---------------------------------------------------------------
Policy Change without
Government Change? German Gridlock
after the 2002 Election
THOMAS KÖNIG, TILL BLUME
and BERND LUIG
While the government parties had blamed the lingering burden of
unification and the global economic crisis for the bulk of Germany:s
troubles in the 2002 election campaign, the topic of gridlock and
policv reform is re-entering the agenda of German politics. From a
scientific view, the analysis of Schröder 's potential for policy change
imposes some challenges. Germany needs reforms in many policy
areas, in particular in the economic and societal domains. We present
a new method to measure the positions of political parties on many
issues. To identify the structural causes for German gridlock we apply
the spatial model for legislative choice, which uncovers the room for
manoeuvre. More precisely, we intend to show how much potentialfor
policy change the Schröder government will have in economic,
societal and foreign policy, and which policy position will be
promoted by the Red-Green coalition in these areas.
POLICY REFORM AND GRIDLOCK IN GERMANY
Can the re-elected German government under Chancellor Schräder make
the promised policy reforms and restore to the European Union's largest and
weakest economy its former leading role? Will the Union parties
(CDU/CSU) support the reform of the welfare and pension systems after the
2003 state elections in Hesse and Lower Saxony, in which the conservative
opposition has expanded its majority in the Bundesrat? And how will the
Red-Green coalition between SPD and Greens (Alliance '90/Greens)
decide in other policy areas, such as foreign and societal affairs - can this
coalition reform the obsolete immigration regulations, and will it continue
to promote European integration and a non-interventionist German position
in international affairs? But if the Schräder government cannot provide for
policy change, what are the reasons for reform failure in Germany? Is the
chancellor, who has a patchy record in fulfilling promises and taking
German Politics, Vo1.12. NO.2 (August 2003), pp.86-146
PLJBLlSHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
87
unpopular decisions, or the conservative majority in the Bundesrat
responsible for reform blockade, or do internal problems of the Red-Green
coalition limit the potential for policy change in Germany?
While the governmental parties had blamed the lingering burden of
unification and the global economic crisis for the bulk of Germany's
troubles in the 2002 election campaign, the topic of gridlock and policy
reform is re-entering the agenda of German politics. After the most recent
defeat of the governmental parties in two state elections in Hesse and Lower
Saxony, and the losses in the local elections in Schieswig-Hoistein in 2003,
the chancellor announced courageous steps to reform the sclerotic German
patient. The numbers are striking: Germany has currently the slowest
growth - a pathetic 0.2 per cent in 2002 - of the 12 Eurozone countries. It
has one of the highest unemployment rates - officially 11.3 per cent or
almost five million people - in the Western world. The non-wage labour
costs are more than 42 per cent of gross wages, and health insurance
contributions have shot up to 14.4 per cent of gross wages. The Daxstockmarket slump from almost 9,000 to 2,500 points over the past five
years has been spectacular even in comparison with other markets.
From a scientific view, the analysis of Schröder's potential for policy
change imposes some challenges. One reason is that Germany needs
reforms in many policy areas, in particular in the economic and societal
domains. This calls for an identification of the specific reform issues in
these areas and the positions of the actors involved in decision making. For
this purpose, we present a new proceeding which enables us to measure the
positions of political parties on many issues in different policy areas.
Another reason is that the continuous debate about reform indicates that
gridlock has structural rather than issue-specific causes in Germany. The
veto player role of the Bundesrat, and the necessity of building government
coalitions were criticised for their mechanism of blocking reforms, and
raised a debate on constitutional reform. I However, it is still unclear whether
and to what extent these factors prevent reform in Germany. In order to
identify the structural causes of German gridlock we apply the spatial model
for legislative choice, which uncovers the room for manoeuvre of a
governmental agenda setter. 2 More precisely, we intend to show how much
potential for policy change the newly re-elected Schröder government will
have in economic, societal and foreign policy, and which policy position
will be promoted by the Red-Green coalition in these areas.
GERMANY IN CONSENSUS WITHOUT CHANGE?
Four years ago, in autumn 1998, the Christian-liberal government of
Helmut Kohl was the first post-war German government to be voted out in
88
GERMAN POLITICS
Bundestag elections. A major reason was that Germany needed policy
reforms and foreign investment, and most voters did not believe in the
ability of Chancellor Kohl to provide for policy change after 16 years in
office. 3 In their first year in government, the Red-Green coalition complied
with most of the 1998 election pledges - carried out under the leadership of
Oscar Lafontaine, the former leftist SPD party leader. However, in some
cases, such as health care and labour regulation, the Red-Green coalition
only restored the status qua ex ante by suspending the modest reforms
previously made by the Kohl government. Furthermore, the Red-Green
programme for policy change remained unclear: the labour unions' position
had been strengthened in co-determination, but the general tax reform was
welcomed by employers. After all, the Schröder government could not
solve key problems in Germany during its first legislative term from 1998
to 2002.Unsurprisingly, the topic of policy reform dominated the first months of the
Bundestag election campaign in 2002. Comparable to the criticism by the
Red-Green opposition of the former Kohl government in 1998, the
conservative opposition successfully attacked the Schröder government for its
inability to overcome German gridlock four years later. The opposition headed
the opinion polIs until the Bush administration began to target the Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein. Chancellor Schröder unexpectedly promised that Germany
would abstain from any military action against Iraq - independently from the
United Nations Security Council's decision. While the chancellor's promise
worried the international scene and endangered the transatlantic relationship,
the conservative opposition parties were unable to reach a credible position on
the Bush administration's policy of war. At the same time, the Red-Green
government received credit for managing the flood disaster in eastern
Germany in August 2002. These events finally helped the Red-Green coalition
to win the 2002 elections. Compared to their victory in 1998, the SPD lost
some votes, but so-called Überhangmandate, the failure ofthe former Socialist
Party (PDS) to qualify for parliament, and the gains ofthe anti-military Greens
guaranteed the success of the Red-Green coalition in 2002.
The events provide some insight into basic characteristics and problems
in German politics. First, policy change is not identical to governmental
change, because neither the Christian-liberal Kohl government nor the
Red-Green Schröder government were able to overcome gridlock. Second,
the need for policy change covers multiple policy areas, and there is no
longer doubt that fundamental reforms are necessary for economic and
societal affairs. Third, policy change is merely measurable in the number of
adopted bills; like the last Kohl government from 1994 to 1998, the
Red-Green coalition dealt with about 800 bills and succeeded with almost
all government initiatives from 1998 to 2002. 5 And, finally, gridlock can be
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
89
- but is not necessarily - a decisive factor for winning elections: war threats
and natural catastrophes can supersede the permanent issue of reform and
gridlock in German politics.
Since the mid-1970s, the danger of gridlock in German politics has been
discussed in German political science and has stimulated theoretical and
empirical research. Fritz W. Scharpf deyeloped his famous joint decision
making trap approach, which predicts institutional gridlock when the lower
level states must find consensus at the higher federallevel. 6 According to his
view, the need for consensus in Germany is expressed by the institutional
hurdles of German legislative decision making, and the institutional trap is
snapping in cases of (1) possible party blockade by the second chamber, (2)
lack of transparent decision making processes, and (3) little room for
manoeuvre through vertical or horizontal federal decision making
arrangements. Scharpf sceptically concludes that reforms of the institutional
arrangements are impossible because problem solving is at stake and no
actor is interested in losing his veto power.
Similarly sceptical conclusions were drawn by Peter Katzenstein,7
Renate Mayntz,8 Manfred Schmidt9 and Gerhard Lehmbruch lO with respect
to the party system. Lehmbruch argues that, due to historical distortions, the
combination of party competition in the Bundestag and federal coordination
in the Bundesrat prornotes political immobilism. These distortions, which
were created during the historical development of the German political
system, deterrnine the strategies of the legislative actors and lead to
gridlock. This does not concern the legitimacy of the party system even if
the camps are blocking bicameral legislation. It rather produces an
efficiency gap regarding problem solving. Lehmbruch suggests gradual
reforms and adjustments of the rules of the game, which may change the
strategies of the political parties and regional actors. 11
Recent research is careful with criticism of institutional gridlock and the
party system. In the normative literature, gridlock is desirable when it
decreases the manipulative power of an agenda setter. 12 For this purpose, bior multicameral systems are particularly suitable, in which the proposals of
a quasi-dictatorial agenda setter must overcome two or more majority
constraints. 13 In the empirical literature on German legislation, recent
studies have shown that some reforms, such as the modification of the
asylum and immigration laws, were carried out in the societal arena in spite
of high bicameral hurdles anddifferent party majorities. 14 And consensus
has been observed for foreign politics,15 that is, when Germany gave up the
Deutschmark for European integration and approved military action outside
the NATO sphere.
These examples show that we notice policy change in some policy areas
and gridlock in others under the same conditions of the joint decision
90
GERMAN POLITICS
making trap or historical distortions. Since Lehmbruch's and Scharpf's
approaches are derived from the observation of gridlock rather than a theory
of legislative decision making, we can hardly use them to predict legislative
behaviour in different policy areas. For this reason, we start our analysis of
policy change after 2002 with adefinition of gridlock danger (or potential
für policy change as the inverse) according to the veto player theory as the
likelihood for maintaining the status quO. 16 This is determined by the
number and policy distance of the veto players in the legislative game: the
more veto players and the greater the distance between their policies, the
less likely is policy change. This concept draws our attention to the
identification of the veto players and their positions in German legislation.
Ci
z
...:
.,
.,
.,
CI)
CI)
CI)
=
os
.l:l
fJ
....
.~
0
=-
0
=
=
os
.=
.,
CI)
=
=
os
os
.l:l
.l:l
fJ
fJ
fJ
:::
=-
-=0
::
=
0
=
0
....
.......
....
0
0
0
=-
=
-.
<:1
'Ct:>.,"'
VETO PLAYERS AND AGENDA SETTING IN GERMAN
BICAMERALISM
Veto players are actors whose support is necessary for a change of the status
quo. Their support depends on the distance between their policy positions,
the status quo and the proposal to change it. 17 If the distance to the proposal
is doser than to the status quo, a veto player will support the proposal, while
preferring maintenance of the status quo in case of doser distance. In
Germany, the legislative veto players are the majority actors in the
Bundestag and Bundesrat. Moreover, the need to build govemmental
coalitions can decrease the potential for policy change because the coalition
partners are the veto players in govemment. 18 Typically for parliamentary
systems, the German govemment has a strong agenda setter role and
initiates most (adopted) legislation. 19 A special feature of German
legislation is that it offers a strong and a weak bicameral procedure. Figure
1 illustrates the decision tree of the two bicameral procedures:
Most (adopted) German legislation is initiated by the govemment (FG),
which sends its proposal to the Bundestag (BT). In the Bundestag, the
govemmental proposal has to find the approval of the Bundestag majority;
otherwise, the proposal has failed and the status quo is maintained (no
policy change). In case of Bundestag approval, the govemmental proposal
is sent to the Bundesrat (BR). Compared with the strong bicameral
procedure of the Zustimmungsgesetzgebung, which requires an approving
absolute majority in the Bundesrat, a rejection of the govemmental
proposals can be overruled by the corresponding Bundestag majority in the
weak bicameral Einspruchsgesetzgebung. However, if the Bundesrat rejects
the govemmental proposal by a two-thirds majority in the
Einspruchsgesetzgebung, the Bundestag must overrule it by the same
majority.20 InstitutionaJly, the govemmental agenda setter has to
acknowledge the Bun'destag and Bundesrat veto players in the
...Ct:>.,
c
s::
-.
<:1
;>-
...ct:>.,
§'
c
s::
'iii
1;;
o.l
"0
0()
0()
~
0 ()
~o.l
<J
E}
~
N
00
s::
'"
~
-=o
.,~
=
::l
~
6d
"
'"
Li
"''"
'"
""i:"'
.......
"
s::
~
'"
Li
"''"
'"
"'
0()
0()
oii
"0
"
::l
~
~
~
'EE"
.,"
o.l
;>
0
....
o.l
"0
"
s::
~
""'
Ci
~
c
0()
.§
.....;
<.;
~
~
~
0;
s::
~~;>~
~
~
'«:
92
GERM AN POLITICS
Zustimmungsgesetzgebung, while it ean disregard the Bundesrat in the
Einspruchsgesetzgebung as long as the governmental proposal is supported
by one-third of the Bundesrat votes.
Unlike previous approaches, the veto player theory does not exclusively
foeus on the institutional role of aetors. It rather draws out attention to the
interaction between the rules of the game and the poliey positions of the
aetors. This interaction defines the potential for poliey change as the size of
the win-set, the set of all alternatives beating the status quO. 21 The definition
has important implieations beeause we might absorb aetors from our
analysis when they do not reduee the size of the win-set. On the other side,
the agenda setter has a eonsiderable advantage beeause he ean seleet the
most preferred alternative that beats the status quo. As a general rule, we
expeet a large potential for poliey change and a powerful agenda setter in
ease of close poliey positions of the veto players, while the gridloek danger
inereases and the agenda setter's power deereases through wide distanees
between the poliey positions of the veto players. 22
In the past, large distanees between the poliey positions of the politieal
parties eharaeterised the eeonornie area, while SPD and Union had close
(eonservative) poliey positions in the societal area, such as in law and order
polities. 23 In the societal domain, the SPD and Union ean form agrand
coalition against the small and more liberal politieal parties, but the
polarisation of the two main parties has deereased the size of the eeonomie
win-set in the past. This explains why we observe reforms and even
eonstitutional amendments under the same historieal distortions and
institutional deeision making arrangements in the societal area, while
eeonomie issues have been bloeked over the years. Sinee the distanees
between the veto players' poliey positions ean change over time and vary
aeross poliey domains, sub-domains or even partieular issues, we propose
to start our analysis with measures of aetors' poliey positions at the lowest
issue level. In ease of high similarity, we ean still aggregate our issue
findings to higher sub-domain or domain level preference profiles of
politieal parties, whieh would help us to generalise our results without
deereasing the predietive power at the issue level.
In this study, we are interested in providing very detailed measures for
the veto players' poliey positions. Our intention is to outline how mueh the
veto players differ in their views, and whether and to what extent we ean
aggregate their poliey-speeifie positions. In order to prediet outcomes and
poliey change by the newly eleeted Sehräder government, we must also
make some simplifying assumptions on the behaviour of legislative aetors,
such as that the governmental agenda setter is eompletely informed and aets
rationally. This means that the Sehräder government attempts to aeeomplish
its most preferred poliey position by introdueing legislative proposals, and
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
93
the government knows the eonstraints of the legislative proeess. Henee, the
governmental agenda setter eonsiders the distanees of the veto players and
takes into, aeeount that legislative veto players only support governmental
proposals if they expeet improvement over the status quo.
Regarding the behaviour of the Bundestag and Bundesrat veto players,
we assurne that they might aeeept some distanee between their most
preferred poliey position and an outeome independent from the loeation of
their poliey position on the right or left side of the poliey seale. 24 More
preeisely, we assurne that a veto player with a poliey position x supports a
proposal y against an alternative z if the distanee is larger to z than to y; veto
players are indifferent if they have the same distanee to a proposal and the
status quo; and, finally, a veto player supports a proposal y if y is closer than
z, but rejeets it if z is closer than y. This draws our attention to the
measurement of aetors' poliey positions. In order to loeate these poliey
positions, we will provide detailed measures for the legislative aetors and
show how we gathered this information by doeument analysis.
MEASURlNG POLICY POSITIONS OF LEGISLATIVE ACTORS
The measuring of poliey positions, from a wide range of theoretieal
perspeetives, is beeoming a prominent research topie in politieal scienee.
The simple reason is that many studies draw their eonclusions from the
politieal positions of the key politieal aetors. This information ean be
gathered by a number of sourees, including expert interviews, mass surveys
and doeument analysis. All of these instruments have serious
methodologieal and praetieal problems. Methodologieally, expert and mass
surveys suffer from the fact that poliey positions eolleeted using these
teehniques are more a produet of the politiCal proeess than eausality prior to
them. Another disadvantage is their inferenee from momentums and their
general measurement level. Survey and interview data are rarely eonfirmed
and most surveys ask for more generalleft-right loeations of aetors which
ean hardly be applied to prediet the outeome of speeifie poliey issues.
Another instrument to eolleet information on key aetors ' poliey
positions is doeument analysis. Texts include the announeements of
politieal behaviour and they ean be analysed and re-analysed. Compared to
other instruments, doeument analysis also offers to inerease reliability by
using quantitative methods. A number of doeuments relate to individual or
eolleetive aetors, such as politieal parties or governments. Two proeedures
ean be fundamentally differentiated: (1) the salieney approach of the Party
Manifesto Group (MRG - Comparative Manifestos Projeet (CMP)),25 and
(2) Michael Laver's positional approach. Both rely on systematie eontent
analysis of the offieial programmes of politieal parties, and both refer to the
94
GERMAN POUTICS
mandate theory, which assumes that party governments consider their
programmatic pledges when they have been elected in parliament and
office. 26 They differ in their coding technique and in the ways they
determine the policy positions and preference profiles of the political parties
on various policy scales.
The MRG project started in the end of the 1970s and covers the
programmes of 632 political parties in 52 countries over the post-war
period. 27 This cross-country cross-sectional time series database is built on
the saliency approach, which assumes that the policy positions of political
parties can be measured by the selective weighting of issues rather than
positional statements. 28 First, issues are classified by their left/right,
liberallconservative connotation in so-called quasi-sentences, which are the
coding units and evaluated by handcoders with 54 issue categories of the
comprehensive, but static MRG coding scheme. Second, policy positions
are calculated by the relative frequency of quoting an issue category. In
order to identify the preference profiles of political parties, the number of
left/liberal is finally subtracted from the number of right/conservative
categories. 29
The MRG approach has been criticised because of the weighting and the
reliability risks, which result from the handcoding technology. Michael
Laver and John Garry30 suggest a positional approach - with a qualitative
variant and a computer-based version excluding subjective errors of
handcoders. On the basis of more than 300 hierarchical tripolar categories
(pro, neutral, versus), this approach identifies ordinal positions for six
policy scales. A more recent probabilistic proceeding of Laver, Benoit and
Garry starts with a preference profile of a policy dimension (that is,
economics), which is estimated by reference texts over expert interviews,
and relates them to the relative frequency of every (1) word. These so-called
'wordscores' are used for the analysis of the virgin texts. 31 Of course, this
also raises methodological questions, in particular regarding the validity of
the estimations to the reference texts.
In this study, we present a proceeding which is based on both approaches
and applied to the evaluation of the programmes of the political parties for
the 2002 Bundestag election. To identify more specific policy positions and
preference profiles, we introduce some conceptional steps for the computer32
based text analysis of the programmes of German political parties. In
principle, we pursue a position-oriented approach following Laver, and we
thus use tripolar categories too. Nevertheless we also include some
advantages of the MRG proceeding, such as the use of quasi-sentences as
coding units, and some substantial MRG coding mIes. More precisely, we
start with the original MRG coding scheme, expand this rather static
scheme, and present the saliency measures for preference profile in
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
95
comparison. Like the other two approaches, we presuppose the mandate
theory and assume that the programmatic statements of political parties play
an important role for actors' legislative preferences. We justify this
assumption with the observation that party programmes are less about voter
mobilisation than for internal party disciplining. The programmes are
adopted on party congresses and they are used for reminding party and
parliamentary group members on their (promised) party positions after the
elections. 33
Our goal is to use a comprehensive scheme, which considers the content
ofpolitical parties' statements on (almost) all political issues. In a first step,
we have split the programme texts of the five most important German
political parties (SPD, Union, Greens, FDP and PDS) into three broad
policy areas (economic, societal and foreign affairs).34 Second, we were
using the text analysis program Concordance 3.035 for determining the
(relative) frequency of all words. We used these frequencies for updating
and expanding the categories of the original MRG scheme. 36 For the
identification of policy positions, we subsequently assigned three
categorical positions: in the economic domain, this is the tripolar
categorisation by state-interventionlmiddle/economic-liberal, in the societal
domain we used the categories libertarianlmiddlelconservative, and in
foreign affairs national/middle/supranational-international, which are
generally marked by (-1=1+).
More specificaIly, we used the computer program for the specific coding
of the quasi-sentences. For example, the often expressed word 'education'
referred to the sentence 'we would like to increase the expenditure for
vocational training'. This was coded as a positional statement, that is,
increasing expenditure for vocational training. For each quasi-sentence, we
listed the appropriate category of our coding scheme as weIl as the policy
position (-1=1+). Für example, amiddie position is coded when the SPD was
in favour of a vague 'reform' with regard to unemployment benefits. For
more information about our coding, in Appendices I to VII we list all
conceptual steps, for example on economic policy the statements by every
political party, the frequency of the (economic) terms, the MRG scheme of
the economic policy domain and our expanded scheme including the
categorical terms. Appendix VIIIintroduces to our coding some mles for
quasi-sentences by measurement examples.
In order to calculate the positions of the political parties on various
policy scales, we used the following formula: (FREQ+ - FREQJ I (I(FREQ+
- FREQJI + (FREQ=)), whereby (FREQ+) means the frequency of quasisentences with economic-liberaUconservative/supranational-international
positioning, (FREQJ the nutnber of quasi-sentences with state
96
GERMAN POLITICS
TABLE I
POLICY POSITIONS AND PREFERENCE PROFILES
(ECONOMIC, SOCIETAL AND FOREIGNj
Economic Affairs
PDS
Greens
SPD
Union
FDP
Total (domain)
Trade and industry
Labour market
Sodal politics
National budget
Revenue
Future politics
-0.71
-0.72
-D.71
-D.84
-0.83
-0.47
-D.68
-0.23
+0.06
-0.15
-0.64
+0.90
-0.07
-0.42
-0.16
+0.10
-0.38
-0.47
+0.21
-0.07
+0.00
+0.53
+0.58
+0.53
+0.38
+0.79
+0.42
+0.50
+0.81
+0.91
+0.88
+0.71
+0.88
+0.84
+0.69
Domain profile
Trade and industry
Labour market
Sodal politics
National budget
Revenue
Future politics
Preference profiles on the scale of (-1) to (+1)
PDS
Greens
SPD
Union
PDS
Greens
SPD
Union
PDS
SPD
Greens
Union
PDS
Greens
SPD
Union
PDS
SPD
Union
FDP
PDS
Greens
SPD
Union
PDS
Greens
SPD
Union
FDP
FDP
FDP
FDP
Greens
FDP
FDP
Societal Affairs
Greens
PDS
FDP
SPD
Union
Total (domain)
Immigration
MulticulturaIism
Extremism fight
Traditional moral
Law and order
Education politics
-D.48
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-D.60
-D.33
+0.92
-0.32
-0.75
-0.93
-1.00
-0.75
+0.50
+0.43
-0.07
-0.64
-0.89
-0.83
-0.32
+0.68
+1.00
+0.11
-0.08
-0.71
-0.71
-D.21
+0.81
+1.00
+0.51
+0.11
+0.21
-0.67
+0.95
+0.88
+1.00
Domain profile
Immigration
Multiculturalism
Extremism fight
Traditional moral
Law and order
Education politics
Preference profiles on the scale of (-1) to (+1)
Greens
PDS
FDP
SPD
Greens
PDS
FDP
SPD
Greens
PDS
FDP
SPD
Greens
PDS
FDP
SPD
PDS
Greens
FDP
SPD
Greens
PDS
FDP
SPD
PDS
Greens
FDP
SPD
Union
Union
Union
Union
Union
Union
Union
Foreign Affairs
PDS
Union
FDP
SPD
Greens
Total (domain)
Defence and security
European Union
Global affairs
+0.14
-0.48
+0.40
+0.77
+0.49
+0.48
+0.32
+0.60
+0.54
+0.64
+0.46
+0.46
+0.72
+0.73
+0.66
+0.75
+0.77
+0.63
+0.74
+0.96
Domain profile
Defence and security
European Union
Global affairs
Preference profiles on the scale of (-1) to (+1)
PDS
Union
FDP
SPD
PDS
Union
Greens
FDP
Union
PDS
FDP
SPD
FDP
Union
SPD
PDS
Greens
SPD
Greens
Greens
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
97
interventionllibertarianlnational positioning, and (FREQ=J the number of
quasi-sentences with amiddie positioning. One disadvantage of our formula
might be that some issues were mentioned only few times - an argument
which is stated frequently by the MRG researches on the position
approach. 3? However, since we are interested in gathering data on very
specific policy issues, weighting by the number of mentions is of less
importance here.
In order to generalise our findings, we present preference profiles of
the political parties by using the arithmetic means of their issue distances
for sub-domains as well as the three policy domains. Another measure can
be calculated by using the frequency of the three categories per subdomain or within the whole policy domain. To outline calculation effects,
we offer all measurement results in Appendix X. Appendix IX illustrates
the effects of the different calculation methods for the location of the
political parties. Table 1 shows the specific policy positions of the
political parties for the total range of the policy domains and the subdomains, as well as the preference profiles of the political parties. Policy
positions can range between 1.00 and -1.00 on each scale, preference
profiles only consider the ordering of the political parties. We suppose that
a perfect aggregation of the sub-domain preference profiles is possible if
the profiles have the same ordering; otherwise, we can hardly generalise
our findings at the domain level.
The policy positions and preference profiles in the economic domain
show that the PDS has the most state-interventionist location in all subdomains, while Union and FDP are located differently only in one and SPD
and Greens in two of the six economic sub-domains. According to these
findings, SPD and Greens have very dose policy positions, which indicate
a high probability for coalition building according to economic issues. Only
in the job market and budgetary sub-domain, the Greens pursue a more
liberal policy than the SPD does. Summing up the economic sub-domain
results to a domain-specific preference profile, the PDS is the most stateoriented actor, followed by the Greens with small distance to the SPD, while
Union and FDP are located on the liberal end of the economic scale.
Our decision to distinguish between policy domains is confirmed by the
different preference profiles in the societal and foreign policy domains.
While the ordering on the economic scale is PDS<Greens<SPD<Union
<FDP, the societal profile is Greens<PDS<FDP<SPD<Union. Compared to
a state-interventionist group consisting of PDS, Greens and SPD in the
economic domain, SPD and Union are located in the conservative spectrum
of societal affairs. Overall, the societal sub-domain profiles are more
cohesive than those of the economic domain. Only in the issue of traditional
moral and educational issues do the Greens and PDS change their ordering,
98
GERMAN POLITICS
but the Greens are overall the most libertarian political party. The FDP does
not have an extreme position in societal affairs and is located on the left side
of the two big political parties SPD and Union. We find another preference
profile of the political parties in the foreign policy domain. The overall
foreign policy ordering is PDS<Union<FDP<SPD<Greens, but all political
parties are located in the same positive spectrum of the scale. This means
that all support European integration and have similar policy positions on
global issues. Only the PDS is different from the consensus of the other
parties in defence and military issues.
In total, OUf findings on the preference profiles of political parties
confirriJ. OUf conceptual distinction between the three policy domains, and
we must sometimes even consider the different sub-domain orderings when
generalising our results on policy change after 2002. In the economic policy
domain we find a preference profile which corresponds to the usual
left-right ordering with the most liberallocation of the FDP. On the societal
dimension, we identify a grand coalition between SPD and Union, in
particular on law and order issues. However, this profile cannot be
confirmed for the foreign policy domain, which is characterised by a large
party consensus. Political parties differ in many questions not only in their
policy position, but also in their orderings. To what extent these positions
and preference profiles offer govemmental policy change after the elections
of 2002, we will predict by applying the model of legislative choice.
99
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
TABLE 2
AGENDA SETTER AND VETO PLAYERS
1. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS AGENDA SETTER
Policy Domain
Actor
Parties
Position
Eeonomie poliey
Societal poliey
Foreign poliey
Govemment (FGe)
Govemment (FGs)
Govemment (FGf)
SPD/Greens
SPD/Greens
SPD/Greens
-D.20
-D.19
+0.75
2. VETO PLAYERS IN THE BUNDESTAG
Policy Domain
Actor
Party
Position
Eeonomie
Median (BTme)
Two-thirds (BTte)
Median (BTms)
Two-thirds (BTts)
Median (BTmf)
Two-thirds (BTtf)
SPO
Union
SPD
Union
SPO
Union
-D.16
+0.53
+0.11
+0.51
+0.72
+0.49
Societal
Foreign
3. VETO PLAYERS IN THE BUNDESRAT
Economic Affairs
Participant
Party
State
POS
SPDIPDS
Greens
SPD/Greens
SPD
Two-thirds (BRte)
Median (BRme)
Union
SPDlUnion
SPDIFDP
Union
UnionIFDP
FDP
Position
-D.71
-D.44
-D.23
-D.20
-D.16
+0.19
+0.33
+0.53
+0.67
+0.81
Votes
7
10
7
4
17
26
Societal Affairs
POLICY CHANGE AFTER 2002 IN THREE POLICY DOMAINS: A
COMPARISON
In order to predict policy change after 2002, we must identify the position
of the govemment and of the legislative veto players. For this purpose, we
make further assumptions on the collective preference of the coalition
partners in govemment and of the veto players in the Bundestag and
Bundesrat. In this regard, we can find references for weighting the coalition
positions with respect to the chancellor principle. Others refer to the cabinet
principle, which is the median position in the cabinet, and others emphasise
the department principle, to which the party position of the respective
minister belongs, but most prominent is the coalition principle, which
assumes bargaining between the coalition parties. 38 We prefer a nonweighted mean of the coalition positions, because the policy positions of
SPD and the Greens are quite dose, and other weightings can only be
justified ad hoc.
For the legislators of the Bundestag we refer to party discipline and
assume that the parliamentary members will support the policy positions of
their respective political party.39 Regarding the policy positions of the
Participant
Party
State
Position
Votes
UnionIFDP
-D.48
-D.32
-D.19
-D.11
-D.07
+0.02
+0.11
+0.22
Union
SPO/Union
Union
+0.31
+0.51
7
17
Party
State
Position
Votes
SPOIPDS
Union
UnionIFDP
+0.14
+0.43
+0.49
+0.52
7
17
24
Greens
POS
SPD/Greens
SPDIPOS
FDP
SPDIFDP
SPD
Median (BRms)
=Two-thirds (BRts)
10
7
4
24
Foreign Affairs
Participant
PDS
Union
Median (BRmf)
=Two-thirds (BRtf)
FOP
SPOlUnion
SPOIFDP
SPD
SPD/Greens
Greens
+0.54
+0.61
+0.63
+0.72
+0.75
+0.77
7
4
10
100
GERMAN POLITICS
Bundesrat representatives, we also use the party positions and eompute, if
neeessary, the average values of the eoalition parties in the state
govemments. Here we eould also apply a weighting proeedure, that is, by
eonsidering the party affiliation of the respeetive prime minister as a
weighting faetor. However, in aeeordanee with our assumption on the
(federal) govemment position, we use the average value of the respeetive
eoalition partners at the state level too. Appendix XI informs about the
eurrent eomposition and the voting weights of the states in the Bundesrat.
Table 2 lists the poliey positions of the federal govemment as agenda
setter (No. 1) and those of the veto players in the Bundestag (No.2) and the
Bundesrat (No.3) for eaeh of the three poliey domains. Coneerning the
Bundestag median, we identify the SPD as the more moderate partner of the
majority eoalition. We also determine the pivotal players (median aetor,
two-thirds aetor) on the basis of the share of votes and the orderings of all
legislators in the Bundestag and Bundesrat (see ealculated poliey positions
of parties and government eoalitions). This domain-speeifie positional
approach differs from the eommonly quoted Bundesrat camp approach that
distinguishes between the type of states supporting the federal govemment
(so-ealled A-states), states of opposition type (B-states), and mixed states
(C-states). Regarding eeonomie affairs, the SPD has the median position in
the Bundestag (BTme) with a more moderate state-oriented value of -0.16.
The Red-Green govemment (FGe) prefers with a value of -0.20 a more
state-oriented eeonomie poliey than the SPD does, but the distanees to the
Bundestag veto player are very smalI. However, the government has to
eonsider the poliey position of the Union in the Zustimmungsgesetzgebung
(BRme), whieh favours a poliey position with a value of +0.53 in eeonornie
matters. Fewer eonstraints exist for the Schröder govemment in the
Einspruchsgesetzgebung, in whieh the veto player position is in the hands
of grand eoalitions with a value of +0.19 (BRte). The pivotal players in the
entire societal and foreign poliey domains are listed in Table 2. While the
SPD always holds the median and the Union the two-thirds position in the
Bundestag, we find more variation among the pivotal players in the
Bundesrat. Appendix XII provides detailed information about the poliey
positions of the govemment and of the veto players in the eeonomie,
soeietal and foreign poliey sub-domains.
Having identified the poliey positions of the govemmental agenda setter
and the veto players in the Bundestag and Bundesrat, we are able to apply
the model of legislative ehoice. This allows us to prediet how mueh
potential for poliey change the govemmental agenda setter has in eaeh
poliey (sub-)domain after the 2002 eleetions. The logie of this model builds
on a strategie behaviour of the agenda-setting government and differentiates
between three altematives. In addition to implementing the governmental
101
POLI'CY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
FIGURE 2
POTENTIAL FOR POLICY CHANGE IN GERMANY
(CURRENT SITUATION)
················:r·············;············Tr~r··············~·~r······:········~~········1
Outcome
r!:
ü
FGf
~~:x!
VI
,,
FGs
FGe
BTms
FGs
BRms
BRte
BRmf
BTmf
Location of Status Quo
Economic Affairs:
Einspruchsgesetze _
Zustimmungsgesetze - -
Societal Affairs:
Einspruchsgesetze and Zustimmungsgesetze ••••••
Foreign Affairs:
Einspruchsgesetze and Zustimmungsgesetze -
-
102
GERMAN POLITICS
FIGURE 3
POTENTIAL FOR POLICY CHANGE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE LEGISLATIVE
TERM (BEFORE STATE ELECTIONS IN LOWER SAXONY AND HESSE)
Outcome
FOf
-
-
-
-
--
FOs
FOe
FOs
BRme
BTmf
Location of Status Quo
Economic Affairs:
Einspruchsgesetze _
Zustimmungsgesetze _ _
SocietaI Affairs:
Einspruchsgesetze ••••••
Zustimmungsgesetze
..
Foreign Affairs:
Einspruchsgesetze _
Zustimmungsgesetze
_
_
ideal poliey position (status quo interval with penetration), the Schröder
government ean aehieve poliey change by means of eompromises with the
veto players (status quo interval with eomprornise). Moreover, there is a
status quo interval in whieh a mutual blockade between the govemment
and the veto players prevents any poliey change (status quo interval
with gridloek).4ü
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
103
Figure 2 shows the eurrent potential for poliey change of the
govemmental agenda setter in the three poliey domains of eeonornie,
societal and foreign affairs. In order to illustrate the impact of Bundesrat
eleetions, Figure 3 additionally outlines the room for manoeuvre that the
newly eleeted Red-Green eoalition had before their losses in the state
eleetions of Lower Saxony and Hesse in February 2003. Both analyses
distinguish between strong and weak bieameralism in the Zustimmungsand Einspruchsgesetzgebung. On the x-axis, we simulate all status quo
loeations, beeause we ean hardly identify the status quo loeation on these
poliey scales. On the y axis we fix the poliey position of the agenda-setting
govemment in the three poliey domains. The horizontal lines show when
the Schröder govemment ean aehieve its ideal position, the lines from
bottom left to the top right mark the gridloek interval, and the lines from top
left to bottom right indieate the eompromise interval.
Our eomparison before and after the state eleetions in Hesse and Lower
Saxony in February 2003 reveals that the rninor change in the Bundesrat
majority eauses many proeedural differenees between the Zustimmungsand Einspruchsgesetzgebung to disappear. Regarding the eeonomie domain,
the reeent Bundesrat losses of the govemment parties have no impact on the
govemmental potential for poliey change beeause the veto players remain
the same: The agenda-setting federal government still depends on the
support of the Union (BRme) in all eeonornie sub-domains in the ease of the
Zustimmungsgesetzgebung, and the grand eoalitions (BRte) are holding the
pivotal position in five of the six sub-domains in the ease of the
Einspruchsgesetzgebung. However, we find signifieant distanees between
the government and the Bundesrat majority sinee the 2002 eleetions in
eeonomie affairs, in partieular in the Zustimmungsgesetzgebung. Compared
to these bieameral eonstraints on governmental poliey change, we eannot
expeet erueial internal eoalition problems due to the small distanees
between the government and the SPD (BTme), whieh holds the median
position in the Bundestag.
More speeifieally, our analysis shows that the Red-Green eoalition is
only powerful when the status quo is left from its own ideal or far right from
the Bundesrat veto player's eeonomie poliey position. In the broad rniddle
status quo range (between the ideal points of the agenda setter and the
Bundesrat veto players), legislation is greatly threatened by gridloek. In the
ease of the Zustimmungsgesetzgebung this gridloek danger also covers
relatively moderate liberal issues, whereas eomprornises are more likely for
the Einspruchsgesetze in this area. When we take into aeeount the previous
legislative term and eonsider the poliey position of the Red-Green eoalition
(eentre-Ieft) as the most likely eurrent status quo loeation, we prediet very
moderate sueeess in liberalising the German eeonomy after 2002.
104
GERM AN POLITICS
While we find important procedural differences in the economic policy
domain, the two legislative procedures lost their impact for policy change in
the societal domain after the 2003 state elections in Lower Saxony and
Hesse. The reason is that the Bundesrat median (BRms) is currently
identical with the two-thirds actor (BRts) in societal affairs. The Union/FDP
coalitions have the pivotal positions in the Bundesrat - in the entire domain
and in all six sub-domains. Likewise, the SPD holds the median position in
the Bundestag (BTms) in all societal sub-domains. In contrast to the
economic domain, we find larger distances between the coalition partners
SPD and Greens (in immigration as weIl as in law and order issues).
However, the Schröder government can achieve its ideal position if the
status quo is located in the more libertarian as weIl as in the extremely
conservative area. Gridlock is only likely in the smaller middle status quo
range of the societal domain, compromises are expected in the moderately
conservative area. Due to the differences between the sub-domain policy
positions, in particular between multi-culturalism compared to law and
order, we have to interpret our domain findings carefully.
As in societal affairs, the procedural differences in the domain of foreign
affairs vanished in the recent state elections. Union/FDP coalitions not only
have the median position, but also the two-thirds position in the entire
domain of foreign affairs. However, our analysis reveals a small gridlock
interval due to party consensus in this domain (except for the PDS in
defence and security issues).41 This means that we can generalise our foreign
affairs findings, although we identify different Bundesrat veto players in the
sub-domains of this area. The governmental agenda setter has almost
unlimited room for manoeuvre (see national starting points, middle starting
points and the extremely international status quo range). We accordingly
predict that the Schröder government can and will continue to promote
European integration and an international position in foreign affairs.
More detailed findings are summarised in Appendix XIII, which lists the
effects of the two procedures, the strong bicameral Zustimmungsgesetzgebung and the weak bicameral Einspruchsgesetzgebung. These
results also support our conceptual distinction between the three policy
domains, and in some cases we find evidence for differentiating between
sub-domains. This confirms that neither institutions nor preference profiles
alone explain German politics sufficiently in terms of gridlock and policy
change. It is rather the interaction between preference profiles and
institutions, which helps us to understand why the Red-Green coalition can
govern almost without constraints in foreign affairs, while reforms are
more unlikely in the economic domain.
In general, the Schröder government is still better off under 'weak'
bicameral settings in economic affairs, but proeedural arrangements have
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
105
lost their importanee in societal and foreign affairs sinee the 2003 state
eleetions. However, the distanees between the governmental agenda setter
and the veto players are partieularly signifieant in the eeonomic domain. For
this reason, we find more evidenee for gridloek in eeonomie affairs, while
we expeet more poliey change in societal and foreign affairs. The situation
in eeonomie affairs will only change if the Red-Green coalition ean win an
absolute majority in the Bundesrat or the eonservative opposition obtains a
two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat. In the latter and more like1y ease, our
findings of the Zustimmungsgesetzgebung ean be applied to the
Einspruchsgesetzgebung.
OUTLOOK
Our analysis of three poliey domains reveals different eauses and
eonsequenees for poliey change after the 2002 Bundestag and the 2003 state
eleetions in Hesse and Lower Saxony. In the economie and foreign poliey
domains, SPD and Greens have very dose preferenees. We aecordingly find
and prediet a stable eoalition as long as eeonomie and foreign issues
dominate German polities. In both domains, we uneovered eonsiderable
positional similarities at the sub-domain level, whieh means that we ean
generalise our domain-speeifie findings for the more speeifie sub-domain
level. In the societal domain, we identified more differenees between the
eoalition partners. On the one hand, this indieates more internal eoalition
problems for the Schröder government. On the other hand, the SPD ean seek
the support of the Union for soeietal reforms. However, we must take a
more eareful look at the thematie differenees when making predietions of
poliey change and gridloek at the sub-domain level. Our analysis of the
poliey positions reveals that the politieal parties have quite different poliey
positions and preference profiles aeross the poliey domains and subdomains. We identified a consensus pattern in foreign affairs, a polarised
party eonfiguration in the eeonomie domain, and a grand eoalition-type in
the societal domain.
Regarding poliey change and gridloek, we analysed the interplay
between the agenda-setter and the veto players in the Bundestag and
Bundesrat, and distinguished between strang and weak bieameral
arrangements. In the eeonomic domain, the Schröder government will have
immense problems reforming the obsolete labour and investment
regulations, in partieular in the strong bieameral Zustimmungsgestezgebung. The SPD and Greens prefer a eomparatively more stateoriented eeonomie poliey, while the Union dearly favours eeonomie
liberalisation. As the eonservative majority expanded in the Bundesrat in
February 2003, economie reforms are only likely, if the German eeonomie
106
GERMAN POLITICS
situation is extremely improving (Wirtschaftswunder) or worsening
(Wirtschaftskrise), which means that the status quo is moving further away.
In the rather unlikely event of a Wirtschaftwunder, the government would
be able to buy out the opposition, but in case of an economic crisis, the
govemment must move toward the Union's liberal position. This is,
however, risky for the Schröder government because the SPD holds a more
leftist veto player position in the Bundestag. In the other two domains, the
Schröder government has more potential for policy change for different
reasons, but the state elections in Hesse and Lower Saxony cancel out the
procedural differences between the Einspruchs- and Zustimmungsgesetzgebung. In the societal domain, the government has the support of the
Union against the more libertarian view of the small parties, while the
political parties share most views on foreign affairs.
Apart from our findings on German gridlock and policy change in three
domains, our study has a methodological focus as weIl. We presented a
method that enables us to make predictions on policy outcomes at an eady
stage based on reliable data. We started our analysis at the issue and subdomain level, which offers to make more specific predictions. Furthermore
we included assumptions on the behaviour of agenda setters and veto
players, because the reform proposals must pass the hurdles of the
strong and weak bicameral settings in the Zustimmungs- and
Einspruchsgesetzgebung. The bicameral institutions do matter, but it is
ultimately the interaction between specifically determined preference
profiles and institutions which helps us to understand why the Red-Green
coalition can govern almost without constraints in foreign affairs (without
weak bicameral settings), while reforms are unlikely in the economic
domain (in spite of partial weak bicameral settings). Whether our
predictions can be confirmed has to be shown by further empirical research.
Our results in terms of gridlock and policy change, however, seem to be
confirmed by the recent decisions on the original tax plans, modifications of
the labour market proposals as weIl as the international position of the
Schröder government in the Iraq conflict.
NOTES
The data and methods used and applied in this article were developed in the seminar 'Estimating
Policy Preferences' at the University of Konstanz in summer 2002. The authors would like to
acknowledge the assistance of Ina Spatz and Andrei Danila, who contributed to the preliminary
work, the coding and the data collection of the study.
I. Fritz W. Scharpf, 'The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European
Integration', Public Administration, 66/3 (1988), pp.239-87; Dieter Grimm, 'Ist der
Föderalismus wirklich schuld am Stillstand in der Republik?', Die Zeit, 52/42 (1997); Olaf
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
107
Henkel, 'Der Streit um den Föderalismus in Deutschland', Die Zeit, 52/30 (1997).
2. Thomas König and Thomas Bräuninger, 'Wie wichtig sind die Länder für die Politik der
Bundesregierung bei Einspruchs- und ZustimmungsgesetzenT, Zeitschrift für
Parlaments/ragen, 28/4 (1997), pp.605-28.
3. For a comparative analysis of the 1998 German elections and thereafter, see Thomas König,
'Regierungswechsel ohne politischen Wandel? Ein Vergleich des wirtschaftspolitischen
Handlungsspielraums der Regierung Kohl, einer Regierung Schröder, einer Großen
Koalition und einer SPD-Alleinregierung', Zeitschrift für Parlaments/ragen, 29/3 (1998),
pp.478-95.
4. Christine M. Harlen, 'Schröder's Economic Reforms: The End of ReformstauT , German
PoZitics, 11/1 (2002), pp.61-80; Stephen J. Silvia, 'The Fall and Rise of Unemployment in
Germany: Is the Red-Green Government ResponsibleT, German PoZitics, 11/1 (2002),
pp. 1-22.
5. Gebhard Ziller, 'Auch bei unterschiedlichen Konstellationen funktioniert alles ziemlich
reibungslos', Das Parlament, 48/39 (1998), p.14.
6. Scharpf, 'The Joint Decision Trap'.
7. Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth 0/ a Semisovereign
State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
8. Renate Mayntz, 'Politische Steuerbarkeit und Reformblockaden: Überlegungen am Beispiel
des Gesundheitswesens', Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, 1/3 (1990), pp.283-307.
9. Manfred G. Schmidt, 'The Parties-Do-Matter Hypothesis and the Case of the Federal
Republic of Germany', German Polities, 4/3 (1995), pp.I-21; Manfred G. Schmidt, 'West
Germany: The Policy of the Middle Way', Journal 0/ PubZic PoZicy, 7/2 (1987), pp. 139-77;
Manfred G. Schmidt, 'The Impact of Political Parties, Constitutional Structures and
Vetoplayers on Public Policy', in Hans Keman (ed.), Comparative Democratic PoZitics: A
Guide to Contemporary Theory and Research (London: Sage, 2002), pp.l66-84.
10. Gerhard Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat. Regelsysteme und
Spannungslagen im Institutionenge/üge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998).
11. Ibid., p.191.
12. James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus 0/ Consent: Logical Foundations 0/
Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Robert
McKelvey, 'Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for
Agenda Contro!', Journal 0/ Economic Theory, 12 (1976), pp.472-82.
13. George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997).
14. Thomas König, 'Bicameralism and Party Politics in Germany', Political Studies, 49/3
(2001), pp.41I-37.
15. Andrea Volkens, 'Parteiprogramme und Polarisierung', in Oskar Niedermeyer (ed.),
Intermediäre Strukturen in Ostdeutschland (Opladen: Leske + Budrich 1996), pp.215-36.
16. George Tsebelis, 'Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism,
Parliamentarism, MulticameraIism and Multipartyism', British Journal 0/ Political Science,
25/3 (1995), pp.289-325; George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work
(New York: Sage, 2002).
17. Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work,
18. Thomas Bräuninger and Thomas König, 'The Checks and Balances of Party Federalism:
German Federal Government in a Divided Legislature', European Journal 0/ Political
Research, 36/2 (1999), p.22 I.
19. Thomas König, 'Regieren im Föderalismus', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 35/13 (1999),
pp.24-36; Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), vol.2, pp.2386-402.
20. Bräuninger and König, 'The Checks and Balances of Party Federalism', pp.21G-I4.
21. Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.
22. Tsebelis, 'Decision Making in Political Systems'; George TsebeIis, 'Veto Players and Law
Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis', American Political
Seience Review, 93/3 (1999), pp.591-608.
108
GERM AN POLITICS
23. Regarding government declarations, see Thomas König, Andrea Volkens and Thomas
Bräuninger, 'Regierungserklärungen von 1949 bis 1998. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung
ihrer regierungsinternen und -externen Bestimmungsfaktoren" Zeitschrift für
Parlamentsfragen, 30/3 (1999), pp.65D-52.
24. Peter C. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory. An Introduction (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.25.
25. lan Budge, David Robertson and Derek Hearl (eds.), Ideology, Strategy and Party Change.
Spatial Analysis of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987).
26. Richard Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'The Policy Impact of Party Programmes
and Government Declarations in the Federal Republic of Gerrnany', European Journal of
Political Research, 18/3 (1990), pp.277-304.
27. Andrea Volkens, 'Quantifying the Election Programmes: Coding Procedures and Controls',
in lan Budge et al. (eds.), Mapping Policy Preferences - Estimates for Parties, Electors, and
Governments 1945-1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.93-109.
28. lan Budge, 'Theory and Measurement of Party Policy Positions', in Budge et al. (eds.),
Mapping Policy Preferences, pp.75-90.
29. lan Budge and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Finally! Comparative Over-Time Mapping of
Party Policy Movement', in Budge et al. (eds.), Mapping Policy Preferences, pp. 19-50.
30. Michael Laver and lohn Garry, 'Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts', American
Journal of Political Science, 44/3 (2000), pp.619-34.
31. Michael Laver, Kenneth Benoit and lohn Garry, 'Placing Political Parties in Policy Spaces',
www.politics.tcd.ie/kbenoit/fileslWordscoresAPSR I.pdf, 2002.
32. Results based on the traditional MRG/CMP approach for prior elections are given in HansDieter Klingemann and Andrea Volkens, 'Struktur und Entwicklung von Wahlprogrammen
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1998', in Oskar W. Gabriel, Oscar Niederrnayer
and Richard Stöss (eds.), Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, 2001), pp.507-27.
33. Hofferbert and Klingemann, 'The Policy Impact of Party Programmes'.
34. There was a joint election programme of the CDU and its Bavarian sister party CSU in
2002.
35. See www.rjcwJreeserve.co.uk.
36. Budge et al. (eds.), Mapping Policy Preferences, pp.219-28.
37. Andrea Volkens, 'Manifesto Research Since 1979: From Reliability to Validity', in Michael
Laver (ed.), Estimating the Policy Positions ofPolitical Actors (London: Routledge, 2001),
pp.33-49.
38. With the chancellor and cabinet principle, the position of the SPD would become generally
accepted, with the department principle the SPD position in the economic and societal
policies as weil as the Greens' position in the foreign policy domain.
39. Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages, pp.1781-7.
40. See Keith Krehbiel, 'Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided
and United Government', Journal ofTheoretical Politics, 811 (1996), pp.7-40; König and
Bräuninger, 'Wie wichtig sind die Länder für die Politik der Bundesregierung?', pp.617-20.
41. The divergences between SPD and Union can be explained by oUf data as weil despite a
very close position on the foreign policy scale. For this purpose we have to focus on the
results per sub-domain of the policy field (Annex X). The Union's position in security
politics is less supranational (+0.48) - i.e. with special emphasis on national solutions
including (in the eyes of leading Union politicians) a strong link to the United States - then
the SPD (+0.73), that favoured a solution of the lraq conflict through a mandate of the UN
Security Council. The same pattern is obvious in the sub-domain 'global affairs': The Union
amounts to +0.60, and the SPD to +0.75. The position of the PDS has to be explained as
weil: being a pacifist party, it is against NATO and wants to abandon Transatlantic Security
Cooperation. Thus, it has the less supranational position (--DA8) on the scale. On the other
hand, solutions for global problems are strongly encouraged (+0.77).
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
109
APPENDIX I
PARTY MANIFESTOS / SOUR CES
Social Democratic Party (SPD)
Erneuerung und Zusammenhalt - Wir in Deutschland,
Regierungsprogramm 2002 - 2006
regierungsprogramm.spd.de
Version 05/0612002
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (Union)
Leistung und Sicherheit - Zeit für Taten, Regierungsprogramm 200212006
www.cdu.de/regierungsprogramrn/
Version 06/0512002
Alliance'90lThe Greens (Greens)
Grün wirkt! Unser Wahlprogramm 2002 - 2006
www.gruene-partei.de/rsvgn/rs_rubrik/O••2255.OO.htm
Version 04/0612002
Free Democratic Party (FDP)
Bürgerprogramm 2002 - Programm der FDP zur Bundestagswahl 2002
www.fdp-bundesverband.de/grundsaetzliches/buergerprog.php
Version 29/0512002
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)
Es geht auch anders: Nur Gerechtigkeit sichert Zukunft!
Programm der PDS zur Bundestagswahl 2002
www.pds2002.de/positionen/programrn/index.htm
Version 19/0312002
APPENDIX II
ANALYSED TEXTS (ECONOMIC DOMAIN)
SPD
Word scores 55.52% (11,593 : 20,880)
Heading
Page
Präambel
Politik muss nachhaltig sein
I. Deutschlands Rolle in Europa und der Welt
1.2. Eine gerechte Weltordnung
1.3. Deutschland in Europa: Sozialmodell, Einigung
2. Wirtschaft und Beschäftigung
2.1. Wohlstand sichern und steigern
2.2. lndustrie- und Dienstleistungsstandort Deutschland
2.3. Mittelstand stärken
2.4. Wissen und Können aktivieren
2.5. Qualität der Arbeit
4
9
II
12
14
18
18
19
19
21
21
110
GERM AN POLITICS
3. Solide Finanzen und gerechte Steuern
3.1. Steuerreform 2003 und 2005
3.2. Steuergerechtigkeit und -ehrlichkeit
4. Arbeitsmarkt
4.1. Die Weichen sind gestellt
4.2. Die nächsten Schritte
4.3. Reform der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit
5. Rechte der Arbeitnehmer
6. Bildung und Qualifizierung
6.4. Ausbildungschancen
6.5. Mehr akademische Abschlüsse
6.6. Wichtige Säule Weiterbildung
7. Forschung, Innovation, Nachhaltigkeit
7. I. Werkstätten der Zukunft
7.2. Schlüsseltechnologien für die Märkte von morgen stärken
7.3. Nachhaltige Energiepolitik
7.4. Mobilität - integrierte Verkehrspolitik
7.5. Gesunde Umwelt
7.6. Moderne Landwirtschaft
8. Der Osten - ein starkes Stück Deutschland
8.2. Perspektiven für den Osten
8.3. Innovationspotentiale nutzen
8.4. Arbeit und Qualifikation
8.5. Infrastruktur ausbauen
8.6. Die Hälfte des Weges ist zurückgelegt
9. Lebensqualität in Städten und Gemeinden
9. I. Kommunale Handlungsspielräume in Europa erhalten
9.2. Gemeindefinanzreform
9.3. Arbeitslosenhilfe und Sozialhilfe verzahnen
9.4. Sozialhilfe reformieren - Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe stärken
9.6. Soziale Stadt
9.7. Bezahlbarer Wohnraum für alle
13. Generationen miteinander
13.1. Jugend braucht Chancen
13.2. Die Chancen des längeren Lebens: Für Qualifizierung ist es nie zu spät
14. Gleichstellung der Geschlechter
15. Für ein leistungsfähiges und solidarisches Gesundheitswesen
15.1. Solidarität erhalten
15.3. Die Finanzierungsgrundlage der GKV sichern
21
22
23
24
24
25
26
26
O. Präambel
1. Arbeit und Wohlstandfür alle
1.1. Motor für Wachstum und Arbeitsplätze: Programm '3 mal 40'
1.2. Steuerpolitik: gerecht und leistungsfördernd
1.3. Arbeitsmarkt: Chancen fördern, Hemmnisse abbauen
1.4. Zur Selbständigkeit ermutigen, Mittelstand stärken
1.5. Forschung auf Spitzenniveau - Innovationsoffensive für Deutschland
1.6. Bildung: Fundament für die Zukunft unserer Gesellschaft
1.7. Vertrauenswürdige, investitionsfreundliche Haushaltspolitik
2. Im Osten was Neues
3. Ein menschliches Deutschland gestalten
3.2. Gleichberechtigung verwirklichen
5. Lebenswerte Umwelt und gesunde Ernährung für uns und unsere Kinder
5.2. Landwirtschaft und ländliche Räume stärken
7. Vertrauen für Deutschland in Europa und in der Welt
7.1. Europa muss man richtig machen
7.4. Entwicklungspolitik und humanitäre Hilfe aktiv gestalten
32
37
50
52
64
64
72
27
30
31
31
Greens
Word scores: 51.43% (11,877 : 23,092)
32
Heading
Page
Präambel
8 für 8: Sie haben die Wahl
1. Ökologische Modernisierung
1.1. Lebenswerte Umwelt
1.1.2. Umwelt schafft Arbeit
1.1.3. Ein Land für die Sonne: Ausstieg aus der Atomenergie
1.1.4. Städte und Regionen nachhaltig entwickeln
1.1.5. Verkehrswende: Grüne Welle für Bus und Bahn
1.1.6. Ökologische Finanzreform
1.2. Wirksamer Verbraucherschutz, Gesunde Ernährung, Neue Landwirtschaft
1.2.3. Die neue Landwirtschaft
1.2.4. Ländliche Räume stärken
1.2.5. Agrarsubventionen reformieren
1.2.7. Die neue Landwirtschaft: den Welthunger bekämpfen
2. Soziale und wirtschaftliche Erneuerung
2.1. Mehr Arbeitsplätze, Soziale Sicherheit, Wirtschaftliche Erneuerung
2.1.1. Umwelt schafft Arbeit
2.1.2. Abbau der Arbeitslosigkeit
2.1.4. Soziale Grundsicherung einführen
2.1.6. Privathaushalte und kleine und mittlere Unternehmen entlasten
2.1.7. Kleine und mittlere Unternehmen fördern
2.1.8. Wirtschaften in der Wissensgesellschaft
2.1.9. Mitarbeiterbeteiligung stärken
2.1.10. Fairen Wettbewerbsrahmen schaffen
2.1.11. Lohnnebenkosten senken - Sozialversicherungen weiterentwickeln
2.1.12. Solidarische Gesundheitspolitik für die Zukunft
2.1.15. Haushalt konsolidieren und in die Zukunft investieren
2.1.16. Die Kommunen stärken
2.1.17. Die Finanzen neu ordnen
2.1.18. Fairer Steuerwettbewerb in Europa und weltweit
2.3. Gute Bildung, Verantwortliche Forschung, Lebendige Kultur
2.3.1. Eine neue Bildungsreform starten
2.3.2. Lebensbegleitendes Lernen
2.3.4. Qualität der Hochschulen verbessern
2.3.5. Wissenschaft als Beruf
2.3.7. Mehr Geld für Bildung und Forschung
2.3.8. Aktive Forschungspolitik für Mensch und Umwelt
2.4. Selbstbewusstes Ostdeutschland
2.4.2. Für ein solidarisches Gesamtdeutschland
2.4.3. Arbeitsplätze für Ostdeutschland
2.4.4. Die ostdeutsche Wohnungswirtschaft stützen
2.4.6. Die boomende Umweltbranche für Ostdeutschland nutzen
7
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
38
39
40
41
42
42
42
43
43
44
44
44
49
49
51
52
53
54
56
Union
Word scores: 50.52% (10,215 : 20,218)
Heading
111
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
Page
3
6
6
8
10
14
17
19
21
25
8
IO
11
12
13
15
16
18
24
25
27
27
28
29
30
31
31
34
36
37
38
38
38
39
40
43
43
44
44
49
50
51
51
52
53
54
56
57
57
58
59
112
GERM AN POLITICS
2.4.7. Forschungs- und Bildungsschwerpunkt Ostdeutschland
2.4.8. Eine Perspektive für die Jugend
2.4.10. Chancen der Osterweiterung
3. Gesellschaftliche Demokratisierung
3.2. Die Hälfte der Macht den Frauen
3.2.1. Chancengleichheit und Karriere
3.2.5. Geschlechtergerechtigkeit als Querschnittsaufgabe
4. Gerechte Globalisierung und Europäische Demokratie
4.1. Gerechte Globalisierung
4.1.2. Gerechter Welthandel und Agrarwende
4.1.3. Internationale Entwicklungsziele verfolgen
4.1.4. Entwicklung braucht Entschuldung
59
59
60
61
71
72
75
77
79
80
81
82
FDP
Word scores: 55.72% (17,947: 32,211)
Heading
Bereit zur Verantwortung
1. Politik für ein wirtschaftlich starkes Deutschland
1.1. Steuern runter - Jobs rauf
1.2. Arbeitsplätze schaffen statt Arbeitslosigkeit verwalten
1.3. Bürgergeld-Anreize für neue Arbeitsplätze
1.4. Sozialstart - Sicherungssysteme zukunftsfest machen
1.5. Entmonopolisierungs- und Wettbewerbsoffensive
1.6. Schlanker Staat - Starker Staat
1.7. Middlestand - Jobmaschine Nr. I
1.8. Neue Länder - Wirtschaftsstandort mit Zukunft
1.9. Wohneigentum für Alle
1.10. Der Landwirt muss wieder zum Unternehmer werden
1.12. Ökologische Marktwirtschaft
1.12.1. Nachhaltigkeit
1.12.2. Energie sinnvoll nutzen
2. Politik für ein innovatives Deutschland
2.1. Bildung ist eine Hauptaufgabe der Gesellschaft - und der Familie
2.1.2. Für eine solide Grundausbildung
2.1.3. Für Chancengleichheit
2.1.4. Für Innovationen
2.1.5. Leistungsstarke Schulen
2.2. Praxistaugliche Berufsausbildung
2.2.2. Verhältnis Staat - Wirtschaft verbessern
2.2.3. Das LE-GO-Modell - Flexible Regelungen mit Modulsystem
2.2.5. Berufsbildungsangebot erweitern
2.2.6. Strukturwandel an staatlichen Berufsschulen
2.2.13. Ausbildungsfinanzierung
2.3. Hochschule - Mehr Qualität durch Wettbewerb
2.3.3. WettbewerbsHihige Hochschulen sind wirtschaftlich
2.3.4. Wettbewerbsfähige Hochschulen sind profiliert
2.4. Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik - Chancen verantwortungsvoll nutzen
2.4.1. Forschung ist frei
2.4.2. Forschung im Wettbewerb
3. Politik für eine Verantwortungsgesellschaft
3.2. Familie und Steuern
3.5. Frauen
4. Politik für ein freies und sicheres Deutschland
Page
2
4
4
6
9
II
15
17
18
20
23
24
26
26
27
30
31
33
33
34
35
36
37
37
38
38
39
39
42
44
45
45
45
48
49
51
55
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
4.8. Föderalismus
5. Politik für ein bewegliches Deutschland
5.1. Kein Tempolimit bei Reformen
5.2. Mobilität und Privatisierung
5.3. Mobilität und Infrastruktur
5.4. Mobilität und Staat
5.5. Mobilität und Wirtschaft
5.8. Mobilität und Technik
6. Politik für eine freie Welt
6.1. Europa ist unsere Antwort auf die internationalen Herausforderungen
6.1.2. Europäische Osterweiterung
6.1.5. Europas Wirtschaft stärken
6.1.6. Europäische Agrar- und Strukturpolitik
6.3. Chancen der Globalisierung nutzen
6.3.1. Welthandel
6.3.2. Chancen der Globalisierung für die Entwicklungsländer nutzen
113
66
72
72
73
74
74
75
76
78
78
79
81
82
86
86
87
PDS
Word scores: 65.22% (8,963 : 13,743)
Heading
Page
Die Zeit drängt. Deutschland braucht Veränderung
1. Neue Arbeitsplätze - Basis für soziale Gerechtigkeit und Zukuriftsfähigkeit
1.1. Wirtschaftspolitische Instrumente beschäftigungspolitisch nutzen
1.2. Die Arbeitslosenzahl deutlich senken!
1.3. Demokratie und Menschenrechte müssen auch am Arbeitsplatz gelten
1.4. Den sozialen und ökologischen Umbau voranbringen
1.5. Öffentliche Haushalte nicht auf Kosten der Zukunft sanieren
1.6. Politische Handlungsfahigkeit durch eine sozial gerechte
und zukunftsorientierte Haushalts-, Finanz- und Geldpolitik erhöhen
2. Von Deutschlands Rand zu Europas Mitte: Ostdeutschland braucht Aufbruch
2.1. EU-Osterweiterung als Chance nutzen!
2.2. Innovationen und neue Wirtschaftsstrukturen für zukunftsHihige Produkte
2.3. Nicht bis 2004 warten, jetzt aktiv werden!
2.4. Politische Signale für einen neuen Aufbruch setzen!
3. Soziale Sicherheit gestalten heißt Selbstbestimmung garantieren
3.1. Das solidarische Fundament für die Einnahmen erneuern
3.2. Leben in Menschenwürde für alle
3.3. Kinderarmut beseitigen - eine Grundsich,erung für Kinder schaffen
3.5. Einkommen für Arbeitslose sichern
4. Selbstbestimmtes Leben durch Wissen und Kultur, Bildung und Forschung
4.2. Start in ein eigenverantwortliches Leben
4.3. Für eine verantwortungsbewusste Forschung
5. Freiheit, Demokratie und Sicherheit in der offenen Gesellschaft
5.3. Handlungsfähigkeit und Verantwortung von Städten und Gemeinden
5.5. Diskriminierungen beenden, Gleichstellung verwirklichen
6. Globale Probleme friedlich, kooperativ und gerecht lösen
6.1. Globalisierung gestalten
6.2. Keh.rtwende in der Entwicklungspolitik herbeiführen - Armut überwinden
6.5. Die europäische Chance nutzen
I
3
3
4
4
5
6
6
7
8
8
9
9
10
10
II
II
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
21
22
23
24
~---------------------------
GERM AN POLITICS
114
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
APPENDIX IV
TERMINOLOGY OF EACH POLITICAL PARTY (ECONOMIC DOMAIN)
APPENDIX III
COVERAGE OF SELECTED TEXTS (ECONOMIC DOMAIN)
Selected Texts
All Texts
SPD
Union
Unternehmen, 128, 0.211
Frauen, 108, 0.178
Wettbewerb, 81, 0.134
Hochschulen, 80, 0.132
Wirtschaft, 7 , 0.129
Bildung, 76, 0.125
Forschung, 75, 0.124
Arbeit, 69, 0.114
Arbeitsplätze, 62, 0.102
Ostdeutschland, 62, 0.102
Beschäftigung, 51, 0.084
Landwirtschaft, 48, 0.079
Sicherheit, 44, 0.073
Arbeitslosigkeit, 42, 0.069
Gerechtigkeit, 34, 0.056
Infrastruktur, 32, 0.053
Mittelstand, 32, 0.053
Arbeitnehmer, 25, 0.041
Anreize, 22, 0.036
Beteiligung, 18, 0.030
Eigenverantwortung, 18, 0.030
Privatisierung, 17, 0.028
Standards, 17, 0.028
Armut, 16, 0.026
Effizienz, 16, 0.026
Unternehmen, 148, 0.134
Frauen, 151, 0.137
Wettbewerb, 112, 0.102
Hochschulen, 104, 0.094
Wirtschaft, 93, 0.084
Bildung, 111, 0.101
Forschung, 102, 0.093
Arbeit, 98, 0.089
Arbeitsplätze, 75, 0.068
Ostdeutschland, 73, 0.066
Beschäftigung, 59, 0.054
Landwirtschaft,61, 0.055
Sicherheit, 147, 0.133
Arbeitslosigkeit, 52, 0.047
Gerechtigkeit,47, 0.043
Infrastruktur, 41, 0.037
Mittelstand, 36, 0.033
Arbeitnehmer, 31, 0.028
Anreize, 36, 0.033
Beteiligung, 34, 0.031
Eigenverantwortung, 29, 0.026
Privatisierung, 20, 0.018
Standards, 28, 0.025
Armut, 19, 0.017
Effizienz, 24, 0.022
Unternehmen, 27, 0.233
Frauen, 16, 0.138
Wettbewerb,7, 0.060
Hochschulen, 14, 0.121
Wirtschaft, 21, 0.181
Bildung, 2, 0.060
Forschung, 18, 0.155
Arbeit, 22, 0.190
Arbeitsplätze, 10, 0.086
Ostdeutschland, 13, 0.112
Beschäftigung, 22, 0.190
Landwirtschaft, 5, 0.043
Sicherheit, 14, 0.121
Arbeitslosigkeit, 11, 0.095
Gerechtigkeit, 8, 0.069
Infrastruktur, 3, 0.026
Mittelstand, 4, 0.035
Arbeitnehmer, 12, 0.104
Anreize, 4, 0.035
Beteiligung, 3, 0.026
Eigenverantwortung, 4, 0.035
Privatisierung, 0, 0,000
Standards, 2, 0.017
Armut, 3, 0.026
Effizienz, 3, 0.026
Unternehmen, 23, 0.225
Frauen, 8, 0.078
Wettbewerb, 11, 0.108
Hochschulen, 11, 0.108
Wirtschaft, 14, 0.137
Bildung, 9, 0.088
Forschung, 5, 0.049
Arbeit, 9, 0.088
Arbeitsplätze, 8, 0.078
Ostdeutschland, 10, 0.098
Beschäftigung, 10, 0.098
Landwirtschaft, 12, 0.117
Sicherheit, 15, 0.147
Arbeitslosigkeit, 8, 0.078
Gerechtigkeit, 1, 0.01
Infrastruktur, 4, 0.039
Mittelstand, 14, 0.137
Arbeitnehmer, 8, 0.078
Anreize, 4, 0.039
Beteiligung, 2, 0.020
Eigenverantwortung, 8, 0.078
Privatisierung, 2, 0.02
Standards, 2, 0.02
Armut, 1, 0.001
Effizienz, 0, 0.000
Note: First column = item, second column = absolute number, third column = relative frequency
ofitem.
115
Note: First column = item, second co1umn = absolute number, third column = relative frequency
ofitem.
Greens
FDP
Unternehmen, 19, 0.160
Frauen, 41, 0.345
Wettbewerb,12, 0.101
Hochschulen, 14, 0.118
Wirtschaft, 3, 0.025
Bildung, 19, 0.160
Forschung, 21, 0.177
Arbeit, 14, 0.118
Arbeitsplätze, 21, 0.177
Ostdeutschland, 18, 0.152
Beschäftigung, 5, 0.042
Landwirtschaft, 19, 0.160
Sicherheit, 5, 0.042
Arbeitslosigkeit, 8, 0.067
Gerechtigkeit, 17, 0.143
Infrastruktur, 8, 0.067
Mittelstand, 4, 0.034
Arbeitnehmer, 2, 0.017
Unternehmen, 47, 0.262
Frauen, 18, 0.100
Wettbewerb, 50, 0.279
Hochschulen, 36, 0.201
Wirtschaft, 31, 0.173
Bildung, 27, 0.150
Forschung, 17, 0.095
Arbeit, 14, 0.078
Arbeitsplätze, 13, 0.072
Ostdeutschland, 6, 0.033
Beschäftigung, 6, 0.033
Landwirtschaft, 8, 0.045
Sicherheit, 2, 0.011
Arbeitslosigkeit, 8, 0.045
Gerechtigkeit,2, 0.011
Infrastruktur, 16, 0.089
Mittelstand, 10, 0.056
Arbeitnehmer, 2, 0.011
116
Anreize, 8, 0.067
Beteiligung, 5, 0.042
Eigenverantwortung, 0, 0.000
Privatisierung, 0, 0.000
Standards, 3, 0.025
Armut, 8, 0.067
Effizienz, 2, 0.017
GERMAN POLITICS
Anreize, 6, 0.033
Beteiligung, 2, 0.011
Eigenverantwortung, 6, 0.033
Privatisierung, 10, 0.056
Standards, 5, 0.028
Armut, 3, 0.017
Effizienz, 9, 0.050
Note: First column =item, second column =absolute number, third column =relative frequency
ofitem.
PDS
Unternehmen, 12, 0.134
Frauen, 25, 0.279
Wettbewerb, I, 0.011
Hochschulen, 5, 0.056
Wirtschaft, 9, 0.100
Bildung, 14, 0.156
Forschung, 14, 0.156
Arbeit, 10, 0.112
Arbeitsplätze, 10, 0.112
Ostdeutschland, 15, 0.167
Beschäftigung, 8, 0.089
Landwirtschaft, 4, 0.045
Sicherheit, 8, 0.089
Arbeitslosigkeit, 7, 0.078
Gerechtigkeit, 6, 0.067
Infrastruktur, 1, 0.011
Mittelstand, 0, 0.000
Arbeitnehmer, 1, 0.011
Anreize, 1, 0.011
Beteiligung, 6, 0.067
Eigenverantwortung, 0, 0.000
Privatisierung, 5, 0.056
Standards, 5, 0.056
Armut, 1,0.011
Effizienz, 2, 0.022
Note: First column =item, second column =absolute number, third column
of item.
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
117
APPENDIX V
COMPARABLE MRG/CMP-SCHEME (ECONOMIC DOMAIN)
POSITIVE
NEGATIVE
MRG-Domain 4: Economy
MRG-Domain 4: Economy
Free Enterprise
Incentives
Market Regulation
Economic Planning
Corporatism
ProtectionismIPositive
Economic Goals
Keynesian Demand Management
Productivity
Technology and Infrastructure
Controlled Economy
Nationalisation
Economic Orthodoxy
Marxist Analysis
Anti-Growth Economy
ProtectionismlNegative
MRG-Domain 5:
Welfare and Quality of Life
MRG-Domain 5:
Welfare and Quality of Life
Social lustice
Welfare State Expansion
Welfare State Limitation
MRG-Domain 7: Sodal Groups
MRG-Domain 7: Sodal Groups
Labour GroupslPositive
Agriculture and Farmers
Middle Class and Professional Groups
Labour GroupslNegative
Source: See Ian Budge et al. (eds.), Mapping Policy Preferences - Estimates for Parties,
Electors, and Governments 1945-1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001),
pp.219-28.
=relative frequency
GERMAN POLITICS
118
APPENDIX VI
NEW SCHEME (ECONOMIC DOMAIN)
Part of State Activitym
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
APPENDIX VII
LIST OF CONNOTATIONS (ECONOMIC DOMAIN)
State Intervention
Sub-Domain Trade and Industry
Trade and Industry,oo
Standardsl03
Tenderingll16
Competition'.1
Planning ProcedUreSIl14
International Tradel07
Ownership,.,
SubsidieslO'
Employee Rights201
325-€-Jobs204
Employment Agencies207
Employee Participationwz
Working Hours,.,
Employment Programmes,..
RedistributionJOl
Provision,..
Unemployment BenefitJ07
Regional Standards of LivingJO'
Social Security ContributionsJO'
Social WelfareJOS
Scale of State Budget...1
Public Spending....
Debt""
Monetary Policy""
Income Tax,.,
Tax/lncorporated Firms51l4
Fiscal FederalisII1s07
First Tax Rate""
Corporation Tax""
HarmonizinglEU...
Vocational Training..,
Research Assignment604
Biotechnologies607
Promotion of Investments61.
University Education..,
Traffic Infrastructure...
Environmental Technologies...
Sub-Domain Sodal PolWes
Social PoliticsJOO
Level of IncomeJ03
Social InsuranceJ<16
HarmonisinglEU,..
Sub-Domain National Budget
Budget...
Annual Budget Deficit""
Sub-Domain Revenue
Revenue""
Top Earner Tax Rate""
Other TaxesS06
Financial Marketso.
Sub-Domain Future PolWes
Future Politics600
University Autonomy..,
Social Infrastructure...
Start-Up Promotion...
Middle
Positive Connotations
Liberalism
Subjects, Adjectives, Verbs
Sub-Domain Labour Market
Labour Market>oo
Low Pay BracketsZ03
Part-Time Employment206
Collective Bargaining209
119
Notes: 56 categories and each has a tripolar positional connotation:
Positions are State Intervention, Middle, Liberalism (see connotations Appendix VII)
Abstimmung
Ausgabensteigerung
Ausgleich
Balance
Bedarflbedürfen
Beteiligung
Chancengleichheit
Daseinsvorsorge
Fair
Garantie/garantieren
Gerechtigkeit/gerecht
Gestalten
Gleichheit/gleich
Grundversorgung
Intervention/intervenieren
Kaufkraft(stärkung)
Kontrolle/
Kontrollfunktion
Koordination
Leistungsfahigkeitsprinzip
Minimum
Nachfragepolitik
Pflicht
Regeln
Regulierung
Sanktionen
sicher(e Position)
(Grund-)Sicherung
Solidarität/solidarisch
Sozial
Sozialbindung
Sozialismus/sozialistisch
Staatlich(e Handlungsflihigkeit)
Steuererhöhung/-einführung
Steuerung
unterprivilegiertibenachteiligt
Unterstützung/unterstützen
unverzichtbar
Verbot
Wohlfahrtstaats-/ Sozialstaatsmodell
Zugang
Zusammenhalt
Zwanglzwingend
••• as weil as ...
Neutralising/
indistinct
connotations
Derzeitige Standards
(Weiter-)Entwicklung/
entwickeln
Erneuerung/erneuern
Förderung/fördern
intelligent(e Modelle)
Modernisierung/
modern(isieren)
Reform/reformieren
Verbesserung/
verbessern
Anreize
Anstoß
Antrieb
Äquivalenzprinzip
Bewegungsfreiheit
Deregulierung
Dezentral(isieren)
Effizienz/effizient
Eigentümer/eigen
Eigenverantwortung/
eigenverantwortlich
Entgeltprinzip
Erfolg
Erleichterung
Flexibilität/flexibel
Frei(er) Markt
Freigabe
Geldwert(stabilität)
Handlungsfreiheit
Konkurrenz
Konsolidierung
(Transfer-)Kürzung/Abbau
Leistungsorientierung
Leistungsprinzip
Leistungsträger
liberal(isieren)
Lohnabstandsgebot
Markt(mechanismus)
Mobilität/mobil
Nachtwächter(staat)
Ökonomische
Notwendigkeiten
Pauschale (Leistungen)
Preismechanismus
Privatwirtschaft
Selbständigkeit/selbständig
Selbsthilfe
Sparen
Spielräume
Steuersenkung/abschaffung
Subsidiarität
Unabhängigkeit!
unabhängig
Unternehmensgeist
Vereinfachung
Wirtschaftlichkeit
Zurücknehmen
GERMAN POLITICS
120
State Intervention
Middle
Liberalism
Negative Connotations
Subjects, Adjectives, Verbs
Ausbeutung
AusschlusslAusschließung
(Prekäre)
Beschäftigungsverhältnisse
Dumping
EllbogenEntstaatlichung
Großunternehmen!
Kapitalgesellschaften
Kapitalismus
Kaputtsparen
Neo-liberal(ismus)
Technikfolgen
(Schmutziger) Wettbewerb
... as weil as ...
Neutralisingl
indistinct
connotations
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
APPENDIX VIII
CODING RULES AND CODING EXAMPLES (ECONOMIC DOMAIN)
1.
Alimentierungen
Besitzstandswahrung
Bremsklotz
BürokratielBürokratismus
EinmischenlEingreifen
Gängelunglgängeln
Gleichmacherei!
Egalitarismus
Inflexibilität
Planwirtschaft
Strukturkonservativ(ismus)
Verpflichtungen!
Verbindlichkeiten
Verwaltung
121
Quasi-Sentences are coding units. They include complete sentences and parts of them (in
case of new iternlargument).
Die Besteuerung des Trinkgeldes
506+
und die Bauabzugsteuer werden abgeschafft.
506+
2.
The division of Quasi-Sentences should be complete.
3.
Each Quasi-Sentence is used for only one category.
4.
An includedlrelated sentence, which has amiddie position, receives the same coding as the
related coding with other position (sentences without position are disregarded).
5.
Den sich global zusammenschließenden Konzernen wollen wir global
zusammenarbeitende Wettbewerbsbehörden als wirksame Kontrollinstanzen
entgegenstellen.
107-
Wir unterstützen die EU-Kommission in ihrem Anliegen, die Zusammenarb
eit der nationalen Kartellbehörden untereinander zu verbessern.
107-
Example for category 999 (highest level according to scheme)
Der Staat muss sich aus vielen Bereichen zurückziehen, in denen er heute
kostenträchtig tätig ist.
6.
999+
Example for category 300 (middle level according to scheme)
Soziale Sicherheit bleibt für die PDS eine unverzichtbare eigenständige
Aufgabe in einem demokratischen Staat.
Note: State Intervention (-), Middle position (=), Liberalism (+)
300-
122
123
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
GERM AN POLITICS
APPENDIX X
POSITIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
APPENDIX IX
ALGORITHM FOR LOCATION OF POSITIONS
Economic Affairs: Positions of SPD
Distance measure for item (pos( i))
Category
State Intervention
Middle
Liberalism
Staatsrolle
9
4
7
31
0
3
0
12
0
0
0
16
25
14
1
0
4
0
0
0
6
31
6
0
0
9
5
2
0
9
56
16
8
10
0
1
4
2
0
13
2
46
20
2
0
1
0
2
6
10
3
2
21
7
0
0
5
0
2
2
4
1
0
33
15
1
3
2
4
1
2
0
4
1
27
16
0
0
1
0
2
I
3
4
0
13
4
2
0
0
0
0
7
1
0
2
0
0
13
Value
(freq+ - freqJ
pos (i) =
I
I
-0.33
(freq+ - freqJ + freq=
Trade and Industry
Sub·Domain
IndustrielHandel
Wettbewerb
Eigentum
Standards
Planungsverfahren
Subventionen
Öffentliche Aufträge
Welthandel
I
Distance measure for subdomain (pos(s))
1) Arithmetic mean (of sub-domain items): pos (s)M = 1In L pos (i) , i
E S
2) Weighted mean (referring to colurnn sum of items)
(L freq+ (i) - L freq. (i) )
pos (s)w =
I(L
freq+ (i) - L freq. (i)
I
'
i
ES
+ L freq= (i)
I)
Arithmetic mean (of all items): pos (d)M = 1In L pos (i) , i E d
2) Weighted mean (referring to colurnn sum of items)
(L freq+ (i) - L freq. (i) )
pos (d)w =
I(L freq+ (i) - L freq. (i) ~
Labour Market
Sub-Domain
Arbeitsmarkt
Arbeitnehmer-Rechte
Arbeitnehmer-Mitbestimmung
Niedriglohn-Gruppen
325-€-10bs
Arbeitszeit
Teilzeit
Arbeitsvermittlung
Beschäftigungsprogramme
Tarifvertragswesen
I
Distance measure for policy dimension (pos(d))
,iEd
+ L freq= (i)
Annotation:
If freq_ = freq+ > 0
A
freq= = 0, we note '0.00' in spite of the actual resul!.
Abbrevations:
freq-:
freq=:
freq+:
Frequency State InterventionlLibertarianlNational position
Frequency Middle position
Frequency LiberalismlConservative/Supranational position
i:
s:
d:
Hem (category)
Sub-domain
Policy dimension
Sodal Politics
Sub-Domain
Sozialpolitik
Redistribution
Regionale Standards
Einkommens-Niveau
Vorsorge
Sozialversicherungsbeiträge
Sozialversicherungspflicht
Arbeitslosenhilfe
Sozialhilfe
Harmonisierung/EU
I
National Budget
Sub-Domain
Haushalt
Staatsquote
Schulden
Neuverschuldung
Konsumptive Ausgaben
I
2
0
0
0
1
4
0
1
5
0
0
0
10
3
0
Weight. Value
0.00
+0.30
-0.75
-0.43
+1.00
+1.00
-0.54
Item·mean
+0.10
Weight. Value
-0.43
-0.31
-0.80
-1.00
+0.83
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
+0.29
-0.80
-0.50
Item-mean
-0.38
Weight. Value
-0.43
-0.45
-1.00
-1.00
-0.67
-1.00
+0.60
-0.67
+0.25
+0.20
-1.00
Item·mean
-0.47
Weight. Value
+0.56
-0.67
+0.83
+1.00
GERMAN POLITICS
124
Geldpolitik
Revenue
I Sub-Domain
(Staats-)Einnabmen
Einkommensteuer (ESt allg.)
ESt-Eingangsteuersatz
ESt-Spitzensteuersatz
ESt Personengesellschaften
Körperschaftsteuer
Andere Steuern
Fiskalföderalismus
Harmonisierung/EU
Finanzmarkt
Future Politics
I Sub-Domain
Zukunftspolitik
Ausbildungsplätze
Studienplätze
Hochschulautonomie
Forschungsaufträge
Verkehrs-Infrastruktur
Soziale Infrastruktur
Bio-Technologien
Umwelt-Technologien
Start-Up Förderung
Investitionsförderung
Economic Affairs
I Domain
4
2
12
4
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
3
2
5
1
61
0
7
6
0
0
9
12
4
21
I
1
206
40
0
9
5
0
6
3
1
9
2
4
I
153
0
19
1
13
0
0
1
2
2
0
0
0
41
0
2
0
2
13
3
1
11
0
5
4
145
-0.33
Item-mean
+0.21
Weight. Value
+0.64
+0.50
+1.00
0.00
-1.00
+1.00
+1.00
-1.00
-0.67
-1.00
-0.50
Item-mean
-0.07
Weight. Value
-0.33
-0.36
-0.55
+1.00
+0.68
-0.67
-0.92
+0.44
-0.91
+0.50
+0.75
Item-mean
0.00
Weight. Value
-0.29
Item-mean
-0.16
Labour Market
Sub-Domain
Arbeitsmarkt
Arbeitnehmer-Rechte
Arbeitnehmer-Mitbestimmung
Niedriglohn-Gruppen
325-€-lobs
Arbeitszeit
Teilzeit
Arbeitsvermittlung
Beschäftigungsprogramme
Tarifvertragswesen
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
38
22
3
3
0
2
0
0
0
5
3
27
9
1
3
3
5
0
2
2
2
0
Soda1 Politics
Sub-Domain
Sozialpolitik
Redistribution
Regionale Standards
Einkommens-Niveau
Vorsorge
Sozialversicherungsbeiträge
Sozialversicherungspflicht
Arbeitslosenhilfe
Sozialhilfe
HarmonisierunglEU
9
4
0
0
4
0
1
0
0
0
0
11
2
1
23
8
0
1
2
1
6
0
5
0
0
I
I
I
2
1
3
0
1
0
0
National Budget
Sub-Domain
Haushalt
Staatsquote
Schulden
Neuverschuldung
Konsumptive Ausgaben
Geldpolitik
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
3
2
1
0
0
0
0
15
8
0
1
1
1
4
Revenue
Sub-Domain
(Staats-)Einnahmen
Einkommensteuer (ESt allg.)
ESt-Eingangsteuersatz
ESt-Spitzensteuersatz
ESt Personengesellschaften
Körperschaftsteuer
Andere Steuern
Fiskalföderalismus
Harmonisierung/EU
Finanzmarkt
2
0
0
0
0
0
I
1
0
0
0
14
3
4
0
1
1
0
1
3
I
0
39
5
12
1
0
5
0
8
8
0
0
I
Economic Affairs: Positions of CDU/CSU (Union)
I
Categor
Staatsrolle
Trade and Industry
Sub-Domain
IndustrielHandel
Wettbewerb
Eigentum
Standards
Planungsverfahren
Subventionen
Öffentliche Aufträge
Welthandel
I
State Intervention
Middle
Liberalism
0
2
7
15
9
0
0
3
0
3
0
0
23
11
I
0
2
0
6
0
3
44
15
4
4
13
6
0
0
2
Value
+0.78
Weight. Value
+0.56
+0.35
+0.80
+1.00
+0.83
+1.00
-0.33
+0.40
125
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
Future Politics
Sub-Domain
I
9
39
40
Item-mean
+0.58
Weight. Value
+0.40
+0.29
+0.25
+0.25
+1.00
+0.71
+1.00
+1.00
+0.29
0.00
Item-mean
+0.53
Weight. Value
0.56
+0.67
0.00
+0.50
-0.50
+0.50
+0.63
+0.83
Item-mean
+0.38
Weight. Value
+0.81
+0.75
0.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.79
Weight. Value
+0.73
+0.63
+0.75
+1.00
0.00
+0.83
-1.00
+0.88
+0.73
0.00
Item-mean
+0.42
Weight. Value
+0.44
GERM AN POLITICS
126
Zukunftspolitik
Ausbildungsplätze
Studienplätze
Hochschulautonomie
Forschungsaufträge
Verkehrs-Infrastruktur
Soziale Infrastruktur
Bio-Technologien
Umwelt-Technologien
Start-Up Förderung
Investitionsförderung
0
1
0
0
1
2
5
0
0
0
0
Economic Affairs
1: Domain
39
1
4
1
2
8
4
6
3
1
5
5
1
6
I
1
0
14
5
2
2
6
I
130
195
+0.50
+0.33
+0.50
+0.67
+1.00
+0.13
+0.17
+0.60
+0.33
+0.45
+0.83
Item-mean
+0.50
Weight. Value
+0.55
Item-mean
+0.53
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
Redistribution
Regionale Standards
Einkommens-Niveau
Vorsorge
Sozialversicherungsbeiträge
Sozialversicherungspflicht
Arbeitslosenhilfe
Sozialhilfe
Harmonisierung/EU
3
7
1
2
4
5
0
19
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
3
4
0
0
0
0
1
11
0
0
2
0
National Budget
1: Sub-Domain
Haushalt
Staatsquote
Schulden
Neuverschuldung
Konsumptive Ausgaben
Geldpolitik
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
9
0
0
9
0
0
0
127
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
+0.64
-1.00
0.00
-D.81
Item-mean
-0.64
Weight. Value
+0.90
+0.90
Item-mean
+0.90
Economic Affairs: Positions of Alliance '90trhe Greens (Greens)
Revenue
Category
Middle
Liberalism
5
5
0
83
4
0
0
43
0
1
3
32
27
6
1
0
9
0
6
26
1
9
1
2
1
10
0
2
State Intervention
Staatsrolle
Trade and Industry
1: Sub-Domain
IndustrielHandel
Wettbewerb
Eigentum
Standards
Planungsverfahren
Subventionen
Öffentliche Aufträge
Welthandel
0
5
Labour Market
1: Sub-Domain
Arbeitsmarkt
Arbeitnehmer-Rechte
Arbeitnehmer-Mitbestimmung
Niedriglohn-Gruppen
325-€-lobs
Arbeitszeit
- Teilzeit
Arbeitsvermittlung
Beschäftigungsprogramme
Tarifvertragswesen
Sodal Politics
1: Sub-Domain
Sozialpolitik
20
8
I
I
I
0
1
3
0
5
0
54
13
37
23
0
2
0
0
2
3
2
5
0
20
9
9
3
0
0
1
2
0
0
I
2
0
14
0
1: Sub-Domain
28
17
15
(Staats-)Einnahmen
Einkommensteuer (ESt allg.)
ESt-Eingangsteuersatz
ESt-Spitzensteuersatz
ESt Personengesellschaften
Körperschaftsteuer
Andere Steuern
Fiskalföderalismus
Harmonisierung/EU
Finanzmarkt
2
5
0
0
0
1
11
0
8
I
6
0
0
1
0
1
6
I
0
4
0
3
0
0
0
Value
-0.50
Weight. Value
-0.68
-D.33
+0.90
+1.00
-D.82
+1.00
+0.60
-1.00
-D.86
Item-mean
+0.06
Weight. Value
-0.23
-0.18
-1.00
-D.33
0.00
+1.00
-0.33
-0.50
+0.33
-0.38
Item-mean
-0.15
Weight. Value
-0.67
-0.59
0
5
4
1
0
Future Politics
1: Sub-Domain
Zukunftspolitik
Ausbildungsplätze
Studienplätze
Hochschulautonomie
Forschungsaufträge
Verkehrs-Infrastruktur
Soziale Infrastruktur
Bio-Technologien
Umwelt-Technologien
Start-Up Förderung
Investitionsförderung
126
0
5
14
2
8
28
19
16
32
L.
0
61
3
3
8
I
8
6
4
20
6
2
14
0
0
0
4
2
0
I
0
0
4
3
316
168
87
0
Economic Affairs
1: Domain
Weight. Value
-0.43
-D.14
+1.00
+1.00
0.00
+1.00
-1.00
-D.62
0.00
-D.89
-1.00
Item-mean
-0.07
Weight. Value
-0.65
-D.63
-D.82
+0.20
-D.86
-ü.78
-ü.75
-ü.80
-ü.62
+0.25
+0.60
Item-mean
-0.42
Weight. Value
-0.58
Item-mean
-0.23
GERM AN POLITICS
128
Economic Affairs: Positions of FDP
Category
State Intervention
Staatsrolle
Trade and Industry
Sub-Domain
IndustrielHandel
Wettbewerb
Eigentum
Standards
Planungsverfahren
Subventionen
Öffentliche Aufträge
Welthandel
I
Labour Market
Sub-Domain
Arbeitsmarkt
Arbeitnehmer-Rechte
Arbeitnehmer-Mitbestimmung
Niedriglohn-Gruppen
325-€-lobs
Arbeitszeit
Teilzeit
Arbeitsvermittlung
Beschäftigungsprogramme
Tarifvertragswesen
I
Sodal Politics
I Sub-Domain
Sozialpolitik
Redistribution
Regionale Standards
Einkommens-Niveau
Vorsorge
Sozialversicherungsbeiträge
Sozialversicherungspflicht
Arbeitslosenhilfe
Sozialhilfe
HarmonisierunglEU
National Budget
Sub-Domain
Haushalt
Staatsquote
Schulden
Neuverschuldung
Konsumptive Ausgaben
Geldpolitik
I
Middle
Liberalism
0
6
34
2
15
6
1
1
2
0
4
0
1
120
18
12
26
25
2
13
4
20
I
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
I
0
12
3
4
I
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
60
11
10
2
I
I
2
2
8
13
10
0
0
0
18
6
0
0
1
52
13
0
0
I
I
0
0
0
2
0
2
10
9
3
4
12
0
4
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
2
5
0
I
1
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
I
I
I
6
I
VaIue
+0.85
Weight. VaIue
+0.89
+0.74
+0.92
+0.96
+0.92
+1.00
+0.76
+1.00
+0.95
Item-mean
+0.91
Weight. VaIue
+0.83
+0.79
+0.71
+0.67
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+0.80
+0.86
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.88
Weight. Value
+0.73
+0.67
+0.50
+0.90
+0.82
+0.75
+0.67
+0.67
Item-mean
+0.71
Weight. Value
+0.90
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
0
+0.50
Item-mean
129
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
Revenue
I Sub-Domain
(Staats-)Einnahmen
Einkommensteuer (ESt allg.)
ESt-Eingangsteuersatz
ESt-Spitzensteuersatz
ESt Personengesellschaften
Körperschaftsteuer
Andere Steuern
Fiskalföderalismus
HarmonisierunglEU
Finanzmarkt
4
1
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
9
4
3
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
73
19
11
0
1
4
1
21
12
0
4
Future Politics
I Sub-Domain
Zukunftspolitik
Ausbildungsplätze
Studienplätze
Hochschulautonomie
Forschungsaufträge
Verkehrs-Infrastruktur
Soziale Infrastruktur
Bio-Technologien
Umwelt-Technologien
Start-Up Förderung
Investitionsförderung
24
3
2
2
2
0
7
I
I
3
0
3
48
4
6
5
3
8
0
2
138
11
9
7
21
17
35
6
5
19
4
4
Economic Affairs
Domain
36
109
486
I
I
15
3
I
+0.88
Weight. VaIue
+0.88
+0.82
+0.75
0.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+0.95
+1.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.84
Weight. Value
+0.70
+0.67
+0.54
+0.50
+0.86
+0.94
+0.65
+0.63
+0.80
+0.67
+1.00
+0.33
Item-mean
+0.69
Weight. Value
+0.81
Item-mean
+0.81
Economic Affairs: Positions of PDS
Category
Staatsrolle
Trade and Industry
Sub-Domain
IndustrielHandel
Wettbewerb
Eigentum
Standards
Planungsverfahren
Subventionen
Öffentliche Aufträge
Welthandel
I
Middle
LiberaIism
6
0
0
63
14
17
9
0
0
2
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
State Intervention
I
9
7
0
1
8
23
I
I
3
2
0
2
Value
-1.00
Weight. Value
-078
-0.61
-1.00
-1.00
-0.78
0.00
-0.73
-0.91
Item-mean
-0.72
GERMAN POLITICS
130
Labour Market
I: Sub-Domain
Arbeitsmarkt
Arbeitnehmer-Rechte
Arbeitnehmer-Mitbestimmung
Niedriglohn-Gruppen
325-€-Jobs
Arbeitszeit
Teilzeit
Arbeitsvermittlung
Beschäftigungsprogramme
Tarifvertragswesen
46
8
8
4
4
0
7
3
0
5
7
27
20
2
I
0
0
0
I
I
I
I
1
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
Sodal Politics
I: Sub-Domain
Sozialpolitik
Redistribution
Regionale Standards
Einkommens-Niveau
Vorsorge
Sozialversicherungsbeiträge
Sozialversicherungspflicht
Arbeitslosenhilfe
Sozialhilfe
HarmonisierunglEU
National Budget
I: Sub-Domain
Haushalt
Staatsquote
Schulden
Neuverschuldung
Konsumptive Ausgaben
Geldpolitik
104
36
4
10
8
15
3
9
5
10
4
17
4
0
0
0
0
5
0
4
3
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
4
0
4
2
2
3
4
I
0
2
0
0
I
2
0
0
I
I
0
0
25
2
3
0
0
0
4
7
4
2
3
3
0
I
0
0
0
0
I
I
0
0
7
I
I
I
0
I
0
3
0
0
0
Revenue
I: Sub-Domain
(Staats-)Einnahmen
Einkommensteuer (ESt allg.)
ESt-Eingangsteuersatz
ESt-Spitzensteuersatz
ESt Personengesellschaften
Körperschaftsteuer
Andere Steuern
Fiskalföderalismus
HarrnonisierunglEU
Finanzmarkt
Future Politics
I: Sub-Domain
Zukunftspolitik
Ausbildungsplätze
72
9
7
28
10
2
3
0
0
Weight. Value
-0.63
-0.29
--0.80
--0.80
-1.00
-1.00
--0.75
0.00
--0.83
--0.88
Item-mean
-0.71
Weight. Value
-0.86
--0.90
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
--0.38
-1.00
--0.56
--0.77
--0.80
Item-mean
-0.84
Weight. Value
-0.76
--0.80
7
I
12
7
7
7
9
2
4
0
3
0
3
2
3
0
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
I
I
331
96
16
Studienplätze
Hochschulautonomie
Forschungsaufträge
Verkehrs-Infrastruktur
Soziale Infrastruktur
Bio-Technologien
Umwelt-Technologien
Start-Up Förderung
Investitionsförderung
Economic Affairs
I: Domain
+1.00
-1.00
--0.80
--0.80
-1.00
-1.00
Item-mean
-0.47
Weight. Value
-0.71
--0.47
--0.78
-1.00
-0.25
-1.00
-0.70
-0.78
--0.67
-1.00
--0.25
--0.60
Item-mean
-0.68
Weight. Value
-0.77
Item-mean
-0.71
Sodetal Affairs: Positions of SPD
Category
Libertarian
Middle
Conservative
Immigration
I: Sub-Domain
Einwanderung
Ausländer
Demographie
Ausländische Studenten
Einwanderungsland
Einwanderungsgesetz
1
0
0
0
0
I
0
6
4
0
0
0
0
2
4
3
0
0
0
0
I
10
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
2
I
0
2
I
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
2
0
3
0
2
I
0
I
0
Multi-Culturalism
--0.60
-1.00
-1.00
--0.75
Item-mean
-0.83
Weight. Value
-0.86
-1.00
--0.67
+1.00
131
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
I: Sub-Domain
Multikulturell
Multinational
Toleranz
Offenheit
Anpassung
Assimilation
Ausländisch
Religion
Minderheiten
Vielfalt
Ausländerfreundlich
Weltoffen
Pluralismus
Ethnisch
Leitkultur
Extremism Fight
I: Sub-Domain
(Rechts-)Extremismus
Faschismus
Rassismus
Antisemitismus
0
0
0
0
0
Value
Weight. Value
+0.33
+0.43
-1.00
+0.33
Item-mean
-0.08
Weight. Value
-0.71
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
--0.33
0.00
--0.67
-1.00
Item-mean
-0.71
Weigt. Value
-0.71
--0.67
--0.75
132
GERM AN POLITICS
Fremdenfeindlichkeit
Traditional moral
I Sub-Domain
Kirche
Abtreibung
Moral
Religion
Christentum
Lebensweise
Prostitution
Homosexualität
Traditionelle Familie
0
0
2
0
0
5
3
0
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
2
I
0
0
0
Law and Order
I Sub-Domain
Polizei(beamte)
Jugendschutz(-Gesetz)
Drogen
Gerichte
Terrorismus
Rechtsstaat
Strafen
Innere Sicherheit
Kriminelle
Verbrechen
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
Education Politics
Sub·Domain
Budgetsteigerung
Schulautonomie
Neue Technologien
Internationale Hochschulen
Neue Forschungsfelder
Geschlechterforschung
Private Investitionen
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
Societal Affairs
Domain
I
0
18
7
2
0
0
0
0
I
0
I
24
20
2
0
3
I
0
3
2
3
0
6
7
I
I
2
0
I
Item-mean
-{I.71
Weight. Value
0.00
0.00
-1.00
+0.67
Item·mean
-(I.21
Weight. Value
+0.74
+0.50
+1.00
+1.00
+0.75
+1.00
+0.75
+0.67
Item-mean
+0.81
Weight. Value
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
0
2
33
+1.00
Item-mean
+1.00
Weight. Value
+0.38
Item-mean
+0.11
Immigration
I Sub-Domain
Einwanderung
Ausländer
Demographie
Libertarian
3
0
2
0
Multi-CuIturalism
Sub·Domain
Multikulturell
Multinational
Toleranz
Offenheit
Anpassung
Assimilation
Ausländisch
Religion
Minderheiten
Vielfalt
Ausländerfreundlich
Weltoffen
Pluralismus
Ethnisch
Leitkultur
Extremism Fight
Sub·Domain
(Rechts-)Extremismus
Faschismus
Rassismus
Antisemitismus
Ausländerfeindlichkeit
I
Middle
5
2
3
0
Conservative
10
9
0
0
Value
Weight. Value
+0.58
+0.82
-ü.40
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
11
0
0
3
I
I
I
I
0
0
I
2
0
0
0
0
0
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
I
0
0
0
I
I
0
0
0
2
I
4
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Law and Order
Sub-Domain
Polizei(beamte)
Jugendschutz(-Gesetz)
Drogen
Gerichte
Terrorismus
Rechtsstaat
Strafen
Innere Sicherheit
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
-1.00
+1.00
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
Traditional Moral
Sub-Domain
Kirche
Abtreibung
Moral
Religion
Christentum
Lebensweise
Prostitution
Homosexualität
Traditionelle Familie
I
I
Societal Affairs: Positions of CDU/CSU (Union)
Category
Ausländische Studenten
Einwanderungsland
Einwanderungsgesetz
I
-ü.50
133
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
I
0
3
4
0
0
0
3
35
7
0
3
0
10
0
I
2
Item-mean
+0.11
Weight. Value
+0.60
0.00
-1.00
+1.00
+0.75
+0.50
+0.75
-ü.50
Item-mean
+0.21
Weight. Value
-{I.50
-1.00
-ü.33
Item·mean
-(I.67
Weight. Value
+0.94
+1.00
+1.00
+0.75
+1.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.95
Weight. Value
+0.95
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
0.00
+1.00
+1.00
GERMAN POLITICS
134
Kriminelle
Verbrechen
0
0
0
0
I
11
Education Politics
Sub-Domain
Budgetsteigerung
Schulautonomie
Neue Technologien
Internationale Hochschulen
Neue Forschungsfelder
Geschlechterforschung
Private Investitionen
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
2
0
I
0
0
~
Societal AtTairs
~Domain
10
74
14
+1.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.88
Weight. Value
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+1.00
Weight. Value
+0.82
Item-Mean
+0.51
Sociaetal AtTairs: Positions of Alliance '90rrhe Greens (Greens)
Category
Immigration
~ Sub-Domain
Einwanderung
Ausländer
Demographie
Ausländische Studenten
Einwanderungsland
Einwanderungsgesetz
Libertarian
9
2
I
0
2
4
0
Middle
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Conservative
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Multi-Culturalism
~ Sub-Domain
Multikulturell
Multinational
Toleranz
Offenheit
Anpassung
Assimilation
Ausländisch
Religion
Minderheiten
Vielfalt
Ausländerfreundlich
Weltoffen
Pluralismus
Ethnisch
Leitkultur
21
2
0
5
I
0
0
2
0
3
4
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Extremism Fight
Sub-Domain
15
0
0
~
Value
Weight. Value
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
Item-mean
-1.00
Weight. Value
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
5
0
5
4
I
(Rechts-)Extremismus
Faschismus
Rassismus
Anti-semitismus
Ausländerfeindlichkeit
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
Item-mean
-1.00
Traditional Moral
~ Sub-Domain
Kirche
Abtreibung
Moral
Religion
Christentum
Lebensweise
Prostitution
Homosexualität
Traditionelle Familie
5
0
3
0
I
0
0
0
I
0
Law and Order
~ Sub-Domain
Polizei(beamte)
Jugendschutz(-Gesetz)
Drogen
Gerichte
Terrorismus
Rechtsstaat
Strafen
Innere Sicherheit
Kriminelle
Verbrechen
5
0
0
4
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
Education Politics
Sub-Domain
Budgetsteigerung
Schulautonomie
Neue Technologien
Internationale Hochschulen
Neue Forschungsfelder
Geschlechterforschung
Private Investitionen
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
10
I
I
0
5
I
I
I
55
5
12
~
2
I
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
2
I
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
135
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
Societal AtTairs
~Domain
-1.00
Weight. Value
-0.71
0.00
-1.00
-1.00
0.00
-1.00
Item-mean
-0.60
Weight. Value
-0.60
0.00
-1.00
+0.67
-1.00
Item-mean
-0.33
Weight. Value
+0.91
+1.00
+0.50
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.92
Weight. Value
-0.90
Item-mean
-0.48
Societal AtTairs: Positions of FDP
-1.00
Item-mean
-1.00
Weight. Value
-1.00
Category
Immigration
Sub-Domain
~
Libertarian
9
Middle
5
Conservative
1
Value
Weight. Value
-0.62
GERM AN POLITICS
136
Einwanderung
Ausländer
Demographie
Ausländische Studenten
Einwanderungsland
Einwanderungsgesetz
Multi-Culturalism
I Sub-Domain
Multikulturell
Multinational
Toleranz
Offenheit
Anpassung
Assimilation
Ausländisch
Religion
Minderheiten
Vielfalt
Ausländerfreundlich
Weltoffen
Pluralismus
Ethnisch
Leitkultur
Extremism Fight
I Sub-Domain
(Rechts-)Extremismus
Faschismus
Rassismus
Antisemitismus
Ausländerfeindlichkeit
Traditional Moral
Sub-Domain
Kirche
Abtreibung
Moral
Religion
Christentum
Lebensweise
Prostitution
Homosexualität
Traditionelle Familie
I
Law and Order
Sub-Domain
Polizei(beamte)
J ugendschutz(-Gesetz)
Drogen
Gerichte
Terrorismus
I
6
2
4
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
24
0
0
4
4
0
0
2
5
I
6
0
I
I
0
0
I
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
1
0
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
I
5
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
6
3
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
2
10
I
3
0
0
0
0
0
I
I
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
21
3
0
2
2
5
-D.56
-1.00
-1.00
0.00
Item-mean
-0.64
Weight. Value
-0.86
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-D.63
-1.00
-1.00
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
0
0
0
0
I
Rechtsstaat
Strafen
Innere Sicherheit
Kriminelle
Verbrechen
I
I
0
0
0
Education Politics
Sub-Domain
Budgetsteigerung
Schulautonomie
Neue Technologien
Internationale Hochschulen
Neue Forschungsfelder
Geschlechterforschung
Private Investitionen
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
43
26
35
I
Societal AfTairs
Domain
I
I
0
2
0
6
2
3
2
4
I
137
+1.00
+0.50
+0.86
Item-mean
+0.68
Weight. Value
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
0
I
-1.00
-D.50
+1.00
Item-mean
+1.00
Weight. Value
+0.24
Item-mean
-0.07
Societal AfTairs: Positions of PDS
Item-mean
-0.89
Weight. Value
-0.75
-D.50
-1.00
-1.00
Item-mean
-0.83
Weight. Value
-0.45
0.00
Category
Immigration
Sub-Domain
Einwanderung
Ausländer
Demographie
Ausländische Studenten
Einwanderungsland
Einwanderungsgesetz
I
Multi-Culturalism
Sub-Domain
Multikulturell
Multinational
Toleranz
Offenheit
Anpassung
Assimilation
Ausländisch
Religion
Minderheiten
Vielfalt
Ausländerfreundlich
Weltoffen
Pluralismus
Ethnisch
Leitkultur
I
-D.63
Item-mean
-0.32
Weight. Value
+0.66
+0.40
+0.67
+0.67
+0.63
Libertarian
Middle
Conservative
4
2
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
I
0
11
0
0
I
2
I
0
0
2
I
3
0
I
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Value
Weight. Value
-0.67
-1.00
-1.00
0.00
-1.00
Item-mean
-0.75
Weight. Value
-0.92
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-D.50
-1.00
-1.00
GERM AN POLITICS
138
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
139
Item-mean
~.93
Extremism Fight
1: Sub-Domain
(Rechts-)Extremismus
Faschismus
Rassismus
Antisemitismus
Ausländerfeindlichkeit
13
3
3
3
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Traditional Moral
1: Sub-Domain
Kirche
Abtreibung
Moral
Religion
Christentum
Lebensweise
Prostitution
Homosexualität
Traditionelle Familie
3
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Weight. Value
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
Item-mean
-1.00
Weight. Value
~.75
-1.00
-{).50
~.75
Law and Order
Polizei(beamte)
Jugendschutz(-Gesetz)
Drogen
Gerichte
Terrorismus
Rechtsstaat
Strafen
Innere Sicherheit
Kriminelle
Verbrechen
Education Politics
1: Sub-Domain
Budgetsteigerung
Schulautonomie
Neue Technologien
Internationale Hochschulen
Neue Forschungsfelder
Geschlechterforschung
Private Investitionen
Societal Affairs
LDomain
1
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
2
0
2
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
34
I
I
7
11
3
0
0
I
6
0
0
0
0
1
8
0
0
2
1
2
2
1
19
Category
National
Middle
Supranational
Defence and Security Politics
1: Sub-Domain
0
0
0
0
9
3
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
2
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
2
5
13
3
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
HandellWirtschaftlMärkte
Entwicklungspolitik
Menschenrechte
ÖkologielKlima
Migration/Flüchtlinge
Finanzen
Kultur
Völkerrecht
19
9
4
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
3
Foreign Affairs
LDomain
2
21
56
Sicherheit
Aufrüstung
Abrüstung
Rüstungspolitik
Bundeswehr
Streitkräfte
Bündnisse
Militärische Kooperation
Außenbeziehungen
Frieden
Terrorismus
Konfliktlösung/-management
2
0
0
0
0
I
24
6
0
3
I
0
0
3
0
5
3
0
3
European Union
Item-mean
1: Sub-Domain
Foreign Affairs: Positions of SPD
Weight. Value
+0.91
+1.00
-1.00
+1.00
+1.00
0.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.50
Weight. Value
+0.75
0.00
-1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
0.00
Item-mean
+0.43
Weight. Value
~.68
Item-Mean
-0.32
1: Sub-Domain
Erweiterung
Institutionelle Vertiefung
Zuständigkeiten
I
Global Affairs
L Sub-Domain
I
3
0
0
I
I
Value
Weight. Value
+0.71
+0.67
+1.00
+1.00
-{).25
+1.00
+0.71
+0.67
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.73
Weight. Value
+0.65
+1.00
+0.82
+0.17
Item-mean
+0.66
Weight. Value
+0.79
+0.90
+0.57
+1.00
0.00
+1.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.75
Weight. Value
+0.72
Item-mean
+0.72
Foreign Affairs: Positions of CDU/CSU (Union)
Category
National
Middle
6
2
0
0
0
9
0
2
0
0
Supranational
Defence and Security Politics
L Sub-Domain
Sicherheit
Aufrüstung
Abrüstung
Rüstungspolitik
18
8
3
0
0
Value
Weight. Value
+0.57
+1.00
+0.60
GERMAN POLITICS
140
Bundeswehr
Streitkräfte
Bündnisse
Militärische Kooperation
Außenbeziehungen
Frieden
Terrorismus
Konfliktlösung!-management
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
3
0
0
0
2
I
0
3
0
0
0
I
0
2
I
European Union
1: Sub-Domain
I
I
11
2
4
5
10
2
8
0
1: Sub-Domain
2
6
HandellWirtschaftJMärkte
Entwicklungspolitik
Menschenrechte
ÖkologielKlima
Migration/Flüchtlinge
Finanzen
Kultur
Völkerrecht
I
I
0
0
0
4
0
0
10
2
4
0
2
I
I
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Erweiterung
Institutionelle Vertiefung
Zuständigkeiten
2
0
Global Affairs
Foreign Affairs
1: Domain
10
I
38
26
-D.50
+1.00
+1.00
Defence and Security Politics
1: Sub-Domain
Sicherheit
Aufrüstung
Abrüstung
Rüstungspolitik
Bundeswehr
Streitkräfte
Bündnisse
Militärische Kooperation
Außenbeziehungen
Frieden
Terrorismus
Konfliktlösung/-management
European Union
National
5
0
0
0
0
2
I
0
0
0
2
0
0
Middle
Supranational
4
0
0
0
26
I
0
4
0
3
0
2
10
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
I
Erweiterung
Institutionelle Vertiefung
Zuständigkeiten
15
5
9
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
2
0
41
7
8
10
I
0
0
0
0
11
0
3
5
10
I
I
I
I
Global Affairs
1: Sub-Domain
HandellWirtschaftlMärkte
Entwicklungspolitik
Menschenrechte
ÖkologielKlima
MigrationIFlüchtlinge
Finanzen
Kultur
Völkerrecht
I
I
Foreign Affairs
1: Domain
82
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.96
Weight. Value
+0.89
Item-mean
+0.77
Foreign Affairs: Positions of FDP
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.60
Weight. Value
+0.52
Item-Mmean
+0.49
Value
Weight. Value
+0.84
+1.00
Category
National
Middle
Supranational
Defence and Security Politics
1: Sub-Domain
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
11
3
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
4
0
0
0
19
4
1: Sub-Domain
2
7
Erweiterung
Institutionelle Vertiefung
Zuständigkeiten
I
I
0
3
3
28
4
24
0
Sicherheit
Aufrüstung
Abrüstung
Rüstungspolitik
Bundeswehr
Streitkräfte
Bündnisse
Militärische Kooperation
Außenbeziehungen
Frieden
Terrorismus
Konfliktlösung!-management
I
0
0
0
3
6
0
I
I
0
3
0
I
+0.83
+0.83
+0.90
+0.50
Item-mean
+0.74
Weight. Value
+0.93
+1.00
+0.80
+1.00
+0.92
+1.00
0.00
Foreign Affairs: Positions of Alliance '90rrhe Greens (Greens)
Category
1: Sub-Domain
+0.75
0.00
0.00
Item-mean
+0.48
Weight. Value
+0.42
+0.50
+0.64
-D.l7
Item-mean
+0.32
Weight. Value
+0.57
+0.50
+0.50
141
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
+1.00
0.00
+1.00
-1.00
+1.00
European Union
I
+1.00
+1.00
Global Affairs
+0.63
Item-mean
+0.63
Weight. Value
1: Sub-Domain
6
HandellWirtschaftJMärkte
Entwicklungspolitik
Menschenrechte
I
I
0
5
2
I
0
20
10
4
3
Value
Weight. Value
+0.61
+0.57
+1.00
0.00
+1.00
+0.75
-0.20
+1.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.64
Weight. Value
+0.79
+0.75
+0.89
-D.25
Item-mean
+0.46
Weight. Value
+0.74
+0.82
+0.75
+1.00
GERMAN POLITICS
142
ÖkologielKlima
MigrationlFlüchtiinge
Finanzen
Kultur
Völkerrecht
2
0
0
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
I
1
0
0
1
Foreign Affairs
1: Domain
10
23
67
-0.33
+1.00
-1.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.46
Weight. Value
+0.71
Item-mean
+0.54
National
Middle
Supranational
Defence and Security Politics
1: Sub-Domain
Sicherheit
Aufrüstung
Abrüstung
Rüstungspolitik
Bundeswehr
Streitkräfte
Bündnisse
Militärische Kooperation
Außenbeziehungen
Frieden
Terrorismus
Konfliktlösung/-management
16
0
0
4
0
3
1
4
2
1
0
0
I
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
I
2
0
1
0
I
0
6
I
5
0
4
1
3
0
European Union
1: Sub-Domain
Erweiterung
Institutionelle Vertiefung
Zuständigkeiten
Global Affairs
1: Sub-Domain
HandellWirtschaftIMärkte
Entwicklungspolitik
Menschenrechte
ÖkologielKlima
MigrationIFlüchtlinge
Finanzen
Kultur
Völkerrecht
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
0
I
I
I
0
5
0
0
20
5
7
3
I
2
0
I
1
17
16
30
Foreign Affairs
1: Domain
Article 51 11 Basic Law
Value
Weight. Value
-0.83
State
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-0.33
+1.00
+1.00
-1.00
Item-mean
-0.48
Weight. Value
+0.33
+0.50
+0.29
Item-mean
+0.40
Weight. Value
+0.71
+1.00
+0.88
+0.75
+0.50
+1.00
0.00
+1.00
+1.00
Item-mean
+0.77
Weight. Value
+0.45
Item-mean
+0.14
143
APPENDIX XI
VOTING WEIGHTS IN THE BUNDESRAT
Minimum votes per state
With population over 2 million
With population over 6 million
With population over 7 million
Total Votes
Absolute Majority/
(decisive in Zustimmungsgesetzgebung)
Two-Thirds Majority
(decisive in Einspruchsgesetzgebung/
see article 77 IV Basic Law)
Foreign Affairs: Positions of PDS
Category
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
Baden-Württemberg
Bavaria
Berlin
Brandenburg
Bremen
Hamburg
Hesse
Mecklenburg-Vorpommem
Lower Saxony
North Rhine-Westphalia
Rhine1and-Palatine
Saarland
Saxony
Saxony-Anhalt
Schleswig-Holstein
Thuringia
3 Votes
4 Votes
5 Votes
/ 6 Votes
/ 69 Votes
/ 35 Votes
/ 46 Votes
Population
Votes
(mns)
10.65
12.38
3.39
2.58
0.66
1.73
6.09
1.75
7.98
18.07
4.05
1.07
4.36
2.56
2.81
2.40
6
6
4
4
3
3
5
3
6
6
4
3
4
4
4
4
Source: www.bundesrat.de/aktuell/Stimmen.html
Coalition
Prime
Minister
UnionIFDP
Union
SPDIPDS
SPDlUnion
SPDlUnion
UnionlPROIFDP
UnionIFDP
SPDIPDS
UnionlFDP
SPD/Greens
SPDIFDP
Union
Union
UnionIFDP
SPD/Greens
Union
Teufel
Stoiber
Wowereit
Platzeck
Scherf
von Beust
Koch
Ringstorff
Wulff
Steinbrück
Beck
Müller
Milbradt
Böhmer
Simonis
Vogel
GERMAN POLITICS
144
APPENDIX XII
OVERVIEW OF SUB-DOMAIN VETO PLAYERS
Law and Order
BTmsl
Economic Affairs
Trade and Industry
Labour Market
Social Politics
National Budget
Revenue
Future Politics
BTmeti
BTmel
BTmes
BTmeb
BTmer
BTmef
SPD
BTteti
BRmeti
BRteti
+0.10
Union
Union
SPDlUnion
+0.58
+0.58
+0.34
Education Politics
Geens
BTtel
BRmel
BRtel
-0.15
Union
Union
SPDlUnion
+0.53
+0.53
+0.08
Foreign Affairs
Defence and Security Politics BTmfds
SPD
BTtes
BRmes
BRtes
-0.47
Union
Union
SPDlUnion
+0.38
+0.38
-0.05
European Union
SPD
BTteb
BRmeb
BRteb
+0.21
Union
Union
Union
+0.79
+0.79
+0.79
Global Affairs
SPD/Greens
BTter
BRmer
BRter
-0.07
Union
Union
SPDlUnion
+0.42
+0.42
+0.18
SPD
BTtef
BRmef
BRtef
+0.00
Union
Union
SPDlUnion
+0.50
+0.50
+0.25
SPD
BTtsi
BRmsi
BRtsi
-0.08
Union
UnionIFDP
UnionIFDP
+0.11
-0.27
-0.27
SPD
BTtsm
BRmsm
BRtsm
-0.71
Union
UnionIFDP
UnionIFDP
+0.21
-0.34
-0.34
SPD
BTtsex
BRmsex
BRtsex
-0.71
Union
UnionIFDP
UnionIFDP
-0.67
-0.75
-0.75
SPD
BTtst
BRmst
BRtst
-0.21
Union
UnionIFDP
UnionIFDP
+0.95
+0.32
+0.32
Societal Affairs
Immigration
Multi-Culturalism
Extremism Fight
Traditional Moral
BTmsi
BTmsm
BTmsex
BTmst
145
POLICY CHANGE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CHANGE?
BTmsed
BTmfeu
BTmfg
SPD
BTtsl
BRmsl
BRtsl
+0.81
Union
UnionIFDP
UnionIFDP
+0.88
+0.78
+0.78
SPD
BTtsed
BRmsed
BRtsed
+1.00
Union
UnionIFDP
UnionIFDP
+1.00
+1.00
+1.00
Greens
BTtfds
BRmfds
BRtfds
+0.63
Union
UnionIFDP
UnionIFDP
+0.48
+0.56
+0.56
SPD
BTtfeu
BRmfeu
BRtfeu
+0.66
Union
UnionIFDP
SPDlUnion
+0.32
+0.39
+0.49
SPD
BTtfg
BRmfg
BRtfg
+0.75
Union
Union
SPDlUnion
+0.60
+0.60
+0.68
GERMAN POLITICS
146
APPENDIX XIII
POTENTIAL FOR POLICY CHANGE PER AREA (STATUS
Qua LOCATION)
Economic Affairs
Status quo located (I - XI)
Einspruchsgesetzgebung
Zustimmungsgesetzgebung
I
11
m
P
P
G
G
G
G
I
11
m
IV
P
P
P
G
G
G
G
IV
C
G
v
VI
VII vm IX
C
G
C
G
C
G
V
C
C
VI
VII vm IX
X
XI
C
C
C
C
P
P
P
P
X
G
G
P
P
C
C
X
XI
P
P
P
C
C
C
Sodal Affairs
Status quo located (I - XI)
Einspruchsgesetzgebung
Zustimmungsgesetzgebung
P
C
C
C
C
Foreign Affairs
Status quo located (1- XI)
Einspruchsgesetzgebung
Zustimmungsgesetzgebung
I
P
P
11
P
P
m
IV
V
VI
VII vm IX
P
P
P
P
P
P
C
C
G
G
Abbrevations: P: Penetration, C: Compromise, G: Gridlock
G
G
G
G
XI