The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem
Author(s): Susanne Bobzien
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 43, No. 2 (May, 1998), pp. 133-175
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The InadvertentConception
and Late Birth of the
Free-WillProblem
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
ABSTRACT
In this paper I argue that the "discovery"of the problem of causal determinism
and freedom of decision in Greek philosophy is the result of a mix-up of
Aristotelian and Stoic thought in later antiquity; more precisely, a (mis-)interpretationof Aristotle's philosophy of deliberate choice and action in the light of
Stoic theory of determinismand moral responsibility.The (con-)fusion originates
with the beginnings of Aristotle scholarship, at the latest in the early 2nd centuryA.D. It undergoesseveraldevelopments,absorbingEpictetan,Middle-Platonist,
and Peripateticideas; and it leads eventually to a concept of freedom of decision
and an exposition of the "free-will problem" in Alexander of Aphrodisias' On
Fate and in the Mantissa ascribed to him.
I. Various problems of freedom and determinism
Let me start with a number of distinctions vital to the subsequent discussion of ancient philosophical theories. These distinctions are kept rough
and schematic. They are left deliberately vague in certain respects, because the ancient theories whose understanding they are intended to
further are themselves stubbornly vague in those respects. The first distinction is of different kinds of freedom. I distinguish three kinds of indeterminist freedom:
1) freedom to do otherwise: I am free to do otherwise if, being the same agent, with
the same desires and beliefs, and being in the same circumstances, it is possible for
me to do or not to do something in the sense that it is not fully causally determined
whether or not I do it.
2) freedom of decision: a subtype of freedom to do otherwise. I am free in my decision, if being the same agent, with the same desires and beliefs, and being in the same
circumstances,it is possible for me to decide between altemative courses of action in
the sense that it is not fully causally determinedwhich way I decide. 1) differs from
2) in that it leaves it undecided in which way it is possible for the agent to do or not
to do something.
3) freedom of the will: a subtype of freedom of decision. I act from free will, if I
am in the possession of a will, i.e. a specific part or faculty of the soul by means of
C Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 1998
Phronesis XL11112
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134
SUSANNEBOBZIEN
which I can decide between alternativecourses of actions independentlyof my desires
and beliefs, in the sense that it is not fully causally determinedin which way I decide.
2) differs from 3) in that the latter postulates a specific causally independentfaculty
or part of the soul which functions as a "decision making faculty."
Proponents of any of the kinds of indeterminist freedom may be called
indeterminist libertarians. From these three types of indeterminist freedom
must be distinguished what I call "un-predeterminist"freedom.
4) un-predeterministfreedom: I have un-predeterministfreedom of action/choice if
there are no causes prior to my action/choice which determinewhether or not I perform/choose a certain course of action, but in the same circumstances,if I have the
same desires and beliefs, I would always do/choose the same thing. Un-predeterminist
freedom guaranteesthe agents' autonomy in the sense that nothing except the agents
themselves is causally responsible for whether they act, or for which way they decide.
Un-predeterministfreedom requiresa theory of causation that is not (just) a theory of
event-causation (i.e. a theory which considers both causes and effects as events). For
instance, un-predeterministfreedom would work with a concept of causality which
considers things or objects (material or immaterial)as causes, and events, movements
or changes as effects. Such a conception of causation is common in antiquity.
Indeterministfreedom always requires the absence of predetermining causal
factors, but in addition allows for different decisions of the same agent in
the same circumstances. In the interpretationof ancient texts, indeterminist
freedom is often confounded with un-predeterminist freedom. From both
these types of freedom must be distinguished the following ones which
are compatible with both indeterminism and "un-predeterminism":
5) freedom from force and compulsion: I am free in my actions/choices in this sense,
if I am not externally or internally forced or compelled when I act/choose. This does
not precludethat my actions/choices may be fully causally determinedby extemal and
internalfactors.
6) freedom from determinationby external causal factors: agents are free from external causal factors in their actions/choices if the same external situation or circumstances will not necessarily always elicit the same (re-)action or choice of different
agents, or of the same agent but with differentdesires or beliefs.
7) freedom from determinationby (external and) certain internal causal factors: I am
in my actions/choices free from certain intemal factors (e.g. my desires), if having
the same such internal factors will not necessarily always elicit in me the same
action/choice.
The last two types of freedom (6 and 7) differ from freedom from force,
etc. (5), in that the latter only rules out force, compulsion and necessitation, whereas 6) and 7) also rule out full causal determination, e.g.
based on nothing but universal regularity of the respective causal factors.
The list of types of freedoms 1) to 7) is evidently neither exhaustive nor
exclusive.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
135
Note thatthe only properGreektermfor freedomis i4v0epia, and that
our evidence suggests that i4v0epia played no role in the discussion of
determinismand moral responsibilityup to the 2nd centuryA.D. In paris not involved in the developmentof the conticular,the term EXEu0epia
cept of freedomto do otherwise.Ratherit is the conceptualdevelopment
of the phraseEp' ilgiv that is pertinenthere, and which has an altogether
differenthistory.'It is the notion of autonomousagency (see below) and
of not being determinedby something else (freedoms type 5-7) which
in philosophical discussions in later antiquitybecomes connected with
eiXcuepta.
Next, thereare two categoricallydifferentconceptionsof moralresponsibility, one groundedon autonomyof the agent, the other on the ability
of the agent to do otherwise.The first(MR1) considersit a necessaryconditionfor praisingor blamingan agent for an action, that it was the agent
and not something else that was causally responsible for whether the
action occurred.The contrast is between self-determinationand otherdeterminationto act. Actions or choices can be attributedto the agent
because it is in them that the agents, qua rationalor moral beings, manifest themselves. Some thinkersconsider the un-predeterminedness
of an
action/choiceas a necessaryconditionfor autonomy,and consequentlyfor
the attributionof moral appraisal.
The second idea of moral responsibility(MR2) considers it a prerequisite for blaming or praising an agent for an action that the agent
could have done otherwise.This idea is often connectedwith the agents'
sentiments or beliefs that they could have done otherwise, as well as
the agents' feelings of guilt or regret. Some philosophersconsider the
indeterminednessof an action/choice as a necessary condition for the
guaranteethat the agent could have done otherwise.The conceptsof indeterministfreedomof an agent (see above) gain importanceat the point at
which moral appraisalis connectedwith the idea that at the very same
time, the same agent, with the same beliefs and desires, could have done
otherwise.
Dependingon what conceptionof moralresponsibilityan ancientdeterminist philosopherhas, they will encounterdifferentphilosophicalproblems. With an autonomybased concept of moralresponsibility,they tend
to face the problem of the compatibilityof autonomyand determinism:
Accepted June 1997
' I have argued the importance of realising the very different philosophical functions of the terms iEuOrpia and ep'
Vijiv in my "Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and
their Relation to Ethics," in R. Sorabji (ed), Aristotle and After, BICS suppl. 68, 1997.
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SUSANNEBOBZIEN
how can 1, the agent,be held responsiblefor my actions/choices,if everyor necesthing,includingmy actions/choicesis determined,predetermined,
sitatedby god, fate, providence,necessity,or variousotherexternaland/or
internalcausal factors?This is the problemwhich for example the early
Stoics faced.
With a concept of moralresponsibilitybased on a conceptof freedom
to do otherwise,deterministstendto face a very differentkindof difficulty:
the problem of the compatibilityof freedom to do otherwiseand determinism.In accordancewith the threefolddistinctionof indeterministfreedom, three problemscan be distinguished:
a the problem of the compatibility of freedom to do otherwise and
determinism
* the problemof the compatibilityof freedomof decisionanddeterminism
* the problemof the compatibilityof freedomof the will and determinism
All three problems are often referred to as "the free-will problem,"
althoughonly the thirdactuallyinvolves a notionof a free will. The label
"free-willproblem"is also sometimesused for the problemof the compatibilityof autonomyand determinism,namelywhen the agentis thought
to have a faculty of the will, and it is by means of this faculty that the
agent decides betweendifferentcoursesof actions. Quite often it is taken
to be "understood,"and is hence left completelyunclear,what an author
means when talkingabout "freewill" and "thefree-will problem."In the
following I reserve the expression"free will" for the kind of freedomI
called "freedomof the will" above. To avoid confusion,I use the phrase
"free-will problem"sparingly,and for the above-mentionedthree problems only.
Modernphilosopherstend to concentrateon physical or causal determinism based on principlesof the kind "same causes, same effects" or
"like causes, like effects,"and the prevalenttypes of free-willproblemare
those of the compatibilityof universalcausal determinismwith freedom
to do otherwiseor freedomof decision.Few philosophersnowadayswould
postulatea faculty of the will. The earliestunambiguousevidence for the
awareness of any kind of "free-will problem"occurs in Alexander of
Aphrodisias.It resembles the problemsmodern philosophersdiscuss in
that it is concernedwith a theory of universalcausal determinismwhich
contains a principleof the type "same causes, same effects,"and in that
it involves a concept of indeterministfreedomwithout invoking a concept of the will. It is with the "discovery"of this kind of problemthat I
am concernedwith primarilyin this paper.
The historicaltreatmentof the questionof freedomand determinismis
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
137
exacerbatedby the factthatalmostall key termsandphrasesusedto describe
the problemsinvolved are hopelessly vague or ambiguous.This is no different in Greek and Latin than in English. Many phrasesand statements
in philosophicaltexts before Alexanderare - at least at first sight - comfreedom.However,
as concerningindeterminist
patiblewithan interpretation
there is a conspicuousabsence of any unambiguousaccount of indeterminist freedom, and of any philosophicalproblemsthat would involve
such a concept.2I have therefore adopted the strategy of denying the
awarenessof a conceptof indeterministfreedomand of the free-will problem (in any of its manifestations)as long as there are neithertextualevidence nor philosophicalreasonsfor assumingthe opposite.
On the following pages I shall first presentthe situationas we find it
in Alexander; then sketch the development that leads to that state of
the discussion;and finally interpretthe problemspresentedby Alexander
and some relatedphilosophersin the light of the developmentthat led up
to them.
II. The state of the debate in Alexander
In Alexander'streatiseOn Fate we are presentedwith a kind of stalemate
situation between two philosophical positions: the Stoic compatibilist
deterministone and Alexander'sPeripateticand - seemingly- libertarian
one. These positions are characterisedby their stand (i) on causal determinismand (ii) on thatwhich dependson us (o E'i^dv).
ep'
The expression
"dependingon us" is centralto muchof the debate:both partiesare agreed
that moralappraisalfor an action presupposesthat the action dependson
the agent, or is Fir' aiXT-.
The Stoiccompatibilistpositionis orthodoxandstandsin theChrysippean
tradition.Like Chrysippusthese later Stoics are concernedwith the compatibilityof universalcausal determinismwith moralresponsibilitybased
on the idea of autonomy(MR1). They maintainthat everythingis fated,
and define fate in terms of a networkof causes. They hold that there is
no changewithouta cause and thatevery changeand every event has preceding causes (Fat. 191.30-192.14).The most remarkableelementof their
determinismis the formulationof a causal principlewhose functionit is
to back up their basic assumptionthat there is no change without cause
(Fat. 192.22).This principleis not recordedfor any earlierStoics. It states
2 Except perhaps the problem in Arist. EN III 5 (1114a3-1114b25), but even that
is doubtful.
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SUSANNE BOBZIEN
thatin the same circumstancesthe same cause will necessarilybringabout
exactly the same effect:
... that it is impossible that, when all the same circumstancesaround the cause
and that of which it is a cause are present, things should sometimes not happen
in a certain way and sometimes should so happen. (Alex. Fat. 192.224)3
Universalcausal determinismis thus guaranteed;both in the Stoic sense,
in which causes are bodies which actively bring about their incorporeal
effects;and in the commonmodem sense thatthe same cause in the same
circumstancesbrings about the same effect, where both cause and effect
are understoodas events. The Stoics in Alexanderarguefor the compatibility of this physical theorywith moralresponsibilityby means of their
conceptof what dependson us. They define thatwhich dependson us as
that which happensthroughus (8t' giov), i.e. that which is the result of
impulseand assent, and in which the natureof the agent manifestsitself.4
We are thus the main causal factor of our actions and can consequently
be held morallyresponsiblefor them.
The opposingPeripateticpositionwhich Alexanderputs forwardis less
clear. Insteadof a uniformstand,there is a varietyof views, alternating,
and occasionallyfused, a point to which I returnlater. But there is evidence for a position that proposes freedom to do otherwise and which
resemblesup to a pointmodem notionsof freedomof decision.For example, we find the account:
"dependingon us" is predicatedof the things over which we have in us the power
of also choosing the opposite. (Alex. Fat. 181.5)
and the explicit requirementthat this choosing has to be independentof
precedingcauses:
we have this power of choosing the opposite and not everything that we choose
has pre-determiningcauses, because of which it is not possible for us not to
choose this. (Alex. Fat. 180.26-8)
is rejected.Moreover,it seems that
Thus universalcausal pre-determinism
the causes that are rejectedinclude not only the externalprecedingcirI
To t6i)cvaTov elvat,
TWV
1VptEaTIKOT(OV
amkwv 6ca'VtO3v
nEpt
t E to autov
at a)
obugv &h gi1oinwoi n?( nlfi4kveIv, GotEE 0.to. Cf. Nem. Nat. hom.
icyntvacxittov,
105.18-21 (Morani), Alex. Fat. 176.21-2; 181.21-5; 185.7-9, Mant. 174.2-7; see also
section 8.2 of my Determinismand Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford 1998).
4 Cf. Alex. Fat. ch. 13, Nem. Nat. hom. 105-6 and see below. Despite its simple
form, the definition is highly technical. For a detailed discussion see sections 8.1 and
8.4 of Bobzien, Determinismand Freedom....
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
139
cumstances,but also the agents' dispositionor characterand reason (Fat.
171.11-17,Fat. 199.27-200.7):agents can act againsttheirdispositionsor
characterand reason, and are thus causally independentfrom them. This
concept of what dependson us combinestwo features:the first is that of
non-predeterminism,
i.e. the freedom from previous states of the world,
including those concerningthe agent. There are no causes prior to our
choosing by which it is predeterminedwhat we choose. The second is the
agent's freedomto do (i.e. choose) otherwise.
It shouldbe plain that the positionsof the two partiesin the debateare
incompatible. The Stoics maintain that every change in the world is
causallydeterminedby precedingcauses. The same cause, underthe same
circumstanceswill necessarilybringaboutthe same effect. The Peripatetic
claim is that there are some changes in the world that are causally undetermined;and among these are the things that dependon us. In the very
same situation,we, the very same causes (causes understoodas corporeal
entities),could choose one time one way, anothertime anotherway, undeterminedin ourdecisionby externaland internalcausalfactors.It is essential to see that thereis no solutionto this conflict:causal determinismand
partialcausal indeterminismare mutuallyexclusive.
But althoughthe text implies awarenessof a problemof the compatibility of freedomand determinism,the discussion seems to have focused
on a differentproblem:the questionis not "which is the correctconcept
of freedom?"(It is telling that thereis no word for "freedom"used in the
debate;whetheror what conceptsof freedomare involved in the opposed
theories has to be inferredfrom the context. The unfortunatecustom of
translatingthe Greek phrase?' ijWtvby "free-will"or cognates of "free"
simply begs the question.) The question of the debate in Alexander is
rather:"which is the right concept of what dependson us?", i.e. "which
concept provides a sufficientcondition for the possibility of moral appraisal?"And here two very dissimilar underlyingtheories collide. To
understandthe natureof this controversy,we have to realise that the two
parties work with two fundamentallydifferentconceptions of what depends on us. For this we need to make explicit the differentways in
which the phrase"dependingon someone",or ratherthe Greek Enidwith
dativuspersonaecould be understood.The phraseapparentlycould denote
both what I have nameda "one-sided,causative"conceptof what depends
on someone, and what I call a "two-sided,potestative"concept of what
dependson someone.
The two-sided, potestative version is well-attested (cf. e.g. LSJ e'i,
I.1g). It refers to a power for alternativekinds of behaviour;it depends
on me whethersomethinghappens(or will happen).When I call this kind
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140
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
of dependingon us "two-sided,"I mean that if somethingx dependson
us, then not x depends on us, too. Thus, in the two-sided, potestative
understanding,"up to us" would be a good translationof the Greek
expression:for example, if walking is up to me, so is not walking, and
vice versa. In this understandingof "what depends on us", the class of
things that depend on us includes unrealisedpossibilities.For example,
when at a certaintime walking dependson me, then not walkingdepends
on me, too. But I will be able only either to walk or not to walk at that
time. Hence either one or the otherwill remainan unrealisedpossibility.
Note that the two-sided,potestative?p' i8itv itself entails neitherdeterminism nor indeterminism.A readingcompatiblewith determinism(and
indeterminism)is this: walking dependson me at a certaintime if at that
time I have the general two-sidedcapacity for walking - even if in the
specific situationit is fully causally determinedthat I will (or that I will
not) walk.5
But, importantly,the two-sided,potestativeezp'ijiiv can also be understood as indeterministin the following way: at a certain time walking
dependson me, if at that time it is causally undeterminedwhetheror not
I (will) walk, and it dependson my free decision whetheror not I (will)
walk. When the expressionis understoodas two-sided,potestativein this
way, the "we" ("us")in 9p'igiv takes on an interestingrole: the "us"in
e.g. "walkingdepends on us" is given the status of an active decisionmaker.We decide whetheror not we walk. Insteadof a generalcapacity
decidhad at a certaintime, in this case thereis a powerfor undetermined
ing between,and initiating,coursesof action.This is a very differentkind
of capacity. And in this case, if somethingdepends on me, then I have
the indeterministfreedomto do and not to do it (cf. section XI).
Things are quite differentagain in the case of the one-sided,causative
E(p' hIilv. When I call the phrase"one-sided",I understandthis to entail
that if somethingx dependson us, then not-x does not dependon us; and
I
A related reading compatible with determinism(and indeterminism)is this: walking depends on me at a certain time if at that time I have the general two-sided capacity for walking, and nothing (or nothing external) forces me to walk or prevents me
from walking - even if in the specific situation it is fully causally determinedwhether
or not I will walk. This adds to the previous reading my freedom (of type 5 above),
i.e. the additional requirementof the agent's being neither hindered from nor forced
to follow up either alternative.Still differently,a two-sided potestative concept of ?p'
higivthat is neutraltowardsdeterminismand indeterminismcan also be used for action
types without reference to a specific time. So walking may be said to be the sort of
thing that is generally up to human beings.
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PROBLEM
THEFREE-WILL
141
by "causative"I refer to the fact that the prepositional phrase in "x
dependson y" refersto thatwhich is the cause or reasonof x. In this case
a translationlike "attributableto us" may be preferable.If at a certain
time my walking is attributableto me, then it is not the case that my not
walking is attributableto me, too. For in the assumed situationmy not
walking does not obtain at all. Here, the naturalunderstandingof "x
depends on us" is that it expresses who has the causal responsibilityfor
the thing or action in question."Thewalking is attributableto you" translates into "You are causally responsiblefor your walking."The "we" in
ep' i1ilv now expressesthe cause of what happensand dependson us.
The one-sided, causative ezp'itliv, too, can be used in the description
of an indeterministas well as a deterninist system. However,whereasthe
two-sidedEp'ij^Iv can be used to expressan elementof undeterminedness,
by implyingthatwe, qua decision-makers,can decide freely betweenalternative options, the one-sided "dependingon us" cannot be so used. Its
function is to help to distinguishbetween differenttypes of "causes"of
events, not to imply the possibilityof freedomto do otherwise.6The onesided, causative concept of what depends on us is not a concept of any
kind of freedom,but of a particularkind of causal dependency.However,
it presupposesa certain kind of freedom:freedom (type 6) from being
externallydeterminedto act; or freedom(type 5) from being in any way
forced to act and preventedfrom acting. Note that these conceptsof freedom are not the same as this concept of what dependson us. An action
dependson me if (in some way) I bear causal responsibilityfor it and am
in this sense its originator.It is in orderfor this to be possible that I must
not be compelledto act or preventedfrom acting, i.e. that I must be free
from externalor from necessitatinginfluences.
Dependingon which conceptionof Eep'
hij1v a philosopherworks with,
the conceptof moralresponsibilitywill differ.In the case of the one-sided,
causative ?p' FI1iv moral responsibility is attached to someone if they
are - in some sense - the main causal originator and thus autonomous
(MR1). This is the position of the Stoics in Alexander.In the case of
the indeterministtwo-sided, potestative E'p'fi'iiv, moral responsibilityis
attachedto someone if they are free to do otherwise;if they are notfully
6 Matters are complicated by the fact that when the one-sided causative ip' 'Iniv
is employed, it usually refers to the bringing about of something by way of using a
general two-sided capacity (see below). Thus the one-sided conception and the twosided one that expresses a general two-sided capacity come very close, and the context does not always allow one to decide which one is at issue.
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142
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
causallydeterminedin theirdecisionbetweenalternativecoursesof action
(MR2).This appearsto be Alexander'sown position,accordingto the passages cited above.
The case which understandsthe two-sided,potestativeFp'
1iPtv as a general capacity,and which is neutralregardingdeterminismor indeterminism, is usually linked with a concept of moral responsibilitybased on
the agent's autonomy(MR1):moralresponsibilityis attachedto my making use of the two-sided capacity, because it is throughthe use of this
capacity that I, qua rationalor moral person, become the originatorof
the action.
III. The one-sidedpotestativeconceptionof
that which dependson us
Next I shall trace the philosophicaldevelopmentthat led up to the antagonistic views in Alexander, with emphasis on the question of how
the indeterministtwo-sided, potestativeconcept of what depends on us
enteredthe debate.But let me begin with some remarkson the development of the one-sided,causativeconcept.This concepthas a long history
which reachesat least from the 3rd centuryB.C. to the 3rd centuryA.D.
However,I have not found a matchingphilosophicaldefinitionor account
before the 2nd centuryA.D.7
The early Stoics, in particularChrysippus,clearlydid not have an indeterministtwo-sidedconceptionof what dependson us.8Thereare reasons
internalto the Stoic systemwhich help explainingthis. They regardedthe
mind as corporeal, and as unitary: a person's character,dispositions,
beliefs and desires are all reducibleto what impressionsa person,or that
person's mind, gives assent to. (For the Stoics volitions or desires are a
kind of beliefs.) The Stoics operatedwith a model of a person, or of
agency, in which neithera person's characteror dispositions,nor a perI
In his discussion of the problemof the compatibilityof necessitarianismand fatalism with moral responsibilityEpicuruscan be shown to have used throughouta onesided potestative concept of what depends on us. (See my "Did Epicurusdiscover the
free-will problem?"forthcoming.)The standardphrase used by him and his followers
is nap' ihgiy,yieaOat ('to happen because of us') ratherthan Ezp'nigivctvat - a linguistic point which is additional support for my claim. Questions of freedom to do
otherwise and freedom of decision were, it seems, not discussed.
I Cf. section 6.3.5 of Bobzien, Determinism.... We do not know with certainty
which Greek expressions Chrysippus used, but it is likely that E'ii with dativus personae was among them.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
143
son's volitions can be severedfrom thatperson.Rather,they identifiedthe
person with the entire natureof the individual'smind, includingcharacter, dispositionsand all. In this model an action is voluntary,and causally
attributableto the person,if it is the resultof the mind assentingto impulsive impressions(pavtaatiatbpjtcRrTKai),
i.e. impressionsof somethingas
desirable.Whetheror not assent is given to the impressionsdepends on
the agent's individualnatureof the mind. What makes an agent morally
responsibleis that the agent, and not somethingelse causes the action.
There is in this model no space for free will (i.e. for a decision making
faculty that is causally independentof the mind's individualnature).For
the fact that I act in accordancewith the overall natureof my mind is
considereda prerequisitefor attributingthe action to me, whereas free
will takes the detachmentof the decision makingfaculty from the rest of
the person as a necessary condition.The concept of an internallyundetermineddecision made by the agent is thus ill-fitting in the Stoic conceptual framework. And so, accordingly, is the free will problem. It
follows that the libertarianconditionfor the attributionof moral responsibility, that we have freedom to do otherwise,would have made little
sense to Chrysippus.
We can see thattheStoicaccountof thatwhichdependson us in Alexander
is an attemptto capture exactly this early Stoic concept of the causal
responsibilityof rationalagents: an action is said to depend on us if it
happensthroughus. The expression"happensthroughus" is explicatedas
the humanbeing, as a result of impulse and assent,
happeningby ("rOn)
and in accordancewith the humanbeing's individualnature(Alex. Fat.
ch. 13, esp. 181.18-21, 182.11-16;Nem. Nat. hom. 105-6).
IV. The two-sided, potestative 4p' i1jipv:Aristotle
Things are less straightforward
on the side of the indeterministtwo-sided,
postestativebp'hjitv,and with the indeterministconcept of freedom.As I
have said above, the first full and unambiguousstatementof freedomto
do otherwiseseems to occur in Alexander'sOn Fate, and in the Mantissa.
Wherethen do Alexander'sindeterministconcept of what dependson us,
and his theoryof freedomto do otherwiseoriginate?In the Mantissathis
theoryand conceptare attributedto Aristotle.9Of course,this must not be
taken literally.But it is worthwhiletaking up the hint, and to ask: where
9 Cf. the titles of chs. 22 and 23; see also Alex. Fat. ch. 39.
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SUSANNE BOBZIEN
in Aristotle'sextantwritingsdo we find his view on that which depends
on s.o. (?iti with dativus personae)?The answer is: in the Nicomachean
Ethics III.2 and 3, on deliberationand deliberatechoice (npoaipeot;),and
III.5, on the question of whether we are morally responsible for our
actions and our virtues and vices; and in the parallel sections in the
EudemianEthics II.6 (1223al-9) and 11.10.
In EN III.3 Aristotle argues that deliberatechoice is deliberatedesire
of those thingsthatdependon us (EN 1113al0-I 1). The thingsthatdepend
on us are the thingsthatwe can bringabout,as opposedto events brought
aboutby nature,necessity,or chance, and also as opposedto those things
only people other than us could bring about (EN 1112a21-33).They are
in the first instance actions (EN 1112a31, 34). In 111.5we learn that
besides actions,virtuesand vices dependon us (EN 1113b3-1115a3).Note
the relationbetween deliberatechoice and the things that depend on us:
deliberatechoice is choice of the things that dependon us, i.e. in the first
instance of actions (EN 1113alO-11).That is, we deliberateabout and
choosebetweenpossiblecoursesof actions.Thechoicewe make(ipoaipsat;)
is itself not one of the things that dependon us, and the idea that it was
would have been quite alien to Aristotle'sthinking.
There is howeverone factor in Aristotle'sconcept of what dependson
us which we also have in Alexander:its "two-sidedness."In EN III.5
we learn that if doing something depends on us, then not doing that
same thing also depends on us, and vice versa (EN 1113b7-8, cf. EE
1226a27-8),and this relationalpropertyof the conceptis preservedin later
Peripateticphilosophy.But Aristotle's concept of what dependsus does
not entail indeterminism.We have no reason to assume that he has anythingmorein mindthanthatthe thingsthatdependson us are those which
on a generic level it is possible for us to do and not to do, given thatwe
are not externallypreventedfrom doing them. In the two Ethics, all the
concept of what dependson us does is give the general range of courses
of action from which we can choose. The concept is independentof (and
priorto) Aristotle'sconceptof deliberatechoice, and of any mentalcapacity we have. It is takenas a basic concept,undefinedand generallyunderstood, by means of which the scope of the objectsof deliberatechoice is
determined.
Thus Aristotle's remarkson that which depends on us are a far shot
from Alexander'sdefinitions.In none of the passagesdoes Aristotlegive
a philosophicaldefinitionof thatwhich dependson us; nor is he concerned
with fate or causal determinism;and certainlythereis no mentionof freedom to act or choose otherwise,circumstancesand agent being the same.
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145
V. Early commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics
Let us consider next the extant early commentarieson the Nicomachean
Ethics, i.e. the commentaryby Aspasius (who wrote in the first half of
the 2nd centuryA.D.) and the Anonymouson books II to V (who presumablywrote in the second half of the 2nd century).'0The first thing to
notice is that both commentatorsintroducethe topic of fate where they
commenton the Aristotlepassage that states that deliberatechoice is of
the things that depend on us, and in which Aristotle lists the types of
causes necessity, natureand chance." Aspasius contrastsa thing's being
fated and a thing's being determinedby necessity with its depending
on us (EN 74.10-13) and a little later contrasts"dependingon us" with
"being necessitated" (icaTiva'ycaCTal, EN 76.11-14).12 This suggests that
he understandssomething's depending on us as presupposingfreedom
fromforceor compulsion-just like AristotleandtheStoics.TheAnonymous
has a differentconceptof fate: fate is subordinatedto nature,and it is not
untransgressable(ainpapJato;).He thus expresslyrejects a propertycommonly linked with fate by the Stoics and many others, and his view of
fate closely resemblesthat of Alexander(cf. Fat. ch. 6 and Mant. 186).
A second point of interestis that both commentatorsintroduceinto the
presentcontext the idea of something'sbeing able to be or happenotherwise: Aspasius presentsthe Aristotelianaccount of what is necessaryas
t6 j E'v86EXOievov
what cannot be otherwise(&vaycaiovyap XkyeTatT
&aXXo
Aspas. EN 71.25-7). The Anonymouswrites that the actions we
*XEIV,
deliberateabout (and that is, the things that depend on us) are things
which can be done in this way and otherwise (aXX&(IBouXri6o>i0a)
cepl
TO)TWOV a Kai caXXo KQi oix
Ev8XeTat xpaX0vat, EN 149.34-5). Again,
the Anonymous is one step ahead, talking about acting otherwise. The
formulations,especially that of the Anonymous,lend themselvesin principle to an indeterministconceptof freedomto do otherwiseas we found
it in Alexander.But thereare no signs that eithercommentatortook them
that way.
10 Cf. P.
Moraux Der Aristotelismusbei den Griechen I1, Berlin/New York 1984,
226-7, 324-7; or perhaps later? See R.W. Sharples, Alexander: Ethical Problems,
London 1990, xx.
" Aspas. EN 74.10-14; Anon. EN 150.1-4. It may have been Theophrastuswho
introducedfate into this context; cf. Stob. Ecl. I 89.2-5. The earliest clearly two-sided
concept of 9p'i'siv in the fate debate that I have found so far is in Josephus Ant.
13.172. I have been unable to trace any connection between Josephus and the positions discussed in this paper.
12 This is the standardStoic contrast, as we usually find it in Epictetus.
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146
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
As in Aristotle,thereis no philosophicalaccountof thatwhich depends
on us. As in Aristotle,too, deliberatechoice is not one of the things that
depend on us, but is of the things that depend on us. The things that
dependon us are actionsand virtuesand vices. And finally,it dependson
us to do and not to do things, not to choose and not to choose things, as
Alexanderhas it. You may say, well, that was to be expected;after all
this is what Aristotlesays, and we are here dealingwith commentarieson
Aristotle. This is true. However, in the Paraphrase of book III of the
NicomacheanEthics, ascribedvariouslyto some Heliodorusand others,in
pn" instead of Aristotle'sorigiat least one place we have "XlkoOat
ica&t
nal "npaTT.?1vKcalAll (52.25-7); and in the Mantissa ch. 22 we read,
markedout as Aristotle'sview, that deliberatechoice dependson us (?'
iv
ijWIV
npoaipeat;, Mant. 169.38). So at some point Aristotle's remarks on
the thingsthatdependon us musthave been understoodas being primarily
about choice and only secondarily about actions (cf. also Amm. Int.
242.24-5 and below, section X). We do not know when the Paraphrase
was written,but it is very likely to date after Alexander.
Thus, in both commentatorsthe concept of what dependson us seems
wholly compatiblewith both causal determinismand causal indeterminism. They both include elements which we find in the same context in
Alexanderbut not in Aristotle.They both introduceformulationsof the
"it could be/happenotherwise"kind and they both connectAristotle'sEN
III.3, on deliberatechoice and what dependson us, with fate - something
Alexanderdid as well (e.g. Fat. 180).
VI. Middle-Platonistson contingencyand
that which dependson us
For a closer connectionbetween Aristotle's works and Alexander,concerningthat which dependson us, we need to look elsewhere:viz. at the
texts of the Middle Platonists.'3The Middle Platonists- like virtuallyall
philosophicalschools, sects and currentsin the 1st and 2nd centuryA.D. had developedtheir own position on fate and that which dependson us.
Their theoryof fate is based on a handfulof passages from Plato, and is
influencedin many aspects by the Stoics. We find variantsof the theory
e.g. in Alcinous'Handbookof Platonism,in thetreatiseOnFate by [Plutarch],
13 I use the term "Middle-Platonist"to refer to those Platonists commonly classified
in this way, but do not maintain that there was any unified Middle-Platonistschool.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
147
in Nemesius' On HumanNatureand in Calcidius'commentaryon Plato's
Timaeus.'4[Plutarch],Calcidius and Nemesius - althoughat variancein
many details - go back to some elaboratePlatonisttheory of fate which
may stem from the first half of the second century,'5but which should in
any event at least in partprecedeAlexander.This commonsourceencompassed first a parton fate in which - among other things - a distinction
was drawnbetweenthings that are included(eppl?Xetv) in fate, which are
all things, and those thingsthatarefated, or in accordancewithfate (lca0'
cijapgevnv),which are all those things that are necessary.In addition,it
containeda section on the things includedin fate but not fated; a section
on providence;a critiqueof Stoic doctrineof fate; and a discussionof fallacies concernedwith determinism.
For my presentpurposesthe section on things includedin fate but not
fated is relevant.In all three sources this section differsfrom the rest of
the Middle-Platonisttheoryin that(i) the only tracesfromPlato are a couple of examples tagged on in the section on chance; (ii) the passage is
clearly based on a whole range of texts from Aristotle,which all dealt
with "thatwhich is not necessary.'6 It looks as if someone has taken a
list of types of things that are not necessary,perhapsfrom AristotleEN
I11.31112a31-3, perhapsfrom some later, "updated,"list,'7 and then has
worked his way throughthe works of Aristotle,picking out and systematising the relevantsections.The passage drawsfrom Aristotle'sPhysics,
Metaphysics,NicomacheanEthics, De Interpretationeand perhapsfrom
the Categories.The list of things not necessaryis of interestfor two reasons: first, it includesthat which dependson us (t6
rp' idv). Second, we
do not simply have a presentationor co-ordinationof bits from Aristotle,
but a systematisation,in which at that a couple of distinctionsand terms
are added which we do not find, or do not find used in that way, in
Aristotle.
" Alcin. Didasc. ch. 26, Nem. Nat. hom. e.g. 110, 125-6, Calc. Tim. 142-187, [Plu.]
Fat. passim, Apul. Plat. 1.12, perhaps an echo in Alex. Mant. ch. 25 183.
Is So Moraux,Der Aristotelismus... II, 495-6, following Gercke and others. There
is a problemin thatthe texts thatreportfrom this theoryareeitherclearly later(Nemesius,
Calcidius) or cannot be dated with any certainty(Alcinous, [Plutarch]).It is also clear
that over time the theory underwent extensive step-by-step development, and many
elements of the theory as reportedby Calcidius and Nemesius are certainly later than
the 2nd century.
16 Nem. Nat. hom. 103-4, [Plu.] Fat. 570f.-572f., Calc. Tim. 155-6.
17 See e.g. Theophrastusin Stob. Ecl. I 89.2-5, Alex. Fat. 211.1-4, Mant. ch. 25,
Nem. Nat. hom. 112.13-15 for such lists.
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148
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
Regardingthe origin of this passage,we may assume that it was compiled in the 2nd centuryA.D. at the latest. It may well be earlier.As I
said above, the only bits from Plato in it are two examplestagged on to
the section on chance. Thereis thus no reason to thinkthat the authorof
the common source of the Middle-Platonistdoctrineof fate is the originatorof the passage. The rest of the Middle-Platonistfate theory stands
without it, and vice versa. The original author of this bit of "MiddlePlatonist"theory could be equally well a Peripateticor a Platonist- if
indeed such a distinctionmade sense at the time. We may say the author
was an Aristotlescholar.
The passage appears to have employed the following classificatory
scheme:the most generaltermis the possible(6o &ivatov). It encompasses
and the contingent (TO E,V6XOeVOV): the
both the necessary(6o &avayKcaiov)
necessaryis determinedas the possible the opposite of which is impossible; the contingentas the possible the oppositeof which is possible,too
(Suvarov ov icuA xo aivtticeivov
8vval'6v).'8
This is the distinction of one-
sided and two-sided possibility as we find it in Aristotle's De Interpretatione 12 and 13 (Int 22b36ff.;23a15-16), althoughAristotledid not
for two-sidedpossiconsistentlyuse the termn"contingent'(Fv8eX6,Eovov)
That
which dependson
have
done.
to
bility in the way our source seems
us is then characterisedas a subclassof the contingent.'9That is, the section connects explicitly a distinction and an account from Aristotle's
modal theory (that of two-sided possibility),with the questionof moral
responsibility,as it comes up in Aristotle'sethics.
Is not all this a bit far-fetched?you may object. Surelythe Stoics and
the Megaricsor Dialecticianshad alreadyconnectedthe problemof determinism with modal logic, for instance in the Mower Argumentand the
This is true,and given that the same Middle-Platonist
MasterArgument.20
source discussed these very fallacies and criticised the Stoic theory of
fate,2'the triggerfor connectingAristotelianmodaltheoryandAristotelian
ethics may well have come from there.You may also objectthat the connectionbetweenthe conceptof contingency,quatwo-sidedpossibility,and
of what dependson us is just a commonplace.However,for instancethe
Nem. Nat. hom. 103.20-1, [Plu.] Fat. 571b.
'9 [Plu.] Fat. 571c-d, Nem. Nat. hom. 114.21-4.
20 For the Mower Argumentsee e.g. DL 7.25, Amm. Int. 131.25-32; for the Master
ArgumentEpict. Diss. 11 19.
21 [Plu.] Fat. 574e, Calc. Tim. 160-1. Note also that Ammonius discusses the Mower
Argument in his commentaryon De Interpretatione,see previous note.
1B
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149
THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
early Stoics, it seems, had neithera definitionof what dependson us nor
a term for contingency:they talked about two-sided possibility in terms
of what is true but not-necessaryand what is false but possible.22Moreover, the Stoics had a one-sided concept of what depends on us - and
they were by far not the only ones (see section XII).
But be that as it may. The best way to find out whetherAristotle'sDe
Interpretatione12 and 13 were used for the developmentof a concept of
what depends on us is to look at the passages and the ancient commentaries on them. In De Interpretatione13 Aristotleconnectsthe concept of
capacity (56vaii;) with that of two-sided possibility, stating that not all
capacities are two-sided, or capacities of opposites (avtcEtiFieva), although
rationalcapacitiesare, like that of humanbeings for actions,e.g. walking
(Int. 13 22b36-23a6;cf. Met. e 1046b1-2,4-7, 1048a2-3,8-9, 1050b30-4).
Thus here Aristotle links the concept of two-sided possibility with the
capacities for opposites, and draws the connection to human rational
capacities.All the signs are that what Aristotlehas in mind is a general
capacity,andnota capacityinvolvingfreedomto do otherwise.(Forinstance,
he mentionsthe fact that there are non-rationalcapacitiesfor opposites,
e.g. Int. 13 23a3-4: evua pgEvot &vvatat vcai )icat& 6t;
aiu Ta avxltcitrEva.)
&X6yow;6&vaigEt;
Ammonius,in his commentaryon this very passage of the De Interpretatione, states that in the case of us human beings, whose rational
capacitiesare two-sided (Int. 242.19-20),
we are master .., of our deliberate choice, and it depends on us to do or not to
do any of the things that happen in accordance with deliberate choice. (Amm.
Int. 242.24-7)
Ammonius here connects that which depends on us with Aristotle's
two-sidedpossibility(the contingent),via the rationalcapacitiesof which
Aristotle speaks, interpretingthese in particularas power of deliberate
choices.23But deliberatechoice and that which depends on us were the
topic of EN I11.3.
The next line of our passage (Amm. Int. 242.27-8) is also of interest:
there the questionis raisedwhetherthe capacitiesof the gods correspond
to one-sidedor two-sidedpossibility.And then we learn:Alexanderasked
22
Cf. Cic. Fat. 13, Plu. Stoic. Rep. 1055e.
Aristotle himself introduceddeliberate choice (but not that which depends on us)
into this context in Met. e 1048a10-15, but in a very differentway than Ammonius:
his point is that circumstances permittingwe will necessarily realise that side of our
two-sided capacities for which we have a desire resulting from deliberate choice.
23
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150
SUSANNEBOBZIEN
himself the same question. Now, if Alexanderasked himself that question, it seems very likely indeed that what led up to the question,i.e. the
above-quoted passage in the commentaryjust beforehand, stems also
from Alexander, that is - presumably - from his (lost) commentary on
Thus it appearsthat both our Aristotle scholar
the De Interpretatione.24
from the Middle-Platonistcommon source and Alexanderconnectedthat
which dependson us with a passage on modal logic from Aristotle'sDe
Interpretatione13.
But let us returnto our Aristotlescholarand the subordinationof that
which depends on us to the contingentin the Middle-Platonistcommon
source. There we find three types of the contingent:one partof the contingentis "for the most part,"one "for the lesser part"and one "in equal
Those for the most partand for the lesser part are characterised
parts."25
as opposites. For example, if for the most part the weather is hot in
August, it is cold, or not-hot,in August for the lesser part.26On the other
hand, the "in equal parts"is that which depends on us, as for instance
walking and not walking, and in generalacting and not acting.27
In Aristotlewe find neitherthis threefolddistinctionof the contingent,
nor the category of what is "in equal parts."However, there can be no
doubtthat this thirdcategoryis derivedfrom Aristotle'sInt. 9 18a39-b9,
and is meant to pick up what Aristotle calls "as it happens"(6noiep'
evruXv)there.28In chapter9 of the De InterpretationeAristotle investigates whetheror in what way the Principleof Bivalence holds for future
propositions.One of his problems is that, if all propositionsthat state
somethingabout the futureare alreadytrue or false now, this fact could
somehow entail that all future events are predeterminedalready now.29
Aristotlecontraststhe "as it happens"with necessityand explainsit as "it
is no more thus than not thus (ouS&ev
gi&ov), nor will it be" (Int. 18b9,
cf. 19a18),and it is aboutthese (the things"as it happens")thatone deliberates (Int. 18b31, cf. 19a9).
24 See Moraux, Der Aristotelismus... II, 363.
Nem. Nat. hon. 10.1-2,
?X'
Eiov;
iattov,
~
25 'E,ri TO 1t0c'
[Plu.] Fat. 571c, cf.
Calc. Tim. 156.
26 Nem. Nat. hom. 104.2-4, [Plu.] Fat. 571c. [Plutarch]maintainsthat both are subordinatedto nature(ibid.).
27 [Plu.] Fat. 571c-d, Nem. Nat. hom. 104.4-5 in connection with 114.19-22, cf.
below p. xxx.
E
28 Cf. e.g. [Plu.] Fat. 571c so&K
'c'ai;q xai O6ic6epovEurXEv.See also Amm. Int.
143.1-7, Alex. An. Pr. 163.21-9, Fat. 174.30-175.4.
29 For the controversy among scholars over this passage see e.g., D. Frede "The
Sea-Battle Reconsidered,"OSAP 3 (1985) 31-87.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
151
Hence, I assume, our Aristotle scholar - or some earlier Aristotle
exegete - simply reasonedas follows: the "as it happens"must be partof
the contingent,since accordingto Aristotleit is not necessary.An expression, parallelto "for the most part"was then coined for this subtypeof
contingent,namely"in equal parts,"based on Aristotle'sphrase"no more
thus than not thus."Since Aristotlesays that the "as it happens"is concerned with deliberationand action, and this is - accordingto Aristotle
himself - the sphere of that which depends on us, the Aristotle scholar
concludedthatthe "as it happens"mustbe thatwhich dependson us. This
identificationof the "in equal parts"with that which dependson us suggests that, unlike the "forthe most part"and the "for the lesser part,"the
The phrases"for
"in equal parts"was not given a statisticalinterpretation.
the most part"and "for the lesser part"express probabilityin the sense
that if it is, say, hot in August 95% of all years (of all days?), then it is
"for the most parthot" in August. But our Aristotlescholar cannot have
understoodthe statement"walkingis 'in equal parts"' to mean "people
walk 50% of the time; or 50% of the time relevantto walking."Rather,
the idea must have been that in any situationof possible walking it is no
more likely that the personwalks than not - quite independentlyof how
much people statisticallyactuallywalk.
In Nemesius we are twice given a definitionof the "in equal parts";
it is "that of which we are capable of <doing> both it and its opposite." (aino te 5-va'geOacal to a&vuce_ijeVoV
avT*, Nem. Nat. hom. 104.6-7,
114.21-2). In the second passage this definitionis followed by the explicit
identificationof the "in equal parts"with what depends on us, and it is
illustratedwith examples (Nem. Nat. hom. 114.24-115.2).Note the similarityof the definitionwith on the one hand Aristotle'sthings that "6areat
the same time capable of opposites"(&vvaTwa&a'aTxaavutKetiEva) from
De Interpretatione 13 (23a3-4, see above), and with Alexander'sdefinition
of that which depends on us as "that of which we have the power of
a0ai cal
choosing also its opposite" (0v ?V Iiv i ?Vouaia Toi5 CXke
avtuceijirva, Fat. 181.5-6) on the other (see above section II).
As an interimresultwe can state:we have in this Middle-Platonistcommon source a concept of what dependson us which seems to be the outcome of bringing together and systematising three bits of Aristotelian
doctrine:
* the things that depend on us, as those we deliberateabout and from
which we choose, from the NicomacheanEthics, book III 3;
* the concept of two-sided possibility,or the contingent,and its relation
to the two-sided capacities of rationalbeings from De Interpretatione
13 and Metaphysics
e; and
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152
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
the problemof futurecontingents,and the idea of thingsthatcan equally
happenand not happenfrom De Interpretatione9.
The resulting concept is capturedin the account of what is "in equal
parts"- which is identifiedwith what dependson us - as: "thatof which
we are capable of <doing> both it and its opposite."30
VII. The philosophicalrelevanceof the link betweenthe
NicomacheanEthics and the De Interpretatione
Why have I spent so much time on the developmentof a conceptof what
dependson us in the context of Aristotle'sDe Interpretatione?
The reason is this: my above questionwas when and where thatconceptwas first
understoodas indeterminist,and as implyingthe possibilitythat the same
person,with the same beliefs and desires,in the same circumstancesdoes
otherwise. The obvious question now is whether the 'zp'i11iiv of our
Aristotlescholarwas takento imply indeterministfreedom.The definition
"thatof which we are capableof <doing> both it and its opposite"itself
is of no help: it is just as ambiguousin this respect as were Aristotle's
originalphrases"whatdependson him to do and not to"(cf. EE 1223a7-8,
1226b30-1) and "being at the same time capable of opposites" (Int.
23a3-4). Take walking as an example:walking dependson me because I
am capable of both walking and <doing> the opposite, i.e. not walking.
This can mean that I have the generaltwo-sidedcapacityof walking and
of notwalking- whichwouldbe compatiblewithdeterminism.
Alternatively,
it can be understoodas implyingthatthereare no precedingcauses which
sufficientlydeterminethat I walk, or determinethat I do not walk. This
understandingwould be incompatiblewith pre-determinism.
Or it can be
understoodas implyingthat it is causally undeterminedwhetheror not I
walk. This would be incompatiblewith determinism.
Perhapsthe Middle-Platonistidentificationof what dependson us with
what happens"in equal parts"was a step in the directionof undetermined
choice. For if the "in equal parts"is understoodas tied to individualsituations such that e.g. in every situationof possible walking it is no more
likely than not that I walk (see above), then the capacityexpressedin the
30 We do not know who first broughttogether the Nicomachean Ethics and the De
Interpretationein this context. We do know that Aspasius wrote a commentary not
only on the former, but also on the latter, which is however lost; cf. Moraux, Der
Aristotelismus... II, 231.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
153
account"capableof <doing> both it and its opposite"will also be tied to
an individualsituation.Thatis, somethingdependson us at a certaintime
if at that time we are capable of doing both it and its opposite. But this
is still ambiguousbetween (i) having at that time a general capacity to
walk and being at that time (ii) un-predetermined
or (iii) causally undeterminedin our walking.3'
The vagueness in the definitionof that which dependson us seems to
be resolvedin favourof an un-predeterministic
or indeterministicconcept,
once the connectionof that which dependson us with the problemof the
truth-valuesof future propositions is fully taken into account. For in
De Interpretatione9 the problemof truth-valuesof futurepropositionsis
connectedwith the questionof the undeterminedness
of the future,more
precisely, the undeterminednessof whether somethingwill happen at a
particularfuturetime: it is not yet determinednow whethertherewill be
a sea-battletomorrow. Here pairs of propositionsabout the occurringof
futureevents are at issue, and the occurringis tagged to a particulartime
in the future:the occurringof a sea battle tomorrowversus the absence
of the occurringof a sea battletomorrow.Plainly the questionhere is not
whethera sea battle (or anythingelse) has a general capacity of occurring, andwhetherit has thatcapacitynow. The questionis whethertomorrow a sea-battlewill or will not take place. That is, startingout from one
and the same situation,viz. the presentone, it is assumedthat something
could or could not obtainat some later time; and it is at presentundetermined whetheror not it will obtain.
Thus here we have expresslyone necessaryconditionfor indeterminist
freedom to do otherwise:exactly the same antecedentsituationis combined with the possibility of two opposed states of affairs obtaining in
some later situationin such a way that the antecedentsituationleaves it
undeterminedwhich of the laterstateswill obtain.However,in Aristotle's
De Interpretationethis is merely a matter of logic: Aristotle does not
consider whether the present situation is causally responsible for what
happensin the future.A fortiori,he does not ask whetherdefinite truthbivalence of future propositionswould entail that human decisions are
causally predetermined.
n' The same ambiguity is connected with &ja
aZVrtKielEVa
in Aristotle's phrase &vatat
from De Interpretatione13 23a3-4.
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-ja
t&
154
SUSANNE
BOBZIEN
VIII. Alcinousand Ammonius
- when drawingon De
Did our Aristotlescholar,or the Middle-Platonists
Interpretatione9 and identifyingwhat dependson us with what happens
"to equal parts"- makethis step fromthe logical undeterminedness
of the
futureby the presentto the causal undeterminedness
of humandecisions
and/oractions?We do not know. However, remnantsof such a thought
can perhapsbe detectedin chapter26, on fate, possibilityand thatwhich
depends on us, in the Handbookof Platonism of the Middle-Platonist
Alcinous. This passage displays many similaritiesto those in Nemesius,
Calcidiusand[Plutarch],butis sufficientlydistinctto suggestthatit belonged
to a slightly differenttradition.32
Alcinous works with a two-sided,potestative concept of what dependson us which in its formulationis closer
to Aristotle than the one in Nemesius. Thus he writes: &86aicotov
ouv
i]
I caci.ETr'airfi uEuvud xp-cail pr (Didasc. 179.10-11; cf. Arist.
EE 1226b30-1). Of interest to us now is what we find shortly afterwards:
The nature of the possible falls somehow between the true and the false, and
being by nature undetermined,that which depends on us uses it (i.e. the possible) as a vehicle. Whatever happens as a result of our choosing will be either
true or false.33(Didasc. 179.20-3)
and then again:
The possible... is undetermined,and it takes on truth or not depending on the
inclining in either direction of that which depends on us.4 (Didasc. 179.31-3)
This can be read as the abbreviatedversion of an argumentin which the
as found in De Interpretatione9 is appliedto
idea of undeterminedness
the concept of what dependson us. The link with the De Interpretatione
is suggested by the repeatedreferenceto truthand falsehood, which is
entirelyabsentin the relevantchaptersof the NicomacheanandEudemian
32 Cf. e.g. J. Dillon, Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism, Oxford 1993, 160-4.
Alcinous flourishedsome time between the Ist and 3rd centuryA.D. I assume the second half of the 2nd century or the early 3rd century as a likely date; but he may be
even later: cf. T. Goransson,Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus, Studia graeca et latina
gothoborgensia 61, Goteborg, 1995.
cEgi'ow
3 'H SE roi Suvaroi) p'ot; nE'XroE
&optUp
&E OVTt a1sq
m qnrEt
(ooiep
jietoa4i 0to TEaXIOoi ICaiToi Nie58oi),
O 8' av ?XogEVov TIROiv
E'ROXEICal TO lp' fuiiV.
i koSi
pis
yevilrat, robco E&Yrat
`4 T6o8E 8uvatov ... &optaTaivov &?'rp ?P' iv
0v
caTa
T&iv iw' oioCEpov oXaifii . As Whittaker(in his comments in the Budd edition, Paris
iVEt TiOO id?VEvv
1990, 134 n. 424) has pointed out, the whole section reflects Aristotelianthought and
terminology.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
155
Ethics. The argumentcould have run like this: futurecontingentsare not
yet true or false now. It is so far undeterminedwhether the event announcedin them will or will not happen.If we choose that it happens,it
will happen.If we choose thatit does not happen,it will not happen.Once
we have chosen, circumstancespermitting,the correspondingpropositions
will be either true or false. This implies that at least up to the point of
the decision it is not predeterminedwhich way we choose.35
A similarthoughtcan be detectedin Ammoniusat the beginningof his
comments on De Interpretatione9. There he maintainsthat the logical
principlethat states the indefinitenessof the truth-valuesof contrarypairs
of propositionsabout the future is necessary for ethics. It is needed, so
that it can depend on us whetherwe choose or do not choose and perform or do not performcertainactions. Ammonius'argumentationin this
passage implies that prior to our decision it is not yet fully determined
which way we decide (see Amm. Int. 130.23-33, quotedbelow).
So two passages, one of them presumably earlier than Alexander,
suggest that an indeterministtwo-sided concept of what depends on us
was developed in the context of the exegesis of Aristotle'sDe Interpretatione9. However,two things shouldbe noted:first,in both passagesno
mentionis made of causation:that is, we do not know whetherthe indeterminednesswas understoodas absence of causal factors - as opposed
to the "necessitation"of the futureby logical determinismwhich leaves
it openin whichwaythefutureis determinedby the pastor present.However,
we know that some Stoics, presumablyfrom the 2nd century,discussed
Aristotle'sDe Interpretatione 9,36 Since in Stoic philosophythe connection was drawnbetween logical and causal determinism,it is thus likely
that the link with causationwas made at least by some philosophersin
the second century.Second, even if there is no predetermination(causal
or otherwise)of a humanchoice or action, within the context of ancient
theory of causationwhich allows for objects to be causes this need not
imply thatthe choice or action is causallyundetermined.(Thatis, it could
be freedom of type4.) For example, if the assumptionis that there is a
core of personalityor moral characterin each person, then even if the
" The two passages quoted are most remarkablealso for the fact that in them Esp'
iqjAvdoes not refer to the things that depend on us, but to some kind of decision making faculty.
36 Cf. Alex. Fat. 177.7-14; Boeth. Int. II 208.1-3. In the Alexander passage the
example of the sea-battle draws the link to De Interpretatione9 and the terminology
and theory is Stoic, although presumablynot early Stoic, and Alexander connects the
argumentwith the theory of fate.
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156
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
decision is not predetermined,it may be determinedat the time of the
decision by the fact that the person is such and such a person.That is,
the personwould still in identicalcircumstancesalways go for the same
action.
IX. From the Middle-Platoniststo Alexanderof Aphrodisias
I leave it open whetherthe Middle-Platonistsunderstoodtheir two-sided
concept of 9p'7ijiiv as implying undeterminednessor non-predetermination by causalfactors.My concernis ratherwhetherAlexanderwas familiar with the 2nd centurytheoryof ?p 'gi;v as foundin some of the Middle
Platonisttexts on fate, and whetherit is likely that his concepts(which I
sketchedin section II) could have developedfrom it. There is some evidence that this was so.
To begin with, althoughwe do not have the distinctionof things contingentinto "forthe most part,""forthe lesser part,"and "in equal parts"
in his treatiseOn Fate, we do find it in his commentarieson the Prior
Analyticsand the Topics,and in the Mantissach. 22. In his commentson
Arist. Top. 112bl the threefolddistinctionoccurs precededby the distinction between necessity and contingency(Alex. Top. 177.19-27),just
as in Nemesius(Nat. hom. 103-4) and [Plutarch]Fat. 571b-d. In his comments on Arist. An. Pr. 32b8 the threefolddistinctionis introducedby
"one meaningof the 'contingent'is the following;to this belong also the
things that come to be in accordancewith deliberatechoice" (Alex. An.
Pr. 162-4). So Alexander, too, connects the threefold distinction with
Aristotle's concept of deliberatechoice. However, unlike our Aristotle
scholarfromthe Middle-Platonisttexts he does not equatethingsthathappen in accordancewith deliberatechoice with the things "in equal parts."
Rather, he classifies them among things for the most part (,6o C't t6o
cf. also Alex. An. Pr. 270.23-5, An. Pr. 169.6-9). For things"in
nXCtaotov,
equal parts"we obtainthe exampleof Socrates'takinga walk in the evening, and his talkingto some particularperson.This fact, togetherwith the
absenceof the threefolddistinctionin his On Fate, and of that which dependson us in his commentaries,suggests to me (i) that Alexanderdraws
not fromthe Middle-Platonisttexts, but froma sourcethey, like him, drew
from,37and (ii) that he did not connect the threefolddistinctionwith the
question of determinismand freedom at all. In the above passages on
37 On this point I agree with Bob Sharples, see Sharples in P. Moraux, Der
Aristotelismus... III (forthcoming).
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157
THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
things for the most parthe is not concernedwith acts of choice, but with
far more often
the relationbetween one's choices and their realisation:38
than not one actually does what one has chosen to do. Alexander'stwo
examplesfor what happens"in equal parts"on the otherhandinvite a statistical interpretation.They are both cases where one cannot easily say
that Socratesdoes them more often than not, or less often than not.39
Thus Alexander,though acquaintedwith the concept of the "in equal
parts"seems not to have made the connectionbetween it and that which
depends on us. Nonetheless, it seems likely that he knew the account
of what dependson us which in Nemesius was identifiedwith that of the
"in equal parts";that he understoodit as implying indeterminism;and
that it was a precursorof his own concept. If we trustAlexander'sown
words, in his On Fate ch. 26 (196.24ff.) he presents one of a number
of argumentsof his opponentswhich were meant to criticise "that that
which dependson us is such as the commonconceptionof humanbeings
believes it to be." The main point of the argumentis the claim thata twosided Cp'i'JAvwould precludeit thatvirtuesand vices dependon us, since
at the time when we are virtuouswe are not capable of acting viciously,
and vice versa. The argumentbegins:
If, they say, those things depend on us of which we are capable of <doing> also
the opposites...40
This is almost exactly the definitionof what dependson us as we find it
in the Middle-Platonisttexts. What shall we make of this? It seems to me
that the most naturalconjecturewould run somewhatlike this:
Thesecriticsof the"Middle-Platonist"
two-sidedconceptof whatdepends
on us were most probablythe Stoics Alexandercriticisesmost in his book,
i.e. orthodoxStoics who in the 2nd centuryA.D. held a theory of fate
similarto Chrysippus'.We know that the Stoic doctrineof fate had been
38
See also Sharples, ibid.
The story undergoes still a different twist in the Mantissa ch. 22, which seems
not to present Alexander's own view as held in On Fate, but an alternativePeripatetic
one. Here a twofold distinction of what happens for the most part and what happens
for the lesser part comes up in the context of the discussion of that which depends on
us. The things in accordance with deliberate choice are partly subordinatedto what
happens for the most part (when one acts "in character,"as it were), partly to what
happens for the lesser part, and each is connected with its own type of &p'ij;v (see
also below section XII). This time the connection is between one's character,etc. and
one's choices, not between one's choices and one's actions.
39
40
E, paativ,
,,
c
Tabra
E't,
I
v rI' lI,
t
caT1v
c ilgIV,, cXVscat. Ta
avtxlctgEva
8oDva,gFa....
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158
SUSANNEBOBZIEN
the subject of criticism by the Middle-Platonistsin their treatise(s) on
fate.4'These Middle-Platonistcritics,as we have seen, had adopteda twosided, potestativeconcept of what depends on us, based on Aristotle's
writings- althoughthis was not the only one they had (see below section
XII). So it is likely that some second centuryStoics in turncriticisedthis
two-sidedconcept;and thatthis is what we find in the Alexanderpassage.
We can however not rule out with certaintythat Alexander'sopponents
in this chapterare not Stoics but "dissident"Peripatetics.
If the argumentAlexanderpresentsis Stoic, we can infer that the conif not indeterminist.For
cept of &p'Ti'iv was at least un-predeterminist,
only then is it incompatiblewith the Stoic theoryof fate, and would give
the Stoics reasonablegrounds to reject it. In that case there would be
two-sided concept
evidence that before Alexanderan un-predeterminist
of what dependson us was discussed among Middle-Platonists(or Peripatetics)and Stoics. If the argumentwas partof a disputeinternalto the
Peripateticschool, the criticismof the two-sided,potestativeep' i' iv need
not have had anythingto do with the questionof determinism.It could
merely have been a way of pointingout that the definitiondoes not harmonise with Aristotle'sown claim that virtuesand vices dependon us.
In any event we can be reasonablycertainthat Alexanderunderstood
the criticisedaccountof what dependson us as not only un-predeterminist,
but indeterminist.For his criticism of the argument(which extends to
ch. 29 of his On Fate) is one of the passages where he undoubtedly
defends an indeterministconcept of what depends on us (Fat. ch. 29,
199.29-200.7,see section XII).42
Thus Alexander interpretedthe "Middle-Platonist"concept of what
depends on us as indeterminist.However, in Alexander's standardaccounts of what dependson us there are two additionalelementsthat are
account:
absent in the "Middle-Platonist"
"dependingon us" is predicatedof the things over which we have in us the power
of also choosing the opposite. (Fat. 181.5)
[Plu.] Fat. 574e-f, Calc. Tim. 160-1.
Could Nemesius have taken this account from Alexander, rather than the other
way about?This is chronologically possible, but unlikely. For in Nemesius the account
occurs twice as account of the "in equal parts" (which suggests it was a technical
definition), and in one of these cases what happens "in equal parts"is then equated
with what depends on us. Moreover, it would be ratherodd if the one account of what
depends on us which Nemesius picked from Alexander is taken from an argumentby
Alexander's opponents.
4'
42
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
159
Thus, the two new featuresare: (i) the elementof choosing or not choosing (EXia6t) to performan action, insteadof simply acting and not acting; (ii) the introductionof a power (etovaia) which the individualon
whom somethingdependspossesses.43Both featuresare significantin that
they reflectimportantdevelopmentsof the understandingof moralresponsibility and its relationto freedomin later antiquity.
X. The elementof choice in the accounts of what dependson us
The first importantinnovationin the account,which we witness not only
in Alexanderbut also in some later authors,is that from action to choice.
In Alexander'saccountsit manifestsitself in the change from "the power
of doing opposites"to "the power of choosing opposites."We find variations of the formulationwith "to choose"(usuallyaipeia0c) many times
over in his On Fate.' We also find such formulationsin chapters22 and
23 of the Mantissa.4sSimilar accounts are preservedin Ammonius' On
De Interpretatione(130.30-2, on Arist.Int. 9, quotedbelow), in Boethius'
On De InterpretationeII (203, on Arist. Int. 9),'6 in the later paraphrase
of the NicomacheanEthics 52.25-7, a passage to which I referredearlier,
and in Nemesius, Nat. hom. 115.22-7, a passage whose origin I assume
to be later than Alexander'sOn Fate. A comparableexplanationis preserved in Calcidius,Tim. 151.
There were three main philosophicaltheories concernedwith human
43 As far as I am aware, in Alexander the two-sided "Middle-Platonist"account of
what depends on us (i.e. the simple account, without reference to choosing and/or
power) occurs only in the opponents' argumentin ch. 26. Of the four closest passages
one contains ?tovixa
(Fat. 180.2), one the verb "to choose" (Mant. 174.32); the
remaining two (Mant. 170.1, 171.24) are from ch. 22 of the Mantissa which in any
event presents a position quite differentfrom Alexander's in his On Fate and Mantissa
ch. 23; of these Mant. 171.24 does not provide an account either. However, the fact
that the two first-mentionedpassages are so close to the "Middle-Platonist"one, and
each only adds one of Alexander's additional features, makes it the more likely that
Alexander's accounts are a development of the more basic "Middle-Platonist"one that
resulted from Aristotle exegesis.
" E.g. Fat. 180.26-8, 181.5-6, 13-14, 184.18-19.
4S In ch. 23, which seems to present Alexander's view, there is no definition of that
which depends on us with "to choose," but choosing plays a major role passim; e.g.
Mant. 174.9-12, 175.23-5. In ch. 22 xpoatp-ioOat is used instead of acdp6aOal(Mant.
171.22-4, 172.10-12).
4 Ex libero arbitrio, ut quod possum et velle et non velle, an velim hoc antequam
fiat incertum est.
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160
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
choice available to 2nd and 3rd century philosophers,all of which are
possible influence factors, one deriving from Aristotle, another from
Epictetus, a third from Plato. I suspect that a combinationof them is
of "choice"intotheaccountsof whatdepends
responsiblefortheintroduction
on us. None of the threepositionswas originallyconcernedwith freedom
of decision or indeterministfreedomin general.
First, I have tracedabove the adaptationof Aristotle'stheoryof deliberatechoice (xpoaipFal;)fromhis ethics into the debateover fate:his concept of deliberatechoice was connectedwith thatwhich dependson us by
in [Plutarch]'sOnFate (571d), by Nemesius,by Alexander
thecommentators,
in
Mantch. 22). For Aristotle,deliberatechoice is what
Fat.
ch.
12,
(e.g.
distinguisheshuman,rationalagency from animal action. Its characteristic featureis that it is a certainappetitivestate of the soul which results
from deliberationaboutpossible coursesof action.Whetherwe deliberate
well, and what the outcome of our deliberationis dependson our characteror settleddispositions.Thereis no evidencethatAristotlemaintained
that the same agent in the same circumstancescould come up with a different choice (xpoaip?en;).Moral responsibilityis groundedon the fact
thatthe agentsare the beginning(apxii)of theiractions (anddispositions).
Second, Epictetus,spelling out partsof early Stoic philosophy,restricts
thatwhich dependson us to certain"mentalevents"or movementsof the
soul. Only the use of our impressions,that is giving assent to them or
withholdingit, dependson us, since these are the only things not subordinateto externalforce or hindrances.Assentingto impulsiveimpressions
i.e. impressionsof somethingas desirableor to be
(paxvaaiat&pglyrwcai),
avoided, is choosing a course of action. The realisationof what we have
chosen to do does not dependon us, insofaras it is always possible that
it is thwartedby external hindrances.The stress in Epictetusis on the
points that it is oneself who chooses, and that one is not necessitated
(czarMvaylaaOat) in one's choice. To what impressions we give assent
depends on our dispositions (or npoaipern;, see section XI). The question
of whether the same person in the same circumstancescould choose
otherwiseis not addressed.I believe that - in harmonywith the orthodox
Stoic view - Epictetus' answer would have been "no."47 If a person wants
to act in a differentmannerthan they do, they have to change their disposition or ipoaipeot;, i.e. that factor on the basis of which they make
individualchoices. Epictetusemphasises that moral accountabilityis -
4' I argue this point more fully in Bobzien, Determinism..., Section 7.1.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
161
primarily- connectedwith the use of our impressions(e.g. Diss. 1 12.34)
rather than with our actions. We are morally responsiblebecause it is
in our assenting and choosing that our characterand dispositions are
reflected(MR1). The influenceof Epictetuson philosophersand intellectuals in later antiquitywas immense,and at the beginningof the 3rd century various elements of his philosophyhad been absorbedinto the general philosophicaldiscussion,includingChristianand Platonistthought.48
Third, Plato may have provideda furthermotive for the change from
action to choice. As I mentionedabove, the Middle-Platonistphilosophers
arrangedtheir doctrineof fate arounda numberof passages from Plato.
One of them comes fromthe Mythof Er in book 10 of the Republic.There
the souls, before they are born again, have to choose a life, and in that
context they are told that the consequencesof their choice, whethergood
or bad, will be theirresponsibility,and that they cannotblame god: aitia
E
o
EVOi 0s6;
&vaitio; (Rep. 617e). For Plato, in this passage, the ques-
tion was not one of freedomof decision. His concernwas that the human
soul and not someoneelse - in particularnot god - is responsiblefor the
choice (MRI). From the 2nd centuryonwards,mainly in Platonisttexts,
the above quote from Plato occurs so regularlythat we can infer that it,
and with it partsof the Mythof Er, were a centralelementof the Platonist
theory of fate.49
In some texts that presentthe Middle-Platonisttheory of hypothetical
fate,50Plato's theory undergoes a significant development.In Alcinous
(Didasc. ch. 26 179.8-13) Plato's formerly"pre-natal"choice of a life is
presentedas includingthe choice of individualactions in one's life, and
it has become dependingon the soul whetheror not to act. In Nemesius
the term xpoaipeat; has entered the interpretationof Plato's statement:
now the individualchoices (xpoalppEat;)
and some of the actionsin accordance with choice
(cata
ipoaipfatv)
depend on us (Nat. hom. 110.5-9; cf.
109). Neithertext suggests thatlpoaipect; or aitpeitaOat
refers to freedom
48 Epictetus' philosophy was known e.g. to Dio Chrysostom, Philostratus,Lucian,
Celsus, Marcus Aurelius, Gellius, Galen, Origen, Gregory of Nazianzus, and
Augustine.
49 Cf. e.g. Calc. Tim. 154, Hippol. Ref. 19.19 (Doxogr. Graec. 569.19-22), Nem.
Nat. hom. 110.7-9, Max. Tyr. 41.5a, Justin.Apol. 44, Porphyryapud Stob. Ecl. 11 164;
see also Tacit. Ann. 6.22.
s This theory, the earlierst traces of which are preserved in Tacitus Ann. 6.22 and
Plu. Quaest. Conv. 740c, maintains that certain human activities are not fated but
caused by the person, whereas the consequences of these activities are fated. Cf. e.g.
Den Boeft, Calcidius..., 28-34.
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162
SUSANNE
BOBZIEN
of decision. Rather, the importance of the introductionof individual
choices lies in the fact thatit is in theirchoices thatpeoplemanifestthemselves qua rationalor moralbeings:my choices, since determinedby nothing but myself, reflect who I am. This is why I am morallyresponsible
for what I choose (MR1). It is in order to ensure this that choices have
by fate (freedomof type 4). In
been exemptedfrom the predetermination
the parallelpassage in Calcidius(Tim. 151) on the otherhandwe find in
this context a statementthat connectsthat which dependson us with the
motionsof the soul only, and which invokes a notionthat comes close to
that of freedomof decision: in it the fact that the choice between opposite motions of the soul is in our power is used to explain why these
motions dependon us. Still - as in Plato - the choice is one of good or
bad.5 The Middle-Platonistinterpretationsof Plato with their focus on
individual choices of actions is likely to reflect the general focus on
choices and mental events which seems to have startedat the time of
Epictetusor a little earlier.52
Returningto Alexanderand the other authorsthat add choice into the
account of that which depends on us, we can note two things: first, the
introductionof choice appearsto result from a combinationof the three
possibleinfluencefactors,Plato, Aristotleand Epictetus.Second,the motivation for adding choice into the account appearsnot to have been the
attemptto express freedomof decision.
Alexanderknows and uses both a concept of Jrpoaipeal;of the Epictetan/Platonictype, as moral choice (Fat. 169.12), and the Aristotelian
one of deliberatechoice (in the majorityof places, e.g. Fat. 180, 194-5,
212). How exactly Alexanderthought these concepts of choice to link
up with "to choose"in his account"powerto choose opposites"is uncer51
Collocati autem in alterutrampartem(i.e. good or bad) meriti praecessio animum
nostrarummotus est iudiciumqueet consensus earum et appetitusvel declinatio, quae
sunt in nobis posita, quoniam tam horum quam eorum quae his contrariasunt optio
penes nos est.
S2 On the one hand, from the 2nd century onwards sources that discuss determinism
seem generally to concentrate more on mental activities like thinking, deliberating,
assenting and choosing. For instance, the Chaldaeans listed such mental states and
events among the things they claimed were predeterminedby the stars (e.g. Gell. NA
XIV 1.23, cf. Nem. Nat. hom. 104.18-21). These explicit mentions of the predetermination of the motions of the soul may have triggered their explicit exemption from
external causal predeterminationor force on the side of the "libertarians".On the other
hand, there is the importanceof the problemof choice (ipoatipeotq)between good and
evil in early Christiantheory, Platonism and Gnosticism, in particularin the context
of the question of the origin of evil.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
163
tain.53Mostly the expressionsappearto be understoodas non-moraland
as the result of deliberation,i.e. in the Aristoteliansense.
However, there seems to have also been a distinctly non-Aristotelian
elementinvolved in the introductionof choosinginto the accountsof what
dependson us. In Alexander,the accountscontainingthe verb "to choose"
(aipsia&ta)are apparentlynot regardedas a substitutefor those containing the verb "to act" (cpa&rtetv),
but ratheras a supplement.Not only
do we find both kinds of accounts several times, we also regularlyfind
choosing and acting co-ordinatedin one phraseor account.54We find the
same juxtapositionin Nemesius (Nat. hom. 115.22-28; 116.3-5) and in
Ammonius (Int. 130.30-32). These latter authorsprovide a reason why
action as well as choice are considered:action presupposeschoice, and
praiseand blame concernboth actionand choice: both are culpable(Nem.
Nat. hom. 115.27-8, Amm. fnt. 130.32-3); moreover,sometimes we are
prevented from realising our choices (Nem. Nat. hom. 116.3-5). This
suggests that the switch from action to choice, or ratherthe additionof
choice to action, was motivatedby a change of focus regardingwhat is
of primarymoral relevance:choices ratherthan actions. Here Stoic, and
in particularEpictetan,thoughtappearsto have been influential,possibly
via the Middle-Platonistre-interpretation
of Plato's Myth of Er. This may
be the most promisingconjectureof why in Alexander the account of
Vp' TiiLv so frequentlyincludes the term "choice".Alexanderstates, for
instance,in a similarvein, "theassessmentof morallyrightactionis made
not only from the things that are done, but much ratherfrom the disposition and capacity from which it is done" (Alex. Fat. 206.16-18). Thus it
seems that the origin of the term "to choose" in the account of ?P' i'j?iv
is non-Peripatetic,althoughAlexanderthen generally interpretsit in the
Aristoteliansense, as choice that is the result of deliberation,and not as
fundamentalmoral choice.
Taking the various points together, it seems that the initial grounds
for the inclusion of choice in the accounts of what depends on us in
Alexander,Ammonius,Boethius, Heliodorusand Nemesius are unlikely
to have been the quest for an indeterministconcept of freedom of decision (as opposed to freedom of action), or the questionof whetherpeople are causallyindeterminedin theirchoices betweenalternatives.Rather
5' The terms in the accounts are acpr-at;/aipEiaOat,not xpoaipEat;/hpoatp6iaOai.,
but Alexander also uses aipeiaoat to refer to Aristotle's deliberatechoice (Fat. ch. 11).
4
Fat. 181.14 ?Eoozaiav ni; atpEoEw; TE xai lp'pEO-,Exxv &vrttCeEIvo.v; cf. Fat.
179.3, 11, 189.10-11; Mant. 174.4, 175.24-5, 180.28-31.
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164
SUSANNEBOBZIEN
it is the recognitionof choice as the specificactivitythroughwhichhuman
rationalbeings can have an influencein the world, and accordingly,to
which moral appraisalis to be attached.(The issue was autonomyrather
thanfreedomto do otherwise.)This is perhapsfurthercorroboratedby the
fact thatin severalof the passagesin Alexanderthatare most clearlyindeterminist(see next section) the version of the accountwith "to act," and
not the one with "to choose" occurs.
XI. The term i4ovaia in the accounts of what dependson us
On the other hand, the second change in Alexander's account - from
"beingcapable of doing and not doing something"to "havingthe power
(Q0ou)ia) of doing and not doing something"- appearsto be pertinentto
the developmentof a conceptof freedomof decision. Formulationsof the
accountwith?,ovaixaoccuras standardin Alexander'sOnFate (33 instances
accordingto Thillet's index) and in Mantissach. 23, and there can thus
be little doubtthat the use is philosophicallymotivated.Alexanderseems
to be the first- of whom we know - to use the termC4ouaiain this kind
of account of what dependson us.55It furtheroccurs in Quaestio III 13
of the Quaestionesascribedto Alexander;in Nemesius(Nat. hom. 112.10,
115.25) in a passageI believe to be laterthanhis reportsfromthe MiddlePlatonisttheory of fate, in Ammonius(Int. 148.14, 23); and in slightly
differentwordingsin lamblichus(Stob.Ecl. II 173.21)andSimplicius(Ench.
xx). How can we explain the appearance of iovuaia in the accounts? On
this question,I can only offer conjecture.
First,since the term 4oatia seems to have replacedthe verb &bvaAat
in the account, and this verb was linked with Aristotle's two-sided
uvvagl;,i4oauia may have been meant to stand in for Aristotle's twosided, rationalcapacityfrom Int. 13 and Met. e (see section VI). Second,
in Alexander E4overla i aipEeaq/E4ovura toio aippEoOat could take
the place filled in other late 2nd and 3rd centuryauthorsby the phrase
&va.56 This phrase in turn seems to be a descendantof
7Lpoatpe'rut"
xpoaipeoa;in the Epictetan sense and which Epictetus himself already
used in place of npoaipeat;throughoutin Diss. II 23. (But it also experiences an Aristotelianinterpretation,cf. e.g. Nem. Nat. hom. 119.11.) For
ss We do not find ',,ovaoia in this context in Aspasius, the Anonymous on the
Nicomachean Ethics, Alcinous, [Plutarch]On Fate, (nor in Justin and Tatian) nor in
Mantissa ch. 22 and Alexander's commentarieson the Topics and Prior Analytics.
'6 Clem. Strom. VI 135.4 (500.20-21 Staehlin), cf. Nem. Nat. hom. 119.4-5, 11.
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PROBLEM
THEFREE-WILL
Epictetus,npoaipeat; does not refer to a person's particularchoice in a
certainsituation.First and foremosthe uses the term to denote a disposition of the humanmind which determinesa person's individualchoices.
The exertionof this dispositionis the only thing that is never necessitated
by externalcircumstances.What we choose thus dependson us.57If this
is where C'otaia in the accountscomes from, it may referto a specifically
humandispositionfor makingchoices. Third,Alexanderuses 4ouaviav(Ev
Iu,iv) ?%?1tvto ...
as virtually synonymous with (hg6;)
'ploI TOV....
The
latter formulationoccurs about a dozen times in this context. This fact
may provide anotherlink to Aristotle's Ethics (see Alex. Fat. 178.26-8,
180.9-12), but formulationswith icptot for Fp''ildv are standardin practically all schools. There could also be a link between Alexander'suse
of " Etv ttouaixavto Epictetus,who uses it to say whether we or some
externalinfluenceshave control over certainthings. Fourth,the MiddlePlatonistMaximusof Tyre uses ?tzoaia twice in his 41st speech, in the
context of explainingof how vice enteredthe world: it is this power of
the soul (4o-oaia n'r'wii;) which enables us to do bad things (Orat.
41.5a and g).
More important than where exactly the use of the term i4o-)Gia origi-
nates is the particularway in which the variousinfluencesare combined.
It is the synonymywith Kd3pto;which best shows the significanceof the
.oi ipa&1etV
replacement of &)vac6at by 4oucxia. "EXciv In'iv E?40o)aviav
(aitpEia0at) Kca 1.dlnpa&rcctv(aipe6aoat) can be understood in two different
ways. Comparethe sentences
(1) the king has the power (authority, control) over living and dying (life and
death)
(2) the king has the power (ability, capacity) to live and to die
Similarly,the above sentencecan be understoodas
(1) we have the power (authority, control) over acting/choosing and not acting/choosing
(2) we have the power (two-sided ability, capacity) to act/choose and not to
act/choose.
In the cases of type (1), with genitivusobiectivus,where someonehas the
power,authority,or controlover certainthings,we can separatethe person
57 Epictetus' npoaiperat can perhaps be described as a precursorof a concept of
the will. However, it is neither a separate faculty or part of the mind (i.e. one that
can be in conflict with other faculties or parts of the mind), nor is it free in the sense
of being causally independentin its choices.
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166
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
who has the power from the things over which they have the power in a
way that cannotbe done in cases of type (2). The king's power over living and dying can be concernedwith other people's lives. The king's
power to live and die is concernedwith his own condition.In case (1),
the agent becomes a "decisionmaker,"in case (2) this is not so. The synonymity of "having the E'ouaia" and "being lCipto;" over something in
Alexandersuggeststhatwe have case (1) in his accountsof what depends
on us. Somethingdependson us if we are in controlover doing/choosing
and not doing/choosingit. This is noticeablydifferentfromthe earlierformulationwith biovaaOat:
there clearly a two-sidedcapacitywas at issue.
But owing to the introductionof "doing/choosingsomething or its
opposite,"Kc6pto;and E4ouaia do not functionin the same way anymore
as they did in Aristotleand Epictetus:in the latterauthorsit was the fact
that nothinghinderedus from doing or choosing somethingthat made us
have controlover them. In Alexander'saccount,the termsare (at least at
times)58understooddifferently:what makes us have controlover things is
the fact that we are causally undeterminedin our decision and thus can
freely decide between doing/choosingor not doing/choosingthem. The
elementof free decision in Alexander'saccountthus lies not in the addition of the phrase"choosingor not choosing,"but in the introductionof
the term "Eoouaia." We can thus see that the change to tE>ouaia in the
account may have been of great significance,since it provideda way to
express that the agent is a causally undetermineddecision maker. The
introductionof the term into this context is then also one furtherstep
towardsthe conceptof a free will, since such a conceptrequiresan independentfaculty of decision making.
It may also be worth consideringin this context the relationbetween
the expressions E4ouiaiaand
au'tEnoGtoov.
A link between them, although
in a deterministicsetting, can be observedalreadyin Epictetus.59
Someover
thing is in my own power (a uo,atoov) if I have power (F4ouaiaa)
it in the sense thatnothingcan preventme from doing it. Epictetusclearly
contrastsau'e4oi'ato;with someoneelse's i4ovaia overoneself.AuT?,e0oiaO;
indicates that something is outside the sphere of influence of others,
and because of that in the sphere of my power. I suggest that a similar
toi pxpretv caitgi1xpaTietv itself
See next section. Note that the phrase k4ovoaar
can also be understoodas "not being hinderedeither way by extemal or internal factors"; and also as "having a general two-sided capacity to act." In neither case freedom of decision would need to be involved.
"I Cf. Diss. I 25.2, IV 1.62, 1.68, 7.16, 12.8; see also Bobzien, Stoic Conceptions
of Freedom... p. 82 with n. 48; p. 86 n. 59.
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167
THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
relationwas assumed by Alexanderand other authorswho favouredan
indeterministconcept of 9p'8iijlv:for from the late 2nd centuryonwards
becamemoreand morecommonas a philosophicaltermused
alnte_oucatov
instead of ',p'ijidv, and at Nemesius' time seems to have supersededit.
Alexanderuses it very rarely,but in one place he states that sxU,roiotov
is what is actually meant by &p''igtv and that his opponentsmiss this
meaning of the term (Fat. 182.22-4, cf. Fat. 189.9-11). Thus something
may have been considered as in someone's own power (a&re',oUicov),
and as truly ?p' '
preciselyif that personhas the 'touoia over doing
choosing it or its opposite. Auketaou(xov
may then have been understood
by some as implying indeterministfreedomof the agent.
XII. The volatilityof the concept of freedom to do otherwise
Thus it seems that in Alexander'saccountsof what dependson us it was
ratherthe expressionEto1.aiathanaripeita0at
thatservedto expressthe elementof freedomof decision.We saw at the beginningthatAlexanderhad
a concept of freedomto do otherwise.We have now seen how this concept developed,absorbingboth Stoic andAristotelianand perhapsPlatonic
elements on its way. However,we would be quite wrong to assume that
at the turnof the 2nd centurya generalawarenessof the problemof causal
determinismand freedom to do otherwise had arisen, and that it had
become partof the philosophicalstandardrepertoryof the time. Thereare
severalpointsthat suggestthat at his time Alexanderis almostan isolated
case, and that conceptsof freedomto do otherwiseare a rathermarginal
phenomenonwithouta clear philosophicalcontext.
First, it is noteworthythat the one-sided,causativeconceptionof what
dependson us was by no means peculiarto the Stoic system, nor generally seen as a feeble attemptof the Stoics to nominallysave moralresponsibility- even if Alexanderwants to makeus believe this (Fat. ch. 13). On
the contrary,it seems to have been regardedas a serious alternativeor as
a complementto the two-sided,potestativeconceptionin 2nd and 3rd centuryMiddle-Platonistand Peripateticwritings.We find non-Stoicaccounts
of such conceptsin [Plutarch]On Fate ("Thatwhich dependson us is that
partof the contingentwhich is alreadyhappeningin accordancewith our
impulse"),60in the Mantissa, and in Nemesius. Had the general concern
at the time been to preservefreedomto do otherwiseas a prerequisitefor
60
r
j
ti^tV
8xepov
REpO5 tiV
sogvou,
TO Icar&ti1v
ttr? pav Opiiv ij5r
ytIvOEvov ([Plu.] Fat. 571d-e).
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168
SUSANNEBOBZEEN
moral accountability,this repeatedapprobationof a one-sided,causative
c(-'
mliv would be decidedly odd. On the other hand, if we assume that
the two-sided,potestativeconceptwas consideredto express a two-sided
general capacity which provides the vehicle throughwhich rational or
moralagentsmanifestthemselvesin theiractions,this fact is far less startling. For in that case both the one-sidedconceptsand the two-sidedone
serve to ensure that the agent is causally - and hence morally- responsible for the action, if in slightly differentways. (Rememberthat the
one-sided concepts seem to have assumed a two-sided general capacity
throughwhich the agent causes the action.) On this assumptionit is also
not surprisingto find thatthe Neoplatonistconceptionof what dependson
us is one-sidedand causative(cf. Plot. Enn. III 1.9 & 10, 2.10, VI 8.7),
and that this fact seems not to have outragedanyone at the time.
The philosophicalorigins of the non-Stoic accounts of a one-sided,
causativei(p'i'i?v are nowhereexplicitlystated.The accountsin Nemesius
and in the Mantissa show a strikingresemblanceto the later Stoic one
which definesthatwhich dependson us as thatwhich happensthroughus
(&t'igiov, see above sections II and III). Thus Nemesius writes:
We say that, generically, all things that are done voluntarily through us depend
on us....61
and the Mantissahas:
For those choices of which the cause is natureor educating or habit are said to
depend on us in the sense that they happen through us.62
However, I surmise that these accounts- and the above-quotedone in
[Plutarch]'sOn Fate - originatefrom (incorrect)Aristotleexegesis, preof the NicomacheanEthics book III, from
sumablyfrom an interpretation
passages like the following:
We deliberate about the things that depend on us and that can be done;... All
groups of human beings deliberate about the things that can be done through
them ... we deliberate about those things which come to be through us and not
always in the same manner.63(Arist. EN 1112a30-b4)
e p' fLVtVFvat ...
icpan6ieVa
61 XyogEv toivvv yEvuKG 1rivva a 'i5u&
i KIV K
(Nem. Nat. hom. 114.15-16, cf. 102).
&yai cat ;n iodv aYtta, aurat duux, iv
62 OV yap itpoatpexEov il (p{ot; 11o
kyovrat
q Sit' iowiv ytyvo6pEvat (Mant. ch. 22 172.7-9).
v ica irpacov
.... Twv 8' avOpZwv ?icamot
&e iEpi ?Gv ?'
63 PoX?6o?6a
bpI
a8Et' ,
pouX6ovrat ax tpt (v 0i 'aOvr&ivrpa=Cov.. .. 'oa Yiverat S'6 TfLv, gii w,a-ui$toK
nept soivmv fo0v6gea....
Cf. also Arist. EN 11 2b27, 111Ib23-4, 26.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
169
Thus where Aristotleargueson the genericlevel of (possible) actions,the
passages from [Plutarch]and Mantissach. 22 talk about individualhappenings. (Nemesius is ambiguoushere.)
The unfamiliarityof 2nd or early 3rd centurythinkerswith an indeterminist concept of freedom to do otherwise is also beautifullyillustrated
by the awkwardway in which it is handled in ch. 22 of the Mantissa,
which seems to present a presumablyPeripatetic alternative to Alexander's position. Its charmingsolution to the problem of Stoic fashion
determinismlies in the introductionof "thatwhich is not" (6o sTinov) as
an influencefactor.14The argumentationruns roughlylike this:
If everything is caused, and the same causes have the same effects, and our
choices are determinedby a combinationof our nature,habit, and education, then
our choices do not depend on us. But choice does depend on us, and accordingly
not everything is caused. The reason for this is that a little bit of "not-being"is
mixed in with the earthly things. In particularit can be detected in the things
responsible for that which happens for the lesser part. This "not-being"weakens
the things or causes in which it exists, and thus weakens the continuity of causes.
In things external to us this fact leads to chance events. In the causes in us, i.e.
in our natureand habit, it leads to that which depends on us in the proper sense
(rupioc). Whenever the "not-being"in us is responsible for a choice of ours, then
that choice depends on us in the proper sense.
It is hardto see how in this theory moralresponsibilityis to be attached
to the choices that dependon us. Their causal undeterminednessappears
to render them some sort of random motions. Perhaps wisely, moral
responsibilityis not mentionedin the whole chapter.What is more, since
the choices that dependon us in the propersense resultfrom a weakness
or lack of tension of our natureand habit, something'sdependingon us
in the propersense can hardlyhave been judged as a positive thing.65
A thirdpoint that shows that a conceptof freedomto do otherwisewas
far from being securely established,is that not only is there no unambiguousevidence for it beforeAlexander,but also in Alexander'sOn Fate
and in the Mantissathereis a steadyvacillationbetweenvariousconcepts
of what dependson us, some advocatingfreedomto do otherwise,others
implying only the absence of any predeterminationby external and/or
64 This is reminiscent of Plato' struggle with not-being, e.g. in the Sophist; cf. also
Cicero, Fat. 18... ut sine causa fiat aliquid, ex quo existet, ut de nihilo quippiam
fiat...; Augustine, Lib. arb. 201-5.
65 This is very different e.g. in Cicero's On Fate 11 and Alexander's On Fate
ch. 6, where the agents are envisaged as overcoming their nature or habit.
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170
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
internalcausal factors, and still others that are clearly compatiblewith
determinism.16
We have seen above that Alexander'sphrasesof the kind "havingthe
power to do/choose opposites"are ambiguousbetween determinist,unpredeterministand indeterministreadings. In this context Alexander's
encounterwith the 2nd centuryA.D. orthodoxStoic theory of fate becomes crucial:it is only where the two-sided,potestative?p' p7tvmeets
with the Stoic causal principle(that in the same circumstancesthe same
causes necessarilybring about the same effect, see above section II) that
the phrasesare disambiguated,and that a conceptof freedomto do otherwise is uncontroversiallyin play. Generally, wherever Alexanderconsiders the possibilitythat the same personin the same circumstancesacts
or chooses otherwise than they do, phrases like "having the power to
do/choose opposites' seem to acquirean indeterministmeaning.
In particular,indeterministfreedom is almost certainlyat issue in the
importantpassages in which Alexanderdepicts the fictitioussituationof
someone who acts against their character,or againstwhat seems reasonable to them, in orderto show that determinismis wrong (Fat. chs 6 and
29, Mant. 174.33-5). Equally, the passage in which Alexander argues that
our regret shows that we have the power to choose opposites suggests a
concept of freedomto do otherwise.He says
For it is on the groundsthatit was possiblefor us also not to have chosenand
not to have donethis thatwe feel regretandblameourselvesfor ourneglectof
deliberation.
(Fat. 180.29-31,trl. Sharples)67
Here the concept of freedom of decision appears- finally - to be connected with a conception of moral responsibilitybased on the agent's
ability to do otherwise (MR2). A third importantargumentis that the
same circumstancesdo not necessarilylead the same agent to the same
- ends lookactions/choices,becausethereare several- incommensurable
Mant.
ch.
choose
174.17-24).
15,
(Fat.
ing towardswhich we decide and
All these argumentsstrikeone as thoroughlymodem, and as easy to grasp
within a frameworkof today's discussionsof the "free-willproblem."'
Contrastedwith these are the manyAlexanderpassageswith arguments
which, for someone who expects a defence of freedomto do otherwise,
simply seem to beg the question.However,most argumentsmake perfect
66 This point has been discussed by Bob Sharples in "Responsibility,chance, and
not-being in Alexander of Aphrodisias mantissa 169-172," BICS 22 (1975) 37-63.
67 Similarly, but not as clear, Fat. ch. 19 on pardon and blame, where Alexander
plainly goes beyond Aristotle EN III 1, and Fat. ch. 16.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
171
sense as soon as one understandsthemas concernednot with indeterminist
freedom but with differentphilosophicalquestions.There are first those
passages in which Alexanderbasically contents himself with paraphrasing Aristotle, for instance where he describesthe agent as causally responsible, or as a beginning (apxf) of action (Fat. chs. 15, 20; Mant.
173.10-21);similarlywhere he opens up the vexed questionsof character
determinationand of one's responsibilityfor the formationof one's character (Mant. 175.9-32, Fat. ch. 27). Here Alexanderdoes not go beyond
Aristotle,leaving it open whether,when we begin formingour character,
we are "free" or our dispositions predetermined.Moreover, the whole
question of one's responsibilityfor forming one's charactermakes most
sense on the assumptionthat (at least in some situations)what one does
is fully determinedby what characterone has. Finally, deterministreasoning, quite similar to Chrysippus'position (cf. Cicero Fat. 7-9, 41-3)
can be found in Mantissach. 23 (174.35-9). It suggests that if at different times the same person chooses similar things, the reason is not that
the circumstancesare similar (and functionhence as externalnecessitating causes), but because the person's dispositionsare similareach time.
These remarksmay suffice as an illustrationthat Alexanderis by no
means clear and consistent about whether his phrases like "having the
powerto do/chooseopposites"are to be understoodas indeterminist.!'This
may be partlyexplainedby the fact that Alexanderdoes not have a fullyfledgedconcept of a faculty of a will, and a fortiorinot one of a will that
is free in that it can operate independentlyof the agent's beliefs and
desires.This is so despitethe fact that he has collected all the ingredients
requiredfor a notion of acting from free-will: he has endowed human
beings with a two-sided power (4ocuaia)of decision making,which
* is not necessitatedby externalor internalinfluencefactors;
* is exercised as the result of a process of deliberation;
* is envisagedas separablefromthe agent'scharacter,disposition,or nature;
* is envisaged- it seems - as separablefrom the agent's reason:we can
decide against what appears to us as the most reasonable course of
action;
* leads to decisions that are not causally predeterminedby intemal or
externalfactors,so that it is possible that the same agent,with the same
desires and beliefs, in the same circumstances,chooses differently.
' Note also the strange restriction on indeterminism when he writes: "we have
this power of choosing the opposite and not everything that we choose has predeterminingcauses because of which it is not possible for us not to choose this" (Fat.
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172
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
But all these pointsdo not add up to "choosingand actingfromfree-will,"
since for Alexanderthe humansoul is not separablefrom the body and
in principle susceptible to causal impacts. It remains unclear what the
independentdecision makingfaculty would be which has the power over
choosing opposites:it can hardlybe one of the non-rationalparts of the
soul. But if it is a, or the, rationalpart,the difficultyarises how it can as Alexandersuggests - decide against the course of action that appears
as the most reasonableone to the agent:eitherthis was not the most rearationalpart
sonablecourseof actionafterall, or it is not a super-ordinate
of the soul that decides. Thus even if a decision is not necessitated,predeterminedor externallydetermined,there seems to be no suitableplace
for an independentdecision makingfaculty in Alexander'sconceptionof
the soul.
A full conceptof actingfromfree-will,and a full awarenessof the freewill problemin the narrowestsense are not developed in the context of
the Stoic-Peripateticdebate over the compatibilityof universal causal
determinismand freedom to do otherwise. Neither the Stoics nor the
Peripateticsexperiencewithintheir systems any of the free-will problems
listed at the beginning.The Stoics did not requirea concept of free-will,
since they did not connectmoralresponsibilitywith freedomto do otherwise. As a consequence,they had no reasonsto concernthemselveswith
any free-will problem. Theirs is the problem of the compatibility of
autonomous agency and causal determinism.On the Peripatetic side,
Alexanderhad no free-willproblemeither. It is true, at least at times he
seems to regarda concept of freedomto do otherwiseas a prerequisite
for moral responsibility.But he secures such freedomby simply denying
of humanactions. Unlike Stoics and Platonists,he can
pre-determination
do so, becausehe does not believe in universaldivine providence.A freewill problem(in the wider sense) thus arises only in the confrontationof
the two philosophicalsystems,when later Stoic causal determinismmeets
late Peripateticfreedomto do otherwise- with such freedomunderstood
as a necessaryconditionfor moralresponsibility.
If we want to find philosopherswho are troubledby a free-will problem within their system, we need to turn to Platonists and Christian
thinkers.In theirtheoryof hypotheticalfate the MiddlePlatonistshad severed the Stoic chain of causes at the point of humanchoices and actions
(see above section VI). This was made possible by the fact that they pro180.26-8, my emphasis). Calling to mind the above-discussed argument from Mant.
ch. 22, this suggests that it is sufficient if in some of our choices there are no predeterminingcauses.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
173
posed an immaterialhumansoul which can initiateaction in the material
world.69In this way they had gainedun-predeterminist
freedom,thus guaranteeing the agent's autonomy.However, as the Middle Platonistsalso
advocatedthe universalimpactof divine providence,the severanceof the
chain of causes did not solve all their difficulties.For humanactions and
choices, even if not the resultof the networkof causes, are still in accordance with divine providence. The problem of determinismis thus no
longer that of predeterminationby a chain of corporealcauses, but of
predetermination
by god's providence,even if this does not work through
the networkof materialcauses. In particularthe problembecame dominant, how to bring into agreementthe evil choices and actions of human
beings with god's providence,given that god is by definitiongood. Early
Christianthinkersstruggledwith a similar question,despite considerable
differencesin their"metaphysics";and they, too, had the advantageof an
immaterialsoul which made it possible that humanaction became independentof the networkof materialcauses.
It is in this context that finally a faculty of the will is introduced(no
doubt influencedagain by Epictetus' concept of npoaip_at;),to warrant
the independenceof humanevil deeds from god's providenceor creation.
In which way this will was consideredas free varies and is often hard
to determine:indeterministfreedom of decision, un-predeterminist
freedom, and freedomfrom force or compulsion(voluntariness)seem to alternate in our sources. Since the problemis no longer the independenceof
preceding material causes (this has simply been postulated), formulations of determinismof the kind "same (corporeal)causes, same effects"9
are no longer fitting. As a consequence,an unambiguousdescriptionof
the freedom involved in the various theories,whetherindeterminist,unpredeterministor neither,becomes hardto find. Accordingly,it is seldom
clear what kind of problemof "freedom"of the will the philosopherswere
dealing with. After Alexander,the problemof determinismand freedom
to do otherwiseis most clearly presentin the commentarieson Aristotle's
De Interpretatione, where - if I am right - lay one vital element of its
coming into existence.
XIII. Results
The problemof the compatibilityof causal determinismand freedomto
do otherwise appearsto have been formulatedonly in the 2nd century
69 Cf. e.g. Alcin. Didasc. 153.4-5, i be np6t; V
SXoy
; cv pyEta 8t& cra-o;
OVOl?VogE
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174
SUSANNEBOBZIEN
A.D. This seems to have been the result of a confrontationof a refined
Stoic universalcausal determinismon the one hand, with a two-sided,
ilsdlv),based on Arispotestativeconcept of what depends on us (is F"p'
totle's ethics, on the other.Presumablyin the early 2nd century,and as a
consequenceof combiningAristotle'stheoryof deliberatechoice with his
modal theory and with his theory regardingthe truth-valuesof future
propositions, this concept was interpretedas implying freedom to do
otherwise.Who exactly was responsiblefor this new indeterministunderstandingof that which depends on us is unclear,but it seems to have
been acceptedthereafterboth by some Peripateticsand by some MiddlePlatonists. Alexander's accounts, and some later ones, of that which
dependson us displaytwo furtherdevelopmentsof this indeterministconcept of freedom. First, the additionof choice (al;peat;) to action in the
accountsreflects a refinementof theory of action and moral responsibility, which focuses more on intra-psychicevents, and in particularon the
choice of good or bad, and the culpabilityof that choice. Here Stoic and
Platonist impacts become apparent.Second, the replacementin the account of "beingcapableof" by "havingthe power or authority(4ovaia)
over"introducesa decision makingfaculty,and thus leads to a conceptof
free decision- the resultprobablyof a fusion of Epictetanand Aristotelian
elements.Alexanderstops shortof a conceptof free will, due it seems in
partto the fact that he believes the humansoul to be corporeal.The need
of a free will becomes pressingin Platonistand Christianphilosophy,in
the contextof the problemsof how vice enteredthe world,and how god's
providenceand foreknowledgeof the future is compatiblewith human
responsibility.But this is no longer in the contextof a physicaltheoryof
universalcausal determinism,characterisedby principlesof the kind"like
causes, like effects."Ratherthe determinismis now teleologicalonly, and
the context theological.
From the third centuryonwards, physical causal determinismwas, it
seems, no longer consideredan attractiveor plausible theory, let alone
a threat.Overall, the problemof causal determinismand freedomto do
otherwise,appearsnot to have been a very prominenttopic in antiquity.
There is a certainlikelihoodof an awarenessof it for some 2nd century
Stoics who were confrontedwith the Peripateticor Middle-Platonistindeterministconcept of what depends on us; and for those Peripateticsand
perhapsMiddle-Platonistswho in turncriticisedStoic determinism.There
is good evidence of it in certainpassages of Alexander'sOn Fate and in
the Mantissa.Origenmay have been awareof it. And it lingerson in later
commentarieson Aristotle'sDe Interpretatione.
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THE FREE-WILLPROBLEM
175
It is then presumablyonly a slight overstatementwhen I concludewith
saying: the problemof physical causal determinismand freedomof decision enteredthe scene in the 2nd centuryA.D., by a chance encounterof
Stoic physics and the fruits of early Aristotleexegesis, with the contemporaryfocus on the culpabilityof mentalevents and the introductionof a
power of decision makingas catalysts- and it was not partof the philosophical repertoirefor long.70
70 This is the revised version of a paper I gave to a seminar of the Institute of
Classical Studies of the University of London in 1994, and I would like to thank the
audience for helpful criticism in the discussion. I am especially grateful to Bob
Sharples, who not only put me on to the topic and invited me to give the paper, but
also generously sent me several pages of detailed comments.
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