i8
Hobbes and Spinoza
NOEL
i
MALCOLM
Hobbes
When the Parliament sat, that began in April 1640, and was dissolved in May
following, and in which many points o f the regal power, which were necessary for
the peace of the kingdom, and the safety of his Majesty's person, were disputed and
denied, Mr Hobbes wrote a little treatise in English, wherein he did set forth and
demonstrate, that the said power and rights were inseparably annexed to the
sovereignty; which sovereignty they did not then deny to be in the King; but it
seems understood not, or would not understand that inseparability. O f this treatise,
though not printed, many gentlemen had copies, which occasioned much talk o f
the author and had not his Majesty dissolved the Parliament, it had brought him
into danger o f his life.
(Hobbes i839~45a, iv, p. 414)
S u c h w a s H o b b e s ' o w n account, w r i t t e n t w e n t y - o n e years later, o f the
origins o f his first w o r k o f political theory, The Elements of Law. H o b b e s
had h i m s e l f been an unsuccessful candidate for election to the Short
Parliament (Beats 1978, p p . 74—6), so n o d o u b t he f o l l o w e d its proceeding s
closely. T h e disputed 'points o f the regal p o w e r ' e m e r g e d most p o i n t e d ly
in J o h n P y m ' s famous speech o f 17 A p r i l , w h i c h asserted fundamental
constitutional rights o f parliament against the c r o w n ('Parliament is as the
soule o f the c o m m o n w e a l t h ' , 'the intellectual parte w h i c h G o v e r n e s all the
rest') and attacked 'the D o c t r i n e that w h a t p r o p e r t y the subject hath in any
thinge m a y be l a w f u l l y taken a w a y w h e n the K i n g requires it'. T h e latter
point w a s taken u p b y Sir J o h n S t r a n g w a y s o n the f o l l o w i n g day: 'for if the
K i n g e be j u d g e o f the necessitye, w e h a v e n o t h i n g and are but Tennants at
w i l l ' ( C o p e and C o a t e s 1977, p p . 149, 1 5 5 , 159).
T h e k i n g dissolved this parliament o n 5 M a y . F o u r days later H o b b e s
signed the dedicator y epistle o f his treatise, w h i c h w a s addressed to his
patron, the staunchly royalist earl o f N e w c a s t l e ; he explained that the
530
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
principles he w a s e x p o u n d i n g w e r e 'those w h i c h I h a v e heretofore
acquainted y o u r Lordshi p w i t h a l in private discourse, and w h i c h b y y o u r
c o m m a n d I h a v e here put into m e t h o d ' ( H o b b es 1928, p . x v i i ) . T h e
p o l e m i c a l purpose o f the w o r k is evident, and is reflected in its circulation in
n u m e r o u s manuscript copies, at least nine o f w h i c h survive. (Three o f t h e m
w e r e w r i t t e n b y scribes and signed b y H o b b e s : this suggests a f o r m o f
clandestine publication b y a production-lin e o f copyists.) H o b b e s '
a r g u m e n t w a s designed to s h o w first o f all that g o v e r n m e n t b y a civil
s o v e r e i g n w a s necessary, and secondly that the reasons w h i c h m a d e it
necessary also m a d e the s o v e r e i g n t y absolute. H e attacked those w h o ' h a ve
i m a g i n e d that a c o m m o n w e a l t h m a y be constituted in such a manner, as
the s o v e r e i g n p o w e r m a y be so limited, and moderated, as they should
think fit themselves'; he sough t to o v e r t u r n the claim that the sovereig n
p o w e r can be ' d i v i d e d ' or shared b e t w e e n k i n g and people, and (in a
transparent reference to the recent p r o c e e d i n gs in parliament) he d e n o u n c e d those w h o ' w h e n they are c o m m a n d e d to contribute their persons
or m o n e y to the public service . . . think they h a v e a p r o p r i e t y in the same
distinct f r o m the d o m i n i o n o f the s o v e r e i g n p o w e r ' (n.i.13, n.viii.4, 1928,
p p . 68, 135). It w a s H o b b e s ' a r g u m e n t o n this last point a b o v e all w h i c h
m a d e h i m fear for his life w h e n the n e x t parliament assembled in
N o v e m b e r and b e g a n its i m p e a c h m e n t o f Strafford ( A u b r e y 1898,1, p. 334;
Z a g o r i n 1978). W i t h i n a f e w days H o b b e s fled to Paris, w h e r e he w a s to
remain for eleven years; and it w a s there that he w r o t e his t w o other major
w o r k s o f political t h e o r y (De Give, printed in 1642, and Leviathan, printed
in 1651), each o f w h i c h in turn d e v e l o p e d and added to the arguments o f
The Element s-of Law.
T h a t H o b b e s ' career as a political w r i t er should h a v e b e g u n w i t h a
p o l e m i c a l l y royalist w o r k in 1640 is, in b i o g r a p h i c a l terms, not v e r y
surprising. His entire adult life, since his graduation f r o m O x f o r d in 1608,
had been spent in the service o f aristocratic families as a tutor, secretary, and
c o m p a n i o n . E m p l o y e d at first b y the C a v e n d i s h family at H a r d w i c k and
C h a t s w o r t h , he had gained s o m e experience o f quasi-public affairs
c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h the second earl o f D e v o n s h i r e as an active m e m b e r o f the
V i r g i n i a C o m p a n y ( M a l c o l m 1981). In 1629 (prompted , it has been
suggested, b y the Petition o f R i g h t o f the p r e v i o u s year: R e i k 1977, p . 37)
he had published a translation o f T h u c y d i d e s , w h o appealed to h i m for his
1
/
1. These three M S S are: B L H a d . M S 4235; C h a t s w o r t h , Hobbes M S S A 2 B and A 2 A (which n o w
lacks the dedication, but cf. the description in T o d d 1973).
531
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
dispassionate analysis o f the w a y s in w h i c h d e m o c r a t ic g o v e r n m e n t s could
be corrupted and manipulated. For m o s t o f the 1630s H o b b e s w a s a tutor to
the y o u n g third earl o f D e v o n s h i r e ; wardship o v e r the y o u n g earl w a s
exercised b y his cousin, the earl o f N e w c a s t l e , w h o helped to a w a k e n
H o b b e s ' philosophical interests and n o d o u b t his royalist sympathies.
The Elements of Law is not, h o w e v e r , simply a piece o f royalist
propaganda. Its i m p o r t a n c e lies in the w a y that it derives its political
conclusions f r o m a set o f philosophical assumptions. H o b b e s ' philosophical
a w a k e n i n g had taken place, it seems, during the 1630s w h e n he had b e c o m e
p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h an area o f o v e r l a p p i n g fundamental p r o b l e m s in physics,
metaphysics, and e p i s t e m o l o g y . H e had adopted enthusiastically the
Galilean principle o f the subjectivity o f secondary qualities; this m e a nt that
a secondary quality such as heat did not inhere in a 'hot ' object, but w a s a
feature o f the experience o f s o m e o n e p e r c e i v i n g that object, and c o u l d be
causally explained in terms o f the p r i m a r y qualities w h i c h b e l o n g e d to the
object itself (such as the shape and m o t i o n o f its particles). For H o b b e s , this
principle w a s a lever w h i c h c o u l d be used to o v e r t u r n scholastic physics and
metaphysics. H e attacked the n o t i o n that the ultimate reality o f physical
things consisted in their intelligible ' f o r m s ' or 'essences'; scholastic
p h i l o s o p h y had used this explanation to account for the w a y in w h i c h our
process o f sense-perception begins w i t h the. action o f physical causes (light
acting o n the e y e , for e x a m p l e ) but ends w i t h an immaterial mental object
in the intellect. M o s t m e d i e v a l philosophers, d r a w i n g o n a m i x t u r e o f
Aristotelian and N e o p l a t o n i s t t h o u g h t , had distinguished b e t w e e n physical
existence and n o n - p h y s i c a l intelligibility ('esse existentiae' and 'esse
essentiae'), and had subordinated the f o r m e r to the latter in the order o f real
b e i n g . A tree physically existed b y virtue o f b e i n g an expression o f the
essence o f a tree, and so the m i n d c o u l d abstract this essence f r o m its
perceptions o f a tree's physical properties.
T h i s v i e w o f the w o r l d as constituted b y intelligible essences had usually
also assumed that these essences w e r e systematically related to each other in
an e c o n o m y o f perfection: they all participated in absolute B e i n g , w h i c h
w a s unitary and w a s derive d f r o m (or w a s perhaps identical w i t h ) G o d . T h e
rational order o f the w h o l e system c o u l d be described in terms o f the l a w s
o f reason or l a w s o f nature w h i c h g o v e r n e d all its parts. T h i s w a y o f
describing things g a v e rise to a w a y o f v a l u i n g t h e m : a thing b e c a m e better
the m o r e it fulfilled its essential nature, and thereby fulfilled its place in the
w h o l e system o f essences. T h e m o r e arboreal a tree w a s , the m o r e it
expressed its essential nature. H u m a n beings also had an innate t e l e o l o g y to
532
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
fulfil, but as rational beings they w e r e conscious o f their o w n ends and w e r e
able to direct their actions t o w a r d s t h e m . In R i c h a r d H o o k e r ' s w o r d s , ' A
l a w therefore generally taken, is a directive rule u n t o goodness o f
operation . . . T h e rule o f natural agents that w o r k b y simple necessity, is
the determination o f the w i s d o m o f G o d . . . T h e rule o f v o l u n t a r y agents
o n earth is the sentence that R e a s o n g i v e t h c o n c e r n i n g the goodness o f
those things w h i c h they are to d o ' (Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, i.viii.4, 1888,
1, p. 228).
H o b b e s rejected this n o t i o n o f reason intuiting natural teleological
values, because he rejected the metaphysics and t h e o l o g y f r o m w h i c h those
values w e r e derived. His m o s t t h o r o u g h attack o n the old metaphysics
c a m e in a m o n u m e n t a l refutation o f a w o r k b y a C a t h o l i c Aristotelian,
T h o m a s W h i t e ; this refutation, w h i c h remained unpublished till 1973, w a s
written in 1642—3. T h e fundamental principle f r o m w h i c h H o b b e s argued
in this w o r k w a s that o f G o d ' s f r e e d o m to create the w o r l d if, h o w , and
w h e n he pleased (1973, chs. 30—4), a principle w h i c h severed any intrinsic
c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the natures o f created things and the nature o f G o d ,
and reduced 'essences' to mere descriptions o f existing things (p. 381).
T h e s e metaphysical assumptions can already be seen at w o r k in an earlier
manuscript, p r o b a b l y w r i t t e n b e t w e e n 1637 and 1640, in w h i c h H o b b e s
had asserted that 'the original and s u m m o f K n o w l e d g e stands thus: there is
n o t h i n g that truly exists in the w o r l d b u t single and individuall B o d y e s
p r o d u c i n g single and individuall acts or effects' (Rossi 1942, p. 102). A n d in
another early manuscript, p r o b a b l y also w r i t t e n in the 1630s, he had b e g u n
to appl y these principles to the construction o f a system o f p s y c h o l o g y in
w h i c h all c h a n g e w a s to be accounted for in terms o f mechanical causation
(the ' S h o r t T r a c t ' , printed in H o b b e s 1928, p p . 152—67).
Scholastic p s y c h o l o g y had explained the operation o f desire, for
e x a m p l e , in terms o f the m i n d ' s apprehension o f the ' f o r m ' or essence o f the
desired thing; H o b b e s explained it in terms o f a strictly causal process
leading f r o m sense-perception to the setting in m o t i o n o f the b o d y ' s
'animal spirits' (conceived o f as a fine fluid in the n e r v o u s system), causing
the b o d y ' s m o t i o n t o w a r d s the desired thing. T h e ' t h o u g h t ' o f the desired
object w a s s i m p l y that part o f the sequence o f m o t i o n w h i c h t o o k place in
the brain, w h e r e it m i g h t also interact w i t h m e m o r y ' s store o f residual
m o t i o n s f r o m previou s sense-impressions. H o b b e s denied that the feeling o f
desire w a s a special k i n d o f t h o u g h t , and analysed it as a c o m b i n a t i o n o f
h a v i n g the mental i m a g e o f the desired object and b e g i n n i n g to m o v e
t o w a r d s it (1839—45b, v , p. 2 6 1 ) . T h i s idea o f the ' b e g i n n i n gs o f m o t i o n '
533
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
b e c a m e a k e y feature o f H o b b e s ' p s y c h o l o g y and physics; later described b y
h i m as 'conatus' or ' e n d e a v o u r ' , it enabled h i m to reduce intentions to
infinitesimal actions.
For H o b b e s , reason neither participated in the nature o f desire n o r
supplied any substantive k n o w l e d g e o f values. 'For the T h o u g h t s , are to the
Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the w a y to the
things D e s i r e d ' ( 1 6 5 1 , p. 3 5 ) . R e a s o n c o u l d o n l y calculate means to ends,
a p p l y i n g the m e r e l y formal principles o f ratiocination to the brute facts o f
sense-experience and desire. T h e ends themselves w e r e supplied b y the
causal m e c h a n i s m o f desire and aversion. S u c h a v i e w o f h u m a n nature
m i g h t suggest that e v e n i f one tried to m o v e f r o m 'is' to ' o u g h t ' b y
assigning v a l ue to the fulfilment o f desire, one w o u l d still not be able to
f o r m any universal value system: values w o u l d be individua l rather than
general, refracted and fragmente d into a n u m b e r o f conflicting egoisms.
T h e r e is, as w e shall see, a deep sense in w h i c h H o b b e s ' values are individual
rather than universal, but it is not s i m p l y a matter o f h a v i n g an 'egoistic'
m o r a l p s y c h o l o g y . M o t i v a t i o n in H o b b e s ' accoun t is necessarily egoistic
o n l y in a n u g a t o r y , definitional sense: each person strives to fulfil his o w n
desires. T h i s does n o t m e a n that the contents o f those desires cannot be
concerned w i t h the g o o d o f others. T h e definitions o f the passions w h i c h
H o b b e s supplies in chapter 16 o f Leviathan include 'Desire o f g o o d to
2
a n o t h e r , BENEVOLENCE,
G O O D WILL, CHARITY. If to
men
generally,
GOOD
NATURE' (p. 26; cf. G e r t 1965 and 1967). It is true that H o b b e s did tend to
explain the passions in terms o f self-interest, as w h e n he w r o t e t h a t ' Griefe,
for the C a l a m i t y o f another, is PITTY; and ariseth f r o m the i m a g i n a t i o n that
the like calamit y m a y befall himselfe' (p. 27); but is is often unclear in such
cases w h e t h e r 'ariseth f r o m ' explains the feeling in the sense o f analysing its
true content or in the sense o f p o i n t i n g to its causal predecessor. T h e origin
o f m a n y o f these definitions is found in H o b b e s ' early s u m m a r y o f
Aristotle's Rhetoric; Aristotle is often as a m b i g u o u s as H o b b e s and almost as
reductive. A n d w h e n H o b b e s translated Rhetoric 1369b 18 as 'In s u m m e ,
e v e r y Voluntary A c t i o n tends either to Profit, or Pleasure' (1986, p. 55), w e
can see that draining a w a y Aristotle's t e l e o l o g y f r o m his p s y c h o l o g y can
leave us w i t h a v e r y H o b b e s i a n residue.
H o b b e s ' c o n t e m p o r a r y critics d e n o u n c e d h i m for a r g u i n g that m e n
w e r e naturally selfish and hostile t o w a r d s o n e another. His reply w a s
2. References to Leviathan are given in the form o f page numbers in the first edition: these can be
located in the text o f the 1968 Penguin edition (ed. C . B . Macpherson) and in the margin o f the 1909
C l a r e n d o n Press edition (ed. W . G . P o g s o n Smith).
534
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
c o m m o n s e n s i c a l : first, that a l t h o u g h m e n w e r e sometimes b e n e v o l e n t , a
state c o u l d n o t be founde d o n b e n e v o l e n c e alone, and secondly, that
' t h o u g h the w i c k e d w e r e f e w e r than the righteous, yet because w e cannot
distinguish t h e m , there is a necessity o f suspecting, h e e d i n g, anticipating'
(1983, p . 33). A third reason, m o r e i m p o r t a n t but less c o m m o n s e n s i c a l and
less directly stated, also e m e r g e s : the p r i m a r y state o f conflict b e t w e e n
individuals posited b y H o b b e s is n o t a contingent, factual conflict w h i c h
m i g h t n o t exist i f people ceased to be irascible or c o m p e t i t i v e , but rather a
necessary j u r a l conflict b e t w e e n people w h o s e rights o v e r l a p or conflict in
s o m e sense w i t h one another until they h a v e been renounced.
In order to s h o w that m e n can all agree on the need to pass f r o m a state o f
conflict to a state o f peace, H o b b e s argues that it is possible to abstract a set
o f universal rules o f h u m a n action f r o m the c o n t i n g e nt facts o f conflicting
individual desires. Individual desires are various and are constantly in
m o t i o n , so they can be neither c o n s u m m a t e d in the a c h i e v e m e n t o f a final,
systematic g o a l ( H o b b e s rejects the n o t i o n o f a ' s u m m u m b o n u m ' in this
life), nor dispensed w i t h b y means o f Stoic w i t h d r a w a l . ( W h e n H o b b e s
characterises life as a 'restlesse desire o f P o w e r after p o w e r ' ( 1 6 5 1 , p. 47), he
is n o t m a k i n g the empirical observation that m e n are p o w e r - h u n g r y , but
m e r e l y conjoinin g his v i e w o f life as m o t i o n w i t h his definition o f p o w e r as
the 'present means, to obtain s o m e future apparent g o o d ' (p. 66).) O n l y one
desire can h a v e any sort o f priority o v e r all other desires, n a m e l y the desire
to a v o i d death; b e i n g alive is a necessary condition, the present means to all
future apparent g o o d s . H a v i n g established this one general truth o v e r and
a b o v e the mass o f individual desires, H o b b e s proceeds to d r a w f r o m it a
system o f means t o w a r d s the a v o i d a n c e o f death, p r o v i d i n g a set o f rules o f
action w h i c h all m e n must find valid i f they reason correctly. T h e most
i m p o r t a n t means t o w a r d s self-preservation is peace, the establishment o f
stable and trustable social relations. A n d the o p t i m u m means t o w a r d s peace
can be formulated as ' L a w s o f N a t u r e ' or m o r a l principles w h i c h w i l l be
i m m u t a b l y and eternally true. In this w a y H o b b e s has p e r f o r m e d the
transition f r o m the subjective and relative v o c a b u l a r y o f ' g o o d ' and ' e v i l '
( ' g o o d ' m e a n i n g 'object o f desire') to an objectiv e system o f virtues and
vices w h i c h can a p p ly universally.
And therefore so long a man is in the condition o f meer Nature, (which is a
condition o f War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: And
consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way,
or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty,
Equity, Mercy, 8c the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, Morall
Vertues.
(p. 80)
535
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
H o b b e s has thus cleverly passed f r o m 'is' to ' o u g h t ' almost w i t h o u t
appearing to take u p o n h i m s e l f the responsibility for using n o r m a t i v e
language: g i v e n that m e n use such l a n g u a g e in an unreliable w a y to express
their o w n desires, H o b b e s offers a reliable, systematic use o f it in the f o r m o f
' L a w s o f N a t u r e ' w i t h w h i c h they must all agree. T h e law s are
' C o n c l u s i o n s , or T h e o r e m e s c o n c e r n i n g w h a t c o n d u c e t h to the conserva tion and defence o f themselves' (pp. 122—3); a l t h o u g h usually framed
c o n v e n i e n t l y as imperatives, they w o u l d be m o r e correctly spelt out as
theorems o f the f o r m : ' g i v e n that y o u desire to d o x y and z, i f y o u reason
correctly y o u w i l l also desire to d o the f o l l o w i n g ' . T h e l a w s o f nature
specify an o p t i m u m set o f actions designed to b r i n g abou t peace, the
o p t i m u m c o n d i t i o n for self-preservation. B u t there w i l l also be occasions
w h e n o b e y i n g those l a ws w i l l endanger an individual's life rather than
preserving it (e.g. w h e n faced w i t h a m a n o f violence); in such
circumstances the need for self-preservation w i l l dictate b r e a k i n g the l a w s
o f nature and responding w i t h v i o l e n c e in self-defence. T h i s entitlement to
g o against the l a w s o f nature in order to fulfil the purpose w h i c h they serve
is called the ' r i g h t' o f nature. In chapter 14 o f Leviathan H o b b e s s h o w s that
b o t h l a ws and right flow f r o m the same source, w h i c h he calls the 'rule' o f
nature: ' T h a t e v e r y m a n, o u g h t to e n d e a v o u r peace, as farre as he has h o p e
o f obtaining it; and w h e n he cannot obtain it, that he m a y seek, and use, all
helps, and advantages o f W a r r e ' (p. 64). W h i l s t the l a w s put f o r w a r d a
determinate set o f actions, the right covers an indeterminate range o f
possible actions contrary to natural l a w ; hence H o b b e s ' statement in the
same chapter that 'RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to d o , or to forbeare;
W h e r e a s LAW, determineth and bindeth to o n e o f t h e m ' (p. 64). B u t in any
particular set o f circumstances w h e n the right needs to be used, using it w i l l
be n o less necessary than o b e d i e n c e to the l a w s n o r m a l l y is w h e n they can
safely be o b e y e d . C a l l i n g the right a 'liberty ' does n o t m e a n that at critical
m o m e n t s o f self-defence it is a matter o f indifference w h e t h e r the right be
used or not; it connotes rather the right's nature as an 'entitlement' to act
against the usual requirements o f natural l a w .
3
T h i s account has so far been concerned w i t h w h a t m i g h t be called an
internal valuation o f men's actions: each m a n has to consider his o w n need
3. Hence it is not necessary to accept the argument (Warrender 1957) that the laws o f nature cannot be
based on self-preservation because self-preservation is a right, and rights i n v o l v e 'liberty to do, or
to forbeare'. It must also be stressed that H o b b e s ' argument in Leviathan is not that men have a
right to preserve themselves but that they have a right to attempt to preserve themselves. O n this
important distinction see Viola 1979, pp. 88—9.
536
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and Spinoza
for preservation, and this need generates a particular set of laws and a
general right. In the state of nature, when conditions are always potentially
hostile and the scope for acting in accordance with the laws of nature is
reduced almost to vanishing point, all sorts of actions may be justified by
the right of nature. But some actions will still not be justified by it, if they
do not meet the internal standard of conduciveness to self-preservation. In
an important note added to the second edition of De Cive, Hobbes
explained that wanton cruelty or drunkenness in the state of nature would
not be covered by the right of nature (1983, p. 73). Yet elsewhere Hobbes
clearly stated that in the state of nature 'Every man by nature hath right to
all things, that is to say, to do whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth, to
possess, use, and enjoy all things he will and can' (1928, 11.xiv.10, p. 55; cf.
1651, p. 64, 'this naturall Right of every man to every thing'). This suggests
a different use of the term 'right'; we might call it Hobbes' account of men's
external rights, that is, their rights vis-a-vis other men, as opposed to his
internal account of rights overruling laws in the system of actions for selfpreservation.
The old undifferentiated notion of a right or 'ius' as 'that which is right'
was still in the process of being broken up during this period (see Tuck
1979); although Hobbes was one of its main attackers, his own arguments
are sometimes ambiguous because he uses the term in more than one way.
His internal account of the right of nature made a procedural and categorial
distinction between it and the laws of nature, but still conceived of it as an
'objective' right of the traditional kind, a way of justifying actions because
in their particular circumstances they were right to do. Externally, however
(in the field of inter-personal relations), Hobbes put forward a strong
version of the modern 'subjective' notion of a right, a freedom or liberty of
action which, far from being generated by any normative requirements,
consisted of an absence of obligations. Hobbes was presupposing a sort of
moral vacuum so far as inter-personal moral duties were concerned. This
was a condition of his argument that the only standard by which an action
could be judged to be wrong in the state of nature was the internal standard
of conduciveness to self-preservation: in the state of nature there is no
requirement to 'respect' the rights of others, no duty towards other people.
To illustrate: if in the state of nature A snatches B's food, this action can
never be judged to be wrong on the grounds that A has some duties
towards B which he is thereby breaking. A has no duties towards him or
anyone else, and therefore his (external) rights of action are total and allencompassing. So the only standard by which the action can be judged to
537
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
be w r o n g is the (internal) standard o f conducivenes s to self-preservation:
b y this standard A w i l l h a v e the right to snatch the f o o d i f his preservation
requires it, b u t he w i l l n o t h a v e that right i f he does n o t need the f o o d and is
m e r e l y increasing his chances o f suffering retaliatory hostility.
Separating external and internal rights in this w a y helps us to see that
a l t h o u g h the natural l a w s and natural rights c o n c e r n ed w i t h preservation
are in s o m e w a y s similar to a traditional corpus o f ' o b j e c t i v e ' rights and
duties, they are still fundamentally different f r o m any n o r m a l set o f
universalisable m o r a l rules. T h e s e l a w s and rights are universal o n l y in the
sense that they are duplicated in e v e r y individual . T h e i r derivation is
essentially egoistic: each person m a y assign a value to m o d e s t y , h u m i l i t y ,
generosity, etc., but his reason must ultimately be that each quality has an
instrumental value to him. T h e altruism w h i c h flows f r o m obedienc e to
natural l a w is, for H o b b e s , a f o r m o f enlightened self-interest, and it can
o n l y be e x p e c t e d o f individuals o n c e they h a v e j o i n e d together in the
c o m m o n security o f the state.
T h e r e is a danger, in f o l l o w i n g H o b b e s ' a c c o u n t o f the state o f nature
and the f o r m a t i o n o f political society, that the reader begins to treat it as a
literal, historical narrative. H o b b e s presented it in this w a y for the sake o f
exposition, b u t w i l l i n g l y admitted o f the state o f nature that 'I believe it w a s
n e v e r generally so, o v e r all the w o r l d ' ( 1 6 5 1 , p. 63). H e c o n c l u d e d that
families in the state o f nature w e r e to a limited extent miniature political
societies, because children c o u l d be d e e m e d to h a v e consented to o b e y their
parents (pp. 102—6). His o w n favourite e x a m p l e o f a state o f nature w a s that
o f the relations b e t w e e n s o v e r e i g n states (p. 63); in a letter to a friend he also
suggested, rather unsatisfactorily, that soldiers or travelling masons, w h o
passed t h r o u g h various states but o w e d settled allegiance to n o n e o f t h e m ,
m i g h t also be t h o u g h t o f in this w a y . B u t in essence the state o f nature is the
p r o d u c t o f a t h o u g h t - e x p e r i m e n t in w h i c h H o b b e s considers w h a t rights o f
action and reasons for action m e n w o u l d h a v e i f there w e r e n o c o m m o n
authority to w h i c h they c o u l d turn to settle their disputes, or o n w h i c h they
c o u l d rely to g i v e stability to their expectations o f h o w other m e n w o u l d
act t o w a r d s t h e m .
4
C o n v e r s e l y , w h e n H o b b e s describes the f o r m a t i o n o f political authority
4. This letter does not survive, but the reply o f its recipient does, objecting that these t w o instances are
not proper examples o f the state o f nature 'because this is only a w a r o f each against each
successively and at different times': Peleau to Hobbes, B o r d e a u x , 4 January 1657. (Chatsworth ,
Hobbes papers, letters from foreign correspondents, letter 34. I am grateful to the trustees o f the
C h a t s w o r t h Settlement for permission to cite this letter.)
538
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
t h r o u g h a c o v e n a n t he is n o t t y i n g his a r g u m e n t to a putative historical
event, but t r y i n g to characterise the k i n d o f c o m m i t m e n t w h i c h m e m b e r s
o f society must h a v e t o w a r d s the political arrangemen t w h i c h they accept.
C o n t r a c t theories o f the state h a v e often taken a quasi-historical f o r m
because o f the element o f c o n t i n g e n c y w h i c h is one possible reason for
appealing to the n o t i o n o f a contract. Instead o f marshalling general
principles to p r o v e that the political a r r a n g e m e nt in question is the o n l y just
and proper a r r a n g e m e n t that c o u l d h a v e been m a d e , contract theorists can
argue that it is one o f a n u m b e r o f possible arrangements, and that m e n are
b o u n d to this one s i m p l y b y the fact that they h a v e agreed to it. In s o m e
cases, n o t a b l y that o f J o h n Selden, the contract t h e o r y o f the state did h a v e a
genuine, t h o u g h c o m p l e x , historical character; o n the question o f w h e n
resistance to the g o v e r n m e n t b e c o m e s justified, his m a x i m w a s that ' w e
must l o o k to the contract', and this required the services o f legal and
constitutional historians (such as himself). M o r e frequently, h o w e v e r ,
contract t h e o r y b e c a m e an excuse for ahistorical arguments abou t w h a t
p e o p l e 'must h a v e ' rationally contracted to d o ; in other w o r d s , a w a y o f
presenting conditions w h i c h o u g h t to be d e e m e d to be incorporated in any
grant o f p o w e r f r o m p e o p l e to g o v e r n m e n t . H o b b e s f o l l o w e d this
ahistorical tendency, but w i t h a radical difference: he used the n o t i o n o f
necessary consent as a lever to o v e r t u r n all claims about implicit conditions
or limitations o f the rights o f g o v e r n m e n t .
H o b b e s w a s able to d o this because o f the unitary nature o f his
foundation for natural l a w : self-preservation. T h e m a i n C i c e r o n i a n and
T h o m i s t traditions o f natural l a w saw self-preservation as the g r o u n d floor,
so to speak, o f a w h o l e structure o f h u m a n needs and values, and it w a s out
o f those h i g h e r - o r d e r values that rational contractarians c o u l d construct the
implicit conditions w h i c h they t h o u g h t w e r e i n v o l v e d in the grant o f
p o w e r f r o m p e o p l e to g o v e r n m e n t . In H o b b e s ' a r g u m e n t , selfpreservation is a sheer need w h i c h takes precedence o v e r other needs; that a
subject should be preserved b y his g o v e r n m e n t is the o n l y essential
c o n d i t i o n o f his allegiance to it. Since, in H o b b e s ' theory, self-preservation
c o u l d in extremis justify d o i n g a n y t h i n g , the subjects must h a v e granted
their g o v e r n m e n t the p o w e r to d o a n y t h i n g for the sake o f their
preservation. T h e i r consent to this eliminated all scope for further
' c o n d i t i o n s ' or constraints.
It m a y still be w o n d e r e d , h o w e v e r , w h e t h e r H o b b e s ' account needed to
use a c o n c e p t o f contract at all: in any a r g u m e n t w h i c h hinges on the phrase
'must h a v e contracted', it is surely the reasons for saying 'must h a v e ' w h i c h
539
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
are d o i n g the real w o r k . H o b b e s ' reasons are laid d o w n in his l a w s o f
nature, w h i c h enjoin people to enter society, submit to arbitration, and so
on. Indeed, the third l a w o f nature is 'that m e n p e r f o r m e their C o v e n a n t s
m a d e ' ( i 6 5 i , p . 7 i ) . I f the reasons for o b e y i n g covenants are to be found in a
system o f prudential rules, w h y has H o b b e s n o t d r a w n up his w h o l e t h e o r y
o f obedience in terms o f l o n g - t e r m benefits and dispensed w i t h the n o t i o n
o f contract altogether? T h e answer must be that contract w a s o n l y a formal
device in H o b b e s ' theory, but a d e v i c e w h i c h served s o m e i m p o r t a n t
subsidiary purposes. First, it enabled h i m to insulate the l a n g u a g e o f justice
f r o m the rest o f the m o r a l v o c a b u l a r y : a s o v e r e i g n g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t be
iniquitous, that is, it m i g h t break the l a w s o f nature, but it c o u l d n o t be
unjust, because injustice consisted o f breach o f contract. (In H o b b e s '
theory, the s o v e r e i g n is n o t a party to the contract: the contract is b e t w e e n
the subjects, w h o agree to hand o v e r their rights and p o w e r to the
sovereign: p. 89). In a classic e x a m p l e o f his reductive technique o f
a r g u m e n t , H o b b e s dispensed w i t h the traditional claims o f distributive and
c o m m u t a t i v e justice, r e d u c i n g the f o r m e r to equity and the latter to
contractual justice (p. 75). T h e claim that rulers cannot be c o n v i c t e d o f
injustice had n o t been w i t h o u t p o l e m i c a l point in the E n g l a n d o f 1640.
S e c o n d l y , H o b b e s ' t h e o r y requires p e o p l e to r e n o u n ce not o n l y rights o f
action but also rights o f j u d g e m e n t . O n l y the s o v e r e i g n can j u d g e w h a t w i l l
be necessary for the preservation o f peace in the state: if subjects claimed the
right to j u d g e this, they w o u l d be u n d e r m i n i n g the sovereign's role as final
arbiter and frustrating the purpose for w h i c h a s o v e r e i g n w a s instituted.
(This t o o had had a topical relevance in the late 1630s, f o l l o w i n g the Ship
M o n e y case.) T h e n o t i o n o f a c o v e n a n t is a k i n d o f shorthand for the t y p e o f
c o m m i t m e n t to obedience this requires, in advance o f any k n o w l e d g e o f
the contingencies o f particular decisions b y the s o v e r e i g n .
T h e state forces its subjects to k e e p their c o v e n a n t b y a n n e x i n g
punishments to its l a w s . ' C o v e n a n t s , w i t h o u t the S w o r d , are but W o r d s ,
and o f n o strength to secure a m a n at all' (p. 85). B u t H o b b e s is n o t a r g u i n g
here that the desire to a v o i d punishment is the o n l y m o t i v a t i o n for o b e y i n g
the laws. T h e prospect o f punishmen t is a short-term consideration,
necessary to concentrate the minds o f passionate m e n , and thereby to create
secure surroundings for those w h o d o w i s h to k e e p their c o v e n a n t . A n d
there is a l w a y s an adequate l o n g - t e r m consideration p r o m p t i n g this w i s h ,
n a m e l y the conduciveness to self-preservation o f peace and stable g o v e r n m e n t . H o b b e s is sometimes associated w i t h m o d e r n 'positivist' or 'realist'
theories o f l a w w h i c h explain the o b l i g a t i o n to o b e y l a w s in terms o f the
540
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
m o t i v a t i o n to a v o i d the punishments w h i c h those l a w s predict; but in
H o b b e s ' t h e o r y there is thus a l w a y s a further m o t i v e to obedience . T h i s
point c o m e s out strongly in his criticism o f the doctrine o f 'passive
o b e d i e n c e ' in Behemoth, his history o f the C i v i l W a r . ' E v e r y l a w is a
c o m m a n d to do, or to forbear: neither o f these is fulfilled b y suffering' (1889,
p. 50). L a w s d o n o t propos e value-free alternatives o f action leading to
punishment and action leading to n o n - p u n i s h m e n t ; there is a l w a y s a value
attached to o b e d i e n ce to laws, because there is a l w a y s a d u t y t o w a r d s the
legislator, w h o s e c o n t i n u i n g authority ensures peace.
H o b b e s does, h o w e v e r , raise an apparent e x c e p t i o n to this principle
w h e n he writes a b o u t 'the O b l i g a t i o n a m a n m a y sometime s h a v e ,
u p o n the C o m m a n d o f the S o v e r a i g n to e x e c u te any dangerous or
dishonourable Office'. H e r e he concludes: ' W h e n therefore o u r refusall to
o b e y frustrates the E n d for w h i c h the S o v e r a i g n t y w a s ordained, then there
is n o L i b e r t y to refuse: o t h e r w i s e there is' ( 1 6 5 1 , p. 112). T h i s seems to
transgress H o b b e s ' rule that o n l y the s o v e r e i g n can decide w h e t h e r an
action is necessary for the safety o f the state. B u t , l e a v i n g aside the m e n t i o n
o f dishonour ( w h i c h is n o t fully supported b y the rest o f H o b b e s ' t h e o r y ) , it
is clear that H o b b e s is c o n c e r n e d here w i t h the uncertain, probabilistic
borderline at w h i c h the need to o b e y gives w a y to the need for selfpreservation; the ' d a n g e r ' referred to here is danger to the subject's life, and
it w a s an i m m o v a b l e sticking point in H o b b e s ' theory that n o one c o u l d
e v e r c o v e n a n t to kill h i m s e l f (p. 69). It cases o f capital punishment, H o b b e s
argued, the c o n v i c t had a right to resist his gaolers and executioners. B u t it
w a s also an i m p o r t a n t feature o f his a r g u m e n t that at the same time the
s o v e r e i g n ( w h o c o u l d c o m m i t n o injustice) had a right to e x e c u te the m a n .
T h e s o v e r e i g n acted w i t h the rights o f the people, on their behalf.
T h e m o s t striking f o r m u l a t i o n o f this point c o m e s in De Cive, w h e r e
H o b b e s writes that ' T h e People rules in all G o v e r n m e n t s , for e v e n in
Monarchies the People C o m m a n d s ' (1983, p . 1 5 1 ) . H e contrasted the
' p e o p l e ' , w h i c h w a s the corporate entity created b y the political a g r e e m e n t
o f its m e m b e r s , w i t h the ' m u l t i t u d e ', w h i c h w a s any m e r e a g g r e g a t e o f
individuals. His intention w a s to u n d e r m i n e those w h o claimed to speak o n
b e h a l f o f ' t h e p e o p l e ' against their ruler, b y s h o w i n g that individuals gained
a corporate identity o n l y b y virtue o f b e i n g united under a s o v e r e i g n. B u t
since the ' p e o p l e ' w a s also the t e r m w h i c h H o b b e s used for the s o v e r e i gn
itself in the case o f a d e m o c r a t i c constitution, this a r g u m e n t had the
p r o b a b l y unintended consequence that the foundation o f any t y p e o f state
had required a p r i m a r y phase o f d e m o c r a c y . In the quasi-historical
541
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
accounts o f The Elements of Law and De Give this is w h a t happened, and the
d e m o c r a c y then dissolved itself i f it handed o v e r s o v e r e i g n t y to a
m o n a r c h y or an aristocracy (1928, p . 94, 1983 p p . 1 0 9 - 1 1 ) : e v e n i f the
h a n d - o v e r o c c u r r e d at the first gatherin g o f the people, the fact that it did so
b y majority v o t e w o u l d i m p l y the m o m e n t a r y existence o f a d e m o c r a t i c
constitution. H o b b e s w a s o b v i o u s l y troubled b o t h b y the quasi-populist
appearance o f his a r g u m e n t in these w o r k s (as i f d e m o c r a c y w e r e s o m e h o w
m o r e natural), and b y the theoretical a w k w a r d n e s s o f identifying the
corporate w i l l o f the state w i t h an entity, the ' p e o p l e ' , w h i c h apparently
continued to exist after it had disappeared, like the grin o f the C h e s h i r e C a t .
In Leviathan he streamlined his accoun t b y treating the original majority
principle as a necessary procedural assumption (rather than as a m i n i constitution), and w o r k e d out a n e w w a y o f describing the c o n t i n u i n g
corporate entity as the 'person' o f the state. T o g e t h e r w i t h this c o n c e p t o f a
'person', w h i c h w a s d r a w n f r o m the legal fiction that corporations c o u l d
act as persons at l a w , he e m p l o y e d the related legal v o c a b u l a r y o f
'authorising' and 'representing': the s o v e r e i g n (whether an individua l or an
assembly) represents its subjects because it is authorised to act as the bearer
o f their 'person', and they h a v e a unitary 'person' o n l y b y virtue o f b e i n g
represented b y a unitary s o v e r e i g n ( 1 6 5 1 , p p . 80—3; see also P o l i n 1953,
p p . 229—40, and F o r s y t h 1981). T h r o u g h o u t his account, H o b b e s a l l o w s
that the s o v e r e i g n m a y be an aristocratic c o u n c i l or a d e m o c r a t ic assembly;
a l t h o u g h he give s reasons for preferring a m o n a r c h y (pp. 95—8), the nature
o f the s o v e r e i g n t y is the same in each case.
T h e n o t i o n o f authorising is taken u p again w h e n H o b b e s considers the
sovereign's legislative action and permissive inaction. ' A H L a w e s , w r i t t e n ,
and u n w r i t t e n , h a v e their A u t h o r i t y , and force, f r o m the W i l l o f the
C o m m o n - w e a l t h ; that is to say, f r o m the W i l l o f the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e '
(p. 139). C u s t o m a r y l a w thus has its validit y n o t f r o m any intrinsic force o f
its o w n b u t f r o m b e i n g 'authorised' b y the s o v e r e i g n , w h o c o u l d cancel it i f
he w i s h e d . (This w a s the starting point for H o b b e s ' attack o n the claims o f
c o m m o n l a w jurists in his Dialogue . . .of the Common Laws of England.) In a
w i d e r sense, all activities w i t h i n the state are authorised b y the s o v e r e i g n so
l o n g as they are n o t forbidden. T h e state authorises g e o m e t r y professors to
teach g e o m e t r y just as it authorises p e o p l e to w a l k t h r o u g h public parks;
this does n o t m e a n that e v e r y o n e is acting o n instructions f r o m the state,
and it does n o t m e a n that the s o v e r e i g n authority is m a k i n g the professors'
g e o m e t r y true, or o b l i g i n g p e o p l e to believe it. O f course the range o f
things w h i c h might be forbidden b y the state is almost unlimited; but
542
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
H o b b e s ' t h e o r y supplies n o reason for the state to use this p o w e r e x c e p t for
the preservation o f peace and prosperity. It is in the sovereign's interest to
a l l o w individuals to pursue their o w n interests, because this produces a
m o r e contented and prosperous population: ' w h e r e the p u b l i q u e and
private interest are most closely united, there is the p u b l i q ue most
a d v a n c e d . . . T h e riches, p o w e r , and h o n o u r o f a M o n a r c h arise o n e l y
f r o m the riches, p o w e r , and h o n o u r o f his Subjects' (p. 96; cf. G u n n 1969,
p p . 65—81). H o b b e s summarised his a r g u m e n t at one point in the Elements of
Law b y saying that it w a s the sovereign's d u t y b y the l a w o f nature 'to leave
m a n as m u c h liberty as m a y be, w i t h o u t hurt o f the p u b l i c ' (1928, p. 1 4 1 ) .
H o b b e s ' apparently unobjectionabl e claims about the authorisation o f
g e o m e t r y teachers s h a d o w e d forth his a r g u m e n t o n a m u c h m o r e
contentious subject: the status o f the churc h w i t h i n the state. H e regarded
the c h u r ch as a society o f m e n e n g a g e d in teaching the doctrine o f the B i b l e .
T h e s o v e r e i g n m i g h t authorise this teaching in the strong sense o f
endorsing as l a w s the injunctions to action w h i c h the teaching contained; or
the s o v e r e i g n c o u l d authorise it in the looser sense o f p e r m i t t i n g the activity
o f teaching. T h e distinction b e t w e e n belief and action w a s an i m p o r t a n t
one: 'Fo r internall Faith is in its o w n nature invisible, and consequently
e x e m p t e d f r o m all h u m a n e [i.e. ' h u m a n ' ] jurisdiction' ( 1 6 5 1 , p. 285). If the
c h u r c h claimed an independent authority to direct the actions o f m e n
w i t h i n the state, this w a s contrary to the unitary and absolute nature o f civil
s o v e r e i g n t y . T h e church's o w n actions must be subject to the civil p o w e r ,
and those actions must include not o n l y acts o f w o r s h i p but also w r i t i n g
and speaking. B u t H o b b e s distinguished carefully b e t w e e n forbiddin g
teaching and f o r b i d d i ng m e n to believe w h a t they w e r e taught: 'such
F o r b i d d i n g is o f n o effect; because Beleef, and U n b e l e e f n e v e r f o l l o w mens
C o m m a n d s ' (p. 2 7 1 ) . P r o v i d e d that the c h u r ch did not claim independent
rights o f action, and p r o v i d e d that the doctrine it taught w a s not subversive
to the peace o f the state, H o b b e s ' theory a l l o w e d for a great degree o f
religious toleration. Ideally the s o v e r e i g n should h a v e n o m o r e reason to
interfere w i t h the churc h than w i t h g e o m e t r y lessons. H o b b e s is o n l y
loosely to be described as an Erastian; he did not think that any strong
c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n state and churc h w a s necessary, and his theory
permitted R o m a n C a t h o l i c i s m in England, for e x a m p l e , p r o v i d e d that it
w e r e understood that the p o p e appointed teachers o f doctrine in E n g l a n d
o n l y o n sufferance f r o m the English s o v e r e i gn (p. 296). After the
R e s t o r a t i o n , C h u r c h o f E n g l a n d bishops such as E d w a r d Stillingfleet and
S a m u e l Parker used H o b b e s i a n a r g u m e n t s to justify g o v e r n m e n t action
543
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
against the Dissenters, on the g r o u n d s that they w e r e a threat to civil peace;
but in s o m e w a y s it w a s the Dissenters w h o w e r e w i e l d i n g the most
centrally H o b b e s i an a r g u m e n t s w h e n they said that religious beliefs should
not be subject to civil c o m p u l s i o n .
T h e difficulty, o f course, w a s that s o m e versions o f religious belief w o u l d
not fit into H o b b e s ' scheme, because they did i n v o l v e belie f in rights o f
action or jurisdiction independent o f the sovereign. M o s t varieties o f
institutional Christianity taught beliefs o f this sort, and H o b b e s ' arguments
on this point are thus fiercely anti-clerical and a b o v e all a n t i - C a t h o l i c. B u t
e v e n w i t h i n the R o m a n C a t h o l i c church there w e r e traditions o f Marsilian
and Gallican a r g u m e n t o n w h i c h H o b b e s coul d d r a w in his attack on papal
p o w e r ( M a l c o l m 1984, p p . 82-3). W i t h i n the A n g l i c a n church H o b b e s w a s
in s o m e w a y s f o l l o w i n g in the tradition o f rationalist religion, o f writers
such as W i l l i a m C h i l l i n g w o r t h and Falkland at Great T e w . H o b b e s agreed
w i t h t h e m that the essential doctrinal truths contained in the B i b l e w e r e
f e w and easily k n o w a b l e ( 1 6 5 1 , p p . 325—6). A n d in the third part o f
Leviathan he subjected the B i b l e to a m o r e t h o r o u g h course o f rational
textual criticism than had been attempted b y any previous English writer.
His aim w a s to s h o w that scripture, far from d e m a n d i n g beliefs or actions
contrary to those o f his o w n theory, actually m a t c h e d and confirmed his
account o f m e n ' s duties at e v e r y point. It m a y be t e m p t i n g to describe this
as a rather cynical arrière-pensée on H o b b e s ' part; but, equally, it can be
described as a necessary consequence o f his o w n theologica l position. His
t h e o l o g y , as w e h a v e seen, severed all essential links b e t w e e n the nature o f
G o d and the nature o f the w o r l d . N a t u r a l t h e o l o g y m i g h t arrive at the
k n o w l e d g e that G o d existed, but it c o u l d supply n o further k n o w l e d g e o f
his nature. E v i d e n c e o f G o d ' s w i l l could exist in the f o r m o f s o m e t h i n g
historically contingent, such as the text o f scripture; but in order to
interpret this evidence , principles o f interpretation had to be applied, and
they c o u l d not be derived from the evidenc e itself. It w a s inevitable, then,
that in interpreting the B i b l e m e n w o u l d use their natural reason and
interpret a w a y any aspect o f it w h i c h appeared to conflict w i t h the dictates
o f natural reason - dictates already arrived at in the first t w o parts o f
Leviathan. H o b b e s ' similarity to rational theologians such as Falkland w a s
therefore o n l y skin-deep. T h e y read rational beliefs into the B i b l e because
they felt they had substantive k n o w l e d g e o f the rational nature o f G o d ;
H o b b e s did the same because o f his lack o f k n o w l e d g e o f G o d ' s nature,
w h i c h forced h i m to interpret the B i b l e b y the light o f h u m a n nature and
h u m a n reason. D e n o u n c e d and dismissed as an 'atheist', H o b b e s countered
544
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
w i t h a reply w h i c h it is hard to gainsay: ' D o y o u think I can be an atheist
and not k n o w it? O r , k n o w i n g it, durst h a v e offered m y atheism to the
press?' (i839~45a, v n , p . 350).
ii
S p i n o za
O u t s i d e E n g l a n d , the D u t c h republic w a s the c o u n t r y w h e r e H o b b e s '
w r i t i n g s exerted their greatest influence. T h e conditions o f intellectual life
there w e r e favourable to 'free-thinking', w i t h a flourishing b o o k trade o n
w h i c h regulation and censorship w e r e c o m p a r a t i v e l y l i g h t l y enforced. T h e
second edition o f De Cive w a s printed there in 1647; a D u t c h translation o f
Leviathan appeared in 1667; and an i m p o r t a n t collection o f H o b b e s ' Latin
w r i t i n g s , i n c l u d i ng his n e w Latin version o f Leviathan, w a s published in
A m s t e r d a m in 1668.
G i v e n its recent birth and the c o n t i n u i n g uncertainty o f s o m e o f its
constitutional arrangements, the D u t c h republic w a s a c o u n t r y in w h i c h
basic questions o f political t h e o ry w e r e often o f pressingly topical concern .
H o b b e s ' pupil, the second earl o f D e v o n s h i r e , had w r i t t e n about 'such as
professe to reade T h e o r i e o f Statisme; fellows that s w a r m in most places
abroad, especially in Germany, or those places w h e r e the Dutch most usually
frequent, that nation b e i n g easie and apt to be gulled b y these Imposters'
( C a v e n d i s h 1620, p. 40). T h e w o r d 'Statisme' has o v e r t o n e s o f 'etatisme'
and 'raison d'etat'. W h e r e the internal w o r k i n g s o f the state w e r e
concerned, this meant a value-free, c o m p a r a t i v e study o f constitutions as
p o w e r structures; w h e r e their external actions w e r e concerned, it meant a
study o f all the tricks and devices o f d i p l o m a c y and warfare — a study w h i c h
c o u l d be a m p l y justified b y the dependence o f D u t c h foreign p o l i c y ,
t h r o u g h o u t the seventeenth century, o n kaleidoscopically shifting patterns
o f uncertain alliances. T h e leading academic e x p o n e n t o f this sort o f
p o w e r - a n a l y s i s w a s M . Z . B o x h o r n , w h o taught at Leiden U n i v e r s i t y f r o m
1633 to 1653; he published an edition o f Tacitus in 1643, and in his o w n
political w r i t i n g s he used e x a m p l e s f r o m Tacitus to s h o w that rulers w o u l d
a l w a y s be i m p e l l e d b y self-interest to encroach o n the liberties o f their
subjects (e.g. B o x h o r n 1663, p p . 18—22; K o s s m a n n i960, p. 20; W a n s i n k
1981, pp. 9 3 - 1 0 0 , 1 4 9 - 5 3 ) .
T h e history o f the D u t c h republic had also fostered public interest in
another area o f political c o n t r o v e r s y : the relation b e t w e e n religion and the
state. T h e main patterns o f a r g u m e n t had been laid d o w n in the second
decade o f the century, w h e n the R e m o n s t r a n t s (liberal theologians w h o
545
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
f o l l o w e d Jacobus A r m i n i u s ) had appealed to the civil p o w e r s to protect
t h e m against the hard-line C a l v i n i s t C o u n t e r - R e m o n s t r a n t s .
ProR e m o n s t r a n t writers, such as G r o t i u s in his De imperio summarum potestatum
circa sacra (written c. 1 6 1 4 and printed p o s t h u m o u s l y in 1647), had
d e v e l o p e d a t h e o r y o f jurisdiction in w h i c h all p o w e r o v e r Human actions —
i n c l u d i n g teaching, preaching, and acts o f w o r s h i p - had to be vested
ultimately in the civil authority. C h u r c h e s , in this theory, w e r e regarded as
v o l u n t a r y associations w i t h i n the state. T h e R e m o n s t r a n t s defended a
p o l i c y o f religious toleration b y a r g u i n g that the Calvinis t church had n o
jurisdictional p o w e r to persecute, and b y c l a i m i n g that religion w a s
essentially a matter o f beliefs, n o t actions, thus i m p l y i n g that a variety o f
religious beliefs should pose n o threat to the state's activities. T h e r e w a s a
natural c o n g r u e n c e b e t w e e n this attitude and the Tacitea n v i e w o f religion,
w h i c h regarded public religious observances as part o f the trappings, the
p s y c h o l o g i c a l theatre, o f the state, and therefore as s o m e t h i n g w h i c h must
be controlled b y the civil p o w e r . In the abstract, o f course, these a r g u m e n t s
did not dictate w h e t h e r the civil p o w e r should be m o n a r c h i c al or
republican. T h e contingencies o f political history ensured that the
R e m o n s t r a n t s and tolerationists sided w i t h republicanism, w h i l e the
supporters o f the princes o f O r a n g e uphel d the p o w e r s o f the C a l v i n i s t
church. B u t these alignments w e r e n o t quite accidental. For it w a s the
republican theorists w h o , in their attempt to w o r k out f r o m first principles
w h a t the nature and p o w e r s o f the state should be, c a m e closest to
d e v e l o p i n g a rationalist-utilitarian t y p e o f political t h e o r y f r o m w h i c h the
traditional categories o f sacerdotal and ecclesiastical p o w e r w e r e most
likely to be absent.
B y the m i d - c e n t u r y , the influence o f Descartes' p h i l o s o p h y in the D u t c h
academic w o r l d w a s g i v i n g a p o w e r f u l impetus to the desire to replace
traditional bodies o f t h e o ry w i t h n e w systems o f d e d u c t i v e science.
Cartesianism flourished at the Universities o f U t r e c h t and Leiden, w h e r e its
influence w a s strongest in the areas o f m e d i c i n e and physics. T h e antischolastic nature o f Descartes' v i e w s o n h u m a n p s y c h o l o g y w a s taken
further b y D u t c h Cartesians such as Henricus R e g i u s and Gerar d Wassenaar
at U t r e c h t , w h o d e v e l o p e d a m o r e mechanistic, materialist p h i l o s o p h y o f
m i n d w h i c h denied the existence o f innate ideas and described the m i n d as a
' m o d e ' o f the b o d y . T h i s w a s a version o f Cartesianism w h i c h w a s ideally
suited to the reception o f H o b b e s i a n theories t o o . A n d H o b b e s ' w o r k , for
Cartesians, c o u l d usefully r e m e d y the lack o f any political theory in
Descartes' o w n w r i t i n g s . L a m b e r t v a n V e l t h u y s e n for e x a m p l e , w h o had
546
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
studied at U t r e c h t in the 1640s, published defences o f Descartes, C o p e r n icus, and H o b b e s , and in the preface to his ' a p o l o g i a ' for De Give he
defended H o b b e s ' w o r k as i f it w e r e a straightforwardly Cartesian
enterprise: all p r e v i o u s attempts at political p h i l o s o p h y w e r e flawed, he
w r o t e , because they had n o t used 'this d e v i c e o f d o u b t i n g e v e r y t h i n g ' , and
had failed to deduce their various principles f r o m one single starting point
( 1 6 5 1 , sig. *5r).
A l l these strands o f a r g u m e n t - reason o f state, T a c i t i s m , religious
toleration, the defence o f unitary civil p o w e r , republicanism, Cartesianism
and H o b b e s i a n i s m — c a m e togethe r in the w o r k o f the mos t influential
D u t c h political writers o f the 1650s and 1660s, the brothers Johan and Pieter
de la C o u r t . Afte r the death o f W i l l i a m II in 1650, and during the c h i l d h o o d
o f W i l l i a m III ( w h o w a s b o r n a f e w days after his father's death), mos t o f
the D u t c h provinces found themselves operating a truly republican
constitution for the first time, h o l d i n g in a b e y a n ce the office o f 'stadth o l d e r ' w h i c h had p r e v i o u l y been filled b y the princes o f O r a n g e .
U n d e r J o h n de W i t t , the quasi-presidential ' g r a n d pensionary' o f H o l l a n d ,
a v i g o r o u s c a m p a i g n o f republican p r o p a g a n d a w a s w a g e d to persuade
H o l l a n d and the other province s to abolish the office o f stadtholder
altogether. T h e brothers de la C o u r t and Spinoz a w e r e a m o n g the mos t
p r o m i n e n t writers to support h i m .
B o t h brothers had studied at Leide n in the early 1640s, w h e r e they had
b e c o m e Tacitists and Cartesians, and Pieter had g o n e o n in 1645 to study
m e d i c i n e under R e g i u s at U t r e c h t ( V a n T h i j n 1956, p p . 309—15). Johan
m a y h a v e been responsible for the unauthorised printing o f s o m e lectures
b y B o x h o r n , the Commentariolus, in 1649: the w o r k bears a suspicious
resemblance to Johan's o w n notes o n the lectures, w h i c h he heard in 1643
( W a n s i n k 1 9 8 1 , p p . 150—1). A n d a m o r e spectacular e x a m p l e o f literary
piracy w a s Pieter's publication, o v e r his o w n initials ( ' V . D . H . ' : ' v a n den
H o v e ' , the D u t c h equivalent o f 'de la C o u r t ' ) o f a b o o k , Naeuwkeurige
consideratie van staet (A Close Examination of the State), w h i c h w a s in fact
w r i t t e n b y that other pupil o f R e g i u s , Wassenaar (Haitsma M u l i e r 1984).
Wassenaar's b o o k seems to h a v e g i v e n the de la C o u r t s the idea o f
c o m b i n i n g Tacitus and M a c h i a v e l l i w i t h a Cartesian t h e o r y o f the passions,
so that the task o f political p h i l o s o p h y w a s seen as that o f constructing the
state as a m e c h a n i s m to regulate the passions o f individuals and force b o t h
rulers and ruled to identify their individua l interests w i t h the c o m m o n
g o o d . A n d it w a s w i t h this task in m i n d that the brothers de la C o u r t turned
eagerly to the w r i t i n g s o f H o b b e s .
547
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
T h e w r i t i n g s o f the de la C o u r t s f o r m a h o m o g e n e o u s g r o u p o f w o r k s ,
in w h i c h the same a r g u m e n t s k e e p reappearing. ' S e l f - l o v e is the origi n o f
all h u m a n actions', begins the Consideratien (1660, p. 1). 'Self-preservation
is the supreme l a w o f all individuals' (Discoursen, 1662a, p. 9 1 ) . M e n are
g o v e r n e d b y their passions, and most m e n are therefore evil b y nature;
w i t h o u t a political p o w e r to k e e p t h e m in check they w i l l lead a diffident
and violen t existence in a 'state o f nature', each j u d g i n g partially in his o w n
cause (Consideratien, 1660, p p . 1-8). P e o p l e are equal b y nature, and o n l y
the state, an artificial h u m a n construct, has introduced inequalities (p. 346,
mispaginated '246'). O n c e the state is established, the subjects o w e it a debt
o f gratitude for their protection; and they are justified in rebelling o n l y
w h e n their individual lives are threatened (p. 347, mispaginated '247',
Discoursen, 1662a, p. 27).
5
T h u s far, the H o b b e s i a n overtone s are o b v i o u s . T h e 1660 Consider atien
s h o w s a close familiarity w i t h De Cive, and the later editions suggest a
reading oi Leviathan as w e l l . B u t this is a version o f H o b b e s f r o m w h i c h all
the j u r a l categories — rights, covenants, authorisation — h a v e been stripped
a w a y . For H o b b e s , the essential conflict in the state o f nature is a conflict o f
rights. For the de la C o u r t s , it is a conflict o f passions; there is thus n o
qualitative distinction b e t w e e n men's relations in the state o f nature and
their relations in civil society. ' A l l obedienc e is caused b y c o m p u l s i o n '
(Discoursen, 1662a, p . 29). Each individual wishes to live a c c o r d i n g to his
o w n w i l l ('t Welvaren, 1 9 1 1 , p. 10): this principle means that force is
required to get any individual to live a c c o r d i n g to the w i l l o f another, and it
also means that rulers w i l l constantly be t r y i n g to e x t e n d their wills m o r e
fully o v e r their subjects.
5. T h e corpus o f their w o r k s , h o w e v e r , poses m a n y problems o f individual attribution. M o s t o f the
major w o r k s appeared over the initials ' V . H . ' , ' V . D . H . ' , or ' D . C , but other w o r k s w h i c h have
been attributed to them appeared a n o n y m o u s l y . Johan died in 1660; he is thought to have been
largely responsible for the Consider atien o f that year, w h i c h was expanded in subsequent editions b y
Pieter, and Pieter m a y wel l have quarried material from Johan's papers in putting together the
other w o r k s o f the 1660s. T h e major w o r k s are:
't Welvaren der stad Leiden (The Prosperity of the City of Leiden), M S dated 1659, ed. F. Driessen
(Leiden: NijhorT, 1911).
Consider atien en exempelen van staat (Observations and Lessons on the State) (Amsterdam, 1660); 2nd
(expanded) edn published 1661 under the title Consider atien van Staat ofte Polityke Weeg-Schaal
(Observations on the State; or, the Political Balance); 3rd edn (also expanded) and 4th and 5th edns
published under this title, 1662.
Politieke Discoursen (Political Discourses) (Amsterdam, 1662)
Interest van Holland (The Interest of Holland) (Amsterdam, 1662); 2nd edn, expanded w i t h t w o
additional chapters possibly b y de W i t t , published 1669 as Aanwysing der heilsame politike Gronden en
Maximen van de Republike van Holland en West-Vriesland (An Indication of the Salutary Political
Principles and Maxims of the Republic of Holland and West Friesland).
O n other w o r k s b y the de la C o u r t s see G e y l 1947.
548
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
A s a result o f this line o f a r g u m e n t , the p r o b l e m s o f constitutionb u i l d i n g assumed a central place in the w o r k o f the de la C o u r t s . For
H o b b e s , the nature o f an individual's covenantal c o m m i t m e n t to o b e y the
s o v e r e i g n p o w e r w o u l d be the same, regardless o f the constitutional f o r m
w h i c h that s o v e r e i g n p o w e r assumed. T h e arguments in f a v o ur o f
m o n a r c h y in De Cive and Leviathan thus h a v e a purely secondary status in
H o b b e s ' overall t h e o r y . B u t T o r the de la C o u r t s the p r i m a r y p r o b l e m w a s
to design a constitution w h i c h c o u l d k e e p the e n c r o a c h i n g wills o f b o t h
rulers and ruled in check. M o n a r c h y w a s the least attractive solution,
because any individual entrusted w i t h p o w e r w a s likely to use it for his
private benefit (Consider atien, 1660, p p . 13—74). G o v e r n m e n t b y a large
assembly w a s better, because in such a gathering the d i v e r g e n t private
passions w o u l d tend to cancel each other out (p. 203, mispaginated '103');
and since the basic u r g e o f each individual w a s to live a c c o r d i n g to his o w n
w i l l , any m o r e or less d e m o c r a t ic system w o u l d enable individuals to o b e y
the w i l l o f the g o v e r n m e n t and at the same time o b e y their o w n w i l l , w h i c h
w a s a c o m p o n e n t o f the g o v e r n m e n t ' s w i l l (p. 353, mispaginated '253'). If
this sounds like a version o f consent theory, then it is a version quite unlike
H o b b e s ' : this version does n o t explain the nature o f s o v e r e i g n t y , but is
confined to one t y p e o f constitution. It m e r e l y gives a d e m o c r a t ic
g o v e r n m e n t a p s y c h o l o g i c a l advantag e w h i c h m a y , in effect, increase the
a m o u n t o f p o w e r w h i c h the g o v e r n m e n t can w i e l d .
These considerations m a y p r o m p t the conclusion that the de la C o u r t s
o w e d little to H o b b e s b e y o n d their starting point in mechanistic
p s y c h o l o g y . B u t there w a s one i m p o r t a n t area o f their a r g u m e n t w h i c h did
d r a w directly o n H o b b e s ' political theories: their v i e w s on the unitary
nature o f s o v e r e i g n p o w e r and the relation w h i c h this i m p l i e d b e t w e e n
c h u r c h and state. T h e state, they argued, must h a v e p o w e r o v e r all external
acts, and therefore o v e r all acts o f religious w o r s h i p . T o further the interests
o f b o t h rulers and ruled, it must exercise this p o w e r for purely secular ends,
n a m e l y peace and prosperity. H e n c e the need to tolerate all religions w h i c h
are n o t themselves subversive o f the state (Discoursen, 1662a, pp. 1 9 - 2 4 ) .
A n d for the subject, m e r e o u t w a r d c o n f o r m i t y is sufficient (pp. 69—74). T h e
peculiarly H o b b e s i a n twist to this a r g u m e n t is the insistence that 'the public
determination o f w h a t is g o o d and w h a t is evil b e l o n g s o n l y to the
sovereign: o t h e r w i se the political state w i l l change, t h r o u g h the conflict o f
m a n y private j u d g e m e n t s , into a state o f nature' (p. 24). T h i s a r g u m e n t
struck at the m o r a l jurisdiction o f the C a l v i n i st church, and w a s
a c c o m p a n i e d b y s o m e t h o r o u g h l y H o b b e s i a n jibes against the deleterious
effects o f clerical p o w e r on intellectual life (pp. 36—41).
549
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
T h e late 1650s and early 1660s saw n u m e r o u s attempts b y the Calvinists
to reassert their m o r a l and intellectual jurisdiction. Pressure w a s b r o u g h t to
bear o n the university authorities at Leiden to curb the teaching o f
Cartesianism and 'the application o f p h i l o s o p h y to the prejudice o f
t h e o l o g y ' ( M o l h u y s e n , 1 9 1 3 - 2 4 , in, p p . 109—12); the anti-clericalism o f the
de la C o u r t s ' w r i t i n g s p r o v o k e d a storm o f sermons and pamphlets ( V a n
G e l d e r 1972, p. 253); and in U t r e c h t , w h e r e the H o b b e s i a n philosopher
v a n V e l t h u y s e n had penned similar attacks o n clerical p o w e r in 1660
(Ondersoeck and Het predick-ampt), the leading anti-Cartesian, Gisbertus
V o e t i u s , w r o t e a major defence o f the jurisdictional p o w e r s o f the C a l v i n i s t
c h u r c h (Politica ecclesiastica, 1663). In 1665 a b r i e f b ut i m p o r t a n t treatise
attacking the C a l v i n i s t arguments, Dejure ecclesiasticorum (The Right of the
Clergy) w a s published o v e r the p s e u d o n y m 'Lucius Antistius C o n s t a n s ' .
T h i s w o r k , w h i c h w a s o n c e attributed to Spinoza himself, d r a w s so h e a v i l y
o n the argument s o f the de la C o u r t s that it can quite plausibly be attributed
to Pieter de la C o u r t (e.g. b y V a n der Linde 1961, p. 16); but it goes b e y o n d
the de la C o u r t s ' other published w o r k s in its attempt to assimilate the j u r a l
concepts o f contract and 'jus' ('right'). It distinguishes b e t w e e n right and
p o w e r , but observes that the former w i t h o u t the latter is worthless
(pp. 54—5). Differences o f right w i t h i n the state are created b y the p o w e r o f
the state; and the state's p o w e r arises either t h r o u g h the conquest o f the
w e a k b y the strong, or t h r o u g h a social contract, w h e r e b y peopl e transfer
their 'right and p o w e r ' to the ruler (pp. 9—12). Just as the n o t i o n o f ' r i g h t ' is
w e a k e n e d , in the course o f this a r g u m e n t , b y its constant association w i t h
' p o w e r ' , so t o o the n o t i o n o f contractual o b l i g a t i o n is absorbed into the
pattern o f factual p o w e r relations: the ' c o n v e n t i o ' ('agreement') can be
entirely implicit, s o m e t h i n g to be identified 'not in w o r d s but in deeds'
(P-35).
T h i s is the b a c k g r o u n d against w h i c h w e must situate Spinoza's o w n
w r i t i n g s on the nature o f the state. It w a s in 1665 that Spinoza started w o r k
o n w h a t w a s to b e c o m e his major political treatise, the Tractatus theologicopoliticus (henceforth cited TTP), a i m i n g , as he explained to one c o r r e spondent, to defend 'the f r e e d o m o f p h i l o s o p h i z i ng . . . for here it is a l w a y s
suppressed t h r o u g h the excessive authority and i m p u d e n c e o f the preach ers' (Spinoza 1928, p. 206, letter 30). A n d w h e n the w o r k w a s published
in 1670, he explaine d that he had been p r o m p t e d b y the 'fierce
controversies o f the philosophers in c h u r ch and state' ( T T P , preface, 1924,
in, p. 9). His library contained copies o f the de la C o u r t s ' Polityke WeegSchaal (the enlarged second edition o f the Consideratien) and Discoursen
550
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
(Freudenthal 1899, p p . 161—2), and he described the f o r m er w o r k as
' e x t r e m e l y s h r e w d ' (Tractatus politicus (henceforth cited T P ) , v n . 3 1 ) . If
Pieter de la C o u r t w a s not the author o f De jure ecclesiasticorum, then the
m o s t likely candidate is L o d o w i j k M e y e r , a Cartesian d o c t o r and
t h e o l o g i a n w h o w a s a close friend o f Spinoza (Spinoza 1928, p. 50;
M e i n s m a , 1896, p p . 1 4 6 - 5 0 ) .
T h e anti-clerical, tolerationist, republican w r i t i n g s o f the 1660s f o r m the
main b a c k g r o u n d to Spinoza's political w o r k s ; but o f course his o w n
personal history had also g i v e n h i m cause to consider the relation b e t w e e n
religion, state p o w e r , and individual freedom. B a r u c h (Benedictus in Latin)
de Spinoza w a s the son o f a P o r t u g u e s e J e w ; b o r n in A m s t e r d a m in 1632, he
w a s educated at a Jewish school up to the age o f thirteen, and p r o b a b l y
attended a Y e s h i v a h (a society for the study o f the B i b l e , the T a l m u d , and
the T o r a h ) for several years thereafter (Meinsm a 1896, pp. 58—65; V a z Dias
and v a n der T a k 1932, p p . 56—61). B u t in 1656 he w a s e x c o m m u n i c a t e d
f r o m the s y n a g o g u e for 'the horrible heresies w h i c h he taught and
practised'; the exact nature o f his offence is not k n o w n , but all the e v i d e n ce
suggests that he had p r o p o u n d e d a rationalist, deist t h e o l o g y w h i c h
d e m o t e d the status o f the B i b l e as divine revelation, questioned its historical
accuracy, and p r o b a b l y cast d o u b t on the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the soul ( R e v a h
1959). A c c o r d i n g to s o m e early sources, he w r o t e a t h o r o u g h l y u n a p o l o getic ' A p o l o g y ' after his e x c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h contained an historical
critique o f the B i b l e and a w i d e - r a n g i n g attack o n the Jewish religion
(Preposiet 1973, p p . 345, 4 1 7 ) . If this is so, then it is reasonable to assume
that s o m e o f this material w a s put to use in the Tractatus theologico-politicus.
H o w e v e r , the main outlines o f the political theory in that b o o k are d r a w n
n o t f r o m debates w i t h i n Judaism but f r o m the D u t c h H o b b e s i a n republican tradition. E v e n the l e n g t h y discussions o f the O l d T e s t a m e nt
in that treatise m a y also o w e s o m e t h i n g directly to H o b b e s : a l t h o u g h
Spinoza did not read English, he w a s a friend o f the m a n w h o w a s translating Leviathan into D u t c h in the period 1 6 6 5 - 7 , and he m a y also h a v e had
time to benefit f r o m the Latin translation o f Leviathan (1668) before
finishing the Tractatus theologico-politicus in 1670 ( S c h o n e v e l d 1983, pp. 8,
40).
T h e main arguments o f the treatise are succinctly summarised b y
Spinoza himself. H e argues first that p h i l o s o p hy and t h e o l o g y are radically
different in nature, 'and that the latter a l l o w s each person to philosophise
freely' ( T T P , ch. 16, 1924, in, p. 189); then 'that rights o v e r religion b e l o n g
entirely to the s o v e r e i g n, and that external acts o f w o r s h i p must be adapted
551
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
to serve the peace o f the state' (ch. 19, 1924, in, p. 228); and finally that
f r e e d o m o f speech 'is not o n l y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h civil peace, piety and the
right o f the sovereign, but in fact o u g h t to be permitted in order to preserve
all those things' (ch. 20, 1924,111, p. 247). T h e separation o f p h i l o s o p h y and
t h e o l o g y is carefully m a n a g e d , in a w a y w h i c h preserves an apparent
respect for the special nature o f revelation w h i l e at the same time suggesting
that it is ultimately unnecessary. P h i l o s o p h y can teach b o t h virtue and the
k n o w l e d g e o f G o d (these t w o things b e i n g inseparable in Spinoza's
t h e o r y ) ; t h e o l o g y , o n the other hand, w h i c h is based o n revelation, aims
o n l y at teaching obedience to G o d (chs. 7, 14, 15). For this purpose the
teachings o f the O l d T e s t a m e n t w e r e 'adapted' to the understandings o f
ordinary people o f the time: the validity o f a t h e o l o g i c a l doctrine lies not in
its truth but in its p o w e r to instil obedienc e (ch. 14, 1924, in, pp. 176—7).
O n l y gradually does Spinoza m a k e it plain that obedienc e is an inferior
substitute for understanding, that the principal contents o f revelation —
p r o p h e c y and miracles — are fictions adapted for w e a k minds w h i c h cannot
understand that G o d w o r k s in nature b y means o f i m m u t a b l e laws, and that
the peculiar injunctions g i v e n to the J e w s in the O l d T e s t a m e n t w e r e
essentially political devices, designed to further political obedience and
social cohesion. S o m e o f these arguments m a y h a v e derived f r o m M o s e s
M a i m o n i d e s ' t h e o r y o f divine l a w , w h i c h stressed that divine c o m m a n d s
w e r e adapted to historical conditions in the O l d Testament, and suggested
that the dietary and ceremonial laws w e r e simpl y devices for instilling
m o r a l virtues - virtues w h i c h c o u l d in principle be arrived at p h i l o s o p h i cally, w i t h o u t the use o f revelation ( M a i m o n i d e s 1975, pp. 7 1 - 2 , 1904,
pp. 3 1 2 - 8 0 ). B u t Spinoza's c o m m e n t s o n the use o f religion as an
instrument o f political p o w e r also reflect his careful reading o f Tacitus and
Machiavelli.
T h i s is particularly apparent in his account o f the Jewish state in chapter
17 o f the treatise, w h e r e he implies that w h e n the J e w s m a d e G o d their
sovereign they w e r e in fact b e i n g cleverl y manipulated b y M o s e s , w h o
b e c a m e their effective ruler as G o d ' s representatives on earth. Since religion
is such a p o w e r f u l force in h u m a n p s y c h o l o g y ( c o m b i n i n g l o v e , fear, and
admiration — the last t w o o f w h i c h are the products o f defective
understanding), this p s e u d o - t h e o c r a cy w a s a v e r y successful f o r m o f c o v e r t
m o n a r c h y ; but M o s e s ' system o f g o v e r n m e n t w a s flawed, Spinoza argues,
because it a l l o w e d the L e v i t e priests to retain a f o r m o f religious
jurisdiction, and in later generations they w e r e able to assume political
p o w e r and reduce the Jewis h nation to civil w a r (ch. 18).
552
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
Spinoza's t h e o r y o f the nature and purpose o f political p o w e r is set out in
the Tractatus theologico-politicus (esp. ch. 16) and in the first six chapters o f
his later, unfinished w o r k , the Tractatus politicus. L i k e the de la C o u r t s , he
starts w i t h the assumption that m e n are passionate creatures, g u i d e d b y
short-term self-interest; as they b e c o m e m o r e rational, they w i l l be g u i d e d
b y l o n g e r term self-interest, but self-interest remains the k e y to all h u m a n
actions ( T T P , ch. 1 7 , 1924, in, p p . 215—16). Social c o o p e r a t i o n is necessary
for leading a secure and pleasant life. T h e m o r e rational a m a n is, the m o r e
he w i l l desire c o o p e r a t i on because he understands this; but political p o w e r ,
w i e l d i n g c o e r c i v e force, is needed to k e e p irrational m e n f r o m pursuing
their o w n short-term interest against the interests o f society at large. A n d
since rulers as w e l l as ruled w i l l be subject to passions, constitutions must be
designed to ensure that subjects and rulers w i l l subordinate or assimilate
their o w n interests to the interests o f the w h o l e state (ch. 1 7, 1924, in,
p. 203). In the Tractatus politicus Spinoza intended to s h o w h o w this c o u l d
be achieved in each f o r m o f constitution ( m o n a r c h y , aristocracy and
d e m o c r a c y ) ; unfortunately he died before c o m p l e t i n g his section o n
d e m o c r a c y , w h i c h he held to be the most natural and mos t rational o f the
three forms. L i k e the de la C o u r t s , he argue d in the Tractatus theologicopoliticus that the subjects o f a d e m o c r a c y w o u l d enjoy a greater sense o f
freedom, because in o b e y i n g the s o v e r e i gn they w e r e o b e y i n g themselves
(ch. 16, 1924, in, p. 195); and he also f o l l o w e d the de la C o u r t s in c l a i m i ng
that the process o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g in a large assembly w o u l d cancel out
individual passions and ensure the prevalence o f reason (ch. 16, 1924, in,
p. 194; o n his debt to the de la C o u r t s in TP see Haitsma M u l i e r 1980,
p p . 187-208).
T h u s far, Spinoza's t h e o r y seems confined to the bare analysis o f
m o t i v a t i o n and p o w e r structures. M u c h o f the interest o f his theory,
h o w e v e r , lies in the w a y in w h i c h he assimilates the concepts o f ' r i g h t ' and
'contract' into his a r g u m e n t . H e make s use o f the c o n c e p t o f 'right', but
identifies it c o m p l e t e l y w i t h ' p o w e r ' . T h i s is no t a piece o f casual c y n i c i s m
o n his part: it flows f r o m the heart o f his philosophical t h e o l o g y , w h i c h
attributes b o t h infinite right and infinite p o w e r to G o d , and identifies the
physical universe as an expression o f G o d ' s nature. It f o l l o w s f r o m this that
e v e r y event in the physical w o r l d is an expression b o t h o f G o d ' s p o w e r and
o f His right. ' W h a t e v e r m a n does, w h e t h e r he is led to d o it b y reason or
o n l y be desire, he does it a c c o r d i n g to the l a w s and rules o f nature, that is,
b y natural r i g h t' ( T P , 11.5, 1924, m , p. 277). W h e r e H o b b e s argued b o t h
that natural rights w e r e all-encompassing and that there w e r e s o m e actions
553
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
(contrary to self-preservation) w h i c h people did not h a v e the right to
p e r f o r m , Spinoza can argue b o t h that m e n h a v e the right to d o w h a t e v e r
they can d o , and that an order o f preference can be established w h e n
considering alternative courses o f action: actions w h i c h help ensure the
agent's self-preservation w i l l increase his right because they increase his
p o w e r , so that in s o m e sense he w i l l h a v e less right to p e r f o r m those actions
w h i c h diminish his p o w e r .
Just as S p i n o z a uses the t e r m 'right' but reduces it to ' p o w e r ' , so t o o he
uses the term 'contract' but reduces it to a relationship o f p o w e r . In chapter
16 o f the Tractatus theologico-politicus he describes, in terms reminiscent o f
De Cive, h o w p e o p l e must h a v e transferred their natural right to the
s o v e r e i g n t h r o u g h a 'contract' ( ' p a c t u m' or 'contractus'). In the later
Tractatus politicus this a c c o u n t o f a contract is n o t a b l y absent: the n o t i o n o f
' a g r e e m e n t ' ('consensus') is used instead, and m e n are said to ' c o m e
t o g e t h e r ' to f o r m a state n o t because they are led b y reason but because they
are drive n b y c o m m o n passions ( v i . i , 1924, m, p. 295). T h i s has led s o m e
c o m m e n t a t o r s to suggest that Spinoza b e l i e v e d , in the earlier w o r k , in an
historical contract w h i c h the founders o f society had entered into out o f
'rational foresight', and that he later a b a n d o n ed this belief ( W e r n h a m 1958,
pp.25—6). Y e t the real differences b e t w e e n the t w o accounts are n o t so
great. A transfer o f right, as the earlier w o r k has already m a d e clear, can
o n l y a m o u n t to a transfer o f p o w e r , and this is s o m e t h i n g w h i c h can c o m e
about w i t h o u t 'rational foresight' p l a y i n g any special role. S p i n o z a
emphasises in the Tractatus theologico-politicus that 'a contract is b i n d i n g
o n l y b y reason o f its utility' (ch. 16, 1924, in, p. 192); as soon as it b e c o m e s
a d v a n t a g e o u s for s o m e o n e to break his contract, he w i l l h a v e the right to
d o so. T h i s means that m e n k e e p their contract o f o b e d i e n ce o n l y because
the s o v e r e i g n w i e l d s real p o w e r . S u c h a v i e w is entirely c o m p a t i b l e w i t h
the idea that the origins o f the state g o b a c k not to a set o f f o r m al articles o f
a g r e e m e n t but to a gradual coalescence o f h u m a n p o w e r relations. W h e n
Spinoza introduces the idea o f a contract in chapter 16 o f the Tractatus
theologico-politicus he says, in a revealing construction, that m e n 'must h a v e '
contracted (1924, m, p. 191); the n o t i o n o f a contract is n o t h i n g m o r e than a
d e v i c e for describing a p o w e r - r e l a t i o n s h ip w h i c h is i n f o r m e d b y an
understanding o f mutual benefit, and to describe such an arrangemen t as
rational does n o t i m p l y that it can o n l y h a v e been i n t r o d u c e d t h r o u g h a
conscious act o f reason.
Spinoza seems to h a v e adopted, at this point in the earlier treatise, a
H o b b e s i a n t e r m i n o l o g y o f ' t r a n s f e r r i n g ' natural rights, because he w a n t e d
554
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
to m a k e the H o b b e s i a n anti-clerical point that all rights b e l o n g e d to the
sovereign. (This w a s the first stage o f his tolerationist a r g u m e n t , aimed at
r e m o v i n g the jurisdictional p o w e r s o f the c l e r g y w h i c h w o u l d otherwise
be d e p l o y e d against f r e e d o m o f opinion.) A t one point he says that the
subject must h a v e ' c o m p l e t e l y y i e l d e d ' his natural right (ch. 16, 1924, in,
p. 195). B u t this is a misleading f o r m o f w o r d s for Spinoza to use, and it can
o n l y a m o u n t to saying that the subject is sufficiently m o t i v a t e d to act
a l w a y s in c o m p l e t e accordance w i t h the w i l l o f the sovereign . For each
person, in Spinoza's theory, retains natural right so l o n g as he retains
natural p o w e r : w h e n asked b y a friend to explain the difference b e t w e e n his
t h e o r y and H o b b e s ' , he replied that it 'consists in this, that I eve r preserve
the natural right intact, so that the S u p r e m e P o w e r in a State has n o m o r e
right o v e r a subject than is proportionat e to the p o w e r b y w h i c h it is
superior to the subject' (Spinoza 1928, p. 269).
T h i s is the essential a r g u m e n t w h i c h enables S p i n o za to c o n c l u d e that the
toleration o f religious and philosophical opinions is b o t h c o m p a t i b l e w i t h
the sovereign's p o w e r and beneficial to it. In Spinoza's state the p o w e r o f
the s o v e r e i g n can rise or fall, a c c o r d i n g t o h o w the subjects b e c o m e m o r e or
less fully m o t i v a t e d to o b e y it. M o r e p o w e r , and therefore m o r e right,
inheres in a p o l i c y w h i c h is popular: it is in the interests o f the s o v e r e i g n to
a v o i d alienating his subjects. L a w s forbiddin g beliefs are, as H o b b e s
pointed out, fatuous; but Spinoza adds that l a w s forbiddin g people to
express their beliefs w i l l render those people sullen and hostile, and thereby
w e a k e n the p o w e r o f the state ( T T P , ch. 20). O n l y the preaching o f
seditious doctrines must be proscribed; all opinions w h i c h d o not disturb
the peace o f the state are to be a l l o w e d .
Despite, or perhaps because of, his reductive style o f p o w e r analysis,
Spinoza seems possibly to h a v e arrived at a liberal, pluralistic t h e o r y o f the
state w h i c h matches the liberal elements o f H o b b e s ' theory . It is possible to
argue that the role o f the S p i n o z a n state is simply to p r o v i d e an external
f r a m e w o r k o f peace and security w i t h i n w h i c h individuals can continue to
pursue their o w n interests (den U y l 1983, esp. p p . 111—28). S u c h an
interpretation, h o w e v e r , ignores the implications o f Spinoza's metaphysics
and p s y c h o l o g y . His major expositio n o f these subjects, the Ethics, w a s
c o m p l e t e d c o n c u r r e n t ly w i t h the w r i t i n g o f the Tractatus theologico-politicus
in the second half o f the 1660s, and he referred to the Ethics, i m p l y i n g that it
w a s part o f the same systematic b o d y o f t h e o r y, in chapter 2 o f the Tractatus
politicus (1924, in, p. 276). O n l y f r o m the Ethics d o w e learn just h o w
radically different Spinoza' s metaphysics w e r e f r o m H o b b e s ' , and therefore
555
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The end of
Aristotelianism
h o w c o m p l e t e l y his t h e o r y o f reason and his theory o f h u m a n liberty
differed f r o m H o b b e s ' t o o .
In Spinoza's metaphysics, all reality is c o m p r e h e n d e d in G o d , w h o is the
o n l y substance, that is, the o n l y absolutely self-subsistent b e i n g . G o d is
k n o w a b l e t h r o u g h an infinite n u m b e r of'attributes' , o f w h i c h o n l y t w o are
actually k n o w n to us: extension and t h o u g h t . A h u m a n b o d y is a ' m o d e '
(i.e. a modification, a particular entity) o f extension, and a h u m a n m i n d is a
m o d e o f t h o u g h t . T h e r e is a strict parallelism b e t w e e n these m o d e s o f
different attributes: neither can act causally o n the other, but each is an
expression (in a c o m p l e t e l y different dimension, so to speak) o f the same
c o m p o n e n t o f the divine substance. T h u s a h u m a n m i n d is the 'idea o f a
h u m a n b o d y ; the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the m i n d and the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the
b o d y w i l l consist o f the same d e v e l o p m e n t b e i n g manifested in different
forms.
Physical bodies exist in an order o f causes; t h o u g h t exists in an order o f
reasons or implications. T h e h u m a n m i n d , b e i n g the idea o f the h u m a n
b o d y , contains the ideas o f the experiences w h i c h the b o d y u n d e r g o e s. If
the m i n d fails to understand these ideas 'adequately ' (that is, i f it fails to
recognise the w a y in w h i c h each is i m p l i c i t l y part o f the w h o l e system o f
the divine substance) then it experiences an i m p a i r m e n t o f p o w e r , a passive
e m o t i o n , or 'passion' (e.g. fear). B u t i f the cause or reason is understood
adequately b y the m i n d , then the m i n d is exercising and enlarging its
p o w e r o f action, and the passion is transformed into an active e m o t i o n (e.g.
l o v e ) . A l l active e m o t i o n s are ultimately forms o f the l o v e o f G o d , because
they derive f r o m acts o f understanding w h i c h i n v o l v e relating particular
things to the totality o f things, w h i c h is G o d . T h e m o r e active the m i n d is —
the m o r e , in other w o r d s , it 'contains' the causes o f its action w i t h i n itself—
the m o r e free it is. S p i n o z a is a classic e x p o n e n t o f the rationalist t h e o r y o f
f r e e d o m (cf. TP 11.7), and therefore lies at the opposite p o l e f r o m H o b b e s '
v i e w o f f r e e d o m as the absence o f i m p e d i m e n t .
In Part iv o f the Ethics Spinoza explains that w h i l e passions are individual
and particularising, reason is universal and h a r m o n i s i n g . ' M e n can be
o p p o s e d to each other insofar as they are afflicted w i t h e m o t i o n s w h i c h are
passions' (prop. 34, 1924, 11, p. 2 3 1 ) ; ' m e n necessarily agree w i t h one
another insofar as they live a c c o r d i n g to the dictates o f reason' (prop. 35,
d e m . , 1924, 11, p . 233). T h i s ' a g r e e m e n t ' is a real h a r m o n i s i n g and
c o n v e r g i n g o f minds, Hot just an attitude o f liberal non-interference: as
Spinoza w r o t e in his early Short Treatise, i f I teach k n o w l e d g e and the l o v e
o f G o d to m y n e i g h b o u r s, 'it brings forth the same desire in t h e m that there
556
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Hobbes and
Spinoza
is in m e , so that their w i l l and m i n e b e c o m e one and the same, constituting
one and the same nature, a l w a y s agreein g about e v e r y t h i n g ' ( x x v i . 4 , 1924,
1, p . 112).
A l t h o u g h in his metaphysics he rejected t e l e o l o g y in the strict sense,
Spinoza's a c c o u n t o f reason as the defining feature o f the ' h u m a n essence'
gives rise to a quasi-teleologica l scale o f values for m a n k i n d : m a n fulfils his
nature m o r e fully w h e n he acts rationally. S u c h a t h e o r y c o u l d n o t be
further r e m o v e d f r o m H o b b e s ' v i e w , in w h i c h reason is s i m p ly the servant
o f the desires. E v e n the apparent a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n the t w o writers o n the
p r i m a c y o f self-preservation is r e m o v e d b y Spinoza's a r g u m e n t that a
man's true self, his ' p o w e r o f acting', is his reason (Ethics, part 4, p r o p . 52,
d e m . , 1924, 11, p . 248).
T h e aim o f Spinoza's state is to m a k e m e n rational and free. ' W h e n I say
that the best state is one in w h i c h m e n live h a r m o n i o u s l y together, I m e a n a
f o r m o f life . . . w h i c h is defined a b o v e all b y reason, the true virtue and life
o f the m i n d ' (TP, v . 5 , 1924, m , p. 296). S p i n o z a recognises that the state
must be constructed to contain those w h o are n o t p r e d o m i n a n t l y rational
and virtuous; b u t the state can aim gradually to m o u l d its citizens into a
m o r e rational k i n d o f existence b y i m p o s i n g rational l a w s o n t h e m . In v e r y
general terms, w e m i g h t say that the history o f republicanism in political
p h i l o s o p h y presents t w o fundamentally different defences o f republican
g o v e r n m e n t . T h e r e is a mechanistic t y p e o f theory , w h i c h sees the
construction o f a republic as the solution to the p r o b l e m o f organising and
balancing a mass o f conflicting individual forces; and there is the rationalistidealist t y p e o f t h e o r y , w h i c h believes that in a republic m e n are freed f r o m
the c o r r u p t i n g ties o f dependenc e o n or subjection to personal authority,
and are enabled to participate m o st fully as rational beings in the rationality
o f the state and its l a w s . S p i n o z a manages to c o m b i n e b o t h types o f theor y
in a single system: that is the distinction, and the a m b i g u i t y , o f his
achievement.
557
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008