Frege on Sinn �/��
Philosophy of Language, Fall ����
Peter van Elswyk, Rutgers University
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Content
Last week, we looked at speech acts. Speech acts involve the u�erance of sentences in a
context which express propositions. Previously, I mentioned that sentences can express
propositions in more than one way. Sentences can presuppose, implicate, or directly
convey a proposition in virtue of their meaning. We will call the proposition directly
expressed by a sentence the semantic content. Semantic content is the focus for today
and the next few class sessions.
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Compositionality
When thinking about semantic content, it is helpful to consider the meanings of the words
that occur in the sentence expressing the content. Frege (����) follows this practice by
focusing on the meanings of names. Frege does this because he endorses the following
principle:
����������������: �e meaning of a complex expression depends on the
meanings and arrangements of its constituent expressions.
To see this principle in action, consider the meaning of the complex description the red dog.
By ����������������, the meaning of this expression will depend on the meaning of the,
red, and dog since they are its constituents. And this is what we �nd. �e contributes that
there is one salient thing being referred to, red contributes that the thing being referred to
has the property of redness, and dog contributes that the thing being referred to is a dog. If
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a thing fails to satisfy what each of these words contributes to the meaning of the whole,
it cannot be referred to with the red dog.
���������������� also predicts that changing the constituent of a complex expression
can change its meaning. Again, this is what we �nd. Replace the with a di�erent determiner
like every, replace red with a di�erent adjective like small, and/or replace dog with a
di�erent noun like �sh, and we produce a new expression with an entirely di�erent meaning
from the original expression the red dog.
Sentences are complex expressions too. For example, the meaning of (�) can change if
constituents are replaced.
(�) �e red dog ate the cake.
Additionally, the meaning of (�) will change if we change how the words are arranged.
Swap the nouns dog and cake and put each world in the other’s position in the sentence
and you get an entirely di�erent meaning.
I have thus far been talking about ���������������� informally. But it should be noted
that the behavior of meanings to compose with each other to comprise the meaning of a
sentence is a behavior that can be mathematically modeled using resources from lambda
calculus and a few other places of mathematics. In fact, Montague (����), wanting to
formally implement Frege’s vision of language, was one of the �rst to put these resources
together for this purpose.
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It is evident that some if not most of language is
compositional. But can you think of any counterexamples to
����������������? �ese will be cases where the meaning
of a complex expression does not depend on the meaning of
its constituents or how they are arranged.
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Frege’s puzzles
Frege begins his paper with a few puzzles that must be solved when trying to understanding
the meaning of names. �ere are two puzzles.
But before we consider each puzzle, it will be helpful to have the theory of names
in view that is Frege’s target. �e theory of names that Frege is taking aim at is o�en
called Millianism and is owed to the philosopher J.S. Mill. According to Millianism, the
meaning of a name is exhausted by what the name references. �e meaning of the name
Kobe Bryant is therefore the object that these two words reference. �at is, the meaning
of this expression is just Kobe Bryant. So names are linguistic placeholders for the objects
they reference.
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Cognitive signi�cance
�e �rst puzzle concerning the meaning of names involves the relation of identity. Like
any relation, identity has relata. In other words, identity relates one thing to another thing.
But what kinds of things are related by identity? Answering this question brings us
to the heart of Frege’s concerns about the meaning of names.
Suppose a and b are two distinct names for the same object. Now compare the following
two statements:
(�) a = a.
(�) a = b.
Since we have supposed that a and b name the same object, both (�) and (�) have to be true.
But (�) and (�) do not have the same meaning.
Each statement has a di�erent cognitive signi�cance. Suppose we did not know (�).
Learning (�) would then be a signi�cant gain in our knowledge. But learning (�) is not
signi�cant. It is a trivial fact that things are self–identical. Here’s an example where we
replace a and b with more familiar names:
(�) Superman = Superman.
(�) Superman = Clark Kent.
Once again, knowing (�) has a di�erent cognitive signi�cant than knowing (�). Everybody
knows (�) if they take a moment to re�ect. But it is not trivial that Superman is Clark Kent.
�is is a revealing fact about the Superman universe.
Frege uses this puzzle about cognitive signi�cance as an argument against Millianism.
�e argument runs as follows.
(�) Sentences s1 and s2 di�er in cognitive signi�cance.
(�) If s1 and s2 di�er in cognitive signi�cance, then s1 and s2 di�er in meaning.
(�) If s1 and s2 di�er in meaning, then s1 and s2 either have parts with di�erent
meanings or the parts are arranged di�erently.
by ����������������
(�) �e parts in s1 and s2 are not arranged di�erently.
(�) s1 and s2 have parts with di�erent meanings.
�e conclusion spells trouble for Millianism. Names cannot be mere linguistic placeholders
for objects if sentences containing co–referring names di�er in cognitive signi�cance
because of the names they contain.
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One way to resist this argument is to think that a di�erence
in cognitive signi�cance between two sentences is not owed
to a di�erence in meaning. Is there a plausible way to work
out this objection?
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Substitution failure
�e second puzzle concerning the meaning of names involves substitution of co–referring
names. �ere are a number of verbs v that denote a relation between an agent and the
proposition v’d by the agent. �ese verbs denote propositional a�itudes and include know,
believe, hope, fear, and a few others. For example, in (�)
(�) Suzie believes that fall has arrived.
it is conveyed that Suzie stands in the belief–relation to the proposition that is expressed
in the complement clause (i.e. Fall has arrived).
Using one of these a�itude verbs, we can now generate another puzzle. Again, take two
terms such as a and b that refer to the same object. Even though these objects refer to the
exact same object, we cannot replace an instance of a with an instance of b or vice versa
when they occur in the complement of an a�itude verb.
(�) Suzie believes Superman is a hero.
(�) Suzie believes Clark Kent is not a hero.
�e truth of (�) and (�) are independent of each other even though the names co–refer. Suzie
might believe (�), but not believe (�). So the names cannot be freely substituted with each
other. �is is known as substitution failure.
Frege also uses this puzzle as an argument against Millianism. �e argument runs nearly
identically to the previous argument. If two sentences di�er in truth–value, then they di�er
in meaning. If two sentences di�er in meaning, then ���������������� requires that the
di�erence is owed to the sentences having di�erent parts and/or having their parts arranged
di�erently. Since the only di�erence between the statements are the names that occur in
each and these names co–refer, the meaning of a name cannot merely be the object that the
name references.
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Frege demonstrated substitution failure with the use of
a�itude verbs. Can you think of other expressions that
names might interact given ���������������� which could
also generate substitution failures?
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�e puzzles compared
�e two versions of Frege’s puzzle are di�erent but related. �e di�erences are easy
to observe. �e �rst puzzle involves cognitive signi�cance as the central problem for
Millianism and the second puzzle involves substitution failure. But here is something that is
interesting. You can always create substitution failure puzzles by taking identity statements
like (�) and (�) that di�er in cognitive signi�cance and placing them under a�itude verbs
like believes or knows.
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�e upshot
What each puzzle appears to reveal is that the meaning of names cannot be exhausted by
the objects they reference. In each puzzle, we have two names that refer to the exact same
object, but these names bring about di�erence e�ects in the meanings of the sentences
they occur in. When identity statements are learned, the cognitive signi�cance of what is
learned can vary depending on the names used. Similarly, the truth of statements using
names that are embedded under a�itude verbs can vary according to which names occur.
Since ���������������� requires the meaning of sentences to depend on their parts, the
di�erent e�ects on meaning brought about the names must be owed to the meanings of
the names themselves. And since the names are co–referring, there must be more to the
meaning of names than the objects they reference. It looks like Millianism about names is
down and out.
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Frege’s alternative
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Frege denies Millianism. His alternative view of names maintains that a name has a sense in
addition to a referent. Here is how Frege (����: ���) �rst talks about senses in the assigned
reading:
A di�erence can arise only if the di�erence between the signs corespond to a di�erence in the
mode of presentation of the thing designated. [. . . ] It is natural, now, to think of there being
connected with a sign (name, combination of words, wri�en mark), besides that which the sign
designates, which may be called the Bedeutung of the sign, also what I should like to call the
sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained.
�e sense of a name therefore provides the way in which that word is presented to the user
of the word. Later on, Frege (����: ���) gives us an analogy to help us understand how a
sense is a mode of presentation:
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�e Bedeutung of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by using it; the idea
which we have in that case is wholly subjective; in between lies the sense, which is indeed
no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself. �e following analogy
will perhaps clarify these relationships. Somebody observes the Moon through a telescope. I
compare the Moon itself to the Bedeutung; it is the object of the observation, mediated by the
real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image
of the observer. �e former I compare to the sense, the la�er is like the idea or intuition.
�e sense of an expression is therefore like the real image of the Moon projected on
the telescope. It sits between our retinal image of the Moon and the Moon itself. It is a
presentation of the Moon without which we could not see the Moon. In other words,
senses are not psychological entities. As Frege (����: ���) earlier insists, they can be shared
among many people who all grasp the sense. �ey sit between the idea of the thing
associated with the name and the thing that it is referenced by the name.
�e interrelationship between an expression, the sense, and the referent is then as
follows:
Expression
expresses
Sense
determines
Referent
designates
An expression designates its referent, but it expresses a sense that determines the referent. Put di�erently, the sense of a expression determines what the expression designates. In
this way, the sense of an expression can be thought of as acting like a rule that determines
what the expression can be used to designate.
Sense are what we understand when we understand what an expression means. Here’s
Frege (����: ���):
�e sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is su�ciently familiar with the
language or totality of designations to which it belongs; but this serves to illuminate only a
single aspect of the Bedeutung, supposing it to have one. Comprehensive knowledge of the
Bedeutung would require us to be able to say immediately whether any given sense a�aches to
it. To such knowledge we never a�ain.
If you understand a language, you grasp senses. Senses are public. You might not know
if every word has a Bedeutung, but knowing as much is not knowledge about a language. It
is knowledge about the world.
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�e solution
Maintaining that names have senses provides Frege with interesting things to say about
both of his puzzles. With respect to cognitive signi�cance, Frege can explain the di�erence
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in signi�cance between identity statements by suggesting that the names in the identity
statements have di�erent senses. Self–identity statements are trivial because the name that
occurs on both sides of the identity sign has the same sense. But other identity statements
with di�erent names �anking the identity sign involve expressions with di�erent senses.
With respect to substitution failure, Frege can again appeal to a di�erence in sense. But the
details of this solution will have to wait till next class.
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How do senses act like rules for determining referents in the
case of �ctional names?
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�ird realm
You might think that senses are somehow psychological. Not for Frege. He thought they
existed in a third realm. �e third realm is distinct from the inner realm of our private
thoughts and the outer realm of material objects.
Undeniably, the view that senses belong to a third realm is very mysterious. Dumme�
(����: ���–���) writes:
Frege’s conception of thoughts and their constituent senses is mythological. �ese
eternal, changeless entities inhabit a ’third realm’, distinct from the physical universe and
equally distinct from the inner world of any experiencing subject. Despite their separation
from the physical world, many of these thoughts are about that world, and are true or false,
not indeed by corresponding to anything in it or failing to do so, but in so far as they are
about the external world, in virtue of how things are in that world. Somehow we grasp these
thoughts and sometimes judge them to be true or false; indeed, it is only by grasping them
that we become aware of the external world, rather than only of our own inner sensations
and feelings. Somehow, too, we associate senses with words, and so communicate thoughts and
judgements to one another. As long as this perspective is dominant, all is mysterious.
�ere is no way of explaining how thoughts relate to things in other realms of reality,
that is, what makes them about anything. �ere is no way of explaining how we grasp
them: no wonder Frege wrote, ’this process is perhaps the most mysterious of all’. Above all,
there is no way of explaining how we a�ach senses to words or expressions, that is, what makes
them senses of those words and expressions. All this is obscured for us by Frege’s having had
very good, if not fully complete, explanations of all these things. It is just that these explanations
cannot be reconciled with the mythological picture. When we have Frege’s theory of meaning
in view, our perspective has wholly altered: the third realm has receded to in�nity.
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Moving beyond names
Frege uses the puzzles about names to motivate the existence of senses. But he does not
stop with names. All expressions have senses. Let’s consider how this works with respect
to sentences.
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Senses of sentences
A declarative sentence expresses what Frege calls a thought. A thought is the same thing
as a proposition. It is the information conveyed.
But should the thought of a sentence be the referent or sense of a sentence? �is is
a question about how we should understand the nature of a proposition. Here we face a
similar decision to the decision faced earlier when trying to understand the meaning of
names. Unsurprisingly, Frege’s answer to this decision is the same as the earlier answer.
�oughts are the senses of sentences and not the referents of sentences. Frege’s
reasons are similar too. Take a sentence like (�):
(�) �e bar across from my o�ce serves beer.
We can replace a part of this sentence with something that is co–referring. For example,
we can slide in a di�erent description.
(�) �e bar on Easton and Somerset serves beer.
Since both descriptions co–refer and still ���������������� holds, the referent of the
sentence must be the same in (�) and (�) regardless of what is the referent. And yet, (�)
and (�) have di�erent meanings. We can realize this by repeating either of the two puzzles
presented by Frege.
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�e True, �e False
But what is the referent of a sentence? Frege’s answer is that the truth–value of a sentence
is the referent. Frege (����: ���–���) writes as follows:
We are therefore driven into accepting the truth-value of a sentence as constituting its
Bedeutung. By the truth-value of a sentence I understand the circumstance that it is true or
false. �ere are no further truth-values. For brevity I call the one the True, the other the False.
Every assertoric sentence concerned with the Bedeutung of its words is therefore to
be regarded as a proper name, and its Bedeutung, if it has one, is either the True or the
False. �ese two objects are recognized, if only implicitly, by everybody who judges something
to be true—and so even by a sceptic. (Emphasis added.)
�is answer make the True and the False objects that can be designated. According to
Frege, sentences are names that designate one of two objects.
Let’s put the pieces together. Since thoughts are the senses of sentences, thoughts
determine truth–values since senses determine referents. In this way, thoughts are modes
of presentation. �ey are ways of presenting of �e True and �e False. So thoughts act
like rules that help us determine a sentence’s truth–value.
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A few interesting consequences follow from this answer. �e �rst is that every sentence
that expresses a true thought has the exact same Bedeutung. So does every sentence that
expresses a false thought. �is �rst consequence follows from the fact that the only objects
that can be designated by sentences are �e True and �e False.
Frege thinks this consequence is not a problem for his view. It just requires us to not be
interested in only the referent of a sentence. We should also be interested in the thought
of the sentence too.
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What reasons do you see for or against making truth and
falsity objects that sentences reference? How else would you
relate truth/falsity to sentences and/or the propositions they
express?
Another interesting consequence follows from Frege’s answer. Recall that every name has
a sense, but not every name has a referent. Sometimes a name can fail to refer to anything
because the rule provided by the sense cannot be satis�ed. Such failure is what happens with
�ctional names. Since sentences are names, Frege is commi�ed to thinking that sentences
can fail to designate �e True or �e False. Frege (����: ���) endorses this conclusion
outright:
�e sentence ‘Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep’ obviously has a sense.
But since it is doubtful whether the name ‘Odysseus’, occurring therein, has a Bedeutung, it
is also doubtful whether the whole sentence does. [. . . ] Whoever does not admit the name
has a Bedeutung can neither apply nor withhold the predicate. But in that case it would be
super�uous to advance to the Bedeutung of the name; one could be satis�ed with the sense,
if one wanted to go no further than the thought. If it were a question only of the sense of
the sentence, the thought, it would be needless to bother with the Bedeutung of a part of the
sentence; only the sense, not the Bedeutung, of the part is relevant to the sense of the whole
sentence. �e thought remains the same whether ‘Odysseus’ has a Bedeutung or not. �e fact
that we concern ourselves at all about the Bedeutung of a part of the sentence indicates that
we generally recognize and expect a Bedeutung for the sentence itself.
In defending what we will call truth–value gaps, Frege once again appeals to the principle
of ����������������. �e referent of a sentence is determined by the thought of the
sentence. �e thought of the sentence depends on the senses of the words that the sentence
has as parts. Since a sentence can contain a non–referring name (e.g. Odysseus), the entire
sentence can fail to have a referent. As Frege puts it above, “we can neither apply nor
without the predicate” ascribing a property to Odysseus because there is no individual to
examine and see if they have the property.
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Do you think it is a virtue or vice of Frege’s account of
meaning that sentences can fail to have truth–values? Also:
the topic of truth–value gaps will return when we talk about
presupposed content later in the semester.
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Talking about senses
Typically, we are talking about the referent of an expression when we are using it. When
using a name, we are interested in the person that name refers to and not the sense of the
name that helps us �gure out who the name refers to. But sometimes we want to talk about
expressions or their meanings and not the referents. How does this work given Frege’s view
of sinn?
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�otation
�e most obvious way we talk about words is with quotation. When quotation occurs, Frege
maintains that the quoted words do not have their usual referent. Instead, quotation ensures
that the words enclosed by the quotation marks are the referent of the entire quoted phrase.
Here is Frege (����: ���–���):
One’s own words then �rst designate words of the other speaker, and only the la�er have their
usual Bedeutung. We then have signs of signs. In writing, the words are in this case enclosed
in quotation marks. Accordingly, a word standing between quotation marks must not be taken
as having its ordinary Bedeutung.
Frege doesn’t say a whole lot more in the assigned reading about quotation. But it is
interesting to note that he must be commi�ed to the existence of words as object if words
are the referent of quoted expressions.
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Why aren’t senses the referents of quoted expressions?
Does Frege’s account of the meaning of quotation con�ict
with his endorsement of ���������������? If not, how can
we compositionally explain how quotation makes words
have non–ordinary referents?
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Indirect speech
�e next way we usually talk about what has been said is with indirect speech reports.
�ese are sentences that have verbs like say, overheard, and con�rm and take a complement
clause like the a�itude verbs we discussed last time.
(�) Snookie said that it was raining.
|
{z
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complement
(�) Pauly D agreed that it was raining.
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{z
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complement
In (�) and (�), we have indirect speech reports and the complement clauses are clearly
marked. According to Frege, the complement clauses do not refer to truth–values. Instead,
the complement clause designates a thought in (�) and (�). Again, an expression does not
have its ordinary referent in indirect speech reports.
Frege has two related reasons for thinking that the complement clause refers to its sense.
�e �rst reason is that that the truth of the entire sentence does not depend on the truth
of the complement clause. Regardless of whether it is true that it is raining, (�) and (�) can
both be true or false. �e truth of whether Snookie or Pauly D said what they are a�ributed
does not turn on whether what they said is true.
�e second reason is related to the puzzle of substitution failure. If we place another
sentence in the complement clause which has the same true–value as the initial clause but
a di�erent sense, then the truth–value of the entire sentence will change. For example, we
could replace the complement clause in (�) and (�) with �+�=�. On the assumption that
the complements above are true, our substitution would preserve truth. But this does not
ma�er because the truth of (�) and (�) depends on the thought of each sentence: (�) and (�)
are true only if the thought expressed by the complement clause is the same as the thought
which Snookie and Pauly expressed.
In other words, when a sentence occurs as a complement under the right kind of verb,
the sentence does not refer to �e True or �e False like it normally does. Instead, the
sentence as complement refers to its own sense. Frege (����: ���) draws this conclusion
from what he says about indirect speech reports:
In the cases so far considered the words of the subordinate clauses had their indirect Bedeutung,
and this made it clear that the Bedeutung of the subordinate clause itself was indirect, i.e. not a
truth–value but a thought, a command, a request, a question. �e subordinate clause could
be regarded as a noun, indeed one could say: as a proper name of that thought, that
command, etc., which it represented in the context of the sentence structure.
Complement clauses for Frege are then a special kind of name for the though expressed by
the underlying sentence.
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What explains how an expression comes to refer to its sense
as opposed to its referent? Are they really names? �ey feel
a li�le . . . di�erent.