Part II -- Main Edition ~ 5 Oct
ober 1979
COLUMNISTS
ARMED fonces
JfOURfVlAL
l-i>uiMlcd in
Th. »>»,. .ml N..t Journal
OCTOBER 1979 (5)
Pg. 52
Curing the Nunn Illusion:
Striking a Bargain for SALT
By Justin Galen
THE FOCUS OF THE SALT U DEBATE
make any specific proposals. The Cha
irhas slowly shifted from an effort to bloc
4-5% real increases should cover, or wha
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General
k
t
or amend the Treaty, to one that wou
programs should have which priority.
ld
David C. Jones, has now found himself
in
trade ratification for the force improve
Press releases from Nunn's office provide
the awkward position of having to chan
ge
ments necessary to ensure a stab
no
further amplification of how he wants
le
position on the need for new programs
strategic balance. This trade ratification
as
incr
eased defense expenditures to be
the Administration has changed its estifor strength is unquestionably the mos
spen
t. His most detailed statement says no
t
mate of the Treaty's chances for Senate
desirable outcome that can be obtained
mor
e
about nuclear forces than. "We must
ratification. Even such a strong voice
as
frorn the debate.
find
a
way of reducing the vulnerability of
General Alexander Haig has been remarkBlocking the new Strategic Arms Limiour
land
based ICBMs from a Soviet first
ably vague regarding the need for anythin
tation Treaty will do nothing to improve
g
strike. We must also invest much greater
other than cruise missiles for NATO.
US strength or security, and might well
resources in bomber and submarine
The end result could be disastrous for
inspire the Soviet Union to even greater
laun
ched strategic weapons."
US security. The only thing worse than
efforts to improve its strategic forces.
Senator Nunn simply calls for broad
Amending the Treaty might satisfy the
improvements in theater nuclear weapon
s,
"They may Inck the simplicSenate's desire for legal equity, but
NATO allied conventional forces. Japa
it
nwould not make Soviet forces any smaller
ity of a one sentence solution,
ese' self-defense, the US shipbuilding
or US forces any larger.'There is no
prog
ram, US intelligence, R&.D. and
but SALT is not a one
credible way the US can hope to use
find
ing
an alternative to the all volunteer
a
sentence problem."
treaty to persuade the USSR to acce
forc
e.
Esse
ntially, Senator Nunn asks for
pt
actions which are not dictated by a US
ever
ythi
ng
in
the most general terms posmaking no commitment to making the
willingness to compete and by US
sible
,
whil
e
spec
ifying only the increase he
force improvements necessary to achieve
strength.
wants in defense expenditures. Yet, from
US security would be the illusion of such
a
Unfortunately, however, this shift from
the planner and politicians' viewpoin
commitment. But as things now stan
t,
d,
opposition to the Treaty to bargaining with
aski
ng for everything is equivalent to
this is the most likely result of the Senate's
the Carter Administration has been bad
asking for nothing.
effort to trade ratification for the security
ly
mismanaged. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA)
There are many reasons why such
by seeking some kind of a percenta
ge
in particular, may have done far mor
focu
s on budgets, rather than forces, can
increase in real defense expenditur
e
e.
damage than good by indicating he wou
only
produce the illusion of strength,
Throwing money at the problem is an over
ld
support the Treaty if the Administration
rather than the reality,
simplified and militarily meaningless goal
committed to a 4-5% real increase
It is virtually impossible to calculate a
whose future political and economic cred
in
idefense expenditures.
"real" increase in defense expenditure
bility is highly uncertain.
in
Henry Kissinger did a much better job
an economy inflating as rapidly as ours is.
From the Noon Amendment
of articulating a viable SALT II bargain,
Defense Secretary Brown and Ambassado
to the Noun Illusion
r
but the details of his conditions for ratif
Robert Komer found this out earlier this
It is unfortunate that the Senate's most
ication of the SALT II Treaty have been
year when they desperately bargained with
expert and defense oriented conservativ
es
blurred and partially identified with Sen
the
White House Office of Management
shou
ald have chosen to propose such a
tor Nunn's oversimplified emphasis on
and Budget for an FY80 defense budget
vague SALT II bargain.- The joint lette
r
increased defense spending. Further
which would meet the US commitment
which Senators Sam Nunn, John Tow
,
to
er,
whatever his other talents, Mr. Kissinge
NAT
O of 3% real increase in defense
and Henry Jackson sent to Presiden
r
t
is not a force planner and has not
expenditure. As AFJ noted in March, the
Carter called for little more than "rea
l
presented a detailed military program.
defe
nse spending figure Secretary Brown
increases of at least 4-5% in the overall US
Worst of all, the senior military officers
wru
ng
from OMB was meaningless in
defense budget." It did not specify the
who might have been expected to do the
term
s
of
military forces, and so subject to
force improvements required, the changes
most to establish the proper conditions for
infla
tion
that
it had no practical chance of
in the balance which are needed
or
improving US strategic forces have faile
bein
g
a
3%
real
increase.
changes needed in US planning and stra
d
tto contribute much constructive substanc
The accuracy of that warning has been
e
egy. It stated only that the money shou
ld
to the SALT II debate.
proven in less than six months, and serv
go to "the crucial areas of real military
es
Although General Richard H. Ellis,
as
a clear demonstration of the fallacy of
investment in weapons, ships, equipment,
Commander of the Strategic Air Com
calling for defense expenditures rath
and research and development." In fact,
er
it
mand, has been a notable exception
than specific programs. The "3% real
was so vague that it led the Wall Stre
in
et
speaking out on the need for an improve
increase" in the FY80 budget was base
d Journal to write an editorial on August 9th
d
bomber force, and General James E. Hill
on
an estimate of only 7% inflation. Yet
trying to draft Senator Nunn's shoppin
,
g
the Commander of NORAD, has called for
even in August, long before the full effe
list for him, and a host of other new
ct
simprovements in our air defenses, mos
of
the recent increase in oil prices could
active and retired military officers called t papers and magazines to speculate on
impact on the US economy, OMB had
to what Nunn really meant
lo
by his "5%
testify before the Senate have failed
raise
its inflation estimate to 9.3%. As
to solution."
result, the planned Sl22.'7-billion budget
Since the "Nunn Letter," it has also
Jusiin Galen is the pen name ofaformer
would mean only a '/>-!% "real" increase
become clear that his initiative was not
.
senior Department of 'Dffensf civilian
Hoever, it now seems nearly certain
part of a broader or more detailed plan
.
that inflation will ultimately exceed 11%
official.
There has been no follow-up on how the
,
money should be spent, what period the
(See SALT, Pg. 2-F)
1-F
SALT -yCONTINUED
Part II »• Main Edition - 5 Octobtr 1979
and (hat a 5122,'-billion figure would then
be A "real" decrease In defense spending,
Accordingly, while the Administration
talk! about S2.5'billlon supplemental to
reitore the FY&O budget to a "real" 3%
Increase, It will take over S1.3-blllion to
compensate for each 1% Inflation, or
supplemental of more than S5>billlon,
Thli situation will be even worse In
FY81 because inflation shows no sign of
moderating below 10% annually, and the
S133.7-bllllon defense budget planned for
FYB1 was estimated on the basis of only
6% inflation. A real 3% increase would
require the FY81 budget to rUe from a revised FY80 budget projection of $128billion to between $136- and S140-billion.
The resulting uncertainty and confusion
over what constitutes a "real" 4-5%
Increase in defense expenditure has also
been apparent in the estimates of the cost
of such an increase provided to the prest.
The Washington Post got an estimate from
0MB that such an increase would cost SBbillion the day after the Nunn letter was
sent, and an estimate of S20-billion from
the Senate Budget Committee. A different
Administration source, evidently in the
White House, quoted $5-billion to the
Baltimore Sun. and press reports reached
a high of S22-blIllon for FY80. The Post
even went so far as to estimate $216.6billion for FY84, which does not seem unrealistic given the current trends in the
economy.
In simple terms, a call for a given
percent of real increase is simply a recipe
for statistical disaster. This is particularly
true when it is as badly worded as in the
Nunn letter. The Senator did not define
either how many yean it should be
applied real spending would increase by
28% over the next FYDP if the 5% annual
increase was applied every year during that
period or what the base year should be.
The choice of FY79, 80, or 81 would
mean a spread of over SlO-billion in
the nature of the increase required. Such
definitional problems also have a serious
political cost. Given double digit inflation,
the economic effects of the oil crisis, §
coming recession, and an election in 1980,
the chances of any given percentage increase remaining statistically valid, and
surviving the mix of other political and
economic imperatives, are approximately
zero. Once SALT II is ratified or rejected, no one will defend a nonsense
number for defense in the face of real
national needs.
All 'political commitments are tenuous
and uncertain, but no commitment can be
more uncertain than one to a level of
expenditure which even budget statisticians can squabble over endlessly. A
commitment to a pointless number???
Nothing would be more likely to result in a
future reversal of any deal made over
SALT II ratification. In fact, the Congress
has already demonstrated what can happen under such conditions. While Senators Nunn. Jackson, and Tower were
formulating their call for increased expenditures, the House Appropriates Committee was cutting the defense budget by
S3.5 billion and adding 51.3-billion of its
own programs. Further, twelve other
Senators immediately responded by calling
for no increase in real defense expenditures.
Moreover, unless a rise in expenditure is
tied to a given set of force improvements
whose progress can be monitored, h can be
"Throwing money at the
problem U an over-simplified
and militarily meaningless
goal."_____________
easily eaten up in the normal cost escalation and ilack for unexpected manpower,
operating, and equipment cost increases.
This Is particularly true when the rise must
be suddenly reprogtammed and tacked
onto the defense five year plan. Such
sudden additions are an Invitation to bad
management, and to fund marginal programs that would otherwise never survive,
Virtually none of the problems In our
strategic or theater nuclear forces, or our
NATO and Korea forces, can be solved
simply by throwing more money at 'hem in
the next year or two. What it needed In
virtually every case is to make long term
commitments to new programs whose bill
will be due long after the SALT II
ratification vote is forgotten.
The risk of eating up money in marginal
short-term expenditures, while doing
nothing to make real improvements in our
strategic posture, was all too clearly reflected in JCS Chairman General David Jones1
Initial comments on how a 4-5% real increase might be spent. He noted that it
would be impossible to quickly program
the money into speeding up the M-X
which he said could only be expedited by
months or into a new bomber which was
a year away from the point where money
could be programmed. He then, however,
talked about putting the money into "a lot
of mundane things such as spare parti,
more repair and maintenance funds, more
equipment in operational condition, and
more flying time for pilots." However
useful such efforts may be, they do nothing
to correct the trends in the strategic
balance, reduce US strategic vulnerability,
or to improve stability and deterrence.
Granted, Senator Nunn't letter may
have some positive effects. It has led to a
new Administration emphasis on defense,
and -to the President's appointment of a
special committee to look at increases in
defense spending with members from the
NSC, OMB, State Department, and DoD.
It has also led to a contingency planning
exercise in the Department of Defense
looking at such options as zero percent
real growth, 3-4% real growth, and 8%
real growth, with an emphasis on better
funding of strategic programs, theater
nuclear forces, the ground launched cruise
missile, shipbuilding, aircraft refits, and
readiness.
However, such increases are dangerous
if they blind the critics of the US strategic
posture to the need for more substantive
efforts. The US cannot afford to simply
put more money into its existing strategy
or lack of it. The issue is not what we are
spending: we may be able to buy a fully
effective force posture with what we spend
now. The issue is what changes are taking
place in the threat, and what combination
of strategy and future forces we must plan
to check.
It would, of course, take a far more
complex SALT II ratification proposal
than Senator Nunn's to deal with such
issues. Such a proposal would almost certainly lack that note of mindless oversimplification which allows both Senate
conservatives and moderates to quickly
support the same proposal. But, quite
frankly, we expect more of Senator Nunn
and his able assistant for national security
2-F
_______
affairt. Jeffery Record. We expect leadership and solutions, not Imagery and etiy
consensus. Srm Nunn Is about the best tht
Senate hai, and It Is horrifying that tht
best has chosen position that li Intellectually vague, politically absurd, and fiscally meaningless.
The Klkitnger Posltioni
Better, Bat Not Good Enough
There are obvious Ironies In Henry Klisinger's current concern with the strategic
balance. He It, after all, the father of a far
less demanding SALT II Treaty that wai
almost sent to the Senate for ratification In
1976, and he Is famous In many circles for
asking in 1974, "What in the name of God
Is strategic superiority?," a view that he
now explains was the result of "fatigue and
exasperation, not analysis."
It is, therefore, a little like Saul upon
the road to Damascus for him to have
defined strategic superiority -in such
eminently practical terms in his testimony
to the Senate:
"The peace we seek . . . must rest on
something more tangible than a hope or a
fear of holocaust. It must also reflect a
military and geopolitical equilibrium . . .
The notion of balance of power has always
been unfashionable in America. But it it
the precondition of security, and even of
progreii .... If the present trendi
continue, we face the chilling prospect of a
world sliding gradually out of control, with
our relative military power declining, with
our economic lifeline vulnerable to blackmall, with hostile forces growing more
rapidly than our ability to deal with them,
and with fewer and fewer nations friendly
to us surviving . . . ."
It is also refreshing to see him shift from
the position that the Congress should not
meddle in foreign policy to i call for
variety of-specific conditioni for SALT II
(which make far more tense than Senator
Nunn's blanket call for more spending), or
the host of technical quibbles which other
Senior* have proposed as SALT II amendments. Dr. Kisslnger is (till somewhat
vague about the military improvements he
seeks, but he stresses programs and forces
far more than Senator Nunn,
"After 15 years of giving inadequate
priority to defense, it is time for a serious
long-term effort to prevent a menacing
imbalance against us . . . . The program
must include accelerated development of a
counterforce capability through the M-X
and Trident II, air defense against Backfire, immediate steps to restore tne theater
nuclear balance and urgent measures to
beef up our capacity for regional defense,
including accelerated modernization and
expansion of our Navy."
Dr. Kissinger also sets solid political
conditions for ratification in demanding
that the Senate should attach an expression of the following principles to its
ratification instrument:
"That the absence -»f political restraint will seriously jeopardize continuation of the SALT process.
"That the Senate understands this to
include Soviet supply or encouragement of
intervention by proxy military forces; the
use of Soviet forces on the territory of itt
allies such as Cuba to free Cuban forces to
fight in Africa; the support, financing or
encouragement by any members of the
Warsaw Pact of group? end activities
seeking to undermine governments friendly to the United States, or tne exacerbation
of regional conflicts.
(See SALT, Pg. 3-F)
Part II -- Main Edition -- 5 October 1979
SALT -- CONTINUED
"Thai the administration be required
to submit an annual report to the Senate
on the degree to which the Soviet Union is
living up to these criteria.
"That the Senate vole every two years
its judgment whether the Soviet Union has
lived up to these criteria."
It is a tragedy that so little attention has
been paid to these details of Kissinger's
proposals. The fact that both he and Senator Nunn have called for increased defense
expenditures has led the media and most
of the Senate to vaguely lump their positions together. Dr. Kissinger has provided
a far more sophisticated basis for responding to the SALT II Treat)1 , and has described an infinitely better bargain in
terms of US security. His terms for ratification could lay a solid base for the rebirth
of American leadership and competition
with the USSR. It is the beginning of what
will be a continuing US struggle to avoid
strategic inferiority.
It is also here, however, that Secretary
Kissinger's statement is also inadequate.
It is not enough to call for a new strategic
program or doctrine, but it is clear that
Kissinger cannot be expected to do more.
Whatever his strengths in negotiating with
the USSR and China, no one who has ever
worked with Henry Kissinger would accuse
him of being an expert on the details of the
military balance. For at least the last
decade, he has tended to be extraordinarily impatient with numbers, technical
details, and quantitative analysis. He has
not shown great interest in the US' strategic retaliatory plans or in the details of
US strategic war games and net assessments. He is not a numbers man or a strategist. Accordingly, it is not surprising that
he does not advance details or specific
military proposals.
The Tragedy of the Advice
from Our Senior Military Officer!
Yet if Henry Kissinger has his limitations, they are predictable and natural in a
man whose forte is international politics
and not military strategy. It is our senior
military officers whom we expect to
outline the specific force improvements we
need, and to think in terms of long term
military trends, strategy, and war fighting
effects. Unfortunately, however, few of the
American military have provided a detailed picture of the specific improvements
needed in US strategic forces.
There are several reasons for this. The
Joint Chiefs cannot provide such advice.
The Chiefs and Secretary Harold Brown
have already made a hard fought bargain
which traded the force improvements set
forth in the FY80 defense program for
support of SALT II. There is no question
from the viewpoint of our national interest
that this bargain was more valuable than
any conceivable opposition to the Treaty,
or the ultimate step of public resignations
which would have divided the serving military from their commander-in-chief.
To their credit, the Chiefs have also
done much behind the scenes during the
last four months to use the SALT II issue
as a tacit lever in strengthening US defense
posture. There is no doubt that their support of SALT II has been obtained as part
of a silent bargaining process with the
Administration over the M-X, over
strengthening of our posture in the Persian
Gulf and halting withdrawals from Korea,
and over the improvement of our theater
nuclear forces. There is also no doubt that
the Chiefs have u:>ed the positive aspects ol
the Nunn letter to bargain for more readiness, the ground launched cruise missile,
and a higher rate of shipbuilding, and
higher aircraft readiness and modification
rates. If these improvements do not compensate for the decline in America's overall strategic posture, they are infinitely
more desirable than an open confrontation
with the Administration.
One must also give credit to two Air
Force officers who have done more. SAC
Commander General Richard H. E!Iis has
called for major improvements in the US
bomber force, and for the upgrading
of engines on the KC-135 tankers used for
refueling the B-52. He has also publicly
exposed the fact Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown has credited the B-52G
cruise missile force with a 75% survivability rate that will be dependent on force
improvements not even funded in Brown's
own five year defense plan. While opinions
may differ over the desirability of Ellis' call
for upgrading 66 FB-lllAs and approximately 90 F-lllDs into a new strategic
bomber, it is at least the kind of tangible
suggestion that is needed in the SALT II
debate. It is far better to call for an FB-111
B/C with B-l engines and range and payload equivalent to the B-52, or for a fixed
wing variant of the B-l than to talk in
generalities.
Similarly, NORAD Commander General James E. Hill deserves credit for exposing the weakness of US strategic air defenses. He again talked in specifics the
need to replace F-106 fighters from the
late 1950s with F-15 and F-14, the need to
provide more Airborne Warning and
Control Systems (AWACS), and about the
need to improve Ballistic Missile Early
Warning System (BMEWS) and provide
an enhanced distant early warning system
with full low altitude coverage, and for an
improved over-the-horizon backscatter radar. He also was explicit about the massive
manpower, radar, and control center reductions in North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD).
These, however, are the exceptions to a
general pattern of silence, or broad and
largely political posturing for and against
SALT II by other senior military officials.
They also represent the practical limit of
what active duty officers can say while
remaining in the system.
This burden should, by rights, have
fallen on our retired military and the civilian experts who are not directly involved in
serving the Administration. Yet, they have
so far failed to make a major contribution
to formulating the SALT II bargain. This
may partly be a result of the fart that
relatively few such senior officers combine
a background in strategic planning with
the ability to assess the threat and the
impact of specific force improvements on
the balance. It may also reflect the length
of time many officers have retired, and the
fact that other officers with detailed expertise lack public recognition. And, it may
be the result of the fact that many of those
retired officers who do combine expertise
and public recognition have long been
associated with strong positions for and
against the Treaty, and are so polarized on
the issue of ratification that they have
failed to see the opportunity inherent in
the SALT II ratification process.
Regardless of the causes, however, our
retired military have failed to provide the
leadership and advice which is needed. As
a result, a special burden of responsibility
3-F
has fallen on the two officers who have not
been committed to fixed position*, and
whose recent retirements freed them to
speak: General Alexander Haig and Lt.
Gen. Edward Rowny.
In Rowny's case, however, it would br
unfair to expect specific proposals for
changes in our strategy and forces. He
resigned specifically to oppose the Treaty,
and he has been a negotiator and advisor
on the Treaty, rather than having been
involved in the problems offeree planning
and strategy. His courage in resigning
deserves admiration, but his views on the
heavy missile problem and verifiability do
not provide a basis for shifting the balance
towards a more secure level of deterrence.
It is General Alexander M. Haig who
might have been expected to provide the
creativity and specificity that is needed,
and to give the Senate the advice it needs
in order to act.
Unfortunately, however, Haig failed to
do so. His testimony was rambling and
weakly organized in both his appearances
before the Senate, and as a result, both the
Senate and the press focused almost exclusively on his call to table the SALT II
Treaty. The truly substantive things he
said in his testimony were largely ignored
because they came only after prolonged
Congressional questioning, and were
buried towards the end of a 91 page
transcript.
This has led many observers to ignore
the fact that Haig did provide some basic
recommendations which could be a useful
core for a SALT II bargain. He did call for
a comprehensive review of US forces and
strategy, for cruise missiles for NATO and
improved theater nuclear forces, for
200-300 M-X missiles rather than 100. for
raising the Trident production rate to I'/»
submarines per year, and for developing a
new strategic bomber.
While these are good suggestions, they
are far too vague for the Congress to act
upon. Worse, they are coupled to a call for
tabling the SALT II Treaty while the US
re-evaluates its strategy which is a dc facto
call to delay the ratification vote until after
the next Presidential election. This is far
too risky a political strategy to be
practical. It ignores both the uncertainties
of the next Presidential election, and the
large Democratic majority in the Senate.
With all due respect, it also falls into the
trap of making the US wait on ratification
until most of the protocol period expires
without setting any limits on fhc expansion
of Soviet forces.
As a result, we now -lack the specific
military proposals and concepts needed to
evolve a sound bargain for SALT II ratification. We lack a clear picture of what
action is called for and what improvements
are necessary. We lack advice on what
really must be done to restore the trends in
the balance: on what M-X, 1CBM and
Trident SLBM programs are needed, on
what improved bomber and cruise missile
are needed, on the strategic defense we
need, and on what should be done to
improve our command, control, warning,
and intelligence system.
Setting the Real Price for SALT O
Yet there are answers to these issues
which are more meaningful than Mmplv,
throwing money at our defense posture.
Specifically, a sound SALT II bargain
might have the following element*:
(See SALT, Pg. 4-F)
Ptrt II
SALT...-?..CONTINUED
1, A Presidential PUdgi to Bring a Specific M-X Program on Lint According
to a Fixed Schedule and Regardless of
Budget Constraints.
It is not enough to vaguely promise an
M-X program or to decide on a potential
basing concept. What Is needed is a firm
Presidential commitment to a specific program. Such a program should also provide
stiong Incentives for the USSR to comply
with SALT II, and to seek further arms
limitsticns In SALT III:
It should involve provision of a verifiable "break out" option by which the US
could rapidly deploy additional M-X
missiles on the new "race tracks." The
USSR should realize the US could rapidly
build up much larger forces if it pursues
strategic superiority.
The US should also develop a road
mobile M-X carrier as a conspicuous R&D
program so the USSR would know the US
could respond to any technical advance In
Soviet targeting in ways the USSR could
not match.^,
There should be a clear Presidential
commitment to precision guided re-entry
vehicles (PGRVs) and Maneuverable ReEntry Vehicles (MaRVs), so that the
USSR knows the US will seek the most
advanced warhead and guidance technology possible, and that the US could offset
virtually any heavy missile capability witha combination of more missiles and
improved lower yield warheads.
The M-X system should be linked to
advanced targeting and retargetmost
the
ing, command, control, communications,
warning, and intelligence system the US
can buy, and all of the Minuteman force
should be similarly upgraded. This should
provide the level capability not only to face
the risk of launch under attack, but to
provide a growing US surgical strike
capability, and "empty hole" locatioir
capability. The USSR must bejnadeto
face the risk that virtually any attack could
lead to an unacceptable and controlled
response.
The US should maintain an open
M-X production line, and fund a verifiable
surge capabilty that would prevent the
USSR from being able to count on any
delay in increased US intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) production.
There should be a contingency plan to
deploy the Minuteman in the race track
mode as a means of speeding the reduction
in vulnerability of the US ICBM force.
This may not be necessary, but the US
must not hinge its security on a single
missile development program. It should
have the option of beginning secure basing
in the mid-1980s, and adding the new
missile it needs later.
2. Create Effective Theater Nuclear
Forces.
The President should pledge the United
States to achieving parity in theater
nuclear forces, and to responding in kind
to any further increase in the Warsaw Pact
threat to NATO. This would mean.
Develop and deploy an effective
theater nuclear command and control
system for NATO with the same advanced
C I. targeting, and warning capabilities as
an advanced US strategic system.
Deploy the extended range Pershing
II in sufficient number and locations to
ensure that the USSR could not pre-empt
NATO's long range nuclear strike capabilities.
K&in Edition
5 Octobif 19
Develop and deploy a ground
launched crulie misiile which would m^et
the 600 km limit of the SALT II Treaty,
but have growth potential to 1500 km, and
which could replace the bulk of NATO'l
Lance forces and theater nuclear artillery
with a virtually untargetable dispersed
mobile launch system.
Develop a NATO Medium Rang*
Ballistic Missile (MRBM) with the tame
general performance capabilities at the
Soviet SS-20, but which takes advantage of Western ' technology to provide
superior mobility and lower targetsbillty.
Such a system should be linked to Soviet
SS-20 deployment! with the clear understanding It will be deployed if the SS-20
force continues to grow.
Develop a verifiable advanced nuclear
strike conversion option for all new NATO
fighter bombers, except for the A-10 and
light trainers, so that NATO can rapidly
increase its tactical air nuclear delivery
capability if the Soviet threat continue! to
grow.
Develop an advanced "gray area"
nuclear strike aircraft with conventional
capabilitiei which would confront the
USSR with the risk NATO would have a
tactical aircraft which could be modified
to provide major strategic capabilities
against Soviet targets if the Backfire threat
is not kept in check.
Develop a nuclear option for the
Patriot Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) so
that the USSR faced the risk NATO might
deploy a short range nuclear strike system
with both counter air and limited antimissile capabilities.
Commit NATO to a fully updated
theater nuclear doctrine and training
program so that NATO's nuclear forces
had war fighting credibility.
Develop new "terrorist proof/tamper
systems to
dispersed basirTgartd-jeduce
incentive to the USSR to launch a
massive pre-emptive strike.
3. Provide a Presidential Commitment to
Expedite the Development of Trident II
14 RV Warhead and PGRV/
with
MaRV Capability.
An equally firm Presidential commitment is needed to solve Trident II problems, and to build rapidly an advanced
ballistic missile submarines and sealaunched ballistic missile (SSBN/SLBM)
combination that takes full advantage of
the improvements permitted in SALT II.
Any future arms control negotiation must
be conducted by a USSR which knows the
US has fully committed its resources and
technology to an SSBN/SLBM program
which would:
Create an SSBN force w;ith the same
hard kill capability as ICBMs.
Provide the same advanced command, control, and warning system described for the M-X, and perform all of the
same kinds of missions and war fighting
requirements.
Include funding of a surge production
capability and expanded yards for the
mid-1980s so that the US could both overcome program delays and respond quickly
to increases in the Soviet threat.
Include development of a verifiable
SLBM "breakout" option, such as towed
barges, mobile launch vehicles for the
Great Lakes, or other rapidly constructable launch vehicles, so that the USSR
would face the risk of quick increases in
US forces if it did not pursue a meaningful
SALT III agreement.
4-F
Expedite a verifiable strategic submarine launched cruise mUille option luch as
Tomahawk which Is timed for readiness
shortly after the expiration of the limits
Imposed by the SALT 11 Treaty so that the
US could turn its nuclear attack submarines into strategic SSCNi.
4. A Modern Hardened Bomber and Advanced Crulw MlsiUe a* a Follow-on to
the B*52G/Cruise MUsUa,
There should be a firm Presidential
pledge to implement fully all the Improvements necessary to correct the
B-52G problems In terms of reaction time,
hardening, reliability, radar croii section,
and penetration capability by 1985, and to
providing the improved tanker force
needed by modifying the KC-135 and buy
additional capacity. There should al»o be a
commitment to an advanced cruise minlle
program that would provide a clear signal
to the USSR that the US will develop
longer range and less detectable cruise
missiles which will make virtually any near
term improvement in Soviet strategic air
defenses Ineffective.
Such a program should also,
Provide a verifiable "breakout" capability to compensate for any Soviet force
Improvements by designing the new
bomber such as the simplified fixed wing
variant of the B-l or FB-111 B/C so that It
could be rapidly modified to carry much
larger numbers of cruise missiles.
Keep the cruise missile production
lines open once the B-52G requirements
are met, even stockpiling such missiles for
deployment in verifiable locations so that
the US could increase the cruise missile
load on its retaliatory forces in a matter of
months.
Design a modification program for
selected USAF tanker and cargo aircraft
which could be rapidly fitted to further
expand the US cruise missile force. Even
four cruise missiles per aircraft could
massively increase the launch force the
USSR would face.
5. The Skeleton of an Effective Strategic
Defenw.
There should be a firm Presidential
commitment to make the basic improvements in our strategic missile defense, air
defense, and civil defense programs necessary to allow their rapid expansion from a
contingency capability to an effective
capability to reduce damage to the United
States.
Such a program would have three major
~ >->
elements,
h and developresearc
ed
An expand
logy, antitechno
ABM
in
ment effort
anti-missile
exotic
and
satellite technology
e beam
particl
and
defenses like lasers
level of
the
to
d"
weapons clearly "linke
e their
improv
to
effort the Soviets make
forces.
ic
strateg
offensive and defensive
such
of
ts
Most of the critical elemen
program already exist in the FY80 defense program. The key change would
be to clearly tie the US level of effort to the
Soviet effort, and to provide the necessary
increase in resources to ensure full technical development.
Provide a dedicated F-14 force for
NORAD with the flight range, stand-off,
sensor, and look-down shoot-down capability to provide a significant threat to the
Soviet bomber force. While four to six
squadrons of such aircraft could not act as
a barrier to attacking bombers, they would
ensure such bombers could not be targeted
(See SALT, Pg. 5-F)
Part II -- Main Edition -- 5 October 1979
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 5 OCTOBER 1979 Pg.27
Charles W. Yost
The real danger to US security
ernmenl lOciTours can conduct, at least during doing anfl wiu continue 10 ao whatever is nee
our agcobdngry lo«g electoral campaigns, a essary to maintain "essential military cquiva
common sense foreign policy and can convince lence" with the Soviets. Our hawks rare!)
its anxious allies of its capacity to lead an al- mention that we still have about 9.000 strategic
liance. As a liberal senator was recently nuclear warheads to the Soviet's 5,000, or that
quoted by the Washington Post as saying: "We the second-strike capability of our submarine _
The United States, for example, could be seem to have this low-grade chauvinistic fever remains as invulnerable as ever, We should
clearly superior to the Soviet Union in military that we haven't been able to shake out of our also remember that the Soviets arc1 as deter
terms, and still be dangerously insecure if its i system since Vietnam. We're just spoiling for mined to maintain "equivalence" as we arc
leadership were weak, if its government-were j a fight, trying to regain our lost manhood." Even if we increased our military expenditures
so divided that it could not deal effectively Even the administration is groping for ways to not 5 percent but 10 percent they would do like
with urgent problems, if it proved unable to "punish" the Soviets for their troops in Cuba, wise and neither would be more secure.
free itself of dependence for essential energy which could easily provoke them to "punish"
It is precisely to check that costly and use
supplies on the Middle East, if the dollar con- us for our troops in Turkey.
less competition, and to save our resources for
tinued to be battered internationally, if the
more constructive purposes, that the contin
Former President Ford, in a speech to the uation of the SALT process is so necessary. If
government could agree on no effective way to
safeguard the economy against inflation and Army War College which filled an entire news- the Senate should add the rejection of SALT II
paper page, devoted two short paragraphs to to our other disabilities of the past decade, if
recession.
economic aspects of national security. He was the administration should in the process still
Art Buchwald in a recent column described of course speaking on SALT and defense poliprovoke a quite unnecessary confrontation
with his usual wit a hypothetical congressman cies, but declarations focusing exclusively on
\
preparing to answer his constituents' com- an alleged military threat seriously mis- with the Soviets over Cuba, then indeed our naplaints on inflation, unemployment, gas short-' represent the problem by implying that we are | tional security would be endangered.
Under those circumstances our allies could
ages and the like, by proclaiming his determi- j in imminent military danger from the Soviets,
hardly be blamed if they became concerned
nation to drive the Soviets out of Cuba and I which we are not, while ignoring the real dan- , that we were endangering their security as
wipe Hanoi off the map.
i gers to our security arising from the political
well as ours. If they should perceive that we
These are the sort of cheap political cop-outs paralysis and preelection shenanigans from were, in their view capriciously and unnecesone hears all too frequently on Capitol Hill and which we are suffering.
sarily, interrupting a process of negotiation
Increased Soviet and Cuban adventurism in and accommodation which they deem n-'-esaround the country these days, while measures
" tp^leal with the energy problem and with in- the third world since 1974 can be far better ex- sary I) the tranquility of Europe, and wen? reflation languish in congressional committees as? plained by our withdrawal syndrome after viving the cold war with all its hazards, it is
they have for several years. The Senate Fi- Vietnam, by the collapse of our leadership af- not inconceivable that our most essential alnance Committee is preparing a "windfall ter Watergate, and by our unmet economic dif- liance would begin to unravel.
profits tax" that spends more than it takes in, ficulties than by any shift in the military balThis would not be because, as Mr Kissinger
while some seem willing to hold up a treaty, ance. If we found nuclear weapons unusable in unjustifiably warned a few weeks ago. our alwhich would substantially enhance American; Vietnam, as we did, such weapons are unlikely lies could no longer count on the protection of
military strength, until the Soviet brigade in' to prove any more usable, either in fact or as our nuclear umbrella, but ntore simply beCuba, which could not conceivably pose a an effective threat, in situations like southern cause they could not count on us Io place their
serious threat to the United States, is removed, Africa, the Middle East or Cuba.
security interests, or even our own, alxnn the
one cannot help but wonder whether a gov-1
"There can be no question that the US is parochial concerns of our domestic politics.'
Those who talk most about national security
are unfortunately those who define it most narrowly and with least apparent understanding of
what the term actually means in the modern
world.
9
SALT .
CONTINUED
against residual targets in the US with a
high probability of penetration, and they
would also prevent the kind of bomber
penetration dependent upon target evaluation and strategic reconnaissance to "mop
up" after a Soviet missile attack. A broad
upgrading of the missilery and data linkson other active and reserve fighters in)
CONUS; and of the NORAD sensor and1
data management system, is also neededj
to reduce penetration probability and pre-i
dictability for Soviet bombers.
4
Funding US civil defense at the(
level where it could prepare and update
emergency evacuation plans, and run at
least limited tests and simulations. Further, such programs should again be
clearly linked to the level of Soviet activity.
If conclusive evidence is found of major
improvements in Soviet plans, then US
civil defense activity should be increased
accordingly. The problem is not to return
to the damage limiting civil defense
posture of the 1950s, but rather to
establish a strong enough program so that
the Soviets are convinced they cannot
proceed with theirs without an American
response.
6. Pledge
Full Re-Assessment of the
Needs of NATO, Japan and Korea, and
the Persian Gulf.
Rather than rush into unneeded or
partially thought-out improvements in our
conventional forces, the President should
firmly commit himself to present Congress
with comprehensive net assessments of the
trends in the balance in the key regions
shaping US security, and to force improvement plans which will check the growth of
Soviet power if the USSR does not adopt a
more moderate rate of growth in its theater
forces.
Establishing a Cost-Effective Linkage
Between Both Soviet Political and Military
Actions and the US Response
The essence of such a military program
is not that even system or development
has to be deployed, but rather that the
United States would establish a firm
military "linkage" between Soviet actions
and the forces it would buy. Such a program would provide the military capabilities necessary to ensure the success of
Henry Kissinger's diplomatic and political
conditions for SALT II.
The US could start such a strategic force
improvement program and carry it
through full development, with only
limited changes to existing Department of
Defense program^. It .could build on
efforts already underway, or for which
most research and design are completed.
Accordingly, many key elements could be
5-F
executed to the deployment point with only
limited changesln the US current five year
defense plan. If the Soviets then responded
by showing any interest in turning SALT
III into serious arms control, the US
would not have to deploy such options and
could avoid major increases in real defense
expenditures for strategic arms in future
years.
Such a program would also ensure that
the US could respond to virtually any
change in Soviet strategy and weaponry, or
"breakout" in Soviet force numbers, on a
rapid and timely basis. The US would
never again be faced with a gap of half a
decade in responding to growth in the
Soviet threat.
This size of the US effort should depend
on Soviet actions. In an ideal world, the
USSR should respond to a rebirth of US
leadership, and accept the inevitable in
formulating a SALT III Treaty with 0 US
which negotiated from strength. It would
realize that continuing its present build-up
would simply result in the US' raising (he
threshold of deterrence. More practically,
however, the price tag must depend upon
the need. The US must buy the nuclear
forces it has to buy to compensate for any
failure to achieve real arms control, and
for a Soviet unwillingness to compromise.
This, however, is not playing budget percentages; it is paying for what must be
done.
v