing nature which in the Royal Navy
would have been restricted to Flag Officers
only. This dangerous gamble paid off; like
the Germans, the Japanese refused to
believe that their codes could be
compromised with the result that their
merchant fleet was decimated.
By 1944 almost every Japanese code,
diplomatic, naval, and army seems to have
been penetrated and the Americans could
follow almost every move made by their
opponents. It became clear that, no matter
how much Japanese diplomats might feel
that the war was lost, the Army and a
section of the Navy intended to fight to a
finish - information which goes a long way
to explain and perhaps justify the Allied
decision to drop the atom bomb.
There is fresh information on almost
every page of this truly excellent book for
historians, and lessons to be learned by all
political and military leaders. Most
reasonably priced (for these days) it should
be a must for all members of The Naval
Review.
PATRICK
BEESLY
A VOYAGE TO NEW HOLLAND
by WILLIAMDAMPIER
(Alan Fulton-£9.95)
Dampier's name is generally known, but not
his exact achievements. Most people
probably think of him as a privateer, but he
was not another Drake. He does not seem to
have been a natural fighting man.
His supreme talent was navigation and
being also an acute observer he was a
natural explorer. Unfortunately, in his age
war provided the main employment for the
former talent, and he had only one
opportunity to use all his special skills in a
voyage of pure exploration.
This book reproduces his own account of
that one voyage; the Admiralty sent him in
command of the 290-ton Roebuck to
investigate New Holland, Terra Australia,
and New Guinea. It was the first British
attempt to explore the South Seas, so
Dampier had to work out the basic
procedures for himself.
He was poorly supported. He had no Sir
Joseph Banks to give his voyage prestige
and share its direction; his officers and petty
officers seem to have been a poor lot. His
crew feared a voyage into the unknown.
Dampier was originally ordered to
proceed westabout, but the usual
difficulties delayed his departure until the
season was too late to round Cape Horn.
His new route was Teneriffe, the Cape
Verde Islands, and Santos in Brazil.
To minimise the constant threat of
mutiny, he landed his potential Christian,
his First Lieutenant, SNLR at Santos; and
then sailed directly to Western Australia,
sighting the Cape of Good Hope, but not
II
REVIE
calling there for fear his crew would insist
on turning back. It was a remarkable
example of his navigation skill.
This was Dampier's second visit to the
area, already established as a landfall on the
Dutch route to their East Indies. Careful
exploration from Shark's Bay north to
Roebuck Bay confirmed its reputation as
barren and inhospitable. Eventually, with
water running short and scurvy appearing,
Dampier bore away for Timor.
There were some small European settlements there, but little was known of them.
Dampier studied the island with his usual
care, then continued with his main task,
proceeding along the northern coast of New
Guinea to New Britain. He sailed round
New Ireland and New Britain, discovering
that they were separate from New Guinea,
though not realising they were two separate
islands.
From there his orders were to head south;
but the Roebuck was in poor condition, he
had only one serviceable boat, and his
carpenter was incompetent - so he turned
for home. He was wise to do so, the
Roebuck sprang an incurable leak off
Ascension, sinking without loss of life.
So much for the outline of the voyage. It
should be read in Dampier's own words. It
is the account of an acute observer with an
enquiring mind; written in a distinctive,
simple style. The text is illustrated with
charming pen and ink drawings of flora and
fauna, in addition to the more usual naval
charts and views of coastlines. The book
has been admirably edited by James
Spencer, and beautifully produced by its
publisher.
J.S.
THREE BROTHERS AT HAVANA
- 1762
by SONIAKEPPEL
(Michael Russell-f 6.50)
The three brothers are the Earl of
Albemarle, who commanded the Land
Forces; Major General William Keppel, one
of his two Divisional commanders; and
Commodore Augustus Keppel, the future
Admiral, who was Pocock's second-in-
command. This short book by their
descendant Sonia Keppel is essentially a
description of the combined operation that
captured Havana in 1762 - and is only very
lightly hung on the involvement of her three
ancestors in such senior posts.
The authoress displays occasional signs
of lack of complete familiarity with military
and naval jargon and usage, especially in
the opening introductory chapters. Once
she gets into her stride, however, the
narrative flows much more smoothly; and
she does display a considerable mastery of
that rather abstruse branch of eighteenth
century warfare - siege operations.
Havana was a remarkable achievement.
Anson and Ligonier presented their plan
for its capture in the first week of January.
This involved the assembly of naval and
military forces then stationed, and in most
cases engaged in operations, in the UK, the
Leeward Isles, Jamaica, and North
America.
The UK element sailed on 6 March with
the bulk of the stores for the whole force. It
arrived at Barbados on 20 April. There was
then a pause to reorganise and integrate the
Leeward Isles element, a process
complicated by Rodney who had dispersed
his ships across his station in flagrant
disobedience of orders - something that
was to be remembered against him. The
expedition sailed again on 6 May,
rendezvousing on passage with the Jamaica
contingent. At the inspired direction of
Anson, it made its approach by a
completely unexpected route, through the
hazardous Old Bahamas Channel, and so
achieved total surprise when it arrived off
Havana on 6 June.
After the shortest pause to reconnoitre, it
was decided to begin the attack by taking
the great Morro fortress that dominated the
eastern side of the entrance to the harbour.
The troops went ashore further to the east
the next day. By the 15th they had captured
the approaches to the Morro, and the
construction of the siege batteries could
begin. A secondary operation by Pocock
secured another beach-head to the west of
Havana.
REVIE
The pace of events then slowed. The
authoress hints that Albemarle may have
been something of a Hyde Park soldier, and
certainly his limited experience of war had
been gained in ponderous European
operations. It may have been a mistake on
his part to undertake a formal siege; instead
of attempting the swift, and superficially
rash, assault that was so often the key to
spectacular success under West Indian
conditions. The usual ingredient for success
was there, the Spaniards were greatly under
strength.
Albemarle's decision committed his men
to prolonged and arduous work in an
unhealthy climate, for which they paid the
usual terrible price. They were gravely
handicapped by lack of water, to the extent
that when the guns did open fire on 1 June,
they set their own batteries on fire within 24
hours, making it necessary to rebuild them.
The Morro was eventually stormed on 30
July. Free from the threat of its fire,
Albemarle switched his attack to the west of
Havana. Within a few days, he had
established batteries commanding the city
and with the loss of the Morro the
defenders had no defence against them.
Havana capitulated on 12 August. This
brought to a successful end what was in
many ways a model combined operation,
marked in particular by the most cordial
relations and co-operation between the
Army and Navy, to which the presence of
the three brothers must have contributed.
They were very well rewarded for their
contribution. Albemarle received £ 122,697
in prize money and his two brothers £24,539
each. In contrast seamen received only £3
19s 9d and private soldiers £4 18s 8%d.
Altogether, a short but readable book. It
is well-produced, so its price is not
unreasonable.
J.S.
THE GREAT ENTERPRISE
(The History Of The Spanish Armada)
Contemporary Documents
selected and edited by
STEPHEN
USHERWOOD
(Bell & Hyman-£7.95)
This is a delightful book; a history of the
Spanish Armada taking the form of a
selection of contemporary documents.
Apart from choosing the documents, its
editor, Stephen Usherwood, has contributed a general introduction, shorter
introductions to each chapter, and brief
comments on some of the documents.
Your reviewer had expected the result to
be rather 'bitty' - a book in which the
reader would dip selectively to read
individual entries. He was very pleasantly
surprised to find that this unusual approach
has produced a book with such unity and
continuity that it can be read in the normal
way, and is, indeed, hard to put down.
It covers a broad canvas, from the
political origins of the Spanish enterprise to
its attempted execution and failure. The
ground that it covers is, of course, well
known, but the book does give insights into
factors and circumstances that are often
only mentioned in passing in conventional
histories.
One dominating impression is the
frightening over-centralisation of Spain's
government in the hands of an aging,
obstinate man. Philip was so determined to
do everything himself that, as a shrewd
Venetian observed, he ruled 'almost as one
might say, without Ministers'.
The plan he conceived was unrealistic.
The men who had to execute it recognised
this, but none dared to tell their King
outright, though Parma's mounting. hopeless, pessimism becomes perfectly clear.
Medina Sidonia emerges with credit. The
book includes his letter seeking to decline
the command. Historians have tended to
focus attention on his mention of his rather
pathetic proneness to seasickness; but there
is much more to the letter than that. Once
compelled to accept the command, the
Duke showed determination and energy and great personal courage. Howard too
emerges as a straightforward fighting
leader.
Administrative aspects of the campaign
are well-covered and interesting, and were,
of course, of great importance. Two of the
documents include the ration scales of each
side. The English were much more generous
242
REVIEWS - I1
than the Spanish. In fact, fighting men in
those days were rarely lucky enough to
enjoy full rations. The English were on
scantyings of four rations among six men
from an early stage, and their victualling
was a constant anxiety.
The Spaniards were far worse off. Philip
was swindled on a massive scale by his
contractors. Great quantities of rotten food
had to be thrown overboard before the
Armada even left Corunna. There was
hardly any food left fit to eat in the ships
captured in the Channel.
The total lack of generosity of the Queen
and her Ministers to her seamen after the
Armada had fled is well known. It is
documented here and makes a sorry tale, in
which the penny-pinching harshness of the
administrators becomes only too apparent.
Another dark aspect of the documents, is
the terrible savagery of warfare in Ireland.
Stephen Usherwood has allowed himself
the luxury of an Envoi, taking up to a tenth
of the book, to break away from the main
stream of the campaign and tell the tale, in
his own words, of one Spanish officer's
experiences. It is an admirable conclusion;
an astonishing adventure, full of lessons
in escape and evasion - and in survival.
J.S.
LAST CALL FOR HMS EDINBURGH
by FRANKPEARCE
(Collins-f 8.95)
Her Asdic long unserviceable, an A/S
trawler enters the convoy to pick up
survivors. 'The young Captain was faced
with an impossible choice . . . ravaging
brain and heart like a searing flame . . .' He
was sure the U-boat was there in the middle
of the convoy - so he fired a pattern of
depth charges among the survivors which
we are to presume sank the U-boat even if it
did the survivors no good.
Starting with rubbish like that your
reviewer found it hard to read on but the
effort was just worth it. Amidst Arctic gales
and storms of cliches this is the story,
written by a former rating in Trinidad, of
PQ 14, which resulted in his ship and
Edinburgh being lost.
Scantily laced with historical background
(his Bibliography page lists three books),
the only strength comes from the picture
drawn by the numerous quotes from those
involved and the description of the life led
by the survivors ashore in Russia. The
author can be forgiven a lot for his account
of the auction there of effects for
Edinburgh's next-of-kin.
I read the book as news was coming in of
the nation's agonising over the sinking of
the Argentinian cruiser and it certainly put
things in perspective. Worth a quick browse
if you find it on a library shelf but don't
buy it.
C.C.A.