The Baltic Sea Region
Cultures, Politics, Societies
Editor Witold
Witold Maciejewski
Maciejewski
Editor
A Baltic University Publication
20
The structures
of representative government
1. The Institutional Design
The crucial role played by political institutions in upholding a democratic government was
acknowledged as early as in the 18th century by the French philosopher Montesquieu (16891755). Ever since Montesquieu, great attention has been paid to institutional, rather than
social, economic or cultural, explanations of political results. For example, the electoral system’s great impact on the number and types of political parties has been proven by extensive
research. Of course, institutional design does not explain all of the workings of democratic
government. Real power is often vested in hands that are not fully restricted by formal rules;
however, this taken into account, institutions certainly do matter.
Since there exists no single formula of how a democratic political system should
be structured, the specific institutional design of each of the world’s democracies varies. Some institutions, however, are common to all democracies. They all hold elections,
for example, although the electoral system can be quite different in character. All democracies also need some kind of representative bodies, normally a legislative and an executive assembly – but there is no given answer to the question whether the representative system
should be parliamentary or presidential. There are also different kinds of power distribution
between centre and locality; there are federations and there are unitary states, the latter being
divided into systems of relatively autonomous local self-government and of fused central and
local authorities. The object of this and the following chapter is to give a brief survey of these
institutional variations in the Baltic region, in democratic theory, as well as in practice.
2. Electoral Systems
The free and fair election is a cornerstone of every democracy. The design of electoral systems
and electoral laws can vary immensely and different systems have different effects on politics
and party structures. The most basic distinction is the difference between plurality elections
and proportional representation. The plurality system is based on territorial representation,
and the candidate that receives the majority of the votes becomes the representative of that
constituency. Notable examples of this system are Great Britain and the USA, where the
leading candidate is elected on the first and only ballot (the so called “first past the post”
system).
The major virtue of the plurality method is that it normally produces clear-cut majorities
in parliament and, by this, strong and stable governments. This in turn is believed to promote
general political stability. Due to the fact that the plurality vote tends to give a distinct out290
Democracy
The structures of representative government
come in terms of winners and losers, elections normally have a direct impact on the formation
of government and what policies are to be pursued. Accordingly, in the case of widespread
disappointment with the incumbent government’s performance among the citizens, they can
easily vote the party in power out of office. This way the plurality formula strengthens political accountability.
The basic premise of proportional representation is that the diversity of opinions in society
should be reflected in the key political bodies. The system uses different techniques to allocate
seats in proportion to the number of votes that the contesting parties or candidates receive.
A common procedure is that the vote is cast for a party’s list of candidates, the so-called list
system. In most cases the voter can also express support for individual candidates on the party
list, but since it takes a majority to change the ranking order this seldom has any effect.
Examples of this method are found in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, while in the
Finnish list system, the voter can influence the selection of party candidates a great deal since
the vote is cast for a specific candidate. Estonia and Latvia also used the proportional listsystem in their general elections in 1992 and 1993. Lithuania used a mixed system, adopted
from Germany: 70 of the 141 members of parliament were selected through the proportional
formula, while the other half (71 members) was elected by a majority vote in single-member
constituencies. The new parliament in Russia was elected in late 1993 with a mixed method
similar to the one in Lithuania. Half of the members in the Duma (the lower chamber) were
elected from party lists on the proportional basis, and the remaining 225 were elected by the
majority formula in single-seat constituencies.
The parliaments of the Baltic States have a 5 (Estonia) or 4 (Latvia and Lithuania) percent
threshold to keep small parties out. This is a common
The Plurality System
feature to prevent deadlock
(Winner takes all in single-member
and weak assemblies under
constituencies.)
In each constituency the candidate
the proportional system.
belonging to the party receiving the
In Poland, the electoral
highest number of votes gets elected.
system has been changed
Fo example, if Party A gets 60% ofthe
votes, Party B 25% and Party C 15%,
several times since the electhe candidate belongning to Party A
tions of 1989. An extremely
gets elected in that constituency.
proportional method was
Party A
used in 1991 and the result
Party B
Constituency
was fragmentation of the
Party C
Polish parliament, resulting
in 29 parties and coalitions.
A 5 percent threshold for
The Proportional System
Each party gets seats in the parliaparties, and 8 for election
ment in proportional to their share of
coalitions, was introduced
the total number of votes. For exama few months ahead of the
ple, if Party A gets 46% of the votes
in a country, and there are 100 seats in
elections to the lower champarliament, that party gets 46 seats.
ber, the Sejm, in September
Party A
1993. In the elections to the
Party B
upper chamber, the Senat,
Party C
the majority formula was
used.
Each party’s share of the total number of votes
With the proportional
Figure 90. Two basic forms of electoral systems. Ill.: Karin Hallgren
formula, all political interDemocracy
The structures of representative government
291
ests and corresponding parties, small and large
alike, are given the same chance of being represented in relation to the votes they have received.
This greater fairness (in terms of equal opportunity) is presumed to contribute to the legitimacy
of the democratic process. However, compared
to the plurality system proportional representation certainly exhibits some obvious drawbacks.
Proportional elections are usually less decisive
with respect to forming a government. With
many relatively small parties represented, the
formation of a cabinet often becomes a hazardous business, where the game of inter-party bargaining may be more crucial than the electoral
“message” from the voters. For the same reason,
governments are overall weaker and far less
long-lived under the proportional formula. On
the other hand, the advocates of proportional
Figure 91. Three basic forms of democratic power
representation can point to a number of merits
distribution. Ill.: Karin Hallgren
of this system. Providing good prospects of representation also for minority groups and new
political tendencies, the system is more inclusive
and responsive in a broader sense than the plurality method. Thus, it is believed to reduce
potential conflicts and turmoil in society and to enhance political order. Furthermore,
electoral turnout is generally higher under proportional representation. The reason is that
this formula makes it possible to present a broader range of real alternatives to the voters,
which increases the incentives to take part. In a more fragmented party system, which tends
to come with proportional representation, the ties between parties and various groups in
society in general are closer which makes people feel greater identity with one of the parties
that are running.
3. Presidential vs. Parliamentary Government
The parliamentary and the presidential systems are two alternative forms of representative government in a democracy. The former is characterised by the unity of legislative and executive powers, the latter by an institutional “separation of powers”. In
parliamentarism, governmental power is grounded on legislative power; the chief executive of that power is the prime minister together with his cabinet colleagues, who must enjoy
the support of parliament. In a presidential government the head of the government is the
president, who is elected by the people for a fixed term. In the United States of America, the
best example of an ideal-type presidential system, the members of the cabinet are chosen by
the president and are politically responsible to him only.
To characterise the distinctive features of the presidential system as being a “separation
of legislative and executive power” is rather misleading, however. In parliamentary systems,
too, there exists an institutional separation of responsibilities between the legislative assembly
and the executive. This separation varies of course from one democracy to another, some hav-
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The structures of representative government
ing more active and influential assemblies, others having parliaments of more reactive and
responding nature – to give just one example of existing differences. But some general characteristics of the functions of the assembly and those of the executive might still be outlined.
One of the main features of the elected assembly in a democracy is its representative function:
the parliament “stands for” the people, and acts for them. Furthermore, the elected assembly is
often called “the legislature”, thus indicating its authority to make laws; the assembly generally
determines the size of tax revenues and public spending. Finally, it plays a decisive role in the
scrutiny of the exercise of power. The executive, on the other hand, can be characterised as
the main seat of authoritative power in society. It provides broad direction of national policy,
and supervises the policy implementation.
4. Executives in the Baltic Region
The predominant type of executive in the old democracies of Western Europe is the parliamentary system. In the Baltic Region, this is best exemplified by Sweden, Norway and
Denmark. The relation between the parliament and the executive in these countries is simple
and clear-cut: the executive is subject to parliamentary confidence, yet has the power to
dissolve the parliament. In Finland, the situation is somewhat more complex. Finland is
something of a special case in the Scandinavian context, in that it combines elements of both
presidential and parliamentary government in a unique, balanced fashion. The Finnish president is elected by direct vote of the people for a six-year term. He commands considerable
constitutional power, more so than any other elected head of state in Western Europe. For the
purpose of “general government” the country has a cabinet, called the Council of State, which,
according to the express provision contained in the constitution, must enjoy the support and
confidence of the parliament. Headed by the prime minister, the members of the cabinet are
normally selected from amongst the majority parties in parliament. Thus, the Finnish mode
of democratic government, including both a popularly elected president who presides for
a fixed term and an executive subject to parliamentary confidence, might be described as a
“semi-presidential” system.
A similarly mixed system is laid down in the Lithuanian constitution of 1992. The
Lithuanian citizens elect their president directly, for a five-year term. Therefore, he or she has
far greater authority than his or her colleagues in Latvia and Estonia. Unlike the Finnish president, however, the Lithuanian president
is restricted in power by the possibility of
a newly elected Seimas (the Lithuanian
parliament) dismissing the president;
such a decision, however, must be taken
by a three-fifths majority within 30 days
of the parliament’s first session.
Another example of semi-presidentialism is the Russian constitution
adopted in late 1993, seemingly lending the former president Boris Yeltsin
the most extensive presidential powers
in the region. He appointed the cabiFigure 92. Prominent Lithuanian polititians (from the right):
net, and could dissolve the parliament
Valdas Adamkus, Algirdas Brazauskas, Vytautas Landsbergis.
Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz
– however, not until a year after parliaDemocracy
The structures of representative government
293
mentary elections. Furthermore, the power of the Russian parliament to remove the cabinet
was circumscribed by a complicated procedure of non-confidence voting, and the president’s
authority to govern by decree seemed to be far-reaching. The constitution is, however, utterly
vague in some aspects, and it is still difficult to predict what the future of Russian semi-presidentialism holds in store. In the 1990s, the power of the Russian regions and their governors
has been strengthened, but the power of the president undoubtedly remains extensive.
The presidents of Estonia and Latvia, as mentioned above, lack the extensive authorities
of their neighbouring counterparts. They are not popularly elected, but appointed by the
parliament. The first Estonian president after independence was, however, supposed to be
popularly elected in 1992. But since no candidate received an absolute majority of the votes,
the decision was handed over to parliament. The parliamentary system in Latvia and Estonia
is similar to the one in Germany, where the president, as head of state, mainly performs formal and ceremonial duties. However, this does not necessarily imply that the presidents in
these countries lack political importance entirely. In Germany, for example, the struggle to
be elected president can be both harsh and competitive, as the high symbolic prestige of the
office goes to the party with the winning candidate. In particular the role of Lennart Meri,
Estonian president until 2001, has often been considered to be more important than could
be expected from his constitutional obligations alone.
5. Pro and Contra Presidentialism
Assessing the advantages and drawbacks of presidential and parliamentary systems is a matter
of great dispute among scholars. Strong sides, as well as main flaws, of both systems have been
pointed out. In favour of presidentialism one usually points to the ability of this system to
make the executive directly accountable to the people. Presidential systems tend to maximise
the connection between the choices made by the electorate at the ballot box and the ability
of the policy-makers to meet the voters’ expectations, whereas the voter in a parliamentary
system (especially if proportional representation is being used) has a rather vague idea as to
what kind of government will be formed after the election. Also, presidential systems lend
themselves more easily than parliamentary ones to crisis leadership.
The other side of this argument, however, is the difficulty to remove an incapable or
unpopular government in the presidential systems, due to the fixed term of election. With
the option of a no-confidence vote, the parliamentary system provides for a more flexible
institutional means of executive replacement. The rigidity, which comes with the fixed term,
entails the risk of getting a majority of the legislature representing a political opinion opposed
to the president, thus creating political stalemate and an institutional rivalry between the
executive and the legislature. In popular presidential elections, one could argue further against
presidentialism, the winning candidate gains all power and prestige, while the loser is left
empty-handed. Under such circumstances the political life may become a zero-sum game,
marked by hard polarisation and destabilisation of the government. In the worst scenario, the
president, taking advantage of the personalisation of the power vested in his mandate, may
slide into authoritarian habits.
Thus the proponents of the parliamentary system argue that presidentialism endangers
democratic stability – or even that it has proved to be the detriment of democracy. If this
turns out to be true, the future of a number of reborn East European democracies is at
stake. However, in a comprehensive work on the subject, two scholars strongly refute this
stand. They argue, first, that when looking at history, there is no discernible pattern as to
whether presidential or parliamentary systems promote stable democracy. An examination of
all the cases of democratic breakdown during the 20th century shows that there are numerous
294
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examples of both regime types deteriorating into authoritarian rule. Second, the arguments
against pure presidentialism do not necessarily hold true for the mixed systems of semi-presidentialism. When, for example, the executive is subject to parliamentary – not presidential
– confidence, the temporal rigidity and the potential for an institutional conflict between the
executive and parliament could be avoided (Shugart&Carey 1992). Accordingly, in systems
like for example the Lithuanian or Polish one, the shortcomings of presidential rule could be
mitigated.
The Finnish Presidency
Jaakko Nousiainen
During eighty years, from 1919 to 2000 Finland was governed within the framework of a mixed constitution that combined strong presidency and party-based parliamentary government. In political practice, there was considerable fluctuation
over time in the relative weight of presidential vs. parliamentary power. As a general rule, the prime minister and his cabinet
were responsible for the day-to-day management of the country, but the president, by virtue of the enormous prestige he
traditionally enjoyed, had supreme authority.
Since the early 1980s government stability has increased considerably: broad majority coalitions remain in power for the
life of the parliament (four years between general elections), and the premiership has developed into a real and effective
leadership role. Political diffusion has been supplanted by a strong sense of consensus, and the Finnish sort of parliamentarism has become the most stable among the Nordic countries, at least in its external aspects. With this development
pressures increased, especially in the parliament, for a constitutional reform and a 'redistribution' of power within the
state. Subsequently, the preparation of the reform proceeded very quickly and in a most consensual atmosphere. Parliament
approved Finland’s new constitution almost unanimously, and the president ratified it to come into force on 1 March
2000.
The central elements of the reform, as far as the position of the head of state is concerned, can be summed as follows:
• In the process of government formation the president becomes a secondary actor, because parliament now elects the
prime minister after discussions among the various parliamentary groups.
• The president no longer ‘determines the relations of Finland with foreign powers’, but the president shall exercise foreign
policy leadership in close association with the government. European affairs belong basically to the cabinet’s and prime
minister’s jurisdiction.
• The power to issue decrees is transferred mainly to the cabinet. The government drafts the bills submitted to parliament
for approval, and the president's right to refuse ratification has been restricted.
• The president of the republic appoints only a small number of top civil servants.
• The president makes his or her decisions, with very few exceptions, in the council of state (cabinet meeting) and on the
cabinet’s proposition. The president is more strictly than before tied to the cabinet’s position.
The new constitution will act as a buffer, preventing the reoccurrence of the presidential activism of the 1960s and 1970s,
and the political climate is amenable to the further development of the parliamentary modes of operation. It is a natural
expectation that the strengthening of the parliament-government axis and the reduction of the president’s powers will
distance the head of stet from the everyday policy-making and emphasise his or her role as a support of the sitting government, a moderator in conflicts and a mirror of the popular opinion.
The new president Social Democrat Tarja Halonen took office simultaneously with the new constitution coming into
force. She recently characterized her role by saying that as a head of state she will be ‘constitutional, firm and cooperative’.
This can be taken as an allusion that she will not refrain from using her constitutional powers independently in specific
situations, but at the same time she acknowledges the intensified role of the prime minister and the cabinet in national
decision-making.
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295
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