The Stability of a Bipolar World
Author(s): Kenneth N. Waltz
Source: Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3, Population, Prediction, Conflict, Existentialism (Summer,
1964), pp. 881-909
Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20026863 .
Accessed: 15/10/2011 20:22
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
The MIT Press and American Academy of Arts & Sciences are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Daedalus.
http://www.jstor.org
KENNETH
N.
WALTZ
The Stability of a Bipolar World
over the centuries,
accumulated
wisdom,
statesmen
and students often draw as they face prob
upon which
wisdom
the conventional
lems in international
politics. One part of
some in America, have
is now often
in
and
Europe,
forgotten. Many
an alliance as
come to
of it
if the members
unsatisfactory
regard
one hears said
are
in
"Real
power.
partnership,"
grossly unequal
If this is
in a variety of ways,
"is possible
equals/'1
only between
an
read:
should
unreal
addendum
true,
among
Only
partnerships
states have lasted
the moment
of pressing
beyond
danger. Where
states in association
have been near equals, some have voluntarily
to others, or the alliance
has become
abdicated
the leadership
or
it
stalemate
and
has
indecision,
by
simply dissolved.
paralyzed
One may observe
that those who are less than equal are often dis
in all
satisfied without
that equality
thereby concluding
things is
an
alliance
well
As
and
Bismarck
Machiavelli
knew,
requires
good.
can be most
an alliance
leader; and leadership
easily maintained
the leader is superior in power. Some may think of these two
where
even so, where
as
the unworthy were wise,
unworthy;
exemplars
their wisdom
should be revived.
A second theorem of the conventional
wisdom
is still widely
of many powers
is more
It reads: A world
stable than
accepted.
a
of ad
by the peacefulness
bipolar world, with stability measured
the international
of
justment within
system and by the durability
the first element of the conventional
the system itself. While
wis
dom might well be revived, the second should be
radically revised.
Pessimism
of
a two
about the possibility
achieving
stability in
war
was
world
reinforced
after
the
of
power
by contemplation
the character of the two major contenders.
The Soviet Union,
led
a
iso
Stalin, and the United
States, flaccid,
by
possibly
psychotic
There
is a conventional
881
KENNETH N. WALTZ
re
in the ways of international
by tradition, and untutored
to
well
of
have
been
the
task
unsuited
lations, might
finding
thought
a route to survival. How could either reconcile
itself to coexistence
were
interests
when
differences
great and antithetical
ideological
constant
of
occasion
for conflict? Yet the bipolar world
provided
a remarkable
the postwar
shown
has
period
stability. Measuring
time from the termination
to 1937. Despite
of war, 1964
corresponds
all of the changes
in the nineteen
since
1945
that might have
years
shaken the world
into another great war, 1964 somehow
looks and
feels safer than 1937. Is this true only because we now know that
1937 preceded
the holocaust
by just two years? Or is it the terror
of nuclear weapons
from major war? Or
that has kept the world
is the
of
the
world
postwar
stability
intimately related to its bipolar
pattern?
lationist
Stability Within
Within
a Bipolar System
a
bipolar
of violence
the
four factors conjoined
world,
encourage
in the relations of states. First, with only two
world
there are no peripheries.
The United
States is the
powers
for
Soviet
Union
for the Soviet Union,
and the
obsessing
danger
an
no
can
to
extent
state
since
each
other
the other
that
us,
damage
can match.
that involves the fortunes of the
Any event in the world
or the United
States automatically
elicits the interest
Soviet Union
at the time of the Korean
of the other. Truman,
invasion, could not
in the Czechoslovakian
crisis
words
echo Chamberlain's
very well
a
east of
in
far
the
and claim that the Koreans were
away
people
knew nothing. We had to know about them
Asia of whom Americans
or
and
England
lay between
quickly find out. In the 1930's, France
we could too, that their fron
and
could
believe,
Germany.
England
tier and ours lay on the Rhine. After World War
II, no third power
for none
States and the Soviet Union,
the United
could lie between
limitation
is indivisible was controversial,
that peace
The statement
in the 1930's. It be
it was made by Litvinov
indeed untrue, when
a gen
came a truism in the 1950's. Any
of
maintaining
possibility
a
to fight small wars. With
the
eral peace
willingness
required
one
a
to
and
could
both
serious
loss
intense,
easily ap
competition
a conclusion
that follows from the very
pear as a gain to the other,
action has corre
Political
condition
of a two-power
competition.
to
Communist
in
this
operating
assumption.
guerrillas
sponded
The
Truman
doctrine.
of
the
Soviet
Greece
tightening
prompted
existed.
882
The Stability of a Bipolar World
control over the states of Eastern Europe
Plan
led to the Marshall
to
rise
the
in
turn
and the Atlantic Defense
and
these
gave
Treaty,
Cominform
and the Warsaw
Pact. The plan to form aWest German
in a two
the Berlin blockade. Our response
government
produced
was
to
to
which
world
Soviet
theirs
and
ours,
action,
power
geared
an
solid
balance.
produced
increasingly
bipolar
as
in a
Not only are there no
bipolar world but also,
peripheries
a second consideration,
in the compe
the range of factors included
as the
tition is extended
increases. In
intensity of the competition
a reluctance
is
to
creased
in
accept small terri
intensity
expressed
Ex
torial losses, as in Korea, the Formosa
and
Indo-China.
Strait,
one looks. Vice President
of range is apparent wherever
as our
Nixon
hailed
decision
the Supreme Court's
desegregation
war. When
it became
clear
greatest victory in the cold
increasingly
at a rate that far exceeded
that the Soviet economy was growing
our own, many
in the economic
began to worry that falling behind
a shot
race would
lead to our losing the cold war without
being
most
taken as an
often
fired. Disarmament
have
been
negotiations
for propaganda.
As contrasted with
the 1930's, there
opportunity
concern
is now constant and effective
lest military
fall
preparation
tension
below
the
antagonist.
level
necessitated
between
by
the military
efforts of the major
states
the wars
affected
different
Changes
to the varying
with adjustment
and abilities
ambitions
on cumbrous mechanisms
of
and
compensation
dependent
a
a
to
In
who
is
whom
balance,
realignment.
multipower
danger
is often a most obscure matter:
the incentive to regard all disequi
concern
to them with what
and respond
librating changes with
ever effort may
is consequently
In our
be required
weakened.
two
powers differently,
present world changes may affect each of the
in the national realm
and this means
all the more that few changes
or in the world
are
to be
at
likely
large
thought irrelevant. Policy
attempts to outflank.
proceeds by imitation, with occasional
as we
The third distinguishing
factor in the bipolar balance,
have thus far known it, is the nearly constant presence
of pressure
of crises. It would
and the recurrence
be folly to assert that re
differently,
of states
decrease danger and
threats and recurring crises necessarily
peated
to
assert the
It
be
may
promote
stability.
equally wrong
opposite,
as Khrushchev
seems to
us with war,"
"They frighten
appreciate.
in May of 1962, "and we
he told the Bulgarians
frighten them back
bit by bit. They
threaten us with nuclear arms and we tell them:
'Listen, now only fools can do this, because we have them too, and
883
KENNETH N. WALTZ
are not smaller than yours but, we
than
think, even better
they
is
So
do
us?'
This
do
and
foolish
yours.
you
why
things
frighten
we consider the situation to be
the situation, and this is
why
good."2
con
in which
interests and ambitions
Crises, born of a condition
are
a
one
to
state
effect
of
flict,
by the determination
produced
to resist. With
that another state chooses
the Berlin block
change
in Cuba,
of missiles
ade, for example, as with Russia's emplacement
the United
the Soviet
States decided
that to resist the change
Union
sought to bring about was worth the cost of turning its action
into a crisis. If the condition
the absence
of
of conflict
remains,
a
more
recurrence.
crises becomes
Rather
than
their
disturbing
now than a small war later is an axiom that should pre
crisis
large
cede the statement,
often made,
in the
that to fight small wars
means
wars
the
be
of
later.
present may
avoiding
large
crises also occur in a multipower
but the
world,
Admittedly,
are diffused,
definition
of vital
and
unclear,
dangers
responsibilities
interests easily obscured.
The skillful foreign policy, where many
over one
to gain an advantage
states are in balance,
is designed
into
state without
united
them
others and frightening
antagonizing
in modern Europe,
have
action. Often
seemed
greater
possible gains
an
than likely losses. Statesmen
could thus hope in crises to
push
issue to the limit without
all
to
the
causing
opponents
potential
are
ac
enemies
unite. When
in
several
of
number,
possible
unity
tion among states is difficult
to secure. One could therefore
think
?or
as
did
Bethmann
and
hope desperately,
Hollweg
Adolph
no united
Hitler?that
form.
opposition would
on the other hand, attention
In a bipolar world,
is focused on
crises by both of the major
and
competitors,
especially
by the
state. To move
and
defensive
reap gains serially is dif
piecemeal
a world
in confusion
there is one great certainty,
ficult, for within
the knowledge
of who will oppose whom. One's motto may
namely,
as
still be, "push to the limit," but limit must be emphasized
heavily
as
come
and
the
crisis
of
push. Caution, moderation,
management
to be of great and obvious importance.
that caution
in crises, and
argue, nonetheless,
Many
resulting
is
accounted
for
existence
the
of nuclear
stability,
by
bipolar
with
the number of states involved comparatively
incon
weapons,
a
can
is
deduction
doubtful
be indicated by a
sequent. That this
of how nuclear weapons
to
consideration
affect
reactions
may
crises. In the postwar world, bipolarity preceded
the construction
of
two opposing
atomic weapons
States, with
systems. The United
884
The Stability of a Bipolar World
some
for expenditure
success, substituted
superiority
technological
to the Soviet
a conventional
as a deterrent
system
military
an
we
and
atomic monopoly
Union during the years when
had first
American
then a decisive
and quality of weapons.
edge in quantity
based
a matter of necessity but of preference
was
not
military policy
on a calculation
and a
Some increase in expenditure
of advantage.
different allocation of monies would have enabled the United States
on
to deter the Soviet Union
the threat that any
credibly
by posing
to
West
Soviet attempt,
overwhelm
say,
bring the
Germany would
United
war.* For the Soviet
States into a large-scale
conventional
states would have promised
Union, war against separate European
no
such war could be under
the
large gains; given
bipolar balance,
of American
taken without
the clear prospect
entry. The Russians'
illustrated
is
situation
best
of
the
by the
appreciation
perhaps
structure
of their military
forces. The Soviet Union has concentrated
on
and missiles
bombers
and, to our sur
heavily
medium-range
The country
weapons.
prise, has built relatively few intercontinental
a
of possibly
intent has assumed
posture of passive de
aggressive
terrence vis-?-vis her major adversary, whom
she quite sensibly does
not want
to
and
other
lesser states, the
European
fight. Against
Hence nuclear
Soviet Union has a considerable
offensive capability.**
a condition
exist in their
that
would
reinforce
capabilities
merely
absence: without
the Soviet Union
able destructive
*
The
not
had
States and
both the United
technology
of consider
the ability to develop weapons
Even had the atom never been split, each
nuclear
have
power.
if it
"Even
others.
Aron,
among
by Raymond
the expansion
the United
tolerated
States
have
has been made
point
had
the bomb,
would
as far as the Atlantic?
And would
Stalin have been
ready
empire
risk of general
war?"
The Century
Aron,
of Total War
Raymond
Beacon
Press,
(Boston:
1955),
p. 151.
**
Air Com
W.
from
Hanson
information
Baldwin,
supplied
by Strategic
are one
estimates
mand
intercontinental
that Russian
missiles
headquarters,
of
the
Soviet
to
face
the
to one-fifth
fourth
The
Russians
bombs,
have
ours
with
as numerous
one-sixth
having
In medium
1963).
range
the Institute
of Strategic
700 such missiles,
1962).
than
higher
Disarmament:
(March
November
2,
do
Studies
tend
American
The
are
Russian
warheads
though
larger.
the number
of our long-range
heavy
a greater
November
(New York Times,
21,
capability
Russia
A report of
ballistic
missiles
has been
superior.
the West
sources
British
as ours,
to one-twelfth
Military
1962),
pp.
1961.
estimated
that
a total of 250
to place
estimates.
Background
with
295-300,
as of October,
1962,
Russia
had
(New York Times, November
9,
in the medium
range
capabilities
to
P. M.
S. Blackett,
"The Real Road
to the Geneva
New
Statesman
Talks,"
Russian
Cf.
Hanson
W.
Baldwin,
New
York
Times,
26,
885
KENNETH N. WALTZ
would
lose heavily
if it were
to engage
in a major
war
against
the
other.
If number
of states is less important than the existence of nuclear
con
then one must
ask whether
the world balance would
power,
tinue to be stable were three or more states able to raise themselves
to
reasons one
For many
levels of nuclear
comparable
potency.
doubts
that the equilibrium
about
be so secure. Worries
would
are
a still greater
accidents
and triggering
but
danger
widespread,
of a number of nuclear states would
might well arise. The existence
increase the temptation
for the more virile of them to maneuver,
with defensive
states
forces
of military
paralyzed
by the possession
the use of which would mean
One would
their own destruction.
in the 1930's, with
of
of a new dimension
the addition
status
which
would
increase
the pressures upon
quo pow
strength
ers to make
concessions.
piecemeal
a two-power
Because
nuclear
competition,
bipolarity
preceded
in
the absence of nuclear weapons
because
destructive
power would
still be great, because
states
of nuclear
the existence
of a number
be back
would
as will
increase the range of difficult political
and finally,
choices,
must first be
nuclear weapons
be discussed
below, because
seen as a
rather than as their
product of great national
capabilities
cannot by
that nuclear weapons
cause, one is led to the conclusion
be used to explain the stability?or
themselves
the instability?of
international
systems.
Taken together,
absence of peripheries,
these three factors?the
and the persistence
of pres
the range and intensity of competition,
sure and crisis?are
most
of
the
characteristics
among
important
to
since World War
the period
II. The first three points combine
a wide arena with a great variety
an intense
in
competition
produce
of effort of the two major con
of means
The constancy
employed.
a
their preponderant
with
fourth
combined
factor,
tenders,
power,
to
and absorb
have made
for a remarkable
ability
comprehend
and
the revolutionary
political, military,
The
Union
Soviet
moved
occurred.
changes
new
and numerous
forward and was checked. Empires
dissolved,
in the world.
nuclear
states appeared
weapons
systems
Strategic
came into the
of four separate countries. Tactical nuclear
possession
and to some extent dispersed. The manned
weapons were developed
to
the missile. Vulnerable
missiles were hardened,
bomber gave way
oc
in
and hidden. A revolution
made mobile,
military
technology
an
once
curred on an average of
every five years and at
accelerating
within
economic
886
the bipolar
balance
that have
The Stability of a Bipolar World
each a qualified
of China,
accommodated
without
disastrously
balance between America
affecting?the
pace.3 Two
matic, were
"losses"
loss but both
trau
even
distorting?or
Russia.
and
greatly
are complex.
Its
The effects of American-Soviet
preponderance
are
even
continuation
existence
its
and
subjects of
likely
present
a
in terms of
to
be
The
of
has
defined
controversy.
system
stability
as well as of the
it.
its durability,
of adjustment within
peacefulness
will
In the pages that follow, some of the effects of
preponderance
be indicated while
the durability
of the system is examined.
The End of the Bipolar Era?
In a bipolar world, by definition
each of two states or two blocs
in 1964 of bipo
all others. It may seem that to write
overshadows
era
an
to
is
for
express nostalgia
larity
merely
already ending. Rich
to
ard Rosecrance,
the
since
the war, describes
referring
period
a number of columns
the world as "tripolar."4 Walter
in
Lippmann,
written
in late 1963 and early 1964, assesses
the recent initiatives
China, their ability to move
contrary to
as
of
States
the desires
the United
and the Soviet Union,
marking
in which
two
the end of the postwar world
the
superpowers
closely
controlled
the actions of even their major associates.* Hedley
Bull,
on
in a paper prepared
in
for the Council
the
fall
Relations
Foreign
now and
of 1963, tentatively
reaches the conclusion
that between
1975 "the system of polarization
of power will cease to be recog
nizable:
that other states will count for so much
in world
politics
even when
that the two present great powers will find it difficult,
and Communist
of France
to dominate
them."0
cooperating,
If power is identical with the ability to control, then those
are free are also strong; and the freedom of the weak would
to be taken as an indication
of the weakness
of those who
are
But
material
the
weak
and
great
strength.
disorganized
to control than those who are wealthy
less amenable
and well
out of their strength, influence and
The powerful,
ciplined.**
*
Blame
See,
De
theme
of
for
"NATO
Crisis?and
example, Walter
Lippmann,
Boston
December
Gaulle,"
Globe,
5, 1963, p. 26:
as we know
are
it thus far, is that we
this decade,
Solution:
who
have
have
often
dis
limit
Don't
"The
paramount
from
emerging
a
one where
and entering
world
there are many
two-power
powers."
**
Cf. Georg
"The Sociology
of Conflict,
Simmel,
Journal
II," The American
a diffused
one opposes
IX (March,
"when
675:
crowd
of
1904),
of Sociology,
one may
it is very hard
oftener
isolated
but
to arrive
enemies,
victories,
gain
at decisive
?x the
of the contestants."
results which
definitely
relationships
?87
KENNETH N. WALTZ
each other; the wealthy
are hobbled
they have to lose.
by what
on the other hand, bedevil
The weak,
the strong; the poor can
more
endure and
easily ignore their own interests. Such patterns
men
the
relations
of
and
of
United
States
Steel
groups.
pervade
to
less
freedom
than
the
its
do
of
smaller
vary
enjoys
price
products
The United
States government
finds it easier to persuade
producers.
to cooperate
in an
the great labor unions
secure the
of
small
than
to
firms
anti-inflationary
policy
compliance
and independent
unions. The political
in
is
freer
party
opposition
to speak
Power
than
is
the
corrupts and
government.
irresponsibly
renders its possessors
wealth
of
the
liberates
responsible;
possession
are
in international
and enslaves. That similar patterns
displayed
to find that minor
is hardly surprising.
It is not unusual
relations
a
states have
considerable
nuisance value in relation to states greatly
a
or
in power. A Chiang Kai-shek,
their superiors
Syngman Rhee,
a
more
to deal with
than rulers of
is
difficult
often
Mossadegh
states more nearly one's equal in power.
The influence and control of the two great powers has
stopped
in most places
short of domination
the postwar period.
throughout
The power of the United
States and of the Soviet Union has been
as
not
but
To describe
absolute.
the world
predominant
bipolar
does not mean
that either power can exert a positive
control every
where
in the world, but that each has
it can
global interests which
care for unaided,
To
often
be
desirable.
say that
though help may
more
meant
to
is
until
than
this
has,
recently,
bipolarity
misinterpret
in the middle
the history of the postwar world.
Secretary Dulles,
it as immoral.
and described
1950's, inveighed
against neutralism
to a conviction
His
frequently
expressed
corresponded
judgment
in a 1948 issue of Prob
statements. P. E. Vyshinsky,
in Communist
criterion
that "the only determining
lems of Philosophy,
declared
are
is:
internationalism
of revolutionary
you for or
proletarian
. .
of
the
world
the
motherland
the
U.S.S.R.,
against
proletariat?.
as
the
socialist
motherland
of
the
of
the
of
The defense
U.S.S.R.,
is the holy duty of every honest man everywhere
world proletariat,
and not only of the citizens of the U.S.S.R."6 The rejection of neu
to take is
for other countries
tralism as an honorable
position
an
to
of
extension
another example of intensity
competition
leading
as both the United
of its range. By coming to terms with neutralism,
large
corporations
and
States and the Soviet Union have done, the superpowers
even their inability to extend their wills without
limit.
can we
in
above
the
mind
considerations,
Bearing
888
have
shown
say whether
The Stability of a Bipolar World
China
action of France
and Communist
the recent
independent
mean
or
it
in fact indicate
does
does
of bipolarity,
the waning
a
be
the loosening
of bipolar blocs, with
merely
bipolar relation
to domi
tween the United
States and the Soviet Union continuing
value increased
themselves
of those who
seem to be the case. The Earl of
the
latter
would
independence,
Home, when he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, thought
he saw developing
from the increased power of the Soviet Union
for
and the United
stalemate
that would
States a nuclear
provide
to maneuver.7
De Gaulle,
the middle
states a greater opportunity
in a press conference
famous for other reasons, included the state
nate?
By
the assessment
ment
their use "does not in the least prevent
are the most
which
of all,
weapons,
powerful
the essential
world
of
guarantee
peace."8 Com
of international
and military
calculation
political
that uncertainty
the American
nuclear
from
munist
remaining
China's
about
forces may be highly
'Whatever
Chou En-lai
similar.
happens,"
has said recently,
"the fraternal Chinese
and Soviet peoples will
stand together
in any storm that breaks out in the world
arena."9
are bitter;
between
and Russia
China
their
disputes
Ideological
are more durable
But
interests
conflict.
the
than
alliances
policies
in which
find expression.
Even
they sometimes
though the bonds
of alliance are broken,
the interest of the Soviet Union
could not
were
accommodate
the
to mean
destruction
of
if
China
that
easily
that Western
That
power would
be poised
on the Siberian border.
or at least
tactical
permits
in
strategic
stability produces
now a clich? of
is
The
axiom, transferred
stability
military
analysis.
to the political
realm, remains true. Lesser states have often found
their opportunity
to exist in the interstices of the balance of
power.
The French
and Chinese,
in acting contrary to the wishes
of their
have certainly
caused them some pain.
partners,
principal
Diplo
matic flurries have resulted and some
changes have been produced,
and China have demon
yet in a more
respect, France
important
strated not their power but their impotence:
their inability to affect
the dominant
relation
in the world.
The
solidity of the bipolar
balance
states to act with
be
permits middle
impunity precisely
cause
actions will not
they know that their divergent
measurably
affect the
or the United
States, upon
strength of the Soviet Union
which
their own security continues
to rest. The decisions
of Britain,
and China to build nuclear establishments
are further ad
France,
vertisements
of weakness.
or Soviet
Because
American
military
the
middle
might
provides
protection,
powers need not
adequate
889
KENNETH N. WALTZ
in a military
con
division of labor in a way that would
participate
tribute maximally
to the
military
strength of their major associates.
The United
to exaggerate
States
is inclined
of
the amount
can
it
a system of united alliances
strength
gain from maintaining
as
to bilateral
arises ap
The exaggeration
opposed
arrangements.
from vague notions
about the transferability
of strength.
parently
as one should
of each ally is
the contribution
Actually,
expect,
it
notable
where
that
its
interests
believes
only
require it to make
an effort. In
invasion
the
of
Korean
North
and, later,
resisting
Chinese
forces were
troops, roughly 90 per cent of the non-Korean
at the present
States.10 In South Vietnam
by the United
provided
time the United
States is the only foreign country engaged. British
units inWest Germany,
and French military
under strength and ill
are of little use. Western
to use the
remains,
equipped,
Europe
a
consumer
of
the
of
direct
1930's,
security. The only
terminology
as
interest
of
United
is nicely conveyed
the
States,
really significant
us
is that each
"the
Arnold
Wolfers'
hub power,"11
by
dubbing
be po
that may be threatened
by Soviet encroachment
resist
be
to
and
able
thus
subversion,
self-dependent
litically
to us, and be able at the outset of a
and thus less of an expense
a defense.
to
action
put up some kind of
possible military
interest in Western
On these points,
is
the American
Europe
same as its interest
in
the
underde
the
economically
precisely
countries.
In the case of the European
countries, however,
veloped
losses are harder to sustain and there are advantages
clearly to be
our interests and theirs
States
the
United
where
gained by
overlap.
It would
be difficult to argue that the foreign-aid
programs under
a national
and West
taken by Britain, France,
transcend
Germany
our
or
to
in
have
been
response
purpose
insisting upon
enlarged
that
their duty to share the military
and economic
responsibilities
the United
of persons, property,
States has assumed. The protection
and the pound sterling required Britain to resist Communist
guer
In such
rillas in Malaya, which was after all still her dependency.
serves its
a
a case, the
heavy burden by another country
bearing of
If anything,
the possibility
of a
interests and ours simultaneously.
in
the past fifteen years, along
transfer of strength has decreased
a decline
in usable military
in Britain. Britain had in
with
power
country
stable
her army 633,242 men
in 1948; by 1962 she had 209,500, with
The comparable
further reductions
figures for France
anticipated.
are 465,000 and 706,000.12 France, with a system of conscription
for
term and at relatively
a
low
main
has
pay,
long
comparatively
890
The Stability of a Bipolar World
as a per
tained military
forces impressively
large when measured
the
first
France
As
takes
of
her
steps along
centage
population.*
runs
her military
the route followed by England,
parallel
planning
the
to the earlier
she will seek to cope with
calculations;
English
similar
of
pressures
adjust
requirements
by making
large money
to present French plans, the total of men under
ments.
According
arms is to be reduced
by 40 per cent.**
To compensate
that once came from
for the loss of influence
a
own
the one
their
contribution
outside
borders,
military
making
now
to
build nuclear
country has tried and the other is
attempting
some measure
of
them
that supposedly
establishments
promise
on American
remains
The
effort
British
independence.
dependent
an effective
nuclear
and the French
effort to build
assistance,
recent
is
in
of
its
The
weapons
system
independence
infancy.
on a nuclear
force that
French policy cannot have been grounded
a
and political
of intelligence
barely exists. It is, rather,
product
in a world
in which
will exercised by President
de Gaulle
bipolar
to act. Independence
stalemate provides
the weak some opportunity
of action by France
is at
of China
and by the People's Republic
once a
of
lesser
alliances?the
of
dependence
product
loosening
a
it.
their
associates?and
upon
protest against
principals
de
of Western
In the wake
of the war, the countries
Europe
our
a
in
and
from their weakness
influence
rived
considerable
or
to internal difficulties
external pres
ability to let them succumb
sures without
in relation to Russia.
ourselves
thereby disadvantaging
were
so
We were
less free then because
upon our
they
dependent
it important to recreate strength
support. The Soviet challenge made
a purpose
that could best be achieved
inWestern
coopera
Europe,
From
1960
the
each
the nu
about
of
of
onward,
tively.
dependence
lessened. The earlier postwar pattern
clear giants upon its associates
was one of
with
influence
for junior
consequent
interdependence
has permitted
and
partners. More recently a lesser interdependence
must
assertions
of
which
be
understood
produced
independence,
in part as efforts to recapture
influence once enjoyed.
* In
1960, 1.5% of total population for France; 1.01% for the United King
1.39%
dom;
for
Weidenfeld
the United
and Nicolson,
States.
M.
R. D.
Foot,
Men
in Uniform
(London:
for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1961), pp. 162,
163.
**The
Ministre
reduction
des
Arm?es,
D?fense Nationale
is figured
from
Pierre
Messmer,
the
level
"Notre
of
military
Politique
manpower
Militaire,"
in
Revue
1960.
de
(May, 1963), p. 754.
891
KENNETH N. WALTZ
The Durability
of the Bipolar World
as
as
as a
term remains appropriate
long
Bipolarity
descriptive
there is a great gap between
the power of the two leading countries
one looks
states. When
and the power of the next most considerable
to
mesmerized
in this light at Communist
be
is
he
China,
by
likely
must enable their
the magic of numbers.
Surely 750 million Chinese
to the
to do some
Communist
government
things very damaging
one
or to both of them. When
United
States or the Soviet Union,
their
considers
the West European
he
be
struck
states,
may
by
rapid
movement
from economic and military dependence
upon the United
It is natural to ask whether
States to positions of some independence.
from
this is part of a trend that will continue, or simply a movement
can
zero on the scale of
to a threshold
that
nearly
independence
to
It
is
be
think
the
that
trend
will
continue
easy
hardly
passed.
the
until, again in the words of Hedley
Bull, "over the next decade
Soviet Union
and the United
States will find themselves
still the
in opposed
powers
systems of alliances, but, like Britain
principal
aware
and Germany
that their allies are not irrevocably
1907-1914,
to their cause and able to cooperate
committed
themselves
against
their lesser allies on particular
issues."13 But this is an analogy
The allies of Britain and of Germany were of an
that can mislead.
of territory, popula
order of power, as measured
by a combination
to
that
economic
similar
of their principals.
and
tion,
capability,
in the past fifteen years
That many important changes have occurred
that have occurred
and others that
is obvious. That
the changes
or Ameri
are
to
state
the
of
will
level
Soviet
lift
any present
likely
can
all
is
but
impossible.
capabilities
of the Soviet Union was
In 1962, the gross national
product
States
United
of West
of
the
$555 billion,
$260 billion,
Germany
China
If one
and
of
Communist
$50 billion.
$84 billion,
roughly
the
the
from these figures,
emerges:
picture
following
projects
rate of 5 per cent, will have
at an assumed
Soviet Union,
growth
of $2,080 billion;
the
in the year 2004 a gross national
product
States, at a growth rate of 3 per cent, will have by 2000 a
West Germany,
if it grows
national
gross
product of $2,220 billion;
rate of 6 per cent yearly, will have by 1998 a gross
at a sustained
of $672 billion, and Communist
national product
China, projected
in 2002 of $800
at 7 per cent, will have a gross national product
are unlikely
to be those that
The growth rates assumed
billion.*
United
*
892
To
complete
the picture,
Britain
in 1962
had
a gross
national
product
of
The Stability of a Bipolar World
are those that will narrow
the
actually prevail. The rates chosen
ex
to
the
between
the
middle
the
and
gap
powers
greatest
largest
on these bases,
tent presently
clear
it
becomes
Even
imaginable.
that the Soviet Union
States to the end of the
and the United
millenium
will remain the preponderant
powers in the world unless
two or more of the middle
in a way
that gives
combine
powers
on a
actions
them the ability to concert their
and military
political
sustained and reliable basis.
are
in other ways which
The gap that exists can be described
more
a still
but perhaps
give
sharper picture. The
fragmentary
United
States has been spending on its military
establishment
yearly
an amount that is two-thirds or more of the entire West German or
of
In 1962, the Europe
British or French
gross national
product.
less than a quarter of
the Six plus Great Britain spent on defense
States
the military
States.14 The United
of the United
expenditure
more
on
than
research
and
any of
development
spends
military
on its
countries
the three largest of the West
European
spends
entire military
establishment.
The country that would
its own resources, military
and
develop
an
in
to
a
order
in
role
the
faces
other,
world,
play
independent
It is understandably
dreadful problem.
tempting for such countries
to believe
can
that by developing
nuclear weapons
systems,
they
the
between
and
themselves
the
gap
superpowers.
noticeably
The assumption
will serve as the great equal
that nuclear weapons
izers appeared
"The
early and shows an impressive
persistence.
in 1946, "will again be more than
small country," Jacob Viner wrote
a
or a mere pawn in power-politics,
it is big enough
provided
cipher
to produce
atomic
in the
bombs."15
Stanley Hoffmann,
writing
a
in
the
reflects
similar
words:
"True,
present year,
thought
following
the French
is expensive;
nuclear program
but it is also true that
rearmament
is not
conventional
and that a division
of
cheaper,
in United
States hands
leave all nuclear weapons
labor that would
in conventional
and specialize Europe
forces would earmark Europe
for permanent
and political)
in the cold
(both military
dependence
war and
in
the
international
decline
permanent
competition."16
close
$79 billion and France of $72 billion. Gross national product figures for all of
the
countries
mentioned,
except
China,
are
from
the New
York
Times,
January
26, 1964, E8. The figure of $50 billion for China in 1962, though it is a figure
that
is widely
approximation,
years,
a crude
is necessarily
estimate.
As
given,
I have
taken 3, 5, 6, and 7% as doubling
a close
in 24,
and
14,
convenient
12,
and
10
respectively.
893
KENNETH N. WALTZ
It is difficult to know
ismeant
just what
by saying that "conven
rearmament
is not cheaper" than a nuclear program,
but it
are very
is clear that nuclear programs
indeed.* France
expensive
and Britain now spend about 7 per cent of their gross national
on defense.
to the American
If this were
level
increased
products
of approximately
10 per cent, or even if it were doubled,
the de
fense spending of each country would
remain comparatively
small.
The inability to spend large sums, taken together with the costs of
and maintenance,
leads one to
research, development,
production,
the conclusion
that the French
is
that Kahn's
government
betting
no
in military
revolution
will
five
every
years
longer
technology
take place. The French might
then hope that Polaris
submarines,
their missiles,
with
remain invulnerable.
It is doubtful
that
would
are
even
now.
invulnerable
they
truly
one.
is a complicated
The point
the tracking
By confusing
a
an
of
mechanism
hunter-killer
submarine,
easy accomplishment,
can escape from another. A Soviet submarine, how
one submarine
submarine
ever, may be able to meet and quietly destroy a French
as it comes out of port. It is
in
the
French
that
would
unlikely
not wish
at all; surely they would
to
such an event say anything
to the loss of what
of their
be one-third
draw attention
might
France
To
could
choose
nuclear
this,
prevent
strategic
system.**
a
to operate her submarine fleet entirely from the Mediterranean,
sea from which
the Soviet Union
is militarily
excluded. But limiting
it easier for
the direction
from which missiles may come will make
tional
to defend
claim that
against them. Khrushchev's
can hit a
in
which
strikes
the
sky,
fly
an
has
for
boast,
important
implication
force.17 Missile
de
that would
build a small nuclear
the country
fenses, almost useless against large numbers, may be highly success
a
of only a few missiles.
the approach
ful against
Furthermore,
can
be
obliterated.
control
and
command
system
easily
single
on a
or a very
Middle
powers will have to concentrate
single system
to
of
and
themselves
the
thus deny
invul
small number
systems,
Union
the Soviet
the Soviet
Americans
Union's
rockets
as an irrelevant
* Albert Wohlstetter
and
siles manufactured
as much
times
as
NATO and the N+l
**
first
mer,
894
France
to be
"Notre
plans
operating
Politique
the
has estimated that the first one hundred Polaris mis
for five peacetime
operated
cost of the first one hundred
cost three to five
years will
B-47s
("Nuclear
Sharing:
Country," Foreign Affairs, XXXIX
to have
three
in 1969,
Militaire,"
the
nuclear
others
p. 747).
following
[April, 1961], 364).
of sixteen
submarines
at
two-year
missiles
intervals
each,
the
(Mess
The Stability of a Bipolar World
of the
from dispersion
States
nerability
gained
by the United
one
existence
the
of
and
of
systems.
weapons
any
system
multiple
to cease, a force such as that projected by
Were military
innovation
France could gradually be built up to a level of military
significance.
to look
a future French
force should begin
Polaris
If, however,
French
to the Soviet Union,
the
increased
capability
dangerous
an incentive
to move
faster. And
for Russia
would
itself become
if Russia does, so must we too. Far short of America or Russia using
nuclear weapons
for the surgical excision of any country's embryonic
a nuclear force to a
to develop
nuclear capability,
the opportunity
at all, only on sufferance
level of usefulness
exists, if it is present
of the two nuclear giants.
To look upon nuclear weapons
systems as the great equalizers
is to see them as causes of the increased power of states. It is more
of
accurate
to look upon them as the products
and more useful
a
The
economic
scientific
and
great
railway age brought
capability.
von Moltke
elder
in
increase
which
the
great
military
mobility,
in the wars
So long,
for German
unification.
exploited
brilliantly
men
as
war
masses
and
of
of
form
the
took
however,
great
power
a
were
to
not
force
of
deliver
whole
able
the
material,
railways
in trans
it upon a point. Even
to a front or concentrate
nation
were not
a
a
power, railways
porting
portion of
country's military
cross
to
in
marched
armies
able
the front. Thus
1914, German
of high explosives
InWorld War II, the wedding
through Belgium.18
a na
to aggregate
it possible
and air transport still did not make
to
tion's whole
power and deliver it suddenly and decisively
desig
on
was won
and
War
II
World
nated military
slowly
targets.
largely
one
a
in
the ground. Nuclear
change decisive
technology
produced
can now be distilled. Like the French
a
nation
The
of
power
respect.
chef who boils down a pig for three days until he has a pint of
the very essence of pig, the country that pro
liquid that represents
and the requisite delivery
duces nuclear warheads
systems is dis
a
But
nation.
the
whole
has to be
the
of
power
power
tilling
there before it can be distilled. The stills of such countries as Britain,
China are simply not large enough.
France, and Communist
are not the
Nuclear
but
weapons
systems
great equalizers,
in
of
their
all
with
all
of
and
their
are,
rather,
they
complexity
tremendous
cost, outward
signs of the Soviet and American
ability
to outstrip all others. If other countries
should nevertheless
be able
to build nuclear
systems capable of doing great damage on second
strike to any attacker,
and
then, as the Soviet Union
they would
895
KENNETH N. WALTZ
United
in a nuclear
States now do, participate
stand-off. Compe
tition would
to some extent has already
shift to other means, which
economic
and traditional
criteria of power,
happened,
including
once
on their old
and
would
take
military
again
capability,
signifi
cance.
no difference.
is not to say that nuclear
This
diffusion makes
It is useful to consider briefly some of the
(1) A threat
possibilities.
use
or
to
force in
Communist
nuclear
China
by Britain, France,
order to deter a conventional
attack launched by a great nuclear
is a threat to do limited damage
to the invading state at the
power
of
risk of one's own annihilation.
It is a radically
different way
and
of
Switzerland
should
the
deterrent-defensive
assuming
posture
as a move
to bow out of the great-power
In
be interpreted
picture.
as
an
the
nuclear deterrent derives,
part the desire for
independent
of
the
late Hugh Gaitskell
readiness
the
"from
about
doubts
it,
put
to risk the
citizens
United
and the American
States Government
The nuclear
of Europe."19
destruction
of their cities on behalf
in the early 1950's created in Europe
America
superiority
enjoyed by
a fear that the United
too easily succumb to a tempta
States would
tion to retaliate massively.
The arrival of strategic
stability has
a
the
In
words
senior
the
of
British gen
opposite worry.
produced
is practically
"McNamara
that the worst
telling the Soviets
an attack on West
a conventional
is
need
from
expect
Germany
they
on
a
the difference
lies
counterattack."20
Behind
strategy
divergence
threat makes
the United
of interest. A policy of strategic nuclear
A
of
controlled
States the primary
response would
target.
policy
to Europe.
burdens
shift some of the danger as well as additional
or united, have an incentive
to
of Europe,
The countries
separate
Where
Britain
has
led,
programs.
military
destabilizing
adopt
that lesser powers
it is understandable
France now follows. While
or using nuclear weapons,
want
to be able
should, by threatening
to decide when
States or the Soviet Union
should risk
the United
it is also easy to see that both the United
their own destruction,
eral:
resist such an outcome.
The
the Soviet Union would
to be able to
someone
a country may want
trigger
badly
to do so, which
is another
else's force, the more difficult it becomes
Union
and
the
United
Soviet
States
the
that
have
of
way
saying
to invulnerable
second-strike
close
systems.
something
in a conventional
power were engaged
(2) If a middle
military
or lesser size, the Soviet Union
action against a state of comparable
a nuclear
threaten
States might
strike in order to
or the United
States
more
896
and
The Stability of a Bipolar World
a withdrawal.
It is sometimes thought that the possession
bring about
of a small nuclear force by the middle
such a
power would make
ac
threat ineffective.
In the Suez adventure,
for example, military
tion by Britain and France called forth Soviet rocket threats against
no
them. Against
states
strategic nuclear forces, such threats
having
to exert
would
be more
and thus more
credited,
likely
readily
A small
action
conventional
itself.
the
pressure
against
successfully
is not worth and does not require nuclear
action, however,
military
a
interference
great power, for it can be stopped in other ways.
by
to use nuclear weapons
The onus of
first, in order to
threatening
is
interdict conventional
then placed upon the smaller
interference,
a
not
threat would
be credible.
power. Such
of the
Both the first and second uses presuppose
the adequacy
small
the United
threat when
directed
country's nuclear
against
or the Soviet Union. A
to
is
that
small
capability
compared
or Russia's may be
a certain mini
to
America's
its
task;
adequate
in the foreseeable
achievable
mum, doubtfully
future, is neverthe
that
French
less required. When
Bull
the
ambition
says
Hedley
to
act
to
is "to become
choose
alone,"21
strong enough
deliberately
or
he may have in mind
the one
the second use mentioned
above,
is
which
seldom
discussed.
following,
States and the Soviet Union
have opened
(3) As the United
a
in
between
all others, so
and
themselves
up
gap
power
military
States
the People's Republic
of China, and states who may
Britain, France,
follow them can differentiate
from non-nuclear
nations.
themselves
Great Britain has placed nuclear weapons
in the Middle
and Far
to move militarily
East. Let us suppose
Indonesia were
against
A British threat to use nuclear weapons
could conceivably
Malaysia.
to stop short or
follow, which might cause Indonesia
might persuade
to
the United
offer
States
the support of the Seventh Fleet and
in order to avoid the use of nuclear weapons.
American Marines
are
The effects of nuclear diffusion
but
uncertain,
necessarily
one
can
a small nuclear force is
point
sensibly be made:
Building
an
the integrity of one's
way of seeking to maintain
unpromising
state, even though it may enable that state to act positively
against
or lesser powers.
equal
can be
There
states even where
approximate
among
equality
there is considerable
in
the
material
of their power.
bases
disparity
or not effective power is fashioned from the material
Whether
avail
able depends
of
national
wisdom
of
upon adequacy
organization,
policy,
and
intensity
of
effort.
In
the
1920's,
France
sought
to
897
KENNETH N. WALTZ
a
maintain
in order to com
greater military
strength than Germany
a
for
lesser French
and smaller population.
pensate
productivity
are
the material
coun
Where
differences
small or where
relatively
are
tries of immensely
it
be
may
larger capacity
quiescent,
possible
a nation
to "mobilize"
in peacetime
in order to build on a lesser
material
base a superior military
and Japan in
strength. Germany
the 1930's began
to play the game from which
France was with
since the war, has been able to chal
drawing. The Soviet Union,
a
the
in
United
States
many parts of the world by spending
lenge
on military
share
her
income
of
smaller
disproportionately
large
means.
a
There
is in the West
that the People's
quiet nightmare
a
of
it may mobilize
China
that
such
follow
may
Republic
path,
in order to increase
the nation
simul
production
rapidly while
a
It is
and
modern
taneously
acquiring
military
capability.
large
doubtful
that she can do either, and surely not both, and surely not
the second without
the first, as the data previously
given clearly
indicate. As for France and Great Britain, it strains the imagination
to the breaking point to believe
in which
scientific
that in a world
of
them
will be
either
and technological
has
been
progress
rapid,
near
to spend on anywhere
able to maintain
the pace.* Unable
or Russian
in research, development,
the American
level for work
once
an
and production,
middle
powers will,
they have gained
initial advantage,
find
themselves
behind.
France
constantly
falling
and Britain are in the second-ranking
powers' customary position of
more advanced weapons
a time
systems of
imitating, with
lag, the
their wealthier
competitors.**
it is clear that the time when
From
the above analysis,
other
at the highest
states can compete
levels of power by a superiority
lies far in the future. Unless
of effort in mobilizing
their resources
*
to proclaim,
and French
for British
absurd
governments
an immediate
increase
do, that an embryonic
brings
capability
are not
an addi
to
further
much
of
of
likely
expenditures
bring
to his minister-delegate
at
Cf.
de Gaulle's
President
tional
message
payoff.
"
atomic
France's
first
the
of
device:
'Hurrah
for
upon
explosion
Reggane
"
From
she is stronger
and prouder!'
Leonard
Beaton
this morning
and
Francel
as
It
is not wholly
they
frequently
for
strength;
John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons
1962), p. 91.
**
(London: Chatto &Windus,
Communists
of Chinese
prior to 1949 and of the People's
experiences
to outflank
since
that
China
that
date
of
attempts
may
suggest
Republic
bring
an economist's
success
a greater
to imitate!
term to
than efforts
Or, applying
to ask, where
would-be
Nth-countries
would
do well
do we
matters,
military
a
have
comparative
advantage?
898
The
The Stability of a Bipolar World
some
main
combine or others dissolve
bipolar until the end of the present
in chaos,
states
re
will
the world
century.
Some Dissenting Opinions
The
fact
remains
to
relations
of international
to the
as
unstable
judge bipolarity
compared
a
of
have
world.
probable
they been
stability
multipower
Why
so confident
that the existence
of a number
of powers, moving
in response
to constantly
variations
in national
power
recurring
and purpose,
would
desired
the
stability?
According
promote
to Professors
and Kaplan,
the uncertainty
that results
Morgenthau
from flexibility
a
caution
in the
of alignment
generates
healthy
of
Professor Morgen
every country.22 Concomitantly,
foreign policy
thau believes
of
that in the present bipolar world,
"the flexibility
the balance of power and, with
influence upon the
it, its restraining
on the international
of the main protagonists
power
aspirations
scene have
One may agree with his conclusion
and
disappeared."23
in
him:
The
yet draw from his analysis another one unstated
by
a
of
with
the
for
of
each
world,
flexibility
power
appetite
bipolar
at once whetted
and checked
major competitor
by the other, may
a greater
of power among
promote
stability than flexible balances
a
number
states.
of
larger
are the
What
to a
for coming
different
grounds
diametrically
conclusion? The presumed
double instability of a bipolar world, that
it easily erodes or
is to a great extent based upon its as
explodes,
sumed bloc character.
A bloc improperly
indeed
may
managed
have
that many
students
continued
fall apart. The leader of each bloc must be concerned
at once with
alliance management,
of an allied state might be
for the defection
fatal to its partners,
and with
the aims and capabilities
of the op
more
a
is
The
bloc.
is
than
system
posing
complex
multipower
in part accounts
for its fragility.*
The
situation
balance, which
*
Morton
A.
Kaplan,
System
and
Process
in
International
(New
Politics
York: Wiley, 1957), p. 37; and "Bipolarity in a
Revolutionary Age," in Kaplan,
ed., The Revolution inWorld Politics (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 254. The
difficulties and dangers found in a bipolar world by Kaplan are those detected
by Hans
portance
genthau
in a system
of opposing
alliances.
J. Morgenthau
in
the
of international
assessing
stability
systems
. . . the most
"the opposition
finds
of two alliances
tion within
ed.; New
It
is of
to note
frequent
that Mor
configura
the system of the balance of power" (Politics
Among Nations
York:
Knopf,
1961,
part
4],
p.
189).
Kaplan,
in turn, writes
im
direct
that
[3d
"the
899
KENNETH N. WALTZ
a
I provides
preceding World War
striking example. The dissolu
tion of the
alone
have left Germany
would
Austro-Hungarian
Empire
in the center of
of
alliance
The
part
Europe.
approximate
equality
of
ners, or their relation of true interdependence,
plus the closeness
two
meant
while
between
that
the
any country
camps,
competition
no one country on either side could
could commit
its associates,
exercise
control. By contrast,
in 1956 the United
States could dis
sociate
even
allies and
of its two principal
itself from the Suez adventure
to
in 1914,
them
Austria
Great
like
Britain,
pressure.
subject
tried to commit, or at least immobilize,
its alliance partner by pre
a
a fait
of predomi
senting him with
accompli.
position
Enjoying
as
could
the
United
States
nance,
not, focus its
could,
Germany
on the major
its ally. The
attention
while
adversary
disciplining
are in other
the
situations
but
different,
ability of the
respects
a
in
contrast
to
to
United
States, in
pay
price measured
Germany,
terms is striking.
intra-alliance
a
of blocs
It is important, then, to distinguish
bipolarity
sharply
of all condi
that
F?nelon
from a bipolarity
of countries.
thought
the happiest.
tions of balance
of two states was
the opposition
comment
with
this
the
dismisses
that the
judgment
Morgenthau
in our world
benefits
F?nelon
had hoped
for had not accrued
one
since the war, which depends,
think, on what benefits had
might
otherwise
been expected.*
is relatively
balance
stable
that a multipower
The conclusion
the system's flexibility,
and then dwell
is reached by overestimating
A constant
shuffling of alliances
ing too fondly upon its effects.**
as an
to make new combi
be as dangerous
would
unwillingness
too slow nor too fast: the point is a fine one, made
nations. Neither
finer still by observing
that the rules should be followed not merely
interest of the state but also for the sake of
out of an immediate
the international
preserving
tem here looks
suspiciously
of Nations
of the League
system. The old balance-of-power
like the new collective-security
Nations.
Either
and the United
sys
system
system
is to a
of the ^balance of power'
sys
system
bipolar
Process,
p. 36).
*
as
he treats the case almost
trivial, adds a statement
being
though
Kaplan,
is stable
when
both
"The
that is at least
system
suggestive:
only
tight bipolar
are
actors
and Process,
bloc
p. 43).
organized"
(System
hierarchically
**
and sixth of his rules of a balance-of-power
e.g., by the fourth
Kaplan,
to
a state
state and
to be willing
to oppose
any
threatening
system,
requires
most
tem"
likely
(System
ally with
900
any
transformation
and
other
(System
and
Process,
p. 23).
The Stability of a Bipolar World
depends
and functioning
upon a "neutrality of
the sys
of serious threat. To preserve
of previous
states must overcome
the constraints
for its maintenance
at the moment
alignment"
tem, the powerful
and conflicting
ties and the pressures of both ideological preferences
state
in
to
threatens
the
interests
the
that
confront
order
present
system.24
state system, flexibility
In the history of the modern
of align
in the interest of
has been conspicuously
absent just when,
of flexibility
it was most highly desirable.25 A comparison
stability,
a
the ability of the two present
within
with
world
multipower
to compensate
for changes
superpowers
by their internal efforts
is requisite,
and
the balance
of optimism
for comparison
changes
as
to
two
the
different
In
systems.
pessimism
customarily
applied
a
the world
of
the
of the 1930's, with
three,
grouping
European
ment
out of lassitude,
and
inhibition,
political
or from
with
refrained
from
distaste,
acting
ideological
combining
moment. War
others at the advantageous
the pressure
provided
that forced the world's
states into two opposing
coalitions.
In peace
a
time the bipolar world
that
is ordi
relations
of
displays
clarity
war.
out
Aron
in
found
the
has
that
narily
only
Raymond
pointed
ce que sont, concr?tement,
international
de
les
"syst?me depend
du fait qu'ils sont deux."26 Modi
deux p?les, non pas seulement
and reversing
that of many
others, we
fying Aron's
judgment
a
as
one
to
in
would
that
of many
say
compared
bipolar world,
is more
Ex
the international
powers,
system
likely to dominate.
Western
democracies,
ternal pressures,
if clear and great enough, force the external combi
or the internal effort that interest
nation
requires. The political
and
character of the alliance partner is then most easily overlooked
the extent to which
is
is
determined
de
by ideology
foreign policy
creased.
The number
so
of great states in the world has always been
limited that two acting in concert or, more common
one
historically,
state
for hegemony
could reasonably
conclude
that the
driving
balance would be altered by their actions. In the relations of states
since the Treaty
of Westphalia,
there have never been more
than
one
the
number
that
if
is
in
existed,
eight great powers,
generous
eve
to
on
members
the
doubtful
the
of
the
First
club,
admitting
World War. Given paucity
of members,
states cannot rely on an
of
the
state must
Each
instead look
system.
tendency
equilibrating
to its own means,
the
likelihood
of
gauge
encountering
opposition,
and estimate the chances of successful
The
cooperation.
advantages
901
KENNETH N. WALTZ
of an international
system with more than two members
be small. A careful evaluation
of the factors elaborated
cates that the
far
them.
disadvantages
outweigh
can at best
above indi
Conclusions That Bear upon Policy
are correct,
are also of
they
explanations
of
Fixation
the
upon
flexibility
practical
importance.
advantages
an in
in a multipower
balance has often gone hand in hand with
tense anxiety associated with bipolarity:
the fear that a downward
one
or
slide or a sudden technological
great state
by
breakthrough
them. Either
the
balance
between
the other would
alter
decisively
occurrence
for the disad
could bring
war, which
catastrophic
or
a
war
from
domination
world
of desperation,
vantaged would be
war.
or
one center with
The fear is pervasive,
without
preceding
on the
rests
and in American writings most
assumption
frequently
and tired of the struggle, we will award
that, internally dissolute
Sometimes
this anxiety finds a more
the palm to the Soviet Union.
turns less upon
internal derange
which
expression,
sophisticated
in
ments.
In this view,
the United
States, as the defensive
power
for
the
is inherently
the world,
power
aggressive
disadvantaged,
continues
will necessarily
long enough. But
gain if the competition
a conclusion
is misleading.
from an incomplete
derived
proposition
state may
lose even though the
One must add that the aggressive
state seeking to uphold the status quo never take the offensive. The
that
controls no nation now, except possibly
Soviet Union
Cuba,
was not part of its immediate
It
has
lost
in
control
postwar
gains.
it once seemed to have in China. The
the
and
control
Yugoslavia
as a defensive
to behave
United
States, since the time it began
seen some states
to neutralism,
commitment
from
has
slip
power,
and Cuba have come under Communist
but only North Vietnam
control. One would prefer no losses at all, but losses of this magni
one
tude can easily be absorbed. On balance,
argue that the
might
a
on the
States has gained, though such
United
judgment depends
as
as
is made
well
base line from which measurement
upon how
If
the
preceding
are defined.
gains and losses
States and the Soviet Union weigh
losses and
That the United
to their effect upon the bipolar balance
is crucial,
gains according
in Africa, or Asia, or Latin America
but there are many
changes
of either the Soviet Union
that are not likely to be to the advantage
or the United
States. This judgment can be spelled out in a number
902
The Stability of a Bipolar World
should be
for example,
of ways.
The doctrine
of containment,
to read: defend, or insulate so that one loss need not lead
amended
and the
to another. The habits of the cold war are so ingrained
a
so
defensive
the
that
of
world
country
dangers
invigorating
bipolar
is easily led to overreact.
In Southeast Asia, since no gain for Com
concern
munist China is likely to benefit the Soviet Union, American
to
and
its
should be confined
avoiding dis
maintaining
reputation
a
one
tant repercussions.
If
goes further and asks how great
gain
will accrue to the People's Republic
of China if it extends its terri
in any of the areas open to
torial control
the answer,
marginally,
moves
de
be "very little." Neutralization
it, must
by President
can
for
unwanted
if
the
obscure
events,
Gaulle,
they
responsibility
to realize that the bipolar
in fact be helpful.
It is important
may
the
and define
is continuing
world
lest we worry
unnecessarily
lesser
of
irrelevant gesture or even the helpful
powers
suggestion
as troublesome.
A 5 per cent
rate sustained
add
for three years would
growth
an amount
to the American
than
national
gross
greater
product
or France
or West
of Britain
the entire gross national
product
Even so, the accretion of power the Soviet Union would
Germany.
to her own
say, West
enjoy by adding,
Germany's
capabilities
one such
would be immensely
and
important;
gain might easily lead
can add
to others. Most
from
however,
outside,
relatively
gains
or the United
little to the strengths
of the Soviet Union
States.
is a
There are, then, few single losses that would
be crucial, which
our argument.
statement
that points to a tension within
Bipolarity
each giant to focus upon crises, while
encourages
rendering most
of them of relative
We might
instead put it this
inconsequence.
lead to an
way: Crisis is of concern only where
giving way would
accumulation
of losses for one and gains for the other. In an age
in many
of change,
time is
characterized
respects
by rapidity
is illustrated
the
of
slowed down?as
process
by
"losing" Indo
a conclusive
without
China
that has gone on for nineteen
years
result. Since only a succession
of gains could be decisive,
there is
to contrive a
time for the
state
it
action
should
countering
losing
to do so.
be necessary
and breadth
of competition
Intensity
limn a picture of constant conflict verging
of relations
time, the relative
simplicity
and recurrence
of crises
on violence. At the same
a
within
bipolar world,
903
KENNETH N. WALTZ
the great pressures
that are generated,
and the constant possibility
a conservatism
of catastrophe
on the part of the two great
produce
est powers.
States may
feel
The Soviet Union
and the United
more
a future
?
in
deux
comfortable
than
dealing
contemplating
in which
world
and possible
they vie for existence
advantage with
other superpowers. While
there is naturally worry about an increase
of tensions to intolerable
levels, there is also a fear that the tensions
to seek agreements
de
themselves will
lead America
and Russia
a relaxation
to
at
the
that
will
achieved
be
expense
signed
bring
of lesser powers. The French
commenting
general, Paul Stehlin,
on American
to Nth-country
nuclear
he
forces, which
opposition
a
as part of an American-Russian
to maintain
effort
interprets
bipolar
less political maturity
have
asks wistfully:
"Does Europe
world,
some bitterness
than the Big Two credit each other with?" With
he criticizes America
for placing
"more faith in the ability of the
to control their tremendous
Russians
stockpiles of offensive weapons
to use with wisdom
than they do in my country's capacity
and mod
so hard to
armaments
eration the modest
it is working
for
develop
deterrent
purposes."27
purely
are
and fears on any such grounds
Worries
The
exaggerated.
States influence each other more than
Soviet Union and the United
can
any of the states living in their penumbra
possibly hope to do.
as of the recent past, a condition
In the world
of
of the present,
rather
than
mutual
the
opposition may require
adjustment
preclude
have not led to
of differences.
Yet first steps toward agreement
second and third steps. Instead they have been mingled with other
acts and events that have kept the level of tension quite high. The
a first
States as possibly
in the United
test ban was described
increase
would
the
that
chances
toward
wider
agreement
great step
it was said that
In almost the same breath
of maintaining
peace.
we cannot
lower our guard, for Soviet aims have not changed.28
to halt testing under the sea and above
acts than agreement
Larger
are
to
alter a situation
that congealed
the ground
long
required
and the United
States remain for the fore
ago. The Soviet Union
that can irreparably damage
each
seeable future the two countries
each must worry that
So long as both possess the capability,
use it. The worry
the boundaries
that
describes
the other might
have so far limited both the building up of tensions and the abate
ment of competition.
other.
904
The Stability of a Bipolar World
Where
of horrible
destructive
exist, stability
power
as
an
be
It
end.
will
not,
however,
necessarily
important
One
value.
the
of
who
everyone's highest
accepts
bipolarity
analysis
a world
and the conclusions we have drawn may nevertheless
prefer
of many powers. The
and
of
unity
Europe may,
self-dependence
for
as
rank
example,
stability. Or,
higher
goals than international
one may think of
of melding
American
European
unity as a means
a
with
the
of
in
to
united
order
achieve
power
strength
Europe
Western
for
be
those
may
peo
hegemony.
Unipolarity
preferable,
to a competition
two
between
ples who then become dominant,
polar
a
states. It may even
is too
promise
greater stability. The question
to take up at the moment,
some
but
words of caution
complicated
are
weapons
appears
in order.
The
United
States has consistently
favored
of
the unification
for adding the strength of a united
to
the
Europe,
Europe
existing
power of America would be sufficient to establish a world hegemony.
But there is a confusion
in American
re
rhetoric that accurately
in
a
flects a confusion
We
have
wanted
united
and
thought.
Europe
strong and thus able to share our burdens with us, but a Europe
at the same time docile and
so that it would
pliant
agree on which
are to be assumed and how duties should be shared. The
burdens
dream of Western
has many
enchanting
hegemony
implications,
some of them
A
possibly unpleasant.
Europe of the Seven, or even
the Six, could, given time to put its combined
resources
to work,
a third power
become
in the world on the
largest scale. President
de Gaulle has entertained
the fear that such a
if it were
Europe,
to be born under
serve as an instru
Anglo-Saxon
auspices^ would
ment
of American
foreign policy. One may have doubts of what
would
De Gaulle
is a useful
follow.29
instructor. If we
necessarily
find
the weak
will
the strong be more
con
troublesome,
easily
A united Europe would
a
in the
represent
great change
the change would
be great, its effects are difficult
world; because
to foresee.
to be stable,
If Europe were
strong, and cooperative,
one
but surely it would be
to predict
might be delighted;
dangerous
that a new
Europe would
rapidly find internal stability and develop
It would be more
still to assume that
political maturity.
dangerous
the old American
and the new European
state would
find their
in
It
a
is
safe
that
always
policies
harmony.
seemingly
assumption
a clear and
a
new
interest
of
state
of
to
would
be
pressing
Europe
stand firm against any Soviet attempts
to move
forward. But in
terests must be taken in relation to situations.
In a world of three
trolled?
905
KENNETH N. WALTZ
in the past
of
history
dangerously
European
policies.
disparate
one
the twentieth
be
Nor
could
makes
difficult.
century
optimism
serene about America's
in
Americans
reaction.
have
Typically,
a
for
valued
the
of
The
power.
yearning
Europe
sufficiently
prize
united and thus strong
to oppose the Soviet Union unaided
enough
to
is but one example.
The pressures
of bipolarity
have helped
of action. A relaxation
of those pressures
produce
responsibility
to one in which
it will no longer be clear
will
situation
the
change
who will oppose whom.
then should give one
Two considerations
of
the third power and
the
pause:
necessarily
quality
unpredictable
a
the greater
of
world.
multipower
instability
great
have
powers,
led to
identical
interests may
logically
lead and
can
system of small numbers
always be disrupted
by the
of a Hitler
and the reactions
of a Chamberlain.
Since this
seem that we are in the uncomfortable
is true, it may
of
position
on the moderation,
men
of
courage, and rationality
relying
holding
the vagaries
of men
and the
crucial positions
of power. Given
to events,
one may
reaction
of the individual's
unpredictability
at this point feel that one's only recourse
is to lapse into prayer.
A
actions
take comfort from the thought that, like other
can, nonetheless,
are elevated
to power
and direct
those who
the activities
men,
the residuum of
free agents. Beyond
of great states are not wholly
men will
lies the possibility
necessary
respond
sensibly
hope that
of estimating
the pressures
that encourage
and constrain
them to
two states united in their mutual
in which
do so. In a world
antago
re
to a calculated
nism far overshadow
any other, the incentives
We
sponse stand out most clearly, and the sanctions against irresponsi
achieve their greatest
force. Not only how the leaders
ble behavior
will think but also who they may be will be affected by the presence
of pressures
and the clarity of challenges. One may lament Church
in the 1930's,
ill's failure to gain control of the British government
a balance-of
to
for he knew what actions were
maintain
required
to
did come to power,
it is interesting
power
system. Churchill
assume
as
to
the
in
the
form
familiar
world
note,
bipolar
began
one
now in
of
world
wartime.
the
If a people
representing
pole
runs
itself by selecting
inept rulers, it
clearly discernible
dulges
are pre
States
and
the
United
the Soviet Union
risks. Leaders
of
an
to
to
the
tasks they will have
eye
perform.
sumably chosen with
Other countries can enjoy, if they wish, the luxury of selecting
lead
906
The Stability of a Bipolar World
ers who will most
in which
internal
please their peoples by the way
States and the Soviet Union cannot.
affairs are managed.
The United
It is not that one entertains
the Utopian hope that all future
of the United
and Presidents
States
Premiers
of the Soviet Union
a
set
in
will combine
of nearly perfect
their persons
complicated
of a bipolar world
but rather that the pressures
will
virtues,
to
act
in
them
better
characters
than
their
ways
encourage
strongly
a
otherwise
lead one to expect. It is not that one possesses
might
serene confidence
or even the survival of the
in the
peacefulness,
but rather that cautious optimism may be justified as long
world,
as the pressures
to which
each must respond are so clearly present.
Either country may go beserk or succumb to inanation and debility.
are clear increases
That necessities
the chances
that they will be
can
no
there
from
but
be
abroad may
met,
guarantees.
Dangers
a state and spur its
to
action.
heroic
Or, as with
unify
people
France
Hitler's
external
pressures may divide the
Germany,
facing
to give
the public,
and increase their willingness
leaders, confuse
It may
also happen
that the difficulties
of adjustment
and the
too
for
action
become
The
calculated
necessity
great.
simply
clarity
the necessities
with which
of action can now be seen may be blotted
out by the
flash of nuclear
explosions. The fear that this
blinding
way.
the factors and processes
described
in
may happen has reinforced
the preceding
pages.
states still more
the two strongest
and the
By making
powerful
more
of
third
nuclear
have
difficult,
emergence
powers
weapons
a condition
a great ex
to
to
is
of
It
consolidate
helped
bipolarity.
tent due to its
structure that the world
since the war has
bipolar
a
or more
known
seldom
where
three
powers
stability
enjoyed
each other or have competed
have sought to cooperate with
for
existence.
References
1. Henry
1963),
on
"Strains
Kissinger,
284. Cf.
Max
the Alliance,"
Foreign
"The European
Kohnstamm,
XLI
Affairs,
Tide,"
Dsedalus,
(January,
XCIII
(Winter, 1964), 100-102; McGeorge Bundy's speech to the Economic Club
of Chicago,
New
York
December
Times,
7,
dress at Independence Hall," Philadelphia,
the Presidents
of
the United
States
(
Washington,
1961;
John
F.
Kennedy,
"Ad
July 4, 1962, Public Papers of
D.
C.
:Government
Print
ing Office, 1963), pp. 537-539.
2. Quoted
in V.
D.
Sokolovskii,
ed.,
Soviet
Military
Strategy,
Herbert
S.
907
KENNETH N. WALTZ
Leon
Dinerstein,
editors
(Englewood
3. Herman
4.
On
Kahn,
Press,
1960),
Richard
W.
Thomas
Thermonuclear
Princeton
(Princeton:
Action
Rosecrance,
Brown,
E.
University
1963),
in World
Reaction
and
Politics
pp.
"Communism
Vyshinsky,
(Boston:
210-211.
5. Hedley
A Preliminary
"Atlantic
Problems:
Bull,
Military
on
for the Council
Relations
of November
Foreign
meeting
with
of the author.
Quoted
permission
6. P.
English
p. 43.
1963),
War
and
translators
Wolfe,
Prentice-Hall,
315.
p.
N.
Little,
and
Gour?,
Cliffs:
Essay."
20,
as
the Motherland,"
and
Prepared
1963, p. 21.
in The
quoted
Kremlin Speaks (Department of State publication, 4264, October,
1951),
6, 7.
pp.
7. National
81st
Union
Annual
of Conservative
8. Ambassade
and Unionist
Llandudno
Conference,
de France,
Press
and
Speeches
Associations,
Official
10-13,
(October
1962),
No.
Conferences,
p.
Report,
93.
185
(January
14, 1963), p. 9.
9.
In
a statement
in
before
his African
of 1964,
trip in January
Peking
sent
the message
4, 1964,
p. 2. Cf.
February
by Com
munist
to Premier
China's
leaders
Khrushchev
the occasion
of his
upon
to differences
it is stated
seventieth
After
between
them,
birthday.
referring
our two
that: "In the event of a major world
the two parties,
crisis,
peoples
our common
will
stand
New
York
undoubtedly
against
together
enemy,"
New
York
Times,
M.
ternational
11.
17,
April
10. Leland
taped
Times,
1964,
p. 3.
"Korea:
Goodrich,
No.
Conciliation,
in
Strains
and
"Stresses
Collective
494
Measures
(October,
"
It With
'Going
Alliance Policy in the Cold War
Against
164.
1953),
Others,'
in
Aggression,"
in Arnold
Wolfers,
ed.,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959),
p. 7.
12.
Statesman's
The
S. H.
Year-Book,
ed.
Steinberg,
(London:
Macmillan,
1948), p. 50. Ibid. (1951), p. 991. Ibid. (1963), pp. 103, 104, 1003. The
figures
colonial
13.
for Great
"Atlantic
Bull,
Britain
Those
troops.
Military
exclude
the women's
for France
exclude
Problems,"
15.
16.
1963),
Praeger,
"The
Jacob Viner,
tions," Proceedings
Stanley
Hoffmann,
Army,
and
p. 24.
14. Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor,
York:
Territorial
services,
the gendarmes.
Arms and Stability in Europe
(New
p. 205.
of
Implications
of the American
"Cursing
the Atomic
de Gaulle
Bomb
Philosophical
Is Not
for
Society,
a
Policy,"
International
XC
The
(1946),
Reporter,
Rela
55.
XXX
(January 30, 1964), 40.
17.
908
Cf.
Malcolm
W.
Hoag,
"On
Stability
in Deterrent
Races,"
in Morton
A.
The Stability of a Bipolar World
inWorld Politics
Kaplan, ed., The Revolution
pp. 408, 409.
a
18. Cf.
book
forthcoming
Columbia
Studies,
19. House
Victor
by
(New York: Wiley,
Institute
Basiuk,
of War
and
Peace
1960),
cols.
1136
University.
of Commons,
Debates
Parliamentary
1,
(March
1138. Compare Hugh Gaitskell, The Challenge of Co-Existence
1957),
Methuen,
1962),
(London:
45-46.
pp.
20. Quoted by Eldon Griffiths, "The Revolt of Europe," The Saturday Evening
Post, CCLXIII (March 9, 1963), 19.
21.
Bull,
"Atlantic
22.
Hans
Politics
J. Morgenthau,
Among
4. Morton
A. Kaplan,
part
1961),
Politics
(New York: Wiley,
genthau
and
majority
25.
The
is
point
nicely
"Actor
Objectives
Princeton
Studies,
For
a
inWorld Politics
29.
and
the
represent
and
System
in
Age,"
(New York: Wiley,
Gen.
Paul
1962),
and
University,
of
1964),
February,
"the
and
myth
F. Hanrieder,
by Wolfram
of International
(Center
pp. 43-44.
of
in
Change
flexibility,"
International
see
George
Systems,"
Liska's
World
(October, 1963), 122-123.
et Guerre
Paix
Stehlin,
"The
entre
Evolution
les Nations
of Western
(Paris:
Defense,"
Calmann-L?vy,
Foreign
Affairs,
Senate
Foreign
(October, 1963), 81, 77.
for
See,
Relations
example,
Committee,
Ambassade
1962),
in an
paper
unpublished
International
Systems"
made
sharp questioning
article
"Continuity
Aron,
Raymond
1962),
p. 156.
XLII
28.
known
Cf.
Nations,
p. 350.
Among
Kaplan,
in a
and Kaplan,
"Bipolarity
Revolutionary
Politics
36-43;
Politics, XVI
27.
I shall refer only to Mor
251-266.
review
26.
York: Knopf,
(3d ed.; New
in International
and Process
1957), pp. 22-36.
Kaplan, ed., The Revolution
24.
Nations
System
are
for their writings
Kaplan,
widely
in
of
students
the
field.
opinion
23. Morgenthau,
Process,
pp.
pp.
p. 29.
Problems,"
Military
statement
Rusk's
Secretary
New
York Times,
August
de France,
Speeches
and
Press
before
13,
the
1963.
Conferences,
No.
175
(May
15,
p. 6.
909