FIFTH FRAMEWORK RESEARCH PROGRAMME (1998-2002)
Democratic Participation and Political Communication in Systems of
Multi-level Governance
The European Parliament Campaign
Federica Bicchi
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Jean Blondel
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Palle Svensson
Department of Political Science
University of Aarhus
Work in Progress
March 2003
Draft text not to be quoted without permission of the author(s).
Introductory
It
is
Parliament
by
now
widely
elections
is
known
much
that
higher
than
abstention
at
at
national
European
elections,
though it is not higher than at local elections in all countries. The
only member-states of the European Union in which turnout at European
Parliament elections is about the same as at national elections are
Belgium and Luxemburg, where voting continues to be compulsory (Table
1). On the other hand, the reasons for the low European Parliament
elections turnout are far from clear. Three broad sets of ‘causes’
have been put forward traditionally in the literature, none of which
involves
the
abstention
campaign;
are
far
yet
from
these
being
‘classical’
empirically
sets
of
causes
satisfactory:
of
other
explanatory factors, including the exposure to the campaign, have
indeed to be explored.
One
of
the
set
of
‘classical’
reasons
concentrates
on
the
‘technical’ characteristics of the vote, such as whether the vote is
compulsory or not, whether it takes place on a weekday or not,
whether postal voting is easily granted or not (Franklin et al.,
1996, 328-9). These reasons may account to an extent for differences
in turnout from one member-state to another, but not for differences
in turnout between European and national elections.
A second type of argument suggests that European parliament
elections are not only less important than national elections but are
of a ‘second order’ (Reif and Schmitt, 1980, 3-44; Reif, 1985). Yet
this 'second order' character is far from being proven in so far as
it assumes that citizens vote at European elections primarily to
influence national politics. The authors of a volume on the 1994
European
Parliament
election,
published
in
1998,
noted
on
the
2
contrary, on the basis of a systematic empirical analysis of the
variables affecting turnout, that “... electors do not appear to
abstain in European Parliament elections on the basis that they are
second-order elections” (Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998, 232). A
multivariate analysis further showed that “... turnout in European
Parliament elections is not simply influenced or not even mainly
influenced by national political attitudes...” (244-5).
The
third
‘classical’
argument
has
to
do
with
the
general
feeling that the European Parliament lacks fundamental legitimacy
because of a ‘democratic deficit’ in the European Union (Franklin et
al., 1996, 377). This ‘deficit’ was perhaps manifest in view of the
originally very limited powers of the Parliament: with the increase
in powers of the Parliament from the mid-1980s onwards, the argument
is more difficult to sustain. It appears essentially based on the
notion that decisions taken by the Commission and the Council of
Ministers suffer from an ‘original sin’ because these organs are not
democratically elected and not democratically accountable.
That argument, although widely adopted and often repeated, is
difficult to hold. Its basis in theory is not clear, since the
governments of the member-states are all democratically elected. The
empirical basis is thin, as was pointed out in the volume published
in 1998: “.. the view which is almost universal among ‘elite circles’
according to which there is a large ‘democratic deficit’ in the Union
that does not exist in the member states does not appear to be shared
by large numbers of European citizens, either because they do not
know what the situation really is or because they do not believe that
democracy works very well in their own country” (ibid., 77).
3
Other possible causes for the low turnout had therefore to be
discovered: these emerged from the analysis conducted on the 1994
election, which showed that abstention had been largely due to a
combination of three sets of factors, lack of interest in politics,
lack of knowledge of politics and dislike of European integration
(ibid., 240). These three attitudinal variables are interconnected:
citizens who lack knowledge and those who dislike the Union tend to
be among those who are least interested in politics and in European
politics in particular, while, conversely, by and large, a better
knowledge is associated with greater support for the Union.
factors
pointedly
abstention,
measures
also
‘voluntary’
the
difference
accounted
abstention
between
primarily
being
the
European
and
for
type
These
‘voluntary’
which
national
closely
elections
(ibid., 50-3).
Given the part played by these three attitudinal variables, the
possible
part
played
by
the
campaign
needs
to
be
closely
investigated, since the campaign is the one political activity which
is specifically devoted to boosting political knowledge as well as
interest. Some evidence in that direction was indeed found in the
1994.
“...
passive
campaign
exposure
has
no
direct
effect
on
abstention of any shape or form. What is required is active exposure,
that is reading about it or talking about it. Involvement in even one
of these activities is associated with a reduction in the odds of
voluntary
Euro-specific
abstention...”
(ibid.,
232).
At
the
1994
election, however, it was possible to trace only some elements of the
influence of campaign on turnout. No analysis of the input of the
parties
during
that
campaign
could
be
undertaken
nor
content of messages given through the media be monitored.
could
the
4
The aim of this Chapter and of the following is partly to fill
this gap. The first section of the present Chapter examines the
general conditions under which campaigning can be expected to affect
turnout. In the second section, the extent to which the citizenry at
large is affected is analysed on the basis of survey data, both in
the Union as a whole and in the different member-states. The input of
the parties in the campaign is then described together with the
extent to which these variations were reflected in the press. The
following
Chapter
is
devoted
specifically
to
the
campaign
on
television.
I
How European election campaigning may affect voting
Why campaigning is becoming more important in order to understand
electoral behaviour, in particular at European Parliament elections.
For a very long time, electoral behaviour analysis concentrated its
attention on socio-economic characteristics, although the Michigan
studies, from the 1960s, emphasised psychological aspects of voting,
especially by means of ‘party identification’. Such cleavages as
class, religious practice, age, gender and education, have thus been
regarded as key explanatory factors of voting behaviour (Miller and
Shanks, 1996, 212-4). In Europe at least, turnout had rarely drawn
the attention of political scientists, but to the limited extent that
it did, at least some of these social variables were also regarded as
significant (Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998, 20-22).
Towards the end of the twentieth century, however, it became
increasingly clear that these socio-economic factors were playing a
decreasing part in accounting for voting patterns. Among the reasons
5
for such a change is for instance the emergence of a large ‘middle’
class of citizens who are neither rich nor poor, are less closely
connected to one or another of the political parties and are probably
also relatively unconcerned with politics in general. The traditional
links
between
citizens
and
parties
have
not
ceased
to
exist
altogether, admittedly, as only a segment of the voters, even if it
is
a
large
one,
is
genuinely
‘independent’:
but,
alongside
traditional (long-term) ‘expressiveness’ in electoral behaviour, an
‘instrumental’
(and
short-term)
approach
to
voting
is
becoming
widespread.
In such a context, election campaigns are likely to play a
significant part. This may have been the case in the past, if one
judges from historical impressions about the role campaigns had in
some countries, Britain for instance, in the middle part of the
nineteenth century. However, as the vote for parties became anchored
in
socio-economic
cleavages
such
as
class
or
religion
in
many
European countries, campaigning seemed to lose some of its relevance
even in the eyes of politicians, let alone of observers.
The trend away from campaigning came to be reversed somewhat in
the
last
decades
of
the
twentieth
century.
The
leaders
of
the
established parties seemed able to modify, on the basis of a strong
popular appeal, the allegiance patterns of many. Mainly in the United
States, the part played by individual candidates came to be fully
recognised
by
politicians,
observers
and
even
academics
(Sorauf,
1988, 504-5): large proportions of voters were seen to be casting
their ballots independently from the party with which they claimed to
be ‘identified’. While individual candidates did not play – or have
not as yet played - a similar part in Europe, new parties based on
hitherto unknown personalities have emerged and made, sometimes very
6
rapidly, substantial inroads in the traditional electorate of their
more established rivals. In so doing they have contributed to a
reduction of the part played by long-term party allegiance based on
socio-economic cleavages. In this process, election campaigns have
been
a
key
instrument
used
by
these
new
parties
to
appeal
to
electors. In a general context in which expressive voting is in
decline,
electors
seem
more
likely
to
have
more
doubts
at
the
European level than at the national level about casting their ballot.
As, in this case, less interest and less knowledge about the contest
will tend to tilt the balance towards abstention, the campaign would
appear likely to be one of the main ways to counter such a tendency.
The three sets of factors which, as we noted, appear to account
more specifically for non-voting at European parliament elections,
lack of interest, lack of knowledge and distrust of the European
Union, are clear indications of the fact that citizens are very
unclear about the significance of European Parliament elections. It
is
not
surprising
that
this
should
be
the
case.
The
amount
of
information which percolates down to the average elector about what
goes on in Brussels is so minimal that it borders on being almost
non-existent. Electors have to make a major effort to find out what
are the activities of the European Union, except in a few welladvertised cases. Such an effort is well beyond what the average
citizen, typically already not very interested in politics, is likely
to be willing to make. Indeed, it is surprising – so surprising that
the veracity of the answers seems questionable – that a substantial
proportion of respondents should state, as they regularly do in reply
to Eurobarometer questions, that they ‘rely’ on the Commission, the
Parliament, the Council of Ministers or the Court of Justice. It is
hard to believe that many respondents are in a position to assess
what
these
institutions
do:
the
judgements
which
are
passed
are
7
therefore likely to be given ‘on spec’ and not on the basis of
concrete
examples
which
respondents
have
in
mind.
So
few
such
examples are indeed at their disposal.
This
is
why
one
might
expect
the
election
campaign
to
be
potentially significant: this seems indeed to follow from the fact
that interest in and knowledge of European politics are statistically
associated
campaign
(Blondel,
can
instil
Sinnott
some
and
Svensson,
knowledge;
that
1998,
knowledge
218-20).
is
likely
The
to
stimulate interest. Both the knowledge acquired and the interest
generated are in turn likely to alter views about the Union: what are
literally prejudices, given the limited knowledge of the electors
concerned, may therefore be reduced. The key occasion when these
effects seem likely to occur is during and through the election
campaign. One must therefore examine whether and, if so, to what
extent the election campaign does affect the propensity of electors
to vote at European Parliament elections.
Why the study of the impact of campaigning at the European Parliament
elections is likely to be revealing. Campaigning can thus be expected
to play a part in increasing turnout in European Parliament elections
(and possibly, more and more, in national elections as well for the
reasons which were outlined earlier). Moreover, the study of the
effect of campaigning at European election level is also likely to be
revealing because of the intrinsically comparative nature of any
study of the European electorate at large.
At the national level, campaigning, with respect to the main
European political parties at least, has become highly centralised
and consequently rather uniform. Admittedly, as was noted earlier,
new parties have tended to emerge and these have somewhat modified
8
the panorama of political contests: but even these parties tend to be
centralised.
In
contrast
to
the
United
States,
personalised
campaigning at the level of candidates is rare, indeed almost nonexistent in Europe at the national level. Methods of campaigning may
have changed somewhat, but these changes have tended to affect almost
to the same extent at any rate all the main competing organisations.
It is therefore difficult to measure precisely the effect of
campaigning
either
on
turnout
or
on
the
voting
decision
in
the
context of national elections. Admittedly, at national elections,
while
all
or
nearly
all
look
at
television,
not
all
look
at
television to the same extent; nor do they all look at the same
television
channels.
Moreover,
not
all
citizens
read
the
same
newspaper; nor do they all read political news in the newspaper which
they read. Perhaps above all, there are major variations in the
extent
election
to
which
citizens
campaigns.
characterises
Yet
national
a
discuss
politics
common
set
of
elections:
the
only
with
rules
friends
and
of
significant
during
practices
exceptions
occur in countries in which regional differences are most marked, as
above all in Belgium, and also in parts of the United Kingdom, of
Spain and, to an extent, of Italy.
At the level of European Parliament elections, on the contrary,
there is no uniformity in the character of the campaign. National
practices obtain: these automatically result in major differences
between
countries.
Forms
of
campaigning
vary:
canvassing,
for
instance, does not take place everywhere across the Union. Rules
about party finance differ and affect campaigning. At the level of
the media, too, rules and practices vary: each country treats the
European election in the same way as it treats national elections.
Thus the manner in which the campaign is reported in news bulletins
9
or in other types of programmes (such as debates among political
representatives) and in ‘party political broadcasts’ tends to vary
from country to country. The basis for the analysis of the effect of
campaigning at European elections is thus much richer than it is at
the national election level, as if experiments were made – in the way
they are occasionally made in the United States, typically at the
local level - to discover the impact of candidates when different
techniques are used in different parts of the districts which they
contest.
Admittedly, the study of campaigning reported here has had to
be, mainly for financial reasons, rather limited in scope. It was not
possible to monitor the activities of the parties during the election
itself: that inquiry had to be undertaken later. Party officials were
asked to recall what had been done and what had been the impact; not
surprisingly, there may be variations in the degree of accuracy of
such a recall. Nor was it possible to monitor the content of all the
campaign reporting made by all television stations across Europe:
only the news broadcasts, and indeed for a limited period, were
covered and only some channels were studied. Yet these analyses, in
conjunction
with
the
results
of
the
surveys
of
the
electorate
undertaken a few months after the election, give a picture of the
relationship between the three key types of ‘actors’ which need to be
examined
if
the
impact
of
the
campaign
is
to
be
assessed,
the
providers, which are the parties, the intermediaries, which are the
media, and the customers, who are the electors.
The characteristics of the campaign: facilitation and mobilisation on
both a personal and a contextual basis. Emphasis has been placed
throughout this volume on the major distinctions to be made, first,
between mechanisms which facilitate the vote and mechanisms which
10
mobilise
the
electors
and,
second,
between
the
personal
and
the
contextual bases of turnout and abstention. These distinctions obtain
in the context of the campaign as well: indeed, as interest in and
knowledge of European politics are low, facilitation and mobilisation
during the campaign can be expected to play a significant part in
European Parliament elections.
In the context of the act of voting itself, facilitation refers
to the sets of mechanisms which may be introduced to render this act
easier
to
accomplish:
rules
about
postal
voting
are
an
obvious
example, as is the extension of the hours of polling. On the other
hand, also with respect to voting, mobilisation refers to the ways in
which, by means of various forms of party propaganda, electors are
induced to register their vote for one of these parties.
In the context of the election campaign, what facilitation and
mobilisation consist of is rather different. Facilitation refers to
the processes by which electors come to be in a position to be better
informed on what the election is about: it lifts part of the ‘veil of
ignorance’ within which most electors find themselves with respect to
European Union matters. Meanwhile, mobilisation, in the context of
the election campaign, does not aim at inducing electors to make a
physical move or to fill in and post a postal ballot: it consists in
inducing electors to become motivated to understand better what the
election is about, to be more prepared to listen to or read what the
media say about it and to be more inclined to talk to family or
friends about the election. These acts are as positive as the act of
voting itself; but they are more ‘intellectual’ and their action
covers a longer period.
11
We noted earlier that during the election campaign three sets
of actors are involved, the parties, the media and the electors. In
principle, facilitation seems primarily achieved by the media and
mobilisation
regarded
seems
as
the
preserve
of
‘intermediaries’,
the
parties,
perhaps
the
media
even,
being
somewhat
oversimplistically, as neutral intermediaries, while the parties are
the ‘providers’: they are the bodies from which the messages are
expected to come.
This ‘division of labour’ is not as clear-cut in practice. Some
media at least are closely tied to the parties. This was and still is
to an extent the case with the press; this is even to a limited
extent the case with radio, though not, at any rate in Western
Europe, ostensibly at least, with television. Mobilisation is thus
achieved, in some cases, by the media, and especially by part of the
press,
acting
under
the
supervision
of
the
parties,
admittedly.
Moreover, those who work for the media are not all wholly satisfied
to be ‘mere’ facilitators: they want to ‘present’ points. This means,
to a lesser or a greater extent, admittedly, but to some extent
inevitably, a degree of mobilisation. While it may be the case, by
and large, that the media (except part of the press) facilitate while
the parties mobilise, there is some overlap and perhaps a combination
of both aspects – even where there is not deliberate collusion.
These matters are somewhat complicated by the other distinction
in need of examination, that between the personal and contextual
aspects of the voting process. The contextual aspects are manifest:
they are constituted by the institutional structures of both parties
and media. Personal elements are also present, however: in the case
of
the
voting
campaign,
itself,
these
but,
as
personal
with
characteristics
facilitation
and
do
not
apply
mobilisation,
to
they
12
relate to the ability or the desire to display interest in the events
which are taking place and to obtain information about these events.
Such personal characteristics as education, age, gender, occupation,
and religious appartenance may be expected to affect at least to an
extent the propensity of citizens to be better informed and to seek
the relevant information.
The analysis of the activities of the political parties and of
the
media
in
the
context
of
election
campaigns
thus
gives
an
opportunity to determine in greater detail how far these ‘providers’
and these ‘intermediaries’ ‘facilitate’ and/or ‘mobilise’ electors.
Prima facie, ‘providers’ and ‘intermediaries’ seem to do so but to
achieve these objectives to a limited extent only in the context of
European Parliament elections, since abstention is high and interest
in
and
knowledge
of
European
affairs
are
low.
What
has
to
be
determined is whether and, if so, to what extent this is because
electors are very little affected by or even been made aware of the
election campaign.
Such
an
exploration
constitutes
a
further
area
in
which
comparisons across countries are likely to be revealing, since there
will inevitably be cross-national variations in the character of the
campaign. As European elections take place simultaneously in a number
of countries, differences in interest and knowledge displayed during
the campaign can be monitored and accounted for, thus making it
possible to assess how deficiencies in this respect could at least
partly be overcome and improvements could take place.
Limitations in the analysis: data and methodology. Yet the effect
which the campaign, in its various forms, may have on turnout can be
determined with precision only if, first, the level of interest and
13
the level of knowledge of electors is measured both before and at the
end of the European election campaign: this means interviewing a
panel of electors at least at two points in time or having a two-wave
survey. Such an aim not be achieved with respect to the 1999 European
parliament election. Moreover, as noted earlier, the survey which
took place in 1999 was administered only several months after the
election itself: errors in recall could be expected to be substantial
while no information was obtained as to whether the respondents’
interest and knowledge changed during the period of the campaign.
Three
main
conclusions
can
be
drawn
from
the
information
obtained, however. First, as turnout at the 1994 and 1999 election
can be compared, one can see how far there were variations in the
effect of the campaign as recorded by the respondents in these two
occasions. If the trend is broadly similar, it seems permissible to
conclude that the campaign did indeed have in 1999 the effect which
respondents
recalled
that
it
had,
while,
if
differences
in
the
reactions of respondents in 1994 and in 1999 emerge, conclusions
about the effect of the campaign have to be more tentative. Second,
one can compare interest and knowledge among those who stated that
they had followed the campaign and among those who did not and indeed
among respondents who were exposed to the campaign in a number of
ways. Finally, cross-national variations provide a major basis for
comparisons.
The
coming
section
of
the
Chapter
is
thus
devoted
to
the
analysis of the role of the campaign as recorded by the respondents.
The
third
section
then
examines
the
activities
of
parties
as
‘providers’ during the campaign. Admittedly, as stated earlier, party
activity was monitored only on the basis of a recall and of a recall
14
which
occurred
over
a
year
after
the
1999
European
election.
Officials in all the main parties across the Union were interviewed
about the nature of the campaign conducted by their party; they were
also asked to reflect on what seemed to them to have been the impact
of the campaign. The survey of party officials thus provides a means
of obtaining a broad picture of the activities of the parties and
therefore
of
the
extent
of
‘seriousness’
in
which
the
European
Parliament election was held in the member-states of the Union.
The analysis of the impact of television takes place for the
most part in the following Chapter: it is based on the content
analysis of a large sample of the news programmes which went on the
air in the last two weeks of the campaign. Since the respondents’
exposure
to
the
campaign
is
examined
generally
in
this
Chapter,
findings on television news reporting described in the next will be
related to the extent to which they contributed to modifying – and
almost certainly increasing - the level of interest and of knowledge
of electors.
II
15
Citizens and the European Parliament election campaign
Forms, state and development of campaign exposure. People become
aware of an election campaign in various ways; they learn about
candidates and parties running for office through various channels.
Some may be very interested and seek information by reading about the
election in the press; others may become aware of the election by
seeing posters on walls. Some may actively take up issues and discuss
the election with family and friends; others may come across the
campaign accidentally when they open their television set to see the
news generally or merely to be entertained.
In the 1994 and 1999 Eurobarometer surveys campaign exposure
was
measured
by
means
of
the
same
six
campaign
modes;
three
additional modes were added in the 1999 survey, but these cannot be
taken into account to compare the two election. Moreover, as the
entry of three new member states occurred in 1995 only, over time
comparisons can be made among the 12 ‘old’ member-states only. Table
1 gives an overview of the channels of campaign exposure in 1994 and
1999 (1).
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Remarkably, there was an increase in campaign exposure from
1994 to 1999 in the ‘old’ member-states: this contrasts with the
decline in turnout which occurred between 1994 and 1999. All forms of
communication
did
show
increases,
but
these
were
largest
in
connection with the extent to which party workers call on private
homes (83 per cent) and smallest with respect to radio and television
(15 per cent). It does not follow that the campaign improved in 1999;
16
indeed, overreporting of campaign exposure may have taken place in
1999, since the interviews occurred several months after the event.
Over time patterns are fairly consistent in the ‘old’ memberstates. Television and radio were by far the most frequent agents of
campaign
exposure
channels,
newspaper
Discussions
citizens,
at
with
while
both
coverage,
elections,
followed
by
three
election
leaflets,
and
advertising.
family,
friends
canvassing
was
and
the
colleagues
channel
affected
which
other
fewer
affected
the
smallest number.
Campaign exposure was in most cases higher in the ‘new’ memberstates than in the ‘old’ member-states, except for canvassing, which
is mainly an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, and contact by phone (one of the
campaign modes included in the 1999 survey only), which was most
widespread in Greece and Ireland. Yet higher campaign exposure in the
‘new’ member-states was not associated with a higher turnout than in
the ‘old’ member states: there may have been more overreporting of
campaign exposure in the ‘new’ member-states, perhaps in order not to
display a lack of interest in what was in these countries a novel
form of activity.
There is apparently no direct or simple relationship between
exposure to the campaign and the turnout at the election. People may
become
aware
of
the
campaign
through
two
or
more
modes
of
communication, but the number of these modes may be less important
than the kind of campaign exposure: modes which require a more active
involvement may affect turnout more than those which require merely
passive following.
17
A combined measure was therefore constructed to determine what
can be referred to as the ‘quality’ of campaign exposure. While
reading
about
the
election
in
the
newspapers
and
discussing
the
election with family, friends and colleagues entail a more active
involvement, viewing television and listening to radio, receiving
leaflets, reading advertisements and being contacted by party workers
are more passive instruments (Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998,
145f). Respondents were divided into four groups, those who did not
experience the campaign through any of the six modes (“none”), those
whose exposure to the campaign was in passive modes only (“passive”),
those who experienced the campaign through involvement in one of the
two active modes (“partly active”) and those who experienced the
campaign through both active modes (“fully active”).
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
As Table 2 shows, campaign exposure was higher in 1999 than in
1994, both in all member-states (the “fully active” rose from 16 to
33 percent and the “partly active” from 37 to 40 percent) and in the
‘old’ member-states (the “fully active” rose from 16 to 31 percent
and the “partly active” from 37 to 39 percent); campaign exposure was
also higher in the ‘new’ member-states than in the ‘old’ memberstates. This suggests that even if the intensity of campaign exposure
is taken into account, no direct link exists between campaign and
turnout at the aggregate level. To obtain a better grasp of the
relationship between campaign and turnout we need therefore to turn
to an individual level analysis.
Personal characteristics and campaign exposure. The ability or desire
to display interest in elections and to obtain information about the
parties and candidates in the campaign may be affected by personal
18
characteristics
of
the
citizens.
Factors
such
as
gender,
age,
education or occupation may play a part, as we noted (Table 3).
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Men
are
indeed
slightly
more
exposed
to
the
campaign
than
women, a characteristic which, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, became
larger through the 1990s (gamma .07 in 1994 and .11 in 1999). Age
affects
little,
increasingly
on
aware
the
of
other
hand:
European
citizens
Parliament
scarcely
elections
became
as
they
experienced previous campaigns (gamma .03 in 1994 and .02 in 1999).
The
tendency
for
the
middle
aged
(40-49
years
old)
to
be
more
involved is not strong enough to refer to a curvilinear relationship,
as occurs with turnout and age groups. On the other hand, a strong
relationship
exposure:
exists
the
between
better
levels
educated
of
citizens
education
are,
the
and
more
campaign
they
are
actively exposed to the campaign (gamma .14 in 1994 and .13 in 1999).
Finally, a relationship also exists between occupation and campaign
exposure, but it is not across the board. There was no significant
relationship
(at
the
.01
level)
in
1994
(gamma
.00),
but
a
significant relationship was found in 1999 (gamma .10); farmers and
the urban self-employed tend to be more involved, as well the upper
white collar citizens and students. Whereas, in the case of this last
group, the relationship may be a by-product of education, in the case
of the other groups, the relationship may be more instrumental and be
due to the Common Agricultural Policy and to the Internal Market.
These
relatively
weak
relationships
with
socio-demographic
characteristics and the possible links with knowledge and interest
suggest
that
individual
mobilisation
may
be
more
important
than
individual facilitation with respect to campaign exposure: the data
19
are not such that these points can be fully established, however.
Questions
about
political
interest
in
general
and
in
particular
interest in European matters as well about party attachment were
asked in 1994 but not in 1999. Yet, as involvement in political
discussions (for 1999) may be taken as an indicator of political
interest
and
knowledge,
attitudes
to
European
unification
and
satisfaction with democracy in the EU can be explored in a comparable
manner (Table 4).
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Campaign exposure is closely related to political interest,
both in political matters in general and in European matters in
particular (gamma .31 and .28 respectively). Similarly, those who are
frequently
engaged
in
political
discussions
are
more
actively
involved in the campaign than those who never discuss politics or are
unsure as to whether they do (gamma .36). The relationship is equally
strong
between
campaign
exposure
and
political
knowledge
about
European affairs (2): the better informed people are, the more they
are actively involved in the campaign (gamma .28 in 1994 and .31 in
1999). Whereas it seems reasonable to treat political interest and
discussion, which are general political orientations, as the ‘cause’
and campaign exposure as the ‘effect’, what is cause and effect with
respect to European knowledge is less clear. The level of information
is measured specifically in relation to European matters and it seems
more sensible to view the relationship between knowledge and campaign
exposure as being of a reciprocal character.
Attitudes to European integration are also related to campaign
exposure, but less strongly, in particular in 1994 (gamma .18 in 1994
and .25 in 1999). The more positive people are towards European
20
integration
and
the
more
they
find
membership
of
the
European
Community ‘a good thing’, the more they are actively exposed to the
campaign before the election of the European parliament. The strength
of this relationship is at about the same level as the strength of
the
relationship
(gamma
.17)
and
between
it
party
is
attachment
stronger
than
and
the
campaign
exposure
relationship
with
satisfaction with the working of democracy in the European Union
(gamma .07 in 1994 and .12 in 1999).
Education is related to the extent to which people are exposed to
the campaign, as we saw; since we just noted that exposure to the
campaign is also related to political interest, to knowledge and to
some
extent
to
attitudes
towards
European
integration,
these
relationships might be merely or mainly an effect of the education of
the respondents. A control for education, however, shows that those
who are more interested in politics, who discuss politics frequently,
who are well informed about European matters and who are positively
inclined
towards
the
EU
are
also
more
actively
involved
in
the
European Parliament campaign at all levels of education: this means
that
individual
political
mobilisation
is
important
for
the
involvement in the campaign.
In sum, citizens were found to be more actively involved in the
campaign in 1999 than in 1994, both in the ‘old’ and in the ‘new’
member-states. This involvement was also, in both 1994 and 1999, more
widespread among the well educated, as well as among those who are
politically interested and knowledgeable and – but less strongly –
among those who are positive towards European unification. We need
now to consider turnout to see whether and to what extent it is
associated with campaign exposure.
21
Campaign exposure and turnout. The 1994 study showed that campaign
exposure
and
turnout
were
positively
related:
the
more
actively
citizens were involved in the campaign, the more they voted (Blondel,
Sinnott and Svensson, 1998, 160). A similar relationship was also
found in 1999, indeed more strongly (Table 5).
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Whereas turnout increased 21 points from the lowest to the
highest level of exposure in 1994 (3) it rose 43 points in 1999, with
the strongest relationship at the lowest level of turnout. In 1994,
83 percent of the citizens who were fully active in the campaign did
vote: in 1999, only 76 percent did so, but this relatively small
decline is in part due to the ‘new’ member-states, since, in the
‘old’ member-states, 79 percent of the fully active did vote in 1999
(as against 68 percent only in the ‘new’ member-states). The campaign
was, however, as successful in the ‘new’ member-states as in the
‘old’ member-states in increasing turnout. The increase in turnout
between those who were least involved in the campaign and those who
were most involved was nearly 50 points (from 19 to 68 percent) in
the ‘new’ member-states and over 40 points (from 35 to 77 percent) in
the ‘old’ member-states. As far as the citizens in the ‘new’ memberstates
are
concerned,
one
can
only
surmise
that
more
of
them
abstained because they were less convinced than citizens in the ‘old’
member-states – at the same level of exposure – of the importance of
European Parliament elections.
Admittedly,
it
was
noted
in
the
1994
study
that
the
relationship between campaign exposure and turnout could be spurious
as both turnout and campaign exposure could be a function of interest
in politics; it was shown that the campaign was primarily effective
22
in inducing to vote those who were least interested in politics but
had relatively little effect among those who had some interest in
politics (Blondel, Sinnott, Svensson, 1998, 160). This point cannot
be
ascertained
in
political
discussion
interest,
it
is
discussing
the
involvement
in
the
context
is
also
a
campaign
the
of
the
undoubtedly
means
is
campaign,
of
one
that
an
1999
indication
political
of
election:
the
of
although
political
communication.
indicators
indicator
cannot
of
be
Since
active
used
as
evidence of political interest in this context. On the other hand,
one can explore the extent to which politically relevant knowledge
has an effect on turnout and the extent to which the campaign has an
independent effect on political knowledge (Table 6).
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
Both in 1994 and 1999 the campaign had an impact on turnout at
all levels of political knowledge. That impact was strongest among
those with little or no knowledge; it was also stronger in 1999 than
in 1994. Remarkably, the turnout is as high among those who are fully
active
without
political
knowledge
as
among
those
who
are
fully
active and well informed: turnout is therefore likely to increase
when campaign activities increase.
The campaign also has an impact also among the well-informed,
thus showing that the relationship between knowledge and campaign is
reciprocal. Knowledge is acquired as one becomes involved in the
campaign, while some knowledge of European matters facilitates taking
part
in
the
campaign.
This
interaction
stimulates
turnout,
the
highest level of turnout being found among those who are both very
active and well-informed, since among them between eight and nine out
of ten do vote. That relationship weakened between 1994 and 1999,
23
however, a point which provides a partial explanation for the paradox
of a combination of higher campaign exposure and lower turnout at
that election: if citizens were not really as actively involved in
the
campaign
in
1999
as
they
claim,
high
knowledge
and
high
involvement, even combined, could not lift the turnout as much in
1999 as in 1994.
Individual
characteristics
such
as
political
knowledge
and
exposure to the campaign thus have an impact on turnout at European
Parliament elections. The campaign’s strongest impact is among those
who are least politically engaged, but in a political context in
which there is no prior experience of the European Parliament, as in
the ‘new’ member-states, the starting point at which the campaign has
an impact on turnout is lower. In general, the political context may
be crucial for the impact which the campaign may have on turnout: it
seems therefore appropriate at this point to take a closer look at
the impact on turnout of the campaign among the various countries of
the European Union.
Cross-national variations in citizens’ reaction to the campaign. Very
large differences were found to exist among member-states in terms of
campaign exposure in 1994: 80 percent of the respondents stated that
they were actively involved in Denmark, but only 24 percent in Spain.
In 1999, Swedish respondents were the most actively involved and the
respondents of the other two ‘new’ member-states followed, together
with
Ireland.
Overall,
the
ranking
of
the
countries
was
rather
similar at the two elections, although Britain moved from occupying a
middle position to one near the bottom and respondents in Portugal,
Belgium, France and Italy were somewhat more involved in the campaign
in 1999 than in 1994. Overall, citizens tend therefore to be more
involved
in
European
Parliament
campaigns
in
Ireland,
Greece
or
24
Luxembourg than in Spain or Britain. Whether this has to do with the
extent to which political parties conducted an active campaign or not
needs still to be documented (Table 7).
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
Overall, throughout the European Union, as we saw, the more
actively potential voters are exposed to the campaign, the more they
tend to turn out to vote and this higher turnout is not merely the
result of a greater knowledge about European affairs: it is linked to
an independent mobilisation effect of the campaign. One may therefore
hypothesise that differences in turnout among EU membership countries
may – at least partially – be explained by variations in campaign
exposure: the higher the exposure to the campaign, the higher the
expected
turnout.
Yet,
although
a
strongly
positive
relationship
between campaign exposure and turnout is thus to be predicted in all
EU membership countries, the impact is not the same everywhere. It
seems prima facie that the relationship between campaign and turnout
is, for instance, weaker in Spain and Britain – where citizens are
less involved in campaign activities than member-states - than in
Portugal,
Belgium,
France
and
Italy
–
where
the
effect
of
the
campaign increased more than in other member-states between 1994 and
1999 (Table 8).
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
There are indeed substantial variations from country to country
in the extent to which campaign exposure is related to turnout: it is
more
than
double
in
Ireland,
Sweden,
Britain,
Germany,
Finland,
Austria and Denmark than what in Belgium and Luxembourg; generally,
the
relationship
is
strongest
in
northern
member-states
(except
25
Germany) and in ‘new’ member-states. If figures in Tables 9 and 10
are compared, as is shown in Figure 1, a continuous relationship
between campaign exposure and the strength of campaign impact on
voting
is
found
to
exist
for
most
EU
membership
countries.
The
exceptions are Spain and Britain, where campaign exposure is lower
than what should be expected from the strength of campaign impact on
voting, and Greece, Belgium and Luxembourg, where the apparent effect
of the campaign on voting is lower than would be expected on the
basis of campaign exposure. These exceptions can be accounted for to
an extent, however. The lower impact of the campaign in Greece,
Belgium and Luxembourg relates to the fact that these countries have
or recently had compulsory voting: these are therefore countries in
which the campaign is bound to have less impact on turnout, as
turnout is high for other reasons. Spain and Britain are opposite
cases: a more intensive campaign would seem likely to raise the level
of turnout to a similar level of that of other member-states.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Thus the campaign had an important effect on turnout in both
1994 and 1999. While campaign involvement was larger among the well
educated
as
well
knowledgeable,
as
the
among
strongest
the
politically
impact
on
interested
turnout
was
and
among
the
those
otherwise least mobilised. Increased turnout resulting from campaign
exposure is not merely the result of higher knowledge about European
affairs: the effect is sui generis. A more intensive campaign can
thus be expected to raise turnout in most EU member-states, but to do
so particularly in countries such as Spain and Britain, where the
level of campaign exposure has been stable but low, and not where, as
in
Greece,
Belgium
or
Luxembourg,
particular procedural arrangements.
high
turnout
results
from
26
III
The European Parliament election campaign of the political parties
If
campaign
exposure
affects
the
propensity
to
vote,
what
determines campaign exposure becomes in turn important to assess. Two
factors seem to play a critical part in this respect, the content of
the campaign material and the commitment of the parties to spread that
material. This meant looking at the party ‘manifestoes’, on the one
hand, and, on the other, at the way the parties conducted their
campaign. The analysis of manifestoes did not raise any particular
problems; not so the assessment of the role of the parties, as a
retrospective analyses entailed asking officials of each party to
describe the involvement of their organisation. Given the danger of
exaggeration or of fading memories, a control mechanism was required:
this could be provided by the way the press, in each country, judged
the quality of the campaign. This section of the Chapter thus examines
successively the content of the manifestoes, the assessment by party
officials on the way their party conducted the campaign and the report
of the press as to what the campaign had been.
Party
manifestoes
Transnational
European
at
parties
parties
the
and
endeavoured
1999
the
to
European
manifestoes.
draft
Parliament
The
manifestoes
election.
‘transnational’
for
the
1999
election. This was the case in particular of, the Party of European
Socialists (PES), the European People’s Party (EPP), the European
Liberal, Democratic and Reformist party (ELDR), the Greens and the
European Free Alliance, all of which published ’European programmes’
spelling out common principles and policies for the EU. The programme
of
the
Socialists
was
drafted
with
an
eye
to
a
straightforward
27
application
to
the
national
campaigns,
in
order
to
avoid
the
contradictions which had marred a similar exercise in 1994: at the
time, French and British socialists had signed declarations which
could not be defended at the national level. For the 1999 election,
the European Socialist party produced the most carefully prepared
document of their history and declared that their campaign would be
entirely based on it.
In
spite
of
these
efforts,
large
differences,
often
on
a
national basis, remained, both among the Socialists and even more
among the other parties. Several of these stated only that they did
'associate' themselves to ‘European programmes’ instead of directly
adopting them. Very few parties campaigned on the manifesto prepared
by
the
transnational
parties,
although
several
referred
to
it.
Exceptions in this respect were the Greek PASOK and the Dutch Labour
party, which used the European Socialist manifesto while nuancing
their position in the campaign itself. Party manifestoes for the 1999
European election tended therefore to hint at transnational programmes
and at times to vary in length accordingly. Short national manifestoes
were meant to be summaries and the national translation of ‘European
programmes’ (4). This was the case mainly for Socialist parties, but
also for instance for the Dutch Liberal Party or the Flemish Christian
Democrats.
Thus
transnational
manifestoes
neither
replaced
nor
profoundly modified national party manifestoes.
The varied size of manifestoes. The length of these manifestoes varied
markedly (Table 5b). Those produced by the Finnish Christian League
(300
words)
or
the
Italian
Popular
Party
(575
words)
were
short
leaflets; others had the size of books, and not always small ones, as
in Spain those of the Popular Party (49.300 words) or of the United
28
Left party (84.000 words) (5). Yet, in general, manifestoes tended to
be short. There were some country differences in this respect: the
documents tended to be short in Finland and long in Belgium, Italy and
Spain. To be for or against Europe does not seem to have a consistent
effect on length: in Austria, manifestoes were longer in the case of
the more European-oriented parties than in the case of the 'Eurosceptic' Austrian Freedom Party which issued a 1600 word manifesto;
but the opposite wss true in the Netherlands, where the more critical
parties, such as the Socialist Party, the Calvinist Coalition or the
Green Left, had the longest party programmes.
The seven broad fields of manifestoes. Content was analysed on the
basis of the grid elaborated by the Party Manifesto Research Project
(Budge et al., 1987), with some items being added to cover matters
which were specific to the European Union and/or were of significance
at the time of the election, such as the Euro or Kosovo. Seven broad
issue-areas were distinguished (see Appendix). These issue-areas were
‘European’ questions, such as the structure of the European Union, its
philosophy,
its
membership
and
the
characteristics
of
European
elections, ‘foreign affairs and defence’, including relations with
NATO and with the Balkans, ‘the government of the European Union’,
covering
cases
of
corruption,
the
reform
of
the
Commission
and
subsidiarity, ‘economy and finance’, the ‘environment’, also being
concerned with food protection, ‘social policy’ and ‘education and
culture’.
There were also substantial variations on a national basis in
the space devoted to these issue areas. In Austria, the topic of
‘Europe’ was central, the manifestoes having devoted 16 percent more
space to that topic than the European average. Enlargement, structure
and philosophy of the EU were the key issues developed in these
29
manifestoes. Other countries in which the parties also gave a high
attention to ‘Europe’ as such were Denmark (which also scored 16
percent above EU average) and the Netherlands (which scored 8 percent
above that average). On the other hand, in Belgium, Greece, Ireland,
Italy and Sweden, the space devoted to ’Europe’ was relatively small
and between 9 and 5 percent under the European average. If space
devoted to ‘Europe’ is regarded as an indicator of the presence of a
sharp pro- and anti-Europe cleavage, it would follow that such a
cleavage is absent in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Sweden,
while in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands that cleavage apparently
structured part of the debate, at least in the manifestoes (6). There
was less variation with respect to the ‘government of the European
Union’; these related mainly to rather limited questions about the
future of European institutions.
‘Economy and finance’ was the issue to which most space was
devoted
on
average
in
the
party
manifestoes.
There
were
country
differences, however. Britain and Greece, both in a difficult position
with respect to the Euro, were the two countries where these questions
were given the most space. Meanwhile, in Germany, Belgium and Sweden,
the central issues revolved around ‘social policy’, especially with
respect to employment and the control of population flows. In Sweden,
immigration,
extensive
matters.
asylum
coverage,
In
France,
seekers
because
the
and
of
drugs
Schengen
various
trafficking
and
issue-areas
Europol
were
received
an
cooperation
treated
rather
evenly, except for the Communist party which devoted an above average
space to the ‘environment’.
These
differences
in
the
coverage
of
manifestoes
demonstrate that debates continue to differ markedly from one memberstate to another. European politics tends therefore naturally to be
30
perceived by electors through the lenses of national issues: the
‘second-order’ character of European politics is thus in a sense
primarily a matter of the political parties, not of those who listen
to what these have to say.
Parties and the content of manifestoes. Some parties belonging to a
given 'family' did devote a similar amount of space to the same
issues, but this was not always the case. On ‘Europe, the manifestoes
of several anti-European parties, Danish and Finnish, but also of the
Austrian Freedom Peoples Party, expressed their views at length in the
manifestoes on the matter. On ‘foreign and security issues’, a number
of left-wing parties, the Italian Rifondazione Comunista, the Spanish
United Left, the Greek Communist party were against a strengthening of
European military presence in the world. On the other hand, the Dutch
and Danish liberals were in favour of a Common European defence.
On
the
‘government
of
the
European
Union’,
there
was
a
convergence of the British and Danish Conservative Parties and of the
French and Austrian nationalist parties in their general criticism of
the Union's intrusions in national politics. In particular, three
Danish parties (Christian People’s Party, Conservative People’s Party
and Danish People’s Party) ended up debating the (many) benefits v.
the (few) drawbacks of subsidiarity. ‘Economy and finance’ was mainly
covered by the manifestoes of the Centre-left, with the exception of
the National Coalition Party of Finland, which stressed the positive
achievements of the single market. On the ‘environment’, the Green
parties
of
Northern
Europe
naturally
scored
high,
but
they
were
closely followed by other parties interested in the subject such as
the Danish Radical Liberal and Christian People’s parties. ‘Social
policy’ was almost a monopoly of the manifestoes of the Socialist
parties
of
Belgium,
Ireland,
Germany,
Finland
and
Italy,
while
31
‘education
and
culture’
was
covered,
with
the
exception
of
the
Portuguese Social Democrats, by right-wing and nationalist parties.
Meanwhile, there were also striking differences among parties
which were ideologically close to each other; this was so even in the
case of the Party of European Socialists, although it was perhaps the
most organised transnational party. The component parties of that body
differed in the importance they gave to ‘social policy’, to ‘foreign
affairs’, to ‘economy and finance’ and to the ‘environment’. The gap
was sharpest on ‘social policy’: some of the parties, such as the
British and Dutch Labour parties, devoted less than 10 percent of
their
manifesto
to
these
issues
while
others,
such
as
those
of
Belgium, Finland, Germany and Ireland, devoted to them more than four
times that space.
These
findings
raise
some
serious
doubts
about
the
very
existence of 'party families'. Not only the manifestoes prepared by
transnational parties were not used as the basis for the campaigning
drives, but, beyond a superficial convergence on broad ideological
standpoints, the national manifestoes of parties belonging to the same
transnational party differed in the way they addressed transnational
issues.
Party
officials
selection
of
and
the
candidates.
campaign.
For
the
The
first
electoral
time
in
system
its
and
the
history,
the
European Parliament was elected everywhere in 1999 on a proportional
representation basis, but the type of PR adopted was different, in
particular with respect to the size of constituencies. The whole
country continued to be a single constituency in a number of countries
(Germany,
France,
Spain
officials
interviewed
in
particular).
seemed
happy
A
with
majority
the
of
the
situation,
party
but
a
32
substantial minority did express reservations (29 or about half): this
was so in particular in France (5 out of the 6 parties interviewed)
and in the Netherlands (4 out the 5); positive and negative views were
more balanced in Italy, Spain and Austria. In the French and Dutch
cases, the reasons for the negative views related both to the fact
that the whole country was one constituency and to the threshold.
Elsewhere, there were doubts about the electoral system, in Italy for
instance,
national
and
about
the
constituencies
representation
in
Spain.
Few
of
regional
supported
entities
the
idea
in
of
transnational lists aimed at reinforcing the European character of the
contest.
Views
differed
about
the
extent
to
which
the
selection
of
candidates was open to the broader membership or not. A majority of
parties chose an open process of candidate selection but a substantial
minority did opt for a closed one. Part of these variations were, once
again, on a country basis: an open selection process was preferred in
Denmark (7 out of the 8 parties included in the analysis), Germany (6
out of 6), Ireland (6 out of 6) and Sweden (6 out of 7). A closed
selection process was adopted in Finland (6 out of 7 parties), in
Italy (7 out of 8) and in Spain (4 out of 5). The other countries fell
between these two extremes.
A majority of the parties which were happy with the electoral
process selected their candidates in an open process, whereas among
the party officials who were discontented a small majority had adopted
a closed selection procedure, thus trying to bend the elctoral system
to achieve certain results. This generalisation scarcely applies to
the
European
Socialist
party.
Rather
remarkably,
neither
the
newspapers nor the manifestoes commented on the selection procedure
adopted by parties.
33
How party officials viewed the degree of preparation of the campaign.
Two indicators aiming at measuring the size and the seniority of
campaign teams were combined to analyse the extent to which parties
prepared for the campaign, teams being defined as large or small
depending on whether they had more or fewer than ten members and being
defined as senior or junior depending on whether they included or not
members
of
the
party
executive
and/or
MPs
with
institutional
responsibilities. About two-fifths of the parties appointed a small
and senior team to conduct the campaign, slightly over a quarter had a
large and senior team, a fifth a large and junior team and only little
over one in ten a small and junior group. In two-thirds of the cases
members of party leadership were thus involved in the planning and
conduct of the campaign, though what the exact role of that leadership
was is not clear. It does remain, however, that the party leadership
was (or should have been) at least generally aware of how the campaign
was prepared and implemented. The way the campaign was conducted could
therefore be said to have reflected the intentions of at least part of
the leadership of the parties: contrary to expectations, in only a
minority of cases did the responsibility fall squarely on junior
members, as for three parties in Finland and for a few Left-wing and
Green parties (Table 9).
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
There was no evidence that large parties were more likely to
place junior officials in charge because of bthe low relevance they
attached to European elections. Differences were more likely to be on
a country basis: Austrian, German and Spanish parties selected large
campaign teams, but Finnish, Greek and Italian parties did not. Eight
of the parties belonging to the Party of European Socialists had small
34
and senior teams, two had large and senior teams and four large and
junior
teams.
Socialist
parties
thus
seemed
to
have
a
rather
'detached' approach with respect to the 1999 European election, by
comparison with the overall average of all parties.
Were the issues emphasised in the manifestoes the central themes
of party campaigns according to party officials? To examine that
point, the first two priorities in manifestoes and the first two
priorities referred to by the party officials were compared for every
party (7). These were divided into three groups, those in which there
was perfect correspondence between the top two priorities in the
manifestoes and in the interviews, those in which there was partial
correspondence, as when one of the issues mentioned by manifestoes was
also mentioned by the party official concerned, and those in which the
top
two
priorities
in
the
manifestoes
differed
from
the
top
two
priorities indicated by the party officials.
The conclusion is mixed, as in only about a quarter of the
parties was there 'full correspondence' and in somewhat over a third
'partial correspondence’, while, for the others, the top two issueareas mentioned in manifestoes and in the interviews were different.
There is no apparent association between this distribution and party
'family', nationality or size of party. Thus, whereas the choice of
topics in the manifestoes showed that there was a strong national
emphasis, the discussion in the campaign itself seems to have been
related to other problems: debates among the parties, as well as
national political and media agendas appear therefore to have played a
part.
Beyond the type of team and the analysis of how well the themes
fitted the debate, it was difficult to determine the extent to which
35
the campaign strategy was prepared: after one year and a half had
elapsed, interviewees were perhaps understandably rather unclear about
the details of what occurred. None the less, for 28 of the 82 parties
whose officials were interviewed, respondents hinted at a lack of
detailed preparation of the campaign strategy. This was particularly
true in three countries, Finland (for 4 parties out of the 7 which
were interviewed), Greece (4 out of 5) and of Italy (7 out of 8). The
approach
which
prevailed
in
these
three
countries
constitutes
an
indication of a rather 'leisurely' attitude towards mobilising voters,
while this was not the case in some other countries, notably Austria,
where all parties claimed to have approached the campaign period with
a well prepared strategy.
Nationality does not seem to have played a major part with
respect to the type of team in charge of the campaign, however. What
does emerge is that large and/or senior campaign teams prepared the
campaign strategy more coherently than smaller junior teams, as those
parties which prepared a detailed campaign strategy were likely to
have either a ‘small and senior’ campaign team (23 parties out of 54
with a detailed strategy) or a ‘large and senior’ team (18 parties out
of 54)(Table 10). The situation is less clear for parties which did
not prepare the campaign in advance. About a third had a ‘small and
senior’ campaign team, a fifth a ‘large and junior team’, while the
two extreme arrangements (‘small and junior’ and ‘large and senior’)
constituted
about
a
sixth
of
the
cases.
Thus,
where
parties
endeavoured to gather an effective team, that team and the party in
general did prepare an efficient strategy, according to their own
evaluation.
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE
36
Parties thus devised (at least in general) a campaign which was
not particularly brisk. What does need to be ascertained through
further research, however, is whether that strategy was due to a
specific choice or to a mere lack of commitment during the campaign, a
point which can be examined only if the involvement of the broader
membership is analysed together with, and at the same time as, the
behaviour of the party leadership.
The press and the campaign. The newspaper coverage of the campaign was
generally poor (8): the number of references made to it was tiny, even
during the month of June, newspapers from Portugal, Italy, Ireland and
Greece being the exception. Only one British and one German newspaper
reported the campaign at all seriously; elsewhere, the record was more
mixed, but coverage was generally fairly low. Moreover, on the whole perhaps to explain their relative indifference -, even newspapers
which provided some coverage of the campaign claimed that it was
inactive and dull, while those which gave little or no attention to
the campaign tended not have a view at all on the subject (Table 11).
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE
Newspapers emphatically stressed the national character of the
campaign, while the European dimension was rarely mentioned (Table
4c). The information on the subject was not available in all cases,
notably in French and Dutch newspapers, admittedly, but only one
newspaper (the Danish Politiken) maintained that the campaign had a
European flavour while a few mentioned both aspects as being present
in the campaign. Greek newspapers did refer to both national and
European issues, but the European issues which raised interest in the
campaign were the possibility of joining the EMU and the European
stance
on
Kosovo.
There
was
a
degree
of
relationship
between
a
37
national
emphasis
in
the
campaign
and
inactivity
as
seen
by
the
newspapers, although a national emphasis was associated in a few cases
with a high level of campaign activity (Table 4d). An active campaign
on
both
national
and
European
issues
was
referred
to
by
Greek
newspapers only, while inactivity on both types of issues was recorded
in Finland, Austria, Sweden and Britain.
The press referred little to the manifestoes. In one third of
the newspapers analysed here they were simply not mentioned at all;
where they were mentioned, this was episodically, for instance merely
to point to their date of publication by the parties. There were a few
exceptions. In Austria, both newspapers studied devoted considerable
attention to manifestoes: Die Presse referred to them 15 times and Der
Standard 7 times, in both cases in parallel to the launching of the
campaign by the parties. Other papers which referred to manifestoes
were The Guardian in Britain, the Diário de Notícias in Portugal, the
Süddeutsche Zeitung in Germany and El Pais in Spain. Other papers
mentioned manifestoes 5 times or less, the overall average being less
than three references. Clearly electors could not be expected to be
induced to look at the manifestoes on the basis of the coverage given
to these by the press. Thus while the debate remains open as to what
the role of the media was during the campaign, it is manifest that the
press at least did not supply in 1999 any significant incentive to
induce electors to vote at the European election of that year.
+++++
Two points thus emerge clearly from the analysis of manifestoes,
party officials responses and the press coverage of the campaign: they
have major implications for the campaign itself and indeed for the
impact which the campaign is likely to have on turnout, although, at
38
this point of the research which has been undertaken, it is not
possible to determine the extent and specific forms of that impact and
the analysis of turnout has therefore to remain broadly separate from
the analysis of the campaign ‘efforts’ made by the parties.
The
first
of
these
two
points
is
that
the
1999
European
Parliament campaign was extremely low-key: newspapers reported little
and party officials did not convey the impression that they had put
the machine of their organisation into full fighting gear. It is
fairly common for the media to blame the parties and for the parties
to
blame
the
media
for
this
state
of
affairs
and,
therefore,
indirectly for abstention as well. A detailed examination of campaign
characteristics, at both the levels of the parties and of the press,
strongly suggests that, if blame is to be apportioned, it has to be,
despite some exceptions, apportioned equally between the two sides.
Indeed,
the
behaviour
of
one
side
can
be
expected
to
have
a
reinforcing effect on the behaviour of the other.
The second point relates to the widely-mentioned issue of
the 'second-order' character of European parliament elections: as we
noted in many instances, the emphasis of the party campaigns has been
national rather than European: the nature of the manifestoes and the
press coverage show this abundantly. It is therefore not surprising
that the Euro-election should be regarded, by commentators, though not
seemingly by the public at large, as a kind of appendage of national
elections. Whether such a situation is 'in the nature of things' or
not, it is helped in some important measure by the fact that all the
bodies involved in the process appear concerned essentially with the
national
aspects
of
the
contest.
Before
claiming
that
European
parliament elections are 'second-order', parties and the media surely
need to ask themselves how much they contribute, perhaps to further
39
their own interests as organisations, to maintaining at the national
level a debate which they might, on the contrary, be able to raise at
the European level.
40
FOOTNOTES
1.
2.
The figures are slightly different from and generally a little
higher than those reported in Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson,
1998, 143ff and Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 2001, 14ff, as
we report here figures for the voters, i.e. respondents who
are 18 ye
ars old and above.
2.
The index of European knowledge is similar to the one used in
Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998, 97ff., i.e. combining knowledge
about Commission personnel and member-states of the EU.
3.
The slightly larger difference of 23 points reported in the
1998 book is due to the inclusion of those who were less than 18 years
old and the exclusion of the countries with compulsory voting.
4.
Especially the British and Irish Labour parties, the Belgian
francophone Socialist party, the German SPD, the Spanish PSOE and the
Portuguese Socialist party.
5.
Words are calculated on the basis of the average content of one
page of the manifesto.
6.
Manifestoes typically do not record the presence of a pro- or
anti-Europe cleavage in a party: when it exists, manifestoes tend to
paper over the division by devoting comparatively little space to the
issue. This seems to be one of the reasons why the space devoted to
Europe in British party programme was markedly below average (under 7
percent).
7.
Few party officials indicated one priority only in the issues
they stressed.
8.
The newspaper analysis was based on the examination of two
national newspapers and a regional newspaper in the larger countries,
all of them being of the 'quality' type. In the Belgian case,
newspapers were naturally drawn from both the French- and Dutchspeaking parts of the country. The analysis was speeded up by using
press cutting services where available (for instance from Reuters).
The focus was on how much the newspapers reported about the campaign
and how they characterised the campaign itself and the events which
parties prepared. For the list of parties and newspapers included,
see Appendix.
41
BIBLIOGRAPHY
J. Blondel, R. Sinnott and P. Svensson (1998) People and Parliament
in the European Union, Oxrford: oxford University Press.
J. Blondel, R. Sinnott and P. Svensson (2001). ‘Turnout at the
European Parliament elections during the 1990s’, a paper presented at
the Second Annual Meeting of the Waseda Political Science Association
(Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan, 12 October, 2001).
I. Budge, D. Robertson, D. Hearl, eds., (1987) Ideology, Strategy and
Party Change: spatial analyses of post-war party election programmes
in 19 democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
M. Franklin, and C. can de Eijk, eds., (1996) Choosing Europe? The
European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union, Ann
Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press.
W.E. Miller and J. M. Shanks, (1996),
Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.
The
New
American
Voter,
K. Reif, (1985) Ten European Elections, London: Gower.
K. Reif and H. Schmitt, (1980) ‘Nine second order elections: a
conceptual framework for the analysis of European eleciton results’,
European Journal of Political Research, 8: 3-4.
F.J. Sorauf, Party Politics in America (5th ed. 1988), Boston, MA.:
Little, Brown.
Table 1 Channels of Campaign Exposure, 1994 and 1999
1994
Coverage on TV and Radio
Coverage in the newspapers
Election leaflets received
Advertising
Family, friends or colleagues
Party workers called
Attend public meeting
Contact by phone
Internet
N
64,7
42,6
39,7
38,8
26,4
7,2
11.727
Old member
states
74,4
62,1
62,6
60,3
35,3
13,2
7,5
4,7
3,4
12.487
1999
New member
states
86,6
83,8
69,6
71,1
43,5
3,2
7,5
4,4
6,2
2.924
All states
76,7
66,2
64,0
62,4
36,8
11,3
7,5
4,7
3,0
15.411
Table 2. Campaign Exposure 1994 and 1999. Percent
1994
Type of campaign
exposure
None
Passive
Partially active
Fully active
Total
N
16
31
37
16
100
11.747
Old
member states
13
17
39
31
100
12.487
1999
New
member states
4
8
45
43
100
2.924
All
states
11
16
40
33
100
15.411
Table 3. Campaign and Social Demographic Indicators. Percent Horizontally
Type of campaign exposure
1994
1999
None
Passive Partially Fully
None
Passive Partially
active
active
active
Gender
Men
16
28
38
18
12
15
39
Women
16
34
35
15
14
19
39
Age
18-24
16
32
35
17
16
16
36
25-29
15
31
37
17
14
18
37
30-39
17
30
37
16
13
18
38
40-49
15
29
37
19
10
16
40
50-59
15
29
39
17
11
17
41
60-69
15
33
37
15
13
17
38
70+
18
38
33
11
15
21
41
Education
Low
18
36
34
12
16
21
36
Middle
16
32
37
15
13
16
41
High
15
25
39
21
9
15
40
Occupation
Farmers
9
33
39
19
7
15
32
Urban self-employed
16
28
38
18
10
14
39
Upper white collar
11
24
38
27
9
13
38
Lowe r white collar
16
30
38
16
11
17
41
Skilled workers
18
30
38
14
14
15
38
Un-skilled workers
17
31
38
14
17
24
36
Students
13
29
37
21
13
16
35
Unemployed
16
31
37
16
17
19
39
Retired
17
34
36
13
12
20
42
All
16
31
37
N
11.747
Note: No weighting, only adults: 18 years and above.
16
13
17
39
12.487
Fully
active
34
28
32
31
31
34
31
32
23
27
30
36
46
38
40
31
33
23
37
25
26
31
Table 4. Campaign and Political Indicators. Percent Horizontally
Type of campaign exposure
1992
1999
None
Passive Partially Fully
None
Passive Partially
active
active
active
Political Interest
Political Discussion*)
A great deal
10
19
37
34
6
10
31
To some extent
12
27
40
21
11
15
40
Not much
15
35
38
12
19
24
39
Not at all
26
39
29
6
DK
43
31
22
4
20
22
38
Political Interest in European Matters
A great deal
12
21
37
30
To some extent
12
27
39
22
Not much
14
33
39
14
Not at all
26
38
29
7
DK
32
41
23
4
Political Knowledge
Well informed
10
21
42
27
6
11
39
Moderately well
14
28
39
19
10
14
38
Some but not much
17
32
37
15
9
16
42
Very little
19
37
34
10
13
21
41
No knowledge
20
40
31
10
24
24
35
EC Membership
Good thing
14
28
39
19
10
14
39
Neither good nor bad 18
37
33
12
15
19
41
Bad thing
19
32
33
16
16
22
37
DK
26
39
28
7
25
26
33
Party Attachment
Very close
13
22
39
26
Fairly close
12
28
39
21
Merely sympathiser 15
32
37
16
Close to no party
19
34
34
13
DK
31
32
30
7
Satisfaction with EU Democracy
Very satisfied
15
25
41
18
9
16
33
Fairly satisfied
14
31
37
17
12
17
38
Not very satisfied
16
31
37
16
11
16
40
Not at all satisfied
21
30
33
16
13
17
41
DK
18
36
34
12
19
21
39
All
16
31
37
16
N
11.727
*) The categories are: Frequently, occasionally, never and DK.
13
17
39
12.487
Fully
active
53
34
18
20
44
38
33
25
17
37
24
25
16
42
33
33
29
21
31
Table 5. Campaign Exposure and Turnout 1994 and 1999. Percent Voting
None
1994
N
1999
N
61,8
1.870
33,6
1.739
Type of campaign exposure
Passive
Partially
Fully active
active
66,9
74,2
82,7
3.674
4.280
1.903
52,9
58,2
76,2
2.404
6.163
5.108
Total
71,3
11.727
60,6
15.411
Table 6. Campaign Exposure and Turnout 1994 and 1999. Control for Political
indicators.
Percent Voting
None
1994: Political knowledge
Very well informed
Moderately well
Some but not much
Very little knowledge
No knowledge
1999: Political knowledge
Very well informed
Moderately well
Some but not much
Very little knowledge
No knowledge
Type of campaign exposure
Passive
Partially active
Fully active
Total
72,0
72,7
62,6
57,7
50,0
75,1
71,5
69,4
61,8
61,5
79,8
77,6
72,9
70,8
67,0
86,2
86,9
79,2
76,3
76,2
79,8
77,0
70,9
65,6
62,3
59,1
49,1
32,5
30,3
25,3
67,4
57,9
57,4
47,3
45,0
70,4
62,2
55,4
50,7
50,3
83,8
77,7
77,0
64,2
61,8
76,0
66,8
60,7
51,0
45,3
Table 7. Campaign exposure in EU membership countries, 1994 and 1999. Percent active
1994
Sweden
Ireland
Finland
Austria
Greece
Luxembourg
Denmark
Germany
Italy
Belgium
France
Portugal
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Spain
All
70,0
63,4
79,0
67,1
42,4
40,4
31,9
30,9
54,8
51,0
23,5
1999
89,5
88,9
88,8
85,3
85,3
83,5
80,3
77,5
70,9
70.5
66,2
65,8
65,4
49,0
37,9
52,7
73,1
66,2
Table 8. Turnout and Campaign Exposure, 1999. Gamma Correlations
Ireland
Sweden
United Kingdom
Germany
Finland
Austria
Denmark
Netherlands
Portugal
Italy
Spain
Greece
France
Belgium
Luxembourg
All 15
.552
.542
.532
.526
.505
.502
.463
.389
.382
.344
.338
.298
.289
.218
.203
.407
Table 9 - Percentage of votes taken and ‘Status’ of campaign team, per party per
country
Small and Junior
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Radical Liberal
Party
Finland
Centre Party
Large and Junior Small and Senior Large and Senior
Social Democratic Austrian People's
Party
Party
Greens
Liberal Forum
Liberals (Flanders) Agalev
Christian People's
Party
People's Union
Social Christian
Party
Socialist Party
(Flanders)
Social Democrats
Conservative
June Movement
People's Party
Danish People's
Liberal Party
Party
Socialist People's People's
Party
Movement against
the EU
Greens
National Coalition
Party
Finnish Christian
League
Left Alliance
France
Germany
Greece
Rally for the
Republic
Social Democrats
Swedish Peoples
Party
Communist Party
French Democratic
Union
Socialist Party
Greens
Rally for France
Social Democrats
Bündis90/Greens Christian Social
Union
Christian
Free Democrat
Democratic Union Party
Party of
Democratic
Socialists
Communist Alliance New Democracy
(Syn)
Communist Party
Socialist Party
(PASOK)
New Left
Ireland
Pat Cox (Indep.)
Fine Gael
Green Party
Fianna Fáil
Sinn Féin
Labour Party
Italy
Northern League
Refounded
Communist Party
Christian
Democratic Centre
Popular Party
The Democrats
Calvinist Coalition
The
Netherland
s
Democrats of the
Left
Emma Bonino List
National Alliance
Christian
Democrats
Democrats 66
Green Left
Socialist Party
Popular Party
Portugal
Socialist Party
Convergencia Unio
Spain
Sweden
Left Party
United
Kingdom
Green Party
Socialist Party
Social Democrats
United Democratic
Coalition
Galician
Nationalist Block
Popular Party
Moderate Party
United Left
Centre Party
Social Democrats
Christian
Democrats
Green Party
Liberal Party
Conservative
Labour
Party
Liberal Democrats
Scottish
Nationalist Party
Table 10 – Degree of preparation and ‘Status’ of campaign team
‘Status’ of campaign team
Small Big Small Big Grand Total
Degree of
and and and and
preparation
junior junior senior senior
Not Detailed
5
8
10
5
28
Detailed
5
8
23
18
54
Grand Total
10
16
33
23
82
Table 11 – Amount of references* to the campaign and degree of campaign activism according to
newspapers, by country
* The counting of the references has been done by creating a scale from zero to the maximum number of
references which has been found and dividing the scale in three categories. Therefore, every category
should read ”in comparison to the rest of the cases.”
COUNTRY
NEWSPAP ER
AMOUNT OF REFERENCES
NONE OR
VERY FEW
Austria
Die Presse
Denmark
Finland
Active
Le Soir
No stated
opinion
De Standaard
Inactive
Berlingske Tidende
No stated
opinion
Politiken
Neutral
Aamulehti
Inactive
Helsingin Sanomat
France
Germany
Libé ration
MANY
Inactive
Der Standard
Belgium
SOME
Inactive
Inactive
Le Monde
Inactive
La Dépêche du Midi
Active
Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung
Süddeutsche Zeitung
Inactive
Westdeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung
Inactive
Inactive
Greece
Eleftherotypia
Active
Ta Nea
Ireland
Italy
The Irish Times
Active
The Irish Examiner
Active
Corriere della Sera
Active
La Stampa
The
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Active
Active
Giornale di Sicilia
No stated
opinion
NCR-Handelsblatt
No stated
opinion
Volkskrant
No stated
opinion
Diário de Notícias
Inactive
Público
Inactive
El Pais
El Mundo
Inactive
Inactive
La Vanguardia
Sweden
Dagens Nyheter
Svenska Dagbladet
United
Kingdom
Inactive
Inactive
Active
The Guardian
Inactive
Herald Tribune (Glasgow)
No stated
opinion
The Times
Inactive